MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION C
MAJCOMS/FOAs/DRUs

FROM: SAF/IG


By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force, this Guidance Memorandum immediately implements changes to AFI 90-201, The Air Force Inspection System, specifically pertaining to management of inspection findings, as well as changes to Special Access Program Inspections. This Guidance Memorandum also clarifies types of visits conducted by agencies outside of Department of the Air Force (DAF) Wings, Deltas, and Garrisons; and updates source policy guidance for by-law inspections. Compliance with this memorandum is mandatory. To the extent its directions are inconsistent with other Air Force publications, the information herein prevails in accordance with DAFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management. Compliance with the attachments in this publication is mandatory.

United States Space Force (USSF) inspection policy will evolve to include USSF-specific terminology and inspection requirements. Final USSF inspection policy will be fully incorporated into the next full revision of AF 90-210. Until that time, USSF deviations from this GM and current version of AFI 90-201 are authorized with the approval of the Deputy Inspector General for Space, Department of the Air Force, and The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force.

This memorandum becomes void after one year or upon publication of an Interim Change or rewrite of the affected publication, whichever is earlier.

SAMI D. SAID
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment:
Guidance Changes
**Guidance Changes**

*(Change)* paragraph 1.1.4. to read, “Throughout this instruction, the term ‘Pertinent Oversight Authority’ is defined as an organization responsible for the management and oversight of a particular program or functional area. Responsibilities can include managing and organizing personnel, equipment, training, policy and continual evaluation in order to support operational planning and mission execution.”

*(Add)* 1.1.4.1. There are numerous duty titles for individuals or organizations which perform Pertinent Oversight Authority responsibilities in the DAF, such as MAJCOM/FIELDCOM Functional Manager, Functional Area Manager, Subject Matter Expert (SME), Field Operating Agency (FOA), Direct Reporting Unit (DRU), and/or Centralized Activity.

*(Add)* 1.1.4.2. Pertinent Oversight Authorities at the Center, Wing/Delta/Garrison, or equivalent units are usually the functional SMEs within each organization. Local SMEs are usually sufficient to support Commander’s Inspection Program (CCIP) level inspections and deficiency management; however, deficiencies levied against organizations above the unit (e.g., MAJCOM/FIELDCOM or higher headquarter deficiencies) should be covered by the Pertinent Oversight Authority at that next echelon or level.

*(Change)* paragraph 1.1.8. to read, “1.1.8. Continual evaluation is the routine monitoring of leading and lagging performance indicators of an inspected unit by the appropriate Pertinent Oversight Authority. This includes analysis of metrics, data systems, inspection reports, inventory controls, requests for assistance, Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT) Self-Assessment Checklists (SAC), and/or any reporting system within a functional community. Pertinent Oversight Authorities must effectively engage with supported units to identify when a unit is performing well or struggling to accomplish its mission. Pertinent Oversight Authorities will make notification of any non-compliance found through continual evaluation directly to the process owner, the chain of command, Wing/Garrison IG and/or MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IG. Continual evaluation within DAF organizations is applied both internally and externally to discover efficiencies and strengths, and to identify and mitigate deficiencies or weaknesses. The continual evaluation process should identify findings, determine root causes, apply corrective actions, ensure follow up, and share results across the organization. The IG may supplement these efforts through exercise, inspection, and documentation.”

*(Change)* paragraph 1.3.2. to read “HAF Mission Directive 1-20, *The Inspector General*, and Air Force Policy Directive 90-2, *The Inspector General–The Inspection System*, define the SAF/IG mission. The Judge Advocate General inspections (pursuant to Title 10 United States Code § 806 and § 9037) and The Auditor General audits (pursuant to Title 10 United States Code §§ 9011-9024, §§ 9031-9040, and §§ 9081-9083), are separate statutory obligations and have separate reporting requirements. All other inspections within the Department of the Air Force shall adhere to the objectives and policies contained in this instruction and are subject to review by SAF/IG.”
(Change) paragraph 1.3.8. to read, “1.3.8. Use of contractors as IG inspectors. IG duty is inherently governmental and contractors are prohibited from serving as IG inspectors. Contractor SMEs may gather information for, or provide advice, opinions, or recommendations to, an IG inspector who exercises independent, objective judgment on the subject matter. The IG makes decisions related to the inspection, including schedule, sample selection, deficiency assignment, deficiency severity, grades, and ratings. These tasks may not be performed by a contractor. A contractor is prohibited from serving in any capacity if there is an organizational conflict of interest resulting from other contracts held, as determined by the responsible contracting office.”

(Change) paragraph 1.4.1.12. to read, “Establishes Self-Assessment Checklist policy and guidance.”

(Change) paragraph 1.4.3. to read, “Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General, Special Investigations Directorate (SAF/IGX) manages the DAF Fraud, Waste and Abuse Complaint Hotline for Special Access Programs, including intake, complaint analysis and investigation.”

(Change) paragraph 1.4.4.10. to read, “Provides a summary of inspection results for inclusion in recurring IG briefings to DAF senior leaders and cross-flows this information to the MAJCOM/FIELDCOMs on a continual basis. Tracks and reports, to SAF/IG, open critical and significant deficiencies noted in Nuclear Surety Inspection reports and those levied against higher headquarters during all types of inspections.”

(Change) paragraph 1.4.4.18. to read, “Serves as the DAF Gatekeeper to manage the centralized DAF inspection schedule, which includes inspection activities by external, non-DAF agencies. Serves as the MAJCOM/FIELDCOM Gatekeeper for select DAF FOAs and DRUs. Plans and executes the annual Gatekeepers’ Inspection Scheduling Working Group.”

(Change) paragraph 1.4.5.1. to read, “Conducts program security and government compliance inspections of industry and MAJCOM/FIELDCOM Special Access Programs in accordance with DoD guidance and DAF policies, reports results as directed by the SecAF, CSAF, or CSO and notifies the DAF SAPCO of Special Access Program security compliance inspection trends for potential Special Access Program security policy updates or updates to the Special Access Program security inspection criteria.”

(Change) paragraph 1.4.6.1. to read, “Develop and prioritize inspection requirements. Coordinate requirements with Pertinent Oversight Authorities then forward inspection requirements to the DAF Inspection Agency, Inspection Requirements Division (DAFIA/IR; formerly SAF/IGI) for inclusion in Attachment 3 of this instruction.”

(Change) paragraph 1.4.9.9. to read, “Submit any requests for visits to the MAJCOM/FIELDCOM Gatekeeper for coordination and approval. These include any visit to assess, audit, certify, accredit, or evaluate a unit. The only exceptions are the activities listed in Attachment 2. Requestors must coordinate these activities with the appropriate Gatekeeper but do not require approval. Pertinent Oversight Authorities having not previously coordinated with MAJCOM/FIELDCOM Gatekeepers will coordinate with the DAF Gatekeeper.”
(Change) paragraph 1.5.1. to read, “Major Graded Areas (MGA). MGAs represent key processes, procedures, and requirements based on public law, executive orders, directives, and instructions. The MGAs coincide with the Commander’s responsibilities detailed in AFI 1-2: Executing the Mission, Managing Resources, Improving the Unit, and Leading People (see Figure 1.2). MGA 4.1 (Readiness) will be graded on the SIPRnet and is integrated into the Classified Readiness Assessment in accordance with Attachment 7. See Chapter 4 of this instruction for Management Inspection MGAs.”

(Change) paragraph 1.5.10. to read “Inspection reports. For non-nuclear inspections (see paragraph 5.5.7.1. for nuclear reporting requirements), IGs will submit an executive message providing a summary of the inspection activity and any pertinent details to the respective Inspector General’s Commander no later than five duty days after the conclusion of the inspection out-brief unless the final report is made available prior. (T-3). IGs, at all levels, are highly encouraged to utilize the IGEMS standard report template and are required to complete formal inspection reports and document in the appropriate version of IGEMS no later than 30 calendar days (60 calendar days for ARC; 45 calendar days for Management Inspections) from the conclusion of the inspection. (T-3). Do not reveal any survey or Airmen-to-IG or Guardian-to-IG session data that can be attributed to an individual or sub-organization in order to protect confidentiality. Data should only be grouped at Wing/Garrison/Delta (UEIs) or Organization (Management Inspections [MIs]) level or above.

(Change) paragraph 2.3.3.2. to read, “2.3.3.2. Develop an annual Wing/Garrison/Delta Inspection and Exercise Plan and risk-based sampling strategy based on the Wing/Garrison/Delta Commander’s guidance to enable reliable assessment of the unit’s mission. (T-1). The Wing/Garrison IG must include applicable programs and exercises in Table A2.1 in the annual inspection plan. (T-1). Additional inspections should focus on individual organizations, programs, and processes considered high-risk or of particular interest to the Wing/Garrison/Delta Commander. The annual plan should include at least one no-notice inspection. Wing/Garrison IGs may sample MICT SACs in order to ensure subordinate organizations are communicating with Wing/Garrison leadership on the health of their organization. Wing/Garrison IGs may review SACs for appropriate use of Airmen's and Guardians’ time and report concerns to the appropriate commander for action. MICT should not be relied upon as the sole basis for inspecting a program communicating with Pertinent Oversight Authorities, but should not rely on SACs as the sole basis for inspecting a program. Adapt the inspection team composition based on mission sets within the Wing/Garrison/Delta.

(Change) paragraph 2.3.3.4. to read, “Post grades, summaries, deficiencies, recommended improvement areas, strengths, and final inspection reports in the appropriate version of IGEMS (based on Security Classification Guidance). Posting deficiencies facilitates the tracking of those deficiencies to closure in accordance with Chapter 9 of this instruction.”

(Change) paragraph 2.3.3.13. to read, “2.3.3.13. Develop, and review annually, MICT Business Rules and IGEMS Business Rules for Wing/Garrison/Delta and subordinate units. (T-2).”
(Change) paragraph 2.5.1. to read, “Unit Self-Assessment Program. Led by unit commanders and directors in accordance with Title 10 United States Code Section 9233 and AFI 1-2, the Unit Self-Assessment Program provides a means for internal assessment of a Wing/Garrison/Delta’s overall health and complements external assessments. The self-assessment program may include communication from SACs within the MICT. However, utilizing MICT alone is insufficient to be considered an effective Unit Self-Assessment Program. Commanders and directors at all levels will ensure appropriate internal mechanisms exist to track requirement and resource mismatches, assess resultant mission risk, and track disconnect to closure. (T-2).”

(Change) paragraph 2.5.1.4. to read, “Commanders or directors will ensure assigned SACs are assessed by appropriate members at intervals consistent with unit-level leadership priorities and established MICT Business Rules. (T-1).”

(Change) paragraph 2.5.2.3. to read, “2.5.2.3. Readiness Exercise. Readiness exercises (RE) are Wing/Garrison/Delta-level evaluations of a unit’s capability tied directly to Operational Plans (OPLANS), Concept Plans (CONPLANs), Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) taskings, Unit Type Codes (UTCs), Mission Directives, Mission Essential Tasks (METs), Mission Essential Task Listing (METL), and/or Command guidance. Commanders and IGs will use Attachment 7 to develop and execute REs. (T-1). Commanders should consider the results of recent Readiness Exercises when preparing updates to the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). Wing/Garrison IGs and Deltas must customize readiness exercises to the structure and mission of the organization at a scope and scale approved by the MAJCOM/FIELDCOM Commander or designee. Wing/Garrison IGs and Deltas shall incorporate applicable units (to include local agencies and supporting organizations) and evaluate the unit’s ability to meet readiness criteria as established in OPLANS, CONPLANs, TPFDD taskings, UTCs, Mission Directives, METs, METL, and/or Command guidance. (T-3). Upon completion of REs, Wing/Garrison IGs and Deltas will use the Readiness Reporting Guide and the Classified Readiness Assessment Reporting to capture the results of the RE. (T-1). Wing/Garrison IGs and Deltas should review DRRS reporting for all Wing/Garrison/Delta DRRS-reporting units on behalf of the Wing/Garrison/Delta Commander to verify that DRRS reporting is consistent with Readiness Exercise event results. MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs should validate that DRRS reporting is consistent with readiness execution events, as defined in Attachment 7.

(Change) paragraph 3.3.2.8. to read, “The MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IG, on behalf of the MAJCOM/FIELDCOM CC, determines the overall impact of the Readiness assessment (MGA – Executing the Mission, sub-element Readiness) in the overall UEI grade. During the UEI Capstone or throughout the Continuous Evaluation process, MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs may consider downgrading the CCIP sub-element for a poorly executed Readiness Exercise or readiness reporting process.”

(Change) paragraph 3.4. to read “Unit Effectiveness Inspection methodology. Compliance sampling or more comprehensive commander-directed inspections may be used to verify Commander’s Inspection Programs, especially in areas deemed high-risk. Attachment 3 of this instruction is the authoritative source of Headquarters-level inspection requirements where the risk from undetected non-compliance is greatest for commanders, Airmen, Guardians, and/or the
mission. MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IG teams will build a tailored inspection risk-based sampling strategy for each Wing/Garrison/Delta. The inspection period begins immediately after the UEI Capstone out-brief (see Figure 3.1).”

(Change) paragraph 3.4.7. to read “Group Airmen/Guardian-to-IG Sessions. A Group Airmen/Guardian-to-IG Session is a highly-structured small group discussion (8-15 people), facilitated by a certified MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IG staff member specifically trained for this method via IG Training Course-Inspections. The Group Airmen/Guardian-to-IG Session is a standardized and regulated tool for use by MAJCOM/FIELDCOMs and the DAF Inspection Agency (DAFIA) in UEIs and Management Inspections. MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs may conduct Group Airmen/Guardian-to-IG Sessions during every UEI cycle (may occur prior to the Capstone event) to gather opinions, beliefs, and perceptions, and inform the risk-based sampling strategy at their discretion. If MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs choose to conduct group sessions, the MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs may use their own developed set of questions; however, they will use the DAFIA/IR-approved script and structure located on the DAFIA/IR SharePoint site within the UEI Handbook.”

(Change) paragraph 4.4.1. to read “If utilized, MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IG teams will send a DAFIA-approved survey to members of the inspected organization. The inspection team analyzes survey responses and develops subsequent on-site interview questions.”

(Change) paragraph 5.4.2.1. to read, “Lead or Using command will, 120 days prior to Initial Operating Capability (IOC) through memorandum format, coordinate with HQ AFSEC/SEW to determine the need for an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection in accordance with AFI 63-125, Nuclear Certification Program.”

(Change) paragraph 5.5.1. to read, “Purpose. The purpose of the Nuclear Surety Inspection is to evaluate a certified nuclear-capable unit’s ability to manage assigned nuclear resources and execute nuclear missions in a safe, secure, and reliable manner. More specifically, the Nuclear Surety Inspection inspects a certified nuclear-capable unit’s capability to receive, store, secure, assemble, transport, maintain, load, mate, lock, unlock, test, render safe, and employ nuclear weapons. MAJCOM IGs will inspect the knowledge of missile launch crews, aircrews, command post controllers, and release teams on nuclear weapon system safety rules, Nuclear Control Order Procedures, authentication procedures, and weapon acceptance procedures (unless acceptance procedures were evaluated and documented elsewhere during the UEI).”

(Change) paragraph 5.5.4. to read, “Nuclear Surety Inspection MGAs and ratings. MAJCOM IGs will assign overall ratings and MGA adjectival ratings (as applicable) in accordance with CJCS Instruction 3263.05 (T-0). (See also paragraph 5.5.9.) MAJCOM IGs will incorporate the following Air Force-specific inspection requirements:”

(Change) paragraph 5.5.4.4.1. to read, “Reference CJCSI 3263.05 for inspection requirements. MAJCOM IG teams will select resources to be inspected.”

(Delete) paragraph 5.5.4.4.2.
(Change) paragraph 5.5.4.4.3. to read, “Ensure weapons are stored in accordance with applicable directives (e.g., properly grounded, chocked, and immobilized). Ensure weapons have proper spacing, storage compatibility, and are within explosive and active material limits. If defects are discovered on weapons, components, or equipment during stockpile walkthroughs, ensure evaluation against applicable technical publication, technical order, or instruction and ensure appropriate corrective actions are taken and documented.”

(Change) paragraph 5.5.5.1.3. to read, “Dual-Capable Aircraft aircrew. Inspectors will assess (at a minimum) aircrew processing of recall and termination Emergency Action Procedures via performance evaluation. Grade the evaluation as “Pass” or “Fail”, depending on aircrew taking the appropriate expected actions. The Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection (NWTI) Team Chief may award credit for this requirement if it was observed by an NWTI-certified inspector within the last 90 calendar days. Grades and comments should be included in the NSI report.”

(Add) paragraph 5.5.9. to read, “Adjectival Ratings. Ratings that may be given to the MGAs or sub-MGAs of an NWTI, where such a procedure could prove beneficial to the inspected unit are as follows:”

(Add) paragraph 5.5.9.1. to read, “Outstanding: Operations or procedures conducted strictly as prescribed in directives and with a superior degree of professionalism.”

(Add) paragraph 5.5.9.2. to read, “Excellent: Operations or procedures accomplished in accordance with directives or with only slight deviations.”

(Add) paragraph 5.5.9.3. to read, “Acceptable: Reference CJCSI 3263.05.”

(Add) paragraph 5.5.9.4. to read, “Marginal: Considerable or substantial deviation(s) from directives. This condition requires thorough and timely command attention.”

(Add) paragraph 5.5.9.5. to read, “Unacceptable: Reference CJCSI 3263.05.”

(Change) paragraph 6.3.1.2. to read, "Conduct AF-level oversight on 50% of NSIs in the 24-month cycle. Locations and units subject to oversight inspections will be selected based upon a risk-based sampling strategy primarily driven by TIG and the MAJCOM/CC, and informed by other nuclear enterprise stakeholders. Additionally, AF-level oversight will use a risk-based sampling strategy to determine what MGAs of the NSI require an oversight assessment. Align these AF-level oversight inspections with Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection Oversight Inspections as appropriate.”

(Change) title of paragraph 8.4. to read, “Self-Assessment Checklist Fragmentary Order.”

(Add) paragraph 8.10.5. to read, “By-Law Program Details. Specific program guidance for each By-Law inspection is referenced in Attachment 2 of this instruction. The By-Law programs are as follows:”
paragraph 8.10.5.1. to read, “Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP). CTIP By-Law inspections are directed by DoD Instruction 2200.01, *Combating Trafficking in Persons*, on an annual basis. Use the CTIP Inspection Checklist in DoDI 2200.01_AFI 36-2921, *Combating Trafficking in Persons*, during evaluations. The OPR for CTIP By-Law inspections is AF/A1.”

paragraph 8.10.5.2. to read, “Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP). FVAP By-Law inspections are directed by DoDI 1000.04, *Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)*, on an annual basis and focus on various areas of the program specified by the DoD FVAP Office, DoD Inspector General, and the DAF Services Voting Action Officer (SVAO). Reference AFI 36-3107 for additional inspection criteria. The OPR for FVAP By-Law inspections is AF/A1.”

paragraph 8.10.5.3. to read, “Personnel Accountability. Personnel Accountability By-Law inspections are directed by DoD Instruction 3001.02, *Personnel Accountability in Conjunction with Natural or Manmade Disasters*, on an annual basis. Reference AFI 36-3802, *Force Support Readiness Programs*, for additional inspection criteria. The OPR for Personnel Accountability By-Law inspections is AF/A1.”

paragraph 8.10.5.4. to read, “Suicide Prevention Program (SPP). SPP By-Law inspections are directed by DoD Instruction 6490.16, *Suicide Prevention Program*, on an annual basis. Reference AFI 90-5001, *Integrated Resilience*, for additional SPP inspection criteria. The OPR for SPP By-Law inspections is AF/A1.”

paragraph 8.10.5.5. to read, “Transition Assistance Program (TAP). TAP By-Law inspections are directed by DoD Instruction 1332.35, *Transition Assistance Program (TAP) for Military Personnel*, on a biannual basis. TAP guidance is referenced in AFI 36-3009, *Airman and Family Readiness Centers*. The OPR for TAP By-Law inspections is AF/A1.”


paragraph 8.10.5.7. to read, “Sexual Assault Prevention & Response (SAPR) Program. SAPR Program By-Law inspections are directed by DoDD 6495.01, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program; DoDI 6495.01, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program Procedures*, DoDI 6495.03, *Defense Sexual Assault Advocate Certification Program (D-SAACP)*, on an annual basis. Inspectors must have Defense Sexual Assault Advocate Certified Program (D-SAACP) and Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) certifications and access to Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID). Reference AFI 90-6001 for additional SAPR inspection criteria. The OPR for SAPR Program By-Law inspections is AF/A1.”
(Add) paragraph 8.10.5.8. to read, “Intel Oversight. Intel Oversight By-Law inspections are directed by DOD Manual 5240.01 and DOD Directive 5148.13, Intelligence Oversight, on an annual basis. Reference AFI 14-404, Intelligence Oversight, for additional program guidance. The OPR for Intel Oversight By-Law inspections is AF/A2.”

(Add) paragraph 8.10.5.9. to read, “Wounded, Ill, and Injured. Wounded, Ill, and Injured By-Law inspections are directed by DOD Instruction 1300.24, Recovery Coordination Program (RCP), on an annual basis. See AFI 90-201 Attachment 8 for additional program guidance. The OPR for Wounded, Ill, and Injured By-Law inspections is AF/A1.”

(Add) paragraph 8.11. to read, “Special Emphasis Item (SEI). The DAFIA/CC may periodically issue a directive to inspect a program or area which has generated interest or concern to the extent that SAF/IG has approved publication of a Special Emphasis Item. The SEI will direct inspectors (MAJCOM/FIELDCOM and/or Wing/Garrison) to pay special attention to a particular item(s) during a normal, scheduled inspection. Detailed instructions will accompany the SEI issuance letter. Each SEI will be valid for a period not to exceed 6 months (9 months for ARC) from the date on the SEI.

(Change) paragraph 9.6.1. to read “MAJCOM/FIELDCOM Pertinent Oversight Authorities are the Corrective Action Plan approval and deficiency closure authority for CRITICAL, SIGNIFICANT, and Nuclear Surety Inspection repeat MINOR deficiencies. For all other deficiencies, Commanders will determine the appropriate level of corrective action plan approval and deficiency closure at the lowest appropriate command-level. (T-1). Commanders will ensure Root-Cause Analysis is completed for all deficiencies using the problem-solving approach and level of effort best suited to the situation. (T-1). The Wing/Garrison/Delta Commander (or delegated authority) should close deficiencies not listed above.”

(Delete) paragraph 9.6.5.

(Delete) paragraph 9.6.6.

(Change) paragraph 9.6.7. to read “IGs may close the deficiency in IGEMS when the corrective action plan is entered in IGEMS, the plan is fully implemented, and the results of the plan have been validated by the appropriate-level IG.”

(Change) paragraph 9.7.1. to read, “Any inspector may discover best practices during the normal course of conducting inspections. The inspector is encouraged to document and flag the practice in the IG report and include the name and contact information of the unit member and/or team to help connect with the applicable Pertinent Oversight Authority for assessment. The IG Team Chief ultimately determines if the best practice is included in the final inspection report.”

(Change) paragraph 9.7.2. to read, “Units or individuals who developed best practices identified by IGs may further submit them for formal approval through the Airmen Powered by Innovation process outlined in AFI 38-402, Airmen Powered by Innovation and Suggestion Program.”
(Change) paragraph 10.2.1. to read, “DAF agencies. Should submit requests to change, add, or remove an inspection activity listed in Attachment 2 or an inspection requirement listed in Attachment 3 to the appropriate DAF Functional Area Manager for coordination. DAF Functional Area Managers may submit the recommendation to DAFA/IR (SAF.IGI.Workflow@us.af.mil) for vetting through the DAF Inspection System Governance Process. Requestors must include justification and an Office of Primary Responsibility. SAF/IG will regularly task DAF Functional Area Managers to provide updates to existing requirements and nominate emerging requirements through standard coordination (e.g. Task Management Tool).”

(Change) paragraph 11.4.3. to read, "The Wing/Garrison IG Superintendent (81000) will be an E-7 at a minimum. (T-3).”

(Change) paragraph 11.6. to read, “Inspector Certification. Certification applies to IG-assigned personnel only and consists of IG Training Course-Inspections, Attachment 11 requirements, and the IG Oath. Inspection augmentees and Wing/Garrison Inspection Team members are not certified inspectors, but are sensors trained to participate in the conduct of inspections. A certified inspector must validate findings identified by inspection augmentees or Wing/Garrison Inspection Team members. (T-1).”

(Change) paragraph 11.6.2. to read, “IGs will document IG-assigned inspector training and certification. (T-1).”

(Change) paragraph 12.2. to read, “Inspector General Evaluation Management System. IGEMS (to include the classified version) facilitates scheduling, planning, inspecting, and report writing for IG inspections. IGEMS is also used to assign, monitor, and close (if applicable) all findings (Strengths, Recommended Improvement Areas, Deficiencies) identified during the inspection process. The system is comprised of an open architecture which facilitates manual enterprise-level trending analysis and cross communication with normalized data and standardized reporting. Attachment 12 of this instruction outlines IGEMS Business Rules.”

(Change) paragraph 12.2.4. to read, “Contractor and foreign national access to IGEMS. Contractor and foreign national access to IGEMS is limited to the roles of Basic User, Scheduler, and/or Planner. Contractors and foreign nationals will not register as inspectors or administrators. (T-0).”

(Change) paragraph 12.3. to read, “Management Internal Control Toolset. MICT is an Air Force program of record and provides units a tool for managing their self-assessment programs. It also provides a means to communicate a unit’s program health using SACs and HAF SAC Fragmentary Orders. MICT also provides supervisors and the command chain (from squadron commander to SecAF) tiered visibility into user-selected compliance reports and program status as well as indications of program health across Functional and command channels. MICT also helps facilitate the HAF SAC Fragmentary Order programs by gathering time-sensitive data in an expeditious manner. Attachment 12 of this instruction outlines MICT SAC business rules.”
(Change) paragraph 12.3.1. to read, “12.3.1. Self-Assessment Checklist (SAC). A SAC is a list of available questions which allows communication to commanders at each level within the Wing/Garrison/Delta construct, designed to assess compliance based upon commander’s intent and direction for the organization. In addition, those SACs generated by DAF or MAJCOM/FIELDCOM provide indicators to the functional community, allowing for a more in depth understanding of policy effects on Wing/Garrison/Delta and below organizations.”

(Delete) paragraph 12.4.

(Change) paragraph 13.1. to read “Purpose. To provide guidance for inspecting Special Access Programs in order to report on the health, security, and compliance of Special Access Programs to the Secretary of the Air Force. Identifies, reports, and analyzes issues interfering with efficiency, effectiveness, compliance, security, and management of cost, schedule, performance, and security.”

(Delete) paragraph 13.2.2.

(Change) paragraph 13.2.3. to read “SAF/IGX (in coordination with AFOSI PJ) will execute Special Access Program (SAP) inspections of HAF entities. AFOSI PJ will execute SAP inspections of MAJCOM/FIELDCOMs, FOAs, and DRUs. Efforts should be made to align Special Access Program inspections with scheduled Management Inspections, UEIs, or continual evaluation. SAF/IG may direct an out of cycle (limited or no-notice) inspection if deemed necessary.”

(Change) paragraph 13.2.5. to read “For Special Access Program inspections, the Team Chief will be a SAF/IG-designated O-6 or civilian equivalent (or higher). AFOSI PJ will provide a Security Inspection Lead to organize and execute inspections of DAF and MAJCOM/FIELDCOM-level inspections, under the authority of the TIG or designated SAF/IG representative. The Special Access Program Central Office (DAF SAPCO; SAF/AAZ) will provide at least one team member for each DAF Special Access Program inspection. The inspection Team Chief will identify additional inspectors required in advance of the inspection (see paragraph 13.3.6.1.).”

(Change) paragraph 13.3.1 to read, “SAF/IGX"

(Change) paragraph 13.3.1.1. to read “Leads strategy, policy, and integration of government Special Access Program inspections into the DAF Inspection System.”

(Change) paragraph 13.3.1.2. to read “In coordination with the DAF SAPCO, develops and directs DAF-level policies and plans for Special Access Program inspections in accordance with applicable policy, guidance, and SAF/IG intent.”

(Add) paragraph 13.3.1.3. “Implement a SAP fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption program.”

(Change) paragraph 13.3.2. to read “SAF/IGX, Director of Special Investigations:”
(Change) paragraph 13.3.2.1. to read “In coordination with DAF SAPCO and AFOSI PJ, oversees execution of DAF Staff Special Access Program inspections and provides results, trends, and issues for inclusion into DAF Staff Management Inspections in accordance with applicable security classification guidance.”

(Change) paragraph 13.3.2.2. to read “In coordination with AFOSI PJ, provides results, trends, and issues of Air and Space Staff and MAJCOM Special Access Program inspections to TIG and DAF SAPCO for potential updates to SAP security policy or to SAP inspection criteria.”

(Change) paragraph 13.3.4.2. to read “Performs program security, inspection, investigation, and counterintelligence functions for the DAF Special Access Programs in accordance with DoD guidance and DAF policies; maintains a sufficient cadre of investigators, special agents, analysts, security control assessors, and program security officers to do so.”

(Change) paragraph 13.3.4.3. to read “Assesses compliance of industry SAP agencies by conducting a comprehensive assessment of the management, operational, and technical security controls. Will execute SAP inspections of MAJCOM/FIELDCOMs, FOAs and DRUs.”

(Change) paragraph 13.3.4.6. to read “Supports and assists SAF/IGX, DAFIA, and MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs with classified inspection activities. When IGs need SAP security expertise on inspection teams, AFOSI PJ will support as inspection augmentees under IG statutory and regulatory authorities.”

(Change) paragraph 13.3.5.3. to read “Coordinate with appropriate SMEs (usually the MAJCOM/FIELDCOM Special Access Program Management Official [SAPMO]) to conduct inspections of respective DAF Special Access Program and other sensitive activities in accordance with DoD guidance, DAF policies, and this instruction. Integrate classified and sensitive inspection activities into the overall UEI continual evaluation cycle and grade. Develop MAJCOM/FIELDCOM-specific SAP inspection guidance in the MAJCOM/FIELDCOM supplement to this instruction (as required).”

(Change) paragraph 13.3.5.6. to read “DAFIA/ET will coordinate with SAF/IGX and AFOSI PJ to integrate Special Access Program inspection activities as part of the Management Inspection battle rhythm. Incorporate SAF/IG Special Access Program continual evaluation activities into the respective MGAs and overall grade of the Management Inspection (as appropriate). Depending on acknowledged status, SAP continual evaluations activities may be generically referenced in MI or UEI activities with details, rating, and/or grade referenced under the appropriate security caveats.”

(Add) paragraph 13.3.5.8. ”Ensures any non-DAF SAPs which affects DAF unit compliance discovered through inspection are addressed in the report and passed to SAF/IGX for resolution. The Team Chief will debrief issues to the senior DAF leadership at the inspected unit and appropriately cleared SAF/IG leadership.”

(Change) paragraph 13.3.6.1.8. to read, “Inspections (Office of Primary Responsibility: SAF/IGX)”
(Change) paragraph 13.3.6.3. to read “Participate in the semi-annual Special Access Program Inspection Working Group.”

(Change) paragraph 13.3.6.8. to read “Assist organizations in developing and implementing a robust self-assessment program for use by internal assessors and external inspectors; update as required.”

(Change) paragraph 13.5. to read “Handling of reports and materials. IGs will handle inspection reports and related materials which contain or reference Special Access Program data (to include appendices, attachments, sensitive relationships, etc.) within approved DAF Special Access Program communications channels and facilities. (T-0). Inspectors will house Special Access Program-related inspections within the Secure Integrated Cloud (SIC) or comparable system. (T-1). System administrators will ensure access is controlled to only those IG representatives designated by SAF/IGX and MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs. (T-1).”

(Change) paragraph 13.7. to read “Concept of Special Access Program inspections. SAF/IGX will coordinate with SAF/AAZ, AFOSI PJ, and other DAF agencies designated by SAF/IG to develop an annual inspection plan for SAF/IG approval no later than 15 December each year. With SAF/IG approval, the schedule may be distributed to affected DAF agencies, informing them of projected inspection dates. SAF/IG should make these inspections as minimally-intrusive as possible. Inspected units should voice scheduling concerns with SAF/IG as soon as possible in order to prevent unnecessary work stoppage due to heavy work periods and known key staff absences.”

(Add) paragraph 13.7.1. “DAF SAP Inspections. DAF SAP inspections are designed for DAF organizations. The inspection methodology is focused on adherence to established SAP security policy, effective enforcement and use of proper control and feedback mechanisms, and whether programs have a robust self-assessment program in place. The inspection will use a management inspection methodology based on the fundamental principles of a well-managed organization and uses a combination of military and industry standard criteria to gauge the level of an organization’s performance excellence. SAP security core compliance inspections occur on a 24-month cycle and may be integrated into continual evaluation.”

(Add) paragraph 13.7.2. “MAJCOM/FIELDCOM, FOA, and DRU SAP Inspections. MAJCOM/FIELDCOM, FOA, and DRU SAP inspections are designed for MAJCOM/FIELDCOM-level Special Access Program Management Offices. While MAJCOM/FIELDCOMs, FOAs, and DRUs operate under unique mission environments and no two are the same, the DAF Inspection System can enhance MAJCOM/FIELDCOM mission effectiveness. The inspection methodology is similar to HAF SAP inspections, but includes a focus on oversight and management of below MAJCOM/FIELDCOM-level SAP units and resources. Inspection criteria will use a management inspection methodology based on the fundamental principles of a well-managed organization and will utilize a combination of military and industry standard criteria to gauge the level of an organization’s performance excellence. SAP security core compliance inspections occur on a 24-month cycle and may be integrated into continual evaluation.”
(Change) paragraph 13.8. to read “Semi-Annual Special Access Program Inspection Working Group. Chaired by SAF/IGX; voting membership is comprised of representatives from agencies listed in paragraph 13.3.6.1 of this instruction. Invitations to attend may be extended to other non-voting agencies with SAF/IGX approval. The Working Group meets in May and November annually (or as otherwise directed by SAF/IG). Topics of discussion should include:”

(Change) paragraph 13.8.1. to read “Building, reviewing, and updating the 24-month schedule of inspections; corrections to the schedule are approved by a simple majority of voting members.”

(Change) paragraph 13.8.2. to read “Ensuring the schedule includes enterprise DAF staff offices, MAJCOM/FIELDCOMs, and FOA/DRUs.”

(Change) paragraph 13.9. to read, “DAF Special Access Program notification of inspection. The SAF/IG inspection staff will plan activities based on the SAF/IG-approved inspection plan. In general, the inspection notification process occurs as follows:”

(Change) paragraph 13.9.1 to read, “Approximately 30 calendar days prior to an inspection, SAF/IG will send a notification memorandum to the affected agency with detailed instructions included to assist with pre-inspection requirements/deliverables. Although SAF/IG makes every effort to give the inspected agency 30 calendar days notification of inspection, mission requirements and inspector availability may drive a much shorter notification to the affected agency. SAF/IGX must closely coordinate notifications with the inspected agency within 10 calendar days.

(Add) paragraph 13.12.5 to read, “DAF and DoD SAPCO Special Emphasis Items Checklist”

(Change) paragraph 13.13.11 to read, “SAF/IGX will ensure SAF/IG receives summary notification of inspection outcomes and in-person debriefs on matters identified during an inspection which require SAF/IG visibility based upon inspection results.”

(Delete) paragraph 13.15

(Change) Attachment 1 reference to read, “DAFI 33-360.”


(Change) Attachment 1 reference to read, “AFI 63-125, Nuclear Certification Program, 16 January 2020.”
(Change) Attachment 1 reference to read, “DoDI 2200.01, Combat Trafficking in Persons (CTIP), 21 June 2019.”

(Change) Attachment 1 reference to read, “AFI 36-3107, Voting Assistance Program, 1 May 2019.”

(Change) Attachment 1 reference to read, “CJCS Instruction 3263.05E, Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections, 28 September 2020.”

(Change) Attachment 1 reference to AFI 36-2921 to read, “DoDI 2200.01_AFI 36-2921, Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP), 20 September 2019.”

(Change) Attachment 1 reference to DoD Directive 1000.4 to read, “DoDI 1000.04, Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), 12 November 2019.”

(Add) Attachment 1 reference: “DoDI 3001.02, Personnel Accountability in Conjunction with Natural or Manmade Disasters, 3 May 2010.”

(Change) Attachment 1 reference to AFI 36-3803 to read, “AFI 36-3802, Force Support Readiness Programs, 9 January 2019.”

(Add) Attachment 1 reference: “DoDI 6490.16, Suicide Prevention Program, 6 November 2017.”


(Change) Attachment 1 reference to DoDI 1332.35 to read, “DoDI 1332.35, Transition Assistance Program (TAP) for Military Personnel, 26 September 2019.”

(Change) Attachment 1 reference to AFI 36-3009 to read, “AFI 36-3009, Airman and Family Readiness Centers, 30 August 2018.”


(Change) Attachment 1 reference to AFI 36-2706 to read, “AFI 36-2710, Equal Opportunity Program, 18 June 2020.”
Attachment 1 reference: “DoDD 6495.01, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, 23 January 2012.”

Attachment 1 reference to DoDI 6495.03 to read, “DoDI 6495.03, Defense Sexual Assault Advocate Certification Program (D-SAACP), 28 February 2020.”

Attachment 1 reference to AFI 90-6001 to read, “AFI 90-6001, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, 14 July 2020.”

Attachment 1 reference to read, 10 USC § 9020, Inspector General.

Attachment 1 reference to read, 10 USC § 9233, Requirement of Exemplary Conduct.

Abbreviation and Acronym to read, “SAC—Self Assessment Checklist.”

Abbreviation and Acronym to read, “UTC—Unit Type Code.”

Abbreviation and Acronym to read, “RE—Readiness Exercise.”

Abbreviation and Acronym to read, “AF/JA—The Judge Advocate General.”

Abbreviation and Acronym to read, “SAF/AG—The Auditor General.”

Attachment 1 term: “Airman—The term Airman has historically been associated with uniformed members of the US Air Force (officer or enlisted; regular, reserve, or guard) regardless of rank, component, or specialty. Today, Department of the Air Force civilians and members of the Civil Air Patrol, when conducting missions for the Department of the Air Force as the official Air Force Auxiliary, are incorporated within the broader meaning of the term when there is a need to communicate to a larger audience within the Service, either for force development purposes or for clarity and inclusiveness by senior leaders when addressing a larger body of personnel. All Airmen, military and civilian, support and defend the Constitution of the United States and live by the Air Force core values.”

Attachment 1 term: “Guardian - The term Guardian is the formal moniker when referring to members of the United States Space Force”

paragraph A2.1 to read, “Commander’s Inspection and Exercise Requirements. Table A2.1 outlines mandatory Commander’s Inspection Program inspection areas, including By-Laws and exercise requirements. MAJCOM/FIELDCOMs may supplement these requirements. Installation and Wing/Garrison/Delta Commanders will accomplish exercises listed in Table A2.1 at the frequency prescribed in governing guidance. (T-0). Commanders will reference governing directives, supplemental guidance, host, and/or tenant MOU and MOA to determine exercise and participation requirements. (T-1). Wings/Garrisons/Deltas and subordinate units will execute Readiness Exercises at frequencies prescribed by their MAJCOM/FIELDCOM to ensure highest levels of readiness. (T-1).”
(Modify) Change the indicated rows of Table A2.1 to read:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>OPR</th>
<th>DoD References</th>
<th>Department of the Air Force References</th>
<th>Inspector Notes</th>
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<td><strong>By-Law Programs</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>BL1</td>
<td>AF/A1</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 2200.01</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 2200.01_AFI 26-2921</td>
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<tr>
<td>BL2</td>
<td>AF/A1</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 1000.04</td>
<td>AFI 36-3107</td>
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<td>AF/A1</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 3001.02</td>
<td>AFI 36-3802</td>
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<td>AFI 90-5001</td>
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<tr>
<td>BL6</td>
<td>SAF/MR</td>
<td>DoD Directive 1350.2; DoD Directive 1440.1; DoD Directive 1020.02E</td>
<td>AFI 36-2710</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BL8</td>
<td>AF/A2</td>
<td>DoD Directive 5240.01; DoD Directive 5148.13</td>
<td>AFI 14-404</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exercises</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EX9</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>SECDEF Signed Memo - Chattanooga Shootings Response OSD010319-15</td>
<td>AFI 10-2501 AFI 31-115 AFTTP 3-4.6 AFTTP 3-2.83</td>
<td>Conduct (and assess/grade) a notification system or table top exercise semiannually, for active shooter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EX 10</td>
<td>AF/A3</td>
<td>AFI 10-201, AFI 10-403, AFI 90-201, OPLANs, CONPLANs, TPFDD taskings, UTCs, Mission Directives, METs,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Modify) Change the indicated rows of Table A2.2 to read:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Inspection Name</th>
<th>DAF Office of Primary Responsibility</th>
<th>Policy Reference</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Article 6 Inspection (JAI)</td>
<td>AF/JAI</td>
<td>10 USC § 806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 USC § 9037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Unit Effectiveness Inspection</td>
<td>DAFIA/IR</td>
<td>10 USC § 9020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Service Cryptologic Component Oversight Inspection</td>
<td>AF SCC</td>
<td>USSID SE3000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Add) Insert the following rows after row 64 in the AF/A1 (Manpower, Personnel, and Services) section of Table A2.2:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Enterprise Mail – CONUS Only (Annual)</th>
<th>AFIMSC</th>
<th>DoD Instruction 4525.09</th>
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<tr>
<td>Enterprise Mail – Overseas Only (Annual)</td>
<td>AF/A1</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 4525.09; DoD 4525.6-M, C12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Change) paragraph A2.3. to read “Authorized Functional Visits and Inspections. Table A2.2 contains the list of authorized inspections at DAF Wings/Garrisons/Deltas and includes non-DAF, statutory, certification, accreditation, and technical survey inspections and visits. See paragraph 2.4.3. for deficiency management requirements for Functional Inspection results.”

