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AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
COMMAND**

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VOLUME 3**



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**Security Operations**

**DEPLOYED AIRCRAFT GROUND  
RESPONSE ELEMENT (DAGRE)  
OPERATIONS**

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This instruction implements DoDIO-2000.16V1\_DAFI31-145-O, *Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation*, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Directive 525-8, *Joint Special Operations Air Component*; and AFMAN 11-202 V3, *Flight Operations*, applicable Security Chapters. This publication applies to all AFSOC units to include ANG and AFRC units. Section 1A provides AFSOC commanders and planners guidance for incorporating force protection into mission planning and execution in support of operational and contingency plans. Section 2A provides required information to manage Active Duty, ANG and AFRC Deployed Air Ground Response Element (DAGRE) UTCs. It does not pertain to Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) and generation UTCs. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained IAW AFI 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, and disposed of IAW Air Force Records Information Management System Records Disposition Schedule. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the OPR using the DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route DAF Forms 847 from the field through MAJCOM channels to AFSOC/A4IS. Units are not authorized to supplement any of the contents of this instruction. Units are not authorized to supplement any of the contents of this instruction. The authority to waive requirements in this publication is AFSOC/A4 unless stated otherwise. The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier ("T-0, T-1, T-2, or T-3") number following the compliance statement. See DAFMAN 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures*, for a description of the

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### ***SUMMARY OF CHANGES***

This publication is the first iteration of AFSOCI 31-100 V3. DAGRE training was previously addressed in AFSOCI31-100, *Special Operations Force Protection Planning And Operations*.

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## Chapter 1

### GENERAL INFORMATION.

**1.1. General.** This AFI provides guidelines and restrictions for DAGRE team operations and applies to all units with DAGRE Unit Type Codes (UTC). This instruction is written for normal and contingency operations to reduce procedural changes at the onset of contingencies. When guidance in this AFI conflicts with another basic/source document, that document takes precedence. For matters where this AFI is the source document, waiver authority is with HQ AFSOC/A4I. DAGRE teams provide worldwide security and Force Protection (FP) planning capabilities for AFSOC/SOF assets transiting through airfields, helicopter landing zones and locations where security is unknown or inadequate. When directed, AFSOC will employ mission-tailored DAGRE teams to support combatant commander's regional objectives. They will advise the mission commander (MC) on FP measures, conduct FP surveys, provide close-in security for United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and AFSOC Aircraft and personnel, and assist with SOF-led tactical security detail operations.

**1.2. DAGRE Team (QFMIC) Concept.** DAGRE teams are rapidly deployable, dedicated force protection for AFSOC assets. This 5-person team is comprised of one 7-level TSgt Team Leader (SF) (unless waived by A4IS) and four 5-level (SF) members in the ranks of SrA through SSgt. DAGRE teams are specially trained and designed to provide world-wide deployed aircraft security, as well as FP for missions under the control of the AFSOC MC.

1.2.1. Duties: Provide focused FP for USSOCOM/AFSOC aircraft transiting thru airfields where security is unknown or deemed inadequate to counter local threats. FP advisor for the MC, conducts FP surveys, provides close-in security, and assists with SOF led Tactical Security Detail. Ensure adequate security for AFSOC/SOF resources by assessing and interfacing with other in-place DoD and host nation base defense forces and coordinating with OSI when available. Teams may perform other security missions as required by the Mission Commander (MC) to ensure SOF mission success.

1.2.2. Additional Information: The five-person team composition is based on providing two, 2-person teams working alternating 12-hour shifts and the TL working a 12-hour shift between the two teams. Additional teams may be required for multiple aircraft and/or extended deployments/exercises. Personnel deploy as mission essential personnel (MEP). DAGRE teams remain under operational control (OPCON) and tactical control (TACON) to the deployed MC.

**1.3. Mission Essential Task List.** DAGRE teams will be responsible to secure USSOCOM and AFSOC assets and personnel in austere locations. AFSOC MCs should be thoroughly familiar with DAGRE capabilities and incorporate them into mission planning in accordance with AFI 11-202 v3, *Flight Operations*, AFSOC supplement paragraph A10.3.2.1. and AFSOC Manual 11-219 v3, *Combat Aviation Advisor Operations Procedures*, paragraph 5.3. DAGRE teams will maintain expertise and capabilities in the following functions:

1.3.1. OP 1.2.6. Conduct Defensive Operations. Counter enemy initiative, defeat an enemy attack and prevent the achievement of enemy objectives.

1.3.1.1. Task-organized, to rapidly provide tailored fly-away security for all USSOCOM/AFSOC assets (aircraft, resources and personnel).

- 1.3.1.2. Deploy with a lower profile and less intrusive presence than garrison forces.
- 1.3.1.3. Perform flight deck denial measures and prevent aircraft access while static.
- 1.3.2. OP 1.3.2. Enhance Force Movement.
  - 1.3.2.1. Conducts mission planning and support for security measures to meet MC objectives and guidance.
  - 1.3.2.2. Coordinate/De-conflict ongoing surface operations with other ground components.
  - 1.3.2.3. Coordinate requirements for airfield surveys with Higher Headquarters (HHQ), and develop future courses of action (COA).
- 1.3.3. OP 6 Provide Operational Force Protection. Coordinates FP with MC to enhance freedom of strategic action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise.
  - 1.3.3.1. Develop unconventional FP plans with options to address multiple situations.
  - 1.3.3.2. Provide Route Vulnerability Assessments/Airfield Survey.
  - 1.3.3.3. Assess local situations and up-channel findings as needed.
  - 1.3.3.4. Organize SOF Enablers into working static defense operations to protect against threats.
  - 1.3.3.5. Augment (if requested) SOF, to protect infiltration/exfiltration zones.
- 1.3.4. OP 6.5 Provide Security for Operational Forces. Close-in security provided to AFSOC assets, while conducting measures to protect from surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, terrorism, and sabotage.
  - 1.3.4.1. Provide worldwide organic/non-organic site specific security in permissive and non-permissive environments.
  - 1.3.4.2. May employ sensor equipment and Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (SUAS)
  - 1.3.4.3. Does not include airfield security.
- 1.3.5. TA 4 Sustain Deployed Forces. Provide Forward Aerial Refueling Point (FARP) close-in security.
  - 1.3.5.1. Coordinate and conduct FARP security in austere locations
  - 1.3.5.2. FARP Team/Equipment
  - 1.3.5.3. FARP Survey Team
- 1.3.6. TA 6 Protect the Force. Tactical Security Detail (TSD) for protection of delegated personnel.
  - 1.3.6.1. TSD is utilized for personnel in austere environments without extensive support.
  - 1.3.6.2. Coordinate/Develop communication requirements, as necessary, for tactical operations.

1.3.6.3. Organize Small Unit Tactics into security detail operations to help protect delegated personnel. (Pay agents, non-governmental organizations (NGO), Survey teams, dignitaries etc.)

**1.4. Unit Deployment Manager.** The UDM is responsible for receiving tasking information and for coordinating DAGRE deployments with leadership and the DAGRE section. They are also responsible for keeping DAGRE mobility folders up-to-date (to include passports and Government Travel Cards (GTC), and ensuring all home station/computer base training is completed before any and all missions/deployments. They are to coordinate/distribute appropriate gear requirements stated on the line remarks, reporting instructions, and packing list.

**1.5. DAGRE FLIGHT CHIEF.** The DAGRE Flight Chief will be a SF 7 skill level MSgt unless waived by AFSOC/A4IS.

1.5.1. The DAGRE Flight Chief is the primary point of contact concerning all DAGRE members within the unit. They are responsible for managing mission readiness of all DAGRE capabilities to include: personnel, training, and equipment. The DAGRE Flight Chief will update Microsoft Teams and respective channels to provide a site picture on personnel and training.

1.5.2. Training and Tasking Responsibilities. Responsible for establishing a master training plan MTP, (which will be reviewed annually by HQ AFSOC/A4IS) and master task list based on the Command DAGRE Job Qualification Standard (JQS) on file with AFSOC A4IS and mandated Home Station Training (HST) requirements IAW AFI 36-2646, *Security Forces Training and Standardization Evaluation Programs*, and DAFI 36-2670, *Total Force Development*. Schedule DAGRE certified personnel to meet unit tasking's for missions. Ensure adequate recall system for members is established to support short notice tasking's. Provide assistance to TL in preparation for emergent missions. Address wing and unit scheduling, equipment, and mission preparation conflicts that the TL cannot resolve. Disseminate messages, products, instructions, and training materials pertaining to the DAGRE program from HQ AFSOC/A4IS to all squadron DAGRE certified personnel and squadron leadership. Maintain constant communication with HQ AFSOC/A4IS for any significant changes of DAGRE personnel.

1.5.3. Mission Paperwork. Ensures HQ AFSOC/A4IS is notified of DAGRE employment for local exercises and forwards all paperwork, no later than 30 days after DAGRE teams return from a mission. This paperwork should include the following (if applicable): After Action Report (AAR), Lesson Learned (LL) Report, Trip Report, and a detailed Airfield Security Survey (if applicable). Refer to [para 2.14](#) of this instruction for further guidance regarding these products.

1.5.4. Equipment. Ensure DAGRE equipment is available, operable, and inventoried as required.

#### **1.6. Team Leader. (TL)**

1.6.1. The Team Leader position will be a 7-level MSgt or TSgt (unless waived by AFSOC/A4IS) with the DAGRE SEI 099 and have completed an AF Certified AT Level II Course. TL is responsible for managing team administration and logistics, manages and assists with maintenance and training needs, ensures accountability for all team equipment, and keeps the DAGRE Flight Chief informed on the status of their team.

1.6.2. Mission Readiness Responsibilities. Schedule team members for required briefings from AFOSI, Wing intelligence, and for the aircrew briefing prior to mission. Review DoD 4500.54G, *Foreign Clearance Guide*, (FCG) for information on each mission location. If necessary, meets with an attorney from the staff judge advocate's office to obtain a legal interpretation of FCG restrictions and to review applicable SOFAs for mission locations. After a thorough review of all available vulnerability, threat, and legal consideration information, develop a pre-deployment force protection plan for each location. This force protection plan must cover contingency actions in the event of aircraft or aircrew are attacked, to include recall procedures and rally points. If possible, meet with the MC prior to mission initiation. Present the force protection plan for the mission and tailor it to accommodate operational considerations. Provide the information in **Attachment 2** of this instruction to MC, crew and DAGRE Team members prior to mission initiation. Coordinate with intelligence and AFOSI to develop threat information. Implement the DAGRE checklist in Attachments **3, 4, 5, and 6** of this instruction to ensure aircraft and personnel security throughout the entire mission. Ensures and inspects all required equipment and made available for the mission. Operate SIPRNET systems and ensure all paperwork from mission (Trip Report, LL, AAR, and Airfield Survey) is complete and submits it to the DAGRE Flight Chief.

