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SPACE FORCE INSTRUCTION 13-604

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Nuclear, Space, Missile, Command and Control

SYSTEM ACCEPTANCE

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(Lt Gen DeAnna Burt)

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This publication implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 13-6, *Space Policy*, and Department of the Air Force Policy Directive (DAFPD) 63-1, *Integrated Life Cycle Management*. It provides guidance and procedures on system acceptance throughout the Space Force. This publication applies to uniformed members of the United States Space Force (USSF) and Department of the Air Force (DAF) civilian employees. This publication does not apply to the United States Air Force (USAF). USSF information systems processing both Special Access Program (SAP) and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) will adhere to the more restrictive policies of each of the respective SAP and SCI communities. This publication may be supplemented. This publication may be supplemented at any level, but all supplements must be routed to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) listed above for coordination prior to certification and approval. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the OPR listed above using the DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route DAF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate chain of command. The authorities to waive delta/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier ("T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3") number following the compliance statement. See DAF Manual (DAFMAN) 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures* for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the requestor's commander for non-tiered compliance items. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in this publication adhere to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, and are disposed in accordance with (IAW) the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document supersedes AFSPCI 10-605, Operational Acceptance Process, 20 June 2016. This instruction contains an increased scope to cover fielding and operational acceptance, authorities and processes within the current USSF organization structure, distinction between systems developed for force presentation and those not for presentation.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Overview. This instruction defines the USSF system acceptance process necessary to ensure new systems meet operational and institutional requirements, and have the necessary elements required to support mission execution. System acceptance is implemented through a thorough and scalable process to deliver essential space warfighting capabilities to the war fighter in accordance with (IAW) Chief of Space Operations (CSO) strategic objectives. System includes, but is not limited to, a weapon system intended for operational employment as part of the joint force, institutional capabilities, service-retained capabilities, software, permanent modifications to existing systems, training systems, and test and evaluation systems.

1.1.1. This instruction defines the six-step process of intentional activities and decision points for transferring systems to the operational unit and fielding the force. These steps, as shown in **Figure 1.1** are: (1) Entry, (2) Integrated Test, (3) Fielding Decision, (4) Deliberate Readiness Development, (5) Operational Acceptance, and (6) Force Presentation.

Figure 1.1. Systems Acceptance Process



1.1.2. The system acceptance process allows the USSF to receive multiple categories of systems from disparate sources. These categories of systems are further defined in **paragraph 3.3**.

1.1.3. The system acceptance process has two exit points. These are driven by the end goal of the system under development.

1.1.3.1. **USSF Institutional Systems.** Systems developed to meet USSF institutional requirements (e.g., test, training, and experimental systems) do not require the full scope of the system acceptance process and are not intended for operational employment. These systems will not be presented to a combatant command (CCMD). These systems exit the process of systems acceptance once the fielding decision is made and the system is fielded as part of an Institutional Force.

1.1.3.2. **Systems for Presentation to CCMDs.** Systems developed to be presented to a CCMD will exit this process when the system is declared operationally accepted and made available for force presentation to CCMDs. Although the system may not be immediately presented to a CCMD, all stakeholders have tested and evaluated the system against development and operational criteria and requirements, and the operational acceptance authority has declared the system suitable for operational use.

1.2. Cross-Command and Multi-Service Cooperation. Delivery of new systems may involve stakeholders from other commands, services, agencies, commercial, or allied partners. The processes outlined in this instruction rely on mutual support among stakeholders and a clear understanding of what each contributes to the system acceptance process. These stakeholders are responsible to participate in the system acceptance process and provide input to decisions. The system acceptance process generates products and outcomes providing leadership with the necessary information to make informed decisions. Decision points are inherent in the process to provide the operational acceptance approval authority and stakeholders the opportunity to review and evaluate system performance prior to an operational acceptance decision. These decision points should be completed for approval and advancement to the next step or return to a previous step for further development, test, or evaluation as determined by the approval authority (reference **chapter 2** for organizational roles and responsibilities).

Chapter 2

ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. The Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations, Cyber and Nuclear (Chief Operations Officer (COO) or SF/COO).