(Add) A2.3.1. Deficiencies levied by Attachment 2 organizations may be entered into IGEMS at the Wing/Garrison/Delta and/or unit Commander’s discretion.

(Add) A2.3.2. Should a Wing/Garrison/Delta choose to track their deficiency within IGEMS, it is the Wing/Garrison and/or unit IG’s responsibility to input and track those deficiencies.
(Change) paragraph A7.1. to read, “Readiness Exercise inspection requirements and methodology can be found in the Readiness Reporting Guide, in the Classified Readiness Assessment Reporting guidance, and on the DAFIA/IR SharePoint under the “IG Tools” tab (https://usaf.dps.mil/sites/afia/IGI). Changes to Attachment 7 may be submitted via the Air Force Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication, and advocated for through the DAF System Governance Process or through recurring taskers generated by DAFIA/IR.”

(Change) paragraph A12.1.2.1. to read, “IG-identified grades, summaries, deficiencies (assigned to the appropriate organizational points of contact to resolve), recommended improvement areas, strengths, mandated unit grades, and the final report associated with each inspection. (T-1). There may be some cases where an inspector can detect and solve small issues on the spot (e.g. incorrect uniform wear). In these cases, IGs can make corrections without an IGEMS entry. However, an IGEMS entry is warranted if there is a trend of these small, isolated cases to ensure leadership awareness and corrective action. IGs should enter deficiencies found by non-IG inspectors into IGEMS only after assessing and validating the deficiencies. Inspection augmentees may also enter data in Functional Area Manager data systems in addition to (not in lieu of) IGEMS.”

(Change) paragraph A12.2.1. to read, “A12.2.1. Any DAF publication which levies Wing/Garrison/Delta-level (or lower) compliance may have an associated SAC. However, FAMs and units should not author SACs where there are no Wing/Garrison/Delta-level requirements which require command attention.”

(Change) paragraph A12.2.3. to read, “A12.2.3. Requirements from more than one DAFI or DAFI-directed program may be consolidated into a single SAC. Conversely, multiple SACs may be written for a single DAFI for DAFIs affecting multiple organizational levels within a Wing/Garrison/Delta. A single DAFI may generate a SAC for a Wing/Garrison/Delta-level program, a Group-level program, a Squadron-level program, and/or a work center program. SACs must not contain requirements for multiple organizational levels (e.g., if a DAFI contains requirements for multiple organizational levels, a stand-alone SAC must be created for each organizational level; one for Wing/Garrison/Delta-level, one for Group-level, one for Squadron-level, etc.). Tailoring SACs to the specific level of assessment preserves the value of Airmen’s and Guardians’ time and provides data specific to each demographic.”

(Change) paragraph A12.2.6. to read, “A12.2.6. DAF SAC authors will only reference compliance items for which the 2-letter is the approving official (e.g., an AF/A2 SAC may not include items from an AF/A1 AFI). DAF SAC authors may also reference higher than DAF-level compliance items from policy documents for which the 2-letter has been assigned responsibility (e.g., an AF/A10 SAC may include nuclear DoD Instruction compliance items). SACs should have enough items to inform the command chain of necessary compliance, but should not be so long as to require excess attention to compliance tracking at the expense of accomplishing the mission.”

(Change) paragraph A12.2.7. to read, “A12.2.7. Pertinent Oversight Authority staffs may author SACs for owned supplements which drive Wing/Garrison/Delta-level (or lower) compliance. Pertinent Oversight Authority SACs may include higher-level guidance (e.g. DAF or DoD)
items, provided existing SAC items are not duplicated. For highly-specialized functions not represented by a DAF Functional Area Manager, Pertinent Oversight Authorities may develop and publish SACs which include higher-level guidance. Pertinent Oversight Authorities may develop SACs if no DAF SAC exists. Pertinent Oversight Authority staffs should annotate any required documents required to answer a SAC item.”

(Change) Figure A12.1 title to read, “Self-Assessment Checklist (SAC) Author Guide.

(Change) Figure A12.1 first row to read, “SACs are not intended as inspection checklists. They do not contain all guidance questions pertaining to compliance. FAMs or units creating SACs must be discerning when creating items for assessment and take CC intent and Airmen's and Guardians’ time into account.”

(Change) paragraph A12.2.8. to read, “A12.2.8. Wings/Garrisons/Deltas may generate local SACs for Wing/Garrison/Delta-level supplements which drive Wing/Garrison/Delta-level (or lower) compliance.”

(Delete) paragraph A12.2.8.1.

(Delete) paragraph A12.2.8.2.

(Add) paragraph A12.2.9.3. to read, “A12.2.9.3. SAC authors seeking an out-of-cycle update to a SAC must contact their appropriate level MICT Administrator.”

(Change) paragraph A12.2.10.1. to read, “When using a single DAFI as the reference for a SAC, use the DAFI number along with the long title of the DAFI (e.g., “DAFI 14-404, Intelligence Oversight”).”

(Change) paragraph A12.2.10.4. to read, “When naming a SAC for a policy supplement, use the HAF naming convention and include the supplementing organization identifier (e.g., “DAFI 14-404, Intelligence Oversight – ACC Sup”).”
This Instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive 90-2, Inspector General—The Inspection System, Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3150.02, DoD Nuclear Weapons Surety Program, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction 3263.05, Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections, and Air Force Policy Directive 16-7, Special Access Programs. It provides policy for inspections involving Air Force units, processes, programs, and procedures. Only this instruction may establish service-wide Inspector General (IG) inspection requirements. This Instruction applies to regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), and Air National Guard (ANG) units. Major Commands (MAJCOMs) will coordinate supplements to this instruction with the Secretary of the Air Force, Inspections Directorate (SAF/IGI) before publication and forward one copy to SAF/IGI after publication. Use Air Force Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication, for any suggested changes to this publication (e-mail to usaf.pentagon.saf-ig.mbx.saf-igi-workflow@mail.mil). The authorities to waive unit-level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier number (“T-0”, “T-1”, “T-2”, and “T-3”) following the compliance statement. See AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management, for a description of the authorities associated with Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers via Air Force Form 679, Air Force Publication Compliance Item Waiver Request/Approval, through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver authority. Submit waiver requests for Secretary of the Air Force, IG (SAF/IG) consideration through SAF/IGI. To meet the intent of AFI 33-360, e-mail finalized waivers (Air Force Form 679) to SAF/IGI (usaf.pentagon.saf-ig.mbx.saf-igi-workflow@mail.mil). Ensure records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records, and
disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule in the Air Force Records Information Management System.

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES**

This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. The intent behind this revision is to simplify and improve inspection processes to allow IGs to more efficiently execute inspections. If any part of this instruction impedes a Commander’s ability to effectively or efficiently meet mission requirements or take care of Airmen, contact SAF/IG for timely resolution.

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<td>11.7.</td>
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<td>Figure 11.1</td>
<td>Oath for personnel assigned to or augmenting the IG.</td>
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<td>11.8.</td>
<td>Air Force IG duty badge. .....................................................</td>
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Chapter 1

GENERAL GUIDANCE, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND INSPECTION GUIDELINES

1.1. Overview.

1.1.1. The Air Force Inspection System is a coherent, integrated, and synchronized alignment of inspections conducted on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF), the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), and commanders at all levels. The Air Force Inspection System consists of a Commander-led Unit Self-Assessment Program, three synergistic inspections (Commander’s Inspection Program, Unit Effectiveness Inspection [UEI], and Management Inspection), and continual evaluation (conducted by functional entities), all designed to evaluate the integration of different levels of command in the Air Force. Each inspection is designed to complement the other inspections, relying on the input and output of the other inspections for maximum effectiveness (see Figure 1.1). The Air Force Inspection System relies on a risk-based sampling strategy used during inspections. Subsequent chapters in this instruction describe each inspection type in further detail. The intent is to continuously improve the Air Force Inspection System so there is an ever-shrinking difference (both real and perceived) between mission readiness and inspection readiness. It is necessary for Airmen and commanders to focus on the mission, not the inspection.

Figure 1.1. The Air Force Inspection System.

1.1.2. Applicability of Inspections. The Management Inspection is conducted above the Wing-level (HAF, MAJCOM, and specified Numbered Air Forces (NAFs)/FOAs/DRUs) in accordance with Chapter 4 of this instruction. UEIs are conducted at the Wing-level by MAJCOM IGs and AFIA in accordance with Chapter 3 of this instruction. Commanders of Air Force Wings will execute a Commander’s Inspection Program in accordance with Chapter 2 of this instruction. (T-1) Within the Wing, the Unit Self-Assessment Program is a critical component of the Air Force Inspection System.
1.1.3. Throughout this instruction, the term “Wing” is used as a substitute for any Wing or equivalent unit as determined by MAJCOM Commanders for Air Force Inspection System purposes.

1.1.4. Throughout this instruction, the term “Pertinent Oversight Authority” is defined as an organization above the Wing-level responsible for the management and oversight of a particular program or functional area. Responsibilities can include managing and organizing personnel, equipment, training, policy, and continual evaluation in order to support operational planning and mission execution. There are numerous duty titles for individuals or organizations which perform Pertinent Oversight Authority responsibilities, such as MAJCOM Functional Manager, Functional Area Manager, Subject Matter Expert (SME), FOA, DRU, and/or Centralized Activity.

1.1.5. An IG inspection is defined as any effort to evaluate an organization, function, or process by any means or method, including surveys, interviews, assessments, evaluations, exercises, and audits (excluding audits conducted under the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force Auditor General [SAF/AG]). IG inspections also include events such as technical evaluations or inspection/oversight activities required by law or statute. Commanders may authorize any other assessment or inspection activity they deem necessary. Functional entities may conduct inspections approved by SAF/IG to provide or obtain technical information or assistance (see Attachment 2 of this instruction).

1.1.6. Inspections are an inherent responsibility of commanding officers and civilian directors of military organizations at all levels in accordance with Title 10 United States Code § 8583, Requirement of Exemplary Conduct, and AFI 1-2, Commander’s Responsibilities. The purpose of inspecting is to improve and evaluate the state of conformance, discipline, economy, efficiency, readiness, and resource management. Commanders/Directors or staffs conduct inspections of subordinate units/organizations. NAF Commanders should coordinate inspection requirements with the respective MAJCOM Commander.

1.1.7. Unit inspection preparation is inherently wasteful. Units are inspection-ready when focused on mission readiness and on building a culture of disciplined compliance.

1.1.8. Continual evaluation is the routine monitoring of leading and lagging performance indicators of an inspected unit by the appropriate Pertinent Oversight Authority. This includes analysis of metrics, data systems, inspection reports, inventory controls, requests for assistance, Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT) Self-Assessment Communicators (SAC), and/or any reporting system within a functional community. Pertinent Oversight Authorities must effectively engage with supported units to identify when a unit is performing well or struggling to accomplish its mission. Pertinent Oversight Authorities will provide any non-compliance found through continual evaluation directly to the process owner, the chain of command, and ultimately to the Wing and/or MAJCOM IG. Continual evaluation within Air Force organizations is applied both internally and externally to discover efficiencies and strengths, and to identify and mitigate deficiencies or weaknesses. The continual evaluation process should identify findings, determine root causes, apply corrective actions, ensure follow up, and share results across the organization. The IG may supplement these efforts through exercise, inspection, and documentation.

1.1.8.1. Internal continual evaluation consists of organization self-assessment focusing inward on the discipline, efficiency, and effectiveness of organic staff operations,
processes, and programs in accordance with AFI 1-2. Internal continual evaluation should be repeatable and provide an assessment of commander/director responsibilities. Internal continual evaluation should be customized to meet the requirements associated to the structure and mission of the organization and evaluate commander priorities. Internal continual evaluation should be established and well-understood within the organization, having demonstrated proficiency through multiple assessment cycles on a re-occurring battle rhythm.

1.1.8.1.1. Higher headquarters organizations should consider using the principles associated with the management inspection Major Graded Areas (MGA) as the framework for conducting routine internal assessments.

1.1.8.2. External continual evaluation is the continuous feedback provided to subordinate commanders and process owners from MAJCOM IGs, Wing IGs, and Pertinent Oversight Authorities. Provide functionally-assessed data to IGs at all levels to inform the risk-based sampling strategy. Continual evaluation feedback is also used to inform senior leader decision-making, program oversight, and to identify gaps or deficiencies in existing guidance.

1.1.9. When differences arise concerning inspections governed by this instruction and other inspection guidance (functional inspection requirements, prioritized requirements, duplicative inspections, frequency, scope, etc.), this instruction takes precedence over other Air Force inspection policy and guidance unless otherwise exempted by this instruction.

1.2. **Purpose of the Air Force Inspection System.** The Air Force Inspection System:

1.2.1. Evaluates leadership effectiveness, management performance, aspects of unit culture and command climate, and the ability to minimize waste and prevent fraud and abuse.

1.2.2. Provides the SecAF, CSAF, and commanders at all levels an independent assessment of unit compliance with established directives.

1.2.3. Enables and strengthens commanders’ mission effectiveness and efficiency through independent assessment and reporting of readiness, economy, efficiency, state of discipline, and the ability to execute assigned missions.

1.2.4. Motivates and promotes military discipline, improved unit performance, and management excellence throughout the chain of command and within units and staffs.

1.2.5. Identifies, reports, and analyzes issues interfering with readiness, economy, efficiency, discipline, effectiveness, compliance, performance, surety and management excellence.

1.2.6. Supports and informs commanders’ risk management at all levels. IGs must ensure the Air Force Inspection System supports prudent decisions by commanders that have documented accepted risk.

1.2.7. Enables MAJCOM, ANG and HAF Functional Area Manager assessment of functional effectiveness, field compliance, and of the adequacy of organization, policy, guidance, training and resources.

1.2.8. Provides a mechanism for Air Force senior leaders to direct a targeted, detailed, and thorough inspection of specific programs, organizations, or issues.
1.2.9. Reinforces to commanders and Airmen at every level the equality of mission readiness and inspection readiness.

1.2.10. Eliminates on-site inspections which are not mission-relevant, do not outweigh the cost, or detract from mission performance and readiness.

1.2.11. Significantly reduces (with the goal of eliminating) the wasteful practice of “inspection preparation.”

1.3. Authorities.

1.3.1. SAF/IG reports on readiness, economy, efficiency and the state of discipline of the force to the SecAF and CSAF in accordance with Title 10 United States Code § 8020, Inspector General.

1.3.2. HAF Mission Directive 1-20, The Inspector General, and Air Force Policy Directive 90-2, The Inspector General–The Inspection System, define the SAF/IG mission. With the exception of The Judge Advocate General (AF/JA) inspections (pursuant to Title 10 United States Code § 806 and 8037) and SAF/AG audits, inspections conducted within the Air Force are subject to review by SAF/IG for adherence to the objectives and policies contained in this instruction.

1.3.3. In accordance with AFI 33-360 delegation guidance, SAF/IG delegates waiver authority for all “T-1” compliance requirements contained in this instruction to the Director, SAF/IGI.

1.3.4. AF/JA, SAF/AG, and SAF/IG have statutory authority and responsibility to conduct inspections and audits which must guarantee independence, instill confidence in the system, and be free of any appearance of undue influence. Each statutory inspection team will designate a point of contact to AFIA. AF/JA, SAF/AG, and SAF/IG must coordinate inspections and audits with the appropriate MAJCOM Gatekeeper. Although MAJCOM/Wing Gatekeepers can facilitate optimum scheduling, they do not have the authority to approve/disapprove Article 6 inspections (AF/JA), Air Force Audit Agency audits (SAF/AG), SAF/IGI and AFIA inspections (SAF/IGI-directed), or MAJCOM Commander-directed inspections.

1.3.5. Air Force IGs derive authority from SAF/IG’s statutory and regulatory authority and from the respective Commanders’ authorities (further delegated to IG personnel, including inspection augmentees and Wing Inspection Team members).

1.3.6. IGs are authorized to intervene during an inspection in cases involving safety, security, surety or procedural violations (further delegated to IG personnel, including inspection augmentees and Wing Inspection Team members).

1.3.7. Nuclear surety is always subject to inspection during any IG visit to nuclear-capable units. Inspectors will ensure potential nuclear surety deficiencies are brought to the immediate attention of the inspection Team Chief. (T-1) In the event the IG determines an unsatisfactory condition exists (as described in CJCS Instruction 3263.05) or surety is at risk, the Team Chief must notify the appropriate levels of command. (T-1)

1.3.8. Use of contractors as IG inspectors. IG duty is inherently governmental and contractors are prohibited from serving as IG inspectors. Contractor SMEs may gather information for, or provide advice, opinions, or recommendations to, an IG inspector who exercises independent,
objective judgment on the subject matter. The IG makes decisions related to the inspection, including schedule, sample selection, deficiency assignment, deficiency severity, MGA grades, and ratings (these tasks may not be performed by a contractor). A contractor is prohibited from serving in any capacity if there is an organizational conflict of interest, as determined by the responsible contracting office, resulting from other contracts held. Contractors requiring access to IG information and access to IGEMS require a non-disclosure agreement to maintain the confidentiality of IG information (see the SAF/IGI SharePoint site for template: https://cs2.eis.af.mil/sites/11309/default.aspx). The IG must coordinate the non-disclosure agreement with the respective contracting officer to ensure its terms are enforceable against the contract. (T-3) Refer to paragraphs 12.2.4 and 12.3.4 of this instruction for restrictions on contractor access to IG technical tools.

1.3.9. Access to Information and Spaces. To carry out responsibilities, Commanders shall provide Air Force IGs expeditious and unrestricted access to and (when required) copies of records, reports, investigations, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material to the extent authorized by law or policy and available to or within any USAF activity. (T-0) To the extent permitted by law and policy, commanders will grant inspectors performing official IG inspection duties access to any documents, records, and evidentiary materials needed to discharge duties, to include data stored in electronic repositories. (T-0) When there is uncertainty regarding the extent to which access is permitted by law, coordinate with a legal advisor to ensure records are properly obtained and maintained.

1.3.9.1. Access to medical records. When an IG’s access to medical records is required, a valid basis for disclosure by Air Force Medical Service organizations, addressing applicable law and regulation, must be provided and documented. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) protects an individual’s privacy interest in his or her medical records. Violations of HIPAA regulations may result in criminal and civil liability. Requests for medical records must comply with regulations which provide permissible uses and disclosures of an individual’s health information known as Protected Health Information (PHI).

1.3.9.1.1. Department of Defense publication 6025.18-R sets forth specific rules that apply to PHI, to be carried out in a manner consistent with Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations.

1.3.9.1.2. In applying HIPPA regulatory exemptions, IG personnel must understand the authorities of the Air Force IG. Although the Air Force IG does not enjoy a statutory basis for compelling production of PHI, DoD Directive 6025.18-R, paragraphs C7.4.1 and C7.4.1.1 permit disclosure of PHI to health oversight agencies to conduct audits, inspections, or other activities necessary for appropriate oversight of health care systems.

1.3.9.1.3. Medical records disclosed to and maintained by the IG remain protected by HIPAA and the Privacy Act, and may contain sensitive information protected by other applicable laws. The IG and any personnel with access to medical records must ensure compliance with HIPAA, the Privacy Act, and any other applicable laws or information protection requirements in the further use and disclosure of such records.

1.3.9.2. Privileged information. IGs are not authorized access to material subject to any legally-recognized privilege (e.g., psychotherapist-patient, victim advocate-victim,
attorney-client, applicable safety investigations, etc.) unless voluntarily waived by the holder of the privilege.

1.3.9.3. Access to classified or sensitive information. IGs will forward a visit request through the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (or successor system). (T-0) Commanders will ensure access to classified information is in accordance with DoD Instruction 5205.11 and AFI 16-1404, Air Force Information Security Program. (T-0) If classification or compartmentalization restrictions preclude immediate access to information required by inspectors from the US Air Force IG office, the denying commander will immediately report the situation to the appropriate access-control authority and obtain an access-eligibility determination. (T-2) If this authority does not grant access to the information, notify SAF/IGI of the situation. The notice to SAF/IGI should include the location, date, command, scope of the assistance inquiry, inspection or investigation, who denied access, who verified denial and/or approved denial, the reason access was denied, and the contact details of the supervisor and commander of the organization.

1.3.10. IG reciprocity. MAJCOM and Wing IG reciprocity is an essential component of the Air Force Inspection System. When making decisions regarding inspections of geographically-separated units, consider risk, cost, and reciprocity. If requested, a collocated IG may conduct inspections at geographically-separated units on behalf of the owning unit. IGs should accommodate inspection reciprocity requests to the maximum extent practicable. Additionally, requesting IGs will honor deficiencies reported by the inspecting IG as if they were their own. (T-3) Concerned parties will document reciprocity requests in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). (T-2)

1.3.11. When practical, IG teams may deploy to forward locations and headquarters during exercises and contingency operations to evaluate processes and performance. Inspectors may observe (but not interfere with) real-world activities unless observed actions are in direct violation of mandated guidance or if injury to personnel and/or damage to equipment could occur which may cause significant mission degradation.

1.3.12. Inspecting contracted functions. The Contracting Officer and/or Contracting Officer’s Representative will accompany inspectors (or Wing Inspection Team members) during inspections of contracted functions. (T-3) Inspectors (or Wing Inspection Team members) will assess and rate contracted functions against the Performance Work Statement and assess adequacy of the Performance Work Statement to meet mission requirements. (T-3) Inspectors should communicate with the Contracting Office and/or the Contracting Officer Representative to fully understand the scope and limitations of the contracting authorities and work closely with them to prevent a possible misunderstanding or creation of a condition which may be the basis of a later claim against the Government. IGs should validate findings related to contractor functions with the Contracting Office.

1.3.13. IG Tenet of Confidentiality. Confidentiality is the protection of individual privacy. Inspectors (including Wing Inspection Team members, inspection augmentees, and uncertified inspectors) have a duty to protect the personal identity of any individual providing information to the IG to the maximum extent practicable, particularly when the individual specifically requests confidentiality. Disclosure of communications (and the identity of the communicant) is strictly limited to an official basis as required. Assuring an individual’s privacy is
safeguarded to the maximum extent practicable encourages voluntary cooperation and promotes a climate of openness in identifying issues requiring leadership intervention. The degree of confidentiality and the specific information kept confidential vary according to the IG functions of inspections, assistance, and investigations. During the course of an inspection, inspectors will not normally reveal the identities of individuals who provide information even when individuals are linked to specific functions or interviews. (T-1) Inspectors should never promise confidentiality or anonymity. Airmen (both military and civilian) are responsible for maintaining confidentiality beyond the conclusion of the IG duty.

1.3.14. Protected Communications/Disclosures to Inspectors. Lawful communications to an IG are protected from reprisal (e.g., IG functional interviews, Airmen-to-IG Sessions, etc.). Inspectors and Wing Inspection Team members are representatives of the IG and are authorized to receive disclosures the IG is designated to receive. Inspectors should understand there are distinct laws based on the status of the person which define what communication or disclosure is protected from reprisal. ANG Technicians will be in a military status to participate in Airmen-to-IG Sessions. (T-0)

1.3.15. For individuals seeking assistance or reporting an impropriety, complaint or criminal activity during the course of an inspection, inspectors should direct the individual to the servicing IG in accordance with AFI 90-301. (T-1) Inspection teams will have a handoff plan in place in the event a person comes forward with an allegation of impropriety, misconduct or criminal activity during any on-site inspection. (T-2) Inspectors should have complaint resolution trained individuals and law enforcement contact information immediately available. In response to any allegations of sexual assault, comply with reporting requirements in accordance with AFI 90-6001, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program.

1.4. Roles and responsibilities.

1.4.1. SAF/IG.

1.4.1.1. Coordinates, synchronizes, integrates, and approves/disapproves the inspections and inspection elements of Air Force Inspection System components to eliminate duplication and unnecessary inspections.

1.4.1.2. Acts as the Air Force Gatekeeper for inspections, evaluations, assessments, and other inspection-related visits (including audits and inquiries) conducted by outside entities (Office of the IG, Department of Defense [OIG, DoD]; Government Accountability Office [GAO], and others); SAF/IG will coordinate (to the maximum extent practicable) the activities of those organizations among themselves and with Air Force organizations to allow the development of timely, accurate, and useful information with the goal of the least-possible disruption to the affected unit(s).

1.4.1.3. Establishes Air Force inspection Gatekeeper guidance, policy and oversight for Air Force IG and Functional inspections, assessments and evaluations.

1.4.1.4. In consultation with SAF/AG, coordinates the Air Force Inspection System to make efficient and effective use of Audit Agency resources and capabilities in order to eliminate duplication of effort and minimize disruption within inspected units/organizations.
1.4.1.5. Maintains and safeguards the integrity of the Air Force Inspection System and
reports on the effectiveness of the system to the SecAF and CSAF.

1.4.1.6. Conducts inspections of Air Force Special Access Programs and other sensitive
activities in accordance with DoD guidance and Air Force policies and reports results as
directed by the SecAF or CSAF.

1.4.1.7. Provides oversight of intelligence activities conducted under the provisions of
Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, and DoD Manual 5240.01,
Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities.

1.4.1.8. Publishes inspection guidance for Air Force nuclear-capable units and units with
Nuclear Weapons Related Materiel in accordance with DoD, CJCS, and service guidance.

1.4.1.9. Conveys nuclear inspection issues to the Nuclear Oversight Board.

1.4.1.10. Develops and implements IG selection criteria, assignment policies and civilian
career programs.

1.4.1.11. Provides policy and guidance for The Inspector General’s Inspection Reporting
System, to include the Inspector General Evaluation Management System (IGEMS),
MICT, and the Air Force Gatekeeper site.

1.4.1.12. Establishes Self-Assessment Communicator policy and guidance.

1.4.1.13. Maintains custody of Air Force inspection reports on behalf of the SecAF and
serves as the initial denial authority for Freedom of Information Act requests for Air Force
inspection reports.

1.4.1.14. If necessary, directs inspection of any Air Force program or operation.

1.4.1.15. Serves as the HAF focal point for interacting with the OIG, DoD and other
government IGs by maintaining liaison with IGs from within DoD, other military services,
other statutory IGs, and other agencies concerning Air Force IG activities.

1.4.1.16. Provides feedback to MAJCOMs, DRUs, and FOAs on the adequacy of
inspection programs.

1.4.1.17. Approves Air Force Special Interest Items.

1.4.1.18. Provides annual By-Law reports of inspection results to the OIG, DoD and/or
higher headquarters.

1.4.1.19. Directs the USAF Executive IG Course, Nuclear Surety Inspector Course, and
IG Training Courses.

1.4.1.20. Assists the SecAF and CSAF in teaching and training leaders on the fundamental
tenets of the Air Force Core Values, principles of Exemplary Conduct, ethics, and
command responsibilities.

1.4.1.21. Disseminates information, innovative ideas, and lessons learned as a result of
inspections and recommends processes to help inspected organizations improve and
accomplish command objectives.

1.4.1.22. Serves on boards, committees, councils, and similar organizations and performs
other duties as directed by SecAF and CSAF.
1.4.1.23. Visits wing Flight Commander/leadership courses to ensure best practices are widely shared across active, guard, reserve, and civilian organizations.

1.4.2. SAF/IGI.

1.4.2.1. Monitors and evaluates the adequacy, effectiveness, and efficiency of the Air Force Inspection System.

1.4.2.2. Manages, develops and implements the Air Force Inspection System policies for unit inspection oversight and standards, Gatekeeping, and performance-based evaluations.

1.4.2.3. Coordinates on AFI-directed and HAF-level proposed inspections, assessments, evaluations, audits, surveys or any other special visits to ensure IG-directed and HAF-level efforts are mutually reinforced through the Gatekeeper process.

1.4.2.4. Provides MICT and IGEMS training to HAF Functional representatives.

1.4.2.5. Serves as the principal advisor to SAF/IG and directs Special Access Program inspections in accordance with Chapter 13 of this instruction.

1.4.2.6. Manages Air Force Fraud, Waste and Abuse Complaint Hotline for Special Access Programs, including intake, complaint analysis and investigation.

1.4.2.7. Manages and administers the Air Force Special Interest Item program.

1.4.2.8. Assists OIG, DoD personnel in planning the course syllabus for the Joint IG Training Course; instructs as required.

1.4.2.9. Approves the AFIA-generated IG Training Course-Inspections course syllabus. SAF/IGI and MAJCOM IGs should regularly provide feedback to AFIA through audits and critique.

1.4.2.10. Leads, executes and chairs venues informing the Air Force Inspection System Governance Process.

1.4.2.11. Conveys nuclear-related inspection issues to the Nuclear Working Group.


1.4.2.13. Serves as Office of Primary Responsibility for processing Freedom of Information Act requests concerning nuclear inspections (all types) in accordance with CJCSI 3263.05.

1.4.2.14. Serves as release/initial denial authority for Freedom of Information Act requests concerning inspections other than Nuclear Surety Inspections (all types).

1.4.2.15. Forwards Nuclear Surety Inspector Course syllabi to the Joint Staff (J33), as required IAW CJCSI 3263.05.

1.4.2.16. Develops, coordinates and forwards the nuclear capable unit listing to Joint Staff (J33), as required IAW CJCSI 3263.05.

1.4.2.17. Works with Joint Staff and Service counterparts to develop inspection policy for joint installations.

1.4.3. Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General, Special Investigations Directorate (SAF/IGX) is the SAF/IG action office for intelligence oversight issues.
1.4.4. AFIA.

1.4.4.1. Provides independent inspection, evaluation, oversight, and analysis to advance continuous improvement of mission effectiveness at all AF levels as directed by SAF/IG and in accordance with Air Force Mission Directive 31, Air Force Inspection Agency, and Chapter 6 of this instruction.

1.4.4.2. Oversees Air Force Inspection System standardization and policy adherence by IG teams conducting inspections and provides feedback to MAJCOM IGs and SAF/IG on the effectiveness of the teams’ assessments and deliberative/debrief processes.

1.4.4.3. Provides and integrates medical inspectors with MAJCOM IG teams to conduct UEIs.

1.4.4.4. Collaborates with the Air Force Surgeon General (AF/SG), the Air Force Medical Operations Agency (AFMOA), and MAJCOMs on policies and procedures pertaining to UEIs.

1.4.4.5. Upon request, integrates with MAJCOM IG teams during inspections of field units but will not write a separate report.

1.4.4.6. AFIA inspectors may fly as observers in inspected unit aircraft when appropriate to the inspection role.

1.4.4.7. Serves as the MAJCOM-equivalent for FOAs/DRUs/Activities inspection processes.


1.4.4.9. Serves as Functional Manager and Lead Command for the family of information technology systems which comprise The Inspector General’s Inspection Reporting System. Provides IGEMS and MICT requirements and funding to The Inspector General’s Inspection Reporting System Program Office (AFPEO BES).

1.4.4.10. Provides a summary of inspection results for inclusion in recurring IG briefings to Air Force senior leaders and cross-flows this information to the MAJCOMs on a continual basis.

1.4.4.11. Performs Radioactive Material permit inspections.


1.4.4.13. Manages the Air Force Core Team of certified nuclear inspectors.

1.4.4.14. Independently conducts Management Inspections and UEIs of selected Air Force HAF/MAJCOM staffs, DRUs, FOAs, and Named Activities. SAF/IG selects FOAs and DRUs for a Management Inspection or UEI according to an analysis of the Mission Directive and an assessment of whether the organization is predominantly a policy-making or executing agent.

1.4.4.15. Administers the IG Training Course-Inspections and the Nuclear Surety Inspector Course.
1.4.4.16. Forwards the Nuclear Surety Inspection inspector training syllabi to SAF/IGI no later than 1 September annually and after every change/update.

1.4.4.17. Prepares The Inspector General Brief (using content contributions from the field) to ensure IGs, commanders, and Airmen have access to relevant information for the entire spectrum of IG activities. The Inspector General Brief provides authoritative guidance and information to commanders, IGs, inspectors, and Air Force supervisors and leaders at all levels of command.

1.4.4.18. Serves as the AF Gatekeeper to manage the centralized AF inspection schedule, which includes inspection activities by external, non-AF agencies. Serves as the MAJCOM Gatekeeper for select Air Force FOAs/DRUs.

1.4.4.19. Serves as the lead agent for Air Force By-Law reporting. AFIA will collect MAJCOM data (via the IGEMS By-Law Section) from each of the By-Law inspection requirements performed during the reporting period.

1.4.4.20. Performs any other inspection activity when directed by SAF/IG.

1.4.5. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Office of Special Projects (AFOSI PJ):

1.4.5.1. Conducts program security and government compliance inspections of industry Special Access Programs in accordance with DoD guidance and Air Force policies, reports results as directed by the SecAF or CSAF, and notifies the Air Force Special Access Program Central Office (AF SAPCO) of Special Access Program security compliance inspection trends for potential Special Access Program security policy updates or updates to the Special Access Program security inspection criteria.

1.4.5.2. Inspects and/or investigates any issue under the statutory and regulatory authorities of SAF/IG, AFOSI Commander, or the Director of AFOSI PJ.

1.4.5.3. Supports and assists SAF/IGI, AFIA, and MAJCOM IGs with classified inspection activities. When IGs need security expertise on inspection teams, AFOSI PJ will support as inspection augmentees under IG statutory and regulatory authorities consistent with SAF/IG, AFOSI Commander direction, AFI 16-701, Management, Administration and Oversight of Special Access Programs, and this instruction.

1.4.6. HAF Directorates:

1.4.6.1. Develop and prioritize inspection requirements. Coordinate inspection requirements with Pertinent Oversight Authorities then forward requirements to SAF/IGI for inclusion in Attachment 3 of this instruction. Directorates must provide a Director-approved Continual Evaluation Plan to include the areas in Attachment 3.

1.4.6.2. Levy no inspection, external Staff Assistance Visit, or exercise requirements contradicting Gatekeeper guidance in Attachment 2.

1.4.6.3. Coordinate with the appropriate Pertinent Oversight Authority and Gatekeepers to schedule, validate and integrate/synchronize current and planned inspections, assessments, evaluations and audits listed in Attachment 2 of this instruction.

1.4.6.4. Develop and classify Air Force-level MICT SACs in accordance with Attachment 12 of this instruction.
1.4.6.5. Provide appropriate representatives to support and participate in the Air Force Inspection System Governance Process.

1.4.6.6. Collaborate with the Pertinent Oversight Authorities to monitor program health and close assigned deficiencies in accordance with this directive. Contact SAF/IGI for IGEMS and MICT training.

1.4.6.7. Validate HAF-level findings with MAJCOM IGs and MAJCOM Functional Managers and provide Corrective Action Plan replies for valid, actionable deficiencies within IGEMS. If HAF-level offices do not concur with a HAF-level assigned deficiency, provide rationale for non-concurrence in IGEMS.

1.4.6.8. Periodically review continual evaluation data and deficiencies for trends, analysis, and reporting through IGEMS.

1.4.6.9. Complete MICT training and conduct initial review of SACs and MICT content within 90 days of appointment as a SAC owner.

1.4.6.10. Eliminate non-IG inspections of Wings unless approved by this instruction.

1.4.7. **MAJCOM and AFOSI IG Teams:**

1.4.7.1. Conduct UEIs and required nuclear inspections on Regular Air Force and Air Reserve Component (ARC) Wings in accordance with **Chapter 3** of this instruction. Coordinate the Total Force Associate Wing UEI risk-based sampling strategy and inspection scope development with the lead MAJCOM IG and supporting ARC MAJCOM IG to account for organizational specifics.

   1.4.7.1.1. In accordance with Title 32 United States Code Section 105, Gaining MAJCOM IGs (pursuant to delegated authority) shall execute inspections of ANG Wings, to include areas previously covered by separate functional assessments and applicable Total Force guidance. Gaining MAJCOMs should include NGB IG in all correspondence concerning ANG Wing inspections. (T-0)

1.4.7.2. Report indications of potential Fraud, Waste, and Abuse to the inspection Team Chief and the Wing IG.

1.4.7.3. In coordination with AFOSI, conduct inspections of Air Force Special Access Programs and other sensitive activities in accordance with DoD guidance, Air Force policies, and this instruction. Consider classified and sensitive inspection performance in the overall UEI continual evaluation cycle and grade.

1.4.7.4. Use IGEMS to facilitate Air Force-wide trend analysis and reporting, and deficiency resolution. Minimum required information for deficiencies is described in **Chapter 9** of this instruction.

1.4.7.5. Designate a Gatekeeper for notification of inspections by Air Force and non-Air Force organizations.

1.4.7.6. Participate in the Air Force inspection scheduling process to coordinate and deconflict inspection efforts, including continuous schedule reviews and participation in the Gatekeepers’ Inspection Scheduling Working Group (in-person or remote). Input inspection activities (to include any other activities approved by the Gatekeeper) immediately upon approval to the Air Force Gatekeeping website.
1.4.7.7. Develop MAJCOM-specific inspector training and certification programs for MAJCOM and Wing-level IG Inspectors.

1.4.7.8. When an inspection results in an INEFFECTIVE or UNSATISFACTORY overall rating, results in a loss of critical mission area or certification, results in a serious injury occurs during an inspection event, and/or results may receive national-level press attention, notify SAF/IGI via email or message within 24 hours.

1.4.7.9. Conduct periodic site visits and/or review documentation of unit activity in conjunction with exercises and contingencies, real-world operations, self-assessments, other inspections and/or evaluations, and other measures of sustained performance. These measures are used to adjust the breadth, duration, and frequency of on-site inspection activities. For areas where a MAJCOM HQ has limited expertise due to consolidation of SMEs, MAJCOM IGs will ensure Pertinent Oversight Authority inclusion in these processes.

1.4.7.10. Ensure inspections de-conflict with unit Air and Space Expeditionary Forces vulnerability period(s) and/or scheduled deployments, ANG operations and maintenance deployments, and unit force structure changes. Tailor inspections to allow requisite unit support to Combatant Commands. MAJCOM IGs are the final authority for scheduling and tailoring.

1.4.7.11. MAJCOM/IGs will visit wing Flight Commander/leadership courses to ensure best practices are widely shared across active, guard, reserve, and civilian organizations

1.4.8. ANGRC Directorate of the Inspector General (NGB/IG):

1.4.8.1. Does not conduct inspections under the Air Force Inspection System unless specifically directed by the Director, Air National Guard. However, NGB/IG may provide Title 32 SMEs when requested by a lead MAJCOM for conducting UEIs of ANG units. Additionally, NGB/IG may coordinate inspection policy issues with Gaining MAJCOM IGs and ANG Wing IGs, as required.

1.4.8.2. Individual ANG members may perform an inspection augmentee role in Gaining MAJCOM-funded Title 10 Military Personnel Appropriation status.

1.4.8.3. In conjunction with MAJCOM IG ANG Advisors (as applicable), NGB/IG will assist Gaining MAJCOM IG Gatekeepers with development of MAJCOM inspection schedules for ANG Wings.

1.4.8.4. Acts as the liaison to SAF/IG and MAJCOM IGs for inspection policy related to ANG.

1.4.8.5. Serves as the liaison between MAJCOM IGs and the ANG Readiness Center for UEI continual evaluation requirements.

1.4.8.6. Coordinates resolution of inspection deficiencies levied against NGB or ANG Functional Area Managers.

1.4.8.7. Coordinates corrective action plans with NGB or ANG Functional Area Managers.

1.4.8.8. Coordinates waivers to this instruction with affected Gaining MAJCOMs.
1.4.9. Pertinent Oversight Authorities:

1.4.9.1. Determine methods used to accomplish continual evaluation and oversight requirements within functional areas.

1.4.9.2. Regularly analyze any portion of MICT data and other functional metrics in order to build awareness of unit performance in areas of responsibility and share areas of concern with the appropriate-level IG or subordinate organization commanders.

1.4.9.3. Provide semi-annual (annual for ARC) inputs to the MAJCOM IG risk-based sampling strategy for subordinate Wings and highlight functional area-specific risks identified through continual evaluation.

1.4.9.4. Review validated inspection and self-assessment data to identify trends and/or issues.

1.4.9.5. May, in concert with any other appropriate Pertinent Oversight Authorities and/or NGB/IG, designate additional MICT SACs for assigned Wings to assess. May also recommend SACs outside the scope of the primary mission for Wing assessment.

1.4.9.6. Monitor MAJCOM-published MICT SACs or supplement HAF-level SACs to maintain situational awareness of potential problem areas. The supplemental SAC author should coordinate with HAF owner.

1.4.9.7. Coordinate and approve Corrective Action Plans for MAJCOM IG-identified CRITICAL and SIGNIFICANT Wing deficiencies, Nuclear Surety Inspection repeat MINORS and MAJCOM-level deficiencies. Additionally, consult with appropriate HAF Functional Area Managers to ensure proper interpretation of higher headquarters policy.

1.4.9.8. If necessary, supplement HAF-prioritized inspection requirements or develop requirements where no HAF requirements exist after coordination with the applicable HAF Functional Area Manager.

1.4.9.9. Submit any requests for visits to the Gatekeeper for approval. These include any visit to assess, audit, certify, accredit or evaluate a unit. The only exceptions are the activities listed in Attachment 2 (requestors must coordinate these activities with the appropriate Gatekeeper but do not require approval).

1.4.9.10. Identify and coordinate for inspection augmentees with functional expertise as requested by MAJCOM IGs.

1.5. Inspection guidelines.

1.5.1. Major Graded Areas (MGA). MGAs represent key processes, procedures, and requirements based on public law, executive orders, directives and instructions. The MGAs coincide with the Commander’s responsibilities detailed in AFI 1-2: Managing Resources, Leading People, Improving the Unit, and Executing the Mission (see Figure 1.2). See Chapter 4 of this instruction for Management Inspection MGAs.
1.5.2. **External Inspections.** External inspections serve two purposes. First, they provide an independent, transparent, and accountable assessment of readiness, economy, efficiency and state of discipline. Additionally, external inspections validate and verify internal inspection processes. External inspections include:

1.5.2.1. **Non-Air Force Inspections.** Personnel conducting inspections may or may not be Air Force personnel and conduct inspections on behalf of other governmental agencies, combatant commands, or special committees.

1.5.2.2. **Statutory Inspections.** Inspections conducted on behalf of an organization within the Air Force who has specific legal or statutory authorization to conduct inspection-type activities. They include audits conducted by SAF/AG and inspections conducted by SAF/IG and AF/JA.

1.5.2.3. **Certification/Accreditation/Technical Survey.** Inspection-type activities conducted as part of an accreditation or certification program. This includes technical surveys where facilities and equipment are measured or checked (e.g. boilers, pavement evaluations, etc.).

1.5.3. **No-notice and minimum-notice inspections.** No-notice and minimum-notice inspections are an integral aspect of the Air Force Inspection System. Consider available unit manpower and resources when coordinating notification timeframes for ARC. MAJCOM IGs will coordinate with NGB/IG for ANG inspections and notify NGB/IG and the Wing Commander a minimum of 48 hours prior to any ANG inspection (not applicable for inspection of ANG alert force missions). Inspecting Commanders will determine the amount of notice given to inspected units. (T-3)

1.5.4. **Limiting factors, simulations and deviations.** For non-nuclear inspections, inspected unit commanders will submit limiting factors, simulations, and deviations which could potentially affect the inspection’s outcome to the inspection Team Chief for approval. The inspection Team Chief will ensure availability of approved limiting factors, simulations, and deviations to inspectors prior to the commencement of any inspection activities. (T-2) See Chapter 5 of this instruction for nuclear inspection simulation/deviation guidance.
1.5.5. **Inspection team footprint/constraints.** IG Team Chiefs should work with the inspected unit prior to the inspection to ensure there is a shared understanding of inspection constraints (space, security, escort ratio, etc.). The IG Team Chief should attempt to minimize the inspection team footprint to the maximum extent practical. The IG Team Chief makes the final determination on MAJCOM or Wing inspection team footprint. When multiple IG teams are involved in an event, the lead IG team (defined as the team with the preponderance of inspection responsibilities at the location or in accordance with existing Memoranda of Understanding) will consolidate work center and logistics requirements for teams in order to have a single, deconflicted set of requirements for inspected units to support. *(T-3)*

1.5.6. **Performance-based evaluations.** Inspection teams will randomly select individuals/teams for executing performance-based evaluations in lieu of the inspected unit self-identifying individuals/teams for evaluation (maintain team integrity, as appropriate). *(T-3)* MAJCOM IGs should consider unit assignment of leadership and management roles during complex multi-phased operations (i.e. Logistics Movements and Aircraft Generations).

1.5.7. **Classification.** IGs will classify and mark inspection grades and reports in accordance with the Air Force Inspection System Security Classification Guide, CJCS Instruction 3263.05, and/or DODM 5205.07, Volume 4, Special Access Program Security Manual: Marking, as appropriate. *(T-0)*

1.5.8. **Releasability.** SAF/IG is the confidential agent of SecAF and CSAF for obtaining uninhibited self-analysis and self-criticism of the internal management, operation, and administration of the Air Force. Therefore, Air Force IG reports are internal memoranda and constitute privileged information not releasable outside the Air Force except with specific approval of SAF/IG or as outlined below. Commanders will ensure requests for IG reports (or extracts therefrom) originating from sources outside the original distribution are referred to SAF/IGI for coordination and clearance. *(T-1)*

1.5.8.1. Release determination authority. Before releasing inspection reports other than Nuclear Surety Inspection reports (all types) outside DoD, Freedom of Information Act offices must receive a final release determination from SAF/IGI. *(T-1)* Release of Nuclear Surety Inspection reports is in accordance with CJCS Instruction 3263.05.

1.5.8.2. DoD members, contractors, consultants, and grantees are permitted access to inspection reports in accordance with DoD 5400.7, DoD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program. MAJCOM IGs are authorized to release inspection reports (in whole or in part) within DoD with a courtesy copy to SAF/IGI.

1.5.8.3. Commanders will ensure the following statement appears on the cover and each page of reports: “For Official Use Only. This report may be protected from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. Do not release or publish, in whole or in part, outside official DoD channels without express approval of the Director, SAF/IGI.” *(T-1)*

1.5.9. **Inspection out-brief/results.** In coordination with the Commander of the inspected unit, the IG will determine the timing, location, and format of the inspection out-brief. Inspection out-briefs are considered a part of the inspection report and consequently fall within release restrictions. DoD members, contractors, consultants, and grantees are permitted to attend inspection out-briefs at the discretion of the Commander if part of the very small leadership audience; however, community leaders and the general public are not authorized access to
inspection results (to include out-briefs) unless permitted by the Air Force Inspection System Security Classification Guide, DoD 5400.7 or AFI 35-113.

1.5.10. Inspection reports. For non-nuclear inspections (see paragraph 5.5.7.1 for nuclear reporting requirements), IGs will submit an executive message providing a summary of the inspection activity and any pertinent details to the respective Inspector General’s Commander no later than five duty days after the conclusion of the inspection out-brief unless the final report is made available prior. (T-3) IGs will complete formal inspection reports and document in the appropriate version of IGEMS no later than 30 calendar days (60 calendar days for ARC) from the conclusion of the inspection. (T-2) Do not reveal any survey or Airmen-to-IG Session data that can be attributed to an individual or sub-organization in order to protect confidentiality. Data should only be grouped at Wing (UEIs) or Organization (MIs) level or above.

1.6. Safety assessments, evaluations and inspections. SAF/IG fully recognizes the independent role of Safety to work on behalf of commanders and allows Safety assessments, evaluations, and workplace/facility inspections to take place without undue influence or hardship at all organizational levels to ensure the requirements of 29 Code of Federal Regulations 1960, DoD Instruction 6055.01, DoD Safety and Occupational Health Program, and AFI 91-202, The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program, are met.

1.6.1. Any non-Safety inspector who discovers potential Safety hazards or deficiencies presenting Safety risk will validate them with a qualified Safety professional at the appropriate level before including them in the report and entering them into IGEMS. (T-2) See AFI 91-202 for Safety inspection guidance.

1.6.2. In accordance with AFI 91-202, Safety is responsible for providing a comprehensive report on the status of the Commander’s safety program (inclusive of all safety disciplines evaluated) to the applicable unit commander. When a MAJCOM Safety evaluation is part of the UEI, MAJCOM Safety will attach the report as an addendum to the IG report.
Chapter 2

THE COMMANDER’S INSPECTION PROGRAM

2.1. General information. A validated, accurate, and trusted Commander’s Inspection Program is the cornerstone of the Air Force Inspection System. An effective Commander’s Inspection Program should provide the Wing Commander, subordinate commanders, and Airmen the right information at the right time to assess risk, identify areas for improvement, determine root causes, and precisely focus limited resources, aligned with the Commander’s priorities on the Commander’s timeline. Data from the Commander’s Inspection Program is used by Wing Commanders to facilitate requests for targeted assistance from the MAJCOM Commander and staff. The Wing IG uses the Wing’s Inspection Program (executed under the authority of the Wing Commander) to validate and verify commander self-assessments are accurate and timely, and independently assess effectiveness of subordinate units and programs. The intent of assessing these components is to provide critical data to leadership about the adequacy of policy, training, manpower and personnel, funds, equipment, and facilities.

2.2. Purpose. The purpose of the Commander’s Inspection Program is to improve readiness, efficiency, discipline, effectiveness, compliance, and surety in Air Force Wings. It affords Wing Commanders the ability to assess mission sets in reference to Designed Operational Capability statements, Joint Mission Essential Task Lists and Universal Joint Task Lists, Mission Directives, Unit Type Codes, and/or any other authoritative tasking documents. Wing Commanders use the Commander’s Inspection Program to identify a unit’s ability to comply with policy and guidance, including identification of wasteful directives and areas where resource limitations may prevent compliance or increase mission risk.

2.3. Roles and responsibilities.

2.3.1. MAJCOM Commanders, or designee, will provide guidance and approve the scope and scale of subordinate units’ readiness exercises.

2.3.2. Wing Commanders will:

2.3.2.1. Ensure the Wing Inspection Program and Unit Self-Assessment Program focus on detecting non-compliance with applicable governing directives and on unit effectiveness through the four MGAs in Figure 1.2. (T-3)

2.3.2.2. Identify and apportion manpower to administer an effective Commander’s Inspection Program. (T-3) Appoint an IG, Director of Inspections, Superintendent, and Scheduler/Inspection Planner. (T-3) The Wing IG is organized as a staff function and will report directly to the Wing Commander. (T-1) Consider using the office manning templates located in Attachment 6 of this instruction.

2.3.2.3. Make available resources for training of military and civilian personnel to obtain the technical or administrative expertise required to assist with Commander’s Inspection Program requirements. (T-3)

2.3.2.4. Establish and maintain a Unit Self-Assessment Program led by subordinate commanders in accordance with this AFI and chain of command guidance. (T-2)

2.3.2.5. Designate a Wing Unit Self-Assessment Program Manager. (T-3)
2.3.2.6. Approve Wing Inspection Plans. (T-3)

2.3.2.7. Chair the Commander’s Inspection Management Board (delegable to the Vice Commander). (T-2)

2.3.2.8. Report Commander’s Inspection Program information to the MAJCOM Commander via the Commander’s Inspection Report. (T-2)

2.3.3. The Wing IG will:

2.3.3.1. Manage, administer, plan, and execute the Wing’s Commander’s Inspection Program with the specific goal of informing the Wing Commander of areas of mission execution shortfalls and areas of non-compliance. (T-1)

2.3.3.2. Develop an annual Wing Inspection and Exercise Plan and risk-based sampling strategy based on the Wing Commander’s guidance to enable reliable assessment of the Wing. (T-1) The Wing IG must include applicable programs and exercises in Table A2.1 in the annual inspection plan. (T-1) Additional inspections should focus on individual organizations, programs and processes considered high-risk or of particular interest to the Wing Commander. The annual plan should include at least one no-notice inspection. Wing IGs should sample MICT SACs in order to ensure subordinate organizations are communicating with Pertinent Oversight Authorities, but should not rely on SACs as the sole basis for inspecting a program. Adapt the inspection team composition based on mission sets within the Wing.

2.3.3.3. Review Wing plans and develop realistic, relevant objectives for scenario-based inspections. (T-3) Conduct planning to deconflict scenario issues and distribute any required special instructions. To maximize realism, host Wings should make every attempt to include tenant units in scenario-based readiness and mission assurance inspections.

2.3.3.4. Post deficiencies and final inspection reports in the appropriate version of IGEMS (based on Security Classification Guidance) to track and finalize deficiencies and document to closure in accordance with Chapter 9 of this instruction.

2.3.3.5. Monitor deficiencies and suspense dates. (T-3)

2.3.3.6. Ensure inspection and exercise data is collected for all MGAs. (T-3)

2.3.3.7. Develop and manage a Commander’s Inspection Program dashboard for the Wing Commander to provide real-time trend data on Wing programs and inspections. (T-3)

2.3.3.8. Manage the Wing Commander’s Inspection Management Board. (T-3)

2.3.3.9. Brief new commanders or directors within 30 calendar days (90 calendar days for ARC) of assuming command. (T-3) At a minimum, discuss the commander’s requirement to lead the subordinate Unit Self-Assessment Program in accordance with paragraph 2.5 of this instruction, the Wing’s Commander’s Inspection Program, Wing and/or MAJCOM IG business rules, upcoming releasable IG events and possible impacts, specific unit performance data to date, and any trending data or concerns.

2.3.3.10. Execute White Cell duties (as required). (T-3)

2.3.3.11. Administer Wing MICT and IGEMS. (T-1)
2.3.3.12. Ensure Wing organizations appropriately identify work centers in MICT to receive SAC suggestions. (T-1)

2.3.3.13. Develop MICT Business Rules and IGEMS Business Rules for Wing and subordinate units. (T-2)

2.3.3.14. Oversee the Wing’s Gatekeeper/scheduling process in accordance with Attachment 2 of this instruction. (T-3)

2.3.3.15. Provide wing-specific training to Wing IG and Wing Inspection Team members. (T-1)

2.3.3.16. Assist MAJCOM IGs, NGB/IG, and SAF/IG with data queries. (T-2)

2.4. **Commander’s Inspection Program methodology.** The responsibility for detecting non-compliance rests with the Wing Commander, subordinate commanders, and supervisors. Wing IGs should document non-compliance in Commander’s Inspection Program reports in IGEMS.

2.4.1. **Wing IG.** The Wing IG executes inspections on behalf of the Wing Commander. The Wing IG should be the principal advisor for inspections and a focal point for the Wing Inspection Team to enable efficient reporting to the Commander. Wing IGs will consolidate inspections to avoid redundancy and eliminate inspections whose benefits do not enhance the mission or outweigh the cost. (T-3)

2.4.2. **Wing Safety.** Wing Safety will participate in IG inspections whenever possible; however, the Safety staff can conduct annual workplace/facility inspections and unit safety assessments independent of the IG. (T-3)

2.4.2.1. The Chief of Safety will ensure IG-requested Safety SMEs are available to assist with exercise scenario development and throughout the execution and debrief phases of the exercise. (T-3) Safety will provide the IG any noted safety discrepancies for inclusion in the IG report; the IG will enter all validated deficiencies into IGEMS. (T-3)

2.4.2.2. Safety will provide a copy of inspection and assessment reports to the unit commander inspected/assessed in accordance with established safety processes. (T-3) This report is available to the IG office through the unit inspected.

2.4.3. **Functional visits** (such as Staff Assistance Visits, etc.) are conducted by Pertinent Oversight Authorities only at the request of the inspected organization’s Commander. Commanders may also request assistance visits from other Wings/experts. Functional visits may help a unit better understand the intent of higher headquarters policy and allow Pertinent Oversight Authorities an opportunity to provide training to the unit. Functional visits are not a tool to prepare a unit for a formal IG inspection. IGs will not use functional visits to credit inspection events. (T-2) Pertinent Oversight Authorities will provide Commanders an out-brief and a copy of the report/findings. Wing IGs may document functional visit observations and deficiencies in IGEMS to support Commander’s deficiency management. If Commanders choose to document SAV deficiencies within MICT, Wing IGs should monitor these deficiencies and support as necessary.

2.4.4. **The Wing risk-based sampling strategy.** Should focus on those areas important to the Wing Commander. Include products and sources of information for use as objective indicators of unit or program performance. Integrating and analyzing multiple inputs enables a comprehensive understanding of unit effectiveness and efficiency. Examples include:
2.4.4.1. Air and Space Expeditionary Forces Unit Type Code Reporting Tool/ Defense Readiness Reporting System.
2.4.4.2. Quality Assurance and Standardization/Evaluation programs.
2.4.4.3. Functional assessments, inspection results, after-action reports, and meeting minutes.
2.4.4.4. Individual Medical Readiness reports.
2.4.4.5. Individual Training Records.
2.4.4.6. Personal observations and Unit Self-Assessment Program results.
2.4.4.7. Climate surveys.

2.4.5. Agreements. If agreements are made between Wings which result in one Wing relying on another organization to accomplish inspection requirements, commanders will capture the arrangement in an MOU, Base Support Agreement, Host-Tenant Support Agreement, or other documentation identifying specific inspection responsibilities between applicable parties. (T-2) Although it is preferable for inspection support agreements to be with the host Wing, Memoranda of Understanding/Host-Tenant Support Agreements can be made between tenant organizations in support of one another. A MOU/Host-Tenant Support Agreement template can be found on the SAF/IGI SharePoint site.

2.4.5.1. Program managers should ensure tenant organizations receive adequate support for each program under the host Wing’s purview as applicable under existing agreements.
2.4.5.2. IGs will conduct By-Law inspections as required by program governing regulation or as stated in a Host-Tenant Support Agreement/MOU. (T-0)

2.4.6. Inspection methods. Wing IGs may use any legal and appropriate inspection methods available. Wing IGs will not use exact copies of Group Airmen-to-IG Sessions. (T-2) Wing IGs should not conduct sessions which mimic Group Airmen-to-IG Sessions.

2.4.7. Commander’s Inspection Program findings. The Wing IG will assess and report Commander’s Inspection Program findings using the same four MGAs and associated sub-MGAs as the UEI (see Figure 1.2). (T-1)

2.5. Commander’s Inspection Program requirements. Commanders and directors lead self-assessment components and Wing IGs execute inspection components. The Commander’s Inspection Program inspects Wing-wide and subordinate unit effectiveness while assessing cross-unit programs as directed by the Wing Commander. The intent of the Commander’s Inspection program is for IGs to inspect each subordinate unit at least once during the UEI cycle. Commanders and directors will determine the appropriate scope, scale, timing, and methodology to most effectively accomplish the objectives of Commander’s Inspection Program in accordance with this instruction. (T-3)

2.5.1. Unit Self-Assessment Program. Led by unit commanders and directors in accordance with Title 10 United States Code Section 8583 and AFI 1-2, the Unit Self-Assessment Program provides a means for internal assessment of a Wing’s overall health and complements external assessments. The self-assessment program may include communication from SACs within the MICT. However, utilizing MICT alone is insufficient to be considered an effective Unit Self-Assessment Program. Commanders and directors at all levels will ensure appropriate internal
mechanisms exist to track requirement/resource mismatches, assess resultant mission risk, and track disconnect to closure. (T-2)

2.5.1.1. An effective Unit Self-Assessment Program depends on Airmen reporting the status of compliance with directives, and when they cannot comply, reporting what constraints prevent them from doing so. Commanders and directors then determine whether they have the resources to comply with the directive or if they should accept risk in accordance with the tiered waiver authority assigned. Geographically-separated units will maintain a robust Unit Self-Assessment Program and (if directed by the parent Wing) perform aspects of Commander’s Inspection Program as resources allow. (T-2)

2.5.1.2. For the purposes of this instruction, any evaluation conducted by a non-IG Wing member on a Wing agency (regardless of the title in the originating guidance; e.g. “internal Staff Assistance Visit” or “exercise”) is considered an internal assessment and part of the Unit Self-Assessment Program.

2.5.1.3. There may be non-IG organizations within the Wing who are explicitly authorized to inspect on behalf of the Commander. In these cases, the non-IG inspectors will coordinate requirements with the wing’s Gatekeeper. (T-3) Non-IG inspectors will provide a report to the appropriate commander and to the IG. (T-3) The IG and the non-IG inspection Team Chief will collaborate and determine the non-IG deficiencies to enter into IGEMS. (T-3)

2.5.1.4. Commanders or directors will ensure assigned HAF SACs are assessed by appropriate members. (T-1)

2.5.1.5. Group and Squadron Commanders or directors will appoint at least one Unit Self-Assessment Program Manager. (T-3)

2.5.1.6. Wing Program Managers (e.g. Emergency Management manager) will identify individual unit assessors based on the types of questions asked in the SAC. (T-3) Wing Program Managers will not delegate Wing-level program questions to unit-level assessors. (T-3)

2.5.1.7. When an approved waiver is in place, personnel completing the SAC will identify the respective item as “No”, select the “Waiver” button, and attach (if enabled) or refer to the approved waiver. (T-1)

2.5.2. Wing inspection and exercise program. Executed by the Wing IG under the authority of the Wing Commander, the Wing Inspection Program is designed to validate and verify subordinate commander self-assessments to ensure accuracy. The Wing IG will independently assess effectiveness of subordinate units and programs and use the IGEMS to plan, conduct, and finalize inspections. (T-1) Inspection guidance is purposefully broad to allow commanders flexibility to tailor inspection programs to meet compliance needs within resource constraints.

2.5.2.1. Unit inspections. Unit inspections, commonly referred to as “vertical inspections”, are usually conducted at or below the group level. At a minimum, IGs will conduct one “vertical inspection” per unit per UEI cycle. (T-3)

2.5.2.2. Program inspections. Program inspections, commonly referred to as “horizontal inspections”, assess program health across the Wing (e.g. fitness program, training etc.).
2.5.2.3. Readiness Exercise. Readiness exercises (RE) are Wing-level evaluations of a unit’s capability tied directly to Operational Plans (OPLANS), Concept Plans (CONPLANs), Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) taskings, Unit Type Codes (UTCs), Mission Directives, Mission Essential Tasks/Mission Essential Task Listing (METs/METL), and/or Command guidance. Commanders should consider the results of recent Readiness Exercises when preparing updates to the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). Wing IGs must customize readiness exercises to the structure and mission of the organization at a scope and scale approved by the MAJCOM Commander or designee. (T-2) Wing IGs should incorporate applicable units (to include local agencies and supporting organizations) and evaluate the unit’s ability to meet readiness criteria as established in OPLANS, CONPLANs, TPFDD taskings, UTCs, Mission Directives, METs/METL, and/or Command guidance. Wing IGs should review DRRS capability reporting for all Wing DRRS-reporting units on behalf of the Wing Commander to verify that DRRS reporting is consistent with Readiness Exercise event results. MAJCOM IGs should validate that DRRS reporting is consistent with readiness execution events, as defined in Attachment 7 of AFI 90-201.

2.5.2.4. Wing IGs for nuclear-capable units must evaluate nuclear mission areas as they relate to the Nuclear Surety Inspection MGAs. (T-2) Inspectors will assess any validated finding to the UEI MGAs. (T-1) No overall unit grade (e.g. SATISFACTORY/UNSATISFACTORY) is required.

2.5.3. Geographically-separated units. Commanders of geographically-separated units with a dedicated, full-time IG will follow Commander’s Inspection Program guidance. (T-2) Commanders of geographically-separated units without a dedicated, full-time IG will establish a Unit Self-Assessment Program which aligns with its parent unit. (T-2) The parent unit Commander will establish clear expectations for the geographically-separated unit. (T-2)

2.5.4. Commander’s Inspection Management Board. The intent of the Commander’s Inspection Management Board is to synthesize Commander’s Inspection Program data and results in order to mitigate the risk from known areas of non-compliance and to ensure the Wing Inspection Plan meets the Commander’s requirements. Wing IGs should attempt to migrate the discussion from historical performance (“here’s what we did”) to prescribing what actions the Wing should take (“here’s what we should do”) in order to improve performance in all four MGAs in accordance with the Wing Commander’s vision and priorities. Problem-solving responsibilities and the corrective action processes reside at the lowest appropriate command level, not with the IG staff.

2.5.4.1. The Wing Commander will convene the Commander’s Inspection Management Board monthly (quarterly for ARC). (T-3) The Wing Commander (delegable to the Vice Commander) chairs the board which consists of Group Commanders, Wing Staff Agency chiefs, and Squadron Commanders. (T-3) Commanders should consider including SMEs to assist in closure of deficiencies.

2.5.4.2. Preparations for the Commander’s Inspection Management Board include collecting applicable reports from MICT and IGEMS which identify trends and deficiencies requiring external coordination (Joint-Base support, Functional Area Manager or MAJCOM Functional Manager coordination, etc.). A review of internal and external
inspections captured using a risk-based sampling strategy and Commander’s intent provides background for and guides the discussion.

2.5.4.3. Include the following in the Commander’s Inspection Management Board:

2.5.4.3.1. Commander’s Inspection Program dashboard (a tailored report of the key metrics the Wing Commander values and synthesized prescriptive inspection data, self-assessment findings, questions, deficiencies/severity, and/or observations/trends). (T-3)

2.5.4.3.2. Key open deficiency review to include updates on Corrective Action Plans, estimated close-out dates, mitigating circumstances, recommendations for closure, and external assistance required (if any). (T-3)

2.5.4.3.3. Self-assessment observations review (break out by unit, key observations, and concerns). (T-3)

2.5.4.3.4. Upcoming events (on-site visits, Commander’s Inspection Program calendar, and Gatekeeper events). (T-3)

2.5.4.3.5. Wing Commander objectives/feedback (include progress toward annual requirements). (T-3)

2.5.4.3.6. Group Commander objectives and feedback (to include Commander’s Inspection Program status, issues affecting the organization, and upcoming scheduled inspections and/or Staff Assistance Visits). (T-3)

2.5.4.3.7. Air Force Audit Agency findings. (T-3)

2.5.4.4. Commander’s Inspection Report. The Commander’s Inspection Report is the Wing Commander’s assessment of readiness and compliance written in the framework of the four UEI MGAs reported to the MAJCOM Commander (Gaining MAJCOM Commander for ANG Wings). The Wing Commander will use the Commander’s Inspection Report template (see the SAF/IGI SharePoint page) and should not exceed two pages total. (T-2) Wing Commanders will send a Commander’s Inspection Report to the MAJCOM Commander no later than 90 calendar days (180 calendar days for ARC) after assuming command and annually thereafter. (T-2) ANG Commanders will also send the Commander’s Inspection Report to the State Adjutant General and NGB/IG. (T-2) NGB/IG will forward to the ANGRC/CC and Director, ANG. Pertinent Oversight Authorities executing a Commander’s Inspection Program will send Commander’s Inspection Reports to parent organizations. Wing IGs will publish Commander’s Inspection Reports in the appropriate version of IGEMS no later than 30 calendar days after Wing Commanders transmit the report. (T-1)

2.5.5. Wing Inspection Team. The Wing Inspection Team consists of SMEs who augment the Wing IG conducting inspections and exercises under the authority of the Wing Commander. Specific duties include providing inputs for scenario development, inspecting assigned areas/functions, validating self-assessments, evaluating scenarios, participating in the lessons learned, and providing inputs to reports. Personnel selected to be Wing Inspection Team members should possess attributes of the highest professional standards and moral character. Wing Inspection Team members should also demonstrate adherence to Air Force core values, possess a security clearance commensurate with duties required, and present good military
bearing, professionalism and appearance. Wing Inspection Team members are not required to meet rank or experience criteria in Chapter 11 of this instruction.

2.5.6. Safety augmentation to the Wing Inspection Team. The Wing Safety Office will provide qualified SMEs to assist with Wing IG inspections, when possible. (T-3)
Chapter 3

THE UNIT EFFECTIVENESS INSPECTION

3.1. General information. The Unit Effectiveness Inspection (UEI) is an external continual evaluation of Wing performance based on the four MGAs (as detailed in Figure 1.2) conducted by MAJCOM IGs and/or AFIA. The UEI integrates elements of compliance and readiness to create a comprehensive assessment of unit effectiveness. The UEI is a “photo album” instead of a “snapshot” of a unit’s performance and capabilities over the UEI period.

3.2. Purpose. The UEI provides an independent assessment of Wing effectiveness and validates/verifies the inspected unit’s Commander’s Inspection Program. The UEI evaluates Commander’s Inspection Program accuracy, adequacy, and relevance and provides an independent assessment of the Wing’s resource management, leadership, process improvement efforts, and the ability to execute the mission. The UEI focuses on identifying areas where risks from undetected non-compliance are greatest, and aiding Wing Commanders in identifying areas for improvement in the Commander’s Inspection Program.

3.3. Roles and responsibilities.

3.3.1. MAJCOM Commanders will:

3.3.1.1. Implement and sustain the UEI in accordance with this instruction.

3.3.1.2. Develop a MAJCOM staff process to facilitate the UEI risk-based sampling strategy and continual evaluation of assigned and gained Wings.

3.3.1.3. Allow Wing Commanders the latitude to develop a tailored Commander’s Inspection Program.

3.3.1.4. Hold Wing Commanders accountable for Commander’s Inspection Report accuracy and readiness reporting.

3.3.1.5. Ensure MAJCOM staffs analyze and address assigned adequacy findings.

3.3.2. MAJCOM IGs:

3.3.2.1. Continually evaluate unit effectiveness with Pertinent Oversight Authority assistance. Gaining MAJCOMs will consolidate and analyze UEI continual evaluation data for ANG Wings, analyze, and develop a risk-based sampling strategy based on Gaining MAJCOM Commander guidance.

3.3.2.2. Build a tailored risk-based sampling strategy for each Wing based on guidance in paragraphs 2.4.4 and 3.4.1 of this instruction.

3.3.2.3. Coordinate with respective Gatekeepers to schedule and synchronize on-site visits conducted as part of continual evaluation or Capstone events.

3.3.2.4. The majority of ANG Wings are multi-MAJCOM (gained by one Gaining MAJCOM while having one or more subordinate/supported units gained by other MAJCOMs). The Gaining MAJCOM for a multi-MAJCOM ANG Wing will lead/conduct UEI continual evaluation throughout the UEI cycle in partnership with ANG headquarters and other MAJCOMs in accordance with any established MOU between MAJCOM IGs and in coordination with NGB/IG.
3.3.2.5. Validate and verify Wing Commander’s Inspection Programs.

3.3.2.6. Coordinate with non-IG inspection team leaders (when non-IG inspections are synchronized by the MAJCOM Gatekeeper) to minimize any adverse effects on units’ missions and prevent unnecessary duplication of effort or conflict over installation resources.

3.3.2.7. Provide updates to AFIA regarding Wing status (i.e., activation/inactivation of organizations).

3.3.2.8. The MAJCOM IG, on behalf of the MAJCOM/CC, determines the overall impact of MGA 4.1 results in the UEI Capstone grade. During the UEI Capstone or throughout the Continuous Evaluation process, MAJCOM IGs may consider downgrading CCIP for a poorly executed Readiness Exercise or readiness reporting process.

3.3.3. Pertinent Oversight Authorities:

3.3.3.1. Participate in UEI continual evaluation processes and coordinate with MAJCOM IGs to identify areas of interest and/or emphasis for the UEI by monitoring data from each Wing (e.g., MICT, trend analysis, and any other existing functional processes). At a minimum, continual evaluation inputs must include one entry per Wing for each high-risk area defined in Attachment 3. Continual evaluation assessments should occur at least once every six months and be provided to the inspecting MAJCOM IG. Pertinent Oversight Authorities must inform MAJCOM IGs if the continual evaluation strategy will not comply with this frequency.

3.3.3.2. Recommend functional experts to augment MAJCOM IG inspections. For areas in which a MAJCOM HQ has limited expertise due to consolidation, Pertinent Oversight Authorities responsible for oversight of Wings will execute UEI continual evaluation processes and coordinate data and inspection augmentees with the inspecting IG.

3.3.4. Air Force Inspection Agency Surgeon General (AFIA/SG):

3.3.4.1. Provides a core team of certified medical inspectors. The AFIA/SG team lead will coordinate desired team size and composition to meet inspection requirements with the MAJCOM Team Chief no later than 60 calendar days prior to the inspection start date unless coordinated with the inspecting MAJCOM IG.

3.3.4.2. Integrates with MAJCOM IG teams under direction of the MAJCOM IG Team Chief.

3.3.4.3. Participates in MAJCOM IG meetings and (if available) participate in scoring and report writing.

3.4. Unit Effectiveness Inspection methodology. Compliance sampling or more comprehensive commander-directed inspections may be used to verify Commander’s Inspection Programs, especially in areas deemed high-risk. Attachment 3 of this instruction is the authoritative source of HAF-level inspection requirements where the risk from undetected non-compliance is greatest for commanders, Airmen, and/or the mission. MAJCOM IG teams will build a tailored inspection risk-based sampling strategy for each Wing. The inspection period begins immediately after the close-out of the previous UEI report (see Figure 3.1).
3.4.1. Identified concerns in a Wing Commander’s Inspection Report are an excellent opportunity for MAJCOM IGs to sample deficiency management and commitment to continual improvement. UEI reports and grades should reflect outcomes of identified Root-Cause Analysis efforts and resolution of issues identified in Commander’s Inspection Reports. MAJCOM IG teams must develop a risk-based sampling strategy which evaluates each Wing based on assessment of the following:

3.4.1.1. SecAF and CSAF areas of emphasis and Special Interest Items.
3.4.1.2. MAJCOM Commander’s intent, areas of emphasis, and Command Interest Items.
3.4.1.3. SAF/IG and MAJCOM IG direction or guidance.
3.4.1.4. Pertinent Oversight Authority areas of emphasis, including mandatory items in Attachment 3.
3.4.1.5. Continual evaluation data.
3.4.1.6. Available reports from Attachment 2 and/or external inspections.
3.4.1.7. Maturity and reliability of individual Wing Commander’s Inspection Programs.
3.4.1.8. Wing Commander emphasis areas.
3.4.1.9. Inspection resource availability (e.g. temporary duty funds, inspectors).

3.4.2. Inspection Team. Under the authority of the MAJCOM Commander, the MAJCOM IG will assemble a team of a sufficient number of inspectors and inspection augmentees to perform inspections and submit reports to the MAJCOM Commander, NAF Commander, NGB/IG (for ANG units), and Wing Commanders upon completion.

3.4.2.1. MAJCOM IG teams do not have qualified experts assigned from every Air Force Specialty Code, which may necessitate augmentation from SMEs throughout the Air Force, including centralized locations such as the Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center (AFIMSC).
3.4.2.2. Individual ANG members can perform in an inspection augmentee role in Gaining MAJCOM-funded Title-10 status upon receipt of a validated request to NGB/IG.

3.4.3. Frequency. UEIs follow a 24-36 month cycle for each Regular Air Force/AFRC Wing and a 48-60 month cycle for each ANG Wing. MAJCOM IGs will ensure elements of the UEI are completed within this timeframe (continual evaluation, survey, on-site Capstone inspection, and report). The authority to extend beyond these timelines resides with the MAJCOM Commander (no waiver is required to perform an inspection prior to 24 months).

3.4.3.1. Document respective MAJCOM inspection responsibilities and lead relationships in MAJCOM-to-MAJCOM Memoranda of Understanding or Reciprocity Agreements.
3.4.3.2. In addition to the Capstone visit, Gaining MAJCOM IGs will visit ANG Wings on-site at least once between Capstone visits (ideally, near the 24-month point) in conjunction with ANG Wing exercises, training events, and actual mission performance.
3.4.3.3. Gaining MAJCOM IGs will coordinate with NGB/IG or AFRC/IG and Wing Commanders of Total Force Associate Wings to determine reasonable/practical scope and scale of unit participation in scheduled inspections.

3.4.3.4. Designated MAJCOM IGs will provide a nuclear-focused continual evaluation on-site visit for nuclear-capable units at least once between Nuclear Surety Inspections. Nuclear-focused on-site visits may be performed in conjunction with other inspection events and exercises. Assess any validated finding (deficiency, Recommended Improvement Area, strength, benchmark) to relevant UEI MGAs and document as such; however, no overall unit grade (e.g. SATISFACTORY/UNSATISFACTORY) is required. This data informs the UEI risk-based sampling strategy.

3.4.4. Remote sampling. Remote sampling adds a critical no-notice element to the UEI which helps validate and verify a Wing’s Commander’s Inspection Program. Wings should not be notified in advance of remote sampling. Consider the MAJCOM Commander’s guidance and intent, criticality of the area, Wing performance, and available MAJCOM staff resources.

3.4.5. UEI survey. During each UEI cycle, MAJCOM IGs may administer a voluntary survey to inspected Wings to capture candid, confidential beliefs, attitudes, and opinions about matters relevant to the four UEI MGAs. The purpose of the survey is to gather observations since the last on-site evaluation, assist in determining inspection team composition, and inform a risk-based sampling strategy for Capstone on-site evaluations.

3.4.5.1. If utilized, MAJCOM IG teams will distribute the survey link and instructions to assigned inspected Wing personnel no later than 90 calendar days prior to the Capstone
event (180 calendar days for ARC Wings). MAJCOM IG personnel should close out the survey on a date which provides Wing personnel ample opportunity to complete the survey while also allowing MAJCOM IG personnel ample time to analyze survey results before the Capstone event. MAJCOM IGs will not include subordinate and associated units gained by another MAJCOM within the primary survey of the host Wing unless specifically requested through MOU or reciprocity agreement. When completing surveys on their behalf, share survey results for associate units with Gaining MAJCOM IGs in order to inform their risk-based sampling strategy.

3.4.5.2. **Union considerations.** Since survey participation by union members is strictly voluntary, the IG has no legal obligation to coordinate surveys with the union leadership regardless of Collective Bargaining Agreement requirements. MAJCOM IG teams will not share survey results with union leadership under any circumstances.

3.4.5.3. **MAJCOM IGs will use the SAF/IG-approved survey and may add up to five MAJCOM-identified questions.** The survey results and analysis are intended for MAJCOM IG use only.

3.4.5.4. Survey administrators will ensure attributable results are not shown to participants’ chain of command. IGs will not provide Wing personnel (to include Wing Commanders) copies of survey results under any circumstances.

3.4.5.5. **IG complaints in surveys.** The UEI survey is not intended to be used to file formal IG complaints. MAJCOM IG members will screen results for complaints and hand off identified issues to properly-trained personnel for processing via the Complaint Resolution Process in accordance with AFI 90-301. MAJCOM IG Complaints Resolution Process personnel will determine whether the complaint is already being analyzed/resolved or under investigation via Automated Case Tracking System and/or contact the Wing IG. Complaints should be handed off to the Wing IG when appropriate.

3.4.5.6. **AFIA will submit survey results to the MAJCOM Survey Monitors.** During the out-brief and in inspection reports, Team Chiefs may elect to include non-attributable validated details from surveys. Report these details as IG-validated findings without identifying specific survey participants. Include feedback to Wings on select significant trends and proposed courses of action (without compromising participant confidentiality).

3.4.5.7. **If survey responses include allegations of sexual assault, comply with reporting requirements in accordance with AFI 90-6001.**

3.4.5.8. **Ensure comments about criminal behavior are provided to appropriate law enforcement personnel (usually the local Security Forces or AFOSI representative).**

3.4.5.9. **If survey responses indicate an immediate health or welfare concern, MAJCOM IG personnel will make every attempt to ascertain the identity of the individual from other comment blocks (e.g. voluntarily divulging name).** If the identity of the individual can be determined, contact the Commander or First Sergeant for the individual and request a health and welfare check.

3.4.5.10. **If survey responses include allegations, sexual harassment or unlawful discrimination, comply with reporting requirements in accordance with AFI 36-2706, Equal Opportunity Program, Military and Civilian.**
3.4.6. **On-site Capstone Visit.** The Capstone event is the final on-site visit of the UEI and the catalyst for generating a UEI report. The Capstone event should last approximately one week. Possible Capstone event activities may include validation and verification of the Commander’s Inspection Program, conducting Airmen-to-IG Sessions, and assessing unit effectiveness through task evaluations, audits, and observation.

3.4.7. **Group Airmen-to-IG Sessions.** A Group Airmen-to-IG Session is a highly-structured small group discussion (8-15 people), facilitated by a certified MAJCOM IG staff member specifically trained for this method via IG Training Course-Inspections. The Group Airmen-to-IG Session is a standardized and regulated tool for use by MAJCOMs and AFIA in UEIs and Management Inspections. MAJCOM IGs may conduct Group Airmen-to-IG Sessions during every UEI cycle (may occur prior to the Capstone event) to gather opinions, beliefs, and perceptions, and inform the risk-based sampling strategy at their discretion. During each session, MAJCOM IGs will use the SAF/IGI-approved script and structure located on the SAF/IGI SharePoint site within the UEI Handbook.

3.4.7.1. **Group Airmen-to-IG Session participants.** MAJCOM IG teams may randomly choose military, DoD Civilian, ANG state employees, and spouse participants for Group Airmen-to-IG Sessions. MAJCOM IG teams must coordinate names of participants with inspected units to de-conflict Group Airmen-to-IG Session attendance from other duties or scheduled days off. Group Airmen-to-IG Session attendance is a mandatory duty for military members and DoD Civilians. (T-2) For Title-5 federal employees and state employees, conduct Group Airmen-to-IG Sessions during normal work schedules and in accordance with Federal and local Department of Labor laws and the Master Cooperative Agreement. ANG dual status members will be in a Title 10 military status while participating in Airmen-to-IG Sessions. (T-2) Active participation during the session is voluntary.

3.4.7.2. **Union considerations.** Depending on the content of local Collective Bargaining Agreements, the local union may have a legal right to have a representative in each Group Airmen-to-IG Session. This applies only when one or more participants in the Group Airmen-to-IG Session are subject to the bargaining agreement. Group Airmen-to-IG Session participants are not entitled to individual representatives. MAJCOM IG teams will coordinate with the local civilian personnel office to determine if the union desires to have representatives in Group Airmen-to-IG Sessions. Union representatives will follow the same administrative and conduct rules as other participants, but will not participate in discussions.

3.4.7.3. **Spouse considerations.** Air Force commanders value the perspectives of spouses. MAJCOM IG teams may coordinate Group Airmen-to-IG Session times for spouses. Inspection teams should use any available means to communicate available times to spouses, such as Key Spouse networks, Airman and Family Readiness Centers, and social media. Attendance and participation is voluntary for spouses.

3.4.8. **Individual Airmen-to-IG Sessions.** An Individual Airmen-to-IG Session is a scheduled interview between an individual unit member and an IG inspector. Inform military Individual Airmen-to-IG Session participants of the tenets of protected communications as described in AFI 90-301.
3.4.8.1. Individual Airmen-to-IG Session structure. Individual Airmen-to-IG Sessions are used to clarify information, fact-find, or corroborate other information. There is no mandatory structure for an Individual Airmen-to-IG Session.

3.4.8.2. Individual Airmen-to-IG Session participants. MAJCOM IG teams may choose military, DoD Civilian and ANG state employee participants for Individual Airmen-to-IG Sessions. Individual Airmen-to-IG Session participation is mandatory for military members and DoD Civilians. (T-2) For Title-5 federal employees and state employees, conduct Individual Airmen-to-IG Sessions during normal work schedules and in accordance with federal and local Department of Labor laws and the Master Cooperative Agreement. ANG dual-status members will be in military status. (T-2)

3.4.8.3. Union considerations. Unlike Group Airmen-to-IG Sessions, there are no specific union considerations when conducting Individual Airmen-to-IG Sessions. Neither the participant nor the local union has a legal right to have a representative in any Individual Airmen-to-IG Session.

3.4.9. Safety augmentation to the MAJCOM IG. Safety will provide qualified SMEs to assist with IG inspections. The IG will ensure Safety SMEs are qualified to inspect the disciplines which require an on-site inspection. Safety will prepare a comprehensive report on the status of the Commander’s safety program (inclusive of all safety disciplines evaluated) and attach this report as an addendum to the IG report.

3.4.10. Unit Effectiveness Inspection scoring. MAJCOM IG teams will use the SAF/IGI provided numerical UEI scoring tool and methodology to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of processes related to each MGA. The scoring tool aids in standardization of UEI ratings across the Air Force and to enable Air Force-level trending. MAJCOM IGs must not disclose scores to Wings.

3.4.10.1. Multiple inspectors will score all sub-MGAs using available data gathered during the entire UEI cycle. Only inspectors/inspection augmentees who have been trained in UEI scoring methodology should participate in UEI scoring.

3.4.10.2. MAJCOM IGs may positively influence scoring of the Commander’s Inspection Program if the unit accurately detects and reports in a systematic way to enable the command chain to perform root-cause analysis and apply corrective actions.

3.4.10.3. MAJCOM IGs submit the completed UEI scoring tool to AFIA/ET prior to posting the final report in IGEMS.

3.5. Unit Effectiveness Inspection rating. The UEI report includes two distinct grades: the Wing grade and an “adequacy of resources” grade. The adequacy grade provides MAJCOM Commanders an assessment of the support the Wing is getting from higher headquarters entities. Apply the 4-tier rating system below when assessing the Wing and adequacy grades.

3.5.1. The 4-tier rating system documents performance in meeting the Commander’s Responsibilities outlined in AFI 1-2. The UEI Handbook outlines execution of the rating system. Team Chiefs are the final decision authority on ratings assigned during a UEI. Team Chiefs may adjust the final rating, but may not adjust numerical scores to match final 4-tier rating. Consider widespread and/or critical undetected non-compliance, mission failure, or leadership failure when assigning a grade to the Commander’s Inspection Program.
3.5.2. **HIGHLY-EFFECTIVE.** This rating indicates the Wing meets/exceeds the criteria for an EFFECTIVE rating AND most or all of the following are consistently true:

3.5.2.1. Mission activities, programs and processes are executed in an increasingly cost-effective manner.

3.5.2.2. Results of long-term commitment to continuous process improvement are evident.

3.5.2.3. Commander’s Inspection Program is institutionalized, used to measure and report improvements in all four MGAs, and provides actionable feedback to higher headquarters on manpower, funds, equipment, facilities, and guidance adequacy.

3.5.2.4. Leaders’ decisions and priorities demonstrate genuine care for Airmen.

3.5.2.5. Leaders are engaged to help Airmen achieve personal goals as well as the unit’s goals.

3.5.2.6. Widespread evidence exists of high proficiency, unit pride, and cohesion.

3.5.2.7. Programs and processes are institutionalized and produce highly reliable results.

3.5.2.8. Programs are nearly deficiency-free and efforts to benchmark and share lessons learned with other Wings are evident.

3.5.2.9. Effective Management Systems are in place with clear indications of leadership support, planning, use of risk management, and continuous improvement efforts at all levels.

3.5.2.10. Virtually all units/programs across the Wing have embraced a culture of critical self-assessment. Problems are identified, commanders are aware of issues and solid corrective action plans are in place.

3.5.3. **EFFECTIVE.** This rating indicates most of the following are generally true:

3.5.3.1. Mission requirements are met in all mission areas (Primary, Air and Space Expeditionary Forces and Mission Assurance Command and Control) and personnel are proficient.

3.5.3.2. Commander’s Inspection Program provides the command chain an accurate, adequate and relevant picture of unit performance.

3.5.3.3. Resources are managed in an efficient and compliant manner.

3.5.3.4. Leaders treat Airmen with respect and provide a healthy and safe work environment.

3.5.3.5. Management systems are present and continuous process improvement efforts are evident.

3.5.3.6. Programs have few significant deficiencies and many necessary waivers are in effect.

3.5.3.7. Risk-based criteria are often considered when allocating resources and making decisions.

3.5.3.8. Critical processes are documented, measured and repeatable.
3.5.3.9. A majority of units/programs across the Wing have embraced a culture of self-assessment. Problems are identified, commanders are aware of issues and solid corrective action plans are in place.

3.5.4. **MARGINALLY-EFFECTIVE.** This rating indicates the Wing does not meet the criteria for an EFFECTIVE rating, and most of the following are consistently true:

3.5.4.1. Unit personnel meet minimum performance criteria but with limited proficiency.
3.5.4.2. Some key processes and activities are not carried out in a competent or compliant manner, or are personality-dependent.
3.5.4.3. Little to no evidence exists of continuous process improvement efforts.
3.5.4.4. Risk and resource scarcity are not deliberately considered in decision-making processes.
3.5.4.5. Deficiencies exist which significantly increase risk to Airmen, the mission or the Air Force.
3.5.4.6. Management systems have some elements but are not working in a cohesive process.
3.5.4.7. Commander’s Inspection Program provides an accurate (though limited) picture of unit performance.
3.5.4.8. Leaders do not consistently treat Airmen with respect or do not always provide a healthy and safe work environment.
3.5.4.9. Many units/programs across the Wing have not embraced a culture of critical self-assessment. Problems are not routinely identified, commanders are not aware of significant issues and/or corrective action plans are not sufficient.

3.5.5. **INEFFECTIVE.** This rating indicates the Wing is not EFFECTIVE and does not meet criteria for a MARGINALLY-EFFECTIVE rating; most of the following are consistently true:

3.5.5.1. Wing does not demonstrate ability to execute the primary mission.
3.5.5.2. Evidence exists of systemic non-compliance, widespread disregard for prescribed procedures or inadequate proficiency of unit personnel.
3.5.5.3. The number and severity of deficiencies preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment and/or increase risk to Airmen.
3.5.5.4. Commander’s Inspection Program does not provide an accurate, adequate or relevant picture of unit performance.
3.5.5.5. Leaders do not treat Airmen with respect or do not provide a healthy and safe work environment, and Wing leadership fails to address these issues.
3.5.5.6. Resources and programs are not well managed.
3.5.5.7. Little to no evidence exists of continuous process improvement efforts.
3.5.5.8. Management systems are not evident or are unproductive.
3.5.5.9. Most of the units/programs across the Wing have not embraced a culture of critical self-assessment. Problems are not identified, commanders are not aware of issues and solid corrective action plans are not in place.

3.5.5.10. Regardless of performance in other areas, grade the Wing INEFFECTIVE overall if the Wing has demonstrated a chronic inability to execute any of the unit’s primary missions or the Wing’s Commander’s Inspection Program is not accurate, adequate, or relevant.

3.5.6. Re-inspection for an INEFFECTIVE Commander’s Inspection Program. The MAJCOM IG will reevaluate the Wing via a rigorous, compliance-focused on-site visit to validate and verify the Commander’s Inspection Program Corrective Action Plan within 180 calendar days (12 months for ARC). Re-inspections should be tailored to organization and/or MAJCOM requirements. Specifically, MAJCOM IGs should consider use of Attachment 3 of this instruction, continual evaluation data, and any other objective source to conduct re-inspection activities. The highest possible rating for re-inspection is EFFECTIVE. MAJCOM Commanders may extend the re-inspection window, if required.

3.5.6.1. If the Wing Commander’s Inspection Program is rated EFFECTIVE during the re-inspection, the Wing returns to the normal UEI cycle based on the completion date of the original UEI Capstone.

3.5.6.2. If the Wing Commander’s Inspection Program is rated INEFFECTIVE during the re-inspection, the Wing begins a 12-month (24-month for ARC) UEI cycle.

3.5.6.3. If the Wing Commander’s Inspection Program is rated MARGINALLY-EFFECTIVE during the re-inspection, the MAJCOM Commander will determine the inspection cycle for the Wing.

3.5.7. Re-inspection for other INEFFECTIVE ratings. If a Wing's overall rating is INEFFECTIVE or if any MGA or sub-MGA other than Commander’s Inspection Program is rated INEFFECTIVE, schedule an IG on-site visit within six months (12 months for ARC). The risk-based sampling strategy for the on-site visit should focus on those areas rated INEFFECTIVE during the previous UEI and may include other inspection areas, as well.

3.5.7.1. For Total Force Associates in which one or multiple units is graded INEFFECTIVE, the respective MAJCOM IGs will coordinate with each other and both Wing Commanders to determine re-inspection timeline and scope.

3.6. Unit Effectiveness Inspection Reports. The UEI report covers the entire UEI period. The Wing immediately enters into the next UEI cycle on the day following the UEI Capstone out-brief.
Chapter 4

THE MANAGEMENT INSPECTION

4.1. General information. The Management Inspection is an above Wing-level (SAF/HAF/MAJCOM/FOA/DRU/Center/designated NAFs) inspection designed for headquarters organizations which oversee multiple Wing-level or higher organizations. The Management Inspection is based on the fundamental principles of a well-managed organization and uses a combination of military and industry standard criteria to gauge the level of an organization’s performance excellence. Management Inspections normally occur on a 48-month cycle and may extend to 60 months to account for scheduling conflicts utilizing a Risk Based Sampling Strategy. (T-1)

4.2. Purpose. The purpose of the Management Inspection is to inspect the performance of the organization with respect to the authority granted (e.g. Mission Directive) to perform the mission and the respective outputs and/or outcomes of the products and/or services provided. The inspection looks back as far as required to measure organizational effectiveness as outlined in Table 4.1. Organizations require both effectiveness and efficiency in order to be successful.

Table 4.1. Effectiveness and efficiency.

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<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doing the right things – encourages innovation</td>
<td>Doing things in the right manner – demands documentation and repetition of the same steps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantly measures if the actual output meets the desired output</td>
<td>Output to input ratio – focuses on getting the maximum output with minimum resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focuses on achieving the “end” goal – takes into consideration any variables which may change in the future</td>
<td>Focuses on the process – importance given to the “means” of doing things</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeps long-term strategy in mind &amp; is adaptable to changing environments</td>
<td>Requires discipline and rigor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looks at gaining success</td>
<td>Looks at avoiding mistakes or errors</td>
</tr>
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</table>

4.2.1. Generally, organizations which are predominantly policy-making entities (based on an analysis of the Mission Directive) are selected to receive a Management Inspection. Organizations which are primarily an execution agent are typically evaluated via a UEI in accordance with Chapter 3. Non-MAJCOM owned FOA/DRU/Center organizations are approved by SAF/IG (by exception) to receive a Management Inspection.

4.2.2. For organizations with fewer than 35 authorized personnel, the AFIA Commander (MAJCOM Commander for subordinate Management Inspections) may approve a remote Management Inspection Capstone inspection or extend the standard inspection timeline if the unit has shown a consistently high level of performance and has no high-risk areas identified via continual evaluation. AFIA will inspect any SAF/IG-approved unit without a Commander’s Inspection Program as part of the parent Functional Area Manager or higher headquarters Management Inspection instead of requiring a separate UEI.

4.3. Roles and responsibilities.
4.3.1. AFIA and Management Inspection-certified MAJCOM IGs will:

4.3.1.1. Conduct Management Inspections on MAJCOMs and organizations identified in paragraph 4.1 of this instruction.

4.3.1.2. Conduct continual evaluation event(s) during the inspection cycle.

4.3.1.3. Load Management Inspection Capstone events into the Gatekeeper website at least 12 months in advance and notify inspected unit leadership at least 60 calendar days prior to the Capstone.

4.3.1.4. Following certification by AFIA, MAJCOM IGs may conduct a Management Inspection on subordinate organizations (MAJCOM Directorates, designated NAFs, FOAs, etc.) or other organizations by request of the Commander using AFIA-developed checklists, methodology, and grading criteria and MAJCOM Commander intent. MAJCOM IGs will coordinate with AFIA/ID prior to scheduling an initial Management Inspection for certification in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.

4.3.2. MAJCOM Commanders will determine the appropriate inspection cycle interval for subordinate units who receive Management Inspections.

4.3.3. AFIA will inspect Pertinent Oversight Authorities responsible for guidance and/or support of By-Law programs for the overall management, emphasizing the use of received data (e.g. Functional Area Manager reporting tools, MICT, IGEMS, etc.) and how it is used to support the field through validation or revision of policies and guidance. AFIA inspects By-law programs for units in the National Capitol Region via a single visit annually in lieu of inspection during the respective Management Inspection Capstone event.

4.4. Methodology. The Management Inspection cycle begins at the conclusion of the previous Capstone visit. Management Inspections are initiated by inspecting documents received from a data call to the inspected organization and other collection methods. The Management Inspection culminates with a Capstone event validating/verifying potential findings which are then documented in a final report.

4.4.1. The inspection team will send an AFIA-approved survey to members of the inspected organization. The inspection team analyzes survey responses and develops subsequent on-site interview questions.

4.4.2. Prior to visiting the inspected organization, the inspection team should interview senior leaders and customers within the owning headquarters organization to discuss perspectives on the inspected organization followed by subordinate organization and/or customer interviews to gather data and information regarding adequacy of support.

4.4.3. Inspectors will conduct pre-scheduled Airmen-to-IG Session-Group/Airmen-to-IG Session-Individual during every Management Inspection cycle.

4.4.4. The inspection team will prepare and deliver a draft report to the inspected organization’s leadership in conjunction with the final out-brief detailing ratings for each of the four MGAs and any Deficiencies, Recommended Improvement Areas, and Strengths. Do not reveal any disaggregated survey or Airmen-to-IG G/I data in the report.

4.5. Rating. The Team Chief has final decision authority for grades and ratings assigned during a Management Inspection. The Management Inspection is rated using a two-tiered scale of
EFFECTIVE or INEFFECTIVE. Management Inspection MGAs are rated using the four tiers defined below:

4.5.1. ***HIGHLY EFFECTIVE*** – The rating given to indicate performance or operations exceed mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a superior manner. Resources and programs are very efficiently managed and mostly deficiency-free. Risk-based criteria are often applied when allocating resources and making decisions. Root-Cause Analysis is often used to find and fix problems. Processes in place are mature and well established. Deficiencies are rare.

4.5.2. ***EFFECTIVE*** – The rating given to indicate performance or operations meet expectations and mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in an effective and efficient manner. Resources and programs are managed with few deficiencies. Risk-based criteria are usually applied when allocating resources and making decisions. Root-Cause Analysis is usually used to find and fix problems. Processes in place are sufficient to meet mission requirements. Deficiencies exist which do not impede or limit mission accomplishment.

4.5.3. ***MARGINALLY-EFFECTIVE*** – The rating given to indicate performance or operations barely meeting expectations and mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out, but not in an effective or efficient manner. Resources and programs are insufficiently managed with some deficiencies. Risk and resource scarcity is sometimes considered in decision-making. Little effort is given to increasing efficiency or reliability or use of root-cause analysis. Processes are not well established causing inconsistent results. Deficiencies exist which may impede or limit mission accomplishment.

4.5.4. ***INEFFECTIVE*** – The rating given to indicate performance or operation needs significant improvement. Procedures and activities are not carried out in a competent manner or produce unreliable results. Resources and programs are not well-managed. Risk and resource scarcity is rarely considered in decision-making processes. No effort at increasing efficiency or reliability is evident. Deficiencies exist which impede or limit mission accomplishment.

4.6. **Air Force Management Inspection Major Graded Areas.** The Management Inspection inspects the following four MGAs:

4.6.1. **Strategic Planning and Governance.** An organization's process of codifying its strategy, by producing the organization's vision, mission, priorities, goals, and objectives in an approved strategic plan. Governance involves the establishment of policies, and continuous monitoring of proper implementation, by the members of the leadership of an organization. Policy and guidance is formulated and used to direct mission execution with a clear line of authority from SecAF to the organization’s leaders.

4.6.1.1. **Mission Statement.** A short sentence or paragraph which describes the organization's essential task (or tasks) and purpose (a clear statement of what the organization does or produces and the reason for doing so). The Mission Statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, and identifies how the customer benefits.

4.6.1.2. **Vision Statement.** A top level view describing what the organization should be capable of achieving. The purpose of the Vision is to provide each Airman a clear,
organization-specific, and fiscally unconstrained vector to a future outcome of Global Vigilance, Reach and Power. The Air Force strives to realize the Vision when considering approaches to meet planning guidance.

4.6.1.3. Strategic Plan. Strategic thinking and planning enables the organization to conceive and articulate its mission, vision, priorities, goals, and measurable objectives in an approved strategic plan. The strategic plan becomes the overarching playbook which provides the organization focus and direction as well as defines and guides subordinate organization/echelon plans.

4.6.1.3.1. Air Force-level and Higher Strategic Planning. HAF and MAJCOM organizations also support the DoD and Air Force Senior Leader priorities. Organizations publish Strategic Plans to inform fiscally constrained resourcing decisions, achieve alignment across functional areas, and align with Air Force strategy. Additionally, warfighting MAJCOMs support Combatant Command Strategy, strategic planning, and campaign support plans.

4.6.1.4. Strategic Metrics. A performance metric of an organization's activities and performance which measures progress against strategic plan priorities and objectives, allowing organizational leadership to make informed decisions.

4.6.1.5. Governance and Legal Authority. Establishment of clear/streamlined/current guidance, and a process to identify/correct inaccurate/update outdated guidance. Legal authority ensures organizations operate and function within a current/accurate mission directive.

4.6.2. Organizational Management. Senior leaders throughout the organization establish and maintain a culture of good organizational management practices, to include open communication, leadership and Airmen development, internal continual evaluation, the management of risk, and a focus on a positive organizational climate to address Airmen concerns.

4.6.2.1. Internal Communication. The organization’s mission and vision statements, along with leadership’s values and expectations, are well understood throughout the organization. Organizational strategic plans/flight plans/campaign support plans are well understood and organizational members know their role in achieving stated performance goals and objectives.

4.6.2.2. Risk Management. Leadership has a process to identify risks, to include internal organizational risks, programmatic risks, and external, non-controllable events. Leadership has a process to identify and address single points of failure.

4.6.2.3. Internal Continual Evaluation. The organization has an institutionalized process for conducting routine internal continual evaluation evolutions which includes identification and correction of findings. Internal continual evaluation should be repeatable and capable of assessing whether or not (and to what extent) the commander/director is meeting AFI 1-2 responsibilities. Internal continual evaluation should be customized to the structure and mission of the organization. Consider using the principles associated with the four Management Inspection MGAs as the framework for conducting routine internal assessments. The use of a risk-based sampling strategy which focuses the internal continual evaluation program on the Commander/Director's priorities is recommended.
4.6.2.4. Internal Feedback. Leadership has a process to solicit feedback, address concerns, and provide feedback. Airmen should be comfortable with providing feedback without fear of reprisal and have confidence the concerns are addressed appropriately.

4.6.2.5. Developing Future Leaders. The organization has leadership development programs/processes in place for civilian, officer, and enlisted personnel. Organization should proactively develop personnel through mentoring programs and establishment of training and professional education plans. Organization should have a process for prioritization and selection of training and education opportunities beneficial to both the organization and individuals.

4.6.2.6. Training. Organization has a training plan which ensures personnel are adequately trained for primary duties. Organization tracks personnel training and reviews status monthly in accordance with AFI 36-2201, *Air Force Training Program*. The program should also include a process for identifying and resolving deficiencies.

4.6.2.7. Organizational Climate. Organizational leadership has conducted a Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) in accordance with AFI 36-2706, *Equal Opportunity Program, Military and Civilian*. Leadership uses additional processes to measure Airmen’s morale and quality of life. Airmen are aware of morale assessment results and leadership actively uses results to make organizational changes to positively impact Airmen’s morale and quality of life. Organizational climate is positively influenced by leadership promoting an environment that ensures Airmen are held accountable at all levels.

4.6.3. Process Operations. The design, management, and improvement of Key Work Processes. Key Work Processes are linked activities with the purpose of producing a stated output/outcome and help the organization achieve the Commander/Director’s priorities, objectives, and mission. Key Work Processes also include interactions with customers as well as external continual evaluations. These activities rarely operate in isolation and should be considered in relation to other processes which impact them. The method in which a Key Work Processes performance is measured is fundamental to a high-performing management system.

4.6.3.1. Key Work Processes. Key processes for the organization should be documented and measured via meaningful metrics. Leadership should review and analyze key processes and take action based on results.

4.6.3.2. Process Controls. Controls are in-process measurements of critical points which should occur as early as possible to minimize problems and costs resulting from deviations from expected performance, e.g., risk mitigation. Controls manage or mitigate meaningful, acceptable risks when functioning as intended.

4.6.3.3. Continuous Process Improvement. Leadership is committed to and has oversight of Continuous Process Improvement methodologies for reducing waste in processes used to execute the mission, including feedback from those executing policy and guidance. Continuous Process Improvement plans should be followed to completion using a tracking mechanism, such as the Practical Problem Solving Method. The organization needs to have appointed the proper-level Master Process Officer/Wing Process Manager in accordance with AFI 38-401, *Continuous Process Improvement*. Additionally, the organization should
have access to and use certified process improvement practitioners to facilitate Continuous Process Improvement efforts.

4.6.3.4. Customer Support. Customer support should be pursued through various mediums. Use of technology can enhance communication to ensure the customers’ needs are met. Data from these interactions should be captured to help improve customer support. For long-term success, organizations must engage their customers, including listening to the voice of the customer, building relationships, and using data to improve and identify innovation opportunities. Customer engagement is strategic action focused on building relationships and managing complaints. Complaint aggregation, analysis, and root-cause determination should lead to effective elimination of the causes of complaints and to the setting of priorities for process and product/service improvements.

4.6.3.5. External Continual evaluations. Organizational leadership has the legal authority and responsibility to evaluate sub-organizations. External continual evaluations may be performed “remotely,” through on-site visits, or a combination of the two methods. Information reviewed should include, but is not limited to, previous inspection reports, MICT, internal continual evaluation, Commander’s Inspection Report (if applicable), Commander’s Inspection Management Board meeting minutes (if applicable), By-Law inspection reports, MAJCOM Functional Manager training reports, readiness systems reporting, or similar products.

4.6.4. Resource Management. The efficient and effective deployment of an organization’s resources when and where they are needed is a primary foundational management principle. Resources include human capital, financial resources, inventory, manpower, tools and equipment, facilities, specialized human skills, production materials, and information technology. While no single process, technique, or philosophy can be singled out as the best approach for allocating resources, it is crucial detailed resource allocation planning and execution is properly prioritized and continuously monitored.

4.6.4.1. Financial Planning. Proper financial planning forecasts, prioritizes, and plans the expenditures for the assessed mission area to drive informed decisions. Resources should be addressed in the Execution Plan and demonstrate financial sustainability of the organization. Leadership should encourage an environment of cost effectiveness and financial responsibility at all levels.

4.6.4.2. Financial Performance/Metrics. Organization should collect performance data which supports the mission, assesses risk, and focuses on cost as opposed to budget as a primary measure of performance. Metrics should be relevant and used by leadership to inform decision making and improve the organization.

4.6.4.3. Organization Manning. Manpower resources are addressed in the Unit Manpower Document, Unit Personnel Management Roster, Alpha and/or Unit Rosters (one each for civilian, military, and contractor), and the organization chart. When mismatches or variations of personnel assigned exist, organization has a process to identify and is actively pursuing resolution.

4.6.4.4. Organizational Staffing. A process should be in place to ensure properly trained personnel/AFSCs are aligned with mission requirements. For warfighting headquarters and other organizations who employ matrixed staffing constructs, business practices
should be codified and well understood, ensuring clear lines of authority and accountability as well as balanced workload distribution.

4.6.4.5. Tools/Equipment. Tools and equipment needs should be addressed. Personnel have the materials they need to perform duties.

4.6.4.6. Information Technology. Technology refresh program is in place to support the needs of the organization. Information Technology infrastructure supports effective and efficient mission accomplishment.

4.6.4.7. Facilities. Facilities should conform to acceptable standards and be suitable for mission accomplishment. Organization has a process to resolve sub-standard facility issues.

4.6.4.8. Support Agreements. Support agreements should be developed to document recurring support ensuring utilized properly and help to eliminate unnecessary resource duplication. Documented/approved process to review support agreements, memorandums of agreement and memorandums of understanding in the appropriate timelines. Organization explores avenues or participates in cross-talks with other organizations to implement shared-service opportunities.

4.6.4.9. Higher headquarters Support/Adequacy. Assesses the HAF/MAJCOM/NAF’s overall functional programs for resource issues and equipment in subordinate units. Commanders/directors are entrusted with resources to accomplish a stated mission. Those resources include: manpower, funds, equipment, facilities, environment, guidance, and Airmen’s time. As part of managing resources, higher echelon commanders/directors must ensure adequate resources are provided to subordinate commanders/directors. When resources are not controlled by the higher echelon or execution authority is centralized (e.g., owned by a Pertinent Oversight Authority), responsible commanders/directors must advocate for the required resources and stay informed on progress. This includes aforementioned resources as shaped by the commander/director’s intent. Adequacy evaluations should address the following:

4.6.4.9.1. Process to track higher headquarters deficiencies from subordinate units.

4.6.4.9.2. Process to ensure subordinate units have adequate resources.

4.6.4.9.3. Process the Commander/Director uses to provide intent to subordinate units.
Chapter 5

AIR FORCE NUCLEAR INSPECTION PROGRAMS

5.1. General information. Nuclear weapon systems and the units to which they are assigned require special consideration because of political and military importance, destructive power, and the potential consequences of a nuclear weapons incident/accident. The Department of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establish the policy, guidance and direction to ensure compliance with those standards in the CJCS Instruction 3263.05. The AF executes nuclear inspections as a component of the UEI via a composite inspection methodology consisting of self-assessment, readiness exercises, and technical inspections in accordance with CJCS Instruction 3263.05. Collectively, these inspection efforts provide compliance and capability confidence to nuclear stakeholders. If there is conflict between this document and CJCS Instruction 3263.05, the CJCS Instruction takes precedence.

5.2. Nuclear self-assessment. As a critical component of Air Force Inspection System, self-assessment allows commanders at all levels to evaluate the everyday readiness of a unit. Within units assigned a nuclear mission, self-assessment is aligned with key areas identified in the CJCS Instruction 3263.05, Combatant Command requirements, and JCS directed Operations Plans.

5.2.1. Purpose. The purpose of nuclear self-assessment is to focus inward on the discipline, efficiency and effectiveness of organic staff operations, processes, and programs in accordance with nuclear directives. This process should be repeatable and capable of assessing whether or not (and to what extent) the Commander or Director is meeting assigned responsibilities. Self-assessment of nuclear missions should be customized to the structure and mission of the organization.

5.2.2. Roles and responsibilities.

5.2.2.1. The Wing Commander will:

5.2.2.1.1. Incorporate self-assessment of key nuclear areas into the Unit Self-Assessment Program. (T-1)

5.2.2.1.2. Include nuclear self-assessment of key nuclear areas in the Commander’s Inspection Report. (T-2)

5.2.3. Methodology.

5.2.3.1. Commanders reference applicable instructions (e.g. Combatant Command requirements, technical orders, etc.) as the standard for the documentation, operation, process, and procedure observed or otherwise assessed as a key component of the Unit Self-Assessment Program.

5.2.3.2. Documentation and reporting requirements for self-assessment can be captured using pre-existing organic staff operations, processes, and programs in accordance with nuclear directives and the unit self-assessment program operating procedures (e.g. unit quality assurance reports and trends).

5.3. Nuclear readiness exercises. Nuclear readiness exercises are Wing IG-executed inspections of a unit’s capability to meet Combatant Command and Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed Operations
Plans and Designed Operational Capability Statement or Mission Directive requirements. See paragraph 2.5.2.3 of this instruction for readiness exercise guidance.

5.4. Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections. An Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection is a component of the Air Force Nuclear Certification Program. MAJCOM IGs execute Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections prior to the designation of a unit as nuclear-capable.

5.4.1. Purpose. The purpose of an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection is to inspect new/modified equipment and/or systems requiring nuclear certification and serves as the final step in the Operational Certification Process. Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections are conducted on units not nuclear-certified prior to employing, storing, assembling, maintaining or transporting War Reserve weapons or weapon systems. For currently certified nuclear-capable units programmed to receive new weapon system/delivery systems or to modify previously certified environments (e.g., facilities), Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections are conducted on operations and maintenance activities supporting the new system prior to receipt and on facilities after modification. Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections can be conducted as a single inspection or in phases.

5.4.2. Roles and responsibilities.

5.4.2.1. Lead/Using command will, in coordination with HQ AFSEC, determine the need for an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection based upon AFI 63-125, Nuclear Certification Program.

5.4.2.2. Pertinent Oversight Authorities will develop initial nuclear surety inspection criteria based on applicable system/program requirements.

5.4.2.3. MAJCOM IGs will:

5.4.2.3.1. Conduct Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections on the inspection criteria developed by the applicable Pertinent Oversight Authority(s).

5.4.2.3.2. Coordinate with the Pertinent Oversight Authorities and AFSEC/SEW to determine the need, scope and scale, and due date for Nuclear Surety Inspections following an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection.

5.4.2.3.3. In collaboration with the AFIA Commander, determine size and functional requirements for the Air Force Core Team. The MAJCOM IG approves the final team roster and integrates the Air Force Core Team into the MAJCOM IG inspection team.

5.4.2.3.4. At the request of AFIA and/or other MAJCOM IGs, provide inspectors to supplement the Air Force Core Team.

5.4.2.4. AFIA will:

5.4.2.4.1. Collaborate with the MAJCOM IG on all inspection phases (plan, execute, report, etc.) to include determination of the size and functional requirements for the Air Force Core Team in support of the Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection.

5.4.2.4.2. Provide the Deputy Team Chief as a component of the Air Force Core Team to integrate with the MAJCOM IG team under the direction of the MAJCOM IG Team Chief. The Deputy Team Chief advises the Team Chief during all inspection phases.
5.4.2.4.3. Perform Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection oversight (as required) in accordance with Chapter 6 of this instruction.

5.4.3. Methodology

5.4.3.1. Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection Planning. MAJCOM IGs must use the Gatekeeper process to plan/schedule Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections.

5.4.3.1.1. MAJCOM IGs will build an inspection in IGEMS-C in accordance with predetermined inspection criteria and system performance requirements. This should include inspector task assignment and any inspection-unique circumstances or requirements. If MAJCOM IGs execute the Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection in phases, include required areas to be inspected by each phase.

5.4.3.1.2. MAJCOM IGs will forward a schedule of events to AFIA inspection elements at least 30 calendar days prior to a scheduled Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection.

5.4.3.1.3. The MAJCOM IG will review and approve inspected unit’s simulations and deviations at least 15 calendar days prior to a scheduled Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection.

5.4.3.2. Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection ratings. MAJCOM IGs will assign a “READY” or “NOT READY” rating based on inspection criteria developed by applicable Pertinent Oversight Authorities.

5.4.3.2.1. An Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection “READY” rating is required for certification of the system or unit.

5.4.3.2.2. If an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection is rated “NOT READY”, the MAJCOM IG will accomplish planning and execution steps in accordance with this chapter and re-accomplish the inspection at a time determined through coordination with applicable Pertinent Oversight Authorities.

5.4.3.2.3. If the Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection is conducted in phases, a “READY” rating is required for the phase of the Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection under evaluation before evaluation of the next phase can begin. All phases require a “READY” rating prior to the assumption of nuclear operations. Unless waived by the MAJCOM Commander, a phased “READY” rating expires 180 calendar days from issuance.

5.4.3.3. Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection reporting. MAJCOM IGs will produce an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection report in the timelines prescribed in Chapter 1 and will distribute the Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection report to applicable Pertinent Oversight Authorities located on the SAF/IGI SharePoint site.

5.5. Nuclear Surety Inspection. The Nuclear Surety Inspection is the Air Force performance and compliance inspection executed by MAJCOM IGs to satisfy requirements of the Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection program and frequency as directed by CJCS Instruction 3263.05. The criteria within this section is required for execution of a Nuclear Surety Inspection in addition to those outlined in CJCS Instruction 3263.05.

5.5.1. Purpose. The purpose of the Nuclear Surety Inspection is to evaluate a certified nuclear-capable unit’s ability to manage assigned nuclear resources and execute nuclear missions in a
safe, secure, reliable manner. More specifically, the Nuclear Surety Inspection inspects a
certified nuclear-capable unit’s capability to receive, store, secure, assemble, transport,
maintain, load, mate, lock/unlock, test, render safe, and employ nuclear weapons. MAJCOM
IGs will inspect the knowledge of missile launch crews, aircrews, command post controllers,
and release teams on weapon acceptance procedures (unless evaluated and documented
elsewhere during the UEI), nuclear weapon system safety rules, and nuclear weapon control
order handling and authentication procedures. The Nuclear Surety Inspection is used to assist
the MAJCOM Commander in certification decisions.

5.5.2. Roles and responsibilities.

5.5.2.1. MAJCOM IGs will:

5.5.2.1.1. Conduct Nuclear Surety Inspections in accordance with CJCS Instruction
3263.05 and this instruction. Use applicable guidance as the inspection standard for
documentation, operations, processes, and procedures inspected.

5.5.2.1.2. In collaboration with AFIA Commander, determine the size and functional
requirements for the Air Force Core Team. The MAJCOM IG approves the final team
roster and integrates the Air Force Core Team into the MAJCOM IG inspection team.

5.5.2.1.3. At the request of AFIA and/or other MAJCOM IGs, provide inspectors to
supplement the Air Force Core Team.

5.5.2.1.4. Make all CJCS Instruction 3263.05-mandated inspection outcome
notifications by email or message.

5.5.2.2. The AFIA Commander will:

5.5.2.2.1. Collaborate with the MAJCOM IG on all inspection phases (plan, execute,
report, etc.) to include determination of the size and functional requirements for the Air
Force Core Team in support of the Nuclear Surety Inspection.

5.5.2.2.2. Provide the Deputy Team Chief as a component of the Air Force Core Team
to integrate with the MAJCOM IG team under the direction of the MAJCOM IG Team
Chief. The Deputy Team Chief advises the Team Chief during all inspection phases.

5.5.2.2.3. Perform Nuclear Surety Inspection oversight (as required) in accordance
with Chapter 6 of this instruction.

5.5.3. Methodology.

5.5.3.1. Nuclear Surety Inspection planning. MAJCOM IGs must use the Gatekeeper
process to plan and schedule Nuclear Surety Inspections.

5.5.3.1.1. MAJCOM IGs must coordinate with AFIA at least 60 calendar days prior to
inspection execution.

5.5.3.1.2. MAJCOM IGs will build an inspection in IGEMS in accordance with pre-
determined inspection criteria and system performance requirements. This should
include inspector task assignment and any inspection-unique circumstances or
requirements in addition to the required CJCS Instruction 3263.05 and Air Force
inspection criteria.
5.5.3.1.3. MAJCOM IGs will forward a schedule of events to AFIA inspection elements at least 30 calendar days prior to a scheduled Nuclear Surety Inspection.

5.5.3.1.4. The MAJCOM IG will review and approve inspected unit’s simulations and deviations at least 15 calendar days prior to a scheduled Nuclear Surety Inspection and provide The Defense Threat Reduction Area (DTRA) a copy as required by CJCS Instruction 3263.05.

5.5.3.1.5. Units may be required to submit team assignment documents, duty rosters, Unit Committed Munitions Lists, and/or maintenance capability letters to the MAJCOM IG before team arrival to expedite team selection. MAJCOM IGs should consider individual Career Field Education Training Plans, Training Business Areas, Load Training and Certification Documents (Air Force Form 2435), Personnel Reliability Program status, work shifts, and ARC personnel when making team selections (maintain team integrity to the maximum extent possible).

5.5.3.2. Nuclear Surety Inspection requirements. The criteria below add Air Force-specific inspection specifications and requirements to existing DoD and CJCS criteria:

5.5.3.2.1. Inspectors will intervene to ensure safety, security, and reliability of War Reserve weapon systems. No nuclear surety compliance credit is awarded after inspector intervention.

5.5.3.2.2. MAJCOM IGs will not hypothesize decisions based on conditions requiring another related event or series of related events which may be credible themselves but are not inevitable. The Team Chief will consider whether a deficiency is the result of an individual error, a subordinate unit process or procedural error, or a systemic unit deficiency.

5.5.4. Nuclear Surety Inspection MGAs and ratings. MAJCOM IGs will assign overall ratings and MGA adjectival ratings (as applicable) in accordance with CJCS Instruction 3263.05 and incorporate the following Air Force-specific inspection requirements:

5.5.4.1. Management and Administration.

5.5.4.1.1. Evaluate leadership, guidance, communication, and attitude of unit commander and key supervisors. When assessing management, consider whether deficiencies are the result of individual error or reflect management or supervisory training/experience gaps.

5.5.4.1.2. Evaluate status of approved security or safety waivers, exemptions, and deviations.

5.5.4.1.3. Evaluate Munitions Control in the planning, coordinating, directing and controlling of munitions/weapons activities in accordance with applicable AFIs.

5.5.4.1.4. Evaluate munitions/maintenance plans and scheduling in accordance with applicable AFIs.

5.5.4.1.5. Evaluate certification processes and documentation of unit certified/qualified personnel (e.g., maintainers, aircrew, missile combat crew members, vehicle operators, etc.) assigned to duties involving nuclear weapons.
5.5.4.1.6. Evaluate the Munitions Accountable Systems Officer and Nuclear Accountability Reporting Section on all aspects of the daily accountability, reporting/custody of the unit’s nuclear weapons, components, spares (base and military).

5.5.4.2. Technical Operations.

5.5.4.2.1. Evaluate each type of assigned weapon(s) or weapon system(s) that the unit is tasked to support, in order to assess safe, secure, and reliable technical performance. These evaluations are limited to operations where personnel maintain certification and operations directed by CJCS Instruction 3263.05. Evaluate all documentation and reporting normally associated with the operation. MAJCOM IGs will determine the scope and definitive start/stop of technical operations. In order to minimize the inspection footprint and mirror day-to-day unit operations, evaluate this activity by observing unit-certified teams performing required technical operations with minimal Quality Assurance and/or other unit leadership influence/interference.

5.5.4.2.2. For technical operations and/or task evaluations, the MAJCOM IG will brief the areas in Attachment 5 of this instruction.

5.5.4.2.3. Inspectors will evaluate nuclear weapons Quality Assurance and weapons standardization during a Nuclear Surety Inspection. The MAJCOM IG may task these personnel to perform an evaluation of a maintenance operation within the area of responsibility. MAJCOM IGs will clearly identify technical operations and/or task evaluations which require evaluation of the Quality Assurance function.

5.5.4.2.4. During evaluation of any nuclear-certified procedure, MAJCOM inspectors will evaluate performance of only those individuals/teams required by the applicable Technical Order or guiding instruction for the procedure. Intervention, participation, or influence by any other personnel (e.g. Unit Weapons Officer, unit leadership, etc.) may be cause to terminate the procedure if (in the judgment of the inspector) the outside assistance calls into question the technical proficiency or knowledge of the individual/team under evaluation. The environment in which technical operations are conducted demonstrates technical proficiency and standardization of the unit training program. When technical operations are conducted using training weapons, units may simulate some aspects of security, entry control, approved explosive loading site plans, and/or other operations which cannot be reasonably conducted otherwise if approved by the MAJCOM IG in advance.

5.5.4.2.5. Weapons maintenance technical operations. Evaluate applicable technical operations designated in CJCS Instruction 3263.05 for which the unit is tasked in Maintenance Capability Letters and Unit Committed Munitions Lists. For comparable operations, evaluate only one weapon system type. Certain operations listed individually may be combined for the purpose of inspection. Inspectors will approve the starting and stopping configuration before the operation.

5.5.4.2.6. Loading and Mating. MAJCOM IGs will evaluate a unit’s ability to conduct a complete weapons upload and post-load procedures. Additionally, MAJCOM Commanders may direct evaluation of download procedures. Evaluate loading operations for each applicable type and upload position (internal and external). When
loading operations are conducted in a load training facility, inspectors may authorize simulations. For custodial units supporting non-US delivery organizations, include the US technical load monitor and associated training activities.

5.5.4.3. **Tools, Test, Tie-Down, and Handling Equipment.**

5.5.4.3.1. Air Force-registered nuclear certified motor vehicles and vehicular equipment. Ensure nuclear certified vehicles are maintained in a safe and serviceable condition. Evaluate unit vehicles to ensure only nuclear certified vehicles and vehicular equipment are used during nuclear operations. The evaluation should include assessing vehicle operator/using organization’s ability to perform applicable operator’s maintenance and documentation requirements on nuclear-certified vehicles and vehicular equipment in support of nuclear operations.

5.5.4.3.2. Evaluate unit equipment management to ensure only nuclear-certified software, testers/cables, and equipment is used in support of the nuclear mission. Evaluate equipment is maintained in a serviceable condition, equipment calibration dates are current, and equipment limitations/restrictions are adhered to. Document any supply issues which impact the ability to obtain replacement parts, tools, and equipment required to operate, maintain, and sustain nuclear weapon systems.

5.5.4.4. **Condition of the Active/Inactive Stockpile and Retired Weapons.**

5.5.4.4.1. Examine at least 25 percent of the active/inactive coded assets and associated bolsters, containers, components, and records for weapons in igloo storage, in long term storage facilities, and/or weapon storage vaults to ensure compliance with weapons-specific Technical Orders. MAJCOM IG teams will select resources to be inspected.

5.5.4.4.2. Examine at least 10 percent of weapons coded for retirement and associated records to ensure safe and secure storage in accordance with applicable explosive, nuclear safety, and nuclear security criteria, weapons-specific Technical Orders, and retirement unit requirements contained in Technical Order 11N-35-51, *General Instructions Applicable to Nuclear Weapons*.

5.5.4.4.3. Ensure weapons are stored in accordance with applicable directives (i.e., properly grounded, chocked, and immobilized). Ensure weapons have proper spacing, storage compatibility, and are within explosive and active material limits. If defects are discovered on weapons, components or equipment during stockpile walkthroughs, ensure evaluation against applicable technical publication, technical order, or instruction and ensure appropriate corrective actions are taken and documented. Ensure the applicable sample size weapons inspection record card information matches the asset/container markings (part number, drop numbers, serial number, alterations, etc.) for active, inactive, and retired weapons.

5.5.4.4.4. For assets with storage bags, sample a number of bags to ensure required items are located in the storage bag and properly packaged and/or sealed.

5.5.4.4.5. Rate MGA as Acceptable, Marginal or Not Acceptable.

5.5.4.5. **Storage and Maintenance Facilities.**

5.5.4.5.1. Evaluate roads in/between storage areas and loading/missile launch areas.
5.5.4.5.2. Evaluate nuclear-certified hoists to ensure, at a minimum, hoists are serviceable, authorized, and have received mandatory load testing and/or safety related inspections.

5.5.4.5.3. Evaluate testing and exercising of emergency power generator with facility load to include automatic transfer switching devices.

5.5.4.6. Security.

5.5.4.6.1. Evaluate unit compliance with DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: The DoD Nuclear Weapon Security Program and other required security standards for protecting War Reserve weapons and weapon systems. Performance-based criteria is the primary means of inspection. Assess compliance with existing requirements via a risk-based sampling strategy and in conjunction with exercise events and/or task evaluations (where practical).

5.5.4.6.2. MAJCOMs will supplement this instruction to ensure specific operating environments and elements of the published Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment are addressed in exercise objectives.

5.5.4.6.3. Weapon denial and recapture exercise planning:

5.5.4.6.3.1. MAJCOM IGs (in coordination with Pertinent Oversight Authorities) will develop realistic nuclear weapon security exercise scenarios to determine a unit’s ability to meet Nuclear Weapons Security Standards in accordance with DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108. The MAJCOM IG team will determine the exercise scenario and coordinate the scenario with DTRA during Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection Oversight planning. Evaluate weapon denial and recapture exercises in accordance with CJCS Instruction 3263.05.

5.5.4.6.3.2. Use risk management and safety procedures in planning and execution of security exercises at all levels of command. When exercises are collocated within operational areas, exercise care to avoid scenarios which may be interpreted as an actual hostile situation or cause accidental injury to personnel or jeopardize the security of nuclear resources.

5.5.4.6.3.3. Inspectors will develop exercise scenarios which portray an opposing force replicating adversaries identified in the published DIA Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment. Ensure distinct separation of the exercise play area from real world mission areas using visual identification tools (safety vest/belts, exercise controllers, etc.), safety briefings, and normal exercise Command and Control announcements. The IG will direct the activities of opposing force, exercise controllers, and IG trusted agents.

5.5.4.6.3.4. Exercise scenarios resulting in opposing force gaining access to simulated nuclear weapons may automatically trigger a recapture or recovery exercise at the discretion of the inspectors. Inspectors will ensure both opposing force and exercise controllers know “adversary intentions” for the planned attack (e.g., weapon sabotage, destruction, theft, etc.).

5.5.4.6.3.5. Exercise participants will apply appropriate Information Security and Operations Security measures to safeguard exercise information, tactics,
techniques, and procedures. (T-1)

5.5.4.6.4. Evaluate Explosive Ordnance Disposal integration into weapon recapture and recovery planning to ensure checklists, equipment, and training supports unit concepts of operation in instituting CJCS Instruction 3261.01, (U) Recapture and Recovery of Nuclear Weapons, and Presidential Policy Directive 35 procedures.

5.5.4.6.5. Determine the outcome of executed security action(s) and performance, the impact of unit compliance with technical criteria, and contribution of support forces/supporting security systems to determine if the Nuclear Weapons Security Standard is met.

5.5.4.6.6. As available/applicable, inspectors may use computer modeling or simulation as a viable measurement for developing response force scenarios based on the DIA Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment.

5.5.4.7. Safety.

5.5.4.7.1. Evaluate compliance with explosive safety standards, explosives and active material limits, Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance, and Weapons System Safety Rules.

5.5.4.7.2. Evaluate compliance, programs, implementation, and management thereof per AFI 91-101, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program.

5.5.4.7.3. Assess Air Force Fire Emergency Services flights using CJCS Instruction 3263.05 requirements and the Fire Emergency Services Assessment Program.

5.5.4.7.4. Conduct an inspection of the Intrinsic Radiation Safety Program to ensure controls are in place and personnel practice “as low as reasonably achievable” (ALARA) concepts IAW 91-108, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation and 91(B) Radioactive Material Safety Program.

5.5.4.8. Supply Support. Document any supply issues which impact the ability to obtain replacement parts, tools, and equipment required to operate, maintain, and sustain the nuclear weapon systems and Department of Energy-furnished components.


5.5.4.9.1. Personnel Reliability Assurance Program processes (not records reviews) are the primary focus. Only accomplish a records review as part of scenario-based performance objectives or to investigate a potential finding/discrepancy discovered via a process/procedural review.

5.5.4.9.2. Inspectors will assess certification, continual evaluation, removal from Personnel Reliability Assurance Program duties, return to duty, training, and
management processes using scenario-based exercises, formal and informal interviews, and observing day-to-day operations to validate/verify processes employed by the unit/installation.

5.5.4.9.3. Validate/verify Personnel Reliability Assurance Program is functioning as a Commander’s program which assures only personnel who demonstrate the highest-degree of individual reliability for allegiance, trustworthiness, conduct, behavior, and responsibility are authorized to perform duties associated with nuclear weapons.

5.5.4.10. Logistics Movement. Evaluate units supporting or having responsibility for logistical movement of nuclear weapons by observing weapon transfer/transport, loading, unloading, and custody transfer procedures of representative types of weapons. For Intercontinental Ballistic Missile units, an Operational Movement to/from a launch facility as defined by DoDI 4540.05, DoD Transportation of U.S. Nuclear Weapons is evaluated as a Logistics Movement.

5.5.4.10.1. Evaluate convoy operations, including operational movements to/from launch facilities and weapon movement activities (including security support).

5.5.4.10.2. Evaluate Prime Nuclear Airlift Force support plans, security support, and logistical movements in accordance with applicable AFIs for Prime Nuclear Airlift Force-certified units and installations supporting nuclear airlift missions. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force units must demonstrate the ability to safely and properly load, transport, unload, and transfer custody of weapons. Note: For Prime Nuclear Airlift Force units, evaluate security support and aircrew security actions during the Prime Nuclear Airlift Force movement.

5.5.5. Additional Air Force Nuclear Surety Inspection MGAs. In addition to the MGAs outlined in CJCS Instruction 3263.05, MAJCOM IGs will inspect the following MGAs (as applicable):

5.5.5.1. Nuclear Control Order Procedures. Evaluate command post, aircrew, Permissive Action Link/Code Management System lock/unlock teams, and missile crew responses to nuclear control orders as well as effectiveness of applicable Command and Control functions in accordance with higher headquarters directives. Additionally, perform records audit of emergency action checklists in operational launch control centers, unit command posts and combat mission folders.

5.5.5.1.1. Methodology. Assess Nuclear Control Order Procedures proficiency via performance-based evaluations in an operationally-realistic simulator. If approved facilities or simulator-use decode documents are not available, assess Nuclear Control Order Procedures via scenario-based written test. Inspectors may use Emergency Action general knowledge written testing to supplement (but not replace) scenario-based assessments. The passing standard for general knowledge testing or scenario-based testing is 90 percent. Inspectors will communicate to the unit pass/fail portions of the scenario-based testing if applicable.

5.5.5.1.2. Bomber aircrew. Inspectors will assess (at a minimum) aircrew processing of posture, launch, execution, and termination Emergency Action Procedures via performance evaluation. Grade the evaluation as “Pass” or “Fail”, depending on aircrew taking the appropriate expected actions.
5.5.5.1.3. Dual-Capable Aircraft aircrew. Inspectors will assess (at a minimum) aircrew processing of recall and termination Emergency Action Procedures via performance evaluation. Grade the evaluation as “Pass” or “Fail”, depending on aircrew taking the appropriate expected actions.

5.5.5.1.4. Command post controllers. Inspectors will assess (at a minimum) a performance-based evaluation and an Emergency Action test as applicable IAW AFI 10-207, Command Posts testing standards. The assessment should include posture, launch, execution, message relay, message piecing, termination, emergency destruction and emergency evacuation procedures.

5.5.5.1.5. Missile combat crews. Inspectors will assess (at a minimum) a performance-based evaluation in the Missile Procedure Trainer covering preparatory actions, execution, and termination procedures. Rate the evaluation in accordance with AFGSCI 13-5301, Volume 2, Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) Crew Standardization and Evaluation. In the event an operational simulator is not available and a Nuclear Control Order Procedures scenario-based written test is administered, inspectors will administer tests to Missile Combat Crew Members as a crew.

5.5.5.2. Use Control. Evaluate Permissive Action Link/Code Management System, Command Disablement System, Weapons Render Safe and Continuation Procedures, Positive Enable System, Active Protection System and Emergency Destruction operations according to CJCS Instruction 3260.01, Joint Policy Governing Positive Control Material and Devices, Joint Nuclear Weapons Publication System Technical Orders, and applicable higher headquarters directives.

5.5.5.2.1. Inspect the execution of command disablement procedures and program management (as applicable) using a weapons trainer or a UT1500 Command Disable Trainer in accordance with AFI 21-205-C, Command Disable System (CDS).

5.5.5.2.2. MAJCOM IGs will evaluate nuclear-certified aircrew and Combat Mission Ready missile crew procedures for Positive Control Measure issue and/or alert changeover procedures.

5.5.5.2.3. Evaluate and ascertain Explosive Ordnance Disposal Direct-Support Units full-spectrum capability to render safe, mitigate explosive hazards, and prevent a nuclear yield. Confirm a team’s ability to perform these critical procedures by evaluation of weapons render safe procedures (technical operations) using Joint Nuclear Weapons Publication system technical orders, weapons trainers, UT1500 Command Disable Trainers, and supported weapons systems. Validate certification of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Direct-Support Units’ ability to conduct passive diagnostics and provide a comprehensive technical assessment of any supported weapons system and/or aerospace platform which may be involved in an accident.

5.5.5.2.4. Assess the proficiency of certified Intercontinental Ballistic Missile code controllers. The assessment consists of a performance-based evaluation of the Wing Codes Processing System, covering a complete Launch Facility Load Cartridge load or a Code Change Verifier load. Additionally, conduct a records audit of Launch Control Center and Launch Facility configuration records to validate the accurate installation of operational codes.
5.5.5.3. Nuclear Control Order Procedure and Use Control Rating System and Criteria

5.5.5.3.1. Assess the Nuclear Control Order Procedures MGA as UNACCEPTABLE if any CRITICAL deficiencies are assessed which would create the credible possibility of compromising safety or reliability of nuclear weapons.

5.5.5.3.2. Assess the Use Control MGA as UNACCEPTABLE if the unit fails to follow authorized procedures for receipt, storage, control, destruction and issue of sealed authenticators or Class 3 code management system/weapon coding equipment, resulting or potentially resulting in loss of positive inventory control, unauthorized destruction or unauthorized issue of required materials, or incorrect codes/documents being positioned/installed in weapons/weapon control panels.

5.5.5.3.3. Assess Nuclear Control Order Procedures or Use Control UNACCEPTABLE if an unsafe environment exists. An unsafe environment can result from deficiencies which could lead to physical damage to a weapon, unauthorized launch of a nuclear weapon system, or unauthorized arming or detonation of a weapon. Examples of an unsafe environment include, but are not limited to, missile crews or aircrews releasing/committing unexecuted or terminated weapon(s), missile crews or aircrews releasing/committing weapon(s) outside of specific times required by Emergency Action Procedures, controllers failing to properly process Emergency Action Procedures resulting in improper unlock of weapons, or controller teams failing to properly process Emergency Action Procedures.

5.5.5.3.4. Assess Nuclear Control Order Procedures or Use Control UNACCEPTABLE if an unreliable weapon exists. Unreliable weapons may result from deficiencies which could lead to a weapon not functioning as intended or not reaching its intended target. Examples of unreliable conditions may include, but are not limited to, missile crews or aircrews releasing/committing weapons(s) on incorrect targets, controller teams, missile crews or aircrews failing to properly relay execution/termination instructions in accordance with established procedures, missile crews or aircrews failing to release/commit weapon(s) when directed, missile crews or aircrews attempting to release/commit weapon(s) with incorrect or incomplete targeting data, or insertion of incorrect codes data into a nuclear weapon system, weapons control panel or weapons coding device.

5.5.6. Re-inspection. Re-inspect based on guidance in CJCS Instruction 3263.05.

5.5.6.1. On-the-spot re-inspection. Once the deficient areas are successfully re-inspected, Team Chiefs will grade applicable MGAs no higher than “UNACCEPTABLE (RE-INSPECTED to ACCEPTABLE)”.

5.5.6.2. Conducted re-inspections. In instances where on-the-spot re-inspection is not appropriate (as determined by the Team Chief) or re-inspected area(s) are not sufficiently corrected, the MAJCOM IG will schedule a re-inspection no later than 90 calendar days from termination of the Nuclear Surety Inspection. The Air Force Core Team will integrate with the MAJCOM IG team during re-inspections.

5.5.6.2.1. The Team Chief may assign MGA adjectival ratings. Unless a MGA was inspected to the same level/depth of a full-scale Nuclear Surety Inspection, adjectival
ratings should be limited to “ACCEPTABLE”, “MARGINAL”, or “UNACCEPTABLE”.

5.5.6.3. Once deficient areas are successfully re-inspected, the overall unit rating will either be “SATISFACTORY” or “UNSATISFACTORY (RE-INSPECTED to SATISFACTORY)”, as determined by the Team Chief.

5.5.7. **Nuclear Surety Inspection reporting.**

5.5.7.1. MAJCOM IGs will produce a Nuclear Surety Inspection report in the prescribed timeline in *Chapter 1* of this instruction and distribute the report to the applicable Pertinent Oversight Authorities listed on the SAF/IGI SharePoint site.

5.5.7.2. If non-surety deficiencies are discovered during a Nuclear Surety Inspection, the inspection Team Chief will brief the inspected unit commander of the findings and document via the MAJCOM’s UEI continual evaluation reporting mechanism. In general, deficiencies are categorized as non-surety if the deficiency’s referenced policy is not a primary nuclear policy document nor a supplement to a primary nuclear policy document.

5.5.8. **Actions on DTRA Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection Oversight Inspections.**

5.5.8.1. Throughout the conduct of Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection Oversights, the MAJCOM IG team will meet with the DTRA team to discuss inspection activities and potential deficiencies.

5.5.8.2. MAJCOM IGs will address Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection Oversight-report identified deficiencies during the annual DTRA-hosted symposium, or sooner if otherwise directed. Courtesy copy SAF/IGI for responses to DTRA Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection Oversight report deficiencies.
Chapter 6

OVERSIGHT INSPECTIONS

6.1. General information. The AFIA Commander will perform oversight assessments to provide independent validation and verification of Air Force inspections and promote standardization across the enterprise.

6.2. Purpose. The AFIA Commander provides feedback to SAF/IG, MAJCOM Commanders, and IGs on the efficiency, effectiveness, and consistency of MAJCOM IG teams’ conduct and adherence to policy. Feedback is derived from observation of inspection planning, execution, and reporting. Additionally, the AFIA/CC provides feedback to SAF/IGI on inspection policy effectiveness and areas for possible updates. Finally, AFIA/CC shares identified best practices via feedback during oversight inspections.

6.3. Roles and responsibilities.

6.3.1. The AFIA Commander will:

6.3.1.1. Inspect each MAJCOM IG team conducting inspections of all types over a 24-36 month period. The AFIA/CC will selectively determine which non-nuclear inspections/inspection events will receive an oversight inspection.

6.3.1.2. Conduct oversight inspections at all Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection Oversight Inspections. Additionally, AFIA may conduct nuclear oversight inspections at all other nuclear inspections as determined by a risk-based sampling strategy recommendation based on enterprise continual evaluation and nomination. The MAJCOM/CC is the approval authority for risked-based oversight inspections with coordination through SAF/IG, AF/A10, and the applicable MAJCOM staff.

6.3.1.3. Coordinate each visit with the respective MAJCOM IG and Gatekeeper, and honor the IG trusted agent system (see Attachment 1) to protect the minimum or no-notice aspect of the inspection.

6.3.1.4. Send an official notification message to the MAJCOM IG Gatekeeper informing them of the planned AFIA oversight inspection. Include the Oversight Team Chief and Project Officer names, oversight team size, and request for MAJCOM inspection team information and deliverables in the message.

6.3.1.5. Send a message to the inspected unit point of contact and MAJCOM inspection team planner delineating Oversight Team work center, network access, and logistic support requirements for the inspection.

6.3.1.6. Immediately notify the MAJCOM IG Team Chief if the Oversight Team detects any IG activity which could negatively impact safety, security of personnel/weapons, or validity of inspection results.

6.3.2. MAJCOM IGs will:

6.3.2.1. Provide Oversight inspectors access to inspection planning documents to include any deliverables requested from the inspected unit, current inspection Schedules of Events, IGEMS for the inspection (view only), approved simulations and deviations, MAJCOM
IG team composition/qualification/training, and any other deliverables requested in accordance with the Oversight notification message NLT 30 days prior to the inspection.

6.3.2.2. Allow Oversight inspectors to be present for inspection-related meetings with the inspected unit, daily IG team meetings, deficiency validations sessions, and/or correspondence with the inspected unit and/or Pertinent Oversight Authorities.

6.3.2.3. Immediately notify the Oversight Team of changes to the Schedule of Events or approved simulations and deviations.

6.3.2.4. Immediately notify the Oversight Team Chief of any potential CRITICAL deficiencies.

6.3.2.5. Notify the Oversight Team Chief when the final inspection report is available in the appropriate version of IGEMS.

6.4. Oversight inspection methodology.

6.4.1. The AFIA/OV Team Chief will in-brief the MAJCOM IG team and the inspected unit on AFIA/OV’s role in the inspection process. The AFIA/OV Team Chief will provide a complete out-brief of oversight observations and findings to the MAJCOM IG Team Chief at the conclusion of the inspection. AFIA/OV will provide:

6.4.1.1. An independent perspective of the inspected unit’s nuclear surety (nuclear inspections only).

6.4.1.2. An independent perspective of the inspected unit’s Commander’s Inspection Program.

6.4.2. AFIA/OV inspectors are authorized to intervene in an inspection for reasons of personnel safety, security, or real-world critical non-compliance if the MAJCOM IGs fail to take appropriate actions to correct the situation, or if the safety, security, or reliability of War Reserve Material is in jeopardy.

6.5. Oversight inspection Major Graded Areas. The Oversight Inspection does not assign ratings to IG teams; instead, oversight observations and findings are binned into six MGAs:

6.5.1. Planning. Assess MAJCOM IG coordination of inspection support requirements with the inspected unit; development, coordination and sufficiency of the Schedule of Events; proper coordination and approval of simulations and deviations; relevant and realistic exercise plans; inclusion of applicable Special Interest Items; use of performance data and remote sampling to build a sound risk-based sampling strategy; inclusion of CJCS Instruction 3263.05 and/or inspection requirements in this instruction.

6.5.2. Execution. Assess adherence and coordination of updates to Schedule of Events; awareness of safety, health and security requirements; application of risk management issues; internal inspection team communication and communication with the inspected unit; adequacy of exercise control, pre-briefs, identifying lessons learned and overall execution.

6.5.3. Quality. Assess completeness and quality of MAJCOM-specific inspector training, completion of required training for core inspectors and inspection augmentees, appropriate documentation of inspector qualifications, and professionalism of IG conduct.
6.5.4. **Standardization.** Assess IG team implementation of and adherence to policy and guidance; inspector functional expertise and knowledge of inspection requirements; standardization of event pre-brief and interview techniques; knowledge of/adherence to approved simulations and deviations; task evaluations realistic, relevant and appropriately vetted; random selection of unit personnel for performance-based evaluations.

6.5.5. **Objectivity.** Assess sufficiency of MAJCOM IG deliberative processes; thoroughness and compliance of scoring/rating methodology; objectivity of decision making; sufficiency and effectiveness of unit and MAJCOM Functional Manager validation processes; accuracy and objectivity of MAJCOM Functional Manager guidance clarifications.

6.5.6. **Thoroughness.** Assess complete and accurate documentation of inspection findings, benchmarks, and repeat deficiencies; proper coordination and validation of deficiencies external to the MAJCOM; timeliness and completeness of final inspection report; sufficiency of MAJCOM IG follow-up to include tracking/closure of CRITICAL, SIGNIFICANT and repeat Nuclear Surety Inspection MINOR deficiencies and proper submission of Corrective Action Plans to higher headquarter agencies as applicable (validate based on previous inspection, same type).

6.6. **Oversight inspection report.** Upon inspection conclusion, the Oversight Team Chief will publish a separate non-collaborative report, summarizing MAJCOM IG performance and conduct of the inspection. Specific areas to be addressed in each report include:

6.6.1. Concurrence or non-concurrence with the MAJCOM IG overall assessment.

6.6.2. Summary of IG performance and oversight findings binned against the oversight MGAs.

6.6.3. Contentious issues.

6.6.4. Identified inspection policy issues or significant mission shortfalls or benchmarks.

6.6.5. Training, qualification and composition of the MAJCOM inspection team (to include inspection augmentees).

6.6.6. The Oversight Team Chief will provide the MAJCOM IG the opportunity to rebut or clarify oversight inspection findings prior to publishing the final report.

6.6.7. AFIA/OV will route the completed inspection report through the AFIA Commander and SAF/IG to the MAJCOM Commander and MAJCOM IG, then publish in the appropriate version of IGEMS.
Chapter 7

JOINT BASE INSPECTIONS

7.1. General information.

7.1.1. Definitions.

7.1.1.1. A “Joint Base” is an installation where a lead Service Component manages and provides installation support services for two or more bases as directed.

7.1.1.2. The “Supporting Component” is the component responsible for providing installation support for the Joint Base and geographically-separated locations and functions which transferred via a Joint Base Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) from one or more supported components. The Air Force is the Supporting Component at Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, Joint Base Charleston, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Joint Base San Antonio, and Joint Base Langley-Eustis.

7.1.1.3. The “Supported Components” are the components identified as transferring installation support functions to another component at a Joint Base. For Joint Bases where the Air Force is the Supporting Component, Active and Reserve Army, Navy, Marine Corps and other non-Air Force DoD units on the Joint Base are considered Supported Components. On non-Air Force led Joint Bases, Regular Air Force and AFRC units residing on the installation are considered part of the Supported Component.

7.1.1.4. A “Tenant” (in relation to a Joint Base) is defined as any DoD or non-DoD unit or organization at a Joint Base not specifically attached to the Joint Base Command. National Guard units are tenants on Joint Bases. Working Capital Fund units not performing installation management functions are also classified as tenants.

7.1.1.5. “Installation Support” functions are categories of base operations support activities identified in the Joint Base Implementation Guide.

7.1.1.6. “Joint Base Implementation Guidance” (also titled “Department of Defense Initial Guidance for Base Realignment and Closure 2005 Joint Basing Implementation”) is the primary joint basing guidance document, which outlines implementation guidance and responsibilities. In addition to this document, additional supplemental guidance documents and memoranda exist to address issues and functions not covered in the Joint Base Implementation Guide.

7.1.1.7. Joint Base MOAs are the binding documents for each Joint Base and describe the organizational structures, resourcing, output levels, dispute resolutions and other agreements developed between the Components. The Joint Base Implementation Plan is included in each MOA. MOAs define the relationships between Components and commit Supporting Components to deliver approved output levels. Other support agreements are possible at the local level and fall under the following categories:

7.1.1.7.1. Intra-Service agreements (Air Force to Air Force, to include AFRC and ANG)

7.1.1.7.2. Inter-service (Air Force to other DoD Components)
7.1.1.7.3. Intra-governmental agreements (Air Force to other non-DoD Federal activities)

7.1.1.7.4. Agreements supporting Air Force to other non-Federal activities (excluding private or commercial enterprises)

7.1.2. Reference Information. Joint Basing information (to include the Joint Base Implementation Guide, supplemental guidance, and categories of installation support) are included in OSD guidance and may be found at https://www.milsuite.mil/wiki/Joint_Basing.

7.2. Roles and responsibilities.

7.2.1. **SAF/IGI.** Works with other Service IG(s) and the Intermediate Command Summit to address issues which negatively impact Air Force processes, equipment and/or personnel but are not “owned” by the Air Force (due to transfer of installation support responsibilities), once up-channeled by AFIA and/or the MAJCOM IG Team Chief and captured in an IG report.

7.2.2. **MAJCOM IG:**

7.2.2.1. Develops MAJCOM-specific Joint Base inspection guidance in the MAJCOM supplement to this instruction (as required).

7.2.2.2. Ensures any non-Air Force issues which affect Air Force unit compliance discovered through inspection are addressed in the report and passed to SAF/IGI for resolution. The Team Chief will debrief issues to the senior Air Force leadership at the inspected unit and the senior Supporting Component leadership at the inspected installation.

7.3. Command relationships, base organization, and installation support.

7.3.1. The Joint Base commander has the authority and responsibility to effectively use available resources for planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling the delivery of Installation Support as detailed in the MOA. The Joint Base Commander exercises the authority traditionally associated with the installation commander on non-Joint Base Air Force installations, has authority and control over Joint Base real property, and is responsible for directing installation management and support functions in accordance with the MOA and established requirements.

7.3.2. There may be instances in which the Joint Base Commander’s authority and the authority of other commanders on the installation are concurrent. Unlike other commanders on the installation, the authority of the Joint Base Commander extends to the entire installation by virtue of his or her position as the installation commander. A list of authorities and responsibilities assumed by the Joint Base Commander are set out in the Joint Base specific MOA.

7.4. Inspection methodology.

7.4.1. Only the Supporting Component shall conduct inspections of Installation Support activities unless otherwise documented in the Joint Base-specific MOA or previously coordinated with the Supporting Component IG. (T-0)

7.4.2. If the Supporting Component provides an installation support function at a Joint Base for which it does not have the required inspection expertise, the Supporting IG will either seek
augmentation from the applicable Supported Component or obtain qualification to inspect the activity. (T-0)

7.4.3. Mission partners work through the Joint Base Partnership Council if inspections require Joint Base Installation Support or tasks from embedded military Joint Base Installation Support personnel. Mission partners will comply with the Joint Base workforce availability policy as described in the specific Joint Base MOA. (T-0)

7.4.4. With the exception of Joint Base Installation Support functions, Air Force IGs will inspect Airmen using Air Force inspection requirements whether the Air Force is the Supporting or Supported Component at the Joint Base. (T-2) When inspecting Joint Base Installation Support functions, the inspection standards stem from MOA. When inspecting Joint Base responsibilities, structure, and governance, the inspection standards follow OSD policy. Where there is no Joint Base guidance or policy, the Supporting Component's policies and procedures apply.

7.4.5. Air Force Wing Commanders on a Joint Base will administer Commander’s Inspection Program in accordance with Chapter 2 of this instruction. (T-2)

7.4.6. Joint Base Wing IGs will make every effort to ensure MAJCOM Gatekeepers are kept apprised of other service inspection activities on the installation. (T-2) Wing IGs will also ensure other Service leadership at Joint Bases are kept apprised of installation Air Force inspection activities. (T-3)

7.4.7. At Joint Base locations where the Air Force is the Supporting Component, Joint Base Wing IGs will inspect the Emergency Management program in accordance with Table A2.1 of this instruction. Invite Supported Components to participate in appropriate local exercises.

7.4.8. At Joint Base locations where another Service is the Supporting Component, the owning MAJCOM will develop specific criteria for the lead Regular Air Force unit in accordance with the unit’s role (if any) in the installation Emergency Management program. Air Force units will participate in Joint Base exercises in accordance with unit commander’s intent. (T-3)

7.5. Inspection Rating. Authors of final Air Force reports may provide an assessment of how other services’ installation support impacts the Air Force mission but will not deliver a rating to other services.
Chapter 8

OTHER INSPECTIONS

8.1. General information. Some compliance focus areas require detailed and specific inspection guidance derived from statutory above-Air Force requirements. Air Force senior leaders rely on the findings associated with these areas to facilitate a holistic approach to evaluating Air Force organizations.

8.2. The Air Force Special Interest Item program. Special Interest Items provide a means to gather data in order to evaluate the status of corrective actions regarding specific programs and conditions in the field based on risk to the Air Force mission (e.g., Arming Use of Force Implementation, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response). SecAF, CSAF, or HAF Functional Area Managers may sponsor Special Interest Items. There should be no more than five active Special Interest Items at any given time.

8.2.1. Roles and responsibilities.

8.2.1.1. Special Interest Item sponsors:

8.2.1.1.1. Will ensure proper coordination is accomplished with Pertinent Oversight Authorities (to include ARC) prior to submitting a proposed Air Force Special Interest Item to SAF/IGI for development. Special Interest Item sponsors should contact SAF/IGI as soon as they determine an Air Force Special Interest Item may be appropriate for the issue under consideration.

8.2.1.1.2. Send Special Interest Item nominations to SAF/IGI via workflow message (usaf.pentagon.saf-ig.mbx.saf-igi-workflow@mail.mil).

8.2.1.1.3. Will provide a Special Interest Item point of contact. The Special Interest Item point of contact will contact SAF/IGI to receive appropriate IGEMS training to access inspection findings for Special Interest Items.

8.2.1.2. SAF/IG: Briefs SecAF/CSAF on Special Interest Item content/intent before the Special Interest Item is executed and notifies MAJCOM Commanders when a Special Interest Item is ready for execution.

8.2.1.3. SAF/IGI:

8.2.1.3.1. Coordinates Air Force Special Interest Item topic proposals and obtains SAF/IG approval, distributes approved Air Force Special Interest Items to MAJCOM IGs, and trains the sponsoring agency to assess Special Interest Item data.

8.2.1.3.2. Assesses potential Special Interest Items for impact on the nuclear enterprise.

8.2.1.3.3. Will provide Special Interest Item notification and instructions to MAJCOM IGs.

8.2.1.4. MAJCOM IGs:

8.2.1.4.1. Notify all subordinate units/organizations (including gained ARC units) of the Special Interest Item requirements as soon as possible following publication of the Special Interest Item.
8.2.1.4.2. Evaluate all active Special Interest Items during formal inspections and document the results of Special Interest Item inspections as a separate section of final inspection reports in IGEMS. Units not receiving a MAJCOM IG inspection or continual evaluation event during the active period of the Special Interest Item will conduct a one-time inspection in IGEMS on the Special Interest Item topic in accordance with the instructions accompanying the Special Interest Item. (T-1)

8.2.2. Rating. Normally, inspectors should not rate/grade Special Interest Items; the Special Interest Item is for gathering data for analysis and action (as necessary). If a rating is required as part of the Special Interest Item, the Special Interest Item sponsor will specify the requirement in the Special Interest Item instructions.

8.3. MAJCOM Command Interest Items. MAJCOM Commanders may wish to establish MAJCOM-unique procedures to gather data and/or place emphasis on particular programs via Command Interest Items.

8.3.1. De-confliction. MAJCOM IGs will ensure MAJCOM Command Interest Items do not conflict with Air Force Special Interest Items.

8.3.2. Cross-MAJCOM coordination. In cases where a lead MAJCOM needs to issue a Command Interest Item to other MAJCOMs, the lead MAJCOM IG should coordinate with those applicable MAJCOMs, recommending each MAJCOM Commander issue that Command Interest Item. If unsuccessful, the lead MAJCOM IG may consult SAF/IG and the HAF Functional Area Manager for consideration of issuing a Special Interest Item to satisfy functional requirements.

8.4. Self-Assessment Communicator Fragmentary Order. The Air Force Inspection System gives HAF Functional Area Managers a responsive capability to receive validated/verified data directly from units using MICT via the SAC Fragmentary Order. This mechanism is an order from the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff (VCSAF) to MAJCOM Commanders and subordinates to complete a specified SAC in MICT for a high-priority (often time-sensitive) requirement. HAF Functional Area Managers should contact SAF/IGI for assistance in formatting the SAC Fragmentary Order prior to submitting a request for VCSAF approval and subsequent transmission through normal coordination channels.

8.5. Directed Inspections. Directed Inspections are high-priority inspections normally executed by AFIA and/or SAF/IG personnel. SAF/IG may request assistance from MAJCOM IGs via commanders if necessary to conduct these inspections. The Directed Inspection is usually time-sensitive and deficiencies and recommendations are of significant interest to the Air Force, Congress, and/or the general public. A MAJCOM Commander may direct the MAJCOM IG to perform a Directed Inspection when necessary or may request AFIA assistance.

8.6. Federal Recognition Inspections. Gaining MAJCOM IGs will conduct Federal Recognition Inspections of state units when a unit is being considered for federal recognition or when tasked to do so by NGB/IG. Contact NGB/IG for instructions at usaf_jbanafw.ngb-ig_list.inspections@mail.mil.

8.7. Wounded, Ill, and Injured Facility Inspections. Wounded, Ill and Injured Facility Inspections ensure support for Recovering Service Members and their families when the Recovering Service Member has been wounded, or injured or has an illness that prevents him or her from providing that support. Wing IGs will conduct Wounded, Ill, and Injured facility
inspections, as per National Defense Authorization Act FY2008, House of Representatives Record 4986, Section 1662, Access of Recovering Service Members to Adequate Outpatient Residential Facilities and in accordance with Attachment 8 of this instruction. (T-0) Commanders will ensure Wounded, Ill, and Injured Facility Inspections are conducted as a separate, distinct inspection providing a separate inspection report using a 3-tier rating scale: IN COMPLIANCE, IN COMPLIANCE WITH COMMENTS, or NOT IN COMPLIANCE. Refer to Attachment 8 of this instruction for specific requirements for Wounded, Ill, and Injured Facility Inspections.

8.8. Cemetery inspections. DoD requires annual inspections of cemeteries under Air Force jurisdiction which are identified as active or closed cemeteries in AFI 34-501, Mortuary Affairs Program (see Table 8.1). Inspections of privately-owned or historical cemeteries are not required. The closest-assigned Wing IG will annually (24 months for ARC Wings) inspect active or closed cemeteries as part of the Commander’s Inspection Program. (T-0) Wing IGs will use inspection criteria in AFI 34-501 for assessment and document the inspection and findings in IGEMS. (T-1) Wing IGs will forward copies of the final report to the installation commander and AFIA no later than 10 duty days after inspection report is signed. (T-2) MAJCOM IGs may inspect installation cemeteries during on-site inspections.

### Table 8.1. List of Cemeteries and MAJCOM Responsible for Inspection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Installation</th>
<th>MAJCOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offutt AFB, NE</td>
<td>ACC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE Warren AFB, WY</td>
<td>AFGSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Academy</td>
<td>AFIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairchild AFB, WA</td>
<td>AMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volk Field, WI</td>
<td>ANG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.9. Radioactive Material Permit Inspection. A qualified Radioactive Material inspector will conduct Radioactive Material permit inspections as required by DoDI 6055.08, Occupational Ionizing Radiation Protection Program, Air Force Policy Directive 40-2, Radioactive Materials (Non-Nuclear Weapons), conditions of the USAF Master Materials License issued by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to the Department of the Air Force, and other Master Materials License documents. AFIA will send inspection reports pertaining to NRC-regulated materials to the NRC, the Radioisotope Committee (RIC), the applicable MAJCOM IG and Surgeon General, the permittee, and the permittee’s Wing (or equivalent) IG. AFIA will provide quarterly and annual status reports of inspections (including violation trends) to the RIC.

8.9.1. Radioactive Material inspector qualifications. The AFIA Commander will designate qualified Radioactive Material inspectors. In addition to the requirements in Chapter 11 and Attachment 11 of this instruction, inspectors will attend the appropriate NRC training courses prior to conducting corresponding permit inspections. Additional inspector qualifications are pursuant to RIC policies corresponding to the conditions of the USAF Master Material License or consistent with NRC policies.

8.9.2. Frequency. Inspection frequency is determined by the RIC Secretariat. AFIA will inspect Radioactive Material Permits within a frequency range consistent with the most recent criteria set forth in the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 2800, Materials Inspection Program.
AFIA will ensure Unannounced NRC-led inspections are coordinated with the appropriate agencies.

8.9.3. Methodology. AFIA will inspect units issued a Radioactive Material Permit under the Master Materials License. The Radioactive Material Permit Inspection serves as an independent compliance and risk-based performance assessment of each permit and governing federal regulations. Inspectors will conduct inspections in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual, Chapter 2800 and applicable program-specific NRC Inspection Procedures. Radioactive Material permit inspections will assess permit compliance with applicable federal regulations, conditions of the current permit, and pre-inspection of permits requiring increased controls subject to 10 Code of Federal Regulation Part 37. Radioactive Material inspectors will also conduct Special Emphasis Item inspections and support inspection of sites containing 91(a) or 91(b) material (as requested).

8.9.3.1. Remote Radioactive Material Permit Inspections may only be conducted telephonically or remotely when visual verification of the material is not required by inspectors (i.e. permit termination granted by the RIC).

8.9.3.2. Inspectors will not ask Radioactive Material personnel to perform any unnecessary hazardous task, any task in contradiction to permit conditions or federal regulations, or any task with the potential to disrupt operational activities.

8.9.3.3. During the course of a Radioactive Material permit inspection, if a procedure or practice is determined to be Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health, Radioactive Material inspectors may require the permittee to temporarily cease Radioactive Material operations (Stop Action) until corrective action is taken and the concern has been mitigated. Contact the RIC as soon as practicable if Stop Actions occur.

8.9.3.4. Radioactive Material inspectors will issue violations consistent with the categories defined in the NRC Enforcement Manual and Policy (MINOR, Non-Cited, and Severity Levels I through IV). Radioactive Material inspectors will notify the RIC immediately when a Severity Level I-III violation is suspected or issued.

8.9.3.5. Radioactive Material inspectors should conduct an exit meeting with the permittee and/or Permit Radiation Safety Officer consistent with NRC Inspection Policy. In cases where the inspection results in potential Severity Level I-III violations, an exit meeting with the permittee is mandatory. In these situations, inspectors will contact the RIC prior to the exit meeting.

8.9.3.6. Radioactive Material inspectors will assign a rating of either “Compliant” or “Not Fully Compliant” in the final report. Radioactive Material inspectors will issue a final inspection report and assign ratings within a time period commensurate with the UEI Capstone process. This includes using IGEMS to assign deficiencies (as per the NRC Enforcement Manual and Policy) for tracking and closure of all Radioactive Material permit inspection violations.

8.10. By-Law inspections. By-Law inspections are specific program inspections required by higher-than Air Force policy or authority (or as directed by SecAF/CSAF) and result in a report signed by SAF/IG.
8.10.1. **Frequency.** Wing IGs will conduct By-Law inspections on a fiscal year-basis (unless required more frequently by higher headquarters) regardless of AFI or higher reporting guidance. (T-1) Wing IGs will complete inspections by 30 September and finalize reports on or before the end of October annually. (T-1) Identify any issues with meeting these timelines to SAF/IG by 15 September to determine if an extension is possible. If a MAJCOM fails to reach 100 percent By-Law inspection completion by 30 September, the MAJCOM IG (with MAJCOM/CC endorsement) will document the deficiency. The deficient Wing will provide a Corrective Action Plan via memorandum to SAF/IG by 15 October. (T-1) SAF/IG will make this endorsement available to AFIA for inclusion in the appropriate By-Law Report(s).

8.10.2. **Methodology.** IGs will use appropriate SMEs to accomplish By-Law inspections using program guidance referenced in Attachment 2 of this instruction. (T-0) Include an evaluation of program manager support to any tenant organizations they are responsible for to ensure adequate support is being given to those organizations.

8.10.2.1. MAJCOM IGs will provide feedback on timeliness of By-Law report submissions by sending the Quarterly Consolidated By-Law report to respective Wing Commanders and IGs. MAJCOM IGs will review IGEMS reports monthly for lagging Wing inspection requirements and should determine if and when additional interaction is required. By-Law extract data is provided monthly via IGEMS “AF Level Reports” and the IGEMS SharePoint site for MAJCOM and Wing IGs to validate inspection status.

8.10.2.2. IGs will input validated By-Law data into the respective section within the By-Law header in IGEMS for each program separately using the format found in the “By-Law Checklist-Users Guide” link on the IGEMS site. (T-1) Host wings accomplishing By-Law inspections for tenant units per Host-Tenant Support Agreement/MOU will document inspection results in the tenant unit’s parent wing report to facilitate proper By-Law reporting in IGEMS and oversight by the appropriate wing IG. (T-1)

8.10.2.3. MAJCOM IGs may credit the Wing IG for By-Law inspections if the MAJCOM IG accomplished an adequate inspection of the program(s). Notify the Wing IG of this action to prevent duplication of effort.

8.10.3. **Grading.** IGs must grade By-Laws using a four-tier rating scale: IN COMPLIANCE, IN COMPLIANCE WITH COMMENTS, NOT IN COMPLIANCE, or NOT GRADED. (T-0) NOT GRADED is only used by higher headquarters to indicate By-Law programs were validated and verified but were not holistically inspected.

8.10.4. **Re-inspection.** IGs must re-inspect any program(s) which receive(s) a rating of NOT IN COMPLIANCE within 90 calendar days (180 calendar days for ARC); the program(s) will also be inspected during the next on-site inspection by the next-level IG. (T-2)
Chapter 9

INSPECTION FINDINGS MANAGEMENT

9.1. Purpose. IGs will ensure inspection reports document primary and non-primary inspection activity findings, including safety, surety, or issues of military discipline. (T-1) These concerns may directly affect an overall inspection rating at the discretion of the inspection Team Chief (with the exception of Nuclear Surety Inspections). Recommended Improvement Areas are used to identify areas where a more efficient or effective course of action is available. Do not use Recommended Improvement Areas to document procedural deviations or non-compliance. Attachment 9 of this instruction contains IGEMs and MICT guidance.

9.2. Self-identified findings. To accomplish the goal of fostering a culture of critical self-assessment, continuous improvement, and to reduce reliance on external inspection teams, trust between commanders, Airmen, and the IG is paramount. This trust begins with the shared goal of improving the unit’s effectiveness. A key component to building and sustaining trust in the Air Force Inspection System is creating an environment where Airmen feel they can safely report the truth with accuracy and integrity. Airmen need to understand command chains and commanders' IG teams expect honest and accurate reporting. IGs at all levels will not duplicate deficiencies or observations which are already entered into IGEMS, MICT, or other self-assessment documentation/tracking methods by the inspected organization, provided the inspected organization has correctly identified the nature, validity, and severity of the deficiency and is actively working towards required corrective action. (T-2)

9.3. Validation. MAJCOM and Wing IGs will establish and document a validation process providing the inspected unit or the organization with the deficiency an opportunity to clarify any findings identified during the inspection in a timely manner. (T-1) Prior to the inspection being finalized, inspectors will coordinate with the inspected unit and the appropriate Pertinent Oversight Authority on CRITICAL and SIGNIFICANT deficiencies identified during the inspection and document collaboration in IGEMS. (T-1)

9.3.1. External Validation. When an IG determines the need for external validation of a finding, inspectors will corroborate findings with the appropriate SME at the lowest possible level. (T-3) SMEs will consult with the appropriate HAF Functional Area Managers if they require interpretation of Air Force (or higher) policy. The author of a validated CRITICAL or SIGNIFICANT higher headquarters deficiency will include the name and contact information of the individual who validated the deficiency, a description of whether the deficiency was accepted, and any concerns from the validating official in IGEMS. (T-1) Once validated, the associated Pertinent Oversight Authority is responsible for assisting with deficiency resolution. The MAJCOM IG (AFIA/ID for HAF/FOA/DRU deficiencies) will assist the Pertinent Oversight Authority in tracking the deficiency and notifying the inspecting IG when the deficiency is closed.

9.3.2. Deficiency severity determination. SMEs should clarify policy and procedures or validate whether an observed condition or action does or does not comply with policy. Responsibility to determine severity and mission impact of the deficiency resides with the IG.

9.4. Deficiencies external to the inspected unit. When an IG is considering writing a deficiency against an external organization, the inspecting IG Team Chief will notify the external agency IG
or SME of the potential deficiency and validation details. (T-1) Once validated, the external agency IG or SME is responsible for tracking status and notifying the inspecting IG when the corrective action plan has been implemented for closure consideration. Responsibility to resolve deficiencies resides with the SME, not the IG. However, the IG may support (as requested).

9.5. Format. IGs will ensure findings include:

9.5.1. A unique tracking number. (T-1)

9.5.2. The deficiency and contextual facts in sufficient detail necessary to clearly convey the issue requiring resolution. (T-1) The written description alone should be adequate for the inspected organization to begin corrective action planning.

9.5.3. Reference to the applicable instruction, technical order, or other source documentation from which the requirement is derived. (T-1)

9.5.4. A severity (CRITICAL, SIGNIFICANT, or MINOR) based on impact to the organization’s mission. (T-1)

9.5.5. The corrective action Office of Primary Responsibility charged with resolving the deficiency and any Offices of Coordinating Responsibility. (T-1) The servicing manpower activity may facilitate developing local corrective action plans.

9.5.6. For deficiencies involving host/tenant organizations outside the inspected unit’s chain of command or non-Air Force entities, categorize as higher headquarters/Support Agency Deficiencies. (T-1)

9.5.7. The functional area for all findings to enable functional analysis and feedback. (T-1)

9.6. Deficiency corrective actions and closure.

9.6.1. MAJCOM Pertinent Oversight Authorities are the Corrective Action Plan approval and deficiency closure authority for CRITICAL, SIGNIFICANT and Nuclear Surety Inspection repeat MINOR deficiencies documented via MAJCOM inspections. For all other deficiencies, Commanders will determine the appropriate level of corrective action plan approval and deficiency closure at the lowest appropriate command-level. (T-1) Commanders will ensure Root-Cause Analysis is completed for all deficiencies using the problem-solving approach/tool and level of effort best suited to the situation. (T-1)

9.6.2. Corrective action plans include Root-Cause(s), Deficiency Cause Codes assigned from Attachment 9 of this instruction, countermeasures, corrective action plan Offices of Primary Responsibility, and estimated closure dates. Corrective action plans are required for CRITICAL, SIGNIFICANT and Nuclear Surety Inspection repeat MINOR deficiencies; IGs will ensure this data is documented in IGEMS. (T-1) The corrective action plan approval authority must approve, modify or reject (with associated constructive comments) within 15 calendar days of receipt (30 calendar days for ARC units). (T-1)

9.6.3. MAJCOM IGs will provide the inspected unit with reply instructions. The inspected unit will provide associated corrective action plans to MAJCOM IGs and the Pertinent Oversight Authority Office of Primary Responsibility no later than 45 calendar days (90 calendar days for ARC units) after being assigned in IGEMS. (T-1)

9.6.4. The Deficiency Cause Codes listed in Attachment 9 of this instruction apply to all inspections. Corrective action plan Offices of Primary Responsibility will assign any
Deficiency Cause Codes required to describe the deficiency (use only one Root Cause per deficiency). (T-1)

9.6.5. Wing Commanders will ensure MINOR deficiencies assessed during an external inspection and non-adequacy Commander’s Inspection Program deficiencies are closed at or below the Wing-level. (T-1) Wing Commanders will determine closure authority for Wing-identified deficiencies. (T-3) The Wing Commander (or delegated authority) should close deficiencies when corrective action plans are fully implemented and validated.

9.6.6. Corrective action plan Offices of Primary Responsibility will report status of open deficiencies requiring MAJCOM IG tracking to the MAJCOM IG quarterly. (T-2)

9.6.7. MAJCOM IGs may close the deficiency when the corrective action plan is entered in IGEMS, is fully implemented, and the results of the plan have been validated by the appropriate-level IG.

9.6.8. MAJCOM IGs will validate corrective action plans prior to closing deficiencies assessed against the MAJCOM.

9.6.9. Deficiencies should be closed within 12 months (18 months for ARC).

9.6.10. In instances where corrective action responsibility is assigned to both a host and tenant unit (or supported and supporting unit), IGs will assign an Office of Primary Responsibility and an Office of Coordinating Responsibility to correct the identified deficiencies. (T-1)

9.6.11. Wing and MAJCOM IGs will use IGEMS to assign HAF-level deficiencies to the HAF Functional Directorate and identify AFIA and any affected Pertinent Oversight Authorities as Offices of Coordinating Responsibility. (T-1) The agency validating the deficiency is the MAJCOM’s lead for deficiency resolution and supports the HAF-level Office of Primary Responsibility in deficiency resolution. Offices of Primary Responsibility will upload Corrective Action Plans in IGEMS with enough detail to evaluate whether to close the deficiency or retain. AFIA is the closure authority for HAF-level deficiencies in IGEMS.

9.6.12. Adequacy deficiency Offices of Primary Responsibility will provide associated Corrective Action Plans to MAJCOM IGs and AFIA/ID no later than 45 calendar days (90 calendar days for ARC) after assigned in IGEMS. (T-1) Recommended Improvement Areas under the Adequacy MGA must be officially acknowledged via any recorded method by the assigned Office of Primary Responsibility in reply to the applicable IG, but no definitive action or follow up is required.

9.6.13. In accordance with Safety procedures, coordination with the Safety Office which validated a deficiency is required prior to closing out a Safety deficiency. (T-1)

9.7. Benchmarks. A Benchmark is a process, procedure, or activity which clearly establishes a superior standard of service or performance. Benchmarks have a high potential to apply to a broader organizational spectrum than where the process, program, or technique was originally employed. IG teams process benchmarks as follows:

9.7.1. Any inspector may identify potential benchmarks during the normal course of conducting inspections. The author of a benchmark will include the name and contact information of the individual at the applicable Pertinent Oversight Authority for the submission, a description of whether the benchmark was accepted, and any concerns in
IGEMS. After the IG Team Chief approves a benchmark, it becomes part of the final inspection report.

9.7.2. Units or individuals who developed benchmarks identified by IGs may further submit them for formal approval through the Airmen Powered by Innovation process outlined in AFI 38-402, *Airmen Powered by Innovation and Suggestion Program*. 
Chapter 10

THE AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM GOVERNANCE PROCESS

10.1. Purpose. The governance process is executed by the four groups shown in Figure 10.1. The charter contained in Attachment 10 of this instruction outlines the function of each of these groups and contains detailed duties and functions. Additionally, two MAJCOM-level venues facilitate oversight of inspection findings and corrective actions to provide inputs to the governance process.

Figure 10.1. Air Force Inspection System Governance Process.

10.1.1. The Quarterly Inspection Working Group is chaired by the MAJCOM IG (delegable no lower than the MAJCOM Deputy IG). Members include Wing IGs and MAJCOM Deputy Directors (NGB/IGD for ANG), and special staff. At a minimum, discuss negative trends identified at the command or unit levels, SIGNIFICANT, CRITICAL and Nuclear Surety repeat MINOR deficiencies, and recommendations for the Inspection System Council.

10.1.2. The Semi-Annual Inspection Council is chaired by the MAJCOM Commander or MAJCOM/CV (delegable no lower than a Director). The Chair directs participating members (to include Wing Commanders, ANGRC/CV, HQ Directors and Special Staff, and others). At a minimum, the council agenda will include inspection results, trends and recommended actions. MAJCOM IGs will brief the status of SIGNIFICANT and CRITICAL adequacy deficiencies.

10.2. Process to change the List of Authorized Inspections (Attachment 2) or Mandatory Inspection Requirements (Attachments 2 and 3).

10.2.1. Air Force agencies. Should submit requests to change, add, or remove an inspection activity listed in Attachment 2 or an inspection requirement listed in Attachment 3 to the appropriate HAF Functional Area Manager for coordination. HAF Functional Area Managers may submit the recommendation to SAF/IGI (usaf.pentagon.saf-ig.mbx.saf-igi-workflow@mail.mil) for vetting through the Air Force Inspection System Governance
Process. Requestors must include justification, an Office of Primary Responsibility, and Continual Evaluation Plan. SAF/IG will regularly task HAF Functional Area Managers to provide updates to existing requirements and nominate emerging requirements through standard coordination (i.e. Task Management Tool).

10.2.2. Non-Air Force agencies. Should contact SAF/IGI with requests to change/add/remove an inspection activity in Attachment 2.

10.3. SAF/IG-approved changes. SAF/IG may modify the Air Force Inspection System to meet SecAF/CSAF intent. Decisions reached during an IG conference or IG-led Process Review Group (to include the Nuclear Surety Inspection Process Review Group) are incorporated into this instruction with SAF/IG approval.

10.4. Air Force Inspection System suggestions. Airmen may submit an idea for improving the Air Force Inspection System to SAF/IGI (usaf.pentagon.saf-ig.mbx.saf-igi-workflow@mail.mil).
Chapter 11

INSPECTOR GENERAL FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT

11.1. Air Force IG duty. IG duty is a position of high public trust. Personnel selected for an Air Force IG assignment are functional experts with broad contemporary experience selected from across the Air Force. IG-assigned personnel serve at Wing, MAJCOM, AFIA, SAF, Joint, or other higher headquarters staffs. Personnel not assigned to an IG staff but who support inspections are inspection augmentees.

11.2. IG attributes. Personnel assigned to IG duty should possess attributes of the highest professional standards and moral character, demonstrate potential for future service and continued promotion, and provide credibility for those Airmen, family members, and civilians who seek IG assistance. In addition to these qualities, Airmen selected for IG service will:

11.2.1. Possess or obtain a security clearance commensurate with the duties required as an IG inspector. (T-1)

11.2.2. Have no record of civil conviction (other than minor offenses). (T-2)

11.2.3. Have no conviction by court-martial, nonjudicial punishment, or Unfavorable Information File in the official military personnel record. (T-2)

11.2.4. Have prior nuclear experience or experience applicable to current systems in the respective MAJCOM prior to assignment as a nuclear inspector. (T-2)

11.3. Force development. Commanders and Directors at all levels will manage IG manpower requirements in accordance with respective A1 and Career Field Managers’ guidance for the most effective and economical use of manpower. IG positions at Wings are normally internal-fill.

11.4. Grade requirements. Commanders have discretion to select qualified personnel based on the needs of the unit in accordance with the grades prescribed below. Commanders will hire civilian personnel in the occupational series and ranks in accordance with Standardized Core Personnel Documents at the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) Library, AFRC Air Reserve Technician Standardized Personnel Document Library, or ARC grade guidance. (T-3).

11.4.1. The Wing IG (87GXX/civilian Personnel Document) will be an O-5/GS-14 (or equivalent) or higher. (T-2)

11.4.2. The Wing Director of Inspections (87IXX/civilian Personnel Document) will be an O-4/GS-13 (or equivalent) or higher. (T-3)

11.4.3. The Wing IG Superintendent (8I000) will be an E-8 or E-9. (T-3)

11.4.4. MAJCOM and Wing IG Inspectors (other than those positions listed above; excludes Wing Inspection Team or inspection augmentees). Officer MAJCOM and Wing IG members should be senior O-3s/civilian equivalent or higher with more than seven years commissioned service. Enlisted IG members should be an E-6 (7-level) or higher.

11.4.5. Civilians assigned to the IG. Bargaining unit employees may be assigned to an IG office (Wing, MAJCOM, or HAF) as full-time certified inspectors or in a clerical/administrative support role. Bargaining unit employees may also (on a part-time basis)
act as uncertified inspectors/inspection augmentees. Civilians selected for IG duty will be in the grade of GS–11 or above. (T-2)

11.4.6. MAJCOM IG Team Chief. MAJCOM IGs will select MAJCOM IG Team Chiefs. MAJCOM IG Team Chiefs will be certified inspectors.

11.5. IG Training and Certification. MAJCOM and Wing IGs will ensure IG-assigned personnel and Wing Inspection Team members are trained in accordance with Attachment 11 of this instruction. (T-1) At a minimum, inspectors will complete the requirements in accordance with Table A11.1 prior to certification and receive instruction pertinent to anticipated tasks. (T-1) In addition to IG-specific training, IG personnel should be familiar with the appropriate training required within their Air Force Specialty Code series or career area, complete appropriate education and training commensurate with their grades, and develop proficiency of occupational and institutional competencies commensurate with their grades to enhance duty performance. IGs should also be trained in and familiar with areas they inspect. IG inspectors will be certified within 6 months of being assigned to the IG. (T-3)

11.5.1. MAJCOM IG staffs will appoint a training point of contact to coordinate IG Training Course-Inspections for command IG-assigned inspection personnel. These points of contact are responsible for allocating respective command training slots and scheduling individuals for IG Training Course-Inspections with AFIA, to include subordinate organization personnel and any other appropriate above the Wing-level personnel.

11.5.2. IG Training Course-Inspections completion provides eligibility for award of Special Experience Set 10 for officers and Special Experience Identifier 010 for enlisted.

11.5.3. IG senior personnel training. IG senior officers/civilian equivalents and SNCOs may be nominated by the MAJCOM IG to attend the IG Executive Course at the Pentagon on a space-available basis. Submit requests for training to SAF/IG.

11.6. Inspector Certification. Certification applies to IG-assigned personnel only and consists of IG Training Course-Inspections, Attachment 11 requirements, and the IG Oath. Inspection augmentees and Wing Inspection Team members are not certified inspectors, but are sensors trained to participate in the conduct of inspections. A certified inspector must validate findings identified by inspection augmentees or Wing Inspection Team members. (T-3)

11.6.1. Commanders will certify their respective IGs. (T-1) IGs will certify other IG-assigned inspectors (this requirement may be delegated no lower than the IGI). (T-3)

11.6.2. IGs will document IG-assigned inspector training and certification in IGEMS in accordance with the Record Disposition Schedule. (T-1)

11.7. IG Oath. The IG oath reminds inspectors and inspection augmentees of the special trust and confidence inherent with the IG position and of the need for impartial and independent evaluations on behalf of the commander. Uniformed personnel and Department of the Air Force civilians performing duties on behalf of the IG will take the IG oath (Figure 11.1). (T-1) Contractor personnel working in an IG staff section will not take the IG oath nor be certified inspectors. (T-0)

11.7.1. Administering the IG Oath. The Commander will administer the IG oath to the IG (delegable to the Vice Commander). (T-3)
11.7.2. The IG will administer the IG oath to IG-assigned inspectors. (T-3) This requirement may be delegated no lower than the IGI. The inspection Team Chief will administer the oath to inspection augmentees. (T-3)

**Figure 11.1. Oath for personnel assigned to or augmenting the IG.**

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I, ____________________________, having been assigned as an Inspector General (or member of a MAJCOM/Wing Inspection Team), do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I accept the special obligations and responsibilities of the position freely, that I will uphold the standards for Inspectors General prescribed by Law and regulations and that I will discharge inspection (or investigation) duties without prejudice, bias or partiality on behalf of the commander. [So help me God.]
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11.8. **Air Force IG duty badge.** Upon completion of IG Training Course-Inspections, IG-assigned personnel are authorized the wear of the IG duty badge or organization-standardized IG emblem in accordance with AFI 36-2903, *Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel*. Certified inspectors will wear the IG duty badge while assigned to an IG billet. (T-1) The IG Emblem is any reprinted or embroidered likeness of the IG Duty Badge.

11.8.1. Inspection augmentees may wear organization-standardized distinctive identification when conducting inspection activities. Inspection augmentees are not permitted to wear the badge nor any likeness of the emblem.

11.8.2. The badge or emblem is not authorized for wear when no longer assigned to an IG staff or when withdrawn for cause by the Commander. (T-2)
Chapter 12

AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM TOOLS


12.2. Inspector General Evaluation Management System. IGEMS (to include the classified version) facilitates scheduling, planning, inspecting, and report writing for IG inspections. IGEMS is also used to assign, monitor, and close deficiencies identified during the inspection process. The system is comprised of an open architecture which facilitates manual enterprise-level trending analysis and cross communication with normalized data and standardized reporting. Attachment 12 of this instruction outlines IGEMS Business Rules.

12.2.1. IGs will track deficiencies to closure within the appropriate version of IGEMS. (T-1)

12.2.2. For classified inspection reporting, use existing reporting methods on the appropriate classified system.

12.2.3. Do not enter Personally Identifiable Information, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information, classified information, and 10 USC 1102 data in IGEMS until proper protection mechanisms are in place. If a deficiency requires 10 USC 1102 information, inspectors will enter an abbreviated description of the deficiency into IGEMS along with the following statement: "Per Title 10 United States Code Section 1102, details of this deficiency are not documented in this report." (T-0) Provide detailed documentation to the MAJCOM IG, Wing Commander, Wing IG, Medical Group Commander (for Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and Medical Quality Assurance data), and higher headquarters (if appropriate) for tracking and/or resolution.

12.2.4. Contractor and foreign national access to IGEMS. Contractor and foreign national access to IGEMS is limited to the roles of Basic User, Scheduler, and/or Planner. Contractors and foreign nationals will not register as inspectors or administrators. (T-0) Administrators will only grant United States military and DoD civilian personnel to the classified version of IGEMS. (T-0)

12.3. Management Internal Control Toolset. MICT is the Air Force program of record to communicate a unit’s program health using SACs and HAF SAC Fragmentary Orders. MICT also provides supervisors and the command chain (from squadron commander to SecAF) tiered visibility into user-selected compliance reports and program status as well as indications of program health across Functional and command channels. MICT also helps facilitate the HAF SAC Fragmentary Order programs by gathering time-sensitive data in an expeditious manner. Attachment 12 of this instruction outlines MICT SAC business rules.

12.3.1. Self-Assessment Communicator (SAC). A SAC is a two-way communication tool between policy authors and field-level Airmen, designed to improve compliance with published guidance and communicate risk and program health up and down the chain of command in near real-time.
12.3.1.1. Compliance with a SAC does not relieve individual Airmen from complying with statutory and regulatory requirements in AFIs and/or directives at the local, state or federal level. See Figure A12.1 for SAC author guidance.

12.3.1.2. Cost-benefit balance. SAC items are not free. The cost is measured in terms of Airmen’s time to complete the assessment. As authors add line-items, the benefits of resulting assessments needs to outweigh the cost in Airmen’s time.

12.3.2. Airmen will not enter Personally Identifiable Information, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information, or classified information into MICT. (T-0) Enter 10 USC 1102-protected data into MICT only in the "10 USC 1102 Protected" hierarchy of SACs. Appropriately marked For Official Use Only data is permitted in MICT.

12.3.2.1. MAJCOM SG 10 USC 1102 administrators will only provide MAJCOM SG-appointed personnel 10 USC 1102 administrator access in MICT. MAJCOM SG 10 USC 1102 administrators will track 10 USC 1102 permissions granted within the MAJCOM and only grant permissions to members who have completed 10 USC 1102 training and have a “need to know” to perform official duties. The MAJCOM SG 10 USC 1102 administrator will provide guidance on 10 USC 1102 protocols within MICT to Wing administrators.

12.3.2.2. Wing 10 USC 1102 administrators will oversee 10 USC 1102 permissions for the Wing and ensure completion of 10 USC 1102 training by members requiring 10 USC 1102 permissions. (T-2) Medical personnel complete 10 USC 1102 training via the SWANK health course. All other personnel with 10 USC 1102 MICT permissions will complete training modules on the MICT website under the “Assistance” tab (then “Help Guides”, followed by “SG 10 USC 1102 Training Module”). (T-2) The Military Treatment Facility Commander should decide (in coordination with the Wing Commander) how many and which Wing members are granted 10 USC 1102 access in MICT (typically only one or two trusted agents).

12.3.2.3. If an observation is specific to a 10 USC 1102 SAC line item in MICT, IGs will track the observation, Root-Cause Analysis, and corrective action in the 10 USC 1102 hierarchy or on a restricted drive only accessible by a member with 10 USC 1102 training and permissions in MICT. (T-1)

12.3.3. HAF SAC Fragmentary Order. The SAC Fragmentary Order is an order from the VCSAF to subordinate commanders to complete a specified SAC in MICT for a high-priority, time-sensitive requirement. HAF Functional Area Managers should submit a SAC Fragmentary Order request for VCSAF approval and transmission through normal HAF/ES coordination channels.

12.3.4. Contractor and foreign nationals may have access to MICT.

12.4. The Inspector General Brief. AFIA publishes The Inspector General Brief, which provides feedback and information to commanders, IGs, inspectors, and Air Force leaders at all levels. Anyone may submit articles to AFIA/ET. Articles should relate to anticipated or actual problems, recommendations to improve management, safety, security, inspection or operational techniques, lessons learned, best practices, or contemporary issues of interest to the Air Force.
Chapter 13

SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM INSPECTIONS

13.1. Purpose. To provide guidance for inspecting Special Access Programs in order to report on the health, security and compliance of Special Access Programs to the Secretary of the Air Force.

13.2. Background. SAF/IG conducts inspections of Air Force Special Access Programs and other sensitive activities in accordance with DoD guidance and Air Force policies and reports results as directed by the SecAF or CSAF.

13.2.1. Special Access Programs are inspected to ensure adequate oversight of these highly sensitive programs and the persons charged with proper management, administration, and execution. Inspectors use a standardized inspection methodology which incorporates the tenets of the Air Force Inspection System in order to assess the responsible agency’s ability to successfully execute Special Access Programs.

13.2.2. Each Special Access Program-responsible stakeholder at HAF, MAJCOM, FOA, and DRU will complete self-assessments annually and forward to SAF/IGI upon completion (no later than 31 December). SAF/IGI will analyze results and discuss appropriate recommendations with SAF/IG.

13.2.3. SAF/IGI will execute Special Access Program inspections at the HAF every 24 months. Efforts should be made to align Special Access Program inspections with scheduled Management Inspections or UEI. SAF/IG may direct an out of cycle (limited/no-notice) inspection if deemed necessary.

13.2.4. Special Access Program inspectors partner with enterprise stakeholders to fully integrate oversight responsibilities with continual evaluation, self-assessments and internal control metrics into the inspection and scheduling process. The inspection team will verify self-assessment data as the accuracy is critical for an effective program.

13.2.5. For HAF Special Access Program inspections, the Team Chief will be a SAF/IG O-6/civilian equivalent or higher. AFOSI PJ will provide a Security Inspection Lead. The Special Access Program Central Office (AF SAPCO; SAF/AAZ) will provide at least one team member for each HAF Special Access Program inspection. The inspection Team Chief will identify additional inspectors required in advance of the inspection (see paragraph 13.3.6.1).

13.3. Roles and responsibilities.

13.3.1. SAF/IGI:

13.3.1.1. Leads strategy, policy and integration of government Special Access Program inspections into the Air Force Inspection System.

13.3.1.2. Directs Air Staff Special Access Program inspections and provides results, trends, and issues to AFIA for inclusion into Air Staff Management Inspections.

13.3.2. SAF/IGI, Director of Special Access Program Inspections:
13.3.2.1. Develops and directs USAF-level policies and plans for Special Access Program inspections and investigations in accordance with applicable policy, guidance, and SAF/IG intent.

13.3.2.2. Ensures coherent policy with OSD, Joint, Air Staff and MAJCOM requirements.

13.3.2.3. Reviews policies, procedures, and methodologies for currency and relevance. Makes recommendations for change to the Special Access Program Inspection Working Group and SAF/IG.

13.3.3. **Air Force SAPCO:**

13.3.3.1. Coordinates on the Special Access Program inspection schedule.

13.3.3.2. Provides SMEs for inspections to represent the Director, responsible for general oversight of Special Access Programs for which the Air Force has responsibility.

13.3.3.3. Oversees corrective action plans to monitor closure of inspection deficiencies.

13.3.4. **AFOSI PJ:**

13.3.4.1. Serves as the principal advisor to SAF/IG for Special Access Programs.

13.3.4.2. Performs program security, investigation, and counterintelligence functions for Air Force Special Access Programs in accordance with DoD guidance and Air Force policies; maintains a sufficient cadre of investigators, special agents, analysts, and program security officers to do so.

13.3.4.3. Assesses compliance by conducting a comprehensive assessment of the management, operational, and technical security controls employed within or impacted by information systems.

13.3.4.4. Notifies the Air Force SAPCO of Special Access Program security compliance inspection trends for potential policy updates or updates to inspection criteria.

13.3.4.5. May inspect any issue under the statutory and regulatory authorities of SAF/IG, AFOSI Commander, and/or the Director of AFOSI PJ when conducting any inquiry, investigation, or inspection activity.

13.3.4.6. Supports and assists SAF/IG, AFIA, and MAJCOM IGs with classified inspection activities. When IGs need security expertise on inspection teams, AFOSI PJ will support as inspection augmentees under IG statutory and regulatory authorities.

13.3.5. **MAJCOM, AFIA, Wing, and AFOSI IG Teams:**

13.3.5.1. Coordinate on the Special Access Program inspection schedule.

13.3.5.2. Provide qualified/accessed SMEs for inspections at other MAJCOM/FOA/DRUs and HAF locations (if available).

13.3.5.3. Coordinate with appropriate SMEs (usually the MAJCOM Special Access Program Management Official [SAPMO]) to conduct inspections of respective Air Force Special Access Program and other sensitive activities in accordance with DoD guidance, Air Force policies, and this instruction. Integrate classified and sensitive inspection activities into the overall UEI continual evaluation cycle and grade.
13.3.5.4. The appropriate SMEs (usually the MAJCOM SAPMO or MAJCOM IG) will validate whether Commanders meet compliance requirements for Special Access Program activities within their Wings. (T-0)

13.3.5.5. MAJCOM IGs will coordinate with respective SMEs (usually the MAJCOM SAPMO) to conduct Special Access Program inspection activities as part of the UEI continual evaluation battle rhythm. Additionally, MAJCOM IGs may coordinate with AFOSI PJ for functional expertise for inspecting Special Access Program activities.

13.3.5.6. AFIA/ET will coordinate with SAF/IG and AFOSI PJ to conduct Special Access Program inspection activities as part of the Management Inspection battle rhythm. Incorporate SAF/IG Special Access Program continual evaluation activities into the respective MGAs and overall grade of the Management Inspection.

13.3.5.7. The MAJCOM IG will work with appropriate SMEs (usually the MAJCOM SAPMO) oversight teams to ensure Special Access Program inspections occur during normally-scheduled IG interfaces with affected units. This may include UEI Capstone events, mid-point IG on-site visits, etc. MAJCOM IGs will notify SAF/IG when Special Access Program inspections are to take place. SAF/IGI inspectors may accompany the MAJCOM IG team to observe or participate in Special Access Program inspections or to provide oversight of the Special Access Program inspection process.

13.3.6. **HAF Oversight Stakeholders:**

13.3.6.1. Provide cleared personnel to augment the inspection team as necessary in the following key areas:

13.3.6.1.1. Air Force SAPCO (Office of Primary Responsibility: SAF/AAZ)
13.3.6.1.2. Finance (Office of Primary Responsibility: SAF/FMF)
13.3.6.1.3. Contracting (Office of Primary Responsibility: SAF/AQC)
13.3.6.1.4. Acquisition (Office of Primary Responsibility: SAF/AQ)
13.3.6.1.5. Security (Office of Primary Responsibility: AFOSI PJ and SAF/AAZ)
13.3.6.1.6. Audit (Office of Primary Responsibility: AFAA/AGS)
13.3.6.1.7. Operations (Office of Primary Responsibility: AF/A3)
13.3.6.1.8. Inspections (Office of Primary Responsibility: SAF/IGI and AFIA)

13.3.6.2. Define oversight foci, responsibilities and guiding directives (i.e., tracking/measuring implementation/success/progress; governance of compliance).


13.3.6.4. Identify & discuss any areas of concern or areas requiring re-inspection.

13.3.6.5. Provide a SME for each inspection area of responsibility.

13.3.6.6. Conduct continual evaluation throughout the inspection cycle.

13.3.6.7. Provide continual evaluation results as part of the overall inspection score.
13.3.6.8. Assist HAF organizations in developing and implementing a robust self-assessment program for use by internal assessors and external inspectors; update as required.

13.3.7. **Inspected agency:**

13.3.7.1. Upon receipt of notification, gather the information requested in paragraph 13.10 of this instruction and forward to the Team Chief.

13.3.7.2. Upon receipt of the inspection team roster, properly coordinate with SAF/AAZ and access them in accordance with DoD Directive 5205.07, DoD Instruction 5205.11, AFI 16-701, and this instruction.

13.3.7.3. Secure an appropriate location for and send appropriate representatives to the in-brief.

13.4. **Special Access Program access.** IGs will request Special Access Program-level visit certifications and individual Special Access Program accesses in accordance with AF SAPCO guidance instead of through Joint Personnel Adjudication System (or successor system). AFOSI PJ, with support from authorized IG representatives (AFOSI PJ Command Program Security Officers), will ensure appropriate Special Access Program accesses, visitor badges, and facilities access is coordinated and approved in advance of the IG team arrival. (T-0) SAF/IG may propose an inspection, assessment, or management review of a Special Access Program or Special Access Program function to the SecAF. In addition to DoD Instruction 5205.11, SecAF approval of a proposed SAF/IG inspection, assessment or management review establishes Special Access Program access “need to know” for personnel required to accomplish such activities. In addition to the “need to know,” these credentialed personnel must meet the Special Access Program access eligibility requirements outlined in AFI 16-701. SAF/IG investigations establish “need to know”.

13.5. **Handling of reports and materials.** IGs will handle inspection reports and related materials which contain or reference Special Access Program data (to include appendices, attachments, sensitive relationships, etc.) within approved Air Force Special Access Program communications channels and facilities. (T-0) Inspectors will house Special Access Program-related inspections within the Configuration and Security Tracking System for Special Access Program Facilities or a successor system identified by AFOSI PJ. (T-1) System administrators will ensure access is controlled to only those IG representatives designated by SAF/IGI, AFIA, and MAJCOM IGs. (T-1)

13.6. **Oversight meetings.** SAF/IG (or a designated representative) may attend any Special Access Program Oversight Committee, Special Programs Review Group and Special Access Program Oversight Review Board meeting or other Special Access Program-related meetings as directed by SecAF and/or required by AFI 16-701.

13.7. **Concept of HAF Special Access Program operations.** SAF/IGI will coordinate with AFIA, SAF/AAZ, AFOSI PJ, and other HAF agencies designated by SAF/IG to develop an annual inspection plan/schedule for SAF/IG approval no later than 15 December each year. With SAF/IG approval, the schedule may be distributed to affected HAF agencies, informing them of projected inspection dates. SAF/IG should make these inspections as minimally-intrusive as possible. HAF staffs should voice scheduling concerns with SAF/IGI as soon as possible in order to prevent unnecessary work stoppage due to heavy work periods and known key staff absences.
13.8. **Semi-Annual HAF Special Access Program Inspection Working Group.** Chaired by SAF/IGI; voting membership is comprised of representatives from agencies listed in paragraph 13.3.6.1 of this instruction. Invitations to attend may be extended to other non-voting agencies, upon SAF/IGI approval. The working group meets in May and November annually (or as otherwise determined by SAF/IGI). Topics of discussion should include:

13.8.1. Building, reviewing, and updating the 36-month schedule of inspections; corrections to the schedule are approved by a simple majority of voting members.

13.8.2. Ensuring the schedule includes enterprise HAF offices, MAJCOMs, and FOA/DRUs.

13.8.3. Reprioritizing inspections, using risk-based sampling strategy and stakeholder feedback.


13.8.5. Discussion of any recommended/required changes to policy, guidance, and/or oversight.


13.9. **HAF Special Access Program notification of inspection.** The SAF/IG inspection staff will plan activities based on the SAF/IG-approved inspection plan. In general, the inspection notification process occurs as follows:

13.9.1. Approximately 10-14 calendar days prior to an inspection, SAF/IG will send a notification memorandum to the affected agency with detailed instructions included to assist with pre-inspection requirements/deliverables. Although SAF/IG makes every effort to give the inspected agency 10-14 calendar days notification of inspection, mission requirements and inspector availability may drive a much shorter notification to the affected agency. SAF/IGI must closely coordinate notifications with the inspected agency within 10 calendar days.

13.9.2. Approximately 3-4 calendar days prior to the inspection, SAF/IGI will provide the inspected agency a list of inspectors to verify inspector clearance and access. If the inspection is a directed no-notice inspection, the Team Chief will present the inspector roster upon team arrival and the inspection commences immediately after verification of the roster.

13.10. **HAF Special Access Program pre-inspection deliverables.** Inspected organizations will send the following items to the inspection Team Chief within five duty days of receiving notification of the inspection:


13.10.2. Current self-assessment report to include results, status of deficiencies, corrective actions, etc.

13.10.3. Any deviations and/or waivers to regulatory guidance the inspected agency is operating under.

13.10.4. Status of any previous discrepancies/findings (from external audits, self-inspections, evaluations, assessments, etc.).
13.10.5. Current Unit Manning Document or other authoritative document, listing the personnel associated with Special Access Program execution/management. Include the status of personnel not present during the inspection (temporary duty, leave, sick, etc.).

13.10.6. Number of personnel in the inspected area accessed to Special Access Programs.

13.10.7. Number of accountable items.

13.10.8. Number of classified/unclassified computers resident in the Special Access Program Facility or Temporary Secure Working Area.

