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**NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF
ASSISTANCE VISIT PROGRAM**

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This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive 91-1, *Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety*. This publication is consistent with Air Force Policy Directive 13-5, *Air Force Nuclear Mission*. It establishes key components of the nuclear surety program according to guidance in Department of the Air Force Instruction (DAFI) 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*. This instruction assigns responsibilities and establishes procedures for conducting Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits and provides guidance to all levels of command participating in the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit process. It applies to designated directorates, Numbered Air Force and Center staff agencies, parent wing main operating bases when augmenting the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team, and all units participating in the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit. This instruction applies to all civilian employees and uniformed members of the Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard. This publication does not apply to the United States Space Force. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in the publication adhere to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-322,

Records Management and Information Governance Program, and are disposed in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using Department of the Air Force (DAF) Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route DAF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. The authorities to waive wing and unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3”) number following the compliance statement. See Department of the Air Force Manual (DAFMAN) 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures*, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the publication OPR for non-tiered compliance items. Compliance with the attachments in this publication is mandatory. This publication may be supplemented at any level, but all direct Supplements must be routed to the OPR of this publication for coordination prior to certification and approval. Send major command supplements to this instruction to Air Force Safety Center Weapons Division, 9700 G Avenue, Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5670, for coordination and approval before publication.

(AFGSC) AFI 91-121, *Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Program*, is supplemented as follows. This supplement applies to HQ AFGSC and subordinate units, Air Force Reserve Command, and Air National Guard units supporting AFGSC nuclear operations. This publication does not apply to the United States Space Force. Users of this instruction must notify Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Division (HQ AFGSC/SEN) of conflicts between this instruction and other directives, instructions, or technical orders. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in this publication adhere to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, and are disposed in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility using DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*. Route DAF 847s from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“T-2, T-3”) number following the compliance statement. See DAFMAN 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures*, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the Publication Office of Primary Responsibility for non-tiered compliance items. This publication may not be supplemented or further implemented/extended.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document has been revised and should be reviewed completely. Changes include added guidance to provide the Air Force Safety Center (AFSEC) with sanitized summaries of reports for trend analysis and inclusion in a semiannual report on overall trends. Deleted the requirement for Crossfeed reports, and reduced timeframe for Inspector General augmentee support. Finally, corrected minor typos and updated guidance references.

(AFGSC) This document has been substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. This revision provides guidance for Nuclear Surety Requirements Validations (NSRV) and further clarifies Roles and Responsibilities.

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Chapter 1

NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT PROGRAM

1.1. Overview.

1.1.1. Scope of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Program. The Secretary of the Air Force established the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit program to assist nuclear tasked units, on a non-attribution basis, to maintain effective nuclear surety programs. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit is an opportunity to receive assistance from experienced headquarters personnel who write nuclear surety policy and guidance. It is not an inspection nor is it intended to prepare units to pass Nuclear Surety Inspections. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits may not give a rating, score, grade, or assessment. However, the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team may recommend the Wing Commander conduct a root-cause analysis if significant observations are identified during the visit. The Wing Commander should provide the results of the analysis to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit lead division or team chief. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team chief will determine which Major Command (MAJCOM) identified observations require a formal root cause analysis. **(T-1)** Assessment statements will be limited to processes and procedures. **(T-1)** **Attachment 2** outlines typical areas observed during a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit. Wing Commanders may use the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit results to strengthen the unit Nuclear Surety Program. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit also provides an opportunity for resolution and clarification of issues between the unit and headquarters functional managers. The objective is threefold:

1.1.1.1. Determine if higher headquarters guidance is adequate and clear.

1.1.1.2. Provide feedback to the Wing Commander on whether the unit is properly applying sound procedures to implement Nuclear Surety guidance.

1.1.1.3. Provide situational awareness on command nuclear surety to senior leadership in the form of a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit executive summary and crossfeed report (described in **paragraph 2.3.**).

1.1.2. Assistance Areas. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team assesses all areas included in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3263.05F, *Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection*, and DAFI 90-302, *The Inspection System of the Department of the Air Force*, as supplemented. Additional areas may be assessed by MAJCOM staffs as time permits or when requested by the MAJCOM Commander or wing leadership. At Joint Bases where USAF is a supported component, installation support is a sister service responsibility and United States Air Force (USAF) may not control elements of the Nuclear Surety program at that installation. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will either include sister service members to evaluate supporting processes and procedures, or forward team observations to the Joint Base chain of command. **(T-0)**

1.1.2. **(AFGSC)** Fixed and Mobile NC3 systems shall be assessed during the NSSAV process to facilitate visibility of roles, responsibilities, and authorities required by the AFGSC/CC to execute specified functions within DAF directives. Air Force-owned ground based NC3 systems maintenance documentation will be assessed IAW T.O. 00-33A-1001, *Methods and Procedures, General Cyber Defense Operations, Activities Management Procedures and*

Practice Requirements; ICBM weapon system, support equipment, and communication system discrepancies IAW AFMAN 21-202, *Missile Maintenance Management*; and NC3 equipment accountability IAW DoDI 5000.64 DAFI 23-111, *Accountability and Management of DoD Equipment and Other Accountable Property*. (T-3)

1.2. Roles and Responsibilities.

1.2.1. MAJCOMs. MAJCOM Headquarters will designate a directorate, division, or special staff as the lead to perform Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits. (T-1)

1.2.1. (AFGSC) AFGSC Safety (AFGSC/SE) manages the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit program and coordinates with AFGSC staff on related policy issues and guidance. AFGSC/SE will coordinate with AFRC/ANG staff to provide over-the-shoulder assistance on AFRC/ANG nuclear associated components. (T-2)

1.2.2. Units. Units will provide a unit point of contact to MAJCOM Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Program Manager. (T-1)

1.2.2. (AFGSC) Detailed roles and responsibilities for AFGSC units receiving a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit are explained in [Chapter 3](#).

1.2.3. The DAF Chief of Safety and Commander, Air Force Safety Center (AF/SE), through the AFSEC Weapons Safety Division (AFSEC/SEW), will examine results of Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits to identify trends affecting nuclear safety and surety across the Air Force. AFSEC/SEW will publish a semiannual trend analysis report, not attributable to specific units, for Nuclear Surety senior leaders, MAJCOMs and/or other stakeholders to identify broad issues or root causes. (T-1)

1.3. Process Overview.

1.3.1. For Technical Operations, Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members will select maintenance teams for each specific technical operation based on team/crew integrity. (T-1)

1.3.1. (AFGSC) Prior to assessing Technical Operations, the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will provide individuals being assessed a Technical Operation briefing utilizing [Table A4.1](#). (T-2)

1.3.2. Team integrity for maintenance teams will be maintained in accordance with Department of the Air Force 21-101, *Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management*, and Air Force Manual 21-202, *Missile Maintenance Management* requirements. (T-1) To demonstrate their knowledge and proficiency, they may be tasked to perform at least one evaluation of a maintenance operation within their area of responsibility. Loading Standardization Crews and Squadron Lead Crews will be observed by the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team. (T-1)

1.3.3. For Weapon Security, Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit functional area experts will use performance-based methodology to determine whether a unit meets the Nuclear Weapons Security Standard. (T-1) They will observe the integrated execution of security actions and response (performance), and compliance with technical criteria, as applicable. (T-1) They will observe execution of applicable plans and tactics, techniques and procedures. (T-1) They will assess the effectiveness of active and/or passive defenses, deployed delay and/or denial systems, and other technology. (T-1) They will assess the use of available options to deny

unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. **(T-1)** If denial is not achieved, the ability to prevent the loss, theft, damage or destruction of nuclear weapons will be assessed by the functional area experts. **(T-1)** Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit functional area members will develop or validate that wing planned exercises are realistic scenarios to determine the wing's ability to meet the Nuclear Weapon Security Standard. **(T-1)** The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will assess the adequacy of and compliance with approved compensatory measures for MAJCOM approved security deviations. **(T-1)**

1.3.3. **(AFGSC)** When security support issues are identified that involve the local helicopter squadron, the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team Chief, or the designated representative, will notify 582d Helicopter Group at F.E. Warren AFB of the concern prior to the conclusion of the visit. Observations regarding a support issue will be provided to the local Helicopter Squadron/CC, 582d Helicopter Group/CC, and the supported SFG/CC following the completion of the visit.

