


**BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY
OF THE AIR FORCE**

SPACE FORCE INSTRUCTION 16-1002

20 NOVEMBER 2025



Operations Support

**THREAT MODELING, SIMULATION,
AND ANALYSIS GUIDANCE**

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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This publication implements Department of Air Force Policy Directive (DAFPD) 16-10, *Modeling and Simulation*, Air Force Instruction (AFI 16-1001, *Verification, Validation, and Accreditation*, AFI 16-1005, *Modeling and Simulation Management*, and SAF/SA, *One Red, Bring Your Own Blue Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis Guidance*, **See Attachment 1 for additional authoritative sources**. This publication applies to all civilian employees and uniformed members of the United States Space Force (USSF) and those with a contractual obligation to abide by the terms of Department of the Air Force (DAF) issuances, except where otherwise noted. This publication does not apply to the United States Air Force except for Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units performing space operations and select career fields which directly support USSF exercises. Refer recommended changes and questions about this instruction to the office of primary responsibility (OPR) using Department of the Air Force (DAF) Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Product*; route DAF Forms 847 from the field through appropriate functional chain of command and Space Force Director of Staff. This instruction may be supplemented at any level, but all supplements must be routed to the OPR of this instruction for coordination prior to certification and approval. The authorities to waive delta/unit level requirements in this instruction are identified with a tier (T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3) number following the compliance statement. See DAF Manual (DAFMAN) 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures*, for a description of the authorities associated with the tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate tier waiver approval authority. The OPR of this instruction retains final approval authority for waivers to all non-tiered requirements. Compliance with the attachments in this instruction is mandatory. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in this publication adhere to AFI 33-322, *Records Management and Information*

Governance Program, and are disposed in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System.

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1. Overview. A lack of unifying USSF guidance regarding space threat models and threat scenario representation leaves USSF analytic organizations creating ad hoc space and counterspace threat representations to meet local Modeling and Simulation (M&S) requirements. These M&S solutions may not use Defense Intelligence All-Source Analysis Enterprise (DIAAE) validated threat intelligence and therefore risk inconsistent, inaccurate, and/or incomplete threat representation. Leveraging threat data that is not authoritative for the setting of initial conditions and model instantiation introduces ambiguity and produces unreliable results when assessing USSF force design, supporting Developmental Test (DT) and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), and Integrated Test (IT) activities, or planning for operations.

2. Policy.

2.1. This guidance applies to the USSF Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis (MS&A) enterprise (see **attachment 1**), including intelligence, acquisition, force design, operations, and wargaming activities. Only DIAAE authoritative threat intelligence shall be used to construct and/or instantiate threat models used across the USSF MS&A enterprise. **(T-0)**

2.2. To comply with DAFPD 16-10 and DAFI 63-101/20-101, inform decision authorities, enable increased analytical rigor, facilitate standardization across the USSF MS&A activities, and enable repeatable outcomes across the USSF MS&A enterprise, USSF MS&A activities should **(T-1)**:

2.2.1. Employ Model-Based System Engineering (MBSE) and Modular Open Systems Architecture approaches.

2.2.2. Maximize commonality, reuse, interoperability, exportability, scalability, efficiency, and effectiveness.

2.2.3. Integrate data and assessments that are informed and managed by USSF National Space Intelligence Center (NSIC) or authoritative DIAAE model producer.

2.2.4. Leverage common standards, methodologies, and best practices for all threat model types being developed across USSF organizations.

2.2.5. Possess a shared understanding of the threat baseline for USSF capabilities. The assessed threat should be applied to scenarios supporting MS&A activities in a consistent and repeatable fashion.

2.2.6. Leverage a shared definition of threat model types used.

2.2.7. Leverage a shared understanding of the accepted use-cases for approved threat models and types.

2.3. NSIC will establish the Space Threat Model & Simulation Committee (STMSC) to synchronize production of DIAAE authoritative models within the committee's scope, reduce duplication of effort, define threat M&S standards for federated production, establish Verification and Validation (V&V) processes, and codify processes to federate creation of DIAAE validated models of foreign space and counterspace systems and networks within the scope of STMSC's purview. (see **Attachment 3**).

2.3.1. STMSC Chair will respond to USSF MS&A enterprise threat model requirements.

2.3.2. STMSC Chair will task STMSC member organizations through their respective STMSC representatives. The STMSC Chair will coordinate with MS&A organizations that fall outside of STMSC members to communicate requirements that are outside the STMSC scope.

3. Roles and Responsibilities.

3.1. The Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Intelligence (SF/S2). Responsible for issuing plans, directives, procedures, and publications for the management and approval of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) M&S in coordination with AF, DoD, and Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) components. Responsible for assigning V&V manager responsibilities for threat models or simulations owned by the Space Force as outlined in Headquarters Air Force Mission Directive (HAFMD) 2-4 *Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Intelligence*, and AFI 16-1001 *Verification, Validation and Accreditation*, and AFI 16-1005 *Modeling and Simulation Management*. (T-0)

3.2. NSIC. Responsible for foundational and scientific and technical intelligence analysis of foreign space and adversary counterspace weapons, employment, and integrated counterspace kill-chains. NSIC partners with the DIAAE when technical assessments of space and counterspace threats fall outside the Center's assigned Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP) production responsibilities. NSIC is responsible for V&V of foreign space and adversary counterspace weapon system and network models. (T-0)

3.3. Field Commands, Direct Reporting Units, and Field Operating Agencies. Responsible for MS&A activities with NSIC coordination for threat model V&V and participation in NSIC-led committees in support of their role. (T-1)

4. **Threat Representation in Scenarios.** NSIC is responsible for threat selection in scenarios supporting USSF MS&A activities. Threat selection will be informed by the mission and capability under test in the scenario. Threat representation in MS&A scenarios will be based on DIAAE assessed threat Order-of-Battle (OB), DIAAE assessed estimates of future threat OB, and DIAAE threat performance and threat system operations assessments. (T-0)

4.1. Overall quantity and placement of the threat in the scenario will be based on the DIAAE validated analytical record and assessment of adversarial weapons employment. Threat progression in the scenario and prioritization of threat employment along the counterspace continuum (reversible to non-reversible) will be aligned with the DIAAE assessment of the adversaries' campaign planning activities. NSIC shall produce, socialize, and maintain analytical threat baselines for space and counterspace MS&A.

4.2. USSF MS&A community may conduct analytic "excursions", (e.g. deviation from defined model description, established MBSE processes, analytical thread, test plan, etc.) for applications not covered by DoDI 5000.61 and DoDM 5000.102. When such analytic excursions are conducted and require threat data to deviate from established intelligence analytical record, then the MS&A activity must be clearly identified as excursions and include specific explanations of (1) how the threat data in the MS&A event deviates from the relevant authoritative DIAAE assessments and (2) why that excursion was used. Excursions that require threat data representation beyond the DIAAE analytical record will be coordinated with NSIC.

5. Model Types. Within the USSF MS&A enterprise, four broad threat model types will be used: Parametric, Physical, Behavioral, and Physics (see [Attachment 2](#)). New threat model types shall be authorized by the NSIC commander. **(T-0)**

6. Model Access & Acceptable Use. USSF MS&A entities will access DIAAE authoritative models via the DIA enterprise model repository. Foreign space and adversary counterspace threat models not produced and/or validated by the DIAAE are not permitted.

BRIAN D. SIDARI, Brig General, USSF
Deputy Chief of Space Operations
for Intelligence

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

Space Doctrine Publication 2-0, *Intelligence*, 19 July 2023

Space Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Operations*, 19 July 2023

SAF/SA, *One Red, Bring Your Own Blue Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis Guidance*, 16 August 2023 (Tri-signed memorandum between SAF/SA, AF/A2, and SF/S2)

SPOCMD180, *SPACE DELTA 18 – National Space Intelligence Center (NSIC)*, 21 February 2024

AFI 16-1001, *Verification, Validation, and Accreditation*, 29 April 2020 (In revision)

DAFI 63-101/20-101, *Integrated Life Cycle Management*, 16 February 2024

DAFPD 16-10, *Modeling and Simulation*, 31 August 2021

DoDI 5000.59, *Modeling and Simulation Master Plan*, 8 August 2007, Incorporating Change 1, Effective 15 October 2018

DoDI 5000.61, *DoD Modeling and Simulation Verification, Validation, and Accreditation*, September 17, 2024

DoDI 5000.70, *Management of DoD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Activities*, 10 May 2012, Incorporating Change 3, 15 October 2018

DoDI 5000.97, *Digital Engineering*, 21 December 2023

DoDI 5000.86, *Acquisition Intelligence*, 11 September 2020

DODM 5000.102, *Modeling and Simulation Verification, Validation, and Accreditation for Operational Test and Evaluation and Live Fire Test and Evaluation*, 9 December 2024

DOD; DoDD 5105.21; *Defense Intelligence Agency*; 18 March 2008

DIA; *FY23 Management Guide; Defense Intelligence All-Source Analysis Enterprise*

DIA; *Defense Modeling & Simulation Intelligence Analysis Committee Charter*; 23 January 2023

DIA FY 24-25, *Defense Intelligence All-Source Analysis Enterprise Management Guide*

HAFMD 2-4, *Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Intelligence*, 24 April 2023

AFI 16-1005, *Modeling and Simulation Management*, 23 June 2016

AFI 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, 23 March 2020

Prescribed Forms

None

Adopted Forms

DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Product*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFSIM—Advanced Framework for Simulation, Integration, and Modeling

C4—Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

CAD—Computer Aided Design

CI—Counterintelligence

DAF—Department of the Air Force

DAF/RCO—Department of the Air Force/Rapid Capabilities Office

DAFPAM—Department of the Air Force Pamphlet

DAFPD—Department of the Air Force Policy Directive

DIA—Defense Intelligence Agency

DIAAE—Defense Intelligence All-Source Analysis Enterprise

DIAP—Defense Intelligence Analysis Program

DIE—Defense Intelligence Enterprise

DMSIAC—Defense Modeling & Simulation Intelligence Analysis Committee

DoD—Department of Defense

DoDD—Department of Defense Directive

DoDI—Department of Defense Instruction

HAFMD—Headquarters Air Force Mission Directive

IC—Intelligence Community

IPC—Intelligence Production Center

ITASE—Integrated Threat, Analysis, & Simulation Environment

JSE—Joint Simulation Environment

LLNL—Lawrence Livermore National Labs

M&S—Modeling and Simulation

MS&A—Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis

NGTS—Next Generation Threat System

NRO—National Reconnaissance Office

NSIC—National Space Intelligence Center

OB—Order-of-Battle

OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility

SNL—Sandia National Labs

SPOCMD—Space Operations Command Mission Directive

SpRCO—Space Rapid Capability Office

SSC—Space Systems Command

STARCOM—Space Training and Readiness Command

STK—Systems Tool Kit

STMSC—Space Threat Model and Simulation

SWAC—Space Warfighting Analysis Center

TMAP—Threat Modeling and Analysis Program

USD(I&S)—Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security

USG—United States Government

USSF—United States Space Force

USSPACECOM—United States Space Command

V&V—Verification & Validation

Terms

Acquisition—The conceptualization, initiation, design, development, test, contracting, production, deployment, and disposal of a directed and funded effort that provides a new, improved, or continued materiel, weapon, information system, logistics support, or service capability in response to an approved need. (DAFPAM 63-128)

Capability—The ability to complete a task or execute a course of action under specified conditions and level of performance through combinations of means and ways across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership & education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTmLPF-P) to perform a set of tasks to execute a specified course of action. (DAFPAM 63-128)

Decision Support—The process of gathering, generating, filtering, optimizing, and organizing mined information to support leadership decision making.

USSF Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis (MS&A) enterprise—those USSF Organizations involved in all or part of the following activities: 1) creating model representation of a system or process using behavioral, parametric, physical, physics, or logical constructs; 2) using the model to imitate the behavior or functionality of a system over time, often under different conditions; 3) examining the results of the simulation to extract meaningful information and insights.

Requirement—An established need justifying the timely allocation of resources to achieve a capability to accomplish approved military objectives, missions, or tasks.

Stakeholders—M&S stakeholders are individuals and organizations who are developers and/or users of USSF-related modeling & simulation capabilities. This includes regular and reserve Air Force and Space Force personnel, USSF civil servants, support contractors, and the formal organizations and informal professional communities to which these individuals belong.

Standard—A rule, principle, or measurement established by authority, custom, or general consent as a representation or example.

Attachment 2

USSF AUTHORIZED THREAT MODEL TYPES

A2.1. The types of space and counterspace Modeling and Simulation (M&S) models. Currently produced by the Defense Intelligence All-Source Analysis Enterprise (DIAAE) include:

A2.1.1. Behavioral Models.

A2.1.1.1. Low-fidelity, systems engineering models describe the basic system structures and the associated underlying behaviors. Low-fidelity models can incorporate data from parametric data models to instantiate a specific representation in a simulation environment.

A2.1.2. High-fidelity, systems engineering models represent complex system decision logic, activity in response to external stimuli, and highly detailed networks of system-of-systems interactions.

A2.2. Parametric Information Data Models.

A2.2.1. Information models that capture specific parameters to describe the capabilities, performance, limitations, and vulnerabilities of foreign space and counterspace systems and networks.

A2.2.2. The DIAAE authoritative producer(s) for threat systems have database solutions and can identify the appropriate parametric information models.

A2.3. Physical Models.

A2.3.1. High-fidelity Computer Aided Design (CAD) models capture the external design, geometries, and physical properties of the system, such as detailed models of system/subsystem components and material properties.

A2.3.2. Signature models provide a specified phenomenology's predicted signature derived from an authoritative DIAAE CAD model.

A2.4. Physics-based Models and Simulation Environments.

A2.4.1. Threat Modeling and Analysis Program (TMAP) is an Intelligence Community (IC) authoritative, dynamic software representation of a foreign threat system, capturing assessed performance characteristics based on all-source intelligence and developed in accordance with tradecraft standards.

A2.4.2. Systems Tool Kit (STK) is a digital mission engineering application for aerospace, defense, and other industries using a physics-based modeling environment to analyze platforms and payloads in a realistic mission context.

A2.4.3. The Advanced Framework for Simulation, Integration, and Modeling (AFSIM) is a multi-domain, software simulation framework for use in research and development, operations analysis, and experimentation across the DoD.

A2.4.4. Integrated Threat Analysis & Simulation Environment (ITASE) provides authoritative system-of-systems MS&A across land, air, sea, space and cyber domains, leveraging authoritative foreign threat models and Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) networks for engagement and mission level simulation scenarios.

A2.4.5. Next Generation Threat System (NGTS) is a training and simulation system that provides a synthetic environment that supports training, testing, analysis and research and development. NGTS provides the battlespace environment for the Joint Simulation Environment (JSE).

A2.4.6. These simulation environments are provided as exemplars. Additional simulation environments may be leveraged through incorporation of appropriately sourced DIAAE threat and scenario representations.

Attachment 3

SPACE THREAT MODEL & SIMULATION COMMITTEE (STMSC) CHARTER

A3.1. Purpose. This charter establishes the Space Threat Model & Simulation Committee (STMSC) and defines its mission, scope, goals, composition, organization, functions, and responsibilities.

A3.2. Mission. STMSC will synchronize production of Defense Intelligence All-source Analysis Enterprise (DIAAE) authoritative models within the committee's scope, reduce duplication of effort, define threat Modeling and Simulation (M&S) standards for federated production, establish Verification and Validation (V&V) processes, and codify processes to federate creation of DIAAE validated models of foreign space and counterspace systems and networks within STMSC scope. STMSC provides a formal mechanism to orchestrate the execution of customer modeling requirements so model producers can address these needs on behalf of the service.

A3.3. Scope. STMSC is responsible for establishing standards and developing a federated production plan for space and counterspace M&S on non-U.S. forces and capabilities within the scope of the Intelligence Function Codes (IFCs) assigned to NSIC and Intelligence Production Centers (IPCs) who elect to be STMSC members, and in accordance with the guidance of the Defense Modeling & Simulation Intelligence Analysis Committee (DMSIAC). These models will provide the Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Community (IC) with authoritative representations of foreign space and counterspace systems and the foundation for additional unique and exploratory M&S efforts.

A3.3.1. The committee will:

A3.3.1.1. Define space and counterspace M&S types and use cases.

A3.3.1.2. Develop common M&S standards and processes for federated production.

A3.3.1.3. Lead coordination and de-confliction of ongoing and future model production and develop the federated model production plan incorporating Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Intelligence (SF/S2), Joint Warfighter and IC M&S production priorities.

A3.3.1.4. Ensure that any federated models produced under the STMSC adhere to all DIAAE M&S and all-source intelligence production standards and IC tradecraft.

A3.3.1.5. Establish V&V plans, actions, processes, and documentation for federated M&S systems within the scope of topics that member IPCs are the authoritative producers for.

A3.3.2. **The committee will not:**

A3.3.2.1. Dictate resource allocation within threat M&S production centers.

A3.3.2.2. Supersede established DoD & IC M&S policy or processes.

A3.3.2.3. Validate previously created, or new space or counterspace M&S that does not follow the associated federated production processes.

A3.3.2.4. Validate models and simulations of systems outside of the scope of topics for which member IPCs are the authoritative producer on or provide validation of models or simulations without authoritative producer concurrence and approval.

A3.3.2.5. Accept, manage, or assign customer requirements to IPCs.

A3.4. Goals.

A3.4.1. Establish and maintain clear modeling and all-source intelligence tradecraft standards for the development of DIAAE validated space and counterspace M&S.

A3.4.2. Define processes in-line with DoD Instruction 5000.61 to conduct federated production, review, and V&V of space and counterspace threat M&S between authoritative producers and non-DIAAE M&S producers for all types of M&S.

A3.4.3. Define easy to navigate processes in accordance with DoD Instruction 5000.61 to enable customers to obtain models and perform simulations of foreign space and counterspace systems and networks that are validated and approved for use by the USSF force design, acquisitions, operations, and test communities.

A3.4.4. Coordinate, de-conflict and federate production of adversary space and counterspace M&S across the national space enterprise in conjunction with Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP) authoritative producers.

A3.4.5. Engage with customers to continually improve the development of adversary space and counterspace M&S requirements, ensuring appropriate model types and fidelities are developed to support predictive signature analysis, target development, tactics development, and test requirements.

A3.4.6. Increase the production capacity of DIAAE authoritative adversary space and counterspace M&S by establishing a federated process with clear expectations and reducing duplicative efforts.

A3.5. Definitions.

A3.5.1. Authoritative Producer. Organization or entity responsible for maintaining subject matter expertise and producing authoritative DIAAE analytic assessments pertaining to a specific intelligence subtopic. Under the Defense Intelligence All-source Analytic Enterprise, the Defense Intelligence Analytic Program assigns NSIC, for example, as the authoritative producer of DIAAE-validated threat models for on-orbit space and counterspace systems. For the full list of authoritative producers, see the Defense Intelligence All-source Analysis Enterprise Management Guide: ([https://intellipedia.intelink.ic.gov/w/index.php?action=downloads3file&id=MzU0Njc1NDJ8czM6Ly9jMnMzLWludGVsbGlwZWVpYS1wcm9kL2ltYWdlcy9jL2NmLzIzMDktMzgyMDhfSV9ESUFBRV9NYW5hZ2VtZW50X0d1aWRlXzIwMjNfRmluYWwucGRmfGFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL3BkZg==&title=File:2309-38208 I DIAAE Management Guide 2023 Final.pdf](https://intellipedia.intelink.ic.gov/w/index.php?action=downloads3file&id=MzU0Njc1NDJ8czM6Ly9jMnMzLWludGVsbGlwZWVpYS1wcm9kL2ltYWdlcy9jL2NmLzIzMDktMzgyMDhfSV9ESUFBRV9NYW5hZ2VtZW50X0d1aWRlXzIwMjNfRmluYWwucGRmfGFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL3BkZg==&title=File:2309-38208_I_DIAAE_Management_Guide_2023_Final.pdf)).

A3.5.2. Coordination and De-confliction. Action to minimize duplication and maximize the efficient use of analytic resources to produce threat models. To avoid inefficiencies or contradictory assessments, the federation of production must be negotiated in coordination with the authoritative producer; STMSC must be made aware of any such agreements.

A3.5.3. Defense Intelligence Analysis Program. DIA centrally manages defense intelligence analysis and production using a distributed analytical process known as the DIAP. This program integrates general military intelligence and scientific and technical intelligence production conducted at DIA, Combatant Commands, and Service Intelligence Centers. The DIAP allows DIA to focus all-source defense intelligence analysis efforts on compelling issues for defense customers while limiting duplication of effort.

A3.5.4. Defense Intelligence Enterprise. The organizations, infrastructure, and measures to include policies, processes, procedures, and products of the Intelligence, Counterintelligence (CI), and Security Components of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Military Departments, and other DoD elements that perform National Intelligence, Defense Intelligence, CI, and security functions, as well as those organizations under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S).

A3.5.5. Federated Production. The cooperative development of threat models by multiple organizations or entities. In instances where the authoritative producer cannot complete tasked threat model production, or develop model variants, it may become necessary to federate production through coordination with the authoritative producer through the STMSC.

A3.5.6. Threat M&S Producers. Entities that generate space and counterspace and network models in support of the Space Enterprise to include predictive signature analysis, target development, tactics development, and test requirements. Includes organizations such as IPCs, national laboratories, academic institutions, and industry partners.

A3.6. Composition and Organization.

A3.6.1. STMSC Chair. The NSIC Commander will chair the STMSC, with the authority to delegate this role.

A3.6.2. STMSC Membership. The standing members of the STMSC include a representative from any United States Government (USG) organization supporting or participating in production or validation of DIAAE authoritative threat modeling and simulation of non-US space and counterspace systems and networks. STMSC standing members must be appointed by an O-6 or civilian equivalent from their organization, having the authority to make decisions on behalf of their organization. USG organizations providing members to STMSC include, but are not limited to:

A3.6.2.1. Department of the Air Force/Rapid Capabilities Office (DAF/RCO)

A3.6.2.2. Lawrence Livermore National Labs (LLNL)

A3.6.2.3. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

A3.6.2.4. Sandia National Labs (SNL)

A3.6.2.5. Combat Forces Command (previously Space Operations Command)

A3.6.2.6. Space Rapid Capability Office (SpRCO)

A3.6.2.7. Space Systems Command (SSC)

A3.6.2.8. Space Development Agency (SDA)

A3.6.2.9. Space Threat Assessment Cell (STAC)

A3.6.2.10. Space Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM)

A3.6.2.11. United States Space Command (USSPACECOM)

A3.6.2.12. Member IPCs

A3.6.3. Timing. The STMSC will meet quarterly.

A3.7. Functions and Responsibilities. The STMSC defines M&S types and use cases, coordinates and de-conflicts M&S production, establishes and enforces M&S standards and tradecraft, and conducts V&V for space and counterspace M&S.

A3.7.1. STMSC Chair.

A3.7.1.1. Oversees STMSC and coordinates updates/changes to STMSC Charter.

A3.7.1.2. Ensures STMSC non-U.S. space and counterspace systems and network M&S are developed by or in a recognized federated partnership between authoritative producers and other M&S producers.

A3.7.1.3. Assesses and approves the recommended updates to federated M&S and V&V processes, procedures, and documentation standards as appropriate for federated production.

A3.7.1.4. Leads production of an annual STMSC threat M&S federated production plan for the USSF based on production priorities SF/S2, Joint Warfighter, and IC users provide to the committee.

A3.7.1.5. Coordinates with the SF/S2, Joint Warfighters, and the IC to mitigate risk when unable to meet prioritized M&S requirements in conjunction with M&S producers.

A3.7.1.6. Coordinates M&S and V&V processes, procedure, and documentation format with the DMSIAC to ensure alignment with DIAAE M&S activities and guidance.

A3.7.2. Member IPCs.

A3.7.2.1. Subject expert on validation for models and simulations for which they are the authoritative producer.

A3.7.2.2. Provides validation recommendation to the STMSC Chair in accordance with STMSC processes and standards for the approval of models produced through the federated process.

A3.7.3. STMSC Members.

A3.7.3.1. Facilitate the creation of an annual threat M&S federated production plan for the USSF based on SF/S2, Joint Warfighter, and IC production priorities.

A3.7.3.2. Submits recommended updates to M&S and V&V processes, procedures, and documentation standards as appropriate.

A3.7.3.3. Provides inputs to STMSC regarding planned M&S production and requirements.

A3.7.4. M&S Users Supporting the STMSC.

A3.7.4.1. All functions and responsibilities of STMSC Members.

A3.7.4.2. Designate a representative to serve as a member of the STMSC.

A3.7.4.3. Provide M&S production requirements in support of STMSC annual production plan

A3.7.5. M&S Producers Supporting the STMSC.

A3.7.5.1. All functions and responsibilities of STMSC Members.

A3.7.5.2. Designate a representative to serve as a member of the STMSC.

A3.7.5.3. Plans, conducts, and documents federated space and counterspace M&S in accordance with STMSC processes, procedures, and documentation standards.

A3.7.5.4. Conducts validation updates for non-U.S. space and counterspace systems and networks M&S throughout their lifecycles consistent with STMSC-designated responsibilities.

A3.7.5.5. Collaborates with authoritative producers to obtain validation of space threat M&S.

A3.8. Effective Period and Modification. These procedures become effective upon the date of signature on the host document, SPFI 16-10, and will be reviewed every two years. Recommendations for modifying these procedures prior to biennial review may be submitted to the STMSC Chair by any member.