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PROTECTIVE SERVICE MATTERS

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command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the publication Office of Primary Responsibility for non-tiered compliance items.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document has been substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. This rewrite updates tiered waiver authorities for unit level compliance items.

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Chapter 1

PROGRAM OVERVIEW AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1.1. Overview. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) is the lead agency within the DAF authorized to provide protective services, including long-term protective service operations (PSOs), when the requester and AFOSI jointly deem such protection necessary. **(T-1)** **Chapter 3** outlines PSO considerations. **(T-0)** The Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General (SAF/IG), resolves disputes between AFOSI and requesters. **(T-1)**

1.2. Responsibilities.

1.2.1. The SAF/IG exercises oversight responsibility for all special vehicle acquisitions to combat terrorist threats via SAF/IGX.

1.2.2. AFOSI is responsible for training and equipping Military Law Enforcement (MIL/LE) personnel permanently assigned to AFOSI in support of PSO and/or assigned to Protective Service Details (PSD). **(T-1)** AFOSI will:

1.2.2.1. Make the final selection of MIL/LE personnel on each particular PSD.

1.2.2.2. Investigate threats made by DAF personnel against DAF or Department of Defense (DoD) officials and refer threats made by civilians or threatening information from civilians to the United States Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. **(T-2)**

1.2.2.3. Monitor threat investigations affecting the DAF. **(T-2)**

1.2.2.4. Train defense forces on protective support functions. **(T-2)**

1.2.2.5. Notify the responsible AFOSI Personal Security Advisor (PSA) of threats to high-risk personnel (HRP). **(T-1)**

1.2.2.6. In coordination with the AFOSI Detail Leader, request PSO assistance from the installation Defense Force Commander to obtain the following on-base support:

1.2.2.6.1. Traffic control.

1.2.2.6.2. Installation perimeter security and entry and exit control to include expedited installation gate entry procedures.

1.2.2.6.3. Checkpoints, crowd control, and surveillance security posts.

1.2.2.6.4. Security for principal's aircraft.

1.2.2.6.5. Perimeter security for principal's on-base residence.

1.2.2.6.6. Other support the AFOSI PSD Leader and the installation Defense Force Commander agree upon.

1.2.2.7. Manage the AFOSI armored vehicle fleet to determine when to use an armored vehicle to protect designated HRP. **Note:** This responsibility can be delegated to the local PSD.

1.2.2.8. Lead the Commercial Armored Vehicle (CAV) Working Group to address CAV requirements. At a minimum, the CAV Working Group will include participants from SAF/IGX, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection (AF/A4), and AFOSI Financial Management and Comptroller Directorate (AFOSI/FM).

1.2.2.9. Allocate AFOSI armored vehicles in coordination with AFOSI region commanders or their designated security elements and representatives of the CAV Working Group.

1.2.2.10. Coordinate tactical deployments of AFOSI armored vehicles with supported commands.

1.2.2.11. Establish continuity of AFOSI armored vehicle support agreements with supported commands.

1.2.2.12. Provide hands-on orientation to drivers and maintenance personnel on the operation and special care required for AFOSI armored vehicles.

1.2.2.12.1. Establish training standards.

1.2.2.12.2. Ensure that training is accomplished for personnel assigned as drivers for DAF senior leaders.

1.2.2.12.3. Coordinate driver participation in advanced driving courses.

1.2.2.13. Prepare current threat assessments to accompany installation commanders' requests for vehicle requirements resulting from terrorist threats.

1.2.2.14. Provide and/or certify specialized antiterrorism defensive and evasive driver courses (e.g., the Senior Leader Security Seminar, AFOSI PSO course, or other training provided by a certified driving instructor).

1.2.2.15. Evaluate AFOSI armored vehicles and protective systems.

1.2.2.16. Complete a Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan (RAMP) for each individual nominated for a permanent HRP position in accordance with (IAW) DoD Instruction (DoDI) O-2000.22, *Designation and Physical Protection of DoD High-Risk Personnel*. **(T-0)**

1.2.2.16.1. AFOSI will initiate a RAMP within 90 days of an official's assignment to an HRP position and submit the completed RAMP to the HRP's Component Head within 120 days of an official's assignment to the HRP position. **(T-0)**

1.2.2.16.2. AFOSI will validate RAMPs annually and update RAMPs when threats, vulnerabilities, or terrorism threat levels change.

1.2.2.17. Ensure all members authorized to arm under AFOSI credentials have completed individual qualifications specific to the make and model of the weapon. **Note:** All members authorized to arm under AFOSI credentials are required to carry any AFOSI controlled USG-issued duty weapon assigned to them IAW DAFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force*, and DAFI 31-131, *Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM) Program*.

1.2.3. Major Commands and Field Commands will:

1.2.3.1. Establish a focal point for AFOSI-assigned armored vehicles.

1.2.3.2. Validate special vehicle requests in response to terrorist threats through SAF/IGX; submit validated requests to the Materiel Support Division, Directorate of Logistics (AF/A4LR).

1.2.3.3. Fund incurred armored vehicle transportation costs as a result of command-initiated transfers, reallocations, or deployments.

1.2.3.4. Fund maintenance and repair costs of armored vehicles.

1.2.4. DAF installation commanders maintain responsibility for the safety and security of all assigned and visiting personnel. **(T-1)**

1.2.5. DAF personnel will immediately notify the local AFOSI unit when learning of a specific threat against any HRP.

Chapter 2

PROTECTIVE SERVICES AND ARMORED VEHICLES

2.1. Protective Service Detail. The AFOSI PSA assigns MIL/LE personnel to PSDs for high-risk operations and is the final authority of who may and may not support PSOs. **(T-1)**

2.1.1. MIL/LE personnel assigned to a PSD will operate under the direction and guidance of AFOSI.

2.1.1.1. Permanent PSDs will be trained IAW DoDI O-2000.22 and capable of filling the following roles: Detail Leader, Shift Leader, Advance Agent, Limousine Driver, and Chase/Follow Driver.

2.1.1.2. Other PSO positions that are dependent on the specific missions are Command Post personnel, and Left Rear, Right Rear, and a Well Agent to ride in the rear of the Chase Vehicle.

2.2. Protective Service Operations Equipment Requirements. MIL/LE personnel on permanent assignment to a PSD in the performance of a PSO will equip with armored and non-armored transportation, personal protective equipment, surveillance and communication equipment, and offensive and defensive weapons systems. This equipment includes, but is not limited to, the following:

2.2.1. Vehicles with mobile emergency light kits, two-way ultra-high frequency vehicle radios, a ballistic blanket, a weapons storage kit, and a weapons rack.

2.2.1.1. PSO missions require, at a minimum, two armored or non-armored, large sport utility vehicles or sedans designated as Limousine and Chase/Follow vehicles. Type of vehicles used will be determined by the AFOSI PSA and threat level. Reference Title 31 United States Code (USC) Section 1344, *Passenger Carrier Use*; DoD Manual (DoDM) 4500.36, *Acquisition, Management, and Use of DoD Non-Tactical Vehicles*, and AFI 24-302, *Vehicle Management*.

2.2.1.2. DoDI O-2000.22 and DoDI O-2000.27, *DoD Senior Foreign Official Visit Program*, identifies the restricted use of the class IV vehicles. **(T-0)**

2.2.2. Personal Protective Equipment that includes low-profile non-standard issue law enforcement Level IIIA body armor for improved concealment; tactical Level IV body armor; a vest carrier that allows for the flexibility of movement; and a protective helmet that provides adequate protection to the head without hindering the visibility of the operator.

2.2.3. Surveillance equipment must be manageable enough for one person to efficiently transport, set up, and remove it. Additionally, video surveillance equipment must produce high-definition resolution, be equipped with motion and contact sensors, be accessible from smart media devices, and contain the following capabilities: infrared and night vision, time-lapse playback, internal memory storage, and television streaming.

2.2.4. Communication equipment will include Wi-Fi[®] ready, tri-band, two-way radios, and holsters concealable in business attire and casual civilian clothing. Radios should have wired and/or wireless dual ear pairing capability. Surveillance kits must allow for intercepting environmental acoustics.

2.2.5. PSD personnel train and equip with 9-millimeter caliber submachine guns and 5.56 millimeter caliber short barrel rifles in the support of PSO missions, in addition to the authorized primary duty weapon (handgun).

2.2.6. Trauma medical bags that include individual first-aid kits, tourniquets, blood clotting materials, an automated external defibrillator, and other specialized medical items as dictated by the mission.

2.2.7. Other equipment including global positioning tracking and navigation system; breaching tool kit; and cellular based encrypted push to talk communication applications.

2.3. Protection of Designated High-Risk Personnel. AFOSI will provide a PSD to conduct PSOs and conduct other protective assistance for permanent HRP positions and their HRP level. HRP positions include: the SecAF; the Chief of Staff of the Air Force; Chief of Space Operations; Combatant Commanders; and other HRP as directed. **(T-0)** Reference DoDI O-2000.22, for PSD size ranges and authorized deviations per HRP level position.

2.3.1. Installation commanders will not independently request protective services for HRP personnel from their servicing AFOSI office. **(T-1)**

2.3.2. AFOSI will appoint a PSA to coordinate protective services and other protective assistance for HRP. **(T-1)**

2.3.3. Local commanders will not initiate protective service measures for HRP without prior approval of the AFOSI PSA assigned to the visiting HRP. **(T-1)**

2.3.4. AFOSI may provide annual antiterrorism briefings specifically addressing personal and family security, travel security, driving security, and hostage survival to designated HRPs.

2.4. Travel of Designated High Risk Personnel. AFOSI will conduct a Protective Threat Assessment (PTA) for each stop on a designated HRP's official travel itinerary to determine the level of protection required. **(T-1)**

2.4.1. AFOSI will produce PTAs, coordinated with appropriate DoD protection providing organizations (PPO), intelligence, federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement and/or security agencies for all travel in which the HRP will be off-base or overseas. **(T-1)**

2.4.2. The AFOSI PSA will make the final determination on the level of security required based on the PTA results after coordinating with the designated HRP, or their designated representative.

2.4.3. Protective services during official travel ranges from supplying the HRP's staff with a point of contact list for the target visit area to a full PSD, depending on the event, location, and threat. Protective services for unofficial travel to high threat locations requires approval by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) or the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef); otherwise, such support may be approved by the SecAF.

2.4.4. The AFOSI PSA will coordinate protective measures for designated HRP at travel destinations. Principals may decline protection but will not dictate protective posture. The PSA will document all instances when protection is offered and declined via memorandum for record. **(T-1)**

2.5. Protective Services for Foreign Guests.

2.5.1. IAW DoDI O-2000.27, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) Foreign Liaison Office notifies AFOSI of pending visits by foreign guests; such visits require PSO coverage and therefore PTA coordination is required for all such visits. **(T-0)**

2.5.2. The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Director of Staff (SAF/DS), notifies AFOSI of pending visits by foreign guests of the DAF, which may require PSO coverage, and coordination of a PTA is required for all such visits. **(T-1)**

2.5.3. IAW the DoD Senior Foreign Official Visit Program, all such visits will be coordinated with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

2.6. Protective Assistance to Other Department of Defense Agencies.

2.6.1. AFOSI maintains liaison with the other DoD PPOs and, when resources permit, aids those agencies when their principals visit DAF installations or areas where AFOSI has primary jurisdiction.

2.6.2. AFOSI, as determined by the PSA, will request support from other DoD PPOs, local, state, federal, and host nation security and law enforcement to provide mutual assistance on PSD operations, when practical, to augment and enhance joint operations, and to reduce costs and the need to have large, permanent details. **(T-0)**

2.7. Protection of Other Officials or Dignitaries. When necessary, and when resources permit, AFOSI works with other federal, state, and local agencies to protect officials or dignitaries visiting a DAF installation or attending a DAF event.

2.8. Threatened Airman Program. DoDI O-2000.22, Enclosure 4, defines procedures for temporary physical protection and personal security of victims and witnesses under the Threatened Airmen Program.

2.8.1. The OUSD(I&S) authorizes the required approval of a PSD for outside the continental United States missions.

2.8.2. The SecDef or DepSecDef authorizes the required approval of a PSD for continental United States missions.

2.8.3. All requests will be sent through AFOSI to SAF/IGX for coordination through Office of the Secretary of Defense.

2.9. Other Services.

2.9.1. AFOSI establishes training standards and ensures training is accomplished for personnel assigned as drivers for DAF senior leaders.

2.9.2. AFOSI coordinates driver participation in advanced driving courses.

2.9.3. PSAs will document all instances in which drivers assigned to senior DAF leaders declined attendance in advanced driving courses. **(T-1)**

2.10. Armored Vehicle Logistics and Alternate Considerations.

2.10.1. Procurement of CAVs will be handled IAW DoDM 4500.36 and AFI 24-302, *Vehicle Management*. **(T-0)**

2.10.2. When warranted by the local threat, achieve transportation security objectives through selective use of CAVs, unarmored indigenous vehicles, vehicle painting and marking exemptions, and domicile-to-duty transportation. Refer to DoDM 4500.36 and AFI 24-301, *Ground Transportation*.

2.10.3. CAV drivers will not exceed the armoring firm's recommended top speed, as armoring significantly adds to a vehicle's weight and required stopping distance. **(T-3)**

2.10.3.1. Driving CAVs is restricted to authorized individuals trained in defensive and evasive driving techniques. Authorized individuals include but are not limited to military members or persons occupying high-risk billets (does not include any dependents), Security Forces, AFOSI Special Agents, Logistics Readiness Squadron personnel, and foreign nationals assigned as drivers for individuals in high-risk billets. Other individuals may be authorized (in writing) on a case-by-case basis depending on specific circumstances surrounding the use of the CAV in their respective area of responsibility.

2.10.3.2. All drivers must have successfully completed specialized antiterrorism defensive and evasive driver training.

2.10.4. Prolonged exposure to the elements causes delamination and loss of the rated ballistic defeat capabilities of the transparent armor; therefore, garage armored vehicles when possible. At a minimum, park armored vehicles under a cover, such as a carport, to prevent long term damage.

2.10.5. When an armored vehicle is determined to be excess or unserviceable by the host vehicle maintenance activity, AFOSI will attempt to reallocate any serviceable excess armored vehicles IAW AFI 24-302.

Chapter 3

PROTECTIVE SERVICE OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS

3.1. Responsibilities. The DAF may protect its leaders and official guests from acts which jeopardize their safety and security, impedes their mission or has potential for embarrassment.

3.1.1. The United States Government holds host foreign governments responsible for the safety of United States citizens overseas. The DAF may provide protective services off base in overseas areas only under circumstances that conform to local Status of Forces Agreements, treaties, agreements, or laws.

3.1.2. AFOSI is the focal point within the DAF for all liaison activity with the United States Secret Service, the Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and all other federal, state, and local agencies regarding protective service missions.

3.2. Protecting Others:

3.2.1. AFOSI may provide protection to family members of a HRP when authorized by the SecDef, or DepSecDef within the United States, or the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP) outside the United States.

3.2.2. AFOSI may not provide support or services for non-Air Force or non-DoD related principals in an off-base environment without specific approval from SecDef, or DepSecDef within the United States, or the OUSDP outside the United States.

3.3. Requesting Protective Services. Request AFOSI protective services only in the following situations:

3.3.1. There is an imminent and credible threat or compelling operational considerations concerning approved HRP IAW DoDI O-2000.22.

3.3.2. A DAF leader or official guest must perform a mission in an environment which places that person at significant and abnormal risk, in other than a wartime situation.

3.3.3. When in support of a long term PSO conducted for HRP, AFOSI PSOs are initiated only for noncombatant senior DAF officials required to be there temporarily for fact-finding or other essential reasons. Other senior military officials will be protected only if specifically requested or directed by the Theater Commander.

3.4. Advisors. AFOSI and installation Defense Force Commanders serve as key advisors to commanders in determining reasonable protective measures.

3.5. Authority. Final authority to make all decisions affecting the safety and security of the principal and AFOSI protective service personnel rests with the AFOSI PSA.

STEPHEN L. DAVIS
Lieutenant General, USAF
The Inspector General

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

31 USC Section 1344, *Passenger Carrier Use*

DoDI O-2000.22, *Designation and Physical Protection of DoD High Risk Personnel*, 19 June 2014

DoDI O-2000.27, *DoD Senior Foreign Official Visit Program*, 20 December 2012

DoDM 4500.36, *Acquisition, Management, and Use of Non-Tactical Vehicles*, 7 July 2015

AFMD 39, *Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI)*, 12 February 2024

AFPD 71-1, *Criminal Investigations and Counterintelligence*, 1 July 2019

AFI 24-302, *Vehicle Management*, 21 February 2020

AFI 24-301, *Ground Transportation*, 22 October 2019

DAFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force*, 28 January 2025

DAFI 31-131, *Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM) Program*, 1 April 2025

AFI 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, 23 March 2020

DAFMAN 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures*, 18 October 2023

Prescribed Forms

None

Adopted Forms

DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

Acronyms

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFMD—Air Force Mission Directive

AFOSI—Air Force Office of Special Investigations

CAV—Commercial Armored Vehicles

DAF—Department of the Air Force

DAFMAN—Department of the Air Force Manual

DepSecDef—Deputy Secretary of Defense

DoD—Department of Defense

DoDI—Department of Defense Instruction

DoDM—Department of Defense Manual

HRP—High-Risk Personnel

IAW—In Accordance With

MIL/LE—Military Law Enforcement

OSD—Office of the Secretary of Defense

OUSDP—Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

PPO—Protection Providing Organizations

PSA—Personal Security Advisor

PSD—Protective Service Detail

PSO—Protective Service Operations

PTA—Protective Threat Assessment

RAMP—Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan

SecAF—Secretary of the Air Force

SecDef—Secretary of Defense

Office Symbols

AF/A4—Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection

AF/A4LR—Materiel Support Division, Directorate of Logistics

AFOSI/FM—AFOSI Financial Management and Comptroller Directorate

OUSD(I&S)—Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

SAF/DS—Office of the Secretary the Air Force, Director of Staff

SAF/IG—The Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General

SAF/IGX—The Secretary of the Air Force, Inspector General, Special Investigations

Terms

Advance Agent—Conducts route and site surveys of places to be visited. Guides detail and principal to the event site and provides site updates, guides Principal to site/event. The advance agent must have strong working knowledge of the route, site and local area.

Commercial Armored Vehicle (CAV)—These vehicles are often referred to as non-tactical light or heavy armored vehicles. CAVs are commercially designed and manufactured motor vehicles, with a fully armored configuration, procured for the physical security of personnel such as certain key DoD officials or visiting dignitaries.

Detail Leader/Agent in Charge—Protective Agent in charge/Detail Leader of the overall protective mission. A protective service specialist assigned/detailed to AFOSI who is assigned overall responsibility for the personal safety and security of a principal during a PSO. The detail leader is authorized to make decisions on all matters concerning the immediate personal safety and security of the principal. The detail leader rides in front passenger seat of the limousine (or vehicle carrying the principal).

High-Risk Personnel (HRP)—United States personnel and their family members whose grade, assignment, travel itinerary, or symbolic value may make them an especially attractive or accessible terrorist target. HRPs are designated by policy, position, or by special circumstance through the processes; DoDI-O 2000.22.

Limousine Driver—Responsible for overall planning, operations and execution related to the follow car and motorcade route. Coordinates with the Follow/Chase Driver.

Military Law Enforcement (MIL/LE)—Comprised of Military Police, Security Forces, and/or Master-at-Arms.

Personal Security Advisor (PSA)—An individual assigned to an HRP's staff to evaluate and recommend improvements to the HRP's security posture, particularly in planning foreign travel, as required. The PSA plans, administers, and supervises the protective details and is responsible for assignments, personnel, equipment. Primary conduit to the HRP's and the Staff. When the HRP travels, the PSA collects threat data, recommends security measures, and requests additional PSD support as appropriate; DoDI O-2000.22.

Protection Providing Organizations (PPO)—Refers collectively to United States Army Criminal Investigation Command, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, AFOSI, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, and Pentagon Force Protective Agency; DoDI O-2000.22.

Principal—Another name for the HRP of a PSO. A principal may or may not be a distinguished visitor.

Protective Service—A specialized activity which increases the personal safety and security of a distinguished visitor or other principal. The activity may be limited to a protective threat assessment or may extend to a major PSO involving considerable manpower and resources.

Protective Service Detail (PSD)—Trained and armed protective security officials capable of providing continuous protection for a designated individual. The detail includes the total number needed to sustain the levels described in DoDI O-2000.22, Table 2.

Protective Service Operation (PSO)—The use of specialized techniques and procedures by trained personnel to ensure a principal's personal safety and security during a specific event, while traveling, or over an extended period of time.

Long Term PSO—Any PSO which lasts longer than 30 days and does not have a known termination date. Usually, AFOSI conducts such operations to protect against a specific threat or vulnerability when the principal cannot be relocated.

Protective Threat Assessment (PTA)—Collecting and analyzing information to identify direct and potential threats to harm, seize, interfere with, or embarrass a specific principal, as well as to determine the existing and anticipated security environment. A PTA is always the initial phase of a PSO.

Risk Assessment and Mitigation Plan (RAMP)—An assessment to determine the vulnerability of a particular individual to an attack. Identifies specific areas of improvement to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or terrorism against the individual. RAMP is the DAF implementation of DoDI O-2000.22's Personal Security Vulnerability Assessment.

Shift Leader—Tactical commander of the protective detail. Normally one shift leader per eight-hour shift. Makes teams assignments. Updates the Detail Leader on issues (schedules, movements, assignments, logistics, etc.) as required. Handles all notifications while PSO is moving. Rides in the front passenger seat of the chase/follow car.