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PURPOSE: This Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) document describes the activities the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) employs in support of Integrated Defense (ID). AFOSI conducts counterintelligence, criminal investigations, and operations to find, fix, track, and neutralize enemy threats to promote Air Force operations. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained IAW Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management of Records, and disposed of IAW the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) in the Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS). Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF IMT 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route AF IMT 847s from the field through the appropriate career field functional manager’s chain of command. This publication applies to regular Air Force military and civilian personnel and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG) personnel when published in the AFRCIND 2 and ANGIND 2. The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES: The following are a summary of changes to the ID CTO TTP: renames Client Service Administrator to Administrative Support (paragraph 2.1.4) with definition; adds language to Linguist (paragraph 2.1.7); adds SPOT reports to Reporting (Paragraph 3.3); adds applicable policy in the US Air Force Special Investigations Academy (USAFSIA) Counterthreat Operations Course (CTOC) (paragraph 4.2); updates Attachment 3 Reading List.

SCOPE: This Air Force TTP describes command and organizational relationships, execution using functional capabilities, and training requirements to conduct effective CTO. While these TTP principles are focused on expeditionary operations in high threat locations, the tactical doctrine principles remain the same for home-station operations.
Chapter 1
COUNTERTHREAT OPERATIONS (CTO) OVERVIEW

1.1. Overview. AFMD-39, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, directs AFOSI to find, fix, track, and neutralize enemy threats in order to create a sustained permissive environment for air, space, and cyberspace operations. AFOSI utilizes its five core capabilities in support of this mission directive. These are: Detect and Mitigate Threats; Engage Foreign Adversaries and/or Threats Offensively; Conduct Major Criminal Offense Investigations; Provide Global Specialized Services; and Protect Critical Technologies and Information. CTO are intelligence-driven operations employing information derived from multiple intelligence and counterintelligence sources. These operations provide commanders tactical situational awareness, drive force protection conditions, and forewarn of possible attacks. AFOSI operational activities seamlessly collect, fuse, and disseminate relevant threat information from a broad array of sources on a continual basis. Successful CTO execution requires strong collaboration and coordination between AFOSI personnel and direct action forces to effectively neutralize enemy threats. Within the US Air Force, AFOSI executes CTO by integrating all AFOSI capabilities into the Air Force "kill chain" cycle to achieve the desired effects. CTO tactical doctrine is a compilation of knowledge and expertise and describes the appropriate AFOSI role in integrated defense (ID) in hostile, uncertain, and permissive environments.

1.1.1. The following activities are conducted in support of CTO; counterintelligence (CI) collections, analysis, investigations, offensive and defensive CI operations, law enforcement activities, evidence collection, liaison, threat detection, functional services such as technical services, polygraph, clinical psychology, protective service operations (PSO), surveillance, counter-surveillance, surveillance detection, tactical debriefing, field interviews, and defensive capabilities in cyberspace.

1.1.2. CTO Planning. AFOSI units should develop effective CTO plans to support an effects-based approach to operations (EBAO). “An effects-based approach to military operations means taking action against enemy systems so as to create specific effects that contribute directly to desired military and political outcomes.” Defining the battlespace environment is critical to conducting successful CTO (i.e., Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)). CTO plans consist of, but are not limited to, a unit’s mission, map layout illustrating areas of concern/areas of influence, focused collection requirements, identified threats, and potential adversary courses of action (COA).

1.1.3. CTO Training. Conducting CTO missions can be inherently dangerous. For this reason, all efforts should be made to maximize training. Training is key to mission effectiveness. Effective ground combat skills are imperative to survival in hostile or uncertain environments. Initial and recurring field training on perishable skills is vital.

1.1.3.1. The USAFSIA CTOC trains AFOSI agents in realistic scenarios to perform in high-risk locations more efficiently and effectively. This training is a team-centered, operationally intense, execution-based immersion course designed to train agents in core deployment skills. Curriculum focuses on perishable skill sets used in hostile or non-permissive environments. Prior to a contingency deployment or assignment, all military and civilian AFOSI personnel are required to attend mandatory advanced training, in accordance with AFI 10-403 AFOSI Supplement – Operations, Deployment Planning and Execution.
Chapter 2

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

2.1. Organization. AFOSI prepares and organizes combat-ready forces to meet the needs of the Air Force. This implies a high level of training, flexibility in organization and equipment, and professional leadership. Although a standard force structure is not realistic for all contingencies, a deployed AFOSI force should have the following elements to effectively conduct CTO in concert with Service or joint command goals and objectives.

2.1.1. Leadership. Deployed AFOSI expeditionary leaders report directly to the senior agent deployed who is part of the COMAFFOR staff.

2.1.2. Special Agents. Deployed AFOSI expeditionary leaders normally ensure that deployed agent personnel have the requisite pre-deployment training to conduct CTO activities.