1.6.3. Counter Threats. Report suspicious activities or surveillance at a transiting airfield to the MC, Host Nation Security Forces, and the U.S. Embassy representative (Regional Security Officer (RSO), Defense Attaché Officer (DAO)). If an incident arises, the TL will provide a verbal situation report (SITREP) to the MC or Deputy Officer (DO) as soon as possible. Any unique or escalated situation must be reported to HQ AFOSC/A4IS. This information will also be included in the team's Trip Report/Airfield Survey.

**1.7. Team Member. (TM)** The Team Member is the backbone of a DAGRE team. The Team Member will be a certified DAGRE SEI 099 Security Forces Member in the ranks of SrA (may be A1C with MAJCOM approval) or SSgt. Verifies that ammunition/equipment are evenly distributed, evaluates terrain for defense, assists TL in assigning targets and fields of fire, coordinates team logistics, actively discusses all health issues at deployed site, assists TL in managing safety risks inherent to operations, evaluates casualties/performs life-saving measures, responsible for enforcing proper field sanitation, develops the casualty evacuation plan, recognizes and exploits information likely to affect operations, recommends special orders, reports, and priority intelligence requirements to TL, participates in all phases of mission planning, provides guidance to all deployed personnel on handling classified material, completes the Airfield Survey upon completion of mission, advises TL on all communication matters, performs readiness check of communications equipment issued to team, plans and manages all aspects of the teams communications.

**1.8. Commander.** Commanders are vital in maintaining the health, welfare, good order, and discipline of the DAGRE program. In order to maintain the worldwide qualified and deployed standards of all DAGRE members, Commanders will accomplish an *AF FORM 2096 Classification On-The-Job Training Action* permanently removing the DAGRE SEI of 099 for any Article 15 Non-Judicial Punishment action, Placement on a Control Roster (CR), and or Placement on an Unfavorable Information File (UIF). Commanders will notify A4I of administrative actions that result in the removal of the DAGRE SEI 099 within three duty days after completion of action.

## Chapter 2

### CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

**2.1. Duties and Responsibilities.** HQ AFSOC/A4IS will provide administrative oversight to this instruction and will ensure its accuracy with current Air Force level policy/guidance.

2.1.1. HQ AFSOC/A4IS. Serve as the DAGRE program manager and is the primary interface between DAGRE teams and all AFSOC agencies.

2.1.1.1. Establish and disseminate AFSOC security and Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) policy, and provide security and AT/FP oversight on behalf of the AFSOC Commander.

2.1.1.2. Track all deployed DAGRE and maintain an accurate status of all SOF associated equipment.

2.1.1.3. Interface with the 371st Special Operations Combat Training Squadron (SOCTS) for formal training quotas in support of SOF requirements.

2.1.1.4. Archive all Airfield Security Surveys/After Action Reports (AAR) from returning DAGRE teams. Reports will be reviewed for any reoccurring trends and/or training needs. All reports will be given to A4IS to be uploaded into the A4IS SharePoint on SIPR.

2.1.1.5. Direct manpower validations in support of fly-away security requirements.

2.1.2. HQ AFSOC/A5/8. Plan and program for SOF specific requirements outlined in this instruction.

2.1.3. HQ AFSOC/FM (Financial Management). Allocate yearly SOF SF baseline funding. Manage the Budget Execution Review process to address emergent requirements. Provide Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to the wing level to support deployments.

**2.2. Joint Special Operations Air Component (9AAHQ).** Position is filled by one SF officer (in the rank of O-1 to O-3) or a SF Senior Non-Commissioned Officer (E-7 or E-8).

2.2.1. Duties: Primary advisor to the SOF Air Component Commander and staff on issues relating to AT/FP, physical security and support to DAGRE. This includes but not limited to QFM1C employment IAW this instruction. Must be AT Level II certified.

**2.3. Joint Special Operations Air Detachment (9AAHD).** Position is filled by two SF 7-levels assigned to the SOF Air Component intermediate level of command; at least one must be a SF Senior Non-Commissioned Officer (E-7 or E-8).

2.3.1. Duties: Primary advisor to the Detachment Commander and staff on issues relating to AT/FP, physical security, and support to DAGRE. Must be AT Level II certified.

**2.4. SF SOF Security Logistical Detail (QFL1D).** Provides support equipment to the QFM1C UTC (5 DAGRE personnel). Requirements will be determined by a detailed analysis of the deployed site and mission planning. Deploys to various bases, each with tailored missions, and supports all AFSOC/SOF contingency operations. This UTC does not include base operating support (BOS) equipment.

**2.5. Pre-Mission Planning.** Utilize pre-mission checklist [Attachment 2](#), DAGRE Mission OORDER, when in pre-mission planning phase.

2.5.1. Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). The installation legal office or site SJA will provide DAGRE team members with assistance in interpreting Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), U.S. Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide restrictions, arming and use of force considerations for mission locations prior to mission initiation, and any regional Rules of Engagement (ROE) that may apply.

2.5.2. Mission Essential Personnel. IAW AFI 11-401 AFSOCSUP, *Aviation Management*, individuals in MEP status are individuals who perform unique support duties for local or off-station flights essential to a particular aircraft, aircrew, or mission. DAGRE personnel are considered MEP and will ensure that this status is on their orders or on a blanket letter/message authorized by the Operations Group (OG)/CC (or equivalent).

2.5.2.1. The OG/CC (or equivalent) with operational control of the mission being flown, may authorize blanket letters for MEP status for personnel (military or civilian) required to fly on their aircraft when performing mission essential duties. Blanket request letters will include specific AFSCs (or names) and inclusive dates not to exceed one year. Note: IAW paragraph 2.10.4 of AFI 11-401 AFSOCSUP, commanders should request noninterference aeronautical orders for non-aircrew personnel required to frequently perform specific tasks on the aircraft for local and/or off-station flights.

2.5.2.2. Cite MEP approval in travel orders. Following is an example statement: MEP is authorized by (appropriate OG/CC) on (aircraft number and/or mission number/exercise or contingency name) for duration, i.e., 22 – 27 June 2011). End the statement with name and phone number of individual approving MEP status. Note: MEP authority may also be cited in a letter or message using the statement above.

2.5.2.3. Individuals will coordinate their travel with the appropriate current operations function prior to travel. It is imperative that mission operators and air terminal operations centers are aware of MEP requirements when scheduling missions and crews. Individuals joining mission's enroute will present their travel orders to the appropriate Command and Control Agency at least three hours prior to intended travel.

2.5.2.4. MEP travel status will be strictly controlled and approved only for those with a bona fide mission essential purpose.

**2.6. Location Lists and Threat Assessments.** The required security capability will be tailored based on a detailed mission analysis/estimate of the situation IAW DAFI 31-145-0, *Air Force Anti-Terrorism (AT) Program Implementation*. Mission planners from the appropriate deployed theatre SOW/SOG/JSOAC/JSOAC (as applicable) will work with their local SF, AFOSI, AST, and TWG, to identify when security and/or CI/FP are recommended to support exercises, training missions, contingency operations and small/large scale deployments. When researching the security of an airfield prior to a mission, AFSOC and DAGRE personnel will use information found in the following locations:

2.6.1. Air Mobility Command/A2 SIPRNET Site. When tasked with a mission, DAGRE teams should review all locations on the itinerary. This is done by cross-checking the country currency requirement to the location (date of most current survey) reflected in the Phoenix Raven Location List (PRL), located on the AMC/A2 SIPR website. The AMC/A2 Site is a site that provides important factors to consider when determining if security is needed. This site is a useful reference tool to use during initial planning to determine the terrorist and

criminal threat level as well as if the location is identified as a Raven required location. This listing is updated daily by a multitude of intelligence and security professionals. Located on the AMC FP SIPR site <https://portal.amcin.scott.af.smil.mil/index.cfm>.

2.6.2. Aircraft Force Protection Risk Assessment Matrix (AFPRAM). Under emergency situations (emergency landing, uncertain environments, broke-down aircraft, etc.), the AFPRAM can be used to determine the security of an airfield. The MC can also use the AFPRAM if they feel that the security to a normal, unmanned aircraft security location, is no longer safe. (See **Attachment 7**)

2.6.2.1. A cumulative score of 20 or below implies that normal unmanned aircraft security measures are adequate and a DAGRE is normally not recommended; however, commanders may consider additional security measures.

2.6.2.2. If the cumulative score is greater than 21, a DAGRE Team is normally recommended and commanders should consider deploying security personnel. **Attachment 7** is for consideration only; other possible factors including the MCs judgment and discretion in meeting their responsibility to ensure adequate aircraft security measures is required. **Note:** Normally, additional security for the aircraft is not required at military installations within a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country or US civilian airfields approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

2.6.3. Permissive or Uncertain Environments. The MC will receive a threat assessment and force protection capability evaluation briefing at home station prior to departure and receive updates enroute, if required. When landing at a DoD component installation, the MC will determine if the security provided is sufficient and in compliance with AFI 31-101. Using the AFPRAM (See **Attachment 7**) to help assess the risk to parked aircraft, unattended by crew for planned overnight stops located at non-US military installation overseas and civilian airfields.

**2.7. Unscheduled/Emergency Landings at Unplanned Airfields.** The MC will assess the aircraft security situation and take actions as needed. If the aircrew is not capable of providing adequate security, the MC will request/coordinate security through available channels, notify the respective air operations center (AOC) as soon as possible, and contact the US Embassy or US DAO for security assistance. Follow the Security chapter in the applicable AFI 11-202V3 AFSOCSUP *Flight Operations* for actions to take in situations where force protection capability appears insufficient.

**2.8. Airfield Security Survey.** IAW AFSOCI11-219V3, *Flying Operations*, the MC with or without force protection expertise, should use the Airfield Security Survey **Attachment 8** at a new or not recently utilized site to provide deployed theatre TWG personnel and future MC up to date information for follow-on mission planning. Questions should be routed to the AFSOC/A4IS section at [AFSOC.A4IS@us.af.mil](mailto:AFSOC.A4IS@us.af.mil) or COMM: 850-884-2049/DSN: 312-579-2049/VOISP: 312-579-0097; surveys to [AFSOC.A4IS.DL@SOCOM.SMIL.MIL](mailto:AFSOC.A4IS.DL@SOCOM.SMIL.MIL).