1.3.4. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will review nuclear surety training programs and administration to ensure commanders and supervisors at all levels demonstrate effective responsibility, emphasis and focus on nuclear weapons surety per DAFI 91-101. **(T-1)**

1.3.4. **(AFGSC)** The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will conduct random nuclear surety testing at the discretion of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team Chief. **(T-3)**

1.3.5. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will review the administrative qualifications, certification, continuing evaluation, removal from Personnel Reliability Assurance Program, Department of Defense Manual 5210.42_Air Force Manual 13-501, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program* duties, return to duty, and training and management processes to assess the overall effectiveness of the unit's implementation of Personnel Reliability Assurance Program. **(T-0)** The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will focus on Personnel Reliability Assurance Program processes, including scenario-based exercises, formal and informal interviews, and observe day-to-day operations to validate/verify processes employed by the unit. **(T-0)** Ensure that the use or disclosures of protected health information as part of the medical Personnel Reliability Assurance Program Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit process are properly accounted for in accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. **(T-0)**

1.3.6. Command Post Controller and Communication Security Two Person Code Team Member closed book testing will be administered at bases with a strategic tasking as follows:

1.3.6.1. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Teams will test and evaluate eighty percent of available Communication Security Two Person Code Team Members (i.e., not on temporary duty, leave, or just completing a 12-hour Command Post shift). **(T-1)**

1.3.6.2. Command Post will be evaluated with performance evaluations in the same manner as Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 10-207, *Command Posts*, including respective MAJCOM supplements and DAFI 90-302. **(T-1)** Performance evaluations will include a scenario portion and testing portion. **(T-1)** The Command Post Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members should conduct as many evaluations as possible so the number of evaluated members of the Command Post can be maximized.

1.3.6.3. Fixed and mobile ground-based nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems maintenance documentation in accordance with technical order 00-33A-1001, intercontinental ballistic missile weapon system NC3 systems, support equipment, and communication system discrepancies in accordance with AFMAN 21-202, and NC3 equipment accountability in accordance with Department of Defense (DoDI) 5000.64_DAFI 23-111, *Accountability and Management of DoD Equipment and Other Accountable Property*, shall be inspected during the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit process. **(T-1)**

1.3.7. For Regular and Reserve/Guard Associate/Total Force Integration units, the sponsoring unit will have responsibility for the Associate/Total Force Integration unit(s) outlined in this instruction. **(T-1)**

1.3.8. MAJCOMs will determine the composition and qualifications required for the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Team. **(T-1)** The composition and qualifications should be based on the scope of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit as required by either the MAJCOM or Wing Commander.

1.3.9. **(Added-AFGSC)** Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team Composition

1.3.9.1. **(Added-AFGSC)** Refer to **Table 1.1** for unit-specific team composition. Composition may be adjusted as required, depending on unit commander requests for support and Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team Chief recommendations. Final team composition decisions will reside with the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team Chief. Functional directorates will fund additional team members. The priority for augmentee selection is: AFGSC staff, NAF staff, AFGSC units, other MAJCOM staff, and then other operational units. **(T-2)**

1.3.9.2. **(Added-AFGSC)** Team members are drawn from applicable AFGSC staff agencies. When necessary or desired, other units and/or organizations may augment the team. Actual team size, composition, and requirements will vary according to base and assigned nuclear mission. The team should consist of cross-functional areas that contribute to nuclear surety at the respective wing. Team composition will include members of the ANG or AFRC when the visit involves their personnel and assets. **(T-2)**

1.3.10. **(Added-AFGSC)** Nuclear Certified Equipment (NCE) Activities:

1.3.10.1. **(Added-AFGSC)** Observe unit personnel performing NCE validation and verification actions for ensuring equipment items meet NCE standards.

1.3.10.2. **(Added-AFGSC)** Validate NCE documentation procedures (e.g. Maintenance Information System and associated records and forms) are accomplished IAW TO 00-20-1, *Aerospace Equipment Maintenance Inspection, Documentation, Policies, and Procedures*, requirements.

1.3.10.3. **(Added-AFGSC)** Assess NCE Monitor programs for compliance with AFI 63-125, *Nuclear Certification Program*, and AFI 63-125_AFGSCSUP requirements.

1.3.10.4. **(Added-AFGSC)** Assess unit-possessed nuclear certified tools, test, tie-down and handling equipment associated with aerospace ground equipment (AGE) operations for proper maintenance and inspection documentation.

1.3.10.5. **(Added-AFGSC)** Assess nuclear certified hoists, cranes, and slings that are not real property installed equipment (RPIE) for proper care, maintenance, and inspection documentation.

Table 1.1. (Added-AFGSC) Unit-Specific Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team Composition.

	2 BW 307 BW	5 BW	91 MW 219 SFS	90 MW	341 MW	509 BW 131 BW	377 ABW	377 TEG	595 C2G
Duration (Days)	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	5	5
Team Size	53	69	45	72	71	68	53	32	20
Team Chief/Deputy	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Safety (SEW)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
PRAP (A3OM/SG)	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	5	5
Bomber Operations (A3T)	5	5	0	0	0	5	0	0	0
HARM/SARM (A3TA)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
ICBM Operations (A3O/A3T)	0	0	9	9	9	0	0	4	3
Crew Comm (A3C)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Command Post (A3O)	4	4	0	4	4	4	3	0	0
Security Forces (A3S)	0	6	6	8	8	6	7	0	0
Bomber Mx (A4M)	3	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
ICBM Mx (A4B)	0	0	6	6	6	0	0	4	0

	2 BW 307 BW	5 BW	91 MW 219 SFS	90 MW	341 MW	509 BW 131 BW	377 ABW	377 TEG	595 C2G
CE (A4C)	4	4	1	5	4	4	4	0	0
Emergency Response (A4C)	3	3	0	3	3	3	3	0	0
LRS (A4R)	6	6	3	6	6	6	6	3	0
Weapons/MUNS (A4W)	8	16	0	9	9	15	10	7	0
VIIDS (A6N)	0	2	0	2	2	2	2	0	0
NC3 Systems Maintenance and Accountability (A3/6 & A4N)	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	0	4
CYBER (A6)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Information Protection (IP)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

1.4. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Trip and Event Scheduling.

1.4.1. MAJCOMs will determine when Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits are scheduled. **(T-1)** Wing Commanders may request additional Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits outside the MAJCOM schedule. United States Air Forces in Europe may request deviations to MAJCOM schedules as required to accommodate host nation requirements and the Functional Expert Visit Program.

1.4.1. **(AFGSC)** AFGSC/SE, in coordination with the unit and AFGSC Gatekeeper, will request units to schedule Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits 6 to 9 months prior to their next Nuclear Surety Inspection, when possible. AFGSC/SEN will submit the formal Gatekeeper request form to AFGSC Gatekeeper and unit Gatekeeper no later than 60 days from the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit. **(T-2)**

1.4.1.1. MAJCOMs will send draft Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit schedules to AFSEC/SEW annually no later than 15 March. **(T-1)**

1.4.2. MAJCOMs will provide a notification message to the Numbered Air Force or Center, and unit 60 days prior to the planned visit confirming the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit. **(T-1)** The message will include date(s), lead point of contact, billeting, transportation and work center requirements (A Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team member should provide an info copy to the installation-owning MAJCOM if the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit is for a tenant unit). **(T-1)** Units will appoint a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit point of contact and forward the name to the MAJCOM within one week of receiving the notification message. **(T-1)**

1.4.3. Units should locally coordinate and provide inputs on a proposed Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit sequence of events. Units will send a draft schedule of events to the MAJCOM not less than 40 days prior to the scheduled visit. **(T-1)** MAJCOMs will ensure the proposed schedule of events fulfills the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit requirements and coordinate the proposed schedule of events within the staff. **(T-1)** Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members will coordinate functional area specific scheduling requirements with their unit points of contact. **(T-1)** A confirmed schedule of events will be completed by the unit and submitted to the MAJCOM not less than 14 days prior to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team's arrival. **(T-1)** After the visit and schedule of events is confirmed, any scheduling conflicts must be immediately brought to the attention of the MAJCOM Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit point of contact for resolution. **(T-1)**

1.4.4. **(Added-AFGSC)** Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit trip duration will be based on [Table 1.1](#). However, trip duration may vary according to schedule of events. Team arrival time(s) and method(s) will be coordinated with the wing or unit point of contact. Direct interaction between the Team Chief, all team members, the wing/unit commander, and respective staff is required to ensure the visit efficiently accomplishes its objectives.