2.1.3. Special Agent Specialists. Some AFOSI personnel have received specialized training and perform a specialized mission. Deployed AFOSI expeditionary leaders usually organize and deploy specialists such as polygraph examiners, technical service technicians, computer crime investigators, case officers, and forensic science consultants to maximize combat effectiveness.

2.1.4. Administrative Support. Deployed administrative personnel normally have the requisite training and security clearances to conduct support functions (office management, human resources, executive support, postal/official mail, commander programs, and limited client level IT support) that enable the AFOSI unit or personnel to conduct the CTO mission.

2.1.5. Tactical Security Elements (TSE). Freedom of movement is crucial to conducting successful CTO. In hostile and some uncertain environments, AFOSI units and personnel should conduct CTO with dedicated security elements. A TSE is a squad-size element that provides the capability, equipment, and firepower to travel independently of other ground maneuver units. Forces for TSE may come from organic AF units or may be provided by other service or coalition forces.

2.1.6. Analysts. AFOSI units should have embedded analysts with the requisite skill and training to analyze enemy threats. AFOSI embedded analysts should continuously gather and fuse relevant threat information from a broad array of sources. CI analysis helps focus collection and targeting activities.

2.1.7. Linguists. AFOSI units should have embedded linguists, specializing in the languages spoken in the operational environment. The linguists should be vetted and have appropriate security clearances. Linguists should be employed at the lowest category to provide appropriate support.

2.2. Command Relationships. AFOSI Commanders maintain command and control over those forces assigned or attached to an AFOSI unit. Command relationships in a joint environment for AFOSI operations are derived from Joint Publications (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States; JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations; JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism; and JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater. Command authority for AFOSI forces conducting CTO is delegated from the Joint Force Commander (JFC), through the commander of Air Force forces (COMAFFOR), to the designated senior agent deployed. Administrative control (ADCON) for AFOSI forces remains within the Air Force chain of command at all times. See Figure 2.1.
2.2.1. The COMAFFOR exercises operational control (OPCON) over AFOSI CTO activities supporting force protection (See Figure 2.1) via the designated senior agent deployed. The Secretary of the Air Force retains responsibility for law enforcement, CI investigations, and associated matters, and exercises this responsibility through the Commander, AFOSI. In the case of forces attached to another Service to act in lieu of (ILO) that Service’s forces, OPCON may be delegated to the Air Force commander holding OPCON over all ILO forces.

2.2.2. AFOSI personnel not attached to an Air Expeditionary Task Force (AETF) who are performing the CTO mission in a Joint Operational Area (JOA) are normally under the operational control of the AFOSI senior agent deployed (e.g., personnel providing support to a contingency response group/contingency response element).

2.2.3. When the Air Force is the force providing TSE support to AFOSI, tactical control (TACON) of a TSE is assigned to the supported AFOSI detachment commander or Special Agent-in-Charge (SAIC) via the AFOSI senior agent deployed. This ensures continuity of mission execution and operational security. The SFS Commander retains OPCON and ADCON of TSE personnel. TSE supported missions must be jointly planned by AFOSI and TSE personnel to identify the objectives and evaluate risks associated with the proposed operation. Conflicts are normally resolved by the installation-level AFOSI and SFS commanders. During mission execution, the TSE patrol leader has TACON of the security mission to include directing convoy operations to and from the objective, as well as directing combat operations if the convoy comes under attack. The senior AFOSI special agent on the mission has TACON of operational CTO activities.

Figure 2.1. Command Relationships (JP 1).

2.2.4. AFOSI detachment commanders or SAICs normally coordinate their unit’s CTO activities in hostile and uncertain environments with the appropriate base operations center (e.g., Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC), Tactical Operations Center (TOC), Battle Space Owner, etc.) and maintain communications with that element to facilitate freedom of movement, unity of effort, and
safety of forces. AFOSI personnel, when operating in a joint/combined environment, must understand the rules of engagement (ROE), or the Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) established by the joint force commander.
Chapter 3

CTO EXECUTION CYCLE

3.1. The CTO Execution Cycle. Air Force CTO contributes to a keen awareness of the operating environment including Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), and it incorporates the full range of functions/activities (figure 3.1) AFOSI uses to find, fix, track and neutralize the enemy. CTO activities help create a sustained permissive environment for air, space, and cyberspace operations. CTO capabilities are widely variable depending on their application combined with the prevailing threat, threat state, environment, friendly forces available, ROE, RUF, applicable laws, and other factors that characterize an operational area. The following sections define the CTO execution cycle.

Figure 3.1. The Counterthreat Operations Umbrella.
3.2. The five phases of the CTO Execution Cycle: Find, fix, track, neutralize, and assess.