13.10.9. Number of networks in each inspected area and level of authorized classification for each.

13.10.10. Other items of interest which may be listed in the notification of inspection.

13.11. HAF Special Access Program Air Force Inspection System Major Graded Areas.

13.11.1. Management of resources. Assess adequacy and stewardship of:

13.11.1.1. Manpower (stewardship, reporting of manning levels, readiness).

13.11.1.2. Funds (budgetary decisions, cost-effective, accountability).

13.11.1.3. Facilities (sustainability, asset management, maintenance).


13.11.1.5. Airmen’s time (stability, predictability, balance).

13.11.2. Leading people.

13.11.2.1. Communication (vertical, horizontal and feedback).

13.11.2.2. Discipline (culture of accountability, compliance, pride).

13.11.2.3. Training (proficiency, team building).

13.11.2.4. Professional and personal development of Airmen.

13.11.2.5. Quality of life engagement (climate and morale).

13.11.3. Improving the unit.

13.11.3.1. Strategic alignment with mission directive or other authoritative document/guidance, including the Special Access Program Annual Report.

13.11.3.2. Process operations (critical processes, limiting factors).

13.11.3.3. Robust self-assessment program.

13.11.3.4. Data-driven decision (applicable, relevant metrics).

13.11.3.5. Corrective action plans and progress from previous inspections, audits, reports.

13.11.4. Executing the mission.

13.11.4.1. Primary mission (Special Access Program Directive, Designed Operational Capability statement, or order).

13.11.4.2. Air and Space Expeditionary Forces readiness (if applicable).
13.11.4.3. Mission Assurance Command and Control.

13.11.4.4. Perceived threats/hazards to the mission and preparation to meet them (budget, open press, re-vectoring, etc.).

13.11.4.5. Control mechanisms in place/practiced (Security Classification Guides, Memoranda of Understanding, Business Rules, Operating Instructions, etc.).

13.12. Other mandatory HAF Special Access Program inspection areas. In addition to the Air Force Inspection System MGAs, expect special emphasis on the following areas during each SAF, HAF, MAJCOM, FOA, and DRU Special Access Program inspection:


13.12.2. Safeguards employed against potential for an insider threat.


13.12.4. General knowledge of the Special Access Program with which the person/agency is entrusted.

13.13. HAF Special Access Program inspection process/methodology.

13.13.1. Inspections consist of a thorough review of key documentation beginning with the aforementioned pre-inspection deliverable items.

13.13.2. The Team Chief will establish inspection team meeting times normally at the beginning of each duty day, prior to/after lunch, and near the end of each duty day during normal working hours to gather inspection findings and ensure appropriate inspection progress and direction.

13.13.3. The Team Chief will provide a short in-brief describing the inspection process and introducing inspection team members to the inspected agency/program leadership.

13.13.4. The inspected agency will provide a concise mission brief to the inspectors. The inspected program’s leadership in-brief should be concise (generally limited to 30 minutes or less).

13.13.5. Once briefings are complete, inspectors will coordinate with inspected unit leadership to ensure appropriate points of contact are available to assess MGAs and specific oversight areas such as program acquisition functions, contract oversight, budget, legal requirements, operations, and security (information protection, counterintelligence, and administration). The Team Chief will meet with internal leadership to determine any requested items to include in the inspection. Individual Airmen-to-IG Sessions should be conducted with available AF personnel until a sufficient number of personnel are contacted to assess appropriate inspection areas and unit personnel are afforded an opportunity to speak with an accredited inspector.

13.13.6. Airmen-to-IG Sessions. Inspected agencies can expect inspectors to conduct individual interviews. Commanders, Directors, Supervisors and any others in the organization are advised these interviews are protected communications between the individual being interviewed and the inspector(s). As such, the individual(s) being interviewed are afforded the protections from reprisal/retaliation in accordance with Title 10 United States Code Section 1034 and as defined in AFI 90-301. Do not attempt to discuss the conversation between the inspector and the interviewee.
13.13.7. Inspectors will assess customer satisfaction and responsiveness to stakeholders.

13.13.8. IGs will evaluate the Unit Self-Assessment Program and documentation to ensure the inspected agency is conducting continual evaluation essential to the Air Force Inspection System.

13.13.9. The Team Chief will brief overall inspection team findings to unit leadership at the end of each inspection day. If potential SIGNIFICANT and/or CRITICAL deficiencies are noted during the inspection, the Team Chief will promptly brief unit leadership on the deficiency noted to facilitate addressing the deficiency. This briefing may take place prior to normal end of day leadership sessions at the discretion of the Team Chief.

13.13.10. At the conclusion of the inspection, the Team Chief will provide a verbal out-brief to unit leadership regarding the initial findings of the inspection pending formal inspection validation and report processing, review and distribution. The Team Chief will de brief pertinent issue(s) arising from the inspection to the Commander/Director at the inspected agency, as well as the HAF oversight stakeholders as appropriate.

13.13.11. SAF/IGI, Director of Special Access Program Inspections, will ensure SAF/IG receives summary notification of inspection outcomes and in-person de briefs on matters identified during an inspection which require SAF/IG visibility based upon inspection results.

13.14. HAF Special Access Program deficiencies. The inspection team will establish a validation process which provides the inspected agency, or the organization owning the finding, the opportunity to clarify and/or provide additional information in a timely manner for any potential deficiencies identified during the inspection. The Team Chief (in coordination with the leader of the inspected agency) will coordinate with the appropriate Functional Area Managers on CRITICAL and SIGNIFICANT deficiencies identified during the inspection.

13.15. HAF Special Access Program inspection report. Inspectors will make every effort to write inspection reports without specifically including Special Access Program information. Reference Special Access Program information only when it is absolutely necessary for report inclusion to accurately document findings and inform Special Access Program leadership of corrective actions needed.

13.16. HAF Special Access Program inspection follow-up. Re-inspections may occur for units receiving an overall INEFFECTIVE rating based on coordination with SAF/AAZ, and SAF/IGI. IGs will only inspect areas previously-rated as INEFFECTIVE unless SAF/IG determines a full re-inspection is warranted or SAF/AAZ requests a full re-inspection.
Chapter 14

INSPECTION OF AIR EXPEDITIONARY WINGS

14.1. General. While Air Expeditionary Wings operate under a unique combat mission environment and no two are the same, the Air Force Inspection System can enhance Air Expeditionary Wing mission effectiveness using the following guidance to set expectations and guide Air Expeditionary Wing Air Force Inspection System implementation.

14.2. Air Expeditionary Wing Commander’s Inspection Program. Air Expeditionary Wing Commanders are in the best position to identify areas of highest risk to personnel and the mission. Commanders are responsible for ensuring risk management decisions are properly communicated. At a minimum, Air Expeditionary Wing Commanders will implement the following areas of the Commander’s Inspection Program:

14.2.1. A Unit Self-Assessment Program to identify risk, validate readiness, and measure compliance. (T-2) Use MICT in accordance with Chapter 2 of this instruction. (T-2) Local checklists provide a means to ensure Air Expeditionary Wing continuity; development and use is highly-encouraged.

14.2.2. Execute applicable By-Law inspections (as determined by the Air Expeditionary Wing Commander). (T-2)

14.2.3. Exercise and conduct unit inspections at the discretion of the Air Expeditionary Wing Commander. (T-3)

14.2.4. Conduct Commander’s Inspection Management Boards at least quarterly. (T-3)

14.3. MAJCOM IG inspection of Air Expeditionary Wings. MAJCOM IGs and the Commander, Air Force Forces will collaborate to determine the scope of UEI and the Commander’s Inspection Program for Air Expeditionary Wings. Ideally, Air Expeditionary Wing UEI cycles should mimic the Regular Air Force cycle in accordance with Chapter 3 of this instruction.

14.4. MAJCOM IG team composition. The MAJCOM IG should be cognizant of minimizing mission impact to the Air Expeditionary Wing during the inspection cycle. MAJCOM IGs will coordinate on-site events with the Air Expeditionary Wings through the Gatekeeper process.

14.4.1. Pre-inspection surveys and on-site Group Airmen-to-IG Session events are at the discretion of the Air Expeditionary Wing Commander.

14.4.2. The Lead MAJCOM is determined by the Air Expeditionary Wing organizational chain of command. Supporting MAJCOMs are any participating MAJCOM who is not the Lead MAJCOM.

14.4.3. The Lead MAJCOM IG will coordinate with Supporting MAJCOM IGs and the Air Expeditionary Wing Commander to determine inspection team size and requirements no later than 90 days prior to travel (on-site) or inspection commencement (remote). As a general rule, plan for no more than 15 inspectors for any on-site event.

14.5. Air Expeditionary Wing IG training. Wing IG training is vital to ensure the expertise necessary to employ an effective expeditionary IG force with minimal training in the theater of operations. In addition to the requirements in Attachment 11 of this instruction, deploying IG
personnel with no previous IG experience will complete Wing IG training at the home station Wing IG office, focusing on MICT, IGEMS, Wing Inspection Team management, Commander’s Inspection Management Boards, and exercise development. (T-2)

STAYCE D. HARRIS, Lt Gen, USAF
The Inspector General
Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References
AFI 1-2, Commander’s Responsibilities, 8 May 14
AFI 10-201, Force Readiness Reporting, 3 Mar 16
AFI 10-701_AFGM2017-01, Operations Security, 8 Jun 11
AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program, 19 Apr 16
AFI 14-104_AFGM2017-01, Oversight of Intelligence Activities, 1 Dec 15
AFI 14-1020, Intelligence Mission Qualification and Readiness, 8 Nov 17
AFI 16-701, Management, Administration and Oversight of Special Access Programs, 18 Feb 14
AFI 16-1404, Air Force Information Security Program, 29 May 15
AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense (For Official Use Only), 5 Jul 17
AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management, 1 Dec 15
AFI 36-2706_AFGM2017-01, Equal Opportunity Program, Military and Civilian, 5 Oct 10
AFI 36-2921, Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP), 30 Aug 11
AFI 36-3009, Airman and Family Readiness Centers, 16 Jul 14
AFI 36-3107_AFGM2017-01, Voting Assistance Program, 27 Feb 14
AFI 36-3803, Personnel Accountability in Conjunction with Natural Disasters or National Emergencies, 7 Jun 16
AFI 38-401, Continuous Process Improvement, 15 Apr 16
AFI 63-125, Nuclear Certification Program, 24 Jul 17
AFI 90-301, Inspector General Complaints Resolution, 27 Aug 15
AFI 90-505_AFGM2017-01, Suicide Prevention Program, 6 Oct 14
AFI 90-6001, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program, 21 May 15
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AFI 91-204, Safety Investigations and Reports, 12 Feb 14
AFMAN 33-363_AFGM2017-01, Management of Records, 21 Jul 16


Air Force Inspection System Classification Guide

CG-W-5, *Joint Nuclear Weapons Classification Guide*, 16 Oct 95

CJCS Instruction 3260.01E, *(U) Joint Policy Governing Positive Control Material and Coded Control Devices*, 22 Apr 15 (S)

CJCS Instruction 3261.01C, *(U) Recapture and Recovery of Nuclear Weapons*, 31 Jan 14 (S)

CJCS Instruction 3263.05C, *Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections*, 10 Mar 17


DoD 5240.01, *Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities*, 8 Aug 16


DoD Directive 3150.02, *DoD Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*, 24 Aug 17

DODD 5106.04, *Defense Inspectors General*, 22 May 14

DoD Directive 5205.07, *DoD Special Access Program Policy*, 1 Jul 10

DoD Instruction 1000.04, *Federal Voting Assistance Program*, 13 Sep 12

DoD Instruction 1332.35, *Transition Assistance for Military Personnel*, 29 Feb 16

DoD Instruction 1100.22, *Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix*, 1 Dec 17

DoD Instruction 2200.01, *Combating Trafficking in Persons*, 21 Apr 15

DoD Instruction 3020.52, *DoD Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive Preparedness Standards*, 18 May 12

DoD Instruction 5205.11, *Management, Administration, and Oversight of DoD Special Access Programs (SAPS)*, 6 Feb 13


DoD Instruction 6055.01, *DoD Safety and Occupational Health Program*, 14 Oct 14

DoD Instruction 6055.06, *DoD Fire and Emergency Services Program*, 21 Dec 06

DoD Instruction 6055.08, *Occupational Ionizing Radiation Protection Program*, 17 Nov 17

DoD Instruction 6495.02, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Procedures*, 28 Mar 13
DoD Instruction 6495.03, *Defense Sexual Assault Advocate Certification Program*, 7 Apr 17
DoD Manual 5200.01V1, *DoD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification*, 24 Feb 12
Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, 4 Dec 81
Executive Order 13526, *Classified National Security Information*, 5 Jan 10
Title 10 United States Code § 8020, *Inspector General*
Title 10 United States Code § 8583, *Requirement of Exemplary Conduct*
Title 10 United States Code § 1102, *Medical Quality Assurance*
Department of Defense Initial Guidance for Base Realignment and Closure 2005 Joint Base Implementation, 22 Jan 08
USAF Master Materials License, License #42-23539-01AF, Docket #030-28641

**Prescribed Forms**

None

**Adopted Forms**

Air Force Form 679, *Air Force Publication Compliance Item Waiver Request/Approval*
Air Force Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*
Air Force Form 2435, *Load Training and Certification Document*
Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFI—Air Force Instruction
AFIA—Air Force Inspection Agency
AFIMSC—Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center
AFMAN—Air Force Manual
AFMOA—Air Force Medical Operations Agency
AFOSI—Air Force Office of Special Investigations
ANG—Air National Guard
ANGRC—Air National Guard Readiness Center
ARC—Air Reserve Component, including both ANG and AFRC
CJCS—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONPLAN—Concept Plan
CSAF—Chief of Staff of the Air Force
CD—Deputy Commander
DIA—Defense Intelligence Agency
DISA—Defense Information Systems Agency
DoD—Department of Defense
DOE—Department of Energy
DRU—Direct Reporting Unit
DTRA—Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EO—Executive Order
FM—Financial Management
FOA—Field Operating Agency
GAO—Government Accountability Office
HQ USAF or HAF - HAF, includes the Secretariat and the Air Staff
IG—Inspector General
IGEMS—Inspector General Evaluation Management System
IGI—Inspections Directorate
JA—Judge Advocate
MAJCOM—Major Command
MET—Mission Essential Task
METL—Mission Essential Task Listing
MGA—Major Graded Area
MICT—Management Internal Control Toolset
MOA—Memorandum of Agreement
MOU—Memorandum of Understanding
NAF—Numbered Air Force
NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGB—National Guard Bureau
NRC—Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OIG—Office of the IG
OPLAN—Operational Plan
OSD—Office of the Secretary of Defense
RIC—Regulatory Information Conference
SAC—Self Assessment Communicator
SAF—Secretary of the Air Force (Secretariat)
SAF/IG—The Inspector General (SAF/IG)
SAPCO—Special Access Program Central Office
SAPMO—Special Access Program Management Official
SE—Safety
SecAF—Secretary of the Air Force
SME—Subject Matter Expert
TPFDD—Time Phased Force Deployment Data
UEI—Unit Effectiveness Inspection
USAF—United States Air Force

Terms

Abuse—Intentional wrongful or improper use of Air Force resources. Examples include misuse of grade, position, or authority causing the loss or misuse of resources.

Access—Close physical proximity to a nuclear weapon in such a manner as to allow the opportunity to tamper with or damage a nuclear weapon.

By-Law inspection—Any inspection requirement directed from above the Air Force level (e.g. DoD, Presidential order, or Public Law) normally requiring a report to a higher-than-Air Force authority or to SAF/IG for compilation into a single report.

Benchmark—A noteworthy process, procedure or activity which establishes a superior standard of service or performance.

Capstone Visit—The final on-site visit of the UEI and the catalyst for generating a UEI report.
Continual Evaluation—A meaningful and timely feedback mechanism between process owners and the chain of command, Wing IGs, Pertinent Oversight Authorities, and MAJCOM IGs; routine monitoring of performance indicators.

CRITICAL deficiency—Any deficiency which results in (or could result in) widespread negative mission impact or failure.

Deficiency—An inspection finding validated against established guidance by an IG.

Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection Oversight—An inspection conducted by DTRA which provides the CJCS with an independent assessment on the ability to adequately conduct a Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection.

Denial—The effect achieved by security systems and devices which prevent a potential intruder or adversary from gaining access to a nuclear weapon.

Deviation—An acknowledged departure from established guidance.

Federal Recognition Inspection—An inspection to confirm the organized militia of a State meets qualifications prescribed for the organization/composition of the ANG.

Finding—An identified difference between an existing condition and a commonly accepted practice/condition; includes benchmarks, strengths, deficiencies, and Recommended Improvement Areas.

Fraud—Any intentional deception to unlawfully deprive the Air Force of something of value or to secure for an individual a benefit, privilege, allowance, or consideration not entitled.

Functional Area Manager—Refers to the organization accountable for the management and oversight of personnel and equipment within a specific functional area to support operational planning and execution.

Gatekeeper—MAJCOM IG and Wing IG POCs who facilitate optimum scheduling for inspections, evaluations, assessments, and other inspection-related visits (including audits and inquiries) conducted by outside entities (Office of the IG, Department of Defense [OIG, DoD]; Government Accountability Office [GAO], and others).

Gatekeeper Process—The process in which MAJCOM IG and Wing IG POCs facilitate optimum scheduling for inspections, evaluations, assessments, and other inspection-related visits conducted by outside entities.

Gaining MAJCOM—The MAJCOM responsible for inspecting an ANG unit.

IG Inspection—Any effort to evaluate an organization, function, or process by any means or method, including surveys, interviews, assessments, evaluations, exercises, and audits (excluding audits conducted under the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force Auditor General [SAF/AG]).

IN COMPLIANCE—A rating which indicates a program complies with governing directives and supports mission accomplishment despite any deficiencies.

IN COMPLIANCE WITH COMMENTS—A rating which indicates a program complies with most governing directives, but does not meet some mission requirements due to deficiencies.
Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection—An inspection to evaluate a unit’s readiness to assume or resume a nuclear mission, evaluate/certify new or significantly modified maintenance and storage facilities, or significant changes to weapons systems or portions thereof.

Inspector—A person assigned by the commander or IG to inspect in accordance with this instruction.

Key Work Processes—Linked activities with the purpose of producing a stated output/outcome (rarely operate in isolation and require evaluation in relation to other processes).

Limiting Factor—A factor or condition which either temporarily or permanently impedes mission accomplishment.

Major Graded Area—Key processes, procedures, or requirements based on public law, Executive Orders, DoD Directives, or Air Force policy.

MINOR Deficiency—A validated deficiency which does not meet the definition of a CRITICAL or SIGNIFICANT deficiency but requires corrective action.

NOT IN COMPLIANCE—A rating which indicates a program does not comply with key elements of governing directives; deficiencies exist which may result in significant mission impact.

Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment—A Joint Intelligence Study of capabilities/intentions of actors to gain unauthorized physical access to a nuclear weapon.

Nuclear-Capable Unit—A unit/activity assigned responsibilities for employing, assembling, maintaining, transporting, or storing nuclear weapons, associated components, and equipment.

Nuclear Mission Area—Any aspect of a unit which directly or indirectly supports a nuclear mission and can be inspected in accordance with CJCS Instruction 3263.05.

Nuclear Oversight Board—A board that provides senior level executive oversight and strategic direction to resolve key issues affecting the Air Force nuclear enterprise.

Nuclear Surety Inspection—A compliance-based inspection conducted to evaluate a unit’s ability to manage nuclear resources while complying with nuclear surety standards.

Observation—A non-validated negative finding or non-compliance found, observed, or identified by a non-IG function during a self-assessment, a Staff Assistance Visit, or other continual evaluation activity.

Pertinent Oversight Authority—An agency responsible for the management and oversight of a program or functional area. Responsibilities can include managing and organizing personnel, equipment, training, and policy (i.e. continual evaluation).

Readiness Exercises—Evaluations of a unit’s capability tied directly to OPLANS, CONPLANs, TPFDD taskings, UTCs, DOCs, METs/METL, and or Command guidance in order to evaluate the unit’s ability to meet established criteria as established in OPLANS, CONPLANs, and/or other applicable standards.

Recommended Improvement Area—An identified process, product, or capability which could be improved by a suggested course of action.

Regular Air Force—The component of the Air Force which consists of persons whose continuous service on Active Duty in both peace and war.
Repeat Deficiency—A condition recorded resulting from failure to comply with the same guidance noted on a previous inspection of the same installation/unit.

Risk—Chance of adverse outcome or bad consequence, such as injury, illness, or loss. Risk level is expressed in terms of hazard probability and severity.

Risk Based Sampling Strategy—A methodology employed to inspect areas deemed most-important by Commanders and Functional Area Managers requiring an independent assessment by the IG.

Root Cause Analysis—A systematic process for identifying “root causes” of problems or events and an approach for responding to them.

SIGNIFICANT Deficiency—A validated deficiency which has or could have negative mission impact.

Simulation—Imitating essential features or capabilities as an aid to training or inspecting.

Special Interest Item—An area of focus for management used to gather data and assess the status of specific programs and conditions in the field.

Strength—An area which far exceeds directives/mission requirements/expectations.

Total Force Associates—The Associate Organization is the partner unit forming a TFA and subordinate to the Associate MAJCOM. The associate organization shares the primary physical resources assigned to the sponsor organization, and may provide additional physical resources necessary to support the shared mission. Associate organizations will vary from full or tailored wings to groups, squadrons, and detachments, depending on the scope of the shared mission.

Trusted Agents—SAF/IGI, AFIA, AFSEC/SEW, ANG/IG, MAJCOM and OSI Gatekeepers, and Functional inspection team scheduling POCs who participate in the Air Force Inspection Scheduling Process are “trusted agents” for the Air Force Inspection Schedule. The IG trusted agent system is designed to protect the minimum or no-notice aspect of the inspection.

Unit Effectiveness Inspection—An independent assessment of Wing performance and effectiveness which validates/verifies the Wing’s Commander’s Inspection Program.

Remote Inspection—An inspection conducted through the gathering and analysis of metrics, reports and other data without on-site inspection.


Waste—The extravagant, careless, or needless expenditure of Air Force funds or the consumption of Air Force property which results from deficient practices, systems controls, or decisions.

White Cell—SMEs which act as exercise/inspection proctors who provide input and simulation injects (under the direction of the Wing IG) regarding environment, scenario and operational ability which keep the exercise/inspection on course in an effort to measure a desired objective.

Wing Inspection Team—A team of SMEs which augment the IG staff while executing a Commander’s Inspection Program.

Working Capital Fund Unit—A unit that provides goods and services to a variety of customers in exchange for the full cost of these services or goods.
Attachment 2

WING COMMANDER’S INSPECTION AND EXERCISE REQUIREMENTS

A2.1. Wing Commander’s Inspection and Exercise Requirements. Table A2.1 outlines mandatory Commander’s Inspection Program inspection areas, including By-Laws and exercise requirements. MAJCOMs may supplement these requirements. Installation Commanders will accomplish exercises listed in Table A2.1 at the frequency prescribed in governing guidance. (T-0) Wing Commanders will reference governing directives, supplemental guidance, or host/tenant MOU/MOA to determine exercise and participation requirements. (T-1)

Table A2.1. Wing Commander’s Inspection and Exercise Requirements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By-Law Programs</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>OPR</th>
<th>DoD References</th>
<th>Air Force References</th>
<th>Special Inspector Qualifications</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BL1</td>
<td>Combating Trafficking in Persons</td>
<td>AF/A1</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 2200.01</td>
<td>AFI 36-2921</td>
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<td>BL2</td>
<td>Federal Voting Assistance Program (N/A for ARC)</td>
<td>AF/A1</td>
<td>DoD Directive 1000.4</td>
<td>AFI 36-3107</td>
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<td>BL3</td>
<td>Personnel Accountability</td>
<td>AF/A1</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 3001.02</td>
<td>AFI 36-3803</td>
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<td>BL4</td>
<td>Suicide Prevention Program</td>
<td>AF/A1</td>
<td>DoD Directive 6490.16</td>
<td>AFI 90-505</td>
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<tr>
<td>BL5</td>
<td>Transition Assistance Program</td>
<td>AF/A1</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 1332.35</td>
<td>AFI 36-3009</td>
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<tr>
<td>BL6</td>
<td>Equal Opportunity</td>
<td>SAF/MR</td>
<td>DoD Directive 1350.2; DoD Directive 1440.1; DoD Directive 1020.02</td>
<td>AFI 36-2706</td>
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<tr>
<td>BL7</td>
<td>Sexual Assault Prevention &amp; Response Program</td>
<td>AF/A1</td>
<td>DoD Directive 6495.01; DoD Instruction 6495.02; DoD Instruction 6495.03</td>
<td>AFI 90-6001</td>
<td>To inspect case files or Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database (DSAID), inspectors are required to be Defense Sexual Assault Advocate Certified Program</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>BL8</td>
<td>Intelligence Oversight</td>
<td>AF/A2</td>
<td>DoD 5240.01; DoD Directive 5148.13</td>
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<td>AFI 14-104</td>
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<td>BL9</td>
<td>Wounded, Ill, and Injured</td>
<td>AF/A1</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 1300.24</td>
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<td>AFI 90-201</td>
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<td><strong>Exercises</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>EX1</td>
<td>Emergency Management</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 6055.17</td>
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<td>AFI 10-2501</td>
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<td>EX2</td>
<td>Antiterrorism</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 2000.12; DoD Instruction O-2000.16 Volume 1</td>
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<td>EX3</td>
<td>FPCON Measures</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD Instruction O-2000.16 Volume 2</td>
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<td>EX4</td>
<td>Public Health Emergency</td>
<td>AF/SG</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 6200.03</td>
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<td>EX5</td>
<td>Fire &amp; Emergency Services Disaster Preparedness Plans</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 6055.06</td>
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<td>EX6</td>
<td>Nuclear Weapons Accident Response</td>
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<td>DoD Directive 3150.08</td>
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<td>EX7</td>
<td>Continuity of Operations</td>
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<td>DoD Directive 3020.26</td>
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<td>AFI 10-208</td>
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<td>EX8</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 3020.52 Standard 4</td>
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</table>
**A2.2. Air Force Inspection Scheduling Process.** The purpose of the Air Force Inspection Scheduling Process (Gatekeeper) is to synchronize inspection efforts to maximize unit training days available and inspection resource usage; build out-year schedules; and align non-Air Force inspection requirements listed in Table A2.2 with Air Force inspection schedules.

A2.2.1. IGs will consolidate inspections to avoid redundancy. (T-2)

A2.2.2. **Gatekeeper.** Gatekeepers at all levels should ensure the inspection system is able to independently and efficiently inspect units on behalf of the command chain. Gatekeepers ensure a commander’s priorities take precedence over non-mission-essential activities of any unit/organization. Gatekeepers have the authority to approve or disapprove, schedule, de-conflict and eliminate duplication between inspection-type activities on behalf of the commander unless exempted in paragraph A2.2.2.1 of this instruction.

A2.2.2.1. External visit points of contact should contact the MAJCOM Gatekeeper for scheduling coordination. Any outside agency seeking to conduct an inspection not listed in Table A2.2 must contact the AFIA Gatekeeper for coordination. Any outside agencies seeking to include an inspection in Table A2.2 must follow the Air Force Inspection System Governance Process in Chapter 10. Gatekeepers cannot disapprove Attachment 2 visits and instead should offer optimum timeframes or alternative de-confliction from unit events. For ANG units, requestors will coordinate through NGB/IG as the Gatekeeper.

A2.2.2.2. When scheduling inspections for installations with units gained by multiple MAJCOMs, MAJCOM IGs should coordinate the inspection schedules to conduct concurrent MAJCOM inspections to the maximum extent practicable.

A2.2.2.3. MAJCOM Gatekeepers will establish inspection schedules within the MAJCOM via the Air Force Gatekeeper Program website, to include a projection for the next 60 months.
A2.2.2.4. Unit commanders will provide real-world/exercise mission schedules through the respective IG office to the MAJCOM IG via the Gatekeeper site within 60 calendar days of events and event details/schedules 30 days prior to the event. (T-2) This enables external agencies to appropriately schedule and conduct inspections (e.g. on-site visits) throughout the course of the UEI cycle.

A2.2.2.5. MAJCOM Gatekeeper functions include the ability to establish/maintain situational awareness and to synchronize and de-conflict unit inspection activity within the MAJCOM. MAJCOM Gatekeepers also review subordinate Wing inspection schedules, via the Air Force Gatekeeper Program website for continual evaluation of inspections. Gatekeeping unit inspections may include tracking organizations below the Wing-level, as needed. MAJCOM Gatekeepers will only approve access to subordinate Wings in accordance with MAJCOM Commander guidance.

A2.2.2.6. Wing Gatekeepers (in coordination with the MAJCOM Gatekeeper) will de-conflict outside agency inspections/visits from the Wing inspection schedule. (T-3) Review Wing flying, maintenance, and operation schedules and coordinate exercise schedules with base agencies.

A2.2.2.7. If an inspecting authority is requesting access to an installation and the inspection activity is not listed in Table A2.2 nor approved/requested by the Wing Commander, Wing Gatekeepers will contact the MAJCOM Gatekeeper and/or AFIA for assistance to either validate the inspection activity or deny access to the installation. (T-1)

A2.2.2.8. For inspections listed in Table A2.2, verify timelines, approval methods and inspection authority.

A2.2.2.9. Safety considerations are of vital importance when conducting an inspection. The IG and Safety staffs must closely coordinate their efforts to be mutually supportive in meeting the commander’s intent. (T-1) The Wing Safety office will coordinate annual inspection/assessment schedules with the Gatekeeper for de-confliction with Wing calendar events. (T-1). If high-priority scheduling conflicts occur in which the IG and Safety staffs are unable to reach agreement, the commander will determine prioritization. (T-1)

A2.2.3. Non-Air Force Agency Access to Inspect. Any non-Air Force agency (DoD, DTRA, DISA, GAO, etc.) requesting access to an installation to conduct inspection-type activities will contact AFIA and request liaison with the appropriate MAJCOM Gatekeeper. Gatekeepers should make every effort to accommodate the request while balancing the need to guard a unit’s calendar whitespace through synchronization in accordance with commanders’ priorities. If unable to resolve the non-Air Force agency request, AFIA will notify SAF/IGI for assistance. Civilian medical inspection agencies listed in Table A2.2 will coordinate inspection schedules with trusted agents at AFMOA/SGHQ. AFMOA/SGHQ coordinates directly with AFIA and MAJCOM Gatekeepers for scheduling for both notice and no-notice inspections.

A2.2.4. Non-IG Air Force Inspection, Accreditation, and Certification Teams. Commanders will ensure non-IG Air Force inspection, accreditation, or certification teams designate a scheduling point of contact via email to AFIA Air Force Gatekeeper (afia.tio.1@us.af.mil). (T-2) The representative must have the authority to approve inspection schedule changes on
behalf of the inspecting entity. The scheduling point of contact will synchronize each of these inspections, accreditations or certifications through the appropriate-level Gatekeeper.

A2.2.5. Air Force Gatekeeper Site. MAJCOM and Wing IGs will enter inspection activities into the Air Force Gatekeeper Site (the only authorized Gatekeeper system). (T-1)

A2.2.5.1. Access management. Administrators will provide access to the Air Force Gatekeeper Site to:

- A2.2.5.1.1. MAJCOM administrators (by AFIA).
- A2.2.5.1.2. MAJCOM users (by MAJCOM IGs).
- A2.2.5.1.3. Wing administrators (by MAJCOM IGs).
- A2.2.5.1.4. Wing users (by Wing IGs). (T-3)

A2.3. Authorized inspections. Table A2.2 contains the list of authorized inspections at Air Force Wings and includes non-Air Force, statutory, certification, accreditation, and technical survey inspections/visits.

Table A2.2. List of Authorized Inspections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Inspection Name</th>
<th>AF Office of Primary Responsibility</th>
<th>Policy Reference</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treaty Inspections</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Inspection</td>
<td>AF/A10</td>
<td>CFE Treaty</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty Inspection</td>
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<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>New START Treaty Inspection</td>
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<td>Open Skies Treaty Inspection</td>
<td>AF/A10</td>
<td>Open Skies Treaty, Annex F</td>
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<td>Vienna Document 1999 Treaty Inspection</td>
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<td>Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education</td>
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<td>Evaluate the quality and patient experience of AF residents in AF resident programs</td>
<td>AFPC/DP2N</td>
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<td>Blood Banking Procedures Compliance</td>
<td>AFMOA</td>
<td>21 Code of Federal Regulation 200/600/800</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Certification for possession, use, and transfer of Biological Select Agents and Toxins</td>
<td>AF/A10</td>
<td>42 Code of Federal Regulation Part 73, 9</td>
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<td>Code of Federal Regulation Part 121; 7</td>
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<td>Code of Federal Regulation part 331; DoD Instruction 5210.89</td>
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<td>NATO Sub-registries, Control Points, and Communication Center Inspections</td>
<td>SAF/AA</td>
<td>DoD Directive 5100.55</td>
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<td>Inspection of Laboratory Functions and Processes</td>
<td>AFMOA</td>
<td>Code of Federal Reg 42, Part 493; AFIP Pamphlet No. 40-24</td>
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<td>Vulnerability Assessment</td>
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<td>DODI 2000.16</td>
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<td>Command Cyber Readiness Inspection</td>
<td>SAF CIO A6</td>
<td>DoD Directive 8500.1; DoD Instruction 8500.2; CJCS Instruction 6510.01 &amp; 6510.01A</td>
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<td>Computer Network Defense Service Provider Inspection</td>
<td>SAF CIO A6</td>
<td>DOD O-8530.1-M Process; DOD O-8530.1; DOD O-8530.2</td>
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<td>Performance Evaluation</td>
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<td>DISA Circular 310-70-57; DoD Directive 5105.19</td>
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<td>Automated Tank Gauge Inspection</td>
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<td>DOD 4140.25-M Ch 8;</td>
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<td>Cathodic Protection Inspection</td>
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<td>DESC-P-2 Para 3.2.4.2; API MSPS Ch 3</td>
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<td>Energy Oil Spill Response Training/Exercise</td>
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<td>Oil Pollution Act of 1990; DODI 4140.25-M</td>
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<td>Filter Separator Inspections (American Petroleum Institute (API) 510)</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DODI 4140.25-M Ch 8; in accordance with API 510 and NFPA 30; 40 Code of Federal Regulation 112; 40 Code of Federal Regulation 280; UFC 3-460-01; UFC 3-460-03</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Fuel Tank Demolition</td>
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<td>DOD 4140.25-M, Ch 8; DESC-P-12, App 1</td>
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<td>Installation Level Review</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD 4140.25-M; DoDI 4165.14; DoDI 4165.06; UFC 3-460-01; UFC 3-460-03; UFC 3-600-01</td>
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<td>Pier Inspection (including dredging and loading arms)</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD 4140.25-M Ch 8; UFC 4-150-06; UFC 4-150-07; UFC 4-150-08; UFC 4-151-10; NAVFAC MO-104.1; NAVFAC MO-104.2; NAVFAC MO-124; NAVFAC MO-322 Vol 1 &amp; 2; UFC 3-460-01; UFC 3-460-03; 33 CFR156, UFGS, API, NFPA, ASTM, STI, UL, NAVOSH/ OSHA, NACE, ASME</td>
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<td>Pipeline Integrity Inspection (API 570)</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD 4140.25-M; UFC 3-460-1; UFC 3-460-3; UFC 3-570-6; 40 Code of Federal Regulation 112; API 570; API 574; ASME B31.3</td>
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<td>Rail Fuel Receipt Facility</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD 4140.25-M; DESC-P-12</td>
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<td>Tank Inspections (API 653 and steel tank)</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD 4140.25M; UFC-3-460-3 Sect 10.3.3; 40; CFR112</td>
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<td>Base Operating Support Contract Inspection</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD 4140.25-M; Federal Acquisition Regulation</td>
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<td>Defense Working Capital Fund Financial Audit</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>OMB-123, DoD 4140.25-M; DLA Energy P-7, DoD 7000-14R; DLAI 5102</td>
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<td>45.1, DLAD 1.690</td>
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<td>Balanced Survivability Assessment</td>
<td>AF/A3</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 3000.08</td>
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<td>Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection Oversight</td>
<td>SAF/IGI</td>
<td>DoD 3150.2-M; CJCS Instruction 3263.05</td>
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<td>DoD Explosives Safety Management Program</td>
<td>AF/SE</td>
<td>DoDI 6055.16; DODD 6055.9E</td>
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<td>Customs Border Clearance Agency Program Recertification</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD 4500.9R; ECI 4002.01</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Investigation of DoD Working Conditions</td>
<td>AF/SE</td>
<td>DoDI 6055.1; EO 12196</td>
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<td>Passport Facility Inspections</td>
<td>AF/A1P</td>
<td>Title 20 United States Code 211a; DoS/DoD MOU</td>
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<td>Proper Handling of Narcotics</td>
<td>AFMOA</td>
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<td>EPA Inspections (Federal and State)</td>
<td>SAF/IE</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulation Titles 33, 40, and 42</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Air Traffic Control Facilities Evaluation</td>
<td>AF/A3</td>
<td>FAA Order 7610.4</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>National Bridge Inspection Program</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>23 Code of Federal Regulation 650.307; DoD Unified Facility Criteria (UFC) 3-310-08</td>
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<td>Licensure and Registration of Blood Banks</td>
<td>AFMOA</td>
<td>Title 21 Code of Federal Regulation Parts 200, 600, 800</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>SAF/FM</td>
<td>Budget &amp; Accounting Acts of 1921 &amp; 1950; Legislative Reorg Act of 1970; Congressional</td>
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Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board

Department of Agriculture

Department of Labor (DOL) or State OSHA Equivalent

Department of State

Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)

Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

Government Accountability Office (GAO)
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<th>Health and Human Services (HHS)</th>
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<td>41 Compliance with Patient Privacy Information Handling</td>
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<th>Information Security Oversight Office (ISSO)</th>
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<td>42 Information Security Oversight</td>
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<th>Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee</th>
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<td>43 Joint Terminal Attack Controller Training Standardization</td>
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<td>44 Joint Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Training Standardization</td>
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<th>Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA)</th>
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<td>45 Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Oversight Evaluation</td>
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<td>47 Federal Recognition Inspection (ANG only)</td>
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<td>48 Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Enhanced Response Force Package Standardization and Evaluation Team</td>
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<td>49 Intelligence Oversight Inspection</td>
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<th>National Security Agency (NSA)</th>
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<td>50 Communications Security Audits</td>
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<th>North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)</th>
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<td>Nuclear Regulatory Commission</td>
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<th>Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC)</th>
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<th>AF/A1 (Manpower, Personnel and Services)</th>
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**AF/A3 (Operations)**

| 65 | Critical Asset Risk Assessment | AF/A3 | Public Law 110-417, Sec 903; Title 10 United States Code Sec 2228; DoD Instruction 5000.67; |
| 66 | Operations Security (Operational Security) External Threat-based Comprehensive Assessment | AF/A3 | DoD Directive 5205.02; DODM 5205.02M |

**AF/A4 (Logistics, Installations and Mission Support)**

| 67 | Air Force Structural Management Assessments (Corrosion, NDI, Composite, Coating Surveys) | SAF/AQ | DoD Directive 3020.40; DoD Instruction 3020.45 |
| 68 | Corrosion Surveys | SAF/AQ | Public Law 110-417, Sec 903; Title 10 United States Code Sec 2228; DoD Instruction 5000.67 |

**Statutory Inspections**

<p>| 69 | Air Force Audit Agency Audits | SAF/AG | AFMD 17 |
| 70 | Army Air Force Exchange Service - Quadrennial Joint Inspection | AF/A1 | DoD Directive 5106.01; DoD Directive 5106.4, AR 215-1; AFI 34-211 (I) |
| 71 | Article 6 Inspection (JAI) | AF/JAI | Title 10 United States Code §806; Title 10 United States Code 8037 |
| 72 | Facility Condition Assessment | AF/A4 | EO 13327; DoD Instruction 4165.14 |
| 73 | Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection) | SAF/IGI | CJCS Instruction 3263.05; HAFMD 1-20 |
| 74 | Unit Effectiveness Inspection | SAF/IGI | Title 10 United States Code §8020 |
| 75 | Nuclear Surety Inspection | SAF/IGI | DoD Instruction 3150.2-M; CJCS Instruction 3263.05 |
| 76 | Nuclear Surety Inspection Oversight | SAF/IGI | DoD Instruction 3150.2-M; CJCS Instruction 3263.05 |</p>
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<td>77</td>
<td>Public Accountant Contract Audits of Non-Appropriated Fund Activities</td>
<td>AF/A1SR AF/FSVA</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 7600.2; DoD Instruction 7600.6</td>
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<td>78</td>
<td>Radioactive Material Permit (Unannounced) Inspections</td>
<td>AF/SG</td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>Sexual Assault Prevention and Response &amp; Administration of Focus Groups</td>
<td>AF/A1Z</td>
<td>Public Law 109-364, 120 STAT. 2205</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>Special Access Programs</td>
<td>SAF/IGI</td>
<td>DoD Directive 5205.07; DoD Instruction 5205.11</td>
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<td>81</td>
<td>NATO STRIKEVAL</td>
<td>USAFE</td>
<td>Supreme HQ Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Tactical Evaluation Manual (STEM)</td>
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<td>82</td>
<td>Environmental Impact Analysis Process impact statements and assessments</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>40 CFR 1500-1508, 32 Code of Federal Regulation Part 989</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td>Installation Complex Encroachment Management Action Plans</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoDI 3200.21; Supp Guidance for Implementing/Operating Joint Bases</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td>Air Installation Compatible Use Zones</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 4165.57</td>
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<td>Pest Management Program Reviews</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 4165.57</td>
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<td>86</td>
<td>Air Force Mission Assurance Assessment</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>MA Program Implementation Memo 27 Apr 15</td>
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**Certification/Accreditation/Technical Survey**

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<td>Airfield Pavement Evaluations</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>40 Code of Federal Regulation Part 63; ASME CSD-1; NFPA 85</td>
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<td>88</td>
<td>Boiler Inspection</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
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<td>Community College of the Air Force, Commission on Colleges of Southern Association of Colleges/Schools</td>
<td>AF/A1DL</td>
<td>Public Law 94-361, 14 Jul 76; AFI 36-2648, AFI36-2649_AFGM2018-01, Ch 10; CCAF Campus Affiliations, Policies, Procedures &amp; Guidelines</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>Administration of Information and Information System Security</td>
<td>AF/A2</td>
<td>DoDM 5105.21-V1, V2, V3</td>
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<td>91</td>
<td>Standardization/Evaluation Qualification Programs (flying check rides only)</td>
<td>AF/A3</td>
<td>AFI 11-202 V2</td>
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<td>92</td>
<td>COMBAT SHIELD</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>AFI 10-706</td>
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<td>Commission on Fire Accreditation</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>DoD Instruction 6055.06</td>
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<td>94</td>
<td>Metrology &amp; Calibration (AFMETCAL)</td>
<td>AF/A4</td>
<td>Technical Order 00-20-14</td>
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Attachment 3

UNIT EFFECTIVENESS INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS

A3.1. Inspection requirements. Table A3.1, Air Force Inspection Requirements (located on the SAF/IGI SharePoint site below) contains HAF-identified inspection requirements which indicate areas of highest risk where undetected non-compliance puts Airmen, commanders, the Air Force, or our nation at significant risk. Table A3.1 can be found on the SAF/IGI SharePoint under the “AFI 90-201” tab (https://cs2.eis.af.mil/sites/11309/IG%20Tools/Forms/AllItems.aspx). HAF Functional Area Managers may submit changes to Table A3.1 via the Air Force Inspection System Governance Process or through recurring taskers generated by SAF/IGI.