1.4.5. **(Added-AFGSC)** The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will provide the wing or unit security point of contact (POC) an Entry Authorization List (EAL) of team members.

1.4.6. **(Added-AFGSC)** The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will provide the certified wing/unit Inspector General (IG) POC an EAL of team members. The certified wing/unit IG POC will open an inspection category Nuclear Surety Evaluation (NSE) with inspection title "NSSAV" within Inspector General Evaluation Management System-Classified (IGEMS-C). Once opened, enter Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members into the NSSAV. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members will operate within IGEMS-C under the guidance of the certified wing/unit IG.

1.4.7. **(Added-AFGSC)** The assessed wing or unit commander and key staff will provide an in-brief to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team. This in-brief will include local conditions, safety, and security briefings required by the unit.

1.4.8. **(Added-AFGSC)** The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team Chief will provide a formal in-brief to the assessed unit, and designated staff, and may provide the unit commander an informal in-brief.

1.4.9. **(Added-AFGSC)** The Team Chief will conduct an out-brief with the assessed unit commander and designated unit staff. The out-brief location is determined by the unit commander.

1.4.10. **(Added-AFGSC)** Area Leads will validate potential Significant and Critical deficiencies/observations with the appropriate functional AFGSC staff member.

1.4.11. **(Added-AFGSC)** Area Leads will meet with the respective group commander or designee daily to discuss the day's events. **(T-3)**

1.5. Unit Preparation.

1.5.1. Units will provide current self-assessment checklists as well as copies of the last self-assessment performed in reviewable areas 30 days prior to the arrival of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team. **(T-1)**

1.5.2. Units will provide a copy of their simulations/deviations to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team not later than 30 days prior to the scheduled visit. **(T-1)** The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team chief(s) will approve or disapprove simulations at least seven days before the visit commences. **(T-1)**

1.5.2. **(AFGSC)** AFGSC/SE will coordinate specific work center requirements with the unit point of contact. The minimum requirements include:

1.5.2.1. **(Added-AFGSC)** 10 Local Area Network access points (to support AFGSC staff laptops).

1.5.2.2. **(Added-AFGSC)** 4 Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) computer.

1.5.2.3. **(Added-AFGSC)** A minimum of 4 Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) computers with IGEMS-C access.

1.5.2.4. **(Added-AFGSC)** 2 laptop docking stations with dual monitors, keyboards and mice.

1.5.2.5. **(Added-AFGSC)** 1 NIPR color duplex printer.

1.5.2.6. **(Added-AFGSC)** 1 SIPR duplex printer.

1.5.2.7. **(Added-AFGSC)** 1 Government Service Administration-approved classified shredder capable of shredding up to SECRET material.

1.5.2.8. **(Added-AFGSC)** Standard office supplies to conduct day-to-day operations (e.g. stapler, folders, scissors, stick notes, paper cutter, highlighter, etc.).

1.5.2.9. **(Added-AFGSC)** A Security Forces POC to provide the Entry Authorization List template and Security Management Office (SMO) Code for Defense Information System for Security (DISS) verification.

1.5.2.10. **(Added-AFGSC)** Base communications support available to assist with establishing hardware connections such as laptop and printer connections. Support must be available during the duration of the visit should additional communication issues occur.

1.6. (Added-AFGSC) Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Funding.

1.6.1. **(Added-AFGSC)** AFGSC/SE funds the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit program and advocates for a fiscal year budget. **(T-2)**

1.6.2. **(Added-AFGSC)** Compensation for any civilian team member working overtime during the visit will be the responsibility of the member's assigned unit. AFGSC/SE will not be responsible for any overtime associated with a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit. **(T-2)**

1.6.3. **(Added-AFGSC)** AFGSC directorates will procure travel based on the AFGSC/SE provided cross-organization fund cite authorization letter, which outlines maximum allowable travel/per diem rates. **(T-2)**

1.6.4. **(Added-AFGSC)** Book travel within 10 duty days of receiving fund cite authorization letters. Failure to do so could result in increasing travel costs. AFGSC/SE will not be responsible for increased travel costs due to personnel deviating from this timeline. **(T-2)**

1.6.5. **(Added-AFGSC)** Any deviation from approved travel plans requires authorization by the Team Chief. Excess costs will be assessed to the sending unit in accordance with the Joint Federal Travel Regulations. **(T-2)**

Chapter 2

NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT SUMMARY

2.1. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Report.

2.1.1. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit reports assist units in identifying strengths and areas for improvement in order to enhance overall nuclear surety effectiveness. Identified deficiencies will reference governing instructions and guidance (e.g., DAF instructions and manuals, MAJCOM instructions and manuals, Technical Order, United States Strategic Command Publications, etc.). **(T-0)** Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit reports will be classified in accordance with CJCSI 3263.05F, Enclosure F, paragraph 2. **(T-0)** Unclassified information to include observations, corrective actions, or significant observation resolutions, when separated from its final report, must be handled according to its respective portion markings by the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members. **(T-0)** Final release of any data separated from its final report is subject to guidance defined in section 3 of CJCSI 3263.05F. **(T-0)**

2.1.2. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team project officer uses inputs provided by each functional team member to build the report in accordance with the contents listed at [Attachment 2](#). The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team chief will provide a draft copy of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit report to the Wing Commander prior to the team's departure and provide a copy to the lead division upon return to the staff location. **(T-1)** The authority for further distribution resides with the Wing Commander and/or MAJCOM Commander.

2.1.2. **(AFGSC)** To facilitate unit corrective actions and overall MAJCOM readiness, Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit reports will be distributed to AFGSC/CC, AFGSC wing/unit commanders, AFGSC NAF/CCs, AFGSC A-Staff and Special Staff directors, AFGSC/CoS, AFSEC/SEW, and AFNWC/DS. Further distribution authority resides with the wing/unit commander and/or MAJCOM commander. NOTE: AFGSC/IG will not receive a copy of Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit reports.

2.1.2.1. 30 days after final report is completed, MAJCOMs will provide a sanitized summary of all strengths and deficiencies identified during the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit to AFSEC/SEW. **(T-1)** If deficiencies include any root causes and/or corrective actions those items will be included in the summary sent to AFSEC/SEW. **(T-1)** The Air Force Safety Center will only use the sanitized summaries for overall trend and tracking analysis, to be used to construct a semi-annual Air Force Nuclear Surety Report Trend Analysis report and will not attribute any observation or trend to a specific unit. **(T-1)**

2.1.3. To preserve program integrity, the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members will not be used as Inspector General augmentees at a wing or unit where they have performed a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit in the past 6 months. **(T-1)**

2.1.4. Team members must include all safety, security, and weapon system reliability related observations in the detailed report, referenced by published guidance, with paragraph numbers to the maximum extent possible. **(T-1)** Overall and sub-area ratings are not assigned. Observations are categorized in the following categories:

2.1.4.1. STRENGTH — An observation that highlights strong processes, knowledge, or performance.

2.1.4.2. REPEAT SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATION — Any significant observation not corrected from a previous Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit or Nuclear Surety Inspection report.

2.1.4.3. SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATION — Any deficiency having or likely to have a major negative effect on the nuclear weapons mission of the activity.

2.1.4.4. REPEAT OBSERVATION — Any observation not corrected from a previous Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit or Nuclear Surety report.

2.1.4.5. OBSERVATION — Any deficiency not meeting, having or likely to have a major negative effect on the nuclear weapons mission of the activity, but requires corrective action.

2.1.4.6. RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENT AREA — These suggestions to improve a process (Does not require referencing governing instruction or guidance).