3.2.1. Find. The find phase requires clearly designated guidance. This guidance is typically provided via established Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and associated collection requirements. These requirements drive CI collection planning and operations. CI collections lead to the detection of current and emerging targets. Tailored all-source analysis drives and focuses CI collections activities. AFOSI personnel should be familiar with the multiple targeting cycles present in a joint/combined operating environment.

3.2.1.1. In all situations, including time sensitive targeting (TST), AFOSI forces conducting CTO do not engage in direct action activities. Instead, AFOSI provides information to direct action units or operations centers.

3.2.2. Fix. The fix phase uses analysis and prioritization to determine if an emerging target is worthy of engagement. It may begin when an emerging target is detected or soon thereafter. When an emerging target is detected, sensors (human source networks, ISR platforms such as the Predator/Reaper), liaison, specialist activities, and information operations are focused to confirm the target’s identity and precise location. Target location and other information must be accurately refined to permit tracking and neutralization. The completion of the fix phase results in a confirmed target with a designated CTO named operation.

3.2.3. Track. Tracking is done with the initiation/continuation of specific and directed CI collection and investigative activities. Tracking is also accomplished with the employment of specific ISR platforms. Information obtained during this phase is compiled and documented in a comprehensive target package.

3.2.4. Neutralize. The neutralize phase begins after collected information is determined to be credible. Actionable intelligence or a comprehensive target package may be provided to a direct action authority for neutralization of the threat. AFOSI activities in this phase may include: positive identification (PID), surveillance (physical, technical or both), apprehension (during criminal investigations), recruitment, influence operations, computer network exploitation, and dissemination of actionable intelligence to direct action units to support exploitation, seizure, sensitive site exploitation, cordon and search, detention, or capture/kill operations.

3.2.4.1. In hostile and uncertain environments, AFOSI normally coordinates with maneuver units within the battlespace for target package execution. Following the execution of a CTO target package, AFOSI special agents may participate in site exploitation (search). Additionally, special agents should participate in and/or contribute to tactical questioning and document exploitation efforts.

3.2.5. Assess. Tactical assessments determine the effectiveness of executed CTO activities. The principal question answered during the assess phase is whether desired effects and objectives were achieved. In cases of fleeting targets, quick assessments may be required in order to make expeditious re-attack recommendations.
3.3. **Reporting.** CTO reports contribute to commanders’ overall awareness of the operational environment. AFOSI reports normally are disseminated to the intelligence and law enforcement communities, as appropriate, at all levels and during all phases of the CTO cycle. These reports include but are not limited to suspicious incident reports (SIRs), intelligence information reports (IIRs), comprehensive target packages, analytical products, spot reports, etc.
Figure 3.3. The CTO Execution Cycle.

KEITH M. GIVENS
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander, AFOSI
Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

Air Force Publications

Air Force Instruction 10-403 – Operations, Deployment Planning & Execution, 20 Sep 12, IC, 15 Jul 14
Air Force Manual 33-363, Management of Records, 1 Mar 08, IC, 28 Jan 15

Joint Publications

Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 May 13
JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations, 17 Aug 11
JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations
JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 Aug 11
JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, 23 Mar 12
JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 24 Nov 10
JP 3-05, Special Operations, 16 Jul 14
JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, 13 Nov 14
JP 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 8 Nov 10 (as Amended through 15 Jun 15).
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 Mar 13
JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 Jan 12

Terms

Administrative Control—Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support. Also called ADCON (JP 1-02).

Analysis and production—In intelligence usage, the conversion of processed information into intelligence through the integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of all source data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements. (JP 1-02)

Area of Interest—That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02)

Area of Operations—An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02)

Counterintelligence (CI) —Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted
for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. Also called CI. (JP 2-01.2.)

**Countersurveillance**—All measures, active or passive, taken to counteract hostile surveillance. (JP 3-07.2)

**Counterthreat Operations** (CTO)—The employment of AFOSI capabilities to find, fix, track, and neutralize enemy threats in order to create a sustained permissive environment for air, space, and cyberspace operations. (AFTTP 3-10.3)

**Defensive Cyberspace Operations**—Passive and active cyberspace operations intended to preserve the ability to utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, net-centric capabilities, and other designated systems. Also called DCO. (JP 1-02)

**Direct Action**—Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Also called DA. (JP 3-05)

**Liaison**—That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action (JP 1-02).

**Military Source Operations**—The collection, from, by and/or via humans, of foreign and military and military-related intelligence. Also called MSO. (JP 2-01.2).

