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AIR FORCE DISTRICT OF
WASHINGTON**

**AIR FORCE DISTRICT OF
WASHINGTON INSTRUCTION 31-104**

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**SECURITY FORCES SPECIALIZED
MISSIONS**

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This policy provides guidance for the protection of DV aircraft requiring use of Executive Aircraft Security (EAS) teams. It establishes security procedures for missions directed by AF/A3M (CVAM) on C-17, C-20, C-32, C-37, and C-40 aircraft in order to safely and successfully accomplish their worldwide missions. Additionally, this instruction provides guidance for the close-in DV protection, DV security escorts while transiting JBA, and security support for National Special Security Events (NSSE) requiring the use of Protective Services Teams (PST). It applies to individuals at all levels who perform these missions, except where noted otherwise. This publication may be supplemented at any level, but all supplements must be routed to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) listed above for coordination prior to certification and approval. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the OPR listed above using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate chain of command. The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3”) number following the compliance statement. See AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management, Table 1.1 for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the Publication OPR for non-tiered compliance items. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS). The

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Chapter 1

EAS PROGRAM AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1.1. Objectives.

1.1.1. Executive Aircraft Security (EAS) provides discrete, low-visibility security that ensures protection for Executive Airlift Operations, including support of the Vice President of the United States (VPOTUS), First Lady of the United States (FLOTUS), Foreign Heads of State (FHoS), and protection for Air Force aircraft transiting airfields where security is unknown or deemed inadequate to counter local threats. The executive airlift mission provides safe, reliable, protected, and comfortable air transportation for national leadership in direct support of national security objectives. The 11th Security Forces Group (11 SFG) provides security support for three different requirements: aircraft user (senior executive only, not support personnel/equipment), aircraft Protection Level, and location(s) transited.

1.1.2. Detect. EAS teams are designed to discover attempts to access or damage Air Force aircraft.

1.1.3. Protect. EAS teams defend Air Force aircraft, assets, and personnel from terrorist, criminal, and foreign intelligence threats.

1.1.4. Inform. EAS team members provide Integrated Defense (ID) advice to aircraft commanders (AC) concerning individual protective measures when traveling in high threat areas.

1.1.5. Communicate. EAS team leader will provide the AC with security related details for operational reporting. (T-2) FAS team leader will immediately notify MAJCOM/A4S if they are not successful in the first two objectives or when issues arise that the team cannot address through the AC. (T-2)

1.1.6. Incident Report. If any incident occurs during a mission, EAS teams will compile a clear and accurate report of the incident and security situation at transited airfields, and forward to AFDW/A4S, and if appropriate, AFDW/A2 as previously coordinated. (T-2) AFDW/A4S does not require routine site surveys and/or mission reports.

1.2. Duties and Responsibilities.

1.2.1. 18 AF/CC. The 18 AF/CC is the waiver authority for any deviation to the PR policy for missions transiting a RRL.

1.2.2. Headquarters Air Force District of Washington Security Forces (SF) Division (AFDW/A4S). Will provide administrative oversight to this AFDWI and will ensure its accuracy.

1.2.2.1. Maintains QFEPR UTC currency IAW AFI 10-401, *Air Force Operations Planning and Execution*, including Logistics Detail (LOGDET) and in the individual equipment listing in Attachment 5.

1.2.2.2. Ensure appropriate guidance is provided to unit commanders and EAS Program Managers (PM) as needed.

1.2.2.3. Ensure EAS program has certified staff personnel in place to properly oversee the EAS program. These staff members routinely accompany EAS missions to assess program effectiveness.

1.2.2.4. Coordinates with other MAJCOMs and Air Reserve Components (ANG and AFRC) to ensure EAS/PR certified personnel are available to support CVAM/A3M missions. ANG and AFRC will in turn, coordinate with respective units to meet mission requirements.

1.2.2.5. Identifies requests and allocates available man-days to certified EAS ARC units to support CVAM/A3M missions.

1.2.2.6. Reserves the right to audit EAS selection and removal practices.

1.2.3. Installation Responsibilities.

1.2.3.1. Installation Commander. The Installation Commander with mission execution authority, or designee, may direct teams to accompany missions at other than MAJCOM-directed locations and will ensure all wing organizations provide adequate support for the EAS program. **(T-3)** EAS funding is codified in an AFDW and AMC Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). If additional funding is not addressed through other means (e.g. in deployment orders), the tasked airlift wing or the tasked flying unit is responsible for providing EAS teams with a fund cite for mission accomplishment. If members from one wing are used to support another wing's mission, the tasked unit will utilize the appropriate fund cites according to current MAJCOM/Financial Management Board (FMB) guidance. The tasked wing will ensure, through wing and airlift squadron current operations sections, EAS team members are included as mission essential personnel (MEP) IAW AFI 11-401, *Aviation Management*. **(T-1)**

1.2.3.2. Wing. Wings supporting aircraft requiring EAS support can supplement this instruction as necessary to ensure Wing-specific mission requirements are met. Wing-supplements will include:

1.2.3.2.1. Threat Assessment Process. Wings supporting aircraft requiring EAS support will supplement this AFDWI with their threat assessment process to determine EAS requirements to support missions. **(T-1)** This supplement will include how airfield security surveys and reports are used to inform subsequent missions and what products are used. **(T-2)**

1.2.3.2.2. Tasking Process. In addition to chapter 2 of this instruction, Wings supporting aircraft requiring EAS support will supplement this AFDWI with their EAS tasking process.

1.2.3.2.3. Funding Process. Wings requiring EAS support will program manpower and equipment to support their requirements.

1.2.3.2.4. EAS Team Training and Certification. Wings requiring EAS support will define additional training and certification requirements if necessary within their supplement to this instruction.

1.2.3.3. Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). The installation legal office will provide EAS team members with assistance in interpreting Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), U.S. Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide restrictions, arming and use of force

considerations for mission locations prior to mission initiation, and any regional Rules of Engagement that may apply. **(T-0)**

1.2.3.4. Operations Group/Unit Intelligence. Prior to any mission, Operations Group/Unit Intelligence will coordinate with EAS team(s) and provide members a threat briefing. Briefings should highlight the following minimum requirements: current Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and combatant command (COCOM) threat level, potential and specific threats (to include Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat, Force Protection Conditions (FPCON), and measures in-place to reduce susceptibility to terrorist attack or criminal activity.

1.2.3.5. Medical Group. Each certified member assigned, or tasked, to an EAS duty position will receive an annual physical by their Primary Care Manager (PCM) with a psychological review of the medical records during their initial physical. **(T-2)** The PCM will document recommendation for frequent flying; state the member has no occupational restrictions precluding safe egress from aircraft and no history of ear, nose, or throat problems; and that the member meets all criteria IAW AFI 48-123, *Medical Examinations and Standards*. This information should be documented on the Standard Form 600, *Medical Record-Chronological Record of Medical Care*. Members who wear prescription glasses will be provided aircrew style eyeglasses, prescription aircrew sunglasses, and gas mask inserts to support EAS missions. All EAS team members will receive immunizations as required prior to mission departure and an annual medical intelligence briefing on current worldwide medical threats. Annual reviews by PCMs medically recertify members continuing in the program.

1.2.3.6. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). As required, EAS team members will receive all relevant foreign intelligence, terrorist, and criminal threat information pertaining to mission locations. **NOTE:** If AFOSI personnel are not available to provide this information, EAS team members should seek this information from other sources such as the local Antiterrorism Officer or Intelligence Office.

1.2.3.7. Defense Force Commander (DFC). DFCs assigned EAS requirements will appoint EAS program manager (PM) and EAS deputy program manager (DPM). Additionally, the DFC will maintain certified EAS teams as dictated by their Wing or AFDW. **(T-2)**

1.2.3.8. Oversees EAS selection and decertification processes. All EAS applicants must have the following items to be eligible for EAS selection to include attending Air Mobility Command's Phoenix Raven course (all deviations from this requirement requires AFDW/A4S approval):

1.2.3.8.1. A minimum of 18 months time in service.

1.2.3.8.1.1. Successfully completed 5-Level Career Development Course (CDC).

1.2.3.8.1.2. No medical profile precluding worldwide deployment.

1.2.3.8.1.3. Received no Article 15 action during the current term of enlistment.

1.2.3.8.1.4. Not been placed on the control roster or the subject of an unfavorable information file (UIF).

1.2.3.8.1.5. Received rating of "Exceeded some, but not all expectations" or better, on the last three (3) Enlisted Performance Reports (EPRs). **NOTE:** No less than 4

rating on older EPRs.

1.2.3.8.1.6. Is not on the AF Weight Management Program (WMP) or remedial fitness program.

1.2.3.8.1.7. Possess at least two years retainability in service after completion of Phoenix Raven Qualification Course (PRQC).

1.2.3.8.1.8. Possess at least a Secret clearance or U.S. equivalent.

1.2.3.8.1.9. Complete the AF Fitness Assessment with a minimum of 90% overall.

1.2.3.8.1.10. DFC or designated representatives will review EAS applicants' SURF, AFFMS, and last three (3) EPRs at a minimum prior to conducting interviews. All EAS applicants must conduct a mock fitness assessment as part of the interview process.

1.2.3.8.2. Pre-PRQC. Pre-PRQC training is conducted prior to PRQC attendance to ensure applicants are properly prepared and equipped. DFC will oversee Pre-PRQC to ensure training is adequate and safe. The goal is to hire only the best applicants for the EAS section while ensuring their safety.

1.2.3.9. Unit EAS PM. For units with EAS responsibility, the PM should be a certified Phoenix Raven; this individual will serve as the primary liaison to AFDW and other MAJCOM PMs. Program management should be consistent with wing supplements to this instruction.

1.2.3.9.1. The EAS PM and DPM will hold Special Experience Identifier (SEI) 329. EAS personnel can support other functions or sections in their unit when not flying missions or conducting EAS training requirements, as long as they do not detract from their ability to support EAS taskings.

1.2.3.9.2. Upon request, provide Situational Reports (SITREPs) to AFDW/A4S via e-mail or available communication means. SITREPs will outline personnel covering missions, on leave status, attending professional military education (PME), deployed, available, and any other circumstance not outlined in this publication.

1.2.3.9.3. The EAS PM/DPM is responsible for supporting EAS/PR that may be attached to a JBA EAS mission (i.e., JBAs EAS PM/DPM is responsible to support Dover PRs when they are covering a JBA mission).

1.2.3.9.4. Ensure EAS members maintain two valid official passports and 12 visa photos. Dual passports allow members access to a passport for operational missions, while the other is being processed for a visa, or renewal.

1.2.3.9.5. Ensures EAS members are placed on crew orders as MEP personnel. Under no circumstances will the AC relieve an EAS team of their security responsibilities at a RRL without coordinating with the 618 AOC for 18 AF/CC approval.

1.2.3.9.6. Ensure all Airfield Surveys are completed within 72 hours of completion of an EAS mission. When tasked with a mission, EAS PM/DPM must review all locations in the itinerary and determine the survey currency of each location. This is done by cross-checking the country currency requirement to the location (date of most current survey) reflected in the RRL posted to the Phoenix Raven Tracking and Tasking EIM

site, or the PR Airfield Survey tool on the AMC/A2 SIPR website (<https://portal.amcin.scott.af.smil.mil/index.cfm?PageID=19>). If a location is due/overdue, the EAS PM will task the team leader to complete a new survey for those locations in the mission. AMC/A4SC will periodically update the currency requirement list, or as country threat levels change, and will provide this list to the EAS PMs. As always, any unusual event or incident should be reported, no matter the location. EASs should use judgment on whether an incident should be immediately reported or can wait until they return to home station.

1.2.3.9.7. Regardless of team size, the EAS PM will designate a team leader for all missions. Team leaders are responsible for all items listed in Attachment 2 of this instruction.

1.2.3.9.8. Ensuring individuals selected for the EAS program display the attributes of trustfulness, maturity, and reliability to operate with minimum or no supervision in foreign locations/austere environments.

1.2.3.9.9. Upon successful graduation of PRQC, personnel should be assigned to an EAS position for a minimum of two years. Do not place EAS members, who are filling an EAS authorization on deployment or against an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) position.

1.2.3.9.10. Monitor the behavior/work ethic of assigned EAS members to ensure individuals are able to work in the capacity of an EAS. Ensure EAS personnel are properly managed within the unit. EAS positions should be filled consistent with the unit's overall military manning percentage. Project replacements due to permanent change-of-station, retirement, separation, decertification, or other factors to maintain that fill rate.

1.2.3.9.11. Ensures EAS members are given adequate time upon mission completion for gear turn-in, completion of reports, and post-mission downtime. Compensatory time may be adjusted based on mission needs.

1.2.3.9.12. Ensure EAS equipment is available and inventoried, as required. Equipment that is lost, damaged, or destroyed will be investigated and report of survey actions completed.

1.2.3.9.13. Notify AFDW/A4S whenever an EAS member is decertified or removed from EAS duties for cause. Actions surrounding the decertification will be outlined in the notification. If an EAS member is decertified pending criminal/non-judicial punishment, notify AFDW/A4S once the administrative/legal process is complete. Depending upon the severity of the incident or if the SFS commander deems necessary, the EAS member may be removed from the EAS program and permanently decertified by AFDW/A4S. When a member is permanently decertified, the SFS commander will submit an AF Form 2096 to have the SEI 329 removed from the member's military record. HQ AMC/A4S is the final approval for all EAS/PR decertifications.

1.2.3.9.14. Notify AFDW/A4S whenever you deem an EAS/PR member should be recertified. Submit a formal MFR to HQ AMC/A4S through AFDW/A4S stating the reason you deem a member should be reinstated. HQ AMC/A4S is the final approval for all EAS/PR recertifications.

1.2.3.10. Aircraft Commander (AC). Overall responsibility for FP rests with the AC. If additional protection for the aircrew is needed at the hotel or while transiting to and from the airport, the AC should coordinate additional security with the U.S. Embassy Regional Security Officer (RSO) and/or DoD Force Protection Detachment (FPD), when appropriate. The AC coordinates FP matters with the EAS team leader and provides any assistance necessary to establish security for the aircraft. **(T-3)** As with other crewmembers, the AC will ensure EAS team members attend mission briefings and are given the opportunity to brief all crewmembers on FP. **(T-3)** The AC will ensure availability of necessary food, water, relief, transportation, and billeting for team members throughout the mission. **(T-3)**

1.2.3.11. Aircrew Responsibilities. All aircrew members must remain in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft, unless official duties require otherwise, until security procedures are established for the mission and approved by the AC. **(T-3)** Aircrew members must assist the EAS team in observing avenues of approach to the aircraft during any separations that leave a void in aircraft security. **(T-3)** Example: EAS members go with host nation (HN) security to conduct an airfield survey. If there are insufficient security team members to secure the aircraft, the AC designates a crewmember(s) to supplement the team until return of the survey team. **(T-3)**

1.3. Concept of Operations.

1.3.1. Pre-Departure Requirements.

1.3.1.1. Planning. Prior to departing for a mission, EAS team members will coordinate with AFOSI and Operations Group/Unit Intelligence to identify the threats posed to operations and existing force protection measures at each mission location. **(T-3)** EAS team members should utilize their installations Risk Assessment Database to coordinate with their Medical Group, Public Health Section, to receive a medical intelligence briefing, pre-deployment medical records review, and recommended medical countermeasures for the deployed location.

1.3.1.1.1. AFTRANS Ravens Required Policy. To ensure Force Protection of mission aircraft at RRL, EAS will be designated as MEP and will travel onboard the aircraft. EAS teams traveling via other means elevate the risk to the mission aircraft, aircrew, and EAS members. The following unforeseen scenarios can potentially leave a mission aircraft without necessary security: commercial flight delays or cancellations, delays or changes to mission aircraft itineraries, country Visa requirements, travel costs, and staffing/coordination requirements to pre-position EAS teams. EAS members have mission priority and their seats not be released to for the purpose of adding additional passengers to the remaining legs of the mission.