2.8.1. Section 1: Coversheet information.

2.8.2. Section 2: This will provide the AFSOC/A4IS staff a quick snap-shot of the airfield in question. With that in mind, please select the most appropriate response and provide a brief explanation and/or comments.

2.8.3. Section 3: Should be utilized when more specific information and/or time is available.

## **2.9. Deviations and Waivers.**

2.9.1. At no time, should an MC deviate from the policies and guidance of security instructions IAW AFSOCI 11-219V3, *Flying Operations*, unless safety dictates otherwise.

2.9.2. If a situation should arise, affecting the safety of the personnel on the aircraft, the MC should submit requests for waivers through their chain of command to the appropriate approval authority.

**2.10. Deployed Security Requirements.** Deployed aircraft security requirements are mandated by AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*; and DAFI 31-145-0, *Air Force Anti-Terrorism (AT) Program Implementation*. Additional aircraft specific security procedures can be found in the applicable AFTTP 3-3MDS, *Combat Aircraft Fundamentals* (SIPRNET); AFTTP 3-1MDS, *Combat Aircraft Training* (SIPRNET); and AFI 11-202 Volume 3, *Flight Operations*, in the applicable Security chapters.

2.10.1. Arrangements must be made to protect the aircraft while at deployed locations, if security does not deploy with the aircraft.

2.10.2. DAGRE teams are usually not transported on gunships. If gunship security is required, team members will normally be transported separately to the required location via other means.

## **2.11. Considerations for Low Visibility Operations.**

2.11.1. DAGRE personnel must be capable of blending in with the aircrew and/or airport personnel in order to avoid attracting unnecessary attention. As such, DAGRE personnel are authorized to wear civilian attire as required when performing official duties.

2.11.2. DAGRE Teams must be capable of providing both overt and covert lighting for parked aircraft in order to enhance aircraft security and provide a low visibility lighting option.

2.11.3. When identified in line remarks, unit commanders will certify DAGRE members to receive a civilian clothing allowance IAW AFI 36-3012, *Military Entitlements*, through the base finance office.

2.11.4. DAGRE must be trained and qualified to carry a concealed weapon IAW AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*, in order to provide armed security in a low visibility posture. Qualification must be annotated on a properly completed and current AF Form 523, *USAF Authorization to Bear Firearms*, indicating concealed carry meets this requirement. **(T-2)** AFSOC A4 will be the waiver authority.

2.11.5. Unless mission requirements dictate otherwise, DAGRE personnel will wear concealable body armor when carrying a concealed weapon.

**2.12. Post Mission Requirements.** HQ AFSOC/A4IS records and addresses issues, best practices, and Lessons Learned (LL), from major exercises, contingency operations, and deployments. They use the information provided in AARs, LL Reports, Trip Reports, and Airfield Security Surveys, for future mission planning. All paperwork is due to the DAGRE Flight Chief within 15 days of returning from each mission.

2.12.1. DAGRE Team Members require time upon mission completion to complete required reports. Reports and surveys should include an executive summary covering the event

information (i.e., dates, locations, participant units/organizations, etc.), lessons observed, and issues/problems encountered with recommended corrective actions. See **Attachment 6** for Post Mission/Deployment checklist

2.12.2. The TL will consolidate AARs, LL Reports, Trip Reports, and Airfield Security Survey inputs from subordinate team members, validate observations and once approved, submit the signed report to their DAGRE Flight Chief. The DAGRE Flight Chief will then check for discrepancies and set up a meeting with leadership for final review. Once documents are corrected/approved, they will forward them to HQ AFSOC/A4IS central repository (or as directed).

2.12.3. Trip Reports and After Action Reports. (See **Attachment 9 & Attachment 10**) Trip Reports will be forwarded to Mission Commanders and HQ AFSOC/A4IS, within 15 days of DAGRE Teams returning from their mission. AARs will be completed upon returning to home station to summarize the DAGRE Team's deployment and will be forwarded to home station Unit Commanders and HQ AFSOC/A4IS, within 30 days of return.

2.12.4. Lessons Learned Reports. In addition to local instructions, all validated AFSOC LL are entered into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) by AFSOC A4IS at <https://www.jllis.mil/apps/> and <http://www.jllis.smil.mil/usaf/>. The unit Chain of command involvement is key in validating all AARs and LL submissions.

2.12.5. Approved AARs, LL, Trip Reports, and Airfield Security Surveys will be stored and centrally managed on the A4IS SharePoint on SIPR at: <https://eis.afsoc.af.mil/sites/A4/A4I/A4IS/default.aspx>.

2.12.6. The DAGRE Flight Chief/TL will submit the approved Airfield Security Surveys and AARs to the AMC/A2 SIPR website at: <https://portal.amcin.scott.af.smil.mil/index.cfm>.

**2.13. Risk Management.** Commanders and Supervisors at all levels will ensure Risk Management is involved in mission planning IAW AFI 90-802 para 4.8.4.

**2.14. Medical Force Protection Considerations.** Teams escort aircraft into geographic areas with patterns of infectious disease where systems for public health, sanitation, and medical care may be quite different from those they are accustomed to in the CONUS and Europe.

2.14.1. Public Health Processing. Team members are individually responsible for obtaining needed disease-prevention medications (such as malaria prophylaxis) and for complying with the schedule for taking medications issued. Additionally, all team members are responsible for returning to Public Health for a post-deployment follow-up.

## Chapter 3

### FLY AWAY SECURITY OPERATIONS.

**3.1. General.** AFSOC is not required to comply with AMC fly away security requirements for Raven required locations, but instead will use this information as an important factor to consider when determining if security is needed. FAS missions should be planned and executed IAW AFI31-101 and this instruction. **(T-3)**

#### **3.2. Recommended Team Size for Fly Away Security Operations.**

3.2.1. Less than 12hrs. When security is required and the aircraft ground time is less than 12 hours, a 3-person DAGRE team is recommended to support the mission. Generally, two personnel remain with the aircraft providing security, while the TL coordinates with the MC, security with forces at the offsite airfield/aircraft staging area and conducts an Aircraft Security Survey. Due to passenger and weight restrictions on smaller AFSOC platforms, missions with ground times of less than 12 hours may be tailored down to a 2-person DAGRE team.

3.2.2. More than 12hrs, less than 7 days. When security is required and the aircraft ground time is more than 12-hours but less than 7-days, a 5-person DAGRE team is recommended for mission support. Generally, two personnel work alternating 12-hour shifts and the TL works a 12-hour shift between their team and coordinates with the MC, works as the area supervisor, coordinates security with forces at the offsite airfield/aircraft staging area and conducts an Aircraft Security Survey. This team is capable of providing security for multiple aircraft parked in the same area.

3.2.3. Longer than 7 days. For missions where aircraft are operating from an airfield for longer than 7-days, additional DAGRE Teams are recommended, but not required, to assist in sustaining security.

**3.3. Pre-Departure Considerations.** DAGRE TLs should be integrated into the mission planning process with the MC and loadmaster to ensure DAGRE team integration and mission success. It is recommended to have 48 hour notice prior to FAS operations. DAGRE TLs should use SIPR resources and J2/S2 support to acquire information prior to departure to include airfield imagery, recent local events as well as any previously completed airfield security or hotel vulnerability assessments.

3.3.1. Situation. FAS teams should be aware of the current situation at all airfield destinations and all circumstances that may affect aircraft/aircrew security.

3.3.2. Threats. Any known threats to resources or personnel to include criminal, military, and terrorist groups, foreign intelligence as well as medical/environmental concerns. DAGRE Teams should be prepared for the most likely and deadliest enemy courses of action.

3.3.3. Friendly Forces. All US, allied nation and host nation forces that will be operating in or around the airfield. MC and DAGRE team leaders should also have prior coordination with US Embassy's RSO/SOFLE in country.

3.3.4. Concept of Operations. The DAGRE team should know the entire concept of operations and timeline for the mission to include en route stops, expected ground times, bed down sites, ground transportation methods, local contacts and any additional activities to be accomplished

while on the ground such as surveys. TLs should also, review the EAP with the MC and DAGRE team to include responding to enemy actions.

3.3.5. Foreign Clearance Guide. Consult the Foreign Clearance Guide for all en route countries during the mission for pertinent information such as SOFA status, weapon restrictions, passport/visa requirements, uniform wear, etc.

3.3.6. Rules of Engagement. ROEs and UoF should be reviewed for each en route stop.

3.3.7. In-Place Force Protection Measures. Review available information to predict the in-place protection measures at each airfield and determine if they will meet AFI31-101 standards.

3.3.8. Force Protection Recommendations. Use the available J2/S2 and SIPR resources to make recommendations to the MC for bed down locations, ground transportation, routes to/from airfields, clothing, arming and equipment.

3.3.9. Command and Signal. TLs should ensure all DAGRE team members know the chain of command to include the aircrew and all call signs. DAGRE teams will also use tactical radios and COMSEC procedures to effectively communicate while on the ground. DAGRE teams should also understand aircrew's SOPs for hand and arm signals and overt/covert lighting in the event of communication failure.

3.3.10. Key phone numbers. MC and TLs should have satellite phones and/or global access phones to communicate with adjacent units, host nation security, the US Embassy, or higher headquarters as an alternate method to SATCOM. Key phone numbers should be known throughout the aircrew and DAGRE Team.

### **3.4. Mission Execution.**

3.4.1. Airfield Deployment. The DAGRE TL should coordinate with the loadmaster to plan for team deployment from the aircraft ramp or door. Once it is deemed safe to exit the aircraft the DAGRE team will rapidly deploy from the aircraft and take up security positions as dictated by the TL during mission planning. The DAGRE TL will maintain the over watch position on the aircraft until the security at the airfield has been solidified.

3.4.2. Communications. When using tactical radios on FAS operations DAGRE teams should maintain a separate inter-team operational frequency to ensure effective communication within the team and to avoid impeding on the aircraft's operational frequency. The TL will maintain communication with the loadmaster or MC via the aircraft's operational frequency and disseminate information back to the DAGRE Team.

3.4.3. Accountability. The TL should know the location of all DAGRE Team members at all times during the mission. The loadmaster is typically responsible for all cargo and passengers on board the aircraft. The DAGRE TL will relay accountability to the loadmaster when all DAGRE Team members have embarked/disembarked the aircraft.

**3.5. Flight Deck Denial.** DAGRE Teams must remain vigilant of individuals attempting to gain access to the flight deck. If the individual is not authorized, it is important for the team to take appropriate action while using the minimum amount of force necessary to deny access. DAGRE Teams must maintain constant communication with the MC to alleviate potential threats to flight deck personnel. IAW AFI 11-401 AFSOCSUP, authorized personnel include additional crew

members and individuals approved by the MC. DAGRE Teams should be made aware of the approved personnel.