2.1.4.7. **(Added-AFGSC) MAJCOM TAKEAWAY** – These observations require further action by the AFGSC staff and must identify which staff agency is the office of primary responsibility along with an associated POC. All takeaways will be tracked through the AFGSC Nuclear Surety Council (NSC). **(T-2)**

2.1.5. MAJCOMs will determine the guidance for recognizing outstanding performers. **(T-1)**

2.1.5. **(AFGSC)** Outstanding Performers/Teams will be recommended to the Team Chief by Area Leads based on observations made by the team members during the visit. Area Leads will confirm with the owning unit that the individual has no quality force indicators that would preclude recognition. Final approval rests with the Team Chief. Note: Outstanding Team nominations will be no larger than eight members unless approved by the Team Chief. **(T-2)**

2.2. Tracking Requirements.

2.2.1. MAJCOMs will determine any tracking requirements. **(T-1)**

2.2.2. MAJCOMs will determine a process to monitor and identify closure requirements for any observations identified during Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits. **(T-1)**

2.2.2. **(AFGSC)** Wing/unit commanders will ensure observations identified during the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit are entered in the Inspector General Evaluation Management System (IGEMS) database. AFGSC/SEN will monitor and track observations to closure. Observations should be closed within 90 days. Observations exceeding or expected to exceed 90 days will be elevated to the NAF/CC and MAJCOM/CC by the wing/unit CC. MAJCOM TAKEAWAYS will be monitored and tracked by AFGSC/SEN in accordance with [paragraph 2.1.4.7. \(T-2\)](#)

2.2.3. **(Added-AFGSC)** Commanders will notify the appropriate Pertinent Oversight Authority, Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Program Manager, NAF/CC and MAJCOM/CC of any finalized Observations which cannot be resolved within 90 days.

2.3. DELETED

2.3.1. DELETED

2.3.1.1. DELETED

2.3.1.2. DELETED

2.3.1.2. (AFGSC) Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit trends will be discussed/disseminated through semi-annual Nuclear Surety Cross-feed Reports. (T-2)

Chapter 3 (Added-AFGSC)

NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT DETAILED ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1. (AFGSC) Lead Directorate (AFGSC/SE) will:

- 3.1.1. (AFGSC) Assume the role of Team Chief or designate an appropriate alternate.
- 3.1.2. (AFGSC) Be responsible for all communications with wing/group CC or designated representative.
- 3.1.3. (AFGSC) Provide guidance to AFGSC Directorates as overall administrator of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit process.
- 3.1.4. (AFGSC) Ensure the AFGSC/SE Budget Analyst centrally manages budgets and administers funds associated with the program.
- 3.1.5. (AFGSC) In conjunction with the program manager, ensure the size and composition of the team and the scope of the visit meet unit needs.
- 3.1.6. (AFGSC) Conduct the team pre-departure meeting, in-brief, and out-brief.
- 3.1.7. (AFGSC) Provide feedback to unit senior leadership during the visit and act as an arbitrator for any possible conflicts between the unit and Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members.

3.2. (AFGSC) Lead Division (AFGSC/SEN) will:

- 3.2.1. (AFGSC) Assume the role of Deputy Team Chief or designate an appropriate replacement if unable to support.
- 3.2.2. (AFGSC) Appoint a Program Manager who administers and provides program oversight.
- 3.2.3. (AFGSC) Ensure all procedures necessary to effectively govern the program remain current.
- 3.2.4. (AFGSC) Ensure Area Leads are appointed and trained for each visit. Provide report writing training for Area Leads (normally conducted following the Pre-Departure Meeting).
- 3.2.5. (AFGSC) Author the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit report by consolidating inputs from Area Leads provided on AFGSC observation forms and associated executive summaries from each major graded area and associated functional areas.
- 3.2.6. (AFGSC) Standardize and consolidate inputs for out-brief slides received from Area Leads.
- 3.2.7. (AFGSC) Review and consolidate all Outstanding Performer and Outstanding Team nominations/certificates from Area Leads.
- 3.2.8. (AFGSC) Coordinate with Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Area Leads on return of unit-issued items and airport transportation as required.

3.3. (AFGSC) Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Program Manager will:

- 3.3.1. (AFGSC) Plan, organize, coordinate, and direct activities affecting the program.

3.3.2. (AFGSC) Develop and coordinate the Schedule of Events between the assessed wing/unit and Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Area Leads, and work to de-conflict schedule concerns.

3.3.3. (AFGSC) Provide fund cite authorization letter and Defense Travel System (DTS) Line of Accounting to team members.

3.3.4. (AFGSC) Maintain the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit SharePoint.

3.3.5. (AFGSC) Disseminate the schedule of upcoming visits via the Nuclear Surety Council.

3.3.6. (AFGSC) Maintain the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit report archive.

3.3.7. (AFGSC) Verify all team members have proper security clearances and ensure an advance copy of the EAL is transmitted to the unit hosting the visit prior to the team's arrival.

3.3.8. (AFGSC) Submit visit requests to assessed unit through DISS.

3.3.9. (AFGSC) Author, consolidate, and distribute Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Semi-Annual Cross-feed Report.

3.4. (AFGSC) AFGSC Directorates will:

3.4.1. (AFGSC) Assign an experienced individual to fulfill deputy Area Lead responsibilities, overseeing a review of designated major graded areas and associated functional areas.

3.4.2. (AFGSC) Provide subject matter experts for the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team as explained in Team Composition, [paragraph 1.3.9](#).

3.5. (AFGSC) Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Area Leads will:

3.5.1. (AFGSC) Ensure team members have travel orders, military identification, and Air Force restricted area badges (if applicable) before departure to visit location.

3.5.2. (AFGSC) Coordinate with the unit and other Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Area Leads while establishing the schedule of events to ensure no scheduling conflicts exist.

3.5.3. (AFGSC) Review applicable section(s) of previous Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit reports to identify repeat significant observations and/or repeat observations.

3.5.4. (AFGSC) Attend Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Kickoff and Pre-Departure Briefings.

3.5.5. (AFGSC) Disseminate meeting information to assigned team members prior to team arrival.

3.5.6. (AFGSC) Ensure team members do not depart until they have completed all of their duties and confirmed early departure as allowed by the Deputy Team Chief.

3.5.7. (AFGSC) Ensure each Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit event is consistent with a Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection formal checklist or list of objectives. General objectives should focus on unit training, self-inspection, compliance with DoD, USAF and MAJCOM directives, public law (safety and security), and the ability of the unit to accomplish its assigned mission.

- 3.5.7.1. **(AFGSC)** [Operations Area Lead only] Coordinate with controlling authority per CJCSI 3260.01 and EAP-STRAT Vol. 3 for approval to observe procedures involving Positive Control Material. Approval will be documented with a memorandum from USSTRATCOM/J382 and J384.
- 3.5.7.2. **(AFGSC)** Individuals requiring access to code material or coding operations will comply with CJCSI 3260.01F, Appendix H to Enclosure E, EAP-STRAT Vol. 16, *ICBM Code Component Control Policy and Procedures*, and AFGSCI 13-5201 Vol 5, *Code Control Standardization: Procedures, Training, and Evaluation*.
- 3.5.7.3. **(AFGSC)** Individuals requiring access to COMSEC material will maintain an SD Form 572, *Cryptographic Access Certification and Termination*, on file with AFGSC.
- 3.5.8. **(AFGSC)** Submit observations to the Deputy Team Chief for report consolidation.
- 3.5.9. **(AFGSC)** Generate out-brief slide inputs and provide to the Deputy Team Chief, if directed.
- 3.5.10. **(AFGSC)** Submit Outstanding Performer and Outstanding Team nominations and certificates to the Deputy Team Chief.
- 3.5.11. **(AFGSC)** Submit augmentee Letters of Appreciation to the Deputy Team Chief.
- 3.5.12. **(AFGSC)** Return Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team badges to Deputy Team Chief before departure to home station.
- 3.5.13. **(AFGSC)** Remain through Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit completion unless approved for early departure by the Team Chief.

Chapter 4 (Added-AFGSC)

NUCLEAR SURETY REQUIREMENTS VALIDATION

4.1. (AFGSC) Nuclear Surety Requirements Validation Program.

4.1.1. (AFGSC) The program provides the unit with a validation of requirements identified by AFGSC staff in the READY/NOT READY criteria developed by AFGSC subject matter experts. Nuclear Surety Requirements Validations (NSRV) are accomplished prior to the unit requesting an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI) for a new or modified weapon/delivery system, essential facility system, program or process as identified in DAFI 90-302, *The Inspection System of the Department of the Air Force*, & AFI 63-125, *Nuclear Certification Program*.