1.3.1.2. Mission Preparation Time. The unit will release EAS team members from normal duty no later than 48 hours prior to aircraft departure to conduct planning for scheduled missions. **(T-3)**

1.3.1.3. Crew Rest. EAS teams will enter crew rest 12 hours prior to the beginning of the flight duty period. **(T-2)** The crew rest period is the non-duty period before the flight duty period begins. Its purpose is to allow the aircrew member the opportunity for adequate rest before performing in-flight duties. Crew rest is free time, which includes times for meals,

transportation, and rest. Rest is defined as the condition that allows an individual the opportunity to sleep. EAS team members require at least 8 hours of continuous, uninterrupted rest during the 12 hours prior to the beginning of the flight duty period. EAS team members will not consume any form of alcohol or use other drugs or medications that could impair their ability to handle a firearm while on duty, or within 12 hours of the scheduled aircraft departure times at all locations throughout the mission. Any official business required of an aircrew member interrupts the crew rest period. This includes official business conducted on the phone. Any interruption must be made only under the most exceptional circumstances. **(T-2)**

1.3.1.3.1. Most EAS missions do not require in-flight security. EAS members will minimize in-flight duties in order to prepare for duty requirements on the ground. ACs may request flight deck denial in special circumstances (e.g., foreign nationals onboard).

1.3.1.4. Waiver Authority. For Executive Airlift missions executed IAW AFI 11-2 VIP, Vol 3, *VIP Operations Procedures*, the waiver authority for deviating from established procedures outlined in this instruction is the executing Airlift Wing's NAF/CC or designee. IAW AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, the security waiver authority for VPOTUS and FLOTUS tasked aircraft is the Director, White House Military Office (WHMO). IAW AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, the security waiver authority for Foreign Head of State tasked aircraft is the AF/A3. All security waiver requests for these aircraft will be provided via written notification to AF/A3M, who will then notify the 18 AF/CC and the tasked WG/CC.

1.3.2. Execution.

1.3.2.1. Team Size. Team size is primarily based upon the severity of the threat, physical security of the location visited, size and profile of the airframe, and ground time. **(T-2)** The basic team size will be IAW the specific 11 series AFI for the airframe. If requested, a minimum four (4) person EAS team will be assigned to all 1800 Series, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), Secretary of State (SecState), and Cabinet Member (if requested) support missions, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), and humanitarian relief operations. **(T-0)** If not addressed, the MAJCOM with command responsibility for the mission will determine the team size. **(T-2)** One (1) member will remain on board as an overwatch and the other member(s) will secure the exterior of the aircraft. **(T-2)**

1.3.2.1.1. The standard EAS team size requirements are indicated in the table below.

Table 1.1. Team Requirements.

Aircraft	Minimum Requirement	PL-1	Ground Time >16 Hours
C-32	4	4	4
C-40B	2	3	4
C-40C	2 (3 if utilizing both sets of stairs)	3	4
C-37/C-20	2	2	4
C-17	3	3	6

- 1.3.2.1.2. For missions with a cumulative “security required” time greater than 96 hours, additional EAS members will be requested and coordinated with applicable flying unit for approval.
- 1.3.2.1.3. EAS team leader will be in the grade of Staff Sergeant (SSgt) or above **(T-3)**.
- 1.3.2.1.4. The standard EAS duty day is 12 hours, with a 45-minute changeover (12+45), in a 24- hour period. **(T-2)** The duty time begins when the team initiates its first security duty (whether in-flight or at a location). The 12-hour duty day, either continuous or cumulative, will be followed by an 8-hour uninterrupted rest period (sleep opportunity) not including travel, meals, or hygiene. Team sizes are increased when required hours of duty at EAS-required location(s) exceeds 12+45. **(T-2)**
- 1.3.2.1.5. For planning purposes, EAS personnel in TDY status are considered unavailable for the entire period, and will spend an average of ten (10) days per month away from home station performing EAS duty. **(T-3)**
- 1.3.2.2. Team Employment. EAS teams will not be posted in a guard capacity without having another team member at that same location who is capable of serving in an overwatch capacity. **(T-3)** Weapons are postured inside the aircraft for immediate and effective use to neutralize the warranted threat. **(T-3)**
- 1.3.2.2.1. EAS team members will not be required to perform duties that detract from their primary mission of protecting the aircraft and/or personnel.
- 1.3.2.2.2. When not performing security duties, teams may assist crew members with his/her assigned functions if properly supervised/trained.
- 1.3.2.2.3. EAS do not have an in-flight security and flight deck denial mission unless specifically tasked.
- 1.3.2.2.4. Large aircraft require a basic team of three (3) personnel to adequately secure the airframe. **(T-2)** One (1) member will remain on board as an over watch and two (2) members will secure the exterior of the aircraft. **(T-2)**
- 1.3.2.2.5. Small aircraft require one (1) member to remain on board as an over watch and one (1) member will secure the exterior of the aircraft. **(T-2)**
- 1.3.2.2.6. All aircraft upgraded to Protection Level One (PL-1) require an interior sweep inspection by a team or when a military working dog (MWD) team is not available, a hand search conducted by the EAS team and the Flying Crew Chief/Flight Engineer. EAS members will ensure the MWD team is pre-announced to all personnel before entering the aircraft and will accompany the MWD team at all times. All ground support equipment should be identified and inspected by a MWD team. If one is not available the EAS team will conduct the inspection and will constantly monitor the equipment to ensure there is no unauthorized tampering.
- 1.3.2.2.7. Aircraft scheduled to transport the VPOTUS, FLOTUS, and FHoS will be upgraded to PL-1 for the duration of the mission. An aircraft designated as the “immediate backup aircraft” for VPOTUS OCONUS mission will be PL-1 until mission completion. This aircraft is normally referred to as the “SHADOW” aircraft.

1.3.2.2.8. The aircraft designated as the ground backup from home station will be upgraded to the same PL for mission departure. One (1) EAS member accompanying the mission will perform entry control of the backup aircraft until 30 minutes prior to departure of the primary aircraft. If not required for the duration of the mission, the backup aircraft will be automatically downgraded after the primary aircraft has departed.

1.3.2.2.9. Close-in-Sentry (CIS). EAS members performing CIS duties will maintain surveillance over assigned areas of responsibility and alert the AC, host nation, or local law enforcement of any unusual situation(s) in their area. These posts prevent unauthorized entry to or near their areas of responsibility and detect unauthorized personnel and equipment.

1.3.2.2.9.1. Standoff Distance. While performing CIS duties every effort should be made to maximize the distance between unknown individuals and un-swept equipment and the aircraft. EAS members should be proactive and engage with personnel and servicing equipment prior to them entering the close-in area of the aircraft.

1.3.2.2.9.2. Without fail, a physical and visual examination will be made of all items delivered to the aircraft. If questionable objects or devices are found, contact the local authorities and up-channel the information to the AC. It is mandatory for an EAS member to be present when any access point to the aircraft is open.

1.3.2.2.9.3. When the aircraft parks, EAS deplane first and take up pre-designated positions fore and aft of the aircraft. When the baggage compartment is opened, one (1) EAS will monitor baggage unloading and will remain as a sentry until the baggage compartment is secured. If crew baggage will be out of a crewmember's control (i.e., clearing customs), an EAS will accompany the baggage at all times.

1.3.2.2.9.4. Under no circumstances are foreign baggage handlers allowed to enter the baggage compartment area.

1.3.2.2.9.5. Official personnel such as Heads of State, Ambassadors, Governors, and local security agents who have arrived to greet or assist the DV will meet the EAS member controlling entry at the front steps. Unless authorized by the AC, principal DV, and/or trip contact, these personnel are not authorized to enter the aircraft. As always, tact, diplomacy, and sound judgment must be used.

1.3.2.2.9.6. While servicing operations are underway, anyone approaching the aircraft to conduct business, official or otherwise, should be directed to the EAS member at the front steps. Although servicing personnel should be under escort by a crew member, EAS teams should closely monitor all personnel and activities around the aircraft, especially of those who come into physical contact with the aircraft.

1.3.2.2.9.7. Two (2) personnel per shift are required at all times. One (1) personnel is authorized if tail support is provided by a law enforcement trained United States citizen.

1.3.2.2.9.8. Aircrew Orders and Passenger Manifests. EAS control access, after

coordination with the AC, to the aircraft and must positively identify all individuals granted unescorted entry to the aircraft. Personnel listed on the applicable passenger manifest or crew orders will be granted unescorted entry onto the aircraft. Manifest changes for POTUS support aircraft are approved by the AC. Manifest changes for all other aircraft are approved by the mission contact or AC. EAS members board the aircraft only after all passengers and other aircrew members have boarded.

1.3.2.2.9.8.1. ACs may permit other personnel to enter the aircraft when escorted by an authorized aircrew member. The AC will ensure EAS is notified of each approved visit and an authorized aircrew member properly escorts the visitor(s). EAS will coordinate with the AC to determine the limit for escorted visitors as necessary to maintain adequate security. NOTE: For VPOTUS missions, contact and coordination will happen 24 hours prior to the mission start and will be authorized by the Vice President's Military Aide.

1.3.2.2.9.9. Photography. There are no restrictions on exterior photography. Interior photography is authorized at the discretion of the AC and the principal DV. Specific airfields may have restrictions regarding the photography of aircraft.

1.3.2.2.9.10. After completing security coordination and prior to entering crew rest, the EAS team leader will arrange to store all weapons in accordance with AFI 31-104, *Security Forces Specialized Missions*.

1.3.2.2.9.11. Work-Rest Schedule. EAS team leaders are authorized to implement fatigue mitigation measures as needed. Factors that team leaders must consider are ground time, time in flight between locations, and work/rest cycles. Team leaders must notify the EAS PM when any team member will be posted continuously at a "security required" location exceeding 16 hours.

1.3.2.3. EAS Remain Overnight (RON) Operations.

1.3.2.3.1. RON Support. If the mission transits to an airfield designated as a high-risk security threat, or if the OG/CC determines that airfield security protection is inadequate, additional EAS members will accompany the aircraft regardless of the scheduled ground time.

1.3.2.3.2. The following items should be requested and procured by the AC and utilized by the EAS team for all RON locations:

1.3.2.3.2.1. Two (2) vehicles (one (1) point vehicle and one (1) shift change vehicle).

1.3.2.3.2.2. Dedicated host nation security/law enforcement support.

1.3.2.3.2.3. Controlled entry signs printed in the host nation language.

1.3.2.3.2.4. Ropes, stanchions, and area lighting (Note: lighting should be positioned to light the boundary and not the aircraft).

1.3.2.3.3. Local Security. If local SF augment EAS during ground times, the EAS team leader will brief them on their duties and responsibilities.

1.3.2.3.4. EAS and Aircrew Billeting. EAS and crew integrity is a mission requirement per AFI 11-2VIP, Vol. 3, *VIP Operations Procedures*. AC and EAS team leaders must

know where their members are at all times. Itinerary changes are common and often require immediate action by EAS and crew members. To provide EAS and crew control, all EAS and crew members should be billeted at the same facility at en route stops. EAS and crew integrity does not require the whole crew to be billeted together in a BOQ. "Billeted at the same facility" means billeted on the same base or at the same hotel complex; however, if the whole crew is not together, the EAS team leader must have a room phone. When government quarters are available, but not suitable, use an AF Form 2282, Statement of Adverse Effect - Use of Government Facilities, to justify the non-use.

1.3.2.4. Weapons Storage. After completing security coordination and prior to entering crew rest, EAS team leader will arrange to store all weapons and ammunition. **(T-3)** Weapons should be stored in a DoD or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) armory, but if these facilities are not available, teams will store weapons and ammunition aboard the aircraft in a locked container secured to the aircraft. **(T-3)** Additionally, EAS team may consider storage at a U.S. Embassy or U.S. Security Assistance Office (SAO), if the mission profile allows for advance notification and coordination with the appropriate agency.

1.3.2.5. Emergency Deviations. Each Wing, in their supplement to this instruction, will develop and publish emergency deviation procedures based upon unique mission situations that may occur. However, final waiver authority remains IAW paragraph 1.3.1.4.

1.3.3. Post Mission.

1.3.3.1. Post-Mission Security. If the aircraft is to maintain upgraded security status, EAS will maintain the security status until relieved by appropriately cleared military sentries. If the aircraft security status is to be terminated, EAS will remain at the aircraft until all passengers and baggage are unloaded and the AC terminates the upgraded security status. When relieved, EAS will turn weapons and ammunition in to the armory and comply with local debriefing requirements.

1.3.3.2. Mission Return. EAS team members require time upon mission completion for gear turn-in and to complete required reports. EAS team members returning to their home or rotational base should be given sufficient time to recover from the cumulative effects of the mission.

1.3.3.3. Reporting Requirements. EAS team leaders will accomplish all post-mission reports as required by AFDW. **(T-2)** These reports should include: airfield surveys, reportable foreign national contact, after action reports, lessons learned, etc. Information of interest to future missions should be reported to the Operations Group Intelligence IAW AFI 14-202, Vol 3, *General Intelligence Rules*, and applicable Theater Intelligence Reporting Directive.

1.4. EAS Apprentice (EASA) Program.

1.4.1. SFS commanders identify potential candidates for EAS certification as EASs. EASs may accompany EAS missions at the discretion of SFS commanders and EAS PMs. EASs may perform duties as an EAS team member as long as there are two (2) certified EASs assigned to the team. Any exceptions to these procedures must be approved by AFDW/A4S.

1.5. Contingency Forward Operating Locations (FOL).

1.5.1. When deemed necessary, AFDW/A4S may establish contingency FOLs to support operational mission requirements. FOL operations tasking normally include a FOL manager and enough EAS members to support the scope of the operation. The requirements are normally filled through UTC tasking, and the personnel are attached to an AFDW unit. The FOL manager is responsible for the operation of the FOL including lodging, personnel, crew rest, and coordinating administrative paperwork (i.e., LOEs, awards and decorations) with the assigned FOL leadership for review and approval. EAS team leaders are responsible for deploying to the FOL location with their team kit for missions. AFDW/A4S will provide further guidance at the onset of the FOL operations that details mission requirements. During FOL operations, EAS FOL managers will assign EASs to missions and provide daily SITREPs to AFDW/A4S.

Chapter 2

WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE OPERATIONS FOR EAS OPERATIONS

2.1. Purpose. To coordinate Executive Aircraft Security standard operating procedures across multiple Air Force components and the White House Military Office (WHMO).

2.2. Procedures.

2.2.1. Executive Airlift operations are outside the normal air mobility command and control structure. Mission planning, execution, and command and control are normally exercised at the organizational level in coordination with the Air Force Special Air Mission Division (AF/A3M) and/or the WHMO.

2.2.2. When directed, EAS will accompany executive aircrafts. If required by WHMO, EAS members assigned tasked to fly on executive aircrafts must obtain a Yankee White security clearance. EAS assures local security efforts are smoothly integrated into the total security system to protect the aircraft. During mission execution, the aircraft commander coordinates with the assigned senior EAS member to ensure the aircraft is afforded adequate protection.

2.2.3. EAS provides a full spectrum of support options designed to protect the crew, the aircraft, the mission, and by association the traveling party. They perform ground security, in-flight security (flight deck denial) as required, and are sworn military law enforcement professionals. Flight deck denial is usually only performed when there is a concern that passengers may not be fully compliant with all Air Force requirements (e.g. foreign delegations). Any flight deck denial will be coordinated with the AC to ensure proper coordination with an armed aircrew. On the ground, SF also provide aircraft access control, conduct security surveys, and perform sweeps of servicing equipment and baggage, as necessary. They report directly to the AC and are MEP throughout the duration of the mission.

2.3. EAS Responsibilities.

2.3.1. EAS team will provide security support to the 1st Airlift Squadron, 99th Airlift Squadron, 201st Airlift Squadron, 73rd Airlift Squadron, 54th Airlift Squadron, and AMC Mobility Aircraft (if supporting VPOTUS operations).

2.3.2. EAS team assists the AC in coordinating advance security support with local military and civilian authorities.

2.3.3. EAS team will conduct security operations with at least two (2) personnel posted at the aircraft. Coordination with civilian law enforcement entities may be used to augment Close Boundary Sentry (CBS) duties when required. The civilian entity must be composed of Law Enforcement trained United States citizens.

2.3.4. During mission execution, upgrade all aircraft designated to transport the VPOTUS, FLOTUS, or FHoS to PL-1 standards IAW AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*. This will be accomplished two (2) hours prior to departure. When designated, the immediate backup aircraft for the VPOTUS will be upgraded and protected to PL-1 standards in accordance with AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*.

