

**BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY
OF THE AIR FORCE**

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
INSTRUCTION 71-101 VOLUME 1**



24 JANUARY 2025

Special Investigations

**CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
PROGRAM**

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available for downloading or ordering on the e-Publishing website at www.e-Publishing.af.mil

RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication

OPR: SAF/IGX

Certified by: SAF/IG
(Lt Gen Stephen L. Davis)

Supersedes: AFI71-101V1, 1 July 2019

Pages: 44

This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 71-1, *Criminal Investigations and Counterintelligence*, and Air Force Mission Directive (AFMD) 39, *Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI)*. It applies to Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve (AFR) Units, the Air National Guard (ANG), the Civil Air Patrol performing a Department of the Air Force (DAF) assigned mission, and United States Space Force. Refer to **Attachment 1** for a listing of references, abbreviations, acronyms, and terms used in this publication. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in this publication adhere to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, and are disposed in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by DAF. This publication may be supplemented at any level, but all supplements that directly implement it must be routed to Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF) Inspector General's Office, Special Investigations Directorate (SAF/IGX) for coordination prior to certification and approval. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*. Route DAF Forms 847 from the field through Major Command (MAJCOM) publications and/or forms managers. The authorities to waive wing or unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier ("T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3") number following the compliance statement. See DAF Manual (DAFMAN) 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures*, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the publication OPR for non-tiered compliance items. For

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document has been substantially revised and needs to be completely reviewed. This rewrite includes updates on documenting Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs); setting up Base Criminal Investigations Partnership (BCIP); investigations of illegal drug use and distribution; presumptive drug testing; updates the investigative matrix in **Attachment 2**; and corrects references.

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Chapter 1

PROGRAM OVERVIEW AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1.1. Commander, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI/CC). The AFOSI/CC derives his or her criminal investigative authority directly from the SecAF and has the independent authority within the DAF to initiate criminal investigations. The AFOSI/CC is the decision authority on special agent decertification. The AFOSI/CC:

- 1.1.1. Accredits special agents and others performing law enforcement (LE) and counterintelligence (CI) operations in support of the AFOSI mission.
- 1.1.2. Accesses the performance and provides guidance for all AFOSI units.
- 1.1.3. Manages the DAF polygraph program.

1.2. United States Air Force Special Investigations Academy. The United States Air Force Special Investigations Academy (USAFSIA) provides training to all special agents.

- 1.2.1. Investigative curriculum will include training in both the basic and advanced special investigator courses on conducting death investigations and on the execution of the Family Liaison Program described in [Chapter 2](#).
- 1.2.2. Special agents will be trained properly in the following: covered special victim offenses, which include unrestricted reports of adult sexual assault; unrestricted reports of domestic violence involving sexual assault and/or aggravated assault with grievous bodily harm and child abuse involving child sexual assault; and aggravated assault with grievous bodily harm and related training in accordance with (IAW) DoDI 5505.18, *Investigation of Adult Sexual Assault in the Department of Defense*, and DoDI 5505.19, *Establishment of Special Victim Investigation and Prosecution (SVIP) Capability within the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations (MCIOs)*. (T-0)

1.3. AFOSI Investigations Collections Operations Nexus Center (AFOSI ICON Center). The AFOSI ICON Center serves as the DAF's central hub for integrating investigative, LE, CI, and counterterrorism threat reporting. The AFOSI ICON Center will provide timely investigative information and threat reporting data to the AFOSI/CC and other senior DAF and DoD leaders. The AFOSI ICON Center serves as the DAF office responsible for the fusion of all AFOSI-originated criminal intelligence with other intelligence obtained outside of AFOSI, and any subsequent sharing of intelligence within and outside of DoD, consistent with DoDI 5525.18, *Law Enforcement Criminal Intelligence (CRIMINT) in DoD*. The regional and functional desks of the AFOSI ICON Center receive and synchronize information from AFOSI field units and other US Government agencies. The AFOSI ICON Center manages AFOSI's Global Watch, which receives up-channel reporting from AFOSI field units. The Global Watch also coordinates with other US Government, DoD, and DAF watches. The AFOSI ICON Center will coordinate investigative CI and counterterrorism activities as necessary, with DAF human intelligence activities. (T-2) Finally, the AFOSI ICON Center serves as a central clearinghouse for data gleaned from AFOSI's liaison officers assigned to partner agencies in the US Government, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Agency. **Note:** Due to classification levels, AFOSI Office of Special Projects (AFOSI PJ)

field units will coordinate with their chain of command for the services mentioned in this paragraph.

1.4. Air Force Office of Special Investigations Field Investigative Units. AFOSI field units (squadrons, detachments, and operating locations) must:

1.4.1. Liaise with federal, state, local and foreign nation LE, CI, and security agencies. IAW AFPD 71-1, AFOSI serves as the sole DAF agency responsible for conducting liaison for matters falling within the AFOSI mission. **(T-1)**

1.4.2. Notify the immediate commander of the individual under investigation in writing each time an investigation is initiated unless a need exists to maintain strict security controls over an investigative operation. In such cases, action authorities will be briefed and will be given written notification when the need to maintain strict operational security expires. **(T-1)**

1.4.3. Provide a timely Report of Investigation (ROI) to the action authority responsible for determining the appropriate judicial, non-judicial, or administrative actions. **(T-1)**

1.4.4. Operate a Sourcing Program consisting of people who confidentially provide vital information for initiating or resolving criminal or CI investigations. **(T-1)**

1.4.5. Brief installation commanders on the Sourcing Program each time a new installation commander is assigned. **(T-1)**

1.4.6. Review allegations or open investigations with the Installation Defense Force Commander (IDFC) or the Security Forces (SF) Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) of Investigations/Chief of Detectives (hereinafter referred to as the SF Chief of Investigations) and the servicing legal office to ensure the tracking and accomplishment of investigative responsibility and indexing actions. Servicing legal offices include but are not limited to; the installation legal office, the Assistant United States Attorney's Office, and, if applicable, the Office of Special Trial Counsel (OSTC) District Office.

1.4.7. Collaboratively work with SF to close any training gaps resulting from investigative sufficiency reviews or feedback from the servicing legal office.

1.4.8. Operate Group 1 Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems IAW Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 11-502, *Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems*, in support of LE, CI, and training.

1.5. Commanders, Directors, and Action Authorities. Commanders, directors, and action authorities at all levels of the DAF will refer persons affiliated with the DoD suspected of criminal allegations to the appropriate Military Criminal Investigative Organization (e.g., AFOSI), or LE organization (e.g., SF). **(T-0)** Action authorities, or designees, will not order or permit any type of commander-directed investigation or inquiry during an ongoing AFOSI investigation without coordinating with AFOSI and the servicing legal office. **(T-1)** Commanders, directors, and action authorities must:

1.5.1. Provide ROIs and Case Status Reports only to authorized persons whose official duties require access or as required by law. **(T-1)**

1.5.1.1. Safeguard ROIs in security file containers, cabinets, safes, vaults, and locked cabinets or rooms IAW DoD Manual (DoDM) 5400.07_AFMAN 33-302, *Freedom of Information Act Program*, and AFI 33-332, *Air Force Privacy and Civil Liberties Program*. **(T-0)**

1.5.1.2. Do not release an ROI to a non-DAF entity or person whose official duties do not clearly require access, without the coordination and approval of the servicing AFOSI field unit and servicing legal office. **(T-1)**

1.5.2. Send all Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act requests for AFOSI ROIs to the AFOSI Field Support Squadron, Information Release Branch, FOIA (AFOSI FSS/MSII-FOIA), at AFOSI FSS/MSII-FOIA, ATTN: FOIA, 27130 Telegraph Rd, Quantico, VA 22134. **(T-1)** FOIA requests may also be emailed to: afosi_hq_foia_request@us.af.mil.

1.5.3. Maintain classified ROIs IAW DoDM 5200.01 Volume 2_AFMAN 16-1404 Volume 2, *Information Security Program: Marking of Information*; destroy them IAW the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule. **(T-1)**

1.5.4. Destroy all For Official Use Only and Controlled Unclassified Information ROIs IAW with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System. **(T-1)**

1.5.5. Notify the local accounting and finance office for recoupment actions, if appropriate.

1.5.6. Promptly report to AFOSI all actions taken because of an investigation. **(T-1)**

1.5.7. Ensure that Public Affairs officials coordinate with AFOSI Public Affairs Directorate (AFOSI/PA) via e-mail at afosi.pa@us.af.mil prior to releasing any information to the public about an AFOSI investigation. **(T-1)**

1.5.8. Immediately notify AFOSI upon the confirmed or suspected death of a member of the military services; AFR or ANG member serving on active-duty orders under Title 10 United States Code (USC), *Armed Forces*; AFR or ANG Technician; DoD dependent; and any base affiliate (e.g., Non-Appropriated Funds or contract hire personnel). This requirement exists in force irrespective of the location (e.g., on or off installation, or manner or cause of the death). **(T-1)**

1.6. Installation Defense Force Commander. For SF units with a LE mission, the IDFC will designate a Chief of Investigations, who will serve as the principal liaison to AFOSI to manage incidents and/or crimes as delineated in this instruction. The IDFC will ensure that SF deconflict their use of recruited sources with the local AFOSI field unit leader by providing AFOSI with names, units, and the nature of the criminal investigation in which the informant is being used. **(T-1)**

1.7. The Air Force Criminal Justice Information Center (AF-CJIC). Serves as the recipient of all Civil Protection Orders. All necessary coordination will be handled by this office upon receipt of the orders from civilian services. Refer to AFMAN 71-102, *Air Force Criminal Indexing*, for further guidance on processing civilian protection orders.

1.8. The DoD Cyber Crime Center (DC3). Provides LE and CI support to AFOSI, and other Military Criminal Investigative Organizations (MCIO)s, IAW DoDD 5505.13E, *DoD Executive Agent (EA) for the DoD Cyber Crime Center (DC3)*. DC3 provides:

1.8.1. Digital/Multimedia forensics examination and analysis to support LE and CI investigations and operations.

1.8.2. Specialized investigative and cyber training to DoD digital forensics examiners and cyber investigators responsible for the exploitation of digital media in support of LE and CI objectives.

1.8.3. Cyber intelligence analysis products and services to directly support AFOSI, and other MCIO, cyber investigations and operations.

Chapter 2

INVESTIGATIONS PROGRAM

2.1. Determining Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Security Forces, and Conservation Law Enforcement Officials Spheres of Influence.

2.1.1. AFOSI is a field operating agency under the administrative guidance and oversight of the Inspector General of the Air Force (SAF/IG). AFOSI is a federal LE agency with responsibility for conducting criminal and CI investigations, collections and operations, specialized investigative activities, protective service operations, and integrated force protection. AFOSI provides integrated technology protection to the DAF Special Access Program enterprise. AFOSI is also a combat-ready military organization that provides the DAF a wartime capability to conduct, in hostile and uncertain environments, CI support to force protection to find, fix, track, and neutralize enemy threats. Additionally, AFOSI is the DAF's focal point for working with US and foreign nation LE and security services to provide timely and accurate threat information in all environments IAW AFMD 39.

2.1.2. SF normally investigates crimes specified in the far-right column of [Attachment 2, AFOSI and Security Forces Investigative Matrix](#). However, the investigative matrix merely provides a guide. Investigative resources at the installation level will be considered when determining whether AFOSI or SF provides a better posture to investigate a particular matter when law or higher-level policy does not specify which agency has investigative jurisdiction. SF must promptly notify AFOSI upon the initiation of all criminal investigations of a military service member or their immediate family members; a DAF or DoD civilian; a DAF or DoD contractor; or cases in which the US Government is identified as either the suspect or victim of alleged criminal activity. **(T-2)**

2.1.3. DAF Conservation Law Enforcement Officials (CLEO) normally enforce federal laws associated with hunting, fishing, and outdoor recreation regulations, to include general enforcement of open dumping and other general environmental regulations. CLEOs will promptly notify AFOSI prior to the initiation of any criminal investigation. **(T-1)**

2.1.4. IAW DoDI 5505.16, AFOSI field unit leaders have the authority and independent discretion to assume primary investigative responsibility, join a SF or CLEO investigation, or monitor the progress of a SF or CLEO investigation when it involves DAF or DoD personnel, property, or resources. When AFOSI assumes primary investigative responsibility of an investigation, all material pertinent to the investigation will be released to AFOSI. **(T-1)** Similarly, when AFOSI refers an investigation to SF or CLEO, all material pertinent to the investigation will be released to SF or the CLEO.

2.2. Accreditation. The AFOSI/CC accredits AFOSI personnel and those detailed to AFOSI for the purpose of official identification.

2.2.1. AFOSI issues badges and credentials to special agents. Special agents are authorized to:

2.2.1.1. Enter any DAF installation or off-limits areas in the furtherance of an AFOSI mission unless DAF security publications state otherwise.

2.2.1.2. Access all DAF records, property, or people, except as limited by law, instruction, and security publications.

2.2.1.3. Carry concealed or unconcealed US Government-issued or AFOSI-approved privately owned weapons and ammunition on which they are trained and qualified.

2.2.1.4. Wear civilian clothing while performing their duties.

2.2.2. AFOSI issues other badges and/or credentials to AFOSI employees or other personnel detailed to AFOSI for the purpose of identification.

2.2.3. Members are authorized to use those credentials or badges in the performance of official duties to verify their roles and responsibilities while performing the AFOSI mission.

2.3. Masking Rank. AFOSI military special agents and military LE personnel assigned or detailed to AFOSI will mask their rank and grade when executing the AFOSI mission. **(T-1)** Masking rank and grade directly contributes to achieving an efficient, effective, and unbiased investigative process, and furthers the unhindered execution of other LE and security activities. AFOSI agents interact daily with, often in an adversarial role, individuals who are junior and senior in grade to them; the issue of rank should not be an impediment to the pursuit of information or evidence in criminal investigations. Additionally, agents and military LE personnel assigned or detailed to AFOSI interact daily with high-ranking representatives of federal, state, local, and foreign national LE, CI, and security agencies. In many foreign countries, representatives place importance on working with counterparts of equal or higher grade because of custom and culture. Agents often work in unfriendly and hostile environments and not disclosing the rank and grade of agents helps to ensure their safety.

2.3.1. The wearing of civilian clothes helps protect the grades of special agents and military LE personnel to execute AFOSI's mission. DAFI 36-3012, *Military Entitlements*, authorizes civilian clothing allowances.

2.3.2. Federal (e.g., AFOSI, FBI, etc.), state, local, and tribal LE officers or agents may use their LE credentials for installation access while conducting LE operations or investigations and/or responding to emergencies on the installation according to DoDM 5200.08 Volume 3_AFMAN 31-101 Volume 3, *Installation Perimeter Access Control*. **Note:** AFOSI special agents presenting LE credentials for installation access may gain access and sponsor all accompanying personnel and/or vehicles without further identification or searches.

2.3.3. IAW DoDI 7050.03, *Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense Access to Records and Information*, and AFD 71-1, AFOSI authorizes special agents to use their badges and credentials for identification and access to all off-limits areas and access to all DAF records for the purpose of conducting official business, except as limited by law, instruction, or security publications. DAF records include, but are not limited to, all contracts and contracting files; personnel records; security informational files; etc.

2.3.4. To preserve the integrity of criminal investigations, ensure the effectiveness of AFOSI agents executing the CI mission, and for agent safety, offices that use systems that display unmasked rank data will make efforts to safeguard against the disclosure of ranks and grades of AFOSI special agents and military LE officials detailed to an AFOSI mission.

2.4. Using Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Funds. Subject to the limitation of appropriations, 10 USC § 127, *Emergency and Extraordinary Expenses*, provides the SecAF authority for any emergency or extraordinary expenses that cannot be anticipated or classified. AFOSI uses emergency or extraordinary expenses funds (E-Funds) for any authorized requirement that contributes to CI and criminal investigative missions or aids in acquiring CI or criminal investigative information.

2.4.1. Congress annually allocates E-Funds limitation authority to the SecAF. The SecAF has delegated his or her authority for E-Funds limitation management to the Administrative Assistant to SecAF (SAF/AA). SAF/AA sets the annual E-Fund expenditure limitation and reports E-Funds expenditures to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

2.4.2. SAF/AA annually allocates a specific portion of the E-Fund limitation authority from Congress to SAF/IG. SAF/IG oversees the DAF E-Funds for CI and criminal investigative programs and delegates the authority to approve CI and criminal investigative expenditures to the AFOSI/CC.

2.4.3. The AFOSI/CC will manage and implement E-Funds for the CI and criminal investigative program and ensures that expenditures are proper. The AFOSI/CC, or a designee, approves the use of E-Funds for the extension of modest liaison event courtesies attended by representatives of foreign LE and intelligence agencies and key representatives of US federal, state, county, or local LE and intelligence agencies.

2.4.4. The DAF Audit Agency audits the E-Funds program periodically (at least once every four years) to ensure compliance with this instruction and internal AFOSI instructions.

2.4.5. The E-Funds Custodian at each field unit assumes responsibility for the unit's working fund. Cash-on-hand must be stored in a General Services Administration-approved container with a three-position combination lock. **(T-0)**

2.5. Defense Central Index of Investigations. AFOSI and SF will index subjects of criminal investigations in the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) as soon as credible information exists that the subject committed a criminal offense IAW DoDI 5505.07, *Titling and Indexing in Criminal Investigations*. **(T-0)** The acts of titling and indexing denote administrative procedures and do not connote any degree of guilt or innocence.

2.6. Interstate Identification Index and National Crime Information Center. AFOSI and SF will submit offender criminal history data for all military service personnel investigated for offenses listed in AFMAN 71-102. **(T-0)** Reference AFMAN 71-102 for information regarding indexing requirements and processes.

2.7. Fingerprints. AFOSI and SF will submit the Federal Document (FD) 249, *Arrest and Institution Fingerprint Card*, when probable cause exists to believe that a person has committed an offense that requires submission of offender criminal history data IAW AFMAN 71-102. **(T-0)**

2.8. Deoxyribonucleic Acid Samples. AFOSI and SF will take deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) samples of suspects and send the samples to the Defense Forensic Science Center IAW DoDI 5505.14, *DNA Collection and Submission Requirements for Law Enforcement* and AFMAN 71-102. **(T-0)**

2.9. Case Referrals. AFOSI refers cases to the appropriate LE agency IAW AFPD 71-1 for crimes over which the DAF does not have jurisdiction.

2.10. Law Enforcement Collection of Information on Non-Department of Defense United States Persons. DoD Directive (DoDD) 5200.27, *Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense*, restricts the gathering of LE information on non-DoD personnel and organizations. However, in limited circumstances, AFOSI personnel are authorized to collect information IAW DoDD 5200.27, paragraph 4, “*Authorized Activities*.” In addition, the below provisions may apply.

2.10.1. These restrictions do not apply to the collection of US persons’ information by Defense Intelligence Components within the DAF when performing intelligence and CI functions according to Executive Order (EO) 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, and DoDM 5240.01, *Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities*. AFI 14-404, *Intelligence Oversight*, defines the functions and compliance for organizations performing intelligence and CI. **(T-0)**

2.10.2. During normal operations and training, if AFOSI incidentally collects information consistent with law and DoDM 5240.01 about the criminal activity or criminal involvement of a civilian not associated with the DoD, such information will be turned over to the appropriate civilian LE agency. **(T-0)**

2.10.3. Planning or creating missions or training for the primary purpose of aiding civilian LE officials is not permitted. Conducting training or missions for the purpose of routinely collecting information about US citizens is likewise not permitted, IAW DoDI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*, and DoDD 5200.27. **(T-0)**

2.10.4. Report all suspected violations of this section to the SAF/IG and identify the area in which the violation occurred. **(T-1)**

2.11. Collaboration Among Law Enforcement Activities and Servicing Legal Offices. AFOSI, SF, and the servicing legal office will develop a collaborative relationship focused on integrating investigative efforts and the legal process. The goal of this tight integration is to promote justice, assist in maintaining good order and discipline, and strengthen national security.

2.11.1. AFOSI field units and SF will work closely with the servicing legal office in matters involving violations of the 10 USC §§ 801–946a, *Uniform Code of Military Justice*, or where the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act may apply. This collaboration begins at the initiation of and continues throughout substantive criminal investigations. As appropriate, servicing legal office personnel and SF investigators attend AFOSI case review meetings. Likewise, AFOSI personnel attend relevant local legal office military justice meetings. When appropriate, AFOSI and SF will share investigative data as well as information on anticipated leads in criminal investigations with the legal office. AFOSI and SF will also coordinate with the assigned trial team on all subject interviews when appropriate. IAW AFPD 71-1, no other type of investigative, administrative, personnel, or other legal action should be taken against someone under investigation by AFOSI before coordinating with AFOSI and the servicing legal office. Servicing legal offices include but are not limited to; the installation legal office, the Assistant United States Attorney's Office, and, if applicable, the OSTC District Office.

2.11.1.1. Certain “covered” offenses require immediate notification to the OSTC District Office. A full list of offenses can be found under Article 1 (17), of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The installation legal office can assist in facilitating notification to OSTC.

2.11.1.2. For offenses under OSTC authority, the District Office will establish an Investigation and Prosecution Support Team (IPST) to advise investigative steps in the case. Each IPST will include a Special Trial Counsel (STC), AFOSI investigator (s), and personnel from the servicing legal office, including trial counsel, case paralegal, and Victim Witness Assistance Program (VWAP) liaison, if applicable. IPST STC are available on-call to provide investigative support.

2.11.2. Occasionally, cases arise in which providing investigative information to entities outside AFOSI may not be prudent. Examples of such matters include premature compromise of a recruited source, investigations involving servicing legal office personnel, grand jury information, and/or cases not destined for the military justice system (e.g., procurement fraud cases being handled by the Department of Justice). To avoid compromise of sensitive investigative information, including techniques, leads, statements and evidence, the servicing legal office will not forward sensitive investigative information (information that would reveal sources, LE techniques, procedures or which would jeopardize an on-going operation or information provided by another LE agency) without the concurrence of the AFOSI field unit leader. AFOSI field unit leaders will identify to the servicing legal office those details of an investigation that will not be forwarded in legal office reports. AFOSI maintains responsibility in such cases for providing information to appropriate officials.

2.12. Suspicious Activity Reports. DoDI 2000.26 mandates the use of the FBI’s eGuardian system for reporting SARs.

2.12.1. IAW the authority in DoDI 2000.26, SARs will be entered into the FBI eGuardian system IAW the established policy, assigned responsibilities and prescribed procedures for the DoD use of eGuardian.

2.12.2. The eGuardian system will serve as the exclusive unclassified means by which DoD will report suspicious activities to the FBI, MCIOs, and Military Department Counterintelligence Organizations.

2.12.3. AFOSI serves as the sole DAF LE agency authorized to investigate and create SARs concerning active duty and reserve personnel and/or installations. SF will notify AFOSI of any reports of suspicious activity. **(T-1)**

2.12.4. Should an incident occur on an ANG installation, SF may conduct the preliminary inquiry, draft the SAR for approval by their state’s ANG Headquarters, and submit to the AFOSI ICON Center for publishing into eGuardian. The AFOSI ICON Center will also notify the nearest AFOSI detachment of the incident. **Note:** This serves as the exception and not the normal SAR response.

2.12.5. Pursuant to the Information Sharing Environment Functional Standard 200 (known within the suspicious activity reporting community as “ISE FS 200”), DoD personnel with User Level 1 approver, or Fusion Center approver accounts will vet suspicious activity information through the following two-part process before entering it as SAR into the eGuardian system:

2.12.5.1. Review each report of suspicious activity against the eGuardian reporting criteria IAW DoDI 2000.26.

2.12.5.2. Enter the report of suspicious activity into the eGuardian system as a SAR if it meets one or more criteria and indicates a potential nexus to terrorism or other criminal activity.

2.13. Enemy Prisoner of War and Detainee Information. AFOSI will document all enemy prisoner of war and detainee-related incidents and/or information received by AFOSI that does not warrant the initiation of an investigative case file. **(T-1)** Enemy prisoner of war and detainee-related incidents and/or information received by AFOSI may range from a witness alleging a US military member may have assaulted a detainee to another witness overhearing other US military members converse about photographs taken of detainees.

2.14. Obtaining Information from Financial Institutions. AFOSI and SF can issue written requests for financial account information during LE inquiries per DoDI 5400.15, *Guidance on Obtaining Information from Financial Institutions*.

2.15. Setting up Base Criminal Investigations Partnership. AFOSI and SF created a joint structured base-level BCIP concept to service the supported commanders and populations more efficiently and effectively. AFOSI and SF will partner at the installation level by conducting joint activities, such as interviews, to determine who will assume investigative responsibility for the investigation and to allow AFOSI to vet information for potential operational activity. At the base level, AFOSI and SF will assist each other as needed and within their unit's capability. SF and AFOSI will conduct investigations IAW **Attachment 2**, within their own case management system, with early and often collaboration. Reference **Attachment 4**, *Security Forces – Office of Special Investigations Base Criminal Investigations Partnership for Execution of Criminal and Fraud Investigations (BCIP) Memorandum*, for further information.

2.15.1. Pay, Allowance and Entitlement (PAE). AFOSI will defer most allegations to SF IAW **Attachment 2** and AFOSIMAN 71-122, Volume 2, *Fraud and Corruption Investigations*. AFOSI will take lead on PAE cases in which the subject is a senior official (defined as a current or retired O-6, E-9, GS-15 or above) or if the subject is currently the focus of another AFOSI investigation. SF will notify AFOSI in the event the allegation involves large scale manipulation of a financial management system, a member of the Comptroller Squadron, suspected ring activity, and/or forged documents.

2.15.2. Drug Offenses. AFOSI and SF will conduct joint interviews of drug violation suspects to determine the lead investigative agency IAW **Attachment 2**, with AFOSI focusing on drug distribution/manufacturing. AFOSI will be present for all positive urinalysis interviews involving drugs, except for those involving tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) or THC derivatives. AFOSI field leadership will retain discretion at the unit level to participate in interviews of individuals who returned a positive urinalysis for THC or THC derivatives.

2.15.3. Domestic Violence/Interpersonal Violence (DV/IPV). AFOSI and SF will conduct joint interviews for DV/IPV offenses to determine if the allegation meets AFOSI's threshold per **Attachment 2**. At a minimum, AFOSI will be present for interview(s) in which a potential for substantial bodily harm against the victim exists, if the victim is pregnant and/or if prior incidents of violence appear to be escalating in severity.

2.15.4. AFOSI and SF will use an AF Form 3985, *Interview Record*, to document the details of an interview. AFOSI and SF will use AF Form 3986, *Case File Documents Outer Envelope*, and AF Form 3987, *Case File Documents Inner Envelope*, as appropriate, for maintaining printed investigative documents.

2.16. Investigation of Illegal Drug Use and Distribution. AFOSI and SF conduct investigations of illegal drug use and distribution on persons subject to the UCMJ contained in the Manual for Courts-Martial, committed by members of the Armed Forces as shown in [Attachment 2](#). AFOSI may also investigate drug offenses committed by specified persons not subject to the UCMJ when a clear and direct DAF connection and interest exists.

2.17. Presumptive Drug Testing. DAF LE personnel will conduct presumptive drug testing using agency-approved field drug test kits. LE personnel must have on hand and available the appropriate personal protective equipment, Naloxone Nasal Spray (NARCAN[®]), and training on the use of NARCAN[®] before conducting drug testing.

2.18. Death Investigations of Active Duty Military Members. AFOSI and SF conduct death investigations according to the matrix in [Attachment 2](#) when the DAF has investigative jurisdiction. IAW DoDI 5505.10, *Criminal Investigations of Noncombat Deaths*, AFOSI investigates all non-combat deaths of military members on active duty, not medically determined to be from natural causes, to determine the circumstances leading to the cause and manner of death. **(T-0)** AFOSI does not investigate accidental deaths when a preliminary inquiry discloses the death was an accident with no evidence of a criminal act. When an authority other than the Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (OAFME) determines the manner of death, AFOSI submits the ROI to OAFME for a consultation opinion on the comprehensiveness and medical sufficiency of the investigation as it pertains to the cause and manner of death. IAW DoDI 5154.30, *Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFMES) Operations*, AFOSI will conduct forensic pathology investigations only in other cases in which the responsible coroner or medical examiner has not determined the manner of death and the coroner or medical examiner determine suicide a possible manner of death, or in certain unique circumstances. **(T-0)**

2.18.1. Family Liaison Program. This program enhances communication between AFOSI and the immediate family members of a deceased active-duty member whose death was investigated by AFOSI. It is designed to promote an open dialogue between AFOSI and family members, ensure issues and questions raised by the family are thoroughly addressed in a timely manner, and prevent misunderstandings. AFOSI instructions address procedures for this program according to the requirements established in DoDI 5505.10.

2.18.2. AFOSI attempts to accomplish the following in those instances in which the DAF does not have investigative jurisdiction:

2.18.2.1. Maintain a liaison with the LE organization conducting the investigation.

2.18.2.2. Assist the family of the deceased in obtaining cooperation from the responsible LE organization.

2.18.2.3. Obtain and provide to the appropriate military authorities a copy of the ROI, including any forensic or autopsy results.

2.19. Extramarital Sexual Misconduct, Fraternization, and Sexual Harassment. The following guidance and procedures apply to handling allegations of sexual misconduct as defined in DoDI 5505.03, *Initiation of Investigations by Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations*.

2.19.1. AFOSI or SF normally refer allegations of adult private consensual sexual misconduct (including extramarital sexual misconduct and fraternization) to the subject's commander, unless the subject is in a position of authority over the victim as defined in [Attachment 2](#), unless otherwise covered by OSTC, in which case they will be referred to OSTC. AFOSI will investigate authority figures accused of sexual misconduct with a person over whom they exercise authority. **(T-0)** AFOSI field leaders must obtain approval from the AFOSI/CC, Deputy Commander, AFOSI (AFOSI/CD), or the AFOSI ICON Center Commander prior to initiating an investigation into adult private consensual sexual misconduct which does not involve an authority figure. **(T-1)**

2.19.2. IAW DAFI 36-2710, *Equal Opportunity Program*, SF serves as the DAF's independent investigator for formal complaints of sexual harassment pursuant to the procedures in 10 USC § 1561, *Complaints of Sexual Harassment: Independent Investigation*. If the independent investigator develops information that a complaint of sexual harassment against a military member, or civilian subject to the UCMJ, meets the threshold of probable cause for Article 134, UCMJ (Sexual Harassment), the commander and/or the servicing legal office will refer the matter to AFOSI via DAF Form 3984, *AFOSI Sexual Harassment Case Referral Form*. AFOSI will review the information and in consultation with the servicing legal office may determine the complaint does not warrant an AFOSI investigation. In those instances, the SF independent investigation will continue. AFOSI will investigate sexual harassment when it is secondary to another offense within AFOSI's purview. If AFOSI conducts a criminal investigation, AFOSI will implement procedures outlined in DAFI 36-2710, to include providing installation equal opportunity offices timely updates on the progression and conclusion of the investigation for tracking purposes to meet statutory sexual harassment reporting requirements.

2.20. Special Victim Investigation and Prosecution Capability. AFOSI holds primary investigative responsibility for all SVIP offenses as defined in DoDI 5505.19. AFOSI will provide trained investigators for all covered offenses, as defined in DoDI 5505.18, DoDI 5505.19, DoDI 6495.02, Volume 1, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures*, and DoDI 6400.06, *DoD Coordinated Community Response to Domestic Abuse Involving DoD Military and Certain Affiliated Personnel*. These investigators will be certified as required by DoDI 5505.19. **(T-0)** For offenses under OSTC authority, SVIP requirements are met through the IPST function.

2.21. Sexual Assaults. IAW DoDI 5505.18, AFOSI will initiate investigations of all offenses of adult sexual assault of which they become aware that occur within their jurisdiction, regardless of the severity of the offense, except under the provisions of the Catch a Serial Offender (CATCH) Program. **(T-0)**

2.21.1. AFOSI must be notified of the receipt of all unrestricted reports. AFOSI is responsible for collecting as evidence all Sexual Assault Forensic Examination kits, and any additional evidentiary items for restricted reports, and must safeguard them IAW AFI 90-6001, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program*. **(T-1)** IAW DoDI 6495.02V1, at least 30 days before the expiration of the storage period for the Sexual Assault Forensic Examination kit, AFOSI will notify the installation DoD Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC) that the storage period will soon expire and will confirm with the SARC that the victim has not made a request to change to unrestricted reporting or made a request for any personal effects. **(T-0)**

2.21.2. Designated Special Victim Investigation and Prosecution investigators will closely interact with the designated IPST STC or specially trained judge advocates, SARCs, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Victim Advocates, Family Advocacy Program managers, and Domestic Abuse Victim Advocates during all stages of the investigative and military justice process. IAW DoDI 6495.02V1, all adult sexual assault cases involving a service member victim, or a service member subject, require AFOSI to provide incident data to the commander for completion of the Eight Day Report (Formerly Sexual Assault Incident Response Oversight Report). **(T-0)** If AFOSI has been notified of the disposition in a civilian sexual assault case, AFOSI will notify the commander and the OSTC District Office of this disposition immediately. **(T-1)**

2.22. Investigating Fraud Offenses. AFOSI complies with the direction contained within AFPD 71-1 and DoDI 5505.02, *Criminal Investigations of Fraud Offenses*, to investigate major fraud offenses involving DoD programs and personnel, and to present them for prosecution. **(T-0)**. Investigating agents may submit reports of investigation for review under 31 USC §§ 3801–3812, *Administrative Remedies for False Claims and Statements*, and IAW DAFI 51-1101, *Acquisition Integrity Program*.

2.23. Contractor Disclosure Program. AFOSI is responsible for thoroughly evaluating in a timely manner fraud allegations received from the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) through the DoD Contractor Disclosure Program. **(T-0)** In such referrals, AFOSI is responsible for investigating credible allegations and providing quarterly updates to the DoDIG IAW DoDI 5505.15, as well as maintaining a copy of the final ROI and list of all actions taken as a result of an investigation. **(T-0)**.

2.24. Environmental Crime. DAF officials report all suspected violations of environmental laws to AFOSI. AFOSI conducts criminal investigations when warranted and complies with the training and medical requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. **(T-0)** AFOSI also coordinates with installation public health officials, installation and MAJCOM Staff Judge Advocates, the Environmental Protection Agency, and state enforcement agencies in those states in which the Environmental Protection Agency has delegated enforcement authority. At DAF installations with a Conservation Law Enforcement Program (CLEP), CLEOs conducting criminal investigations will comply with the policies and procedures of DoDI 5505.07; DoDI 5505.11; DoDI 5505.14; DoDI 5505.16; and DoDI 5505.17, *Personally Identifiable Information and Law Enforcement Information Handling by DoD Law Enforcement Activities*. **(T-0)**

2.25. Crimes that Involve Computer Systems. AFOSI provides investigative expertise for investigations involving computers used as an instrument in the commission of a crime, which may contain evidence of a crime, or that are the target of a crime. AFOSI trains agents to a basic level of proficiency in mobile phone analysis, hard disk triage, and hard disk imaging. AFOSI Cyber Investigations and Operations (CI&O) personnel and Digital Forensic Consultants (DFC) receive further specialized training to perform computer forensic analysis, technical interviews in which computer terminology is used, and in the development of various documents such as affidavits used in applying for a search warrant. In addition, AFOSI CI&O personnel are the primary investigators for felony intrusions into DAF and selected DoD computer systems. Upon discovery, DAF officials will report all suspected computer crime matters referenced in [Table A2.1](#) to AFOSI.

2.25.1. AFOSI is the only DAF agency with the authority to investigate computer intrusions for LE purposes. AFOSI's CI&O personnel proactively execute LE and CI authorities to conduct investigations and activities that are designed to identify, disrupt, degrade, neutralize, and/or manipulate a foreign intelligence entity's or other threat actor's ability and desire to use the cyber domain for targeting DAF, DoD, and US Government automated information systems. AFOSI CI&O's investigative and operational activities may identify additional information system vulnerabilities, threat information, threat actor attribution (criminal or CI), or ex-filtrated data.

2.25.2. AFOSI DFCs conduct digital and multimedia forensics analysis in support of AFOSI criminal and CI investigations. AFOSI DFCs will be the first option for digital forensic support to AFOSI investigations and operations.

2.26. Processing Requests to Intercept Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications for Law Enforcement Purposes. AFOSI is the DAF's sole agency with authority in the following instances to: intercept electronic, oral, or wire communications; install or use pen registers; employ trap and trace devices; use electronic or optical enhancements for surveillance; conduct covert video and photographic surveillance activities; and/or track individuals or items using technical services and surveillance in criminal investigations IAW DoDI 5505.09, *Communication Interception for Law Enforcement*. (T-0)

2.26.1. AFOSI provides agents training to a basic level of understanding to intercept wire, oral, and/or electronic communications.

2.26.2. AFOSI technical operation agents receive further specialized training to provide AFOSI capabilities to employ specialized equipment to conduct wire, oral, and/or electronic intercepts. Technical operation agents can assist in the development of various documents such as Request for Consensual Intercept Authorization and affidavits used in applying for a search warrant.

2.27. Firearms Tracing in Connection with Criminal Investigations. AFOSI and SF will both conduct a National Crime Information Center (NCIC) query and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives eTrace database check on all firearms seized or recovered in the course of criminal investigations and taken into federal custody consistent with 18 USC, Chapter 44, *Firearms*, Presidential Memorandum, *Tracing of Firearms in Connection with Criminal Investigations*. (T-0)

2.28. Law Enforcement Defense Data Exchange. AFOSI and SF will share information maintained in their unclassified LE case management systems through the Law Enforcement Defense Data Exchange (LE D-DEx), IAW DoDI 5525.16, *Law Enforcement Defense Data Exchange (LE D-DEx)*. (T-0)

Chapter 3

SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES

3.1. Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Techniques.

3.1.1. The SecAF authorizes the use of the polygraph and credibility assessment (PCA) techniques in the DAF, IAW AFD 71-1, and DoDI 5210.91, *Polygraph and Credibility Assessment (PCA) Procedures*.

3.1.1.1. The AFOSI/CC, or designee, manages the DAF Polygraph Program.

3.1.1.2. The DoD authorizes AFOSI as the only DAF organization to conduct PCA examinations, acquire or possess PCA equipment, or to have examiners trained in PCA techniques to support criminal investigations.

3.1.2. Criteria for Conducting Criminal Scope PCA Examinations. The DAF Polygraph Program Management Office (PPMO) AFOSI Requirements Directorate, Criminal and Fraud Investigations (AFOSI/XRG) may authorize the use of PCA techniques in a criminal investigation when the following apply:

3.1.2.1. The crime involves an offense punishable under federal law, including the UCMJ, by death or confinement for one year or more.

3.1.2.2. Investigation by other means has been as thorough as circumstances permit.

3.1.2.3. The development of information by means of a PCA technique occurs as an essential element in conducting the investigation. The DAF PPMO may approve the use of a PCA technique in any matter deemed to be in the best interest of the DAF, DoD, or national security.

3.1.2.4. The person being considered for the examination was interviewed, resulting in a reasonable cause to believe the person has knowledge of or was involved in the matter under investigation.

3.1.2.5. The person being considered voluntarily agrees to undergo PCA testing and is at least 15 years old. Testing of minors aged 15 and below normally is not done without the prior consent of their parent or legal guardian. Requests to test minors without such consent must be coordinated with the servicing legal office.

3.2. Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Examinations Conducted by Non-Federal Agencies. The DAF accepts only PCA examinations and/or the results of such examinations conducted by federal examiners. This restriction exists because the DoD cannot attest to the conditions under which a non-federal examiner administered a PCA examination. This does not restrict the consideration of any evidence as required by the US Constitution or other applicable laws.

3.3. Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Examinations of Pregnant Examinees. Pregnant examinees will present a written opinion from their attending physician before being administered a PCA examination. The opinion must state the PCA examination will have no adverse effects on the examinee's pregnancy. Administer PCA examinations in the third trimester of pregnancy only for incidents involving the most serious offenses.

3.4. Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Examinations of Sexual Assault Victims. The DAF PPMO will consider approving a request for a PCA examination of a sexual assault victim only after the subject of the allegation, if known, declines the offer to take a PCA examination. PCA examinations of such victims is not ordinarily approved unless circumstances clearly warrant it.

3.5. Requesting Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Support. DAF commanders and DAF organizations with responsibility for security, LE, or the administration of criminal justice, and DoD Components that receive investigative support from the DAF, may request a DAF PCA examination. Submit routine requests for PCA support to the nearest AFOSI detachment, squadron, or regional office by any means available, including in person, letter, message, electronic mail, or facsimile. The local AFOSI office, in turn, forwards all requests through the servicing Regional Polygraph Office to the DAF PPMO for approval. Only the AFOSI/CC, AFOSI/CD, Polygraph Program Manager, and quality assurance personnel within the PPMO can approve a PCA examination.

3.6. Preparing the Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Request. A PCA request will, to the extent possible, contain the following information so that the PPMO has sufficient information to evaluate the request. Contact the nearest AFOSI office for assistance in preparing the request.

3.6.1. Reference or Investigation Number. Although this is usually reserved for investigative personnel, if an internal organizational investigative file number or other reference number has been assigned, identify it here.

3.6.2. Title of Case. Identify, in a concise statement, the matter being investigated.

3.6.3. Case Summary. Include a summary of pertinent facts, which addresses the "who, what, when, where, why, and how" surrounding the review, inquiry, or investigation.

3.6.4. Biographical Data for Each Examinee. Provide the full name, sex, date of birth, place of birth, grade, social security number (if applicable), organization, command, and place of duty assignment.

3.6.5. Reason for the Examination. Explain why a PCA examination is essential. Address investigative efforts already undertaken and how a PCA examination would help the investigation.

3.6.6. Medical Suitability. The investigative personnel will provide any known factors involving physical, mental, and emotional suitability of the proposed examinee.

3.6.7. Case Adjudication. Indicate whether the examinee has been tried by a court or has accepted non-judicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, for the offense concerned.

3.6.8. Pending Charges. Indicate whether charges of any kind have been preferred against the examinee. If no charges have been preferred, include other actions being considered.

3.6.9. PCA Coordination. Coordinate all PCA requests with the servicing Regional Polygraph Office. Identify the name of the Polygraph Examiner with whom the request was coordinated. For post-investigative requests, state whether the servicing legal office concurs or non-concurs with conducting the examination. Identify the name of the Judge Advocate with whom the request was coordinated.

3.6.10. Other Factors. Include any additional information that is pertinent in adjudicating the PCA request, such as command interest, pending separation of proposed examinee, or the possibility of media coverage.

3.7. Post-Investigative Requests. Post-investigative requests for PCA support are considered for approval only after coordination with, and the concurrence of, the servicing legal office. The DAF PPMO will consider the merit of each post-investigative request for PCA support as well as the servicing legal office's opinion.

3.8. Post-Judicial Requests. The DAF PPMO will not routinely approve the conduct of post-judicial PCA examinations. **(T-1)** The PPMO will coordinate all post-judicial PCA requests with the AFOSI Judge Advocate Directorate (AFOSI/JA). **(T-1)**

3.9. Waiver, Deviations, or Exceptions to the Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Program Policy. Any person or entity requesting a waiver to the DAF PCA Program policy will submit a letter, message, or other document through the DAF Polygraph Program Manager to the AFOSI/CC. **(T-0)** AFOSI will process all waiver requests through SecAF to the DoD PCA Program Policy Office and then to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSD(P)) for resolution. **(T-0)**

STEPHEN L. DAVIS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

10 USC § 127, *Emergency and Extraordinary Expenses*

10 USC §§ 801–946a, *Uniform Code of Military Justice*

10 USC § 1561, *Complaints of Sexual Harassment: Independent Investigation*

18 USC, Chapter 44, *Firearms*, Presidential Memorandum, *Tracing of Firearms in Connection with Criminal Investigations*

18 USC § 922, *The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act*

18 USC §§ 3261–3267, *Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act*

31 USC §§ 3801–3812, *Administrative Remedies for False Claims and Statements*

EO 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities, 4 December 1981, as amended*

DoDD 5200.27, *Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense, 7 January 1980*

DoDD 5400.11, *DoD Privacy Program, 29 October 2014*

DoDD 5505.13E, *DoD Executive Agent (EA) for the DoD Cyber Crime Center (DC3), 1 March 2010*

DoDI 2000.26, *DoD Use of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) eGuardian System, 4 December 2019*

DoDI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, 27 February 2013*

DoDI 5154.30, *Armed Forces Medical Examiner System (AFMES) Operations, 29 December 2015*

DoDI 5210.91, *Polygraph and Credibility Assessment (PCA) Procedures, 12 August 2010,*

DoDI 5400.15, *Guidance on Obtaining Information from Financial Institutions, 2 December 2004*

DoDI 5505.02, *Criminal Investigations of Fraud Offenses, 29 August 2013*

DoDI 5505.03, *Initiation of Investigations by Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations, 2 August 2023*

DoDI 5505.07, *Titling and Indexing by DoD Law Enforcement Activities, 8 August 2023*

DoDI 5505.09, *Communication Interception for Law Enforcement, 22 August 2023*

DoDI 5505.10, *Criminal Investigations of Noncombat Deaths, 16 March 2023*

DoDI 5505.11, *Fingerprint Reporting Requirements, 31 October 2019*

DoDI 5505.14, *DNA Collection and Submission Requirements for Law Enforcement, 5 April 2022*

DoDI 5505.15, *DoD Contractor Disclosure Program*, 3 June 2021

DoDI 5505.16, *Investigations by DoD Components*, 23 June 2017

DoDI 5505.17, *Personally Identifiable Information and Law Enforcement Information Handling by DoD Law Enforcement Activities*, 22 August 2023

DoDI 5505.18, *Investigation of Adult Sexual Assault in the Department of Defense*, 22 March 2017

DoDI 5505.19, *Establishment of Special Victim Investigation and Prosecution (SVIP) Capability within the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations (MCIOs)*, 3 February 2015

DoDI 5525.16, *Law Enforcement Defense Data Exchange (LE D-DEx)*, 29 August 2013

DoDI 5525.18, *Law Enforcement Criminal Intelligence (CRIMINT) in DoD*, 18 October 2013

DoDI 6400.06, *DoD Coordinated Community Response to Domestic Abuse Involving DoD Military and Certain Affiliated Personnel*, 15 December 2021

DoDI 6495.02 V1, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures*, 28 March 2013

DoDI 7050.03, *Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense Access to Records and Information*, 22 March 2013

DoDM 5100.76, *Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)*, 17 April 2012

DoDM 5240.01, *Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities*, 8 August 2016

AFMD 39, *Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI)*, 12 February 2024

AFPD 71-1, *Criminal Investigations and Counterintelligence*, 1 July 2019

AFI 14-404, *Intelligence Oversight*, 3 September 2019

AFI 17-130, *Cybersecurity Program Management*, 13 February 2020

DAFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, 25 March 2020

AFI 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, 23 March 2020

AFI 33-332, *Air Force Privacy and Civil Liberties Program*, 10 March 2020

DAFI 36-2710, *Equal Opportunity Program*, 23 May 2024

DAFI 36-3012, *Military Entitlements*, 6 April 2023

DAFI 51-201, *Administration of Military Justice*, 24 January 2024

DAFI 51-202, *Nonjudicial Punishment*, 4 January 2022

DAFI 51-1101, *Acquisitions Integrity Program*, 4 Oct 2021

AFI 90-6001, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program*, 15 July 2020

AFMAN 11-502, *Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems*, 29 July 2019

DoDM 5200.01 V2_AFMAN 16-1404 V2, *Information Security Program: Marking Information*, 7 January 2021

DoDM5200.08 V3_AFMAN 31-101 V3, *Installation Perimeter Access Control*, 27 February 2020

DoDM 5400.07_AFMAN 33-302, *Freedom of Information Act Program*, 27 April 2018
AFMAN 71-102, *Air Force Criminal Indexing*, 21 July 2020

DAFMAN 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures*, 18 October 2023

AFOSIMAN 71-122 V1, *Criminal Investigations*, 15 July 2024

AFOSIMAN 71-122 V2, *Fraud and Corruption Investigations*, 30 July 2024

F071 AF OSI D, *Investigative Information Management System (I2MS)*, 28 August 2006
Manual for *Courts-Martial, United States*, 2024 Edition

Prescribed Forms

DAF Form 3984, *AFOSI Sexual Harassment Case Referral Form*

AF Form 3985, *Interview Record*

AF Form 3986, *Case File Documents Outer Envelope*

AF Form 3987, *Case File Documents Inner Envelope*

Adopted Forms

FD 249, *Arrest and Institution Fingerprint Card*

FBI R-84 Form, *Final Disposition Report*

DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

§—Section

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFMAN—Air Force Manual

AFMD—Air Force Mission Directive

AFOSI—Air Force Office of Special Investigations

AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive

AFR—Air Force Reserve

ANG—Air National Guard

BCIP—Base Criminal Investigations Partnership

CI&O—Cyber Investigations and Operations

CI—Counterintelligence

CIA—Central Intelligence Agency
CLEO—Conservation Law Enforcement Official
CLEP—Conservation Law Enforcement Program
DAFMAN—Department of the Air Force Manual
DCII—Defense Central Index of Investigations
DC3—DoD Cyber Crime Center
DFC—Digital Forensic Consultant
DNA—Deoxyribonucleic Acid
DoD—Department of Defense
DoDD—Department of Defense Directive
DoDI—Department of Defense Instruction
DoDM—Department of Defense Manual
DV/IPV—Domestic Violence/Interpersonal Violence
EO—Executive Order
FBI—Federal Bureau of Investigation
FC—Fusion Center
FD—Federal Document
FOIA—Freedom of Information Act
IAW—In Accordance With
IDFC—Installation Defense Force Commander
IPST—Investigation and Prosecution Support Team
L1—Level 1
LE—Law Enforcement
LE D-DEx—Law Enforcement Defense Data Exchange
MCIO—Military Criminal Investigative Organizations
MAJCOM—Major Command
NCIC—National Crime Information Center
OAFME—Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner
OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility
OSTC—Office of Special Trial Counsel
PCA—Polygraph and Credibility Assessment
PPMO—Polygraph Program Management Office

ROI—Report of Investigation

SAF—Secretariat Offices within the HAF

SARC—Sexual Assault Response Coordinator

SAR—Suspicious Activity Report

SecAF—Secretary of the Air Force

SF—Security Forces

STC—Special Trial Counsel

SORN—System of Records Notice

SVIP—Special Victim Investigation and Prosecution

THC—Tetrahydrocannabinol

UCMJ—Uniform Code of Military Justice

USAFSIA—United States Air Force Special Investigations Academy

USC—United States Code

Office Symbols

AF-CJIC—Air Force Criminal Justice Information Center

AFOSI FSS/MSII—FOIA—AFOSI Field Support Squadron, Information Release Branch, FOIA

AFOSI ICON CENTER—AFOSI, Investigations Collections Operations Nexus Center

AFOSI PJ—AFOSI, Office of Special Projects

AFOSI/CC—Commander, AFOSI

AFOSI/CD—Deputy Commander, AFOSI

AFOSI/JA—AFOSI, Judge Advocate Directorate

AFOSI/PA—AFOSI, Public Affairs Directorate

AFOSI/XRG—AFOSI, Requirements Directorate, Criminal and Fraud Investigations

DoD OIG—DoD Office of Inspector General

DUSD (P)—Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SAF/AA—Administrative Assistant to Secretary of the Air Force

SAF/IG—The Inspector General of the Air Force

SAF/IGX—SAF/IG, Special Investigations Directorate

Terms

Accidental Death—A death from inadvertent action or action where no harm was intended.

Action Authority—The authority primarily responsible for taking judicial, nonjudicial or administrative action on a subject.

Active Duty—Full-time duty in the active military service of the US. This includes AFR and ANG members serving on active duty or full-time training duty but does not include full-time ANG members who are not serving in federal status (i.e., status created by orders issued under the authority of Title 10 USC).

DAF Record—Records owned or in the possession of DAF personnel, sections, divisions, or entities.

Counterintelligence (CI)—Information gathered, and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.

Covered Offense—Criminal offenses subject to the exclusive authority of the OSTC, as defined by Article 1 (17), UCMJ.

Credible Information—Information disclosed or obtained by a DoD LE agency person that, considering the source and nature of the information and the totality of the circumstances, is sufficiently believable to lead a trained DoD LE agency person to presume the fact or facts in question are true.

Criminal Investigation—An investigation of possible criminal violations of Title 10 USC, the *Uniform Code of Military Justice*, or, when appropriate, state, or local statutes or ordinances or foreign law.

Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII)—A computerized, central index of investigations for all DoD investigative activities managed by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency.

Domestic Violence—The use, attempted use, or threatened use of force or violence against a person, or a violation of a lawful order issued for the protection of a person, who is one or more of the following: Current or former spouse, person with whom the alleged abuser shares a child in common, current or former intimate partner with whom the alleged abuser shares or has shared a common domicile, person who is or has been in a social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the accused and determined to be an intimate partner.

Detainee—Is as defined in Air Force Joint Instruction 31-304, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and other Detainees*. In addition, a detainee also includes anyone who is apprehended, arrested, or held against their liberty during a LE investigation.

Electronic Communication—Any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature, transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo-electronic, or photo-optical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include the following: any wire or oral communication; any communication made through a tone-only paging device; any communication from a tracking device as defined by 18 USC § 3117; *Mobile Tracking Devices*, electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds; 18 USC § 2510(12), *Electronic Communication*.

Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Funds (E-Funds)—E-Funds used to further the CI and criminal investigative missions of the DAF. This subdivision of operation and maintenance funds is allocated to AFOSI, through SAF/IG, by the SecAF under certain legal restrictions to reimburse investigators for authorized expenses incurred in the performance of their assigned duties.

Enemy Prisoner of War—A person who is described by Articles 4 and 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, *Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*.

Indexing—The recording of information so that an orderly retrieval process can identify and access a particular file or investigation.

Interception—The aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device. The term "contents," when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication; 18 USC § 2510(4), *Intercept*.

Naloxone Nasal Spray (NARCAN®)—An opioid overdose reversal treatment kit.

Oral Communication—Any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic communication; 18 USC § 2510 (2), *Oral Communication*.

Pen Register—A device that records or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached, but does not include any device used by a provider and/or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided by such a provider, or any device used by a provider and/or customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business; 18 USC § 3127(3), *Pen Register*.

Report of Investigation (ROI)—The official written record of an AFOSI or SF investigation.

Servicing Legal Office—Any prosecutorial office assigned to a case, examples include but are not limited to; the installation legal office, the Assistant United States Attorney's Office, and, if applicable, the OSTC District Office.

Subject/Suspect—A person, corporation, or other legal entity about which credible information exists that would cause trained DoD LE agency personnel to believe they committed a criminal offense.

Suicide—A death resulting from purposeful action intended to result in one's own death.

Summary—A condensed version of a ROI that succinctly discusses the allegation and results of the investigation. It may include copies of statements. A judicial or administrative proceeding may use a summary.

Tier 0 (T-0)—Determined by respective non-Air Force authority (e.g., Congress, White House, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff). The requirement is external to the DAF. Requests for waivers must be processed through command channels to publication OPR for consideration.

Tier 1 (T-1)—Non-compliance puts Airmen, Guardians, commanders, or the DAF strongly at risk of mission or program failure, death, injury, legal jeopardy or unacceptable fraud, waste, or abuse. T-1 waiver requests may be granted at the MAJCOM Commander level, but may not be delegated lower than MAJCOM Director, with the concurrence of the publication's approving official.

Tier 2 (T-2)—Non-compliance has the potential to create moderate risk of mission or program degradation or failure, injury, legal jeopardy or unacceptable fraud, waste, or abuse. Waivers may be granted at the MAJCOM Commander level but may not be delegated lower than MAJCOM Director.

Tier 3 (T-3)—Non-compliance has a relatively remote potential to create risk of mission or program degradation or failure, injury, legal jeopardy or unacceptable fraud, waste, or abuse. Waivers may be granted at the Wing, DRU, FOA, and Commander level.

Titling—Placing the name of a person, corporation, legal entity, organization, or occurrence in the subject block of an investigative report. Titling is an operational, rather than a legal decision. Final responsibility for the decision to title an individual or entity rests with AFOSI. Titling and indexing do not, in and of themselves, imply any degree of guilt or innocence.

Trap and Trace Device—A device that identifies the originating number of an instrument or device that transmitted a wire or electronic communication; 18 USC § 3127(4), *Trap and Trace Device*.

United States (US)—For this instruction, the 50 states of the US, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the US.

US Person—For this instruction, US citizens, aliens admitted to the US for permanent residence, corporations incorporated in the US, and unincorporated associations organized in the US and substantially composed of US citizens or aliens admitted for permanent residence.

User—Any person or entity who uses an electronic communication service and is duly authorized by the provider of such service to engage in such use; 18 USC § 2510(13), *User*.

Victim—IAW definitions in DAFI 51-201, DAFI 51-207, and throughout the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), a victim is a person who has suffered direct physical, emotional, or financial harm as the result of an offense. The definition of victim varies throughout the military justice process and that definition governs what rights are afforded the victims, as defined. Therefore, practitioners must consult the MCM to determine which definition of victim applies at each stage to determine which rights apply.

Wire Communication—Any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce; 18 USC § 2510(1), *Wire Communication*.

Attachment 2

AFOSI AND SECURITY FORCES INVESTIGATIVE MATRIX

Table A2.1. AFOSI and SF Investigative Matrix.

RULE	If the alleged matter involves:	Then contact	
		AFOSI about:	DAF Security Forces about:
1	Assault and Domestic Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Aggravated assault resulting in grievous bodily harm. (See Note 1). •Any assault involving strangulation or suffocation. •Any assault committed during the commission of another crime investigated by AFOSI. •AFOSI and SF will conduct joint interviews for DV/Interpersonal Violence (IPV) offenses to determine if the allegation meets AFOSI’s threshold. •At a minimum, AFOSI will be present for interview(s) where there is a potential for substantial bodily harm against the victim, if the victim is pregnant and/or if there are prior incidents of violence that appear to be escalating in severity. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All other
2	Child Endangerment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Physical, sexual, or psychological maltreatment or neglect that places a child in imminent danger of death, grievous bodily injury, or significant mental harm. (see Note 1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unreasonable corporal punishment not resulting in grievous bodily injury. (see Note 1). •All other cases or as deferred by AFOSI.
3	Bad Checks, Forgery, and Counterfeiting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Major cases involving the US Treasury or other federal agencies, false documents or credentials manufactured to commit significant fraud/theft or misrepresentation to the DoD (e.g., fake education and/or medical certificates to gain DAF employment as a physician, fraudulent performance reports, fraudulent identification use to access sensitive/classified areas, etc.). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Insufficient funds checks; minor counterfeiting cases (e.g., fraudulent identification cards used to misrepresent age) and other instances not resulting in significant harm to the DoD.

R U L E	If the alleged matter involves:	Then contact	
		AFOSI about:	DAF Security Forces about:
4	Black Marketing and Customs Violations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Organized criminal enterprises involving significant financial gains. •Major cases involving active investigations with host-nation investigative agencies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All other cases or as deferred by AFOSI.
5	Bribery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •None
6	Combat Related Inquiries (e.g., LOAC and Treaty Violations)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All, unless deferred to SF. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •None, unless deferred by AFOSI.
7	Computer Crimes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Cases involving downloading and/or distribution of child pornography/child abuse material. •Unauthorized root/user level intrusions to DAF or DoD information systems. •Illegal interception of computer communications. •Malware/Virus/Trojan/denial of service attacks causing significant damage to DAF or DoD information systems or have major impact on the DAF or DoD mission. •Alteration of web pages that cause significant damage or disruption to DAF or DoD activities. •Any computer crimes involving classified information, espionage, or terrorism. •Cases involving broadcasting or distribution of intimate visual images when the victim does not consent to the broadcast and distribution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Minor incidents. •Unauthorized personal use of government computers. •General violations of AFI 17-130, <i>Cybersecurity Program Management</i>.
8	Crimes Involving DoD and DAF Contracts and Procurement Matters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All, unless deferred to SF. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •None, unless deferred by AFOSI.

R U L E	If the alleged matter involves:	Then contact	
		AFOSI about:	DAF Security Forces about:
9	Compromise of USAF Test Materials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •None
10	Deaths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All, except on-base vehicle fatalities where foul play or suicide are not suspected. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All on-base vehicle deaths unless foul play or suicide are suspected. •SF must notify AFOSI of attempted self-harm that could have resulted in death
11	Drug Offenses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Sale, transfer, trafficking, or smuggling. •Selected use or possession or introduction cases with likelihood of identifying dealers and traffickers. •All investigations involving off-base activities by persons not subject to the UCMJ. •All cases involving manufacture and cultivation. •AFOSI and SF will conduct joint interviews of drug violation suspects to determine the lead investigative agency with AFOSI focusing on drug distribution/manufacturing. •AFOSI will be present for all positive urinalysis, simple use, and possession interviews involving drugs except for those involving Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) or THC derivatives. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Simple use, possession, or introduction cases. •Cases involving results from random urinalysis. •Note: AFOSI will assume investigative responsibilities for all cases initiated through AFOSI investigative activities.
12	Environmental Crimes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All, unless deferred to SF. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •None, unless deferred by AFOSI.

R U L E	If the alleged matter involves:	Then contact	
		AFOSI about:	DAF Security Forces about:
13	Firearm/Weapon Violations – Unlawful Discharge, Unlawful Possession or Concealment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Any discharges or attempted discharges that do or could result in death/grievous bodily harm or when used in the commission of another crime investigated by AFOSI (See Note 1) •Federal firearms crimes in violation of 18 USC § 922, <i>The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All others •Notify AFOSI of any violations of illegal firearms prohibitions
14	Fraudulent Enlistment, Appointment, Discharge, or Separation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •None, unless AFOSI specifically assumes investigative responsibility (selected major incidents on a case-by-case basis). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All, unless assumed by AFOSI.

R U L E	If the alleged matter involves:	Then contact	
		AFOSI about:	DAF Security Forces about:
15	<p>Involuntary Absence</p> <p>Note: An Involuntary Absence is anytime a service member is absent from their place of duty, without any indication that they have made an unimpaired decision to be absent. This can be but is not limited to absences due to mental health crises, kidnapping, vehicle accident, or similar circumstances.</p> <p>All absences are presumed to be involuntary unless there are specific facts indicating a voluntary absence.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •SF and AFOSI will jointly work all situations involving an involuntary absence to ensure that all available LE resources are engaged to find the missing member as quickly as possible to avoid any potential harm to the member or other individuals. •Units will notify either SF or AFOSI as early as possible when an individual is believed to be missing and reasonable measures have been taken to make contact with the member. After initial notification, units will work to quickly provide contact information that the unit has for family/friends and coworkers of the missing member. •SF and AFOSI will coordinate LE efforts to locate an involuntarily absent member and ensure that all actions within the respective spheres are utilized to find the missing member. Additionally, SF and AFOSI will ensure the individual is input into NCIC as a missing person. •LE actions can include exigent phone location ‘pings,’ sector sweeps of an installation, ECP BOLOs, coordination with state/local authorities, and interviews of coworkers, or friends/family, depending on the exact facts and circumstances of the situation. 	

R U L E	If the alleged matter involves:	Then contact	
		AFOSI about:	DAF Security Forces about:
16	<p>Voluntary Absence</p> <p>Note: A Voluntary Absence is a situation in which a member is absent, and there is specific information to indicate the individual has made an unimpaired decision to be absent.</p> <p>Note: Even if either SF or AFOSI is lead on a particular voluntary absence criminal investigation, both agencies must be actively involved, to the extent allowable by jurisdictional considerations, in locating the individual.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fugitive and Desertion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All others

R U L E	If the alleged matter involves:	Then contact	
		AFOSI about:	DAF Security Forces about:
17	Housebreaking, Burglary, Unlawful Entry, and Larceny	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Entry into a SCIF or other controlled/sensitive area. •Involves the commission of another crime investigated by AFOSI. •Cases involving significant losses, determined on a case-by-case basis at the installation level. •Loss exceeding \$10,000 (or approximate value as determined by AFOSI). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Local incidents involving base dormitories and housing. •Cases deferred by AFOSI.
18	Impersonation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •None, unless committed in conjunction with another crime investigated by AFOSI. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All others.
19	Improper Use or Diversion of Government Property, Larceny, Larceny by Fraud, Theft of Government Property	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Controlled pharmaceuticals. •Arms, ammunition, or explosives addressed in DoDM 5100.76, <i>Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)</i>. •Losses having a direct impact to critical DAF weapons systems. •Significant losses, determined on a case-by-case basis at the installation level. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Cases deferred by AFOSI.
20	Intimidation/Threats (Extortion, Kidnapping, Bomb Threats, Intimidation, Bias and/or Hate Crimes, Active Participation in Extremist and/or Supremacist Groups)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Extortion, kidnapping, and incidents involving grievous bodily harm (See Note 1). •Threats to injure or extort money or favors from others where an overt act occurs. •Active participation in extremist or supremacist groups prohibited by DAF Instruction(s) unless deferred to SF. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Bomb threats, unless assumed by AFOSI. •Threats to injure or extort money or favors from others where no overt act actually occurs. •Cases deferred by AFOSI.

R U L E	If the alleged matter involves:	Then contact	
		AFOSI about:	DAF Security Forces about:
21	Misconduct (various Article 134, UCMJ offenses) not otherwise provided for in this Attachment	•None, unless AFOSI specifically assumes investigative responsibility (selected major incidents on a case-by-case basis).	•All, unless assumed by AFOSI.
22	National Security Matters- Threats and Acts of Espionage, Unauthorized Disclosure, Sabotage Cause by FIE, Treason, Subversion, Assassinations, Proliferation of Export-controlled Materials, Terrorism (Bombings, Hijackings, Kidnapping, and Thefts of Weapons, Explosives, and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction) Disclosure, and Sabotage.	•All	•None
23	Non-fatal Self-Injurious Events (NFSE)	•None, unless death is a likely future outcome from the NFSE.	•All. Note: Notify AFOSI if the death is a likely future outcome from the NFSE.

R U L E	If the alleged matter involves:	Then contact	
		AFOSI about:	DAF Security Forces about:
24	Pay-and-Allowance Matters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •None, unless Subject is a senior official (current or retired O-6, E-9, GS-15, or above). •Subject is currently the focus of another AFOSI investigation. •Significant losses, determined by AFOSI on a case-by-case basis at the installation level. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All, unless assumed by AFOSI. •SF will notify AFOSI if the allegation involves large scale manipulation of the financial management system, a member of the Comptroller Squadron, suspected ring activity, and/or forged documents
25	Perjury	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All, unless deferred to SF. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Cases deferred by AFOSI.
26	Postal Violations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Drug smuggling. •Used to commit other offenses (child pornography, major customs violations, etc.). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All others.
27	Property Destruction, Arson, Bombing, Intentional Damage to DAF Aircraft or Equipment, and Intentional Damage to Government or Private Property	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Arson, unless deferred. •Intentional damage to DAF aircraft or Protection Level 1, 2, or 3 resources (See Note 3). •Other incidents involving major damages and/or loss, determined by AFOSI on a case-by-case basis at the installation level. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Incidents of damage to private property. •Cases deferred by AFOSI.
28	Prostitution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •None, unless specialized circumstances (e.g., involves significant human trafficking, major organized crime activity) exist and AFOSI specifically assumes investigative responsibility. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All, unless assumed by AFOSI.
29	Robbery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •All incidents of armed robbery or incidents resulting in grievous bodily harm (See Note 1). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Incidents in which the offender is not armed.

R U L E	If the alleged matter involves:	Then contact	
		AFOSI about:	DAF Security Forces about:
30	Security Violations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •None, unless Rule 19 applies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Cases to support command responsibilities according to DoDM5200.01 V2_ AFMAN 16-1404 V3, <i>Information Security Program: Protection of Classified information.</i>
31	Sex Crimes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rape, Sexual Assault, Aggravated Sexual Contact, and Abusive Sexual Contact, in violation of Article 120, UCMJ. • Forcible Sodomy (oral or anal sex), committed before 1 January 2019, in violation of Article 125, UCMJ. Offenses occurring on or after 1 January 2019 are covered above in the first bullet. • Attempts to commit any of the above offenses, in violation of Article 80, UCMJ. • Forcible Pandering, Indecent Viewing (e.g., Active Duty Airmen watching a dependent minor undress) and Indecent Exposure (e.g., Active Duty Airmen exposing his penis to a dependent minor), in violation of Article 120c, UCMJ. Accepts for investigation based on severity at the discretion of unit leadership. • An unprofessional relationship involving an authority figure (See Note 2) and either vaginal intercourse, oral or anal sodomy, digital penetration of the vagina or anus, or the fondling of the genitalia or female breasts, in violation of Article 93a or Article 92, UCMJ. • Wrongful broadcast or distribution of intimate visual images in violation of Article 117a, UCMJ, unless deferred. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indecent Viewing (e.g., Active Duty Airmen watching a coworker in the shower), Indecent Recording where no distribution occurred, and Indecent Exposure (e.g., Active Duty Airmen mooning peers at a unit function), in violation of Article 120c, UCMJ. Allegations referred by AFOSI or declined for investigation by AFOSI. • An unprofessional relationship involving an authority figure (see Note 2), punishable under Article 93a or Article 92, UCMJ, that does not involve vaginal intercourse, oral or anal sodomy, digital penetration of the vagina or anus, or the fondling of the genitalia or female breasts.

R U L E	If the alleged matter involves:	Then contact	
		AFOSI about:	DAF Security Forces about:
32	Sexual Harassment (Meeting elements of Article 134, UCMJ)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sexual harassment offenses described in paragraph 2.19.2 or where sexual harassment is secondary to another offense within AFOSI’s purview. • <p>**Note: Reference paragraph 2.19.2 for further details.</p>	All, unless assumed by AFOSI as described in paragraph 2.19.2.
33	Stalking	• Stalking in violation of Article 130, UCMJ, when associated with physical violence.	• Stalking, unless physical violence exists.
34	Traffic Offenses – DUI, Impaired Driving, Reckless Driving, Major Accidents, Fleeing the Scene, Eluding Police	• None, unless homicide or suicide is suspected.	• All, unless homicide or suicide is suspected.
35	Unmanned Aerial Systems Incidents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Respond IAW AFOSIMAN 71-122 Volume 1, <i>Criminal Investigations</i>. • IAW DoDI 2000.26, at a minimum, AFOSI will submit a SAR via the FBI eGuardian system. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document all incidents and respond as appropriate. • Immediately notify the local AFOSI Detachment.

Notes:

1. Grievous bodily harm as defined in the UCMJ is a bodily injury that involves: (i) a substantial risk of death; (ii) extreme physical pain; (iii) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or (iv) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.
2. Authority figures are defined as:
 1. By rank: E-9 or O-6 and above.
 2. By Unit Position: First Sergeants, Unit Commanders.
 3. Superiors, Rating Officials, Supervisors with unit members (AFOSI Unit Commanders can defer appropriate incidents involving Superiors, Rating Officials, or Supervisors when the alleged offender is E-8 and below or O-5 and below).
 4. Military Training Leader/Military Training Instructor when the incident or alleged incident involves trainees.
 5. Official training/Professional Military Education instructors/staff with students.
 6. Recruiters when the alleged incident involves recruits.
 7. Cadets in position of authority over junior ranking cadets.
 8. Medical, psychological, pastoral, legal or other professionals when the alleged incident involves persons receiving their services.
 9. Official training instructor, Professional Military Education instructor, and staff members when the incident or alleged incident involves students.
3. Protection Level 1, 2, or 3 resources are defined in DAFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*.

Attachment 3

AFOSI AND CONSERVATION LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM INVESTIGATIVE MATRIX

Table A3.1. AFOSI and Conservation Law Enforcement Program Investigative Matrix.

R U L E	If the alleged matter involves:	Then contact	
		AFOSI about:	DAF CLEP Official about:
1	Poaching (including endangered or protected species)	•None, unless ring type activity is suspected, or the activity involves entry into a controlled/sensitive area.	•All, unless assumed by AFOSI.
2	Destruction or Intentional Damage to Protected Historical or Cultural Sites	•Incidents involving major damages/losses, determined by AFOSI on a case-by-case basis at the installation level.	•Cases deferred by AFOSI.
3	Environmental Crimes	•All, unless deferred.	•Cases deferred by AFOSI.
4	Wild Land Fires	•Arson, unless deferred.	•All, unless assumed by AFOSI.
5	Forest Product Sales, Grazing/ Cropland Operations	•None, unless involves suspected fraudulent activity.	•All, unless assumed by AFOSI.
<p>Notes: 1. CLEOs ensure that AFOSI is promptly notified prior to the initiation of any criminal investigation.</p>			

Attachment 4

**BASE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS PARTNERSHIP FOR EXECUTION OF
CRIMINAL AND FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS MEMORANDUM**

Figure A4.1. Base Criminal Investigations Partnership for Execution of Criminal and Fraud Investigations Memorandum.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC

24 July 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL INSTALLATION DFCS, ALL OSI FIELD UNITS

FROM: AF/A4S and OSI/CC

SUBJECT: Security Forces – Office of Special Investigations Base Criminal Investigations Partnership for Execution of Criminal and Fraud Investigations

1. Changes in mission focus and structure within Security Forces (SF) and the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) have created the potential for gaps in criminal and fraud investigative coverage for our Department of the Air Force (DAF) Wings. It is agreed we must optimize our collective investigative capabilities and continue building upon a more structured base-level partnership since the initial conceptualization of the Joint Base Enforcement Team on 24 May 2021, now referred to as the Base Criminal Investigations Partnership (BCIP).

2. OSI and SF determined a need to progress the original partnership intent beyond the initial memorandum to better service our supported commanders and populations. Focus is pivoting away from certain entitlement and drug-based offenses and steering towards Domestic Violence (DV)/Interpersonal Violence (IPV) offenses, as there is an emerging need to improve the DAF's response to these offenses. The intent moving forward with BCIP is to build a culture of base-level joint operations and intelligence sharing and run cases efficiently and effectively within each unit's capabilities, as allowed in the AFI 71-101, Volume 1, Attachment 2, Investigative Matrix (hereafter referred to as "the Matrix"). SF and OSI will partner at the installation level as follows*:

a. Pay, Allowance and Entitlements (PAE): OSI will defer most allegations to Security Forces IAW the Matrix and AFOSIMAN 71-122, Volume 2, *Fraud and Corruption Investigations*. OSI will take lead on PAE cases where the subject is a senior official (defined as a current or retired O6, GS-15 or above) or if the subject is currently the focus of another OSI investigations. SF will notify OSI in the event the allegation involves large scale manipulation of a financial management system, a member of the Comptroller Squadron, suspected ring activity, and/or forged documents.

b. Drug Offenses: Security Forces and OSI will conduct joint interviews of drug violation suspects to determine the lead investigative agency IAW the Matrix, with OSI focusing on drug distribution/manufacturing. OSI will be present for all positive urinalysis (UA) interviews involving drugs except for those involving Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) or THC derivatives. OSI field leadership will retain discretion at the unit level to participate in interviews for positive THC UAs.

c. Domestic Violence (DV)/Interpersonal Violence (IPV): OSI and SF will conduct joint interviews for DV/IPV offenses to determine if the allegation meets OSI's threshold per the Matrix. At a minimum, OSI will be present for interview(s) where there is a potential for substantial bodily harm against the victim, if the victim is pregnant and/or if there are prior incidents of violence that appear to be escalating in severity.

d. See attached memorandum, Subject: Implementation of Criminal Investigation and Prosecution (CIP) Capability, signed 24 May 2021. The CIP memorandum codifies best practices developed by OSI, S2I, and The Judge Advocate General's Corps (TJAGC) over recent years, integrating special agents, investigators, attorneys, and paralegals into specialized teams at the inception of an

investigation, through trial, and in post-trial assessments. These practices are collectively defined as the CIP capability. A CIP team is charged to ensure the capability is employed in every criminal case. We assess this CIP capability also presents an opportunity for the installation members to share information more generally, beyond a particular investigation; an information-sharing venue we may build upon in the future.

**Note: Due to jurisdictional considerations, paragraph 2 does not apply to Guard and Reserve SF units at this time. OSI support to reserve bases w/ no S2I is flexible, and the level of support will remain at discretion of OSI Region/CCs.*

3. SF members currently detailed to OSI units under the previous Joint Drug Enforcement Team and Joint Sexual Assault Team (JDET/JSAT) constructs will return to SF at the expiration of any existing Memorandum of Agreements or Understandings (MOAs/MOUs). No new MOAs/MOUs will be approved. SF members will not receive OSI credentials under the BCIP.

4. Local OSI and SF units will conduct, at a minimum, joint annual training on investigation types codified in this memorandum. Moreover, the Criminal Justice Working Group (CJWG) will lead long-term efforts to collect enterprise feedback and continue to adjust the BCIP as necessary at our DAF Wings.

5. This memorandum serves as official policy guidance until AFI 71-101, Volume 1, dated 1 July 2019, is updated/published. This memorandum supersedes the 24 May 2021 Joint Base Enforcement Team memorandum titled: Security Forces – Office of Special Investigations Partnering to Ensure the Execution of Base-Level Criminal and Fraud Investigations.

6. Point of Contacts (POCs) for this partnership are Col William Smith, Chief, Operations and Training Division, AF/A4SO, william.smith.43@us.af.mil and SA Ashlee Wega, Director of Law Enforcement, HQ OSI/XRG, ashlee.wega@us.af.mil.

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Date: 2023.07.24 09:53:00 -0400

GERALD.TIMOTHY.A.1058409622
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TIMOTHY A. GERALD, SES, DAF
Deputy Director of Security Forces
DCS/Logistics, Engineering & Force Protection

Digitally signed by
GERALD.TIMOTHY.A.1058409622
Date: 2023.05.05 15:34:27 -0400

Attachments:
Memorandum, Subject: Implementation of Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Capability