2.1.1. The operational acceptance approval authority for systems intended for the USSF as determined by the Chief Operations Officer.

2.1.2. The early use approval authority for all systems intended for the USSF.

2.1.3. The rapid deployment approval authority for all systems intended for the USSF.

2.1.4. Recommends the addition of operationally accepted systems to forces assigned or allocated to CCMDs in the Global Force Management processes IAW Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCSI) 3100.01E, *Joint Strategic Planning System*.

2.1.5. Recommends the removal of systems from assigned or allocated forces IAW CJCSI 3100.01E.

2.1.6. Recommends apportionment of SAP systems into IJSTO IAW DoDD 5205.07, Special Access Program (SAP) Policy and CJCSI 3120.08D, Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations.

2.2. Field Command (FLDCOM) Commander.

2.2.1. The operational acceptance approval authority for all USSF systems for which it has, or will, have overall operational responsibility. Exceptions are those cases when the Chief Operations Officer directs approval at the Service level.

2.2.2. The gaining FLDCOM Commander, along with the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), as applicable, is the fielding decision authority for all USSF systems coming to their FLDCOM.

2.2.3. Develops and executes an operational acceptance plan and acceptance criteria to include full Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) elements.

2.2.4. The gaining FLDCOM Commander is the approval authority for interorganizational transfer of a previously operationally accepted system with residual capability for Institutional Forces (e.g., a system transferred from Space Operations Command [SpOC] to Space Training and Readiness Command [STARCOM] for training and/or testing purposes).

2.2.5. Ensures cybersecurity monitoring and testing capability is available and implemented on systems throughout the life cycle of the fielded system.

2.2.6. Ensures cybersecurity testing and evaluation is conducted throughout the acquisition life cycle and integrated with interoperability and other functional testing; and that a cybersecurity representative participates in planning, execution, and reporting of integrated test and evaluation activities as documented in DoDI 5000.02, *Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework*.

2.3. Acquisition Organization Leadership.

2.3.1. The Program Executive Officer and Program Manager execute integrated life cycle management responsibilities for space systems, as documented in DoDI 5000.02 and AFI 63-101/20-101, *Integrated Life Cycle Management*, and related issuances. Ensures appropriate resources and funding to support activities required for operational acceptance and maintains the ability to address deficiencies found during deliberate readiness development.

2.3.2. The Program Manager, in conjunction with STARCOM, defines test and evaluation strategy for engineering and developmental testing. The MDA and Program Manager participate in the fielding criteria, test, and evaluation strategy discussions to ensure systems meet operational requirements.

2.3.3. The MDA (or Service Acquisition Executive [SAE] for Acquisition Categories [ACAT] ID, IB, IC, IAC, and special interest programs) issues a Materiel Fielding Decision Memorandum, following a Materiel Release Review, documenting the decision to authorize the materiel to be fielded. The Program Manager, consistent with DAFPAM 63-128, *Integrated Life Cycle Management*, certifies there are no unmitigated operational risks or deficiencies over the lifecycle affecting the performance or fielding of the system, or remaining unmitigated risks or deficiencies are accepted by the appropriate authority. The Program Manager also ensures a safety release has been completed IAW DAFI 91-202, *The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program*, or applicable safety guidance.

2.3.4. The Program Manager delivers the new or modified systems to the operational user(s).

2.4. Space Training and Readiness Command Commander.

2.4.1. Conducts independent integrated test and evaluation of appropriate USSF systems and delivery of timely, accurate, and expert information in support of system development, fielding, and operational acceptance IAW DoDI 5000.89, *Test and Evaluation*, and DoDI 5000.89_DAFI 99-103, *Capabilities-Based Test and Evaluation*. The independent testing and evaluations will include Blue Team vulnerability evaluations and intrusion assessments (e.g., cooperative vulnerability identification and cooperative vulnerability & penetration assessment, cybersecurity inspection/assessments, and red team operations [e.g., adversarial assessment]). **(T-1)**

2.4.2. Analyzes collected test data against an objective evaluation framework and delivers timely and accurate decision-quality results.

2.4.3. Provides recommendations via results briefings or written reports to inform the fielding and operational acceptance authority decision-makers.

2.4.4. Provides environment and infrastructure (e.g., range) to conduct tests and evaluations.

2.5. Space Delta Commander.

2.5.1. Reviews technical data in system acceptance documentation for accuracy and completeness and provides feedback.

2.5.2. Provides recommended changes to initial and critical sparing plans in system acceptance documentation for accuracy and completeness.

2.5.3. Utilizes Delta internal processes to address system acceptance support, including providing feedback to the program office during development, test support, scheduling and schedule deconfliction, deployment support, required training provided by other FLDCOMs, required manning, additional required resourcing, and other programmatic issues.

2.5.4. Supports the conduct of the appropriate deployment and employment reviews for operational systems in coordination with service component leads or institutional stakeholders as appropriate, ensuring deficiencies are identified to the appropriate acquisition program office for resolution.

2.5.5. Participates in system acceptance planning/strategy for space systems to clearly identify operational acceptance requirements, testing strategy, and system delivery expectations.

2.5.6. Supports definition and coordination of operational acceptance criteria.

2.5.7. Ensures units are ready to assume day-to-day responsibilities for the system upon fielding decision.

2.5.8. Provides operational acceptance approval recommendation for the operational acceptance decision authority's consideration.

2.5.9. Responsible for managing assigned weapon systems and cannot delegate the responsibility. Unit commanders must approve changes to system operations, within the approved configuration, to manage resources and assure the preservation of system baseline characteristics. **(T-2)** If change impacts currency of the operations technical order, the commander should work with the applicable program office to ensure the update is appropriately documented.

2.6. Space Force Test & Evaluation Director.

2.6.1. Provides oversight of the Space Force Test & Evaluation (T&E) enterprise, to include the Integrated Test Force (ITF), the Integrated Test process, and T&E resourcing.

2.6.2. Reviews Test & Evaluation plans for all USSF systems and provides recommendations for required T&E activities.

2.6.3. Provides recommendations, based on T&E activity results, for system acceptance and/or residual use capability, to the FLDCOM Commander.

Chapter 3

SYSTEM ACCEPTANCE PROCESS

3.1. System Acceptance Process Overview . The system acceptance process is the formal process by which USSF, through FLDCOMs, accepts delivery of a new system or permanent modifications to existing systems. The program office retains overall responsibility for the life cycle management of the system throughout the system life cycle, regardless of operational alignment, transfer, or transition, unless responsibility is agreed to in writing by Chief Operations Officer. The process is intended to be rigid in its structure, but offers flexibility within each step (e.g., tailored test) depending on the entry parameters.

3.1.1. This instruction does not provide guidance regarding Initial Operational Capability (IOC) or Full Operational Capability (FOC) criteria or milestone declarations.

3.1.2. The system acceptance process may be applied more than once during the lifecycle of an acquisition program. The process uses data gathered during acquisition, technical evaluations, and operational evaluations to support a final acceptance decision. The steps within the system acceptance process must be flexible and may be tailored based upon unique requirements of a program. At a minimum, the Program Management Office (PMO), test agencies, Deltas, operational units, and FLDCOM must be fully engaged during this process. **(T-1)**

3.2. System Development. The responsible PMO leads the development of the system and will weigh operational, sustainment, and cybersecurity factors as early and as often as possible throughout the development of a system to minimize risk, cost and performance issues to operators and sustaining organizations. **(T-1)** Systems that collect, process, produce, or consume intelligence data should have intelligence supportability plans, risks, and cost drivers (to include workforce development) identified as outlined in DoDI 5000.86, *Acquisition Intelligence*.

3.3. Entry. This process allows the USSF to receive multiple categories of systems from disparate sources.

3.3.1. The first category of systems to enter the system acceptance process are those that follow the pathways defined in DoDI 5000.02, *The Adaptive Acquisition Framework*. This includes systems acquired by Space Systems Command (SSC) and the Space Development Agency (SDA). Systems in this category are developed to fulfill an operational or institutional need."