2.3.5. Upgrade required mission aircraft utilizing a MWD (explosive detection certified). In the absence of a MWD, the senior SF member will conduct a hand search of the aircraft with

the flight engineer or crew chief. Once the aircraft is swept, it will be upgraded to PL-1 status. Yankee White SF are required when accompanying VPOTUS aircraft to perform entry control duties. SF accompanying FLOTUS and FHoS aircraft do not require a Yankee White clearance. In addition to an entry controller, all PL-1 tasked aircraft require a CBS. The CBS must be a law enforcement trained United States Citizen. A Yankee White clearance is not required for the CBS on VPOTUS aircraft.

2.3.6. In the event the primary aircraft is not mission capable and an aircraft is alerted for VPOTUS operations, Yankee White SF will transfer from the primary aircraft to the new aircraft and follow the procedures for VPOTUS tasked aircraft. If SF are already posted with the new primary aircraft, the Yankee White SF team leader will assume command and control of security operations. When an aircraft is designated as a VPOTUS backup aircraft for the duration of a mission and is configured for VPOTUS operations, the aircraft will be subjected to the same security requirements as the primary aircraft. Yankee White SF will upgrade the aircraft to PL-1 status. This aircraft is commonly referred to as the “shadow” aircraft and is normally used for OCONUS VPOTUS missions. The “shadow” aircraft may be a Mobility Aircraft.

2.3.7. EAS team will consist of at least four (4) members on all PL-1/PL-2 C-32 missions. EAS team will consist of at least six (6) members on C-32 missions with greater than 96 hours of cumulative ground time, based on an 89 OG Mission Assessment Group (MAG) decision. Normally, a total of four (4) seats will be available on the C-32 for EAS to utilize. Additional seats may be provided as discussed in the MAG.

2.3.8. Local training flights do not require EAS support as they do not full stop at any location. Local out and back trainers require two (2) EAS members to protect the aircraft during a refueling stop with only a single set of stairs. Off Station Training (OST) flights require the same support as missions defined in paragraph 2.2.4.7. If an aircraft on a training flight has a maintenance issue and cannot return to an USAF installation, at least one (1) aircrew member must remain with the aircraft at all times, until relieved by SF.

2.3.9. EAS team will consist of at least three (3) members on all PL-1 C-40B/C missions. EAS team will consist of at least two (2) members on PL-3 C-40B/C missions when transiting a RRL or when missions exceed six (6) hours at Raven Required +6 Locations. “Consider +6” locations require EAS members based on circumstances surrounding the mission and location. Requirements for “Consider +6” locations will be decided at the MAG. When missions exceed 12 hours cumulative ground time, EAS team will consist of at least four (4) members based on a MAG decision. Normally a total of four (4) seats will be available on the C-40 for EAS to utilize. Additional seats may be provided as discussed in the MAG.

2.3.10. EAS team will consist of at least two (2) members on all PL-1 C-37/C-20 missions. EAS team will consist of at least two (2) members on PL-3 C-37/C-20 missions when transiting a RRL. EAS team will consist of at least four (4) members based on a MAG decision. Normally a total of two (2) seats will be available on the C-20/37 for EAS to utilize. Additional seats may be provided as discussed in the MAG.

2.3.11. EAS team leader or designee will attend the Intelligence/Crew Briefing prior to supporting an executive airlift mission.

2.4. EAS Support Prioritization.

2.4.1. EAS will provide support in the priority order below:

- 2.4.1.1. Missions supporting POTUS.
- 2.4.1.2. Missions supporting VPOTUS.
- 2.4.1.3. Missions supporting the First Family (e.g. FLOTUS).
- 2.4.1.4. Missions supporting the Second Family (e.g. Second Lady).
- 2.4.1.5. Missions supporting FHoS/Government.
- 2.4.1.6. Missions with 1st Airlift Squadron C-32 aircraft.
- 2.4.1.7. 89th Operations Group Special Air Missions.
- 2.4.1.8. 201st Airlift Squadron Executive Airlift Missions.
- 2.4.1.9. 73rd Airlift Squadron/54th Airlift Squadron Executive Airlift Missions.

2.4.2. Upon confirmation of a visa-required mission, assist the tasked Airlift Squadron in-processing visas for EAS members.

2.5. Operational Requirements.

2.5.1. 89 OG/CC, 932 OG/CC, and 201 AS/CC will support EAS as stated in WHMO MOA.

2.5.2. Provide EAS with two (2) seats on C-20/37 and four (4) seats on C-32/40 aircraft. Depending on passenger load, additional seats may be available, as discussed in the MAG. If the MAG determines that EAS will be released from the mission prior to mission completion, ensure AC's take responsibility for all weapons and provide their safe return to JBA. This may be accomplished by storing them in a locked container that is secured to the aircraft. Arrangements for associated logistics (i.e. container, locks, etc.) should be coordinated with SF prior to departure from JBA.

2.5.3. Process waivers for Air Force Aircraft Protection Level (e.g. C-32) requirements and AMC's RRL requirements IAW applicable AFIs.

2.5.4. Ensure Airlift Squadrons assist, as needed, with logistics, passports, and visa processing when EAS will be traveling separately from the mission aircraft.

2.5.5. EAS will conduct airfield threat assessments of all locations traveled to evaluate and ensure that appropriate physical security requirements are in place, as well as check each location against the AMC RRL.

2.5.6. Ensure Airlift Squadrons notify EAS when their aircraft will be transporting VPOTUS, FLOTUS, and FHoS.

2.5.7. Ensure Airlift Squadrons notify EAS when their aircraft will transit a location on the AMC RRL.

2.5.8. Ensure Airlift Squadrons provide EAS members with the necessary mission details to include any required pre-travel/post-travel medical requirements.

2.5.9. Fund all security associated expenses to include rental vehicles, point vehicles, and contract taxi services.

2.5.10. AC's will coordinate the below advance security arrangements and notify EAS team leader if the transiting airfield cannot support.

2.5.10.1. Two (2) vehicles (one (1) point vehicle and one (1) shift change vehicle). The shift change vehicle must have a host nation/local embassy driver for overseas locations.

2.5.10.2. Communications capability (radio or telephone) with embassy, airport police, and/or local law enforcement.

2.5.10.3. Area lighting (if aircraft is to remain overnight).

2.5.10.4. Access to restrooms on the aircraft for EAS.

2.5.10.5. Access to the airfield ramp.

2.5.10.6. External security response within five (5) minutes.

2.5.10.7. Ropes and stanchions (if aircraft is to remain overnight).

2.6. AF/A3M Responsibilities.

2.6.1. Notify EAS when FHoS will be traveling on an aircraft operated by the 89 OG, 932 OG, or 201 AS.

2.6.2. WHMO Operations will notify EAS when a mobility aircraft will be utilized as VPOTUS aircraft or the immediate backup aircraft for overseas missions.

2.6.3. WHMO will coordinate with United States Secret Service (USSS) to determine changes to AF SF requirements as outlined in AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense* and process security waivers for aircraft transporting the VPOTUS, FLOTUS, and FHoS. The Director of WHMO is the waiver authority for security.

2.7. Funding.

2.7.1. Units will bear the financial costs of travel as directed by their Wings and MAJCOM (AFDW/AMC MOA). This instruction does not authorize the transfer or exchange of funds or manpower between parties.

2.7.2. Availability of Funds: The obligations of the parties under this instruction are subject to the availability of appropriated funds. Nothing in this instruction will be interpreted to require a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 1341 and 1517. No appropriated funds are obligated by this instruction.

Chapter 3

EAS LEGAL AND MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS

3.1. U.S. Military Aircraft as Sovereign Instrumentalities.

3.1.1. When cleared to overfly or land in foreign territory, it is U.S. policy to assert that military aircraft are exempt from duties and taxation and immune from search, seizure, inspection (including customs and safety inspections), and other exercise of jurisdiction by the HN. Aircraft commanders and EAS team members will not authorize the search, seizure, inspection, or other exercise of jurisdiction by foreign authorities unless directed by the appropriate service headquarters or the local U.S. Embassy. In the rare circumstance in which boarding and inspection of the aircraft is permitted by appropriate U.S. Embassy representative, a report regarding the incident will be generated and forwarded to the Foreign Clearance Program Office, A5XPI. **(T-0)**

3.1.2. Legal Status of Aircraft and Ravens. The International Law Division of HQ USAF/JA has outlined the following policies to be used by transient aircrews. The US Government claims exclusive jurisdiction over its military aircraft, no matter where they are located. This means only US Laws apply in the interior of the aircraft, even though it may be located in a foreign country. The US also takes the position that when its military aircraft pass through another nation with permission, the other nation waives criminal jurisdiction over the military members accompanying the aircraft. However, not all countries agree to this position, especially pertaining to the exterior of the aircraft and the sovereignty of the land. With these principals as a guide, HQ USAF/JA suggests the policies below be followed in situations which might include the use of force.

3.1.2.1. Use of Force and Apprehension Considerations. Whether personnel are inside or outside the aircraft, team members will use force according to AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel* and CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces*, to protect U.S. resources and personnel. **(T-0)** Inside the aircraft, an area of U.S. sovereignty, team members may apprehend and prevent the escape of a person who has committed an offense. EAS members will use the “objective reasonableness” standard when determining the appropriate amount of force to use. If deadly force is used, EAS must be able to articulate objective reasonableness based upon their perception of the threat and the totality of the circumstances. Outside the aircraft while in foreign territory, under most circumstances, team members may not seek to apprehend or prevent the escape of a foreign national. **(T-0)** This is considered a local law enforcement function and the responsibility of the HN. EAS members will seek the assistance of HN personnel in order to apprehend or prevent the escape of a foreign national who has injured or threatened to injure U.S. personnel or damage equipment on the aircraft. **(T-0)** IAW AFI 31-117 and CJCSI 3121.01B, this does not diminish the team’s right of self-defense or ability to detain a person in self-defense until arrival of local authorities. EAS members will not intervene in disputes between host nationals. Such incidents are a local police matter. EAS members will only intervene if U.S. personnel or property are threatened. **(T-1)** Where feasible, standing Memorandums of Agreement/Understanding (MOA/MOU) should be considered to clarify HN law enforcement support.

3.1.3. Foreign Clearance Guide. Team members follow limitations relating to the wear of the uniform and arming restrictions outlined in the Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG), any existing Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), and applicable international agreements. At HN airfields, personnel will be armed IAW AFI 31-117, AFI 31-101, any applicable MOAs/MOUs or Rules of Engagement (ROE) and existing SOFA. **(T-1)** Adhere to all restrictions concerning wear of the handgun while transiting airfields in the CONUS/OCONUS and also the policies concerning the use of expanding hollow point bullets IAW AFCAT 21-209, Volume 1, *Grounds Munitions*. **(T-1)** By adhering to arming requirements/restrictions the team provides adequate close-in security for the aircraft and aircrew at all airfields, while complying with HN agreements.

3.1.3.1. The threat to Air Force assets can change quickly; there may be situations (local rioting, bombings, etc.) that warrant the removal of the weapons from the aircraft at a deployed airfield. In situations other than an immediate hostile threat to Air Force assets, the EAS team leader will contact the U.S. Embassy representative(s) (Defense Attaché Office [DAO], Regional Security Officer [RSO], etc.) for authorization to remove weapons from the aircraft. The EAS team leader will also contact the on-call Security Forces Threat Working Group representative as soon as possible, to provide a detailed briefing of the current conditions by calling the 618 AOC at 618-256-1705 (DSN 576) or 1-800-AIR-MOBL.

3.1.4. Request for Political Asylum or Refuge. If a foreign national approaches a team member during sentry duty to request political asylum or temporary refuge, do not allow them to enter the interior of the aircraft. Refer all requests of this nature to the AC for resolution according to AFI 51-704, *Handling Requests for Political Asylum and Temporary Refuge*.

3.2. Medical Force Protection Considerations.

3.2.1. Teams escort aircraft into geographic areas with patterns of infectious disease where systems for public health, sanitation, and medical care may be quite different from those they are accustomed to in the CONUS and Europe. Team leaders must be aware of the specific medical force protection considerations both at the mission destination and en route to the destination. **(T-3)** Team leaders must also know how to contact aeromedical evacuation assets for medical extraction of team members requiring such evacuation. Unless medical personnel are attached to the team, the level of care generally available to team members will be Self-Aid and Buddy Care (SABC). Team leaders are responsible for assuring that all team members have current training in SABC. **(T-3)**

3.2.2. Public Health Processing. All USAF Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF) have embedded public health and readiness functions which can provide teams with medical intelligence briefings. Team members are individually responsible for obtaining needed disease-prevention medications (such as malaria prophylaxis) and for complying with the schedule for taking medications issued. **(T-1)** Additionally, all team members are responsible for returning to Public Health for post-deployment follow-up. **(T-1)**

3.2.3. Emergency Medical Situations. If a team member experiences a severe illness at the deployed location or en route which exceeds the capability of treatment by SABC, medical personnel accompanying the team, or U.S. Embassy medical assistance, the AC will be asked to query the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center (GPMRC). A physician is

available on the GPMRC staff on a 24-hour basis for consultation and to help in assuring that the most appropriate medical assistance is provided to team members worldwide.

Chapter 4

EAS TRAINING AND DUTY POSITION TASK CERTIFICATIONS

4.1. Unit Responsibilities.

4.1.1. Units with EAS requirements will ensure team members receive training and certification IAW AFI 31-104, *Security Forces Specialized Missions*, AFI 36-2201, *Air Force Training Program*, and AFI 36-2646, *Security Forces Training and Standardization Evaluation Program*. (T- 2)

4.1.2. Annual Training Program. AFDW/A4S will develop and maintain a list of initial (AF Form 797) and recurring (AF Form 1098) training requirements for personnel assigned to EAS positions. The EAS PM will incorporate these requirements into the unit's Annual Training Plan, and is responsible for ensuring training requirements are met. If qualified, the unit training section can conduct and certify initial and recurring training tasks. To the greatest extent possible, scenario based training should be incorporated to meet training objectives. Minimum training standards are as follows: (T-1)

4.1.3. Close-In Sentry Duties

4.1.4. Current Qualification on primary/secondary duty weapons

4.1.5. Individual Protective Measures

4.1.6. Escalation of Force Measures

4.1.7. Use of Force

4.1.8. Expandable Baton

4.1.9. Airfield Survey

4.1.10. Aircraft egress procedures for supported aircraft

4.2. Standardized Evaluation (Stan/Eval) Program.

4.2.1. The EAS duty position is critical and the Duty Position Evaluation (DPE) will be conducted IAW AFI 36-2646, *Security Forces Training and Standardization Evaluation Programs*. Evaluations will consist of written and oral testing as well as practical scenarios. Decertification and re-certification procedures should be IAW AFI 36-2646. The DPE performance evaluation will not be conducted during actual missions. The EAS PM, DPM, or designated personnel will assist the stan/eval section with the annual evaluations. Personnel assigned to an EAS position and are not current in their DPE, or individuals who are currently in a Security Forces DAFSC but, not assigned to an EAS position, but have attended the PRQC and possess the SEI 329, may augment as the third person on a 3-person team.

4.3. Formal Training.

4.3.1. The PRQC is the formal training course required for award of the SEI 329 and the Phoenix Raven Tab (worn IAW AFI 36-2903).

4.3.1.1. Following the completion of the PRQC, individuals must complete two check rides prior to being awarded the SEI 329. Check rides are evaluations conducted during actual missions. The EAS PM, DPM, or EAS designated person will use these check rides

to complete the individual's initial task certification utilizing the AF Form 797. Once task certified, the commander may award the SEI 329.

4.3.1.2. Commanders will ensure individuals attending the PRQC meet the requirements listed in Attachment 6. HQ AMC/A4SC is the waiver authority for any of the attendance requirements.

4.3.1.2.1. Commanders will validate, via official memorandum, that any member nominated for the PRQC has completed and meets the physical fitness requirements established by AFDW/A4S and HQ AMC/A4S. Two fitness assessments will be conducted prior to the class start date. The first assessment must be no sooner than 45 days and no later than 30 days prior to class start date and documented on an official memorandum. Send memorandums to HQ AMC/A4SC, with a courtesy copy to AFDW/A4S, NLT 30 days prior to class start date. The second assessment must be administered by a certified physical training leader (PTL) and loaded into the Air Force Fitness Management System (AFFMS) for Air Force personnel within 10 duty days of the class start date. One AFFMS printout will be sent to HQ AMC/A4SC and one copy will be hand carried by each student to the course. If a candidate is dis-enrolled from the course because of unacceptable physical fitness, the unit will be required to reimburse all TDY expenditures to HQ AMC/A4SC.

4.3.1.2.1.1. Numerous medical and physiological studies support individuals with higher levels of physical fitness are better prepared to perform and endure stressful duties, including those requiring frequent changes to their circadian sleep rhythm. Therefore, individuals assigned to an EAS position are expected to maintain an overall "excellent" rating on their annual Physical Fitness Assessment. Unit fitness monitors will notify the commander when an assigned EASs score drops below 90% and the commander will assess the individual's ability to continue to function in an EAS duty position. If relieved from EAS duties, follow notification procedures outlined above.

4.3.1.2.1.2. SF officers and senior enlisted leaders assigned to units with an EAS mission are highly encouraged to attend the PRQC. Other officers and senior enlisted leaders may attend on a voluntary, space-available basis. SMSgt, CMSgt, and SF officers will only perform EAS member close-in security duties as a last resort. These personnel are more suited to accompany missions for the purpose of evaluating their unit EAS program. Unit senior leadership will get approval from AFDW/A4S and will use unit Raven funding to fund their TDY.

4.3.2. In addition to AFDW/Unit training requirements, units are encouraged to obtain training school slots in the below listed courses. These courses enhance the overall effectiveness of the EAS team:

4.3.2.1. Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) Course

4.3.2.2. HAZMAT Awareness Course via Air Force Distributed Learning Service (ADLS)

4.3.2.3. Dynamics of International Terrorism Course

4.3.2.4. CENTCOM Theater for SOF (CTSOF) Course

4.3.2.5. Sub-Saharan Orientation Course

- 4.3.2.6. Russian, Central Europe, and Central Asia Orientation Course
- 4.3.2.7. SOUTHCOM Theater for SOF (STSOF) Course
- 4.3.2.8. PACOM Theater for SOF (PTSOF) Course
- 4.3.2.9. Inter-Cultural Competence for SOF (ICSOF) Course
- 4.3.2.10. AFRICOM Theater for SOF (ATSOF) Course
- 4.3.2.11. S-V80-A, Combat Survival Training (17 day formal training course at Fairchild AFB)
- 4.3.2.12. Combat Control School Survey (CCSS) Course

Chapter 5

EAS EQUIPMENT

5.1. Equipment Requirements.

5.1.1. Units maintaining an EAS mission should attempt to use AFSFC approved uniform and equipment items. However, AFDW retains the ability to determine specialized uniform and equipment requirements unique to their EAS mission. EAS team individual equipment should be small and lightweight to facilitate movement through airports and minimize space used in AF cargo aircraft.

5.1.2. Commanders will direct uniform of the day requirements for EAS program when EASs are not performing official EAS duties. EASs will coordinate with AC to determine uniform requirements for EAS missions. EASs will wear proper uniforms while performing EAS duties IAW AFI 36-2903, *Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel*. EAS members may wear the SF beret at CONUS airfields, DoD installations, and NATO military bases while performing EAS duties, but they must wear the flight cap or tan boonie hat when transiting all other OCONUS airfields. The approved EAS aircrew name patch for wear on the flight suit and jacket is the PR cloth patch with the embroidered PR emblem with rank, name and PR number.

5.1.3. EAS teams will comply with the standards of AFI, 36-2903 and AFI 11-2VIP, Vol. 3, *VIP Operations Procedures* while assigned to DV missions at all times, including while off duty. Clothing will present a neat, conservative appearance and be appropriate for the country and/or hotel/facilities being visited. At no time will EAS members wear clothing with profane or obscene statements, pictures, or logos. Male crewmembers are not authorized the wear of earrings.

5.2. Funding Requirements.

5.2.1. Forecast funding requirements for the management and maintenance of the program with the base comptroller and wing leadership. **(T-3)** This includes costs associated with gear and uniform item replacement. Funding requests are submitted to AFDW as part of wing funding submissions. The DFC should certify the need for EAS team members to receive a civilian clothing allowance IAW AFI 36-3014, *Clothing Allowance for Air Force Personnel*, Chapter 3, through the base finance office (if required to perform FAS duties on select, sensitive missions).

Chapter 6

PROTECTIVE SERVICES (PS)

6.1. Objective.

6.1.1. PS will provide close-in DV protection, DV security escorts while transiting JBA, security support for National Special Security Events (NSSE), and security support when directed by higher authority. Information related to missions supported by PS is treated as FOUO and released on a need-to-know basis.

6.2. Duties and Responsibilities.

6.2.1. Headquarters Air Force District of Washington Security Forces Division (AFDW/A4S).

6.2.1.1. Will provide administrative oversight of instruction and will ensure its accuracy.

6.2.2. Installation Requirements.

6.2.2.1. DFC. DFCs assigned PS requirements should appoint an NCOIC, PS. Additionally, the DFC will maintain certified PS teams as directed by AFDW.

6.2.2.2. Unit NCOIC, PS. For units with PS responsibility, the NCOIC should be a certified PS member; this individual will serve as the primary liaison for DV security and NSSE missions.

6.3. Concept of Operations.

6.3.1. PS is the dedicated security team that provides protection, security escort, and close-in security for DVs while on JBA.

6.3.2. A DV is a visitor to JBA who, by virtue of their position, is entitled to military honors or protection during their visit. The JBA DV Lounge maintains standardized categories of DVs based on DOD/AF precedence guidelines. The DVs that are afforded PS support include, but are not limited to POTUS, VPOTUS, Cabinet Secretaries, DoD civilian and military officials, FHoS/Government (i.e., Presidents, Prime Ministers, Chancellors, King/Queens, etc.), high ranking foreign military guests, and other persons as designated by the USSS or Department of State (DoS).

6.3.3. PS will assist the USSS with recreational events occurring on JBA involving POTUS, VPOTUS, FLOTUS, SecState, SecDef, National Security Advisor (NSA), Secretary of Homeland Security (SecHS), former POTUS, and low and medium threat level FHoS.

6.3.4. Additionally, PS will be called on to assist with any Cabinet-level or military department's Protocol high-profile DV events that require security support.

6.3.5. Operation Notification. Information concerning a pending arrival or departure is received from, but not limited to, one of the following sources: office of the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS), Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF), Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), Combatant Commanders (COCOM), MAJCOM Commanders, to include all equivalents in all sister services, USSS, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), DoS, Flight line Protocol Office, Command Post, or Base Operations. Personnel who receive notification of a pending arrival or departure should notify the NCOIC, PS, Papa-1 and the base defense operations center (BDOC) immediately.

6.3.5.1. USSS. NCOIC, PS or designee will be the primary liaison with USSS and will support them as necessary.

6.3.5.2. Explosive Military Working Dog (EMWD) Team. EMWD teams will support DV missions as necessary.

6.3.5.3. Emergency Services Team (EST). EST will support AF-1, AF-2, DV-1 and other operations designated by PS. The basic unit is a ten-person (2-marksman/observer teams, 6-man entry team) SF team acting as a single tactical police team or in conjunction with other teams during high-risk operations. EST is a specially trained team of SF members armed and equipped to deal with tasks associated with initial response to include crisis point and location identification, site isolation, evacuation of non-essential personnel, establishment of an inner perimeter, conducting a reconnaissance and intelligence gathering mission and, if necessary, neutralize a special threat.

6.3.5.4. Emergency Situations/Contingency Operations. NCOIC, PS will establish and exercise emergency and contingency action plans for potential threats and hostile situations that could occur during DV movements.

6.4. Execution.

6.4.1. PS Selection Process and Team Member Requirements.

6.4.1.1. Applicants must possess at a minimum Secret Security Clearance with an "Open Investigation".

6.4.1.2. A minimum of 18 months' time in service.

6.4.1.3. Successfully completed 5-Level Career Development Course (CDC).

6.4.1.4. Received no Article 15 action during the current term of enlistment.

6.4.1.5. Not been placed on the control roster or the subject of an unfavorable information file (UIF).

6.4.1.6. Received rating of "Exceeded some, but not all expectations" or better, on the last two (2) Enlisted Performance Reports (EPRs). NOTE: No less than 4 rating on older EPRs.

6.4.1.7. Is not on the AF Weight Management Program (WMP) or remedial fitness program.

6.4.2. Team Size/Employment. In order to sustain the PS mission, 811 SFS is required to maintain a section/flight manned by 14 PS members with Top Secret/Yankee White clearances. Team size is primarily based upon the size of the DV party/convoy, physical security of the location visited, and threat if present. NCOIC, PS or designee will ensure they have enough security personnel to ensure the principle is secure.

6.4.2.1. Routine Posting. Day-to-day posting includes a minimum of seven (7) personnel. This enables elements to cover DV movements at all times. In the event additional personnel are needed to cover multiple details, personnel assigned to 11 SFG and are on-duty, will provide support.

6.4.2.2. DV-1 Posting. Posting consists of a team of seven (7) members. PS members that are fulfilling the post of Papa 1, Papa 2, and Papa 9 must possess a Top Secret/Yankee White (YW) clearance adjudicated through the WHMO and actively employed under the

Presidential Support Duty Program (PSD) to be armed in close proximity to, and in support of, POTUS, VPOTUS, and FHoS. This level of security is provided for POTUS, VPOTUS, FHoS, and any DVs designated by USSS. PS team members meet with USSS at the DV Lounge 90 minutes prior to mission arrival or departure for accountability and mission brief.

6.4.2.3. DV-2 Posting. Posting consists of a team of three (3) members. This level of security is provided for American and Foreign leaders that are not cabinet members. PS team meets with the USSS at the DV Lounge 30 minutes prior to mission arrival or departure for accountability and mission brief.

6.4.2.4. Nickel Posting. Posting consists of a team of five (5) members. This level of security is provided for FLOTUS, SecState, SecHS, SecDef, Director of NSA (DIRNSA), former POTUS, and certain FHoS as determined by USSS and DOS. PS team meets with the USSS at the DV Lounge 30 minutes prior to mission arrival or departure for accountability and mission brief.

6.4.2.5. NSSE Posting. PS may be requested to provide security support for certain localized NSSE events. These events include State Funeral and State Funeral Exercises, United States Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) deployments and exercises, Presidential Inaugurations, or any high-visibility event deemed necessary by the White House. When supporting NSSE, coordination will come through AFDW/A4S. If at any time the 11 SFG is contacted without prior coordination with AFDW/A4S, direct requester to contact AFDW/A4S; who will then task 11 SFG. Ensure direct line of authority (DIRLAUTH) is accomplished to enable streamlined planning/execution at the tactical level.

6.4.2.6. Recreational Security Event.

6.4.2.6.1. POTUS/DV-1 Recreational Security Event. Posting consists of a team of 19 personnel. The 11 SFG will provide a patrol under the direction of the detail lead to block traffic for the arrival and departure of the DV. Additionally, four (4) SF members (preferably Emergency Services Team members) are tasked to operate jointly with USSS Counter Assault Teams. A MWD team will be assigned to the detail and released only under the authority of the detail lead. Detail team meets with the USSS at the DV Lounge 90 minutes prior to departure from the Washington DC area for accountability and mission brief.

6.4.2.6.2. DV-2 Golf Posting. As directed by USSS On-Site Agent.

6.4.2.7. Flight Line Operations. Due to the dynamic nature of the PS mission, there are many requests that are fulfilled which cannot be covered in this instruction. Any visits/events involving DVs on the flight line will be directed to PS to either support or liaise between different agencies to facilitate execution. Some of these events include, but are not limited to, hi-visibility retirement ceremonies and funerals.

6.4.2.8. Non-Flight Line Operations. Hi-visibility meetings take place across JBA and DV-level protection may be requested by outside agencies or the Protocol Office. If PS is requested, the lead agency POC will coordinate with the Protocol Office and/or the PM PS to determine the level of support.

6.5. Equipment.

6.5.1. Vehicles. PS will maintain four (4) unmarked, undercover, SF vehicles equipped with appropriate personnel security package. In addition, these vehicles will have mobile radios, light bar anchored to the vehicle, sirens, and public address system.

6.5.2. Communication. The Maryland Gate maintains two (2) radios utilized for USSS and DoS DV details. These radios were issued to PS from the USSS for this purpose. Additional communication requirements can be found in supplement to this regulation or special security instructions (SSI).

6.5.2.1. DV Call Signs. PS will develop, assign, and use call signs in the place of DV names when transmitting over radio frequencies. This procedure will help alleviate additional threats to high ranking military and civilian leaders within the US and foreign governments.

6.5.2.2. DV Radio Codes. PS will develop code words or terms designating the direction of takeoff and landings DV aircraft arrivals and departures. The codes will aid in keeping DV movements in a need-to-know basis.

6.5.2.3. Radio Codes. PS will develop responder codes that will be used to indicate the various portions of the PS operation.

RICKY N. RUPP, Major General, USAF
Commander, Air Force District of Washington

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

AFI 10-401, *Air Force Operations Planning and Execution* – 7 Dec 2006
AFI 11-2VIPV3, Volume 3, *VIP Operations Procedures* – 12 Feb 2010
AFI 11-401, *Aviation Management* – 10 Dec 2010
AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, Incorporating Change 2 – 5 July 2017
AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel* – 2 Feb 2016
AFI 36-2646, *Security Forces Training and Standardization Evaluation Program* – 12 Jan 2017
AFI 36-2903, *Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel* – 18 Jul 2011
AFI 36-3012, *Military Entitlements* – 23 Aug 2019
AFI 48-123, *Medical Examinations and Standards* – 5 Nov 2013
CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force* – 13 June 2005 [secret]

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AC—Aircraft Commander
ADLS—Air Force Distributed Learning Service
AEF—Air Expeditionary Force
AFDW—Air Force District of Washington
AFFMS—Air Force Fitness Management System
AFI—Air Force Instruction
AFMAN—Air Force Manual
AFOSI—Air Force Office of Special Investigation
AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive
AFRIMS—Air Force Records Information Management System
AMC—Air Mobility Command
ARC—Air Reserve Components
ASO—Area Security Operations
BDOC—Base Defense Operations Center
CBIRF—Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force
CBS—Close Bound Sentry
CDC—Career Development Course

CIA—Central Intelligence Agency
CIS—Close-in-Security
COCOM—Combatant Command
CONUS—Continental United States
CSAF—Chief of Staff of the Air Force
CSD—Class Start Date
DFC—Defense Force Commander
DIA—Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRNSA—Director of National Security Advisor
DoS—Department of State
DPE—Duty Position Evaluation
DPM—Deputy Program Manager
EAS—Executive Aircraft Security
EMT—Emergency Medical Technician
EMWD—Explosive Military Working Dog
FCG—Foreign Clearance Guide
FHoS—Foreign Head of State
FLOTUS—First Lady of the United States
FMB—Financial Management Board
FOL—Forward Operating Location
FOUO—For Official Use Only
FP—Force Protection
FPCON—Force Protection Conditions
FPD—Force Protection Detachment
GPMRC—Global Patient Movement Requirements Center
HQ—Headquarters
HN—Host Nation
IAW—In Accordance With
ID—Integrated Defense
JBA—Joint Base Andrews
LOGDET—Logistics Detail
MAG—Mission Assessment Group

MAJCOMS—Major Commands
MEP—Mission Essential Personnel
MOA—Memorandum of Agreement
MOU—Memorandum of Understanding
MTF—Medical Treatment Facility
MWD—Military Working Dog
NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDA—National Defense Area
NEO—Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
NSA—National Security Advisor
NSSE—National Special Security Event
OCONUS—Outside the Continental United States
OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility
OST—Off Station Training
PCM—Primary Care Manager
PL—Protection Level
PM—Program Manager
PME—Professional Military Education
POTUS—President of the United States
PR—Phoenix Raven
PRQT—Phoenix Raven Qualification Training
PS—Protective Services
PST—Protective Services Teams
PTL—Physical Training Leader
ROE—Rules of Engagement
RON—Remain Overnight
RPM—Raven Program Manager
RSO—Regional Security Officer
RRL—Raven Required Location
SABC—Self-Aid and Buddy Care
SAM—Special Air Missions
SAO—Security Assistance Office

SecAF—Secretary of Air Force
SecDef—Secretary of Defense
SecHS—Secretary of Homeland Security
SecState—Secretary of State
SEI—Special Experience Identifier
SF—Security Forces
SFG—Security Forces Group
SITREP—Situation Report
SJA—Staff