4.1.2. (AFGSC) The NSRV team will use the criteria developed for the INSI.

4.1.3. (AFGSC) The NSRV team will recommend changes to the READY/NOT READY criteria as part of the validation (as applicable).

4.1.4. (AFGSC) Government Acceptance Testing (GAT) may be used in lieu of conducting an NSRV. An NSRV may still be accomplished if the GAT does not cover all items within the READY/NOT READY criteria. GAT results will be documented using the same report/memorandums listed in [paragraph 4.6.2](#).

4.2. (AFGSC) Nuclear Surety Requirements Validation schedule.

4.2.1. (AFGSC) An NSRV will be scheduled once the need for an INSI is identified, the READY/NOT READY criteria is developed, and the unit has formally requested an NSRV from AFGSC/SE. NSRVs will be scheduled around the existing Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit schedule using the AFGSC Gatekeeper process.

4.2.2. (AFGSC) If the wing/unit CC requests, and timing and funding allows, the AFGSC Director of Safety will determine the need and scope for a follow-up NSRV as needed.

4.3. (AFGSC) Nuclear Surety Requirements Validation team composition. Team composition is dependent upon the system, program, or process under review. At a minimum, the team will consist of an AFGSC Team Chief and subject matter experts from all required functional areas. Team composition may include members of the ANG/AFRC when the NSRV involves ANG/AFRC personnel and assets.

4.4. (AFGSC) Nuclear Surety Requirements Validation funding.

4.4.1. (AFGSC) AFGSC/SE funds the NSRV program. (T-2)

4.4.2. (AFGSC) Due to unique scheduling requirements, NSRVs are not part of the annual budget.

4.4.3. (AFGSC) AFGSC/SE will budget travel in accordance with [paragraph 1.6](#).

4.5. (AFGSC) Nuclear Surety Requirements Validation responsibilities.

4.5.1. (AFGSC) AFGSC/SE will:

4.5.1.1. (AFGSC) Manage the NSRV program.

4.5.1.2. (AFGSC) Send formal visit message and AFGSC Gatekeeper request to the unit no later than 45 days prior to the expected visit.

4.5.1.3. (AFGSC) Designate a Team Chief to lead the NSRV once the roster is established.

4.5.1.4. (AFGSC) Provide fund cite authorization letter and DTS Line of Accounting to team members.

4.5.1.5. (AFGSC) Meet with NSRV Team Chief/Area Leads no later than 14 days prior to the visit to ensure coordination efforts are on track.

4.5.1.6. (AFGSC) Maintain and route NSRV reports.

4.5.2. (AFGSC) NSRV Team Chief will:

4.5.2.1. (AFGSC) Coordinate specific work center requirements (e.g. LAN access points, office supplies, SIPR capabilities, etc.) as needed.

4.5.2.2. (AFGSC) Coordinate with the unit and other NSRV Area Leads while establishing the schedule of events to ensure no scheduling conflicts exist.

4.5.2.3. (AFGSC) Ensure the team procures travel within 10 duty days of receiving fund cite authorization letters. Failure to do so could result in increased travel costs. AFGSC/SE will not be responsible for any increased travel costs if team members exceed this timeline.

4.5.2.4. (AFGSC) Meet with the wing/unit commander or appointed individual upon arrival and prior to validation. Additionally, an out brief will be provided prior to departure.

4.6. (AFGSC) Nuclear Surety Requirements Validation reporting.

4.6.1. (AFGSC) The NSRV Team Chief will provide the AFGSC Director of Safety an NSRV Trip Report Memorandum from each NSRV team within 3 duty days of validation completion.

4.6.1.1. (AFGSC) NSRV Team Chief will document action items discovered during the validation that would prevent an INSI on the NSRV Action Item Resolution Memorandum and include this memorandum as an attachment to the NSRV Trip Report Memorandum.

4.6.2. (AFGSC) All AFGSC report memorandum templates can be located on the AFGSC/SEN SharePoint: <https://usaf.dps.mil/sites/AFGSC-HQ/hq/se/sew/SitePages/Nucl.aspx>

4.6.3. (AFGSC) AFGSC Director of Safety will provide a recommendation to the wing commander to request an INSI from AFGSC/IG once the NSRV Trip Report Memorandum has been submitted.

4.6.4. (AFGSC) The NSRV Report will be provided to the validated wing, each AFGSC staff agency involved, and AFGSC/IG.

JEANNIE M. LEAVITT,
Major General, USAF

Chief of Safety

(AFGSC)

DENNIS C. CUMMINGS, Colonel, USAF
Director of Safety

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

DoDI 5000.64_DAFI 23-111, *Accountability and Management of DoD Equipment and Other Accountable Property*, 6 Decembrer 2021

(Added-AFGSC) DODI 5000.64_DAFI23-111, *Accountability and Management of DoD Equipment and Other Accountable Property*, 5 December 2021

DoDM 5210.42_AFMAN 13-501, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program*, 23 August 2023

CJCSI 3263.05F, *Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System*, 20 January 2024

(Added-AFGSC) MPTO 00-33A-1001, *Methods and Procedures, General Cyber Defense Operations, Activities Management Procedures and Practice Requirements*, 11 May 2023

(Added-AFGSC) AFGSCI 13-5201 Vol 1, *Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) Crew Training and Certification*, 4 January 2022

(Added-AFGSC) AFGSCI 13-5201 Vol 2, *Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) Crew Standardization and Evaluation*, 6 February 2022

(Added-AFGSC) AFGSCI 13-5201 Vol 5, *Code Control Standardization: Procedures, Training, and Evaluation*, 16 July 2020

(Added-AFGSC) AFI 32-1001_AFGSCSUP, *Civil Engineer Operations*, 23 October 2023

(Added-AFGSC) AFMAN 17-1302-O, *Communications Security (COMSEC) Operations*, 21 November 2022

AFPD 13-5, *Air Force Nuclear Mission*, 17 July 2018

AFPD 91-1, *Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety*, 24 October 2019

DAFI 21-101, *Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management*, 20 December 2023

DAFI 63-125, *Nuclear Certification Program*, 16 January 2020

DAFI 90-302, *The Inspection System of the Department of the Air Force*, 15 March 2023

DAFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*, 26 March 2020

DAFMAN 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures*, 18 October 2023

AFI 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, 23 March 2020

AFMAN 10-207, *Command Posts*, 11 April 2018

AFMAN 21-202, *Missile Maintenance Management*, 30 May 2024

Prescribed Forms

None

Adopted Forms

DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

(Added-AFGSC) SD Form 572, *Cryptographic Access Certification and Termination*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

(Added-AFGSC) **AEHF**—Advance Extremely High Frequency

(Added-AFGSC) **AFB**—Air Force Base

(Added-AFGSC) **AFGSC**—Air Force Global Strike Command

(Added-AFGSC) **AFGSCI**—Air Force Global Strike Command Instruction

(Added-AFGSC) **AFGSCSUP**—Air Force Global Strike Command Supplement

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFMAN—Air Force Manual

(Added-AFGSC) **AFNWC**—Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center

AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive

(Added-AFGSC) **AFRC**—Air Force Reserve Command

AFSEC—Air Force Safety Center

(Added-AFGSC) **AGE**—Aerospace Ground Equipment

(Added-AFGSC) **ANG**—Air National Guard

(Added-AFGSC) **BW**—Bomb Wing

(Added-AFGSC) **CC**—Commander Civil Engineering

(Added-AFGSC) **CJCS**—Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff

CJCSI—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

(Added-AFGSC) **COMSEC**—Communications Security

DAF—Department of the Air Force

DAFI—Department of the Air Force Instruction

DAFMAN—Department of the Air Force Manual

(Added-AFGSC) **DCU**—Digital Control Unit

(Added-AFGSC) **DISS**—Defense Information System for Security

DoD—Department of Defense

DoDI—Department of Defense Instruction

DoDM—Department of Defense Manual

(Added-AFGSC) **DS**—Director of Staff

(Added-AFGSC) **DTS**—Defense Travel System

(Added-AFGSC) **EAL**—Entry Authorization List
(Added-AFGSC) **EAP**—Emergency Action Procedures
(Added-AFGSC) **EHF**—Extremely High Frequency
(Added-AFGSC) **GASNT**—Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal
(Added-AFGSC) **GAT**—Government Acceptance Test
(Added-AFGSC) **HARM**—Host Aviation Resource Management1Headquarters
(Added-AFGSC) **IAW**—In Accordance With
(Added-AFGSC) **ICBM**—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(Added-AFGSC) **IG**—Inspector General
(Added-AFGSC) **IGEMS**—Inspector General Evaluation Management System
(Added-AFGSC) **INSI**—Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection
(Added-AFGSC) **IP**—Information Protection
(Added-AFGSC) **LAN**—Local Area Network
(Added-AFGSC) **LRS**—Logistics Readiness Squadron
MAJCOM—Major Command
(Added-AFGSC) **MHU**—Munitions Handling Unit
(Added-AFGSC) **MUNS**—Munitions1Missile Wing
(Added-AFGSC) **NAF**—Numbered Air Force
NC3—Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
(Added-AFGSC) **NCE**—Nuclear Certified Equipment
(Added-AFGSC) **NIPR**—Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router
(Added-AFGSC) **NSC**—Nuclear Surety Council
(Added-AFGSC) **NSE**—Nuclear Surety Evaluation
(Added-AFGSC) **NSRV**—Nuclear Surety Requirements Validation
(Added-AFGSC) **NSSAV**—Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit
(Added-AFGSC) **OPR**—Office of Primary Responsibility
(Added-AFGSC) **POC**—Point of Contact
(Added-AFGSC) **PRAP**—Personnel Reliability Assurance Program
(Added-AFGSC) **REACT**—Rapid Execution and Combat targeting
(Added-AFGSC) **RPIE**—Real Property Installed Equipment
(Added-AFGSC) **SARM**—Squadron Aviation Resource Management
(Added-AFGSC) **SCAMP**—Single Channel Anti-Jam Man-Portable

(Added-AFGSC) **SD**—Standard

(Added-AFGSC) **SE**—Safety

(Added-AFGSC) **SEN**—Safety, Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Division

(Added-AFGSC) **SEW**—Weapons Safety

(Added-AFGSC) **SFG**—Security Forces Group

(Added-AFGSC) **SFS**—Security Forces Squadron

(Added-AFGSC) **SG**—Surgeon General

(Added-AFGSC) **SIPR**—Secure Internet Protocol Router

(Added-AFGSC) **SMO**—Security Management Office

(Added-AFGSC) **STRAT**—Strategic

(Added-AFGSC) **TDY**—Temporary Duty

(Added-AFGSC) **TEG**—Test and Evaluation Group

(Added-AFGSC) **TO**—Technical Order

USAF—United States Air Force

(Added-AFGSC) **USSTRATCOM**—United States Strategic Command

(Added-AFGSC) **VIIDS**—Visual Imagery and Intrusion Detection Systems

Office Symbols

AF/A4—Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection

AF/A9—Air Force Director, Studies, Analyses and Assessments

AF/A10—Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration

AF/SE—Chief of Safety

(Added-AFGSC) **AFGSC/CC**—Air Force Global Strike Command Commander

(Added-AFGSC) **AFGSC/IG**—Air Force Global Strike Command Inspector General

(Added-AFGSC) **AFGSC/SE**—Air Force Global Strike Command Safety Directorate

(Added-AFGSC) **AFGSC/SEN**—Air Force Global Strike Command Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Division

(Added-AFGSC) **AFNWC/DS**—Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center Director of Staff

AFSEC/SEW—Air Force Safety Center Weapons Safety Division

(Added-AFGSC) **NAF/CC**—Numbered Air Force Commander

(Added-AFGSC) **SFG/CC**—Security Forces Group Commander

Terms

None

Attachment 2

NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT REPORT FORMAT

A2.1. Major Commands.

A2.1.1. MAJCOMs will determine which sections of the standardized format apply to their unique mission requirements. **(T-1)** This list is not all-inclusive, and MAJCOMs are encouraged to focus on additional areas identified as trends within the MAJCOM or specifically requested by the Wing Commander. MAJCOMs will adhere to the following format to the maximum extent practical to improve standardization across the USAF. **(T-1)**

A2.1.1.1. Executive Summary.

A2.1.1.1.1. **(Added-AFGSC)** Executive Summary Opening Statement: The xx-person Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team conducted its visit from xx to xx month xx (e.g. 18 to 27 Jun 17)

A2.1.1.1.2. **(Added-AFGSC)** Executive Summary Closing Statement: The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team identified x Strengths, x Repeat Significant Observations, x Significant Observations, x Repeat Observations, x Observations, x Recommended Improvement Areas, and x MAJCOM takeaways. Additionally, (if applicable) the team identified x Outstanding Teams and x Outstanding Performers.

A2.1.1.1.3. **(Added-AFGSC)** . Major Graded Area Summaries for paragraph **A2.1.1.2** through **A2.1.1.14** will include the following closing statement: The discipline (e.g. Operations) Team observed x assessment areas, and identified x Strengths, x Repeat Significant Observations, x Significant Observations, x Repeat Observations, x Observations, x Recommended Improvement Areas, and x MAJCOM takeaways. Additionally, (if applicable) the team identified x Outstanding Teams and x Outstanding Performers.

A2.1.1.2. Management.

A2.1.1.3. Operations.

A2.1.1.4. Personnel Reliability Assurance Program. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.5. Nuclear Surety Program.

A2.1.1.6. Civil Engineers. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.7. Munitions/Maintenance.

A2.1.1.8. Nuclear Security. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.9. Intrusion Detection System Maintenance. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.10. Nuclear Weapons Loading and Mating Exercise.

A2.1.1.11. Recapture/Recovery Exercise.

A2.1.1.12. Special Assignment Airlift Mission.

A2.1.1.13. Vehicle Management. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.14. Emergency Response

A2.1.1.15. Outstanding Performers.

A2.1.2. Operations.

A2.1.2.1. Nuclear Control Order Procedures.

A2.1.2.1.1. Command Post Nuclear Control Order Procedures.

A2.1.2.1.2. Aircrew/Missile Crew Nuclear Control Order Procedures.

A2.1.2.1.2.1. **(Added-AFGSC)** Aircrew/ICBM Nuclear Control Order Procedures. AFGSC/SEN in coordination with the Joint Nuclear Operations Center will develop aircrew and ICBM crew Nuclear Control Order Procedures test bank. Additional guidance is located in AFGSCI 13-520v1, Bomber Nuclear Training. Optionally, if AFGSC/SEN does not have the capability within the staff, the AFGSC Bomber and ICBM wings will provide Nuclear Control Order Procedures subject matter experts to AFGSC/SEN annually to create a battery of up-to date Nuclear Control Order Procedures tests. A randomly selected test from this battery is what AFGSC/SE will use during the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit. **(T-2)**

A2.1.2.1.2.2. **(Added-AFGSC)** Aircrew/ICBM Nuclear Control Order Procedures testing will be administered to at least 50 percent of available unit certified crews. Maximum participation is encouraged. Examination will not be formally scored. Group/Squadron commanders will be provided test results to assess potential weak areas. **(T-2)**

A2.1.2.2. Aircrew/Missile Crew Nuclear Operations.

A2.1.2.2. **(AFGSC)** 1 Aircrew Training. Aircrew training folders will be reviewed for documentation of appropriate nuclear training and certification. **(T-2)**

A2.1.2.2.1. Combat Mission Folders.

A2.1.2.2.1.1. **(Added-AFGSC)** [Bomber only] A minimum of 20 percent of each wing's operations program will be reviewed for full compliance IAW self-inspection checklists. Review is not limited to, but will include Combat Mission Folders (Buggy Ride, Mission Support Binder, Strike Folders, etc.). Assess Combat Mission Folder contents for currency, completeness, proper security marking and construction IAW AFGSCI 13-520v2, *Bomber Nuclear Mission Preparation*. If requested by the unit, conduct and assess an ad hoc Combat Mission Folder re-planning tasking exercise to include, as a minimum, aircrew and controller Emergency Action Checklist construction process and products, controller crew action sheets and Combat Mission Folder materials for the new mission. **(T-2)**

A2.1.2.2.2. Positive Control Documents.

A2.1.2.2.3. Coded Switch Procedures.

A2.1.2.2.4. Missile Crew Weapon System Procedures

A2.1.2.2.5. Missile Control Procedures

A2.1.2.3. Command Post Security. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.2.4. Top Secret Control Accounts.

A2.1.2.5. Single Channel Anti-Jam Man-Portable Operations.

A2.1.2.5. **(AFGSC)** 1 A minimum of one Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) / Extremely High Frequency (EHF) [i.e. Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal (GASNT)/Single Channel Anti-Jam Man-Portable (SCAMP)] set-up crew will be observed during the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit. Applicability will vary based on possessed equipment/capability. **(T-2)**

A2.1.2.5.1. Fixed Site Single Channel Anti-jam Man-Portable Operations.

A2.1.2.5.2. Mobile Single Channel Anti-jam Man-Portable Operations.

A2.1.2.6. Safe Passage Procedures

A2.1.2.6.1. **(Added-AFGSC)** [Bomber only] Combat Crew Communication:

A2.1.2.6.1.1. **(Added-AFGSC)** Evaluate readiness of Bomber Strategic Aircraft Reconstitution Team support kits and equipment.

A2.1.2.6.1.2. **(Added-AFGSC)** Review self-assessment program to validate assessments are being conducted IAW AFMAN 17-1302-O, *Communications Security (COMSEC) Operations*, and verify follow-up reviews are accomplished as required.

A2.1.2.6.1.3. **(Added-AFGSC)** Certify Level 1 and Level 2 training is conducted IAW AFMAN 17-1302-O and technicians' complete certification within prescribed timelines. A sampling of training records will be reviewed.

A2.1.2.6.1.4. **(Added-AFGSC)** Validate number of Level 2 certified technicians to support home station and Bomber Strategic Aircraft Reconstitution Team operations.

A2.1.2.6.1.5. **(Added-AFGSC)** Observe Combat Crew Communication technicians constructing communications kits (Type 1, 2, 3 or 4).

A2.1.2.6.1.6. **(Added-AFGSC)** Examine aircrew Initial Communications, COMSEC User, and Emergency War Order training programs and documentation.

A2.1.2.6.1.7. **(Added-AFGSC)** Assess support to CJCS Assessments, USSTRATCOM's Continuing Evaluation Program, and AFGSC's Nuclear Weapons Systems Evaluation Program.

A2.1.2.6.2. **(Added-AFGSC)** COMSEC Support

A2.1.2.6.3. **(Added-AFGSC)** Communications Kits

A2.1.2.6.4. **(Added-AFGSC)** Aircrew Training

A2.1.2.6.5. **(Added-AFGSC)** Mission Support

A2.1.3. Personnel Reliability Assurance Program.

A2.1.3.1. Force Support Squadron, Personnel Reliability Assurance Program Satellite Offices, Security Forces Squadrons, and Unit Programs. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.3.2. Military Treatment Facility Support. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.4. Nuclear Surety Program.

- A2.1.4.1. Program Management.
- A2.1.4.2. Inspection Program.
- A2.1.4.3. Nuclear Surety Training.
- A2.1.4.4. Nuclear Weapon Access/Two-Person Concept.
- A2.1.4.5. Nuclear Certified Equipment Program. (**Note 5**)
- A2.1.4.6. Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance Program.
- A2.1.4.7. Radiation Safety Program.
- A2.1.4.8. Miscellaneous Programs.

A2.1.5. Civil Engineers. (**Note 3**)

- A2.1.5.1. Operations.
 - A2.1.5.1.1. Lightning Protection, Static Bonding, and Grounding.
 - A2.1.5.1.2. Emergency Backup Power.
 - A2.1.5.1.3. Nuclear Hoists.
 - A2.1.5.1.4. Blast Door Inspection.
 - A2.1.5.1.5. Earth Covered Magazine.
 - A2.1.5.1.6. Nuclear Haul Routes.
 - A2.1.5.1.7. Facility Maintenance and Upkeep.
- A2.1.5.2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
 - A2.1.5.2.1. Management.
 - A2.1.5.2.2. Render Safe/Continuation Procedures.
 - A2.1.5.2.3. Emergency Response.
- A2.1.5.3. (**Added-AFGSC**) Installation Emergency Management Program
 - A2.1.5.3.1. (**Added-AFGSC**) Contamination Control Team Operations
 - A2.1.5.3.2. (**Added-AFGSC**) Radiological Survey Team Operations
- A2.1.5.4. (**Added-AFGSC**) Installation Response Task Force Program
- A2.1.5.5. (**Added-AFGSC**) Fire and Emergency Services

A2.1.6. Munitions.

- A2.1.6.1. Management.
- A2.1.6.2. Stockpile and Housekeeping.
- A2.1.6.3. Key and Lock Management.
- A2.1.6.4. Tools, Test, Tie-down and Handling Equipment.
 - A2.1.6.4.1. (**Added-AFGSC**) Assess tools, test, tie-down, and handling equipment associated with aerospace ground equipment operations and munitions. Additionally,

assess hoists, cranes, and slings that are not Real Property Installed Equipment. Observe maintenance actions, Airmen performance, and compliance with technical data within the following areas as a minimum: **(T-2)**

A2.1.6.4.1.1. **(Added-AFGSC)** A sampling of personnel (i.e., not on TDY/leave) in the unit will be randomly observed performing static strap check out and testing procedures. **(T-2)**

A2.1.6.4.1.2. **(Added-AFGSC)** Hoists, cranes, and slings will be assessed for proper care, maintenance, and documentation of inspections. **(T-2)**

A2.1.6.4.1.3. **(Added-AFGSC)** Missile maintenance proficiency is assessed based on the results of AFGSC and unit-administered evaluations: field/base observations, documentation, and equipment/vehicle inspections. **(T-2)**

A2.1.6.4.1.4. **(Added-AFGSC)** [Bomber only] A sampling of MHU-196/MHU-204 trailers will be observed. **(T-2)**

A2.1.6.4.1.5. **(Added-AFGSC)** [Bomber only] A sampling of MHU-83C/D/E and MJ1B/C will be observed. **(T-2)**

A2.1.6.5. Technical Operations.

A2.1.6.5. **(AFGSC)** Technical Operations. **(Note 6)**

A2.1.6.6. Munitions Control.

A2.1.6.7. Nuclear Weapons Loading and Mating.

A2.1.6.7. **(AFGSC)** Nuclear Weapons Loading and Mating. **(Note 6)**

A2.1.6.8. Supply Support. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.7. Nuclear Security.

A2.1.7.1. Operations.

A2.1.7.2. Administration.

A2.1.7.3. Training and Resources.

A2.1.7.4. Standardization/Evaluation.

A2.1.7.5. Response Force Exercise.

A2.1.8. Intrusion Detection System Maintenance. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.9. Nuclear Weapon Loading and Mating Exercise.

A2.1.9. **(AFGSC)** Nuclear Weapon Loading and Mating Exercise. **(Note 6)**

A2.1.10. Recapture/Recovery Exercise.

A2.1.11. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force.

A2.1.12. Logistics Readiness. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.12.1. Materiel Management.

A2.1.12.1.1. **(Added-AFGSC)** Nuclear Weapons Related Material. This program will be reviewed to include appointment letters, training documentation, in-depth evaluation of unit Nuclear Weapons Related Material management and inventory processes. This will include an audit of previous inventory results and inspection of a minimum of 20% and maximum of 40% of on-hand assets listed in the accountable property system of record to verify compliance with storage, identification, labeling and accountability requirements. **Note 6:** Technical operations are based on the unit's current Maintenance Capability Letter and will include associated support programs. ICBM technical operations will be based on the unit's current Team Structure Letter and applicability to nuclear surety (e.g. component certifications, DCU Program Load, code change verifier, reentry system handling, certified nuclear loading tasks, etc.) **(T-2)**

A2.1.12.2. Deployment and Distribution.

A2.1.12.3. Vehicle Management.