A3.2. Risk-based sampling strategy. Inspect items in Table A3.1 items either remotely or on-site during each UEI cycle; this should include validation/verification of Wing IG inspection results.
A4.1. **MAJCOM Management Inspection certification.** MAJCOMs must meet the following requirements in order to independently conduct Management Inspections:

A4.1.1. AFIA will provide one-time Management Inspection training from AFIA to MAJCOM IGs. Following one-time training provided by AFIA/ID, MAJCOMs will provide Management Inspection-specific training to inspectors and inspection augmentees as part of MAJCOM-specific training.

A4.1.2. MAJCOM IGs will send observers on a Management Inspection conducted by AFIA to build knowledge and understanding in the inspection methodologies associated with this type of inspection. Observation includes involvement in preparation, inspection, and execution during the on-site visit and final grading and report writing phases. Observers should have received the one-time Management Inspection training conducted by AFIA.

A4.1.3. Following the one-time training and follow-on observation, AFIA will conduct a Field Observation evaluation of the MAJCOM’s first Management Inspection.

A4.1.4. Upon successful completion of the Field Observation Management Inspection, AFIA/ID will issue a certification memorandum authorizing the organization to conduct Management Inspections.

A4.1.5. MAJCOMs must conduct a Management Inspection once every 48 months to remain certified. If a MAJCOM IG has not conducted a Management Inspection in the last 48 months, the organization must re-accomplish the certification process.

A4.1.6. Units will fund Management Inspection Certification (training/temporary duty).

**A4.2. Management Inspection inspector certification.** Inspectors observing and conducting Management Inspections must be in compliance with individual inspector requirements stated in Chapter 11 of this instruction.

**NOTE:** MAJCOMs previously certified to conduct Management Inspections do not need to re-accomplish the Management Inspection certification process.
**Attachment 5**

**NUCLEAR TECHNICAL OPERATIONS/TASK EVALUATION BRIEFING GUIDE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspectors will stop an operation or task only after any reasonable opportunities to detect the deficient condition have passed or if conditions are detected which would jeopardize personnel or weapon safety, security, weapon system reliability, and/or cause equipment damage.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Include all personnel who must participate in the operation (to include those who perform in process inspections) or provide technical help in accordance with AFI 21-series guidance in all evaluations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If required, Quality Assurance and/or unit supervisors may observe the operation; however, limit inputs to preventing actual safety, security, or reliability errors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If an abnormal situation presents itself which is not covered in technical data, consult with supervision. The MAJCOM IG expects a full assessment of the nature of the problem and what actions are taken to correct or report the problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJCOM IGs may review any paperwork generated as a result of the technical operation or task evaluations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJCOM IGs will approve simulations and deviations prior to the start of the technical operation or task to include previously complied with steps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJCOM IGs are not on Personnel Reliability Program; therefore, inspectors cannot be a part of a TWO-PERSON team. Inspectors will not intentionally violate the TWO-PERSON concept.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Figure A6.1. Notional Host Wing template.
NOTE: Wing Commanders may modify these templates based on mission, available manpower, prioritization, and/or higher headquarters direction.
Attachment 7

READINESS EXERCISES

A7.1. **Inspection Requirements.** Readiness Exercise inspection requirements and methodology can be found on the SAF/IGI SharePoint under the “AFI 90-201” tab ([https://cs2.eis.af.mil/sites/11309/IG%20Tools/Forms/AllItems.aspx](https://cs2.eis.af.mil/sites/11309/IG%20Tools/Forms/AllItems.aspx)). Changes to Attachment 7 may be submitted via the Air Force Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*, advocated through the Air Force Inspection System Governance Process or through recurring taskers generated by SAF/IGI.
Attachment 8

PROGRAM-SPECIFIC INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS

A8.1. Wounded, Ill, and Injured Inspections. Wounded, Ill and Injured Facility Inspections ensure support for Recovering Service Members and their families when the Recovering Service Member has been wounded, or injured or has an illness that prevents him or her from providing that support. As part of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, IGs are required to inspect government-provided facilities which house patients on medical hold. (T-0) Section 1662, Access of Recovering Service Members to Adequate Outpatient Residential Facilities, outlines the requirement for inspecting and reporting. In September 2007, DoD issued standards for inspection of facilities for outpatient service members. To ensure compliance with DoD standards, inspectors will use the checklist at the end of this Attachment (Table A8.1) when performing the Wounded, Ill, and Injured inspection. (T-0)

A8.1.1. Notification of inspection requirement. AFPC Recovery Care Coordinators will provide monthly updates on Recovering Service Members to installation IGs no later than the 15th of each month. IG Team Chiefs will update the Air Force Wounded, Ill, and Injured SharePoint Site no later than the last duty day of the month until all actions are complete and/or the member is no longer in the program. (T-1)

A8.1.2. Pre-Occupancy Inspection. Commanders are ultimately responsible for ensuring appropriate steps are taken to meet member needs. The goal is to ensure individual government-owned housing units (on-base housing units, dormitory rooms, and Temporary Lodging Facilities) meet needs based upon the Recovering Service Member’s medical condition(s). In addition to the scheduled Wounded, Ill, and Injured inspection, the Recovering Service Member’s commander will perform a pre-occupancy inspection of the residence (or as soon as possible if notification is not timely enough to allow an inspection before Recovering Service Member physically occupies the government-owned housing or if the Recovering Service Member occupied the residence prior to receiving Recovering Service Member status). (T-0) Additional personnel deemed necessary may accompany the commander on the pre-occupancy inspection (First Sergeant, Civil Engineering Squadron Commander, housing/dorm manager, Recovery Care Coordinator, etc.). Commanders will submit a copy of the completed checklist (Table A8.1) and documentation addressing deficiencies to the IG Team Chief upon arrival for the follow-up inspection. (T-0)

A8.1.3. Inspection process. IG Teams will conduct Recovering Service Member residence inspections using inspection criteria outlined in Table A8.1. (T-0) For those Recovering Service Members not requiring quarters modification, paragraph A8.1.5 still applies. Once an inspection has been scheduled, the MAJCOM IG or Wing IG will send an inspection notification memo to the Installation Commander and Recovering Service Member’s Wing (or equivalent) Commander (if different than the Installation Commander). (T-1) IG-led inspection requirements include an initial inspection no later than 90 calendar days from validation and annually from the initial inspection date of the government-provided housing facility for as long as the recovering Airman is in Recovering Service Member status and resides in government-provided housing. Commanders will inspect deficient residencies not less often than once every 180 calendar days until the deficiency is corrected. (T-1)
A8.1.4. **Contracted and Privatized Housing Management.** If housing is privatized or managed by contracted personnel, the Wing IG and installation leadership should work with the contractor and responsible contracting office to ensure the inspection takes place in a timely manner.

A8.1.5. **Personal interview.** The IG Team Chief will also complete a formal one-on-one interview with the Recovering Service Member to ensure the owning installation leadership is providing necessary facility modification based upon the Recovering Service Member’s medical condition. (T-1) This interview should be documented in the By-Law report in IGEMS. The Recovering Service Member’s family members are encouraged to participate if requested by the Recovering Service Member. This interview need not be conducted in-person.

A8.1.6. **Joint Base Housing Facility Inspections.** Regardless of which Service "owns/manages" the government-provided housing, Air Force inspectors will inspect housing occupied by Airmen; other Services may inspect in accordance with respective policy. (T-1) There is no requirement to inspect quarters already identified/certified as DoD compliant for Recovering Service Member (e.g., Fisher House, Malone House). Although most Americans with Disabilities Act-compliant quarters meet DoD standards for Recovering Service Members, the IG Team Chief will interview Recovering Service Members to ensure quarters are sufficient and needs are being met. (T-1) This interview need not be conducted in-person.

A8.1.7. **Final report disposition.** The IG Team Chief will forward copies of the final report (with a cover letter identifying the member by rank/name only) to the Installation Commander, member’s Wing Commander (if different than the Installation Commander), and the commander of the affiliated Military Treatment Facility no later than 10 duty days from finalization of the report. (T-1) The IG Team Chief will ensure the Wounded, Ill, and Injured point of contact updates the inspection status on the AF Wounded, Ill, and Injured SharePoint Site. (T-1)

A8.1.8. **Inspection checklist.** The inspection checklist (**Table A8.1**) is designed for a combination of interview, physical inspection, and documentation review. Execute the checklist at the location to be inspected with the Recovering Service Member, case manager, and base housing facility representative present. The primary point of contact for scheduling the inspection should be the case manager. When possible, the inspector should either review applicable documents prior to the inspection or request the housing facility representative bring such documents with him/her to the inspection (e.g., Pre-Occupancy Inspection checklist with associated documents, pending work orders on the housing facility, work orders executed within the past six months, asbestos documentation, lead paint documentation, pest control documentation/procedures, mold documentation, etc.). Rate inspected areas IN COMPLIANCE, NOT IN COMPLIANCE, or IN COMPLIANCE WITH COMMENTS.

**Table A8.1. Air Force Wounded, Ill, and Injured Residence Inspection Checklist.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM #</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>REFERENCE(S)</th>
<th>Office of Primary Responsibility</th>
<th>RESULT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Facility Condition</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Is the building envelope (i.e. roof, exterior walls, windows, etc.) free of leaks?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 1</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Does the HVAC system maintain a constant temperature in the facility?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 1</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Is the electrical system in working order?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 1</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Has the electrical system been modified (or does it comply) to meet the special needs of the patient as determined by the case manager and patient?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 8, para 1-13</td>
<td>SG/CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Is the plumbing system in working order?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 1</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Has the plumbing system been modified (or does it comply) to meet the special needs of the patient as determined by the case manager and patient?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 8, para 1-13</td>
<td>SG/CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Does the facility have any open Life/Fire Safety issues?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 1</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>Has the safety system been modified (or does it comply) to meet the special needs of the patient as determined by the case manager and patient?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 8, para 1-13</td>
<td>SG/CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Does the facility have mold?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 1</td>
<td>SG/CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>Does the facility have asbestos?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 1</td>
<td>SG/CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Reference</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>Does the facility have lead-based paint?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 1</td>
<td>SG/CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>Is the overall facility appropriate for the special needs of the patient as determined by the case manager and patient?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 8, para 1-13</td>
<td>SG/CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kitchens</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Does the kitchen meet or exceed the standard for the type of accommodation provided?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 2</td>
<td>SV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Has the kitchen been modified (or does it comply) to meet the special needs of the patient as determined by the case manager and patient?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 8, para 1-13</td>
<td>SG/SV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are appliances within acceptable reach?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are shelves/counters within acceptable reach?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are the floors clear of obstructions?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does area offer unimpeded mobility?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Laundry Facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Does the facility have laundry facilities?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 3</td>
<td>SV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Have government-owned washer/dryer been provided if the facility only has laundry hook-ups?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 3</td>
<td>SV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3. Has the laundry been modified (or does it comply) to meet the special needs of the patient as determined by the case manager and patient?
   - Are appliances within acceptable reach?
   - Are shelves/counters within acceptable reach?
   - Are the floors clear of obstructions?
   - Does area offer unimpeded mobility?

4. Furnishings

4.1. Have loaner furnishings been provided if required?

5. Electronics

5.1. Does the facility have a television with cable/satellite service?

5.2. Does the facility have a computer with an internet connection?

5.3. Does the facility have a telephone with at least a minimum local service?

5.4. Have the electronic support systems been modified (or do they comply) to meet the special needs of the patient as determined by the case manager and patient? Take into account length of rehabilitation period when viewing inclusion of additional electronic equipment (i.e. stereo, video game player, etc.)

6. Housekeeping/Pest Management
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>SV/CE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Does the facility have a regularly scheduled waste removal service?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Does the facility have housekeeping services if required by patient?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 8, para 8</td>
<td>SV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Has the facility been inspected/treated for pests?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 6</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Does the facility have a bio-hazard waste removal service if required by patient?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 8, para 8</td>
<td>CE/SV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>Landscaping, Grounds Maintenance and Parking</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Have provisions been made to maintain the facility grounds (i.e. in-house or by contract)?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 7</td>
<td>CE/SV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Does the facility have adequate parking?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 7</td>
<td>CE/SV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Does facility parking comply with the special needs of the patient as determined by the case manager and patient?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 8, para 12</td>
<td>CE/SV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are designated parking spots available for patient and care provider (if needed)?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Is parking within acceptable distance to facility?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Does area offer unimpeded mobility?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Has the facility been added to the snow removal plan?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 7</td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td><strong>Physical Security</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1.</td>
<td>Does the facility have adequate interior security (i.e. locks on doors, latches on windows, etc.)?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 8</td>
<td>CE/SV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.</td>
<td>Does the facility have adequate interior and exterior lighting, to include parking area?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 8</td>
<td>CE/SV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Other Areas</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9.1.</td>
<td>Has the bathroom been modified (or does it comply) to meet the special needs of the patient as determined by the case manager and patient?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 8, para 1-13</td>
<td>SG/CE/SV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2.</td>
<td>Has the bedroom been modified (or does it comply) with the special needs of the patient as determined by the case manager and patient?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 8, para 1-13</td>
<td>SG/CE/SV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3.</td>
<td>Has the facility entrance/egress been modified (or does it comply) to meet the special needs of the patient as determined by the case manager and patient?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 8, para 1-13</td>
<td>SG/CE/SV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Proximity to Treatment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10.1.</td>
<td>Does the proximity of the housing facility to the outpatient treatment facility meet the special needs of the patient as determined by the case manager and patient?</td>
<td>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 8, para 13</td>
<td>SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>10.2.</strong> Is adequate and accessible transportation to the outpatient treatment facility and other services provided if patient does not have personal mode of transport?</td>
<td><strong>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 8, para 13</strong></td>
<td><strong>SG</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>11.</strong> Building Maintenance and Housekeeping Requests</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>11.1.</strong> Has the base established an effective mechanism for requesting maintenance and housekeeping services?</td>
<td><strong>OSD Guidance Ltr, Sec 7, para 9</strong></td>
<td><strong>SG/CE/SV</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>12.</strong> Pre-Occupancy Inspection</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>12.1.</strong> Was the Pre-Occupancy Inspection conducted by the commander or designated representative?</td>
<td><strong>AFI 90-201, para A8.1.2.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>12.2.</strong> Have deficiencies annotated on the Pre-Occupancy Inspection been adequately addressed?</td>
<td><strong>AFI 90-201, para A8.1.2.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>12.3.</strong> Were any deficiencies from the Pre-Occupancy Inspection discovered on the IG inspection (repeat deficiency)?</td>
<td><strong>AFI 90-201, para A8.1.2.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table A9.1. Deficiency Cause Codes and explanations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Deficiency Cause Code Sub-Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equipment/Tools (EQ)</td>
<td>Adequacy of equipment/tools considered causal factor of deficiency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equipment/Tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-EQ1 Equipment reliability (e.g., inadequate equipment maintenance, equipment defect or design flaw)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-EQ2 Inadequate/Unavailable equipment (not resource driven for which refer to Resource Shortfall)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-EQ3 Equipment/Tool Accountability inadequate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guidance (GD)</td>
<td>Guidance is considered a causal factor in the deficiency. If GD code is used, provide specific guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cited and select GD4 or GD5 in addition to GD1, GD2 or GD3 as appropriate.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-GD1 Guidance used was inadequate or not available</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-GD2 Guidance used conflicted with other approved guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-GD3 Guidance used was obsolete or not approved</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-GD4 Inspected unit guidance (Wing or Below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-GD5 Other than inspected unit guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership/Supervision (LS)</td>
<td>Leadership or supervision considered a causal factor in the deficiency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership/Supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-LS1 Supervisor/leadership involvement insufficient (Define levels; e.g., team/flight chief, Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(SQ), Group (GP), Wing (WG) or higher headquarters)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-LS2 Ineffective communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-LS3 Decision making process ineffective (Risk Management)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resource Shortfall (RS)</td>
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<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work Environment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-LS4 Workforce effectiveness limited by existing human relations climate</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-LS5 Physical working conditions not conducive to productivity</td>
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<tr>
<td>-LS6 Ops Tempo/Workload</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use of Resources</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-LS7 Unit incorrectly prioritized available resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>-LS8 Unit failed to adequately program resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of resources considered causal factor of deficiency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funding Shortfall</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-RS1 Program shortfall (Air Force level)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-RS2 Program shortfall (MAJCOM level)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-RS3 Program shortfall (Wing/installation level)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-RS4 Parent unit withheld funding (applies to any unit through which funds are allocated/distributed superior to the unit in question)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel Shortfall</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-RS5 Assigned personnel less than accepted CONUS/OCONUS manning averages</td>
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<tr>
<td>-RS6 Insufficient personnel due to temporary duty/deployment</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-RS7 Insufficient personnel due to medical profile</td>
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<tr>
<td>-RS8 Insufficient personnel due to validated installation augmentee requirements shortfall</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-RS9 Awaiting security clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>-RS14 Insufficient personnel due to Personnel Reliability Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equipment Shortfall</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-RS10 Awaiting resupply</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-RS11 Not requisitioned</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-RS12 Maintenance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-RS13 Deployed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safety (SE)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Safety deviation considered causal factor of deficiency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aviation Safety Program Management / Implementation</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-SE1  Aviation Safety Program management inadequate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-SE2  Selected aspects of aviation safety program not effectively implemented (describe)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-SE3  Aviation Safety Supervisory support inadequate</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Safety Program Management / Implementation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-SE4  Occupational Safety Program management inadequate</td>
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<tr>
<td>-SE5  Selected aspects of occupational safety program not effectively implemented (describe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-SE6  Occupational Safety Supervisory support inadequate</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Space Safety Program Management / Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-SE7  Space Safety Program management inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-SE8  Selected aspects of space safety program not effectively implemented (describe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-SE9  Space Safety Supervisory support inadequate</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons Safety Program Management / Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-SE10 Weapons Safety Program management inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-SE11 Selected aspects of weapons safety program not effectively implemented (describe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-SE12 Weapons Safety Supervisory support inadequate</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training considered a causal factor in the deficiency</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training Program Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-TR1 Training Program management inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-TR2 Training guidance/policy/procedures inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-TR3 Training oversight inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-TR4 Training support inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-TR5 Controls/metrics of training process/progress inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Factors (HF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Program Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- TR6 Initial qualification training inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- TR7 Hands-on training inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- TR8 Upgrade/certification training inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- TR9 Training Supervisory support inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- TR10 Training evaluation tools inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- TR11 Training documentation inadequate/missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Influences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HF1 Ops tempo/Workload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HF2 Mission changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HF3 Physical environment interfered with performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition of Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HF4 Attention management (e.g., distraction/tunnel vision)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HF5 Emotional state interfered with performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HF6 Inappropriate motivation (e.g., complacency, burn out, overconfidence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HF7 Inappropriate substance use (e.g., drug, alcohol, self-mediated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HF8 Fatigue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HF9 Unreported medical condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HF10 Skill-based errors—flawed execution of task/procedure which has been highly learned and requires little conscious thought to perform. Most commonly caused by lapses of attention/memory or the use of techniques which are usually unnoticed, but caused an unacceptable performance (e.g., inadvertent operation, procedural error, checklist error).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HF11 Judgment/Decision making errors—have the necessary skills, experience and training but make a cognitive error resulting from inappropriate planning or choice (e.g., ignored caution/warning, inappropriate decision-making during operations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HF12 Intentional violations—willful non-compliance with the known rules or standards (e.g., common practice or &quot;everyone does,&quot; lack of discipline).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Attachment 10

THE AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM GOVERNANCE PROCESS CHARTER

A10.1. Purpose. The purpose of the Air Force Inspection System Governance Process is to continuously improve the Air Force Inspection System via changes to this instruction and other policy/guidance (as necessary). As a control mechanism for the Air Force Inspection System, the governance process enables enterprise-wide participation, HAF evaluation and shaping of the Air Force Inspection System, MAJCOM command chain decisions regarding the Air Force Inspection System, and preparation of decision-quality information for Senior Leader venues. The Air Force Inspection System Governance Process does not replace the Air Force coordination/approval process for this instruction or other policy documents.

A10.2. Organization. There are four components of the Air Force Inspection System Governance Process:

A10.2.1. The Inspection System Working Group. The Inspection System Working Group is chaired by SAF/IGI and is comprised of key HAF Functional Area Manager O-6/civilian equivalent representatives and MAJCOM IGs.

A10.2.2. The Inspector General Executive Steering Group is chaired by SAF/IG and is comprised of MAJCOM IGs and the AFIA Commander.

A10.2.3. The Inspector General Advisory Board is chaired by SAF/IG and is comprised of key HAF Senior Leaders outlined in Table A10.1.

A10.2.4. The Inspection System Council is chaired by SAF/IG and is comprised of MAJCOM/CDs and selected FOA/DRU Commanders outlined in Table A10.1.

A10.3. Methodology. SAF/IG may modify the Air Force Inspection System to meet SecAF/CSAF intent. Decisions reached by the Inspection System Working Group, Executive Steering Group, Inspector General Advisory Board, Inspection System Council, or during an alternative SAF/IG-led venue (to include Workshops, Process Review Groups, etc.) are incorporated into this instruction upon SAF/IG approval.

A10.3.1. Only those organizations indicated as voting members are authorized to vote through representatives to the Inspection System Working Group, Executive Steering Group, Inspector General Advisory Board, and Inspection System Council (as appropriate). Ordinarily, issues are resolved by consensus, but the Chair or any voting member may call for a vote on an issue requiring resolution. A quorum of at least 50 percent of the voting members plus one is required for a valid vote.

A10.3.2. Air Force agencies should submit requests to change, add, or remove an inspection activity listed in Attachment 2 or a high-risk inspection requirement listed in Attachment 3 of this instruction to the appropriate HAF Functional Area Manager for coordination. HAF Functional Area Managers may submit change requests to SAF/IGI for vetting. The request should include the recommended change, rationale, and Office of Primary Responsibility contact data for further coordination. Non-AF agencies should contact SAF/IGI with a request to change/add/remove an inspection activity in Attachment 2 of this instruction for SAF/IG determination.
A10.4. The Inspection System Working Group. The inspection system working group serves as the action arm of the IG advisory board and inspection system council. The inspection system working group staffs, discusses, refines, and resolves O-6-level tasks from the IG advisory board and inspection system council and integrates actions across the Air Force inspection system. Finally, the inspection system working group prepares and forwards issues and recommendations to the IG advisory board. The inspection system working group meets semi-annually.

A10.4.1. Voting membership. The inspection system working group is chaired by SAF/IGI and consists of O-6/equivalent representatives from the HAF functional area managers outlined in Table A10.1 and MAJCOM IGs.

A10.4.2. Responsibilities.

A10.4.2.1. SAF/IGI will:

A10.4.2.1.1. Arrange for a suitable location to host the Inspection System Working Group; meeting may take place via Defense Collaboration System.

A10.4.2.1.2. Send a proposed agenda to Inspection System Working Group members at least one month prior to the meeting.

A10.4.2.1.3. Send a finalized agenda and any read-ahead material to Inspection System Working Group members no later than one week prior to the meeting.

A10.4.2.1.4. Prepare recommendations and background information for consideration by SAF/IG, the Inspector General Advisory Board, the Executive Steering Group, and/or the Inspection System Council (as appropriate).

A10.4.2.2. Voting members will:

A10.4.2.2.1. Forward issues and proposals for changes to this instruction for discussion to SAF/IGI at least 2 weeks prior to the meeting (negative replies required).

A10.4.2.2.2. Provide bullet background papers and other pertinent data (slides) to SAF/IGI on any issue(s) to be discussed.

A10.5. The Inspector General Executive Steering Group. The executive steering group enables IG senior leadership to bridge cross-cutting topics, strengthen IG relationships between SAF/IG and MAJCOM IGs, integrate key issues, and make decisions and provide vectors to inform policy and other Air Force Inspection System governance meetings. The executive steering group meets semi-annually (offset from Air Force Inspection System Process Review Group meetings).

A10.5.1. Voting membership. The executive steering group is chaired by SAF/IG and is comprised of MAJCOM IGs, Air Force DRU IGs, the AFIA Commander, and the Director, SAF/IGI.

A10.5.2. Responsibilities.

A10.5.2.1. SAF/IGI will:

A10.5.2.1.1. Arrange for a suitable location to host the Executive Steering Group.

A10.5.2.1.2. Send out a proposed agenda to members at least two weeks prior to the meeting.
A10.5.2.1.3. Send out a finalized agenda and any read-ahead material to members no later than one week prior to the meeting.

A10.5.2.1.4. Identify priorities, provide vectors to Process Review Groups and make decisions on vetted or emerging issues.

A10.5.2.2. Voting members will:

A10.5.2.2.1. Make IG enterprise decisions on SECAF/CSAF guidance and propose changes to the Air Force Inspection System and this instruction.

A10.5.2.2.2. Discuss critical updates occurring in the IG enterprise and develop courses of action for decisions.

A10.5.2.2.3. Recommend issues to forward to the Inspector General Advisory Board.

A10.6. Inspector General Advisory Board. The Inspector General Advisory Board provides HAF Functional Area Managers and Senior Leaders a recurring forum to propose and evaluate changes to the Air Force Inspection System and to provide expertise and advice to SAF/IG, the Inspection System Council, and other Senior Leader venues. The Inspector General Advisory Board meets semi-annually.

A10.6.1. Voting membership. SAF/IG chairs the Inspector General Advisory Board, comprised of key Functional Area Managers or Deputies identified in Table A10.1. SAF/IGI is the Executive Secretary for the IG Advisory Board.

A10.6.2. Responsibilities.

A10.6.2.1. SAF/IG will:

A10.6.2.1.1. Make arrangements for an appropriate time and location to host the Inspector General Advisory Board.

A10.6.2.1.2. Send a proposed agenda to Inspector General Advisory Board members at least one month prior to the meeting.

A10.6.2.1.3. Send a finalized agenda and read-ahead material to Inspector General Advisory Board members no later than one week prior to the meeting.

A10.6.2.1.4. Brief inspection trends to the Inspector General Advisory Board (as applicable).

A10.6.2.1.5. Brief Inspection System Working Group action items and outputs (as applicable).

A10.6.2.1.6. Prepare recommendations from the Inspector General Advisory Board for consideration by the Inspection System Council (as applicable).

A10.6.2.2. Members will decide issues/concerns to be forwarded to the Inspection System Council for consideration.

A10.7. The Inspection System Council. The Inspection System Council provides MAJCOM and select FOA/DRU commanders a recurring forum to review the adequacy, effectiveness, and efficiency of the Air Force Inspection System and evaluate any proposed changes to ensure delivery of pertinent data and focus on commanders’ needs. The Inspection System Council meets annually or in conjunction with existing MAJCOM/CV meetings.
A10.7.1. Voting Membership. SAF/IG chairs the Inspection System Council, comprised of MAJCOM/CDs and select FOA/DRU Commanders identified in Table A10.1. SAF/IGI is the Executive Secretary for the Inspection System Council.

A10.7.2. Responsibilities.

A10.7.2.1. SAF/IG will:

A10.7.2.1.1. Make arrangements for an appropriate time and location to host the Inspection System Council.

A10.7.2.1.2. Send a proposed agenda to Inspection System Council members at least one month prior to the meeting.

A10.7.2.1.3. Send a finalized agenda and read-ahead material to Inspection System Council members no later than one week prior to the meeting.

A10.7.2.1.4. Brief inspection trends to the Inspection System Council.

A10.7.2.1.5. Prepare finalized changes to the Air Force Inspection System for publication in this instruction prior to the next Inspection System Council meeting.

Table A10.1. Air Force Inspection System Governance Membership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inspection System Working Group Member (O-6/GS-15 &amp; MAJCOM IG)</th>
<th>IG Executive Steering Group Member (MAJCOM IG)</th>
<th>IG Advisory Board Member (HAF Functional Area Manager)</th>
<th>Inspection System Council Member (MAJCOM/CV &amp; FOA/DRU/CC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAF/IG</td>
<td>X (SAF/IGI Chair)</td>
<td>X (Chair)</td>
<td>X (Chair)</td>
<td>X (Chair)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>AF/SG</td>
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<td>X (ANGRC/CC)</td>
<td>X (NGB/DCF)</td>
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<td>AFRC</td>
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</tr>
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<td>AFDW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAFA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A11.1. **Air Force IG Training Course-Inspections.** IG-assigned inspectors will complete the one-time mandatory IG Training Course-Inspections prior to certification. (T-1) AFIA/ET will post IG Training Course-Inspections schedule and courseware on the Air Force IG World Classroom site. Complaints Resolution IG personnel must attend IG Training Course-Inspections to meet certification requirements in order to conduct Air Force Inspection System inspections. (T-1) Coordinate with MAJCOM IGs (NGB/IG for ANG units) to schedule the IG Training Course-Inspections.

A11.2. **AFIA and MAJCOM training.** AFIA and MAJCOM IGs will develop organization-specific training to address specialized team, functional area, and host-nation information for inspectors and inspection augmentees. AFIA and MAJCOM training is intended to supplement (not replace) The Air Force IG Training Course. Additionally, AFIA will develop Management Inspection-specific training and provide instruction to those organization’s pursuing certification to conduct Management Inspections (see Attachment 4 of this instruction).

A11.3. **Wing training.** MAJCOM IGs will establish guidelines for Wing IG training programs. Wing IGs will develop Wing-specific training based on available AFIA course material, MAJCOM guidelines, and commander inspection intent to train IG-assigned inspectors, Wing Inspection Team members, and inspection augmentees. (T-1)

A11.4. **Executive training.** MAJCOM IGs will attend the SAF IG-administered one-day Executive IG Course at the Pentagon within six months of appointment.

A11.5. **Field observation.** Field observation is an over-the-shoulder shadowing by a certified inspector to observe inspection methodology and assess readiness for inspection duties. IG-assigned inspectors and inspection augmentees will receive a field observation by a certified inspector prior to performing unsupervised inspection duties. (T-3) IGs determine field observation scope and scale. Field observations may be conducted during any inspection or on-site visit conducted by the respective IG.

A11.6. **Inspector currency.** IG inspectors, MAJCOM inspection augmentees and Wing Inspection Team members who have not inspected in the previous six months will accomplish MAJCOM- or Installation/Wing-specific refresher training prior to participating in an inspection. (T-3) The extent of refresher training is determined by the respective IG.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A11.1. Inspector Certification Training Requirements.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF/IG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFIA Inspector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A11.2. Inspection Augmentee Training Requirements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>MAJCOM Training</th>
<th>Wing Training</th>
<th>Field Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAJCOM Inspection</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augmentee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wing Inspection Team Member</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

✓ Denotes training requirement

• Denotes additional inspector requirement for Nuclear Surety Inspections
Attachment 12

AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM TOOLS

A12.1. IGEMS Business Rules.

A12.1.1. IGs will post inspection reports in IGEMS within five duty days of final report completion (for ANG units and Air Force Reserve units, within 1 Regularly Scheduled Drill). (T-1)

A12.1.2. IGs will ensure the following data (at a minimum) is entered into IGEMS:

A12.1.2.1. IG-identified deficiencies (assigned to the appropriate organizational points of contact to resolve). (T-1) There may be some cases where an inspector can detect and solve small issues on the spot (e.g. incorrect uniform wear). In these cases, IGs can make corrections without an IGEMS entry. However, an IGEMS entry is warranted if there is a trend of these small, isolated cases to ensure leadership awareness and corrective action. IGs should enter deficiencies found by non-IG inspectors into IGEMS only after assessing and validating the deficiencies. Inspection augmentees may also enter data in Functional Area Manager data systems in addition to (not in lieu of) IGEMS.

A12.1.2.2. IGs will ensure Corrective Action Plans and Deficiency Cause Codes (see Attachment 9) are entered within five duty days (within one Regularly Scheduled Drill for ARC) of Corrective Action Plan acceptance. (T-1) See Chapter 9 for deficiency guidance.

A12.1.3. IG teams will use the classified version of IGEMS for classified inspection reporting (including Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection reports in accordance with CJCS Instruction 3263.05). (T-1)

A12.2. MICT Business Rules.

A12.2.1. Any Air Force publication which levies Wing-level (or lower) compliance may have an associated SAC. However, do not author a SAC if there are no Wing-level requirements which require real-time communication.

A12.2.2. Updated SACs are released quarterly (January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1). Commanders will assess new or updated SACs within 30 calendar days (2 Regularly Scheduled Drill cycles for ARC). (T-1)

A12.2.3. Requirements from more than one AFI or AFI-directed program may be consolidated into a single SAC. Conversely, multiple SACs may be written for a single AFI for AFI s affecting multiple organizational levels within a Wing. A single AFI may generate a SAC for a Wing-level program, a Group-level program, a Squadron-level program, and/or a work center program. Tailoring communicators to the specific level of assessment preserves the value of Airmen’s time and provides data specific to each demographic.

A12.2.4. Do not reference an individual compliance item in multiple SACs unless it applies to multiple organizational levels (i.e. Wing, Group, Squadron, etc.).

A12.2.5. SAC authors will only reference Wing-level (or below) compliance items in an AFI (or other directive publication) and include the associated tier waiver level assigned in the reference publication for each line item in accordance with AFI 33-360.
A12.2.6. HAF SAC authors will only reference compliance items for which the 2-letter is the approving official (e.g., an AF/A2 SAC may not include items from an AF/A1 AFI). HAF SAC authors may also reference higher than Air Force-level compliance items from policy documents for which the 2-letter has been assigned responsibility (e.g., an AF/A10 SAC may include nuclear DoD Instruction compliance items). HAF SACs should contain less than 20 items and will contain no more than 50 items.

A12.2.7. Pertinent Oversight Authority staffs may author SACs for owned supplements which drive Wing-level (or lower) compliance. Pertinent Oversight Authority SACs may include up to 20 higher-level guidance (i.e. HAF or DoD) items, provided existing SAC items are not duplicated. For highly-specialized functions not represented by a HAF Functional Area Manager, Pertinent Oversight Authorities are exempt from the 20-item restriction and may develop and publish SACs which include higher-level guidance. Pertinent Oversight Authorities may develop SACs with up to 50 items if no HAF SAC exists. Pertinent Oversight Authority staffs should annotate any required documents required to answer a SAC item.

**Figure A12.1. Self-Assessment Communicator (SAC) Author Guide.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compliance Items</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Does the benefit outweigh the cost for this item?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Is this information only available in MICT?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Do you or the intended audience have time to track this item?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Can the intended audience make data-driven decisions from assessments of this item?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Is this compliance item within your functional authority or “lane”?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Can the assessment item be answered with yes, no or N/A?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you answered “Yes” to all six (6) of these questions, this compliance item is a good candidate for inclusion in a SAC.

A12.2.8. Wings may write local checklists for Wing-level supplements which drive Wing-level (or lower) compliance.

A12.2.8.1. Unlike SACs, there are no restrictions on line-item content in local checklists. Commanders should pay judicious attention to the quantity of checklist items added and the time spent tracking them.

A12.2.8.2. At no time will Airmen use local checklists in lieu of SACs. (T-1) Completion of a local checklist item does not fulfill the requirement to assess a SAC item.

A12.2.9. SAC authors will post new SACs within 10 duty days of posting a new publication. For updated publications or routine SAC updates, SAC authors may only update or change SACs during scheduled quarterly updates.

A12.2.9.1. SAC authors will review each SAC annually and update the reviewed date in MICT.
A12.2.9.2. For changes to an AFI, SAC authors will update affected SAC line-items during the next quarterly update cycle.

A12.2.10. Naming Conventions. SAC authors will use one of the following naming conventions:

A12.2.10.1. When using a single AFI as the reference for a SAC, use the AFI number along with the long title of the AFI (e.g., “AFI 14-104 Oversight of Intelligence Activities”).

A12.2.10.2. When placing a single AFI’s requirements in multiple SACs, and those SACs do not reference other AFIs, then add a descriptive adjective to the end of the title (e.g., “AFI 90-301 IG Complaints Resolution - Reports of Investigation” and “AFI 90-301 IG Complaints Resolution - Complaints Resolution Program”).

A12.2.10.3. When naming a SAC which uses multiple AFIs as its reference, use the functional program name as the SAC title (e.g., Physical Security, Computer Security, etc.)

A12.2.10.4. When naming a SAC for a policy supplement, use the HAF naming convention and include the supplementing organization identifier (e.g., “AFI 14-104 Oversight of Intelligence Activities – ACC Sup”).
Attachment 13

HAF SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM INSPECTION ELEMENTS

A13.1. Purpose. To provide guidance for inspecting HAF Special Access Programs in order to report on the health, security and compliance of Special Access Programs to the Secretary of the Air Force.

A13.2. HAF Special Access Program inspection team parameters.

A13.2.1. Pre-inspection (5 duty days).
   A13.2.1.1. Research: review unit mission, programs, purpose, customers.
   A13.2.1.2. Schedule interviews if appropriate.
   A13.2.1.3. Review major processes, lines of operation and deliverables.

A13.2.2. Inspection (2-5 duty days).
   A13.2.2.1. Organize under the four MGAs.
   A13.2.2.2. Execute Airmen-to-IG Sessions-Individual/Group.
   A13.2.2.3. Assess agency compliance with applicable directives.
   A13.2.2.4. Stakeholder SMEs review compliance with guidance, status of deliverables, reports, and systems.
   A13.2.2.5. Review steps in major process flows and steps in lines of operation.
   A13.2.2.6. Security Control Assessors inspect approval/authority to operate, proper Information Technology configuration, authorized users, Information Technology security.
   A13.2.2.7. Rate overall performance and MGAs using a two-tiered scale of EFFECTIVE or INEFFECTIVE.
   A13.2.2.8. Provide informal out-brief to Director/Commander and key staff.

A13.2.3. Post-inspection (14-21 days).
   A13.2.3.1. Final report signed by the inspection Team Chief and delivered to Commander or Director with courtesy copy provided to SAF/AA and any required Stakeholder SME office.
   A13.2.3.2. Results of inspections briefed to Air Force SAPCO and then briefed at Special Access Program Oversight Review Board.
   A13.2.3.3. In the event of an INEFFECTIVE rating, the unit must develop and brief a Corrective Action Plan to SAF/AAZ at the Special Access Program Oversight Review Board until the deficiency is corrected and SAF/AAZ deems it may be closed. Courtesy
copy SAF/IGI on published corrective action plans until the deficiency is closed via SAF/AAZ concurrence.