**Neutralize**—1. As pertains to military operations, to render ineffective or unusable. 2. To render enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation. 3. To render safe mines, bombs, missiles, and booby traps. 4. To make harmless anything contaminated with a chemical agent. (JP 3-0)

**Offensive Counterintelligence Operation**—A clandestine counterintelligence activity conducted for military, strategic, Department of Defense, or national counterintelligence and security purposes against a target having suspected or known affiliation with foreign intelligence entities, international terrorism, or other foreign persons or organizations, to counter terrorism, espionage, or other clandestine intelligence activities that threaten the security of the Department or the United States. The two types of offensive counterintelligence operations are double agent operation and controlled source operation. Also called OFCO. (JP 1-02)

**Operational Control**—The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

**Permissive Environment**—Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02)
Positive Identification—An identification derived from observation and analysis of target characteristics including visual recognition, electronic support systems, noncooperative target recognition techniques, identification friend or foe systems, or other physics-based identification techniques. (JP 3-01)

Protective Service Operations—The use of specialized techniques and procedures by trained personnel to ensure a principal’s personal safety and security during a specific event, while traveling, or over an extended period of time. When required, a PSO can be tailored to provide 24-hour protection. (AFOSIMAN 71-144)

Rules Of Engagement—Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-04)

Surveillance —The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 3-0)

Tactical Control —The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Also called TACON. (JP 1)

Tactical Questioning—Direct questioning by any DoD personnel of a captured or detained person to obtain time-sensitive tactical intelligence at or near the point of capture or detention and consistent with applicable law (JP 1-02).

Target Packages—(Air Force) Targeting information provided by AFOSI to direct action units/authorities (Army, SOF, Coalitions Forces, Host Nation Police etc.) for the purposes of identifying and neutralizing threats. (AFTTP 3-10.3)

Threats Identified— (Air Force) Individuals linked to insurgent groups, terrorist groups, or intelligence services that present a threat to USAF installations/resources. (AFTTP 3-10.3)

Technical Services—This support encompasses two distinct mission sets; the AF's Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Program and AFOSI's technical surveillance program. AFOSI is responsible for executing the AF's TSCM Program (ref. AFMD 39), which includes techniques and measures to detect, neutralize, and/or exploit a wide variety of foreign technical surveillance technologies that are used to obtain unauthorized access to classified and sensitive information. AFOSI also provides technical surveillance support, including covert video and audio surveillance, vehicle tracking, photo surveillance, lock bypass, wiretap and other esoteric surveillance techniques. (DoDI 5240.05, AFOSIMAN 71-103 Volume 3)

Threat Assessments—The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System function that provides: timely warning of potential threats to US interests; intelligence collection requirements; the effects of environmental, physical, and health hazards, and cultural factors on friendly and enemy operations; and determines the enemy military posture and possible intentions. (AFTTP 3-10.3)
Uncertain Environment—Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. (JP 3-0)

Vulnerability Assessment—A Department of Defense, command, or unit-level evaluation (assessment) to determine the vulnerability of a terrorist attack against an installation, unit, exercise, port, ship, residence, facility, or other site. Identifies areas of improvement to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or terrorism. Also called a VA. (JP 1-02)
## Attachment 2

### SKILLS LIST

**Note:** The following list contains examples of skills AFOSI agents should be trained on prior to conducting CTO:

**Figure A2.1. Skills List.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactical Vehicle Movements</th>
<th>Tactical Communications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Questioning/Interviews</td>
<td>Tactical Night Driving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Firearms &amp; Tactics</td>
<td>Tactical Foot movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Combat Casualty Care</td>
<td>Small Unit Tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Defensive Tactics</td>
<td>Individual &amp; Field Equipment Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Navigation Map &amp; Compass</td>
<td>Use of Global Positioning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Search &amp; Security</td>
<td>Night Vision Techniques/Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployed CONOPS</td>
<td>Deployed Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployed Stress Management</td>
<td>Developing Standard Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Planning</td>
<td>Intelligence Information Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with Linguists</td>
<td>Deployed Confidential Informant Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism/Insurgency TTPs</td>
<td>Recognize &amp; Neutralize IED/VBIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Detection/Attack Recognition</td>
<td>HVI/HVT Packages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployed Theater/Culture Orientation</td>
<td>Working with SF Tactical Security Elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival, Evasion, Resistance, &amp; Escape</td>
<td>Personal Security Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Operations</td>
<td>Urban Operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Non-AFOSI personnel directly supporting the CTO mission should be knowledgeable of basic CTO principles in order to maximize interoperability between AFOSI and supporting agencies.
Attachment 3

READING LIST

Figure A3.1. Reading List.

DoD Directive 3115.09, *DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning*, 15 Nov 13
Developing and publishing IIR’s (AFOSI IIR writing guide)
Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 25 Mar 2013
Joint Publication 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations
Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 10 Nov 10 (as Amended through 16 Jul 13).
OP Planning (WARNO, OPORD, FRAGO)
Standing DOD CI collection requirements

Note: The following is a list of recommend reading AFOSI personnel should accomplish prior to conducting CTO: