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Security

ENHANCED LARGE VEHICLE INSPECTION OPERATIONS

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This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 31-1, *Integrated Defense.* It references policies and procedures prescribed in Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2000.12, *DoD Antiterrorism (AT)Program,* Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 2000.14, *DoD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures,* DoDI 2000.16, *DoD Antiterrorism Standards*, DoD O-2000.12-H, *DoD Antiterrorism Handbook*; Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-245, *Antiterrorism (AT),* DoD Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) Vehicle Inspection Checklist, Force Protection Battle Lab Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide. It establishes policy and guidance for the implementation and operation of the installation Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Sites (ELVIS). This instruction does not apply to Air National Guard (ANG) and U.S. Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) units. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using Air Force (AF) Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of* Publication; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional's chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at **https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm**. See Attachment 1 for a glossary of references and supporting information. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by the Air Force.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document has been substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. Major changes include guidance regarding United States and Host Nation Postal Drivers and Diplomatic Cargo Escorts, a revised Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Checklist, and the inclusion of a Vehicle Threat Analysis Matrix.

1. Introduction. The bombings of the U.S. Air Force housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and other similar incidents, demonstrated that terrorist use of large vehicle improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to inflict catastrophic damages and potential for mass casualties are, and will continue to be, a threat to national security. The combination of destructive capability, access to large vehicles, and ease of obtaining materials for making lethal vehicle bombs is an incentive for terrorists. Additionally, terrorism characteristics have dramatically changed over the past decade. The bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the suicide bombings of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 demonstrate a trend for sensational destructive impact and mass casualties. Terrorists are imaginative; use of large vehicles, to include emergency response vehicles, to deliver a vehicle bomb is a real threat. The atrocities of 11 September 2001 changed the security environment on an international scale forever. As such, strict, long-term solutions must be developed and implemented to mitigate the threat of large vehicle IEDs.

2. Implementation. Installations will develop and implement local procedures and requirements for enhanced large vehicle inspection sites (ELVIS) utilizing this instruction as the baseline.

3. Systems Approach. The systems approach, with respect to detecting the explosive threat, employs traditional vehicle search techniques and explosive detection technology into an overall strategy to detect vehicle explosives. System design relies upon successively layering these resources and tailoring these technologies to address site-specific threats, available resources, and the particular operating environment in order to progressively detect and isolate explosive threats for immediate cordon and evacuation, followed by appropriate response. The concept incorporates isolation of the ELVIS by exploiting distance and physical revetment methods in an effort to mitigate the effects of blast and fragmentation. The concept also uses available specialists to train inspection personnel. These specialists include but are not limited to the following:

3.1. **Vehicle Maintenance.** Vehicle maintenance personnel are invaluable in determining areas in the engine compartment, undercarriage, tires, and other areas that can conceal an explosive device.

3.2. **Explosive Ordnance Disposal.** Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel are experts in training personnel on explosive recognition and immediate action requirements should an explosive be detected.

3.3. **Hazardous Material (HAZMAT).** Hazardous material personnel are experts in training HAZMAT procedures and operations should this type of material be detected.

4. Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Sites. Each installation will establish an ELVIS for all commercial and contractor delivery vehicles entering the installation. Care should be taken when selecting site location and determining access to the ELVIS.

4.1. **ELVIS Location.** Location of the ELVIS is critical. Ideally, the ELVIS should be established in a remote location at least 2000 feet from any inhabited areas or areas containing Protection Level 1-3 resources. Separate deceleration/access lanes into the ELVIS with enough room for vehicles to safely wait for inspection should be provided.

4.1.1. Fragmentation and Blast Zone Hazards. Fragmentation and blast zones are key elements to consider when orientating the ELVIS, but may be mitigated through the establishment and utilization of an effective barrier plan. If required based on your site location, include the barrier plan in your installation's Integrated Defense Plan (IDP). Examples of fragmentation and blast zone hazard design features can be found in references such as the Force Protection Battlelab Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide.

4.1.1.1. Fragmentation zone hazards are in front of and behind the vehicle. Fragmentation zone hazards can generally be mitigated effectively with the placement of earth based barriers (berms, HESCO bastion barriers, sandbags) at the front of and rear of the vehicle.

4.1.1.2. Blast revetments should be placed to the left and right of the inspection area as well (see **Attachment 3** for diagram). Blast zone hazards extend up to several thousand feet from both sides of the vehicle depending on the size and make-up of the explosive device. Blast zone hazards can generally be mitigated through the use and combination of concrete and earth barriers. Dense vegetation can also help mitigate the primary blast hazard.

4.2. **ELVIS Inspection Areas.** Ideally, each ELVIS should include the three areas listed below (**Figure A3.1**); however, manpower, location, size, and other limiting factors unique to each installation must be considered. Although each ELVIS may incorporate additional areas to their existing arrangement, such as an entry control point, as a minimum, each ELVIS must include:

4.2.1. Pre-Inspection Area. A pre-inspection area is used to gather information about the driver and check documentation that may indicate suspicious activity or a threat situation. Required documentation may vary but normally consists of the vehicle registration, driver's license, logbook, manifest, and shipping papers or bill of lading. During the driver interview, the inspector must observe the individual's behavior while observing the vehicle for physical abnormalities. Typical questions include: What is your citizenship?; where do you live?; where are you going?; what is the name/position of the person you are to see?; what is your cargo?; where did you come from?; who is your employer?; do you own the vehicle? It should not be assumed that the average local national truck driver possesses the necessary English language skills to answer these questions without the aid of an interpreter. Therefore, an interpreter or language cards should be utilized, if necessary, during the driver interview. See **Sample USAFE Form 204, *Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Checklist***, for driver interview responses that may raise suspicion.

4.2.2. Inspection Area. The inspection area is the location where the vehicle inspection is accomplished. This area ideally is covered to offer protection from the elements for the inspectors and the system monitoring equipment. Each inspection area should have large-print signs posted in English and the host nation language that spell out the

procedures. Minimum manning for each inspection point within the inspection area is outlined below.

4.2.2.1. One armed Security Forces member providing "armed over-watch". The armed over-watch is responsible for providing a show of force and final denial to the installation entry control point. Standard Use of Force rules apply.

4.2.2.2. Two Security Forces members (or properly trained augmentation personnel) serving as vehicle inspectors.

4.2.2.3. One Security Forces member (or properly trained augmentation individual) per piece of equipment serving as the Explosive Detection Equipment (EDE) operator. The armed over-watch and two vehicle inspectors will not operate the EDE.

4.2.2.4. One Explosives Detector Dog (EDD) team (as required). If EDE is not available, an EDD team is required.

4.2.2.5. One interpreter (if available).

4.2.3. Post-Inspection Area. The post-inspection area is used for further verification of required documentation and to sign visitors onto the installation. Utilize AF Form 1109, *Visitor Register Log*, or other locally developed electronic database that includes, at a minimum, the same information contained in AF Form 1109.

5. ELVIS Requirements:

5.1. **Requirements.** IAW AFI 10-245, AF Baseline FPCON posture directs inspection of all large commercial vehicles in FPCON Normal. Commercial vehicles are defined as those that are larger than an extended cab pick-up truck (6-passenger) or passenger van, to include but not limited to tractor/trailer (box and flat-bed containing cargo), tanker trucks, box trucks, tour buses, garbage/recycled waste trucks, concrete trucks/mixers, dump trucks, cranes, recreational vehicles, petroleum tankers, postal/mail trucks and all soft-sided delivery vehicles. All aforementioned vehicles and Government Owned Vehicles (GOVs) that fit the "commercial vehicle" definition, except those listed in **paragraphs 5.1.1**, through **5.1.4**, will receive complete inspections prior to entry.

5.1.1. School Buses. School buses will not process through the ELVIS. Installations will establish local security and control procedures to safely and securely expedite school bus entry onto the installation. Coordinate school bus entry procedures through the installation force protection working group and the Department of Defense Dependents School (DoDDS) liaison and include these procedures in the DoDDS Force Protection Plan.

5.1.2. Privately Owned Vehicles (POV). Installations will inspect POVs in accordance with local directives and procedures established in force protection conditions and random antiterrorism measures. Ideally, POV inspections will be conducted in established areas at installation entry control points; however, POV inspections may be conducted at the ELVIS as dictated by mission requirements and threat.

5.1.3. Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) vehicles. Most AAFES and DeCA delivery vehicles undergo strict inventory and sealing procedures prior to departure from their central distribution points to protect merchandise from fraud and theft. Dependent upon current threat and

FPCONs, these vehicles may be candidates for an expedited search at the ELVIS by verifying seal numbers against cargo manifests or bills of lading. If expedited search procedures are established, installation commanders must designate such procedures in writing however, as a minimum, inspection must include areas of the driver/passenger compartment(s), engine compartment, undercarriage, and unsealed cargo carrying areas. The emphasis is to deny hiding areas and dead spaces capable of concealing explosives or individual(s) attempting unauthorized entry. Additionally, soft-sided delivery vehicles are not to be considered secure and must be searched prior to entry.

5.1.4. United States (US) and Host Nation Postal Drivers and Diplomatic Cargo Escorts. Delivery vehicles containing US mail undergo strict inventory and sealing/manifesting procedures prior to departing guarded/secured military installations and/or international commercial airports. Host Nation Postal Drivers and Diplomatic Cargo Escorts, due to the nature of their cargo, may be required to remain in sight of their delivery vehicles. Based on this requirement, the vehicle may be inspected in the presence of the driver/escort. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Article 27 and 36, 24 April 1964, exempts personal baggage of diplomatic agents and official diplomatic correspondence from inspection. Additionally, dependent upon current threat and FPCONs, these vehicles may be candidates for an expedited inspection at the ELVIS by verifying seal numbers against cargo manifests or bills of lading.

5.2. **Contractor and Commercial Vendor Entry Procedures:**

5.2.1. Cleared Contractors and Commercial Vendors. Cleared Contractors and Commercial Vendors with proper background checks and authorized passes should be permitted unescorted entry to the installation after successful completion of a vehicle inspection. Installation commanders and higher headquarters are authorized to impose stricter controls, i.e., requiring escorts from requesting agency, if the threat dictates.

5.2.2. Un-cleared Contractors and Commercial Vendors. Un-cleared Contractors and Commercial Vendors without proper background checks and authorized passes will be escorted onto the installation after successful completion of the vehicle inspection. Escorts will remain with the vehicle at all times while it is on the installation. Escorts will either possess or obtain their own communications, e.g., cell phone or land mobile radio (LMR), to ensure the capability to immediately contact the Base Defense Operations Center, or equivalent agency, in the event of an emergency is maintained. Unless otherwise required, escorts for Contractors and Commercial Vendors themselves are not necessary. These escorts are for the vehicles. Installations should consider maintaining a pool of personnel from appropriate requesting agencies, base details, or a combination of both to perform escort duty. Installation commanders are responsible for establishing procedures to ensure personnel are available to perform escort duty.

6. ELVIS Procedures. The ELVIS procedures consist of a combination of manual inspection techniques and explosive detection technology (if available) to optimize detection capability.

6.1. **Manual Inspection Techniques.** Manual Inspection Techniques are the “baseline” of any vehicle inspection, to include large vehicle inspections, and consist of a visual and physical inspection of a vehicle by an individual (security forces member or augmentee) and an EDD (as required). The inspection may also incorporate the use of an under vehicle mirror or under vehicle “creeper,” if available.

6.1.1. Vehicle drivers should precede the inspector and open all doors, compartments, the hood, and trunk (if applicable). Inspection team members, normally, will not perform these tasks.

6.1.2. All occupants, to include the driver, must exit the vehicle and move to a pre-designated location away from the inspection area and remain in this area until the vehicle inspection is completed. ***Note:*** United States and Host Nation Postal Drivers and Diplomatic Cargo Escorts may be required to remain in site of their delivery vehicles. See **paragraph 5.1.4**

6.1.3. All inspections should be conducted in a systematic and consistent manner, i.e., clockwise or counter-clockwise. Use USAFE Form 204, Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Checklist to standardize and record large vehicle searches. Note: This is not an all-inclusive checklist; installations are encouraged to adapt their local search procedures to delivery vehicles more commonly found in their operating location. For example, delivery vehicles in one country may not be the same make and/or model in another county. Coordination with host nation officials to develop thorough local procedures is encouraged.

6.1.3.1. USAFE Form 204, *Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Checklist*. The *Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Checklist* provides manual inspection guidance for the internal/external inspection of ALL vehicles and GOVs larger than an extended cab pick-up truck (6-passenger) or passenger van, to include but not limited to the examples provided within **paragraph 5.1** Additionally, the *Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Checklist* includes a list of physical and auditory responses that may be experienced by the inspector during the driver's interview. The list of responses should be used to assist the inspector in identifying behaviors that may raise suspicion.

6.1.3.2. Vehicle Threat Analysis Matrix. The Vehicle Threat Analysis Matrix divides vehicles into three separate search categories based on the potential threat risk assumed by the vehicle by meeting/not-meeting specific requirements. For example, if a vehicle is not listed on a base-pass or belongs to a moving company, then based on the Vehicle Threat Analysis Matrix, the vehicle would be considered a high threat risk, thus subject to all inspection items listed (marked with "X") under the "H" column of the Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Checklist. See **Sample USAFE Form 204*, Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Checklist***.

6.1.3.3. To further enhance the inspection of **Low**, **Medium**, or **High** threat risk vehicles, complement manual inspection techniques by incorporating the applicable equipment type listed in the Vehicle Threat Analysis Matrix. ***Note:*** This is not an all-inclusive matrix; installations are encouraged to incorporate available EDE and/or techniques for the purpose of enhancing their local search procedures. Coordination with host nation officials to develop thorough local procedures is encouraged.

Table 1. Vehicle Threat Analysis Matrix

High (50%)	Medium (30%)	Low (20%)
Personnel	**Personnel**	**Personnel**
No Base Pass (Non-vetted)	NATO Vehicles	Base Pass (Vetted)
Moving Company	TMO/DeCA/FMO (Soft Sided)	TMO/DeCA/FMO (Hard Sided)
DHL/FED Ex	Fuel Trucks	GOVs
Delivery Vehicles	Open Bed Construction Vehicles	Mail Truck
		Ammo
		Concrete
Equipment	**Equipment**	**Equipment**
MWD checks	MWD checks	Seal verification
Seal verification	Seal verification	External sweep
Weapons Detection		Expedited entry
Hands on compartment		
Tool box inspection		

6.1.4. Any operation or movement of the vehicle must be performed by the vehicle driver. Inspection team members, normally, will not perform these tasks. Additionally, all personnel must stand and remain clear of a vehicle in motion and remain alert to all other vehicle traffic within and around the area.

6.2. **Explosive Detection Technology.** Numerous commercial off-the shelf (COTS) devices are available to complement manual inspection techniques. These, as well as emerging technologies, help constitute a robust detection capability at the ELVIS. Refer to operator manuals for specific equipment operations and employment methods. Prior to purchasing a device that generates ionizing radiation, contact the base Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) regarding applicable licensing procedures. Units that currently have radiation producing devices must comply with requirements of their radioactive material license to maintain exposures as low as reasonably achievable. In addition, units must contact System Security Section (HQ USAFE/A7SXS), for guidance prior to selection and purchase of any COTS explosive detection technology for use in ELVISs.

7. Additional Considerations:

7.1. **ELVIS Hours of Operation and Designated Delivery Hours.** Consider establishing ELVIS hours of operation and designated delivery hours to complement mission readiness and minimize the threat.

7.2. **Off-Site Shipping and Receiving.** Where possible and when dictated by the threat, consider establishing off-site shipping and receiving procedures. For example, a critical facility can have off-site shipping and receiving where all deliveries are made and then transshipped to the main facility.

7.3. **Large Vehicle "Truck" Routes.** The establishment of large vehicle "truck" routes on the installation should be considered to help minimize the threat to inhabited areas or areas containing Protection Level 1-3 resources.

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Chief, Security Forces

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

DoDD 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism (AT)Program, 13 December 2007

DoDI 2000.14, DoD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures, 15 June 1994

DoDI 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism Standards, 2 October 2006

DoD O-2000.12-H, DoD Antiterrorism Handbook, February 2004

DoD Technical support Working Group (TSWG) Vehicle Inspection Checklist, 23 October 2000

AFPD 31-1, Integrated Defense, 28 October 2011

AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT), 30 March 2009

AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense (FOUO), 8 October 2009

AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records, 1 March 2008

Force Protection Battle Lab Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide, September 2002

Prescribed Forms

USAFE 204, *Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Site (Elvis) Checklist*

Adopted Forms

AF 847, *Recommendation for Change of* Publication

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAFES—-Army and Air Force Exchange Service

COTS—-Commercial Off-The-Shelf

DeCA—-Defense Commissary Agency

DoDDS—-Department of Defense Dependents School

EDD—-Explosives Detector Dog

ELVIS—-Enhanced Large Vehicle Inspection Site

HAZMAT—-Hazardous Material

IED—-Improvised Explosive Device

POV—-Privately Owned Vehicle

USAFE—-United States Air Forces in Europe

Attachment 2

SAMPLE ENHANCED LARGE VEHICLE INSPECTION SITE DIAGRAM

Figure A2.1. Site Diagram.



Attachment 3

ENHANCED LARGE VEHICLE INSPECTION CHECKLIST (SAMPLE)

ITEM #	DESCRIPTION	H	M	L
GENERAL				
1	Inspect all factory built compartments for hidden items.	X	X	X
2	Look for new or shiny bolts or screws. Indicates something may be altered, modified, or moved.	X	X	X
3	Look for unusual scratches or other signs of tampering.	X	X	X
4	Check for unusually clean or dirty components in all areas. Be especially aware of clean or new wiring.	X	X	X
5	Check for spools or remnants of electrical wire, tape, or similar items.	X	X	X
6	Look for new or broken welds. Common technique in hiding items is to cover them with metal welded to the vehicle.	X	X	X
7	Ensure all logos, company insignia and other painted or applied items appear genuine and professional. Sloppy appearance and misspelling may indicate a forgery.	X	X	X
EXTERIOR				
1	Check the headlight and taillight (operational, tampered, fake).	X	X	X
2	Inspect the fifth wheel area. Look under the plate where it is attached to the chassis for sign of modification.	X	X	
3	Check for any compartment in the frame rails. Frame rails are normally open. Compartments can be installed using welding techniques.	X	X	
4	Look for fresh bodyworks.	X	X	X
5	Look in the area between the front grill and the radiator (space should be empty).	X	X	
6	Feel or look at the back of the bumper for false compartments.	X	X	
7	Look in the storage compartments for anything unusual.	X	X	X
8	Look at the fenders for anything unusually thick or wide.	X	X	
EXTERNAL FUEL TANKS				
1	Conduct a visual inspection (fresh welds, wires, leaks)	X	X	
TIRES				
1	Visually inspect spare tire (wires, size).	X	X	

ITEM #	DESCRIPTION	H	M	L
2	Look for new tires on the vehicle. One or two new tires should not be considered suspicious on their own. A complete set of new tires is rare and should be considered suspicious.	X	X	
3	Look for unusually clean or dirty lug nuts.	X	X	
INSIDE ENGINE COMPARTMENT				
1	Look for out of place or unusually clean components, devices, and/or wiring and electrical tape.	X	X	X
2	Check the windshield washer container if visible, for modifications.	X	X	
3	Check under larger components for unusual containers.	X		
4	Inspect the firewall for signs of modification or tampering.	X	X	
INSIDE PASSENGER COMPARTMENT				
1	Look for plugged vents on the dash.	X		
2	Check under floor mats for modifications/stray wires.	X	X	
3	Look in the glove box for switches, receivers, and transmitters.	X	X	X
4	Check all seats for bulges or bumps (tampering/restuffed)	X	X	X
5	Check doors by opening/closing for stress on hinges/excess weight.	X	X	
6	Inspect packages, containers, travel bags, and devices.	X	X	X
UNDER THE VEHICLE				
1	Be sure all connections are properly made, e.g. gas tank filler tube, exhaust pipe to manifold, wires etc.	X		
2	Look for fresh undercoating or paint.	X		
3	Look for spare or extra tanks on the vehicle that have no obvious uses.	X		
INSPECTION OF FUEL DELIVERY VEHICLES				
1	Look at discharge hoses and supporting equipment. (Rust/Corrosion)	X	X	
2	Check the discharge valve for signs of rust, corrosion, or fresh paint.	X	X	
STRAIGHT BOX TRAILER/STEP VAN/REFRIGERATION VEHICLE				
1	Look at the interior walls for evidence of modification. The walls of the trailer are typically constructed using plywood panels held together by rivets and, or screws. Look for possible false walls.	X	X	
2	Look for hinges or signs of tampering at all roof, side wall, or floor junctions.	X		
3	Look for uniformity of cargo (unbalanced load).	X	X	X
4	Carefully inspect the top surface of cargo for any indentations or footprints, or any signs that someone walked on top of the cargo to	X	X	X

ITEM #	DESCRIPTION	H	M	L
	insert a device.			
5	Look at shipping labels on packages. Shipper's name should be clearly identified on cargo shipments.	X	X	X
6	If refrigeration trailer is loaded, check the temperature inside the trailer (visual indicator).	X	X	X
7	Look for the inspection ports in the floor of the trailer in the front and rear corners (total of four).	X	X	X
GARBAGE TRUCKS				
1	Have the driver operate the crusher.	X	X	X
CONCRETE MIXERS				
1	When the truck enters the installation, it should be loaded. Therefore, the drum should be turning in most, but not all, cases. If it is not loaded, or if drum is not turning, have the driver operate the drum.	X	X	X

DRIVER INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

PHYSICAL MANIFESTATIONS				
Turning red	Turning pale	Obvious shaking	Refuse eye contact	Darting of eyes
Excessive blinking	Evasive eyes, looking at floor	Frowning	Biting or chewing lips	Sweating profusely
Fidgeting/nervous hands	Scratching repeatedly	Hiding hands	Folding arms across chest	Exaggerated movements
Moving rapidly or tensely	Appearing restless	Restless shifting of weight	Placing hands inside groin area	Sitting on edge of seat - flight

AUDITORY MANIFESTATIONS				
Inability to answer	Reluctance to answer	Answer question with a question	Continually asks to clarify question	Shaky voice
Deep sighs	Repeatedly clears throat	Grinds teeth	Yawning	Dry mouth
Hesitancy of speech	Repeats your questions	Stuttering	Voice cracking	Responds with unrelated info
Influence questioner with words of qualification; "honestly" "truthfully" "believe me" "To tell the truth" "To be perfectly frank" "May God strike me dead" "I wouldn't lie to you"				

VEHICLE THREAT ANALYSIS MATRIX

High (50%)	Medium (30%)	Low (20%)
Personnel	**Personnel**	**Personnel**
No Base Pass (Non-vetted)	NATO Vehicles	Base Pass (Vetted)
Moving Company	TMO/DeCA/FMO (Soft Sided)	TMO/DeCA/FMO (Hard Sided)
DHL/FED Ex	Fuel Trucks	GOVs
Delivery Vehicles	Open Bed Construction Vehicles	Mail Truck
		Ammo
		Concrete
Equipment	**Equipment**	**Equipment**
MWD checks	MWD checks	Seal verification
Seal verification	Seal verification	External sweep
Weapons Detection		Expedited entry
Hands on compartment		
Tool box inspection		