3.3.2. The second category of systems to enter this process includes interdepartmental, interagency, commercial, or international transfers. It also includes systems developed and operated by DAF sources external to USSF FLDCOMs or PMOs (e.g., Air Force Research Laboratory, Space Rapid Capabilities Office [SpRCO], and the Missile Defense Agency). Once these systems have met the objectives of the prototype development, experimentation, pathfinder, or operations and they still have utility and usable lifespan, then they may be considered for operational use and system acceptance.

3.3.3. The third category of system to enter this process is the transfer of a previously operationally accepted system to the Institutional Force with the intent to utilize any residual system capabilities (e.g., the transfer of an operationally accepted system from SpOC to STARCOM that is no longer force presented and has residual capabilities for training).

3.3.4. Program managers for systems entering the acceptance process from the first or second category will notify the Future Operations Division (SF/COO/X) workflow at **SF.COOX.Workflow@spaceforce.mil** upon entry. **(T-1)**

3.4. Integrated Test. After entry into the systems acceptance process, each system will undergo test and evaluation IAW Department of Defense guidance for the appropriate acquisition model. **(T-1)** This is to ensure the system meets the design requirements and is effective, suitable, and survivable. Proper evaluation and system development adjudication is required for systems described in paragraphs **3.3.2 and 3.3.3** with residual use to be integrated to the USSF.

3.4.1. Integrated test is an essential step for all systems to include cases of interdepartmental, interagency, international, commercial, and residual use systems. This process may be expedited in the case of interagency systems and residual use cases because system development has already been accomplished and the system was operational for the current user.

3.4.2. If the gaining FLDCOM Commander deems that formal test and evaluation is not required, then a commander's estimate shall be required from the gaining unit. **(T-2)** This estimate is required to ensure the gaining unit meets readiness requirements to receive the system or upgrade.

3.5. System Fielding Decision. The fielding decision is the point at which the system and day-to-day responsibility is transitioned from the current owner (e.g., PMO, SpRCO, commercial, or FLDCOM) to the FLDCOM responsible for operating the system. The fielding decision should not be made until the FLDCOM responsible for operating the system has the necessary resources available to begin deliberate readiness development, if required.

3.5.1. System fielding alone does not constitute full operational capability and should not be used for CCMD-driven operations until formal operational acceptance. The current owner must plan appropriate resources and funding to support activities to address deficiencies found during deliberate readiness development in a timely manner. **(T-2)** Systems that have been fielded but do not constitute operational capability can be used for test, training, or other institutional activities. Further, for enterprise-wide capabilities/subsystems that support multiple operational programs/systems across an enterprise, operational acceptance criteria will be jointly determined by the user and development communities and documented in an approved operational acceptance plan. **(T-2)**

3.5.2. If the system entered the system acceptance process IAW **paragraph 3.3.1**, collaboration between the FLDCOM and the acquisition MDA is required for a successful fielding. The MDA or SAE authorizes the system for fielding and the FLDCOM Commander retains decision authority to accept the system.

3.5.3. Systems developed to be used for test, training, research and development, and experimental forces are considered fielded once it is determined that they meet development criteria.

3.6. Deliberate Readiness Development. Upon fielding, systems intended to conduct CCMD operations transition to a period of deliberate readiness development. The gaining FLDCOM is responsible for the specific readiness criteria and timelines. Distinguishing between a fielding and an acceptance decision allots a time period for an operational unit to attain proficiency and for the CCMD to increase their employment confidence. This ensures that all parties are ready and able to employ the system when the capability is presented to a CCMD. Deliberate readiness development does not apply to systems fielded with the purpose to fulfill USSF institutional requirements.

3.6.1. A component of deliberate readiness development is the trial period. The trial period provides the operating unit an opportunity to exercise the system using operational techniques and procedures. It ensures the unit is able to perform continued day-to-day operations and all associated support activities. The system will be employed in an operational configuration with sufficient operational safeguards in place to mitigate risk. **(T-2)** Trial period length is determined by the operational acceptance approval authority and is documented in the operational acceptance plan.

3.6.2. In addition to the trial period, the deliberate readiness development phase includes: live training, live fire exercises, mission rehearsals, and tactics development. Each of these activities are used to demonstrate the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), command and control, intelligence, force protection, logistical, and interoperability elements available to enable mission accomplishment, as well as the full DOTMLPF-P elements required to support sustained operational activities.

3.6.3. The unit gaining a system will require readiness training during deliberate readiness development. **(T-2)** Interdepartmental, interagency, or international transfer authorities have a significant role during this period and are required to provide all necessary documents and procedures to enable a seamless transfer (e.g., TTPs, safety information, technical and operations manuals).

3.6.4. While a system operates in its operational environment with the operations unit, no CCMD-directed operations are authorized at this point without coordination consistent with processes described in paragraphs **3.8.3.1 or 3.8.3.2**. For SpOC systems, exceptions may be granted by SpOC/S3 when fielding of a system requires that CCMD-directed operations must be executed during trial period to accomplish required fielding and operational testing activities (e.g., the use of a ground system in trial period to control operationally accepted satellites that are broadcasting operational signals supporting CCMD-directed operations).

3.7. Operational Acceptance Decision . The final significant decision point in the system acceptance process is the operational acceptance decision. When operational acceptance criteria are met, DOTMLPF-P elements required to support sustained operational activities are in place, risks are deemed acceptable for employment in an operational capacity through coordination with service component leads or institutional stakeholders, and the approval authority declares the new system or modification able to support its operational mission. The operational acceptance approval authority could: 1) accept, 2) accept with liens, or 3) reject a system for operational use.

A lien is placed on the operational acceptance decision when a criterion is not met. The lien will be documented in the operational acceptance memorandum along with a designated responsible party to resource and execute the remedy. **(T-1)** Operational acceptance decisions may be executed multiple times within a program's life cycle depending on the unique delivery schedule of capabilities or modifications to a fielded system. For example, the launch of an additional satellite into an existing constellation (e.g., Global Positioning System) may drive an operational acceptance decision for use of that particular asset.

3.7.1. The operational acceptance approval authority declares the new system able to perform its operational mission and is ready for presentation to the CCMD. The approval authority takes recommendations from stakeholders into consideration and is the final approval authority. If the approval authority makes the decision to reject the system for operational use and determines fix actions are necessary, the program office is responsible to lead the effort to rectify the identified issue and/or resource changes needed to meet operational acceptance criteria. By rare exception all Category 1 deficiencies discovered in testing will be addressed by the program office and cleared by the Integrated Test Team IAW T.O. 00-35D-54, *USAF Deficiency Reporting, Investigation, and Resolution*, prior to operational acceptance. **(T-1)** The operational acceptance decision is documented with an operational acceptance memorandum signed by the approval authority, or their delegated representative. The rationale supporting the operational acceptance decision will be documented in the memorandum (e.g., why it was accepted, accepted with lien(s), or rejected a system for operational use). **(T-2)**

3.7.2. The operational acceptance approval authority determines if new systems have: 1) achieved documented operational objectives, 2) demonstrated required levels of reliability and dependability, and 3) accounted for the resources necessary to support sustained operations as defined within the operational acceptance plan.

3.7.3. The operational acceptance plan is a tailored plan that documents the specific actions, timelines, criteria, and organizational responsibilities for operational acceptance of a new system. It is focused from operational testing through deliberate readiness development to operational acceptance and addresses key decision points with corresponding criteria for success.

3.7.4. Operational acceptance plans are developed for new systems and new capabilities to existing systems. Because operational acceptance criteria, decision parameters, risk tolerances and delivery timelines are unique for each program capability, the operational acceptance plan may be a tailorable document to address the unique parameters of each capability delivery. At a minimum, the operational acceptance plan must address the criteria required for an operational acceptance decision. **(T-1)** An initial operational acceptance plan must be approved before Milestone B for major capability acquisition or within two years of start for middle tier acquisition. **(T-1)**

3.7.4.1. Responsibility for developing the operational acceptance plan resides with the FLDCOM that has, or will have, overall operational responsibility for the system. The designated FLDCOM will update the operational acceptance plan when a significant change to the development, fielding, or sustainment of the program or system impacts the ability to execute the plan. The operational acceptance plan is coordinated with identified stakeholders at the level commensurate with the operational acceptance approval authority. Coordination will include the MDA, PM, appropriate FLDCOM directorates, the test unit, the gaining operational unit, and other organizations as required. **(T-2)** Stakeholder meetings may be used to address issues on operational acceptance criteria and other important aspects of the operational acceptance plan. The operational acceptance decision authority is the final approval authority for operational acceptance.

3.7.5. Modifications are changes to hardware or software to satisfy an operational mission requirement by removing or adding a capability or function, enhancing technical performance or suitability, or changing the form, fit, function, or interface of an in-service, configuration-managed DAF asset as documented in DAFPAM 63-128. Modifications require an operational acceptance decision, unless the modification includes only operation and maintenance funded actions which preserve a previously established performance through routine, recurring maintenance actions to address product quality or identified vulnerabilities (e.g., software version patching). The PM, FLDCOM directorate, and operational unit coordinate on the level of modification and required decision.

3.8. Force Presentation . Following operational acceptance, the system is ready to be presented to a CCMD. The operational acceptance authority will notify the Force Management Division (SF/COO/S7O) that a system may be included in the Global Force Management processes IAW CJCSI 3100.01E. **(T-0)**

3.8.1. The Chief Operations Officer recommends if a system to be presented to a CCMD for operations adequately supports warfighter requirements. If a system is incorporated into a USSF unit that is not currently assigned to a CCMD, per the Forces For table, then that system will be service retained IAW CJCSI 3100.01E. **(T-0)**

3.8.2. Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations (IJSTO) is the process used by CCMDs and components to plan, task, and employ SAP capabilities. The USSF will apportion SAP capabilities into IJSTO at the earliest opportunity IAW CJCSI 3120.08D, Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations. **(T-0)**

3.8.3. Systems that do not complete the full system acceptance process may still be requested for use by a CCMD. These could be systems that meet an urgent need, and the operational acceptance process cannot be completed in a timely manner. These systems will use the following deviations from the system acceptance process.

3.8.3.1. *Early Use.* Early use is the operational use of a system while it is still in development. Operational users may consider early use of an asset if there is a CCMD-driven operational need and it is deemed necessary and advantageous to deploy the asset to increase military utility with the understanding the asset is still in development. The requesting agency and gaining FLDCOM will coordinate the early use request with the acquiring organization to determine capabilities, limitations, risks, interim procedures, resource requirements and readiness levels. The responsible FLDCOM in conjunction with the gaining command and operations community assesses the feasibility of early use for a

system. Users may conduct early use operations in parallel with development and testing activities. The providing program office and gaining FLDCOM will resolve conflicts between operational and developmental priorities on a case-by-case basis. Systems that meet the criteria of early use require Chief Operations Officer approval informed by the FLDCOM responsible for operating the system and the acquisition organization. Early use does not negate the requirement to adhere to the system acceptance process, which still applies to gain an operational acceptance decision.

3.8.3.2. *Rapid Deployment.* Capabilities requiring rapid deployment (e.g., Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON), Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEON), Joint Capability Technological Demonstrations (JCTD), and Urgent Operational Needs (UON)) follow rapid acquisition development processes for fielding. These processes follow tailored acquisition and test activities requiring the execution of the system acceptance process in a compressed/modified timeline to ensure systems can be successfully fielded with required support and acceptable risk. Systems that meet the criteria of rapid deployment systems require Chief Operations Officer approval informed by the gaining FLDCOM responsible for operating the system and the acquisition organization.

DEANNA M. BURT
Lieutenant General, USSF
Chief Operations Officer

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

DoDI 5000.02, *Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition System*, 8 June 2022

DoDI 5000.86, *Acquisition Intelligence*, 11 September 2020

DoDI 5000.89, *Capabilities-Based Test and Evaluation*, 13 July 2022

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AFPD 13-6, *Space Policy*, 13 August 2013

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AFI 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, 23 March 2020

DAFPAM 63-128, *Integrated Life Cycle Management*, 3 February 2021

T.O. 00-35D-54, *USAF Deficiency Reporting, Investigation, and Resolution*, 1 September 2015

Prescribed Forms

None

Adopted Forms

DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CCMD—Combatant Command

CSO—Chief of Space Operations

DAF—Department of the Air Force

DOTMLPF-P—Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy

FLDCOM—Field Command

JCTD—Joint Capability Technical Demonstrations

JUON—Joint Urgent Operational Needs

PMO—Program Management Office

USSF—United States Space Force

UON—Urgent Operational Needs

JEON—Joint Emergency Operational Need

USAF—United States Air Force

IAW—In Accordance With

CJCSI—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

STARCOM—Space Training and Readiness Command

SpOC—Space Operations Command

SSC—Space Systems Command

MDA—Milestone Decision Authority

TTPs—Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

O&M—Operations and Maintenance

IJSTO—Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations

SAP—Special Access Program

Terms

System—a weapon system intended for operational employment as part of the joint force, institutional capabilities, service-retained capabilities, software, permanent modifications to existing systems, training, and test and evaluation systems.

Vulnerability Assessment—Systematic examination of an information system or product to determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security deficiencies, provide data from which to predict the effectiveness of proposed security measures, and confirm the adequacy of such measures after implementation.

Category 1 Deficiency—Those deficiencies which may cause death, severe injury, or severe occupational illness; may cause loss or major damage to a weapon system; critically restrict the combat readiness capabilities of the using organization; or which would result in a production line stoppage, and for which there is no viable workaround.

Attachment 2

SUMMARY OF SYSTEMS ACCEPTANCE CONDITIONS AND CRITERIA

A2.1. Entry of system from PMO to be force presented to support CCMD activities.

A2.1.1. IAW **paragraph 3.3.1**, the system will go through the entire six-step process of: (1) Entry, (2) Integrated Test, (3) Fielding Decision, (4) Deliberate Readiness Development, (5) Operational Acceptance, and (6) Force Presentation.

A2.1.2. The system is an operationally accepted system which is available for CCMD activities.

A2.2. Entry of system from PMO for use by an Institutional Force.

A2.2.1. IAW **paragraph 3.3.1**., The system will go through steps one and three of the six-step process: (1) Entry, (3) Fielding Decision.

A2.2.2. The system undergoes a fielding decision by an Institutional Force and will be used for USSF activities.

A2.3. Entry of system from an external agency to be force presented to support CCMD activities.

A2.3.1. IAW **paragraph 3.3.2**, the system will go through the entire six-step process of: (1) Entry, (2) Integrated Test, (3) Fielding Decision, (4) Deliberate Readiness Development, (5) Operational Acceptance, and (6) Force Presentation.

A2.3.2. A commander's estimate is required to ensure the gaining unit is properly postured to receive the system IAW **paragraph 3.4.1**.

A2.3.3. This system is an operationally accepted system which is available for CCMD activities.

A2.4. Entry of system from an external agency for use by an Institutional Force.

A2.4.1. IAW **paragraph 3.3.2**, the system will go through steps one through three of the six-step process of: (1) Entry, (2) Integrated Test, (3) Fielding Decision.

A2.4.2. A commander's estimate is required if integrated test is expedited or not required IAW **paragraph 3.4.1**.

A2.4.3. The system undergoes a fielding decision by an Institutional Force and will be used for USSF activities.

A2.5. Return of system from CCMD operations to an Institutional Force.

A2.5.1. IAW **paragraph 3.3.3**, the system will go through steps one through three of the six-step process of: (1) Entry, (2) Integrated Test (3) Fielding Decision.

A2.5.2. The system will be recommended to be no longer assigned or allocated to CCMDs IAW **paragraph 2.1.2**.

A2.5.3. A commander's estimate is required if integrated test is not required IAW **paragraph 3.4.1**.

A2.5.4. This system is available to be used for USSF activities.