**3.6. Anti-Hijacking Guidance.** DAGRE teams as well as aircrew, must make every reasonable effort to resist an aircraft hijacking attempt. The MC is the coordinating authority for anti-hijacking procedures. The MC has first-hand knowledge of the situation and must take every opportunity to keep command authorities apprised of the situation.

3.6.1. The Air Transportation Act of 1974 and the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, vest the Federal Aviation Administration with exclusive responsibility for the direction of law enforcement activity in aircraft hijacking situations involving all aircraft (civil and military) in-flight in the United States.

3.6.2. An aircraft is most vulnerable to hijacking when the aircrew is aboard and the aircraft is operationally ready for flight.

3.6.3. Should preventive efforts fail, any actual attempt to hijack a military aircraft must be resisted in a manner appropriate to the situation. Resistance may vary from dissuasion to direct confrontation, including the use of weapons. As a last resort DAGRE Teams are authorized to use weapons to subdue a hijacker.

**3.7. U.S. Military Aircraft as Sovereign Instrumentalities.** When cleared to overfly or land in foreign territory, it is U.S. policy to assert that military aircraft are exempt from duties and taxation and immune from search, seizure, inspection (including customs and safety inspections), and other exercise of jurisdiction by the HN. MC and DAGRE team members will not authorize the search, seizure, inspection, or other exercise of jurisdiction by foreign authorities unless directed by the appropriate service headquarters or the local U.S. Embassy.

3.7.1. Inside the aircraft, is considered an area of U.S. sovereignty. In an event that an individual has gained access to the aircraft, team members may apprehend and prevent the escape of the person. Outside the aircraft while in foreign territory, under **MOST** circumstances, team members may not seek to apprehend or prevent the escape of a foreign national. This is considered a local law enforcement function and the responsibility of the HN. Team members will seek the assistance of HN personnel in order to apprehend or prevent the escape of a foreign national who has injured or threatened to injure U.S. personnel or damage equipment on the aircraft. IAW AFI 31-117 and Standing Rules on the UoF, this does not diminish the team's right of self-defense or ability to detain a person in self-defense until arrival of local authorities.

3.7.2. Team members will not intervene in disputes between host nationals. Such incidents are a local police matter. Team members will only intervene if U.S. personnel or property are threatened.

3.7.3. Where feasible, standing MOA/MOU should be considered to clarify HN law enforcement support.

**3.8. Request for Political Asylum or Refuge.** If a foreign national approaches a team member during sentry duty to request political asylum or temporary refuge, do not allow them to enter the interior of the aircraft. Refer all requests of this nature to the MC for resolution according to AFI 51-402, *International Law*.

### **3.9. DAGRE as Fly Away Security Crew Rest and Duty Day.**

3.9.1. Crew Rest. DAGRE team will enter crew rest 12 hours prior to beginning of the flight duty period. **(T-2)** The crew rest period is the non-duty period before the flight duty period begins. Its purpose is to allow the aircrew member the opportunity for adequate rest before performing in-flight duties. Crew rest is free time, which includes times for meals, transportation, and rest. Rest is defined as the condition that allows an individual the opportunity to sleep. DAGRE teams require at least 8 hours of continuous, uninterrupted rest during the 12 hours prior to beginning of the flight duty period. DAGRE team members will not consume any form of alcohol or use other drugs or medications that could impair their ability to handle a firearm while on duty, or within 12 hours of the scheduled aircraft departure time at all locations throughout the mission. Any official business required of an aircrew member interrupts the crew rest period. This includes official business conducted on the phone. Any interruption must be made only under the most exceptional circumstances. **(T-2)**

3.9.2. Duty Day. The standard DAGRE duty day is 12 hours, with a 45-minute changeover (12+45), in a 24- hour period. **(T-2)** The duty time being when the team initiates its first security duty (whether in-flight or at a location).

## Chapter 4

### FORWARD AREA REFUELING POINT SECURITY OPERATIONS.

**4.1. General.** FARP operations are an integral part of AFSOC Specialized Fueling Operations. These missions often take place at airfields where force protection measures are minimal or non-existent. FARP security operations should be conducted IAW AFI11-235, *Forward Area Refueling Point (FARP) Operations* and this instruction. FARP security builds upon all aspects of FAS included in **Chapter 3** of this instruction.

#### **4.2. Recommended Team Size for FARP Security Operations.**

4.2.1. Less than 12hrs. When security is required and the aircraft ground time is less than 12 hours, a 5-person DAGRE team is recommended to support the mission. Generally, two personnel deploy to each wingtip of the aircraft, and set up intersecting fields of fire while the TL works as the area supervisor and coordinates with the MC, loadmaster and HRS.

4.2.2. More than 12hrs. For missions where aircraft are conducting FARP operations from an airfield for longer than 12 hours, additional DAGRE Teams are required to assist in sustaining security.

**4.3. Pre-Departure Considerations.** DAGRE TLs should be integrated into the mission planning process with the MC, loadmaster and Hot Refueling Supervisor (HRS) to ensure DAGRE team integration and mission success. Additional considerations for larger security zones, refueling personnel integration and hazard concerns are addressed in this chapter.

4.3.1. Situation. FARP security teams should be aware of the current situation at all airfield destinations and all circumstances that may affect aircraft/aircrew security.

4.3.2. Threats. Any known threats to resources or personnel to include criminal, military and terrorist groups, foreign intelligence as well as medical/environmental concerns. DAGRE Teams should be prepared for the most likely and deadliest enemy courses of action.

4.3.3. Friendly Forces. All US, allied nation and host nation forces that will be operating in or around the airfield. Specialized Fueling Operations are highly complex with the potential for multiple aircraft and personnel to move in and out of the security zone. Understanding all expected friendly forces movement in the area is essential for FARP security and mission success. When refueling personnel are armed for FARP missions the DAGRE TL should take planning steps to include those personnel into contact drills to enhance force protection measures.

4.3.4. Concept of Operations. The DAGRE team should know the entire concept of operations and timeline for the mission to include en route stops, expected ground times, inbound aircraft, local contacts and any additional activities to be accomplished while on the ground such as surveys. TLs should also, review the EAP with the MC and DAGRE team to include responding to enemy actions.

4.3.5. Foreign Clearance Guide. Consult the Foreign Clearance Guide for all en route countries during the mission for pertinent information such as SOFA status, weapon restrictions, passport/visa requirements, uniform wear, etc.

4.3.6. Rules of Engagement. ROEs and UoF should be reviewed for each en route stop.

4.3.7. In-Place Force Protection Measures. Review available information to predict the in-place protection measures at each airfield and determine if they will meet AFI31-101 standards. DAGRE TLs should know if friendly ground forces will be at the FARP site and should make contact with the GFC to incorporate the DAGRE team to enhance the FARP security.

4.3.8. Force Protection Recommendations. Use the available J2/S2 and SIPR resources to make recommendations to the MC for bed down locations, ground transportation, routes to/from airfields, clothing, arming and equipment.

4.3.9. Command and Signal. TLs should ensure all DAGRE team members know the chain of command to include the aircrew, refueling personnel and all call signs. DAGRE teams will also use tactical radios and COMSEC procedures to effectively communicate while on the ground. DAGRE teams should also understand aircrew's SOPs for hand and arm signals and overt/covert lighting to ensure proper communication with friendly forces moving in and out of the FARP area. FARP operations are conducted almost exclusively at night.

4.3.10. Key phone numbers. MC and TLs should have satellite phones and/or global access phones to communicate with adjacent units, host nation security, the US Embassy, or higher headquarters as an alternate method to SATCOM. Key phone numbers should be known throughout the aircrew and DAGRE Team.

#### **4.4. Mission Execution.**

4.4.1. Airfield Deployment. The DAGRE TL should coordinate with the loadmaster to plan for team deployment from the aircraft ramp. Once it is deemed safe to exit the aircraft the FAS team will rapidly deploy from the aircraft and take up security positions as dictated by the TL during mission planning. The DAGRE TL will maintain the over watch position on the aircraft until the security at the airfield has been solidified. The inclusion of refueling equipment and personnel adds a unique dynamic to refueling operations. The DAGRE TL will de-conflict any issues deploying from the aircraft with both the Hot Refueling Supervisor (HRS) and loadmaster. FARP security teams should take the below distances into consideration when establishing security.

4.4.2. Aircraft to refueling cart, 200ft.

4.4.3. Hose to the refueling cart to the 6 o'clock position of the aircraft, 100ft.

4.4.4. Hoses from the refueling cart to the left and right at 45 degree angles, 225ft.

4.4.5. Communications. When using tactical radios on FARP operations DAGRE teams should maintain a separate inter-team operational frequency to ensure effective communication within the team and to avoid impeding on the aircraft's operational frequency. The TL will maintain communication with the loadmaster, HRS, and MC via the aircraft's operational frequency and disseminate information back to the DAGRE Team.

4.4.6. Accountability. The TL should know the location of all DAGRE Team members at all times during the mission. The loadmaster is typically responsible for all cargo and passengers on board the aircraft. The DAGRE TL will relay accountability to the loadmaster when all DAGRE Team members have embarked/d disembarked the aircraft. DAGRE teams may also need to push out members further for FARP operations to increase the area of security. The

DAGRE TL will ensure line of sight with DAGRE personnel while maintaining accountability through radios, hand and arm signals and overt/covert light signaling.

**4.5. HAZMAT/Safety Considerations.** FARP operations can be hazardous due to aviation fuel and refueling equipment. DAGRE teams will take instruction from the HRS to avoid contact with aviation fuel and nauseous fumes. It is also recommended that DAGRE Teams bring a jerry can of fresh water and pack a secondary uniform in case of personal contact with fuel. In the event of contact with aviation fuel the DAGRE TL should notify the HRS and follow instructions for decontaminating the team member. DAGRE Team members should also take fire and explosion hazards into account when planning defensive responses to enemy direct/indirect fire.

## Chapter 5

### SITE SECURITY OPERATIONS.

**5.1. General.** This chapter provides guidance for site security operations that will encompass principles of integrated base defense for the security of personnel, aircraft, and or USSOCOM resources. Site security teams will provide close-in security for deployed USSOCOM assets to deter, detect, and respond to threats. Some of the site security operations that the DAGRE teams could conduct include mounted operations, static defense operations, counter operations to include IED and SAFIRE, and joint combined operations. The DAGRE Team will apply security principles IAW AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, and this instruction to deter, detect, react, and defend against threats.

**5.2. Recommended Team Size for Site Security Operations.** A site security survey should be done prior to DAGRE Team tasking to determine the needs for sustained site security. Depending on the size of the security site, the local criminal/terror threat, security technology available and USSOCOM resources being protected, more than one DAGRE Team may be needed to support the mission.

5.2.1. When security is required, but there is on-site support from NATO, host nation or contracted security forces, a 5-person DAGRE team is recommended to support the mission. Generally, two personnel work alternating 12-hour shifts and the TL works a 12-hour shift between their team and coordinates with the MC, works as the area supervisor, coordinates security with local forces at the security site.

**5.3. Site Security Considerations.** Typically, sites requiring AFSOC/SOCOM site security are austere or low profile. These conditions mean that DAGRE Teams providing site security must do so with limited assets and support. Site security should undergo continuous process improvement based on the local threat and availability of resources.

5.3.1. Situation. Site Security teams should be aware of the current situation at the security site and all circumstances that may affect aircraft/personnel security.

5.3.2. Threats. Any known threats to resources or personnel to include criminal, military and terrorist groups, foreign intelligence as well as medical/environmental concerns. DAGRE Teams should be prepared for the most likely and deadliest enemy courses of action.

5.3.3. Friendly Forces. All US, allied nation and host nation forces that will be operating in or around the security site. The MC and DAGRE team leaders should also have prior coordination with US Embassy's RSO/SOFLE in country.

5.3.4. Concept of Operations. The DAGRE team should know the entire concept of operations and timeline for the mission to include the scheme of maneuver for personnel to and from the security site, local safe havens, bed down sites, ground transportation methods, local contacts and the location of the security site and surrounding area. TLs should also, review the EAP with the MC and DAGRE team to include responding to enemy actions.

5.3.5. Foreign Clearance Guide. Consult the Foreign Clearance Guide for all en route countries during the mission for pertinent information such as SOFA status, weapon restrictions, passport/visa requirements, uniform wear, etc.

5.3.6. Rules of Engagement. ROEs and UoF should be coordinated with unit legal team and US personnel at the security site. All members of the DAGRE team should know and understand the ROE's.

5.3.7. In-Place Force Protection Measures. Review available information to predict the in-place protection measures at the security site and determine if they will meet AFI 31-101 standards.

5.3.8. Force Protection Recommendations. Once the team is on location, use the available resources to make recommendations to the MC for improvements to the security site, bed down locations, ground transportation, routes to/from airfields, clothing, arming and equipment. DAGRE Team Leaders should also use Antiterrorism Officer experience to recommend off-limits local establishments, introduce random antiterrorism measures, enhance psychological deterrents and suggest changes to military personnel's schedules to disrupt predictable patterns of life.

5.3.9. Command and Signal. TLs should ensure all DAGRE team members know the chain of command at the security site to include all JSOAD personnel. DAGRE teams will also use tactical radios and COMSEC procedures to effectively communicate between posts/security sites. DAGRE teams should also understand current local communication SOPs and use of overt/covert lighting and integrate with communication plans that may already be in place at the security site.

5.3.10. Key Phone Numbers. MC and TLs should have satellite phones and/or global access phones to communicate with adjacent units, host nation security, the US Embassy, or higher headquarters as an alternate method to SATCOM. Key phone numbers should be known throughout the DAGRE Team.

#### **5.4. Mission Execution.**

5.4.1. Static Defense. Establish priorities of work/routines in defense IAW AFH31-109 *Integrated Defense in Expeditionary Environments*. Examples could be, establish security (position listening and observation posts), establish operations center (JOC, TOC, BDOC), establish a work/rest cycle, stockpile food/water/ammunition, prepare/improve fighting position, and clear fields of fire.

5.4.2. Routines in Defense. Establish routines that ensure the continuous maintenance/improvement of the defensive posture. Examples could include, cleaning weapons, personal hygiene, improving camouflage, preventative maintenance of assigned equipment, and nourishment.

5.4.3. Employ concepts of static defense positions to cover key terrain, facilities, infrastructure and high-speed avenues of approach.

5.4.4. When feasible employ barriers. Barriers define perimeter of the area, establish a physical or psychological deterrent, and potentially enhance detection opportunities by DAGRE team members. Due to the low visibility of AFSOC and SOCOM operations all or some barriers may not be feasible. During low visibility operations natural barriers and man-made barriers that are local to the area may be the best course of action.

5.4.5. Employment of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). When mission dictates ensure to utilize the full spectrum of IDS and incorporate them into your Base Defense Plan.

## Chapter 6

### TACTICAL SECURITY DETAIL OPERATIONS.

**6.1. General.** This chapter provides guidance for tactical security detail operations that will encompass principles of personal protection for US personnel. Some individuals that DAGRE Teams may be tasked to protect include AFSOC/SOCOM Aircrews, JSOAD mission commanders, Field Grade Officers traversing through the AOR, dignitaries traveling onboard AFSOC aircraft, US Embassy personnel moving to/from AFSOC/SOCOM compounds or any other Principle the MC dictates is in need of increased personal security. The DAGRE Team will apply tactical security detail principles IAW AFI31-101 Integrated Defense and this instruction to deter, detect, react and defend against threats against assigned Principles.

**6.2. Recommended Team Size for Tactical Security Detail.** When TSD is required, a 5-person DAGRE team is recommended to support the mission. Generally, two personnel move ahead of the group as an advance security team, while the TL and two other team members provide close in security to the Principle. TSD may be tailored down to a 2-person DAGRE team when the mission logistics will not allow the inclusion of more team members.

**6.3. Tactical Security Detail Pre-Mission Considerations.** DAGRE TLs primary responsibility is mission planning as well as command and control of all members of the TSD. It is recommended to have the principle's itinerary at least 48 hours ahead of mission execution in order to properly plan. DAGRE TLs should use SIPR resources and J2/S2 support to acquire information prior to execution to include imagery, recent local events as well as any previously completed airfield security or hotel vulnerability assessments.

6.3.1. Situation. TSD teams should be aware of the current situation in their AOR, all scheduled movements of their principle and any planned events while providing TSD.

6.3.2. Threats. Any known threats to the Principle to include criminal, military and terrorist groups, foreign intelligence as well as medical/environmental concerns. DAGRE Teams should be prepared for the most likely and deadliest enemy courses of action.

6.3.3. Friendly Forces. All US, allied nation and host nation forces that will be interacting with or operating around the Principle. This may include interpreters, other Security Forces, EOD, K9 or contracted security. The MC and DAGRE team leaders should also have prior coordination with any individuals the Principle is planning to meet or interact with during the mission. If engagements with other VIPs are scheduled the DAGRE TL should plan to communicate with that VIPs security team to enhance the overall security for both Principles.

6.3.4. Concept of Operations. The DAGRE team should know the entire concept of operations and timeline for the mission to include the scheme of maneuver for personnel to and from the Principle's pick-up/drop-off, local safe havens, bed down sites, ground transportation methods, local contacts and any planned events. TLs should also, review the EAP with the Principle and DAGRE team to include responding to enemy actions. DAGRE Teams working TSD should plan for high threat response at every possible location.

6.3.5. Foreign Clearance Guide. Consult the Foreign Clearance Guide for all en route countries during the mission for pertinent information such as SOFA status, weapon restrictions, passport/visa requirements, uniform wear, etc.

6.3.6. Rules of Engagement. ROEs and UoF should be reviewed with all DAGRE Team members prior to mission execution.

6.3.7. In-Place Force Protection Measures. Review available information to predict the in-place protection measures at each location the Principle is visiting. DAGRE TLs should know if friendly ground forces will be at these locations and make contact with POCs to enhance TSD security for the principle at those locations.

6.3.8. Force Protection Recommendations. Use the available J2/S2 and SIPR resources to make recommendations to the Principle or MC for bed down locations, ground transportation, routes to/from airfields, clothing, arming and equipment. It is up to the DAGRE TL to articulate to the Principle when the environment or conditions present too high a threat for their personal safety.

6.3.9. Command and Signal. TLs should ensure all DAGRE team members know the chain of command within the TSD. DAGRE teams will also use tactical radios and COMSEC procedures to effectively communicate while moving the Principle and assessing threats. DAGRE teams should also understand current local communication SOPs and use of overt/covert lighting and integrate with communication plans that may already be in place with other US forces working around the Principle.

6.3.10. Phone Numbers. MC and TLs should have satellite phones and/or global access phones to communicate with adjacent units, host nation security, the US Embassy, or higher headquarters as an alternate method to SATCOM. Key phone numbers should be known throughout the DAGRE Team.

#### **6.4. Mission Execution.**

6.4.1. Tactical Security Officer. A TSO should be the primary point of contact with the Principle to streamline communications and ensure mission success. A DAGRE TL can simultaneously work as the TSO. However, it may be difficult to tend to the Principle and maintain command and control of the TSD at the same time. The TSO will be the closest to the Principle in the TSD formation and the TSO will take physical control of the Principle to move him/her out of immediate danger in a high threat situation.

6.4.2. Advance Team. TSD teams should have a 2-person Advance Team to conduct reconnaissance of routes and locations prior to the arrival of the Principle and rest of the TSD. The Advance Team will identify and mitigate any threats and communicate information back to the DAGRE TL for real-time situational awareness.

6.4.3. Security Drivers. The drivers in the motorcade/convoy must inspect and prep vehicles for operational capability, provide vehicle's security when static, have full understanding of primary, alternative and contingency routes and use defensive driving techniques to maintain motorcade/convoy integrity.

6.4.4. Overt vs Covert Appearance. When conducting TSD the DAGRE team should keep in mind overt verse covert tactics and techniques. Overt and covert mission planning considerations should be based off of the known visibility of the principle, local threat levels, and hardening the target as a psychological deterrent. For example, a TSD for an Aircraft Commander in a low threat location may choose to remain covert, while a TSD for an US Ambassador in a high threat location would appear overt. Covert tactics and techniques include

wearing civilian clothes, carrying concealed firearms/body armor, using earpieces for communications equipment and adjusting TSD formations to avoid singling out the principle. Overt tactics include wearing military uniforms, using tactical equipment, dual arming with rifles and pistols, and providing tight, well-coordinated close-in security to the Principle.

KEVIN L. BROWN, Col, USAF  
Chief, Installations Division

**Attachment 1****GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

AFI 11-235, *Specialized Refueling Operations*, 30 May 2019

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AFSOCMAN 11-219 V3, *Combat Aviation Advisor Operations Procedures*, 4 February 2020

DAFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, 24 March 2020

DAFI 36-2646, *Security Forces Training and Standardization Evaluation Programs*, 18 December 2019

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DAFI 90-160, *Publications and Forms Management*, 14 April 2022

DoDIO-2000.16V1\_DAFI31-145-O, *Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation*, 14 November 2022

***Adopted Forms***

DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

AF Form 1297, *Temporary Issue Receipt*

***Abbreviations and Acronyms***

**ACC**—Air Combat Command

**AETC**—Air Education Training Command

**AF**—Air Force

**AFI**—Air Force Instruction

**AFJI**—Air Force Joint Instruction

**AFMAN**—Air Force Manual

**AFMC**—Air Force Materiel Command

**AFPD**—Air Force Policy Directive

**AFRC**—Air Force Reserve Command

**AFSAS**—Air Force Safety Automated System

**AFSOC**—Air Force Special Operations Command  
**AFSOF**—Air Force Special Operations Forces  
**AFTO**—Air Force Technical Order  
**AFTTP**—Air Force Tactics Techniques and Procedures  
**AMC**—Air Mobility Command/Airborne Mission Commander  
**ANG**—Air National Guard  
**AOR**—Area of Responsibility  
**ARMS**—Aviation Resource Management Systems  
**ASRR**—Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report  
**ATC**—Air Traffic Control  
**ATO**—Air Tasking Order  
**BFT**—Blue Force Tracker  
**BMC**—Basic Mission Capable  
**C2**—Command and Control  
**C3**—Command, Control, and Communications  
**CAS**—Close Air Support  
**CC**—Commander  
**DAGRE**—Deployed Aircraft Ground Response Element  
**DV**—Distinguished Visitor  
**ETD**—Estimated Time of Departure  
**FOB**—Forward Operating Base  
**GFC**—Ground Forces Commander  
**GPS**—Global Positioning System  
**HF**—High Frequency  
**HQ**—Headquarters  
**IAS**—Indicated Airspeed  
**IAW**—In Accordance With  
**IOAT**—Indicated Outside Air Temperature  
**JSOAC**—Joint Special Operations Air Component  
**JSOTF**—Joint Special Operations Task Force  
**MAJCOM**—Major Command  
**MOA**—Memorandum of Agreements

**OPCON**—Operational Control  
**OPREP**—Operational Report  
**ORM**—Operational Risk Management  
**RCO**—Range Control Officer  
**ROZ**—Restricted Operating Zone  
**SA**—Situational Awareness  
**SAR**—Search and Rescue  
**SATCOM**—Satellite Communication  
**SOC**—Special Operations Command  
**SOF**—Special Operations Forces  
**TSD**—Tactical Security Detail  
**TSO**—Tactical Security Officer  
**UoF**—Use of Force

*Office Symbols*

**AFSOC/A3V**—Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command/Standardization/Evaluation  
**AFSOC/A4IS**—Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command/Security Forces Branch  
**HQ AFSOC/A5/8**—Headquarters Air Force Special Operations Command/Plans and Programs

*Terms*

**Air Reserve Components (ARC)**—Units of the Air Force Reserve (AFRC) or Air National Guard (ANG).

**Airborne Mission Commander (AMC)**—The individual given the responsibility to accomplish part of the overall operation. When a formation is used to conduct the operation, this individual is in overall command of all formation aircraft.

**Basic Proficiency**—Crews or crew members qualified and current to fly the unit aircraft only on non-mission sorties.

**Basic Mission Capable**—Crews or crew members qualified and current to perform some portion of the unit mission, but who do not maintain mission ready status.

**Chalk Number**—A number on an aircraft to identify and designate its position for loading and unloading.

**Command and Control Center (C3)**—An agency used by a commander to plan, direct, or control operations. Each C3 provides supervision, guidance, and control within its assigned area of responsibility. For the purpose of this instruction, C3s include the AFSOC Command Center, AMC Command Center, Command Post (CP), Air Mobility Elements (AME), Airlift Coordination

Centers, Combat Control Teams (CCT), AFRC Headquarters Command Post (AFRC HQ CP), NGB Field Support Center, and ARC wing or group operations centers and command posts.

**Commander Air Force Special Operations Command (COMAFSOC)**—The Commander of Air Force Special Operations Command.

**Commander Air Force Special Operations Forces (COMAFSOF)**—The commander designated by USCINCSOC for CONUS deployments or by theater SOC/CCs for overseas deployments, who is responsible for management of Air Force Special Operations Forces (AFSOF) within a theater, a geographic area, or a designated operation. The COMAFSOF is responsible to USCINCSOC for management of CONUS-deployed AFSOF or to the respective SOC/CC for management of AFSOF theater-assigned AFSOF and is responsible to COMAFSOC for monitoring and management of AFSOF operating within the specific area of responsibility.

**Contingency Mission**—A mission operated in direct support of an operation plan, operation order, disaster, or emergency.

**Forward Operating Base (FOB)**—An airfield without full support facilities used during mission operations for an undetermined and sometimes extended period of time.

**Hazardous Cargo or Materials**—Explosive, toxic, caustic, nuclear, combustible, flammable, biologically infectious, or poisonous materials that may directly endanger human life or property, particularly if misused, mishandled or involved in accidents (AFJI 11-204, AFMAN 24-204, TO 11N-20-11).

**Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)**—A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.

**Maintenance Codes**—Fully Mission Capable (FMC). Partially Mission Capable (PMC).

**Mission Ready**—Crews or crew members fully qualified and current to perform the unit mission.

**Night Vision Goggles (NVG)**—Self-contained, battery-operated devices that amplify light to enhance night vision.

**Operational Control (OPCON)**—Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.

**Special Tactics Squadron (STS)**—Air Force special operations combat control and pararescue forces.

**Supported Forces**—Space-required passengers consisting of US and foreign military members who are on board an AFSOC aircraft as an integral part of the mission being performed.

**Supporting Forces**—Space-required passengers consisting of US and foreign military members, DoD civilians, and US civilian employees under contract to the DoD, who directly support the mission or deployment of an AFSOC unit.

**Tactical Control (TACON)**—Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command.

**Time Over Target (TOT)**—The actual time an aircraft is at a geographic point or area carrying out an assigned mission.

## Attachment 2

## DAGRE MISSION OPORD

Table A2.1. DAGRE Mission OPORD.

Format	Annotated Format	Oral Example
		“This is a warning order. Please hold your questions until I finish.”
Situation	Brief description of the enemy and friendly situations (can be taken directly from squadron warning order).	<p>“Numerous probes of the base perimeter have been attempted with limited success by irregular forces up to squad size. We are also faced with a Level I threat consisting of local sympathizers conducting random acts of terrorism. As a result, the base is currently in FPCON Charlie.”</p> <p>“Friendly Forces. The 9th Security Forces Squadron is attached to our unit to assist off-base.”</p>
Mission	Concise statement of the ID task and purpose (who, what, when, where and why). If not all information is known, state which parts are tentative. NOTE: Leaders should make every effort to receive and clarify mission requirements prior to mission brief.	“The mission of Delta flight is to defend a sector of the tactical perimeter from ground attack for an indefinite period for the purpose of allowing sustained air operations.”
Execution	Brief statement of the tentative concept of the operation.	“We will occupy static defensive positions along the sector tactical perimeter, providing final protective fire to our flight front. Two squads will occupy the positions, with a squad in reserve/rest status.”

	<p>Time Schedule:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- NLT defend time</li> <li>- NLT sector occupation time</li> <li>- Flight OPORD time</li> <li>- Squadron OPORD time</li> </ul> <p>Tasks to key subordinate personnel:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Flight Sergeant</li> <li>- Squad leaders</li> <li>- RTOs</li> </ul> <p>Additional general instructions.</p>	<p>“We must be fully capable to defend our assigned sector NLT 2200 local, tomorrow evening. We will occupy our sector NLT 1400 local. I will brief our flight OPORD at 0800 local and receive the squadron OPORD at 0400 local tomorrow morning.”</p> <p>“MSgt Smith (flight sergeant), you will prepare paragraph 1, Situation; and paragraph 4, Service Support, of the flight OPORD. Lead RTO, you will prepare paragraph 5, Command and Signal, of the flight OPORD. I will prepare paragraph 3, Execution. I may require some assistance from my squad leaders to finalize.”</p> <p>“Squad 1 and squad 2 will occupy the static positions initially, with squad 3 in reserve”</p>
Service Support	Any support/logistical needs that may deviate from flight Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).	“Each squad will carry an extra 2,000 rounds of 7.62 ammunition.”
Command and Signal	<p>State chain of command (if not SOP).</p> <p>SOI in effect (if applicable).</p> <p>Sign/countersign/code words</p>	<p>“No change in flight organization.</p> <p>“Currently we are in time period 2 in the SOI. Up-to-date sign/countersign will be provided in the OPORD.”</p> <p>“The time is now 2400 local. Are there any questions?”</p>

## Attachment 3

## PRE-DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST

Table A3.1. Pre-Deployment Checklist.

PRE-DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST
(Use this checklist as a tool to aid in the pre-deployment phase of a DAGRE tasking.)
1. Receive a copy of the mission itinerary from current operations if applicable.
2. Contact the AC to receive assembly times and briefing locations.
3. Obtain specific mission location information or special mission directives not covered in publications, directives, or message traffic.
4. Contact the following sources for planning information:
<b>a. Home Station SF Armory.</b> Validate DAGRE weapons qualification and certification requirements with the armory prior to weapons issue.
<b>b. Wing Intelligence Office.</b> DAGRE TL will obtain information from Wing Intelligence and AFOSI that highlight current terrorist and criminal threats, in place force protection, and deployed theatre TWG force protection recommendations.
<b>c. DOD 4500.54G, Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide.</b> Review this document for arming restrictions, pre-approved billeting locations, and other pertinent force protection information.
<b>d. Wing Staff Judge Advocate's Office.</b> Obtain information pertaining to SOFAs, Rules of Engagement, and legal interpretations pertaining to the FCG (if needed).
<b>e. Local AFOSI Detachment.</b> Obtain threat information and personal protection briefing. This briefing should cover all relevant foreign intelligence, terrorist and criminal threat information.
<b>f. Wing Medical Unit.</b> Obtain medical intelligence briefing and recommended medical countermeasures to included immunizations. Receive pre-deployment medical records review and clearance. Receive any needed disease prevention medications.
5. Prepare aircrew pre-departure briefing from the DAGRE Mission OPORDER.
6. Ensure aircrew pre-departure briefing is received by Wing Intel.
7. Inspect, function check/test, and pack equipment, rations and water for deployment.
8. Ensure DAGRE team members are executed on the MEP letter(s) and orders are completed.
9. Assemble at designated location for aircrew briefing.
10. Out-process the unit through the unit's established pre-deployment processing procedures.