A2.1.13. Air Force Major Graded Area Emergency Exercises. **(Note 4)**

A2.1.14. Outstanding Performers.

Note 1: Order categories in each section as follows:

Strength

Repeat Significant Observation

Significant Observation

Repeat Observation

Observation

Recommended Improvement Areas

Note 2: Observation (with references) will include:

Impact.

Recommendation.

Note 3: At a Joint Base where Air Force is a supported service, these functions are performed either partially or wholly by the sister service for the Air Force mission. In reference to Joint Bases, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal function is considered mission support. Where Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal is assigned at non-lead joint bases and the nuclear mission is primarily Air Force, the Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal flight will respond as the initial response force.

Note 4: Emergency Exercises along with sub areas in accordance with DAFI 90-302, paragraph 4.11.3. Emergency Exercises (e.g., Command Disablement, Emergency Response, Disaster Response Force, Security Force, Munitions/Maintenance....)

Note 5: Verification or current training and accountability of Nuclear Certified Equipment is integral to Nuclear Surety. All units whether nuclear tasked or non-nuclear tasked will have nuclear certified equipment monitors responsible for annual inventory of assets in accordance with DAFI 63-125.

Attachment 3

PREPARING FOR NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT

A3.1. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Preparation Guide.

A3.1.1. Preparation for Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits should use this guide.

A3.1.2. MAJCOMs may deviate from this guide as required to meet their requirements.

A3.2. Schedule of Events.

A3.2.1. INITIAL NOTIFICATION: SCHEDULE OF EVENTS PREP: start T-60 days, finish T-45 days

A3.2.2. Send formal visit message to the unit and info copy the Numbered Air Force and/or Center, and host MAJCOM (as required).

Note: Verify the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit days with a point of contact from the unit prior to formal visit message.

A3.2.3. Determine unit point of contact.

A3.2.4. Ensure unit point of contact begins coordination on the draft schedule of events. (It is common to use a prior year's schedule as a starting point).

A3.2.5. Designate team chief. Notify team chief of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit dates.

A3.2.6. Update and verify appropriate MAJCOM Functional Organization list.

A3.2.7. Notify MAJCOM Functional Organization list.

A3.2.8. Update appropriate MAJCOM long range schedules.

A3.2.9. Schedule conference room for pre-departure briefing.

A3.3. Team Support: start T-45 days, finish T-25.

A3.3.1. Obtain team member names from the staff. Required information: Full Name as it appears for personnel shortages, have appropriate functional area arrange for augmentees. Request Numbered Air Force/Center augmentees if necessary. Request email address for augmentees in addition to standard team member personal information.

A3.3.2. Send team roster, vehicle needs and special requests to the unit point of contact so that they can begin making billeting/vehicle/work center arrangements. Update any subsequent changes with point of contact as they occur. Find out if team will be staying on or off base. Request wing key personnel roster and base map.

A3.3.3. Make travel arrangements for MAJCOM team members (travel/aircraft validation).

A3.3.4. Email team roster/Organizational Defense Travel Administrator fund authorization letter to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members for order preparation.

A3.3.5. Email travel information, itinerary, per diem costs, pre-departure briefing time/location and any miscellaneous information to local team members. Have them arrange temporary duty orders.

A3.3.6. Send team travel info, fund cite/Organizational Defense Travel Administrator fund authorization letter and approximate travel/per diem costs to augmentees. Have them make their arrival times as close to the team arrival times as possible, so the base can pick everyone up together. Have them create their own orders.

A3.4. Schedule of Events Coordination: start T-40 days, finish T-30 days.

A3.4.1. Receive draft schedule of events from wing point of contact.

A3.4.2. E-mail draft schedule of events to team members for review/input.

A3.4.3. Coordinate schedule of events with other MAJCOMs if conducting a multi-MAJCOM Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit.

A3.4.4. Compile schedule of events inputs/recommendations/changes.

A3.5. Trip Preparation Actions: start T-20 days, finish T-10 days.

A3.5.1. Re-confirm travel, billeting, and transportation arrangements.

A3.5.2. Arrange bus transportation to/from airport as required.

A3.5.3. Receive travel verification/itineraries from augmentees.

A3.5.4. Finalize the schedule of events with the unit and send to all team members.

A3.5.5. Generate entry authorization list for review at pre-departure briefing. Ensure entry authorization list is marked Controlled Unclassified Information and contains the Privacy Act Statement. Have team chief sign first sheet.

A3.5.6. Prepare laptop computer and/or disk for the visit.

A3.5.7. Update the pre-departure briefing with pertinent info.

A3.5.8. Verify conference room date and time at least 7 days prior to briefing.

A3.6. Team Chief Book: start T-14 days, finish T-3 days.

A3.6.1. Build team chief book no later than the day before the brief. Include: team roster, Entry Authorization List, schedule of events, wing key personnel list, base map, unit observation forms, travel itinerary, inbrief, draft out brief, draft report, AFI 90-201 and MAJCOM supplements, AFI 91-121, and a copy of the unit's previous Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit report.

A3.6.2. Present team chief book no later than the day before the brief.

A3.7. Team Documents: start T-14 days, finish T-3 days. Assemble team member documents. Include: finalized schedule of events, unit/team member observation forms, outstanding performer forms, team roster, wing key personnel list, pre-departure briefing, draft out brief, draft report, AFI 90-201 and MAJCOM supplements, AFI 91-121, and anything else that might be useful.

A3.8. Pre-Departure Brief: start and finish T-3 days.

A3.8.1. Email out team documents.

A3.8.2. Present briefing and address any outstanding issues.

A3.8.3. Have team members review Entry Authorization List for correctness.

A3.9. Conduct Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit: start T-0 days, finish T+5 days.

A3.10. Post Temporary Duty Actions: start T+6 days, finish T+25 days.

A3.10.1. Send out Augmentee "Thank You" letters from lead division.

A3.10.2. Send significant observation message to wing, listing a MAJCOM point of contact for each significant observation (usually the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team member that authored the observation in the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Report).

A3.11. Significant Observation Resolution: start T+6 days, finish T+60 days. Receive Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit significant observation resolution message from wing.

A3.12. Significant Observation Resolution Coordination: start T+60 days, finish T+90 days. Forward resolution message to appropriate MAJCOM points of contact.

A3.13. Tracking/Follow-up: When MAJCOMs determine tracking and follow up reports are required, the following actions will be taken: Forward resolution message to appropriate MAJCOM points of contact. **(T-1)** Once all MAJCOM points of contact are satisfied that the wing's corrective action addresses the root cause of the discrepancy, the lead division will forward a message to the wing to confirm that all significant observations have been closed. **(T-1)**

Attachment 4 (Added-AFGSC)

TECHNICAL OPERATION BRIEFING

Table A4.1. (AFGSC) Technical Operation Briefing.

1. My name is (Rank and Name), and I am representing Air Force Global Strike Command. My primary focus during this operation is Safety, Security, and Reliability. At any point during the task if any of these are called into question, I will stop the task.
2. Normal day-to-day operations should not be impacted by my (our) presence, this includes all briefing/de-briefing actions, visual inspections, and supervisory responsibilities.
3. Questions may be asked during the task either for clarity or to determine your task knowledge. If you are unable to answer the question you may use your normal supervisory chain and supporting agencies.
4. If an abnormal situation presents itself outside of the scope of the established task, consult with your chain of command prior to troubleshoot/repair actions. A determination will be made to proceed with the assessment or terminate based on the nature of the problem.
5. Any documentation/data entry which is a direct result of the technical operation may be assessed.
6. Prior to the start of the task/operation identify any deviations and/or previously complied with steps or inspections. As these steps present within the task ensure they are vocalized. All training weapons will be treated as War Reserve during the operation.
7. I cannot be part of a TWO-PERSON team. If I am in the immediate area of a critical component, it is your responsibility to fulfill the TWO-PERSON CONCEPT requirements. I will not test your TWO-PERSON procedures by intentionally misleading you.
8. * (Read only if observers are present). During this operation, observers will be present. They are not part of a TWO-PERSON team and should not interact with any member of your team throughout this operation.
9. * (Read only if Quality Assurance is present). After the task is complete, Quality Assurance will brief me on their observations of the task, prior to out briefing the maintenance team.
10. Are there any questions?