## Attachment 4

## ENROUTE LOCATION ARRIVAL CHECKLIST

Table A4.1. Enroute Location Arrival Checklist.

ENROUTE LOCATION ARRIVAL CHECKLIST
<b>(Implement this checklist upon arrival at all stops during a DAGRE mission.)</b>
1. Conduct a security assessment to determine if HN security is adequate (at all non-DoD/non-NATO country airfields).
2. Brief the results of your security assessment to the AC. If security is deemed adequate, proceed to #3, if security is inadequate proceed to #4.
3. If security is deemed adequate then:
a. If available, coordinate additional physical security enhancements/aids (lighting, ropes and stanchions, and patrol coverage/responses).
b. Secure all doors and hatches and seal the main crew entrance door.
4. If security is deemed inadequate and/or at a DAGRE required location then:
a. Post DAGRE team members as close-in sentries.
b. Whether personnel are inside or outside the aircraft, team members will use force according to AFI 31-117, Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces, to protect U.S. resources and personnel.
c. If FCG and SOFA rules and regulations allow, load weapons IAW AFMAN 31-129, USAF Small Arms and Light Weapons Handling Procedures and utilize available safety measures.
d. If available, coordinate additional physical security enhancement/aids (lighting, ropes and stanchions, and patrol coverage/response).
5. Establish a means of communications with Departure Airfield Control Officer (DACO) and/or the nearest U.S. facility/installation and/or an English-speaking HN facility on the airfield.
6. Establish a posting schedule and coordinate transportation to/from billeting locations for post relief, as necessary.
7. Obtain special entry control instructions from the AC.

8. Obtain emergency billeting contact numbers for the AC and crew.
9. As soon as possible, notify the MAJCOM/SF of any emergency or security incidents that occur during the mission prior to aircraft departure from the scheduled stop.

## Attachment 5

## ENROUTE LOCATION DEPARTURE CHECKLIST

Table A5.1. Enroute Location Departure Checklist.

<b>ENROUTE LOCATION DEPARTURE CHECKLIST</b>
<b>(Implement this checklist during DAGRE missions, upon departure from overnight locations.)</b>
1. Implement this item at locations where security was provided by the HN.
a. Remove weapons from storage location if not stored aboard the aircraft.
b. Conduct a search of the aircraft exterior and wheel wells for stowaways, explosive devices, and/or signs of tampering.
c. Conduct a search of the aircraft interior for stowaways, explosive devices, and/or signs of tampering.
d. Assist the crew as necessary.
e. Once airborne, record any pertinent notes for inclusion in the DAGRE Trip Report.
2. Implement this item at locations where security was provided by DAGRE team sentries.
a. Conduct a search of the aircraft exterior for stowaways, explosive devices, and/or signs of tampering prior to the aircrew arriving.
b. Brief the AC on all significant events that occurred during crew rest periods.
c. Retrieve radios issued to host nation for emergency communications purposes.
d. Unload/clear weapons according to established directives in a safe manner (portable clearing barrels or pointed toward a flak vest/barrier that would stop the round) prior to returning them to their weapon storage case.
e. Once airborne, record any pertinent notes for inclusion in the DAGRE Trip Report.

## Attachment 6

## POST MISSION/DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST

Table A6.1. Post Mission/Deployment Checklist.

<b>POST MISSION/DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST</b>
<b>(Implement this checklist upon mission completion and returning to home station.)</b>
1. Ensure all equipment is accounted for, properly cleaned, and turned in.
2. Report to AFOSI (if necessary), to report any unusual/suspicious activity that may affect or endanger the US and or military personnel/resources. Utilize AFI 71-101, Vol. IV, Chapter 3 for more detailed information.
3. Complete a detailed Airfield Security Survey for all DAGRE required locations transited on mission, in accordance with Attachment 8.
4. Turn in all DAGRE paperwork no later than 15 days after returning from a mission to the DAGRE Flight Chief.

Attachment 7

AIRCRAFT FORCE PROTECTION RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX (AFPRAM)

Table A7.1. Aircraft Force Protection Risk Assessment Matrix (AFPRAM).

Classification: <b>SECRET</b> (when completed)							
Airfield: _____		ICAO: _____		Country: _____			Date : _____
FACTORS	0 Points	1 Point	2 Points	3 Points	4 Points	5 Points	Points/ Comments
Threat/source: OSI and Intel (or <i>AMC Virtual Risk Assessment Database</i> <a href="http://www.amcin.scott.af.smil">www.amcin.scott.af.smil</a> )							
1. Terrorist Threat	There is no known threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a negligible threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a LOW threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a MODERATE threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a SIGNIFICANT threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a HIGH threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	
2. Criminal Threat	There is no known threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a negligible threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a LOW threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a MEDIUM threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a HIGH threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a CRITICAL threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	
Aircraft Security Requirements/source: local TWG and/or AFSOC/A4IS (Antiterrorism Officer)							

<p>1. Aircraft Security Standards</p>	<p>US Forces provide aircraft security that meets or exceeds min required PL security IAW AFI 31-101</p>	<p>Coalition Forces provide aircraft security that meets or exceeds min required PL security IAW AFI 31-101: reliability not in question</p>	<p>Host Nation Forces provide aircraft security that exceeds min required PL security IAW AFI 31-101; reliability not in question</p>	<p>Coalition and/or Host Nation Forces provide aircraft security that meets min required PL security IAW AFI 31-101; reliability is uncertain</p>	<p>Host Nation Forces provide aircraft security that meets min required PL security IAW AFI 31-101; reliability is questionable</p>	<p>Forces do not provide aircraft security that meets min required PL security IAW AFI 31-101 or unknown</p>	
<p>Security Presence/source: local TWG and/or AFSOC/A4IS (Antiterrorism Officer)</p>							
<p>1. Security Personnel</p>	<p>US Forces have complete control over all airfield security</p>	<p>Coalition Forces have complete control over all airfield security</p>	<p>US, Coalition and/or Host Nation Forces share control over all airfield</p>	<p>Host Nation Forces have complete control over all airfield security</p>	<p>Host Nation Forces have some control of airfield security</p>	<p>There is no visible control over airfield security or unknown</p>	
<p>2. Response Forces</p>	<p>US Forces have a response force dedicated specifically to the airfield</p>	<p>Coalition Forces have a response force dedicated specifically to the airfield</p>	<p>Host Nation Forces have a response force dedicated specifically to the airfield</p>	<p>Response forces are available but not specifically dedicated to the airfield</p>	<p>Host Nation Forces have a response force dedicated specifically to the airfield; reliability is questionable</p>	<p>No response forces are available or unknown</p>	

Physical Security Measures On-site (if known)/source: local TWG and/or AFSOC/A4IS (Antiterrorism Officer)							
Airfield: _____		ICAO: _____		Country: _____			Date: _____
FACTORS	0 Points	1 Point	2 Points	3 Points	4 Points	5 Points	Points/Comments
1. Aircraft Parking	US aircraft are parked together in a specific area	US and Coalition aircraft are parked together in a specific area	US and/or Coalition aircraft are parked together with HN military aircraft in a specific area	US aircraft are parked near Host Nation commercial aircraft	US aircraft are parked among Host Nation commercial aircraft	US Aircraft are parked everywhere or unknown	
2. Entry Control	Strict entry control; entry credentials used; escort program	Multiple forces control entry to the airfield; strict entry control; entry credentials used; escort program	Entry credentials used; reliability is uncertain	Entry credentials used; problems with entry control and/or escort program	Entry credentials not used	There is no control over entry to the airfield or unknown	

3. Perimeter Fencing	Installation AND airfield are completely surrounded by a fence or wall; both well maintained	Installation OR Airfield is completely surrounded by a fence or wall; well maintained	Installation OR Airfield is completely surrounded by a fence or wall; perimeter not well maintained	Installation OR Airfield is not completely surrounded by a fence or wall	Installation OR Airfield is not completely surrounded by a fence or wall; perimeter not well maintained	There is no perimeter of any kind around the installation/ airfield or unknown	
4. Intrusion Detection	Extensive coverage; systems operable and monitored (sensors, cameras, night vision, observation posts, MWD, etc.)	Good coverage; systems operable and monitored (sensors, cameras, night vision, observation posts, MWD, etc.)	Key areas covered; systems operable and monitored (sensors, cameras, night vision, observation posts, MWD, etc.)	Limited coverage; some systems operable and monitored (sensors, cameras, night vision, observation posts, MWD, Etc.)	Some coverage; systems and monitoring reliability is questionable (sensors, cameras, night vision, observation posts, MWD, Etc.)	There is no coverage or unknown coverage (sensors, cameras, night vision, observation posts, MWD, etc.)	
5. Lighting	Airfield has complete lighting for all parking areas and entry points; well maintained and	Airfield has complete lighting for all parking areas and entry points; maintained illumination is	Airfield has some lighting for all parking areas and entry points; well maintained	Airfield has some lighting for all parking areas and entry points; not maintained and limited illumination	Airfield has little lighting for all parking areas and entry points	Airfield has no lighting at all or unknown	

	illuminate d	lacking in a few areas	but several areas not well illuminate d				
<u>POINTS</u>		1. 21-50	2. 20 or below		Total		
		<i>(fly- away security <u>IS</u> normally recommended)</i>	<i>(fly-away security <u>IS NOT</u> normally recommended)</i>		<i>Note: Evaluate additional factors below prior to making your final recommend ation</i>		
Additional Considerations							
<u>OTHER FACTORS</u>	<u>OTHER FACTORS</u>	<u>MISSION DURATION</u>		<u>DEVIATIONS</u>		<u>SOW/SOG</u>	
<i>Has the requesting agency been tasked to provide aircraft security?</i>	<i>Is the airfield on a Phoenix RAVEN required list?</i>	<i>How much time will the aircraft be on the ground</i>		<i>Does the deployed theatre TWG recommendation require a tailored security measure?</i>		TWG OPR or AT/FP Lvl II Qual SF Expert	

<p><input type="checkbox"/> NO</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> YES</p> <p><i>If transporting SOF combat forces, will they provide security while acft is on the ground?</i></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> NO</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> YES</p> <p><i>IF YES to either, Fly-away security is normally not recommended.</i></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> YES</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> NO</p>	<p><i>at the prescribed location?</i></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Less than 12 hours</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> More than 12 hours</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> More than 7 days</p> <p><i>Note: Duration on ground may drive additional personnel for effective post rotation/ relief</i></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> NO</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> YES</p> <p><i>IF YES, explain:</i></p>	<p>Grade/Name:</p> <p>Signature/Date:</p> <p>Recommended deploy security:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> NO</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> YES</p> <p><i>IF YES, recommend tm size?</i></p>
<p><b>INSTRUCTIONS:</b> Circle/mark the items that apply; consider other factors listed on the bottom of the sheet after determining the total point value. Provide a completed copy of this matrix to the MC with any supporting documents and comments.</p>				

## Attachment 8

## AIRFIELD SECURITY SURVEY

Table A8.1. Airfield Security Survey Part 1.

<b>AIRFIELD SECURITY SURVEY</b>
(Classified <b>SECRET</b> when filled out; mark appropriately)
COUNTRY/AIRFIELD:
ICAO:
DAGRE TEAM:

Table A8.2. Airfield Security Survey Part 2.

<b><u>SUBMITTER</u></b>		<b><u>MISSION INFORMATION</u></b>	
Submitted by:		Unit:	
Date Submitted:		Mission Number:	
Organization:		Aircraft Commander:	
SIPRNET E-mail:		AC Contact Number:	
DSN:		Ground Mission Start:	
		Ground Mission End:	
<b><u>FLIGHTLINE SECURITY</u></b>			
Personnel Are:		Number On Duty:	Day:      Night:
Shift Change Times:		Shift Duration:	
Augmentation Within:			
<b><u>FLIGHTLINE SECURITY PERSONNEL</u></b>			
Personnel training:		Motivation:	Maturity:
Leaders training:		Motivation:	Maturity:
Predominant Language/Dialect:		%English Speaking:	
Willingness/Ability to provide increased security:			

**FLIGHTLINE SECURITY COMMENTS****FLIGHTLINE PATROLS**

Flightline patrolled by armed guards:

Patrol size:

Patrols are:

Variance is a security measure:

Patrols are conducted:

MWD available:

Patrol vehicle type and markings:

**FLIGHTLINE PATROL COMMENTS****FLIGHTLINE SECURITY EQUIPMENT**

Weapons observed at entry control point(s):

Weapons observed in guard tower(s):

Weapons observed on vehicle(s):

Weapons observed on patrol(s):

Weapons observed on Quick Reaction Force(s) (QRF):

Communication gear:

Condition:

Uniform:

Condition:

Color pants:

Shirt:

Weapons Condition:

**FLIGHTLINE SECURITY EQUIPMENT COMMENTS****FLIGHTLINE ENTRY CONTROL POINTS**

Flightline entry is: (controlled/not controlled, if so by whom and duration)

Number of ECP(s):

How many in use:

ECP(s) material:

Gate material:

Number of manned and unmanned gate(s):

ID required to enter ECP(s):

Are procedures the same day/night:

Personal vehicles allowed/not allowed:

Do guard(s) check ID(s) to personal vehicles:

Guard(s) alert:

Visitors:

Flightline badges:

**FLIGHTLINE ENTRY CONTROL POINT COMMENTS****FLIGHTLINE QUICK REACTION FORCES QRF**

Does such a force exist:

Force size:

**FLIGHTLINE QRF COMMENTS****FLIGHTLINE PERIMETER**

Flightline perimeter is open/enclosed, made of:

Condition:

Height:

Has outriggers:

Strands:

Degrees:

**FLIGHTLINE CLEAR ZONES/MARKINGS****FLIGHTLINE BARRIERS****FLIGHTLINE PERIMETER COMMENTS****FLIGHTLINE MONITORING**

(Types of monitoring used for each area below, if observed)

- Airfield:
- Ramp:
- Parking:
- Other:
- ECP:

**FLIGHTLINE MONITORING COMMENTS****FLIGHTLINE LIGHTING**

Boundary of flightline and parking ramp is lit/is not lit:

Any additional fixed spotlights/lights:

Location:

Do lights adequately illuminate clear zones around ramp and/or base perimeter:

Mobile/towable spotlights available?

**FLIGHTLINE LIGHTING COMMENTS**

**FLIGHTLINE PARKING**

Are U.S. aircraft parked in a separate area:

Are U.S. personnel authorized to have weapons on the flightline/ramp:

Are weapons storage facilities available to transient crews:

**FLIGHTLINE PARKING COMMENTS**

**BASE/AIRPORT SECURITY**

Personnel Are:

Number On Duty:

Day:

Night:

Shift Change Times:

Shift Duration:

Augmentation Within:

**BASE/AIRPORT SECURITY PERSONNEL**

Personnel training:

Motivation:

Maturity:

Leaders training:

Motivation:

Maturity:

Predominant Language/Dialect:

%English Speaking:



**BASE/AIRPORT SECURITY EQUIPMENT COMMENTS**

**BASE/AIRPORT ENTRY CONTROL POINTS**

Base/Airport entry is: (controlled/not controlled, if so by whom and duration)

Number of ECP(s):

How many in use:

ECP(s) material:

Gate material:

Number of manned and unmanned gate(s):

ID required to enter ECP(s):

Are procedures the same day/night:

Personal vehicles allowed/not allowed:

Do guard(s) check ID(s) to personal vehicles:

Guard(s) alert:

Visitors:

Flightline badges:

**BASE/AIRPORT ENTRY CONTROL POINT COMMENTS**

**BASE/AIRPORT QUICK REACTION FORCES (QRF)**

Does such force exist:

Force size:

**BASE/AIRPORT QRF COMMENTS**

**BASE/AIRPORT PERIMETER**

Base/Airport perimeter is:

Condition:

Height:

Has outriggers:

Strands:

Degrees:

**BASE/AIRPORT CLEAR ZONES/MARKING**

Markings:

**BASE/AIRPORT BARRIERS**

Type of barriers:

**PHYSICAL LOCATION**

Natural/Manmade obstacles in vicinity of airport:

Locations nearby that aid hostile elements to:

- Conduct covert surveillance
- Launch standoff attack

**BASE/AIRPORT PERIMETER COMMENTS****BASE/AIRPORT MONITORING**

(Types of monitoring used for each area below, if observed)

- Airfield:
- Ramp:
- Parking:
- Other:

ECP:

**BASE/AIRPORT LIGHTING**

Boundary of Base/Airport is lit/not lit:

Any additional fixed spotlights/lights:

Location:

Do lights adequately illuminate clear zones around ramp and/or base perimeter:

Mobile/towable spotlights available?

**BASE/AIRPORT LIGHTING COMMENTS**

**BILLETING**

Were arrangements made through USDAO:

Does Embassy provide billeting in its compound:

If billeting is unavailable, does USDAO maintain a list of hotels meeting minimum security requirements:

USDAO recommended hotels:

Are U.S. Personnel billeted in the same area of the hotel:

And transported to/from hotel by:

**BILLETING COMMENTS**

**MANPADS FOOTPRINT**

Has area been identified?

Who patrols the MANPADS Footprint?

What are the frequencies of these patrols?

How is the area patrolled?

How far do the patrol area extend from the base? (in kilometers)

**MANPADS FOOTPRINT COMMENTS**

**OFF INSTALLATION ROUTE SECURITY**

(Route to and from hotel(s) during mission, different routes might be used each time)

Distance from airport to hotel: and routes to/from hotel.

Route:

- Choke Points
- One-Way Streets
- Bridges
- Overpass
- Police Stations
- Safe Houses

Route:

- Choke Points
- One-Way Streets
- Bridges
- Overpass
- Police Stations
- Safe Houses

Route:

- Choke Points
- One-Way Streets
- Bridges
- Overpass
- Police Stations

Safe Houses

**ROUTE SECURITY COMMENTS**

**PERSONNEL THREATS**

Known dissidents operate near airport:

Group:

Leader:

Sentiment:            Anti-US            Local Spt

Capable of:

Elec Monitoring

Surveillance

Standoff attack capabilities:

MANPADS

RPG

Bombing

Chemical

Group:

Leader:

Sentiment:            Anti-US            Local Spt

Capable of:

Elec Monitoring

Surveillance

Standoff attack capabilities:

MANPADS

RPG

Bombing

Chemical

Group:

Leader:

Sentiment:            Anti-US            Local Spt

Capable of:

Elec Monitoring

Surveillance

Standoff attack capabilities:

- MANPADS
- RPG
- Bombing
- Chemical

**UNUSUAL INCIDENTS/OCCURRENCES**

**ADDITIONAL COMMENTS**

## Attachment 9

## TRIP REPORT TEMPLATE (USE IN AOR)

Table A9.1. Trip report template.

<p><b>(Utilize unit letterhead)</b></p> <p>DD MMM YY</p> <p>MEMORANDUM FOR: UNIT/CC</p> <p>FROM: (Name of DAGRE TEAM LEADER)</p> <p>SUBJECT: DAGRE Trip Report</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Purpose: (Give a detailed description of the purpose of the mission and trip number.)</li><li>2. Travelers: (Identify the DAGRE team by rank and full name)</li><li>3. Itinerary: (List locations visited and inclusive dates.)</li><li>4. Detailed Mission Synopsis:</li><li>5. Mission Number/Mission Commander/Tasked Flying Unit:</li><li>6. Level of security support DAGRE team provided: (Provide information for each stop of the mission)</li><li>7. Foreign Clearance Guide Requirements:</li><li>8. Threat Assessment:</li><li>9. Weather:</li><li>10. Special Requirements:</li><li>11. Not needed items:</li><li>12. Off Limit Areas/Restrictions:</li><li>13. Available Resources:</li><li>14. Lessons Learned:</li><li>15. Other Information of Value for future missions:</li></ol>
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FIRST M. LAST, Rank, USAF Duty Title, Organization
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**Attachment 10****AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR) TEMPLATE (USE POST DEPLOYMENT)****Table A10.1. After Action Report (AAR) Template.**

<p><b>(Utilize unit letterhead)</b></p> <p>DD MMM YY</p> <p>MEMORANDUM FOR</p> <p>FROM:</p> <p>SUBJECT:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Purpose.</li><li>2. Traveler.</li><li>3. Itinerary.</li><li>4. Points of Contact at location.</li><li>5. Pre-deployment from Unit.</li><li>6. Lodging Description.</li><li>7. Facilities/Support.</li><li>8. Employment.</li><li>9. Employment Recommendations/Forecasted Usage.</li><li>10. Threat.</li><li>11. Observations.</li><li>12. If you have any additional questions, please contact me at 850-884-XXXX or via e-mail at first.last@us.af.mil.</li></ol> <p style="text-align: right;">FIRST M. LAST, Rank, USAF Duty Title, Organization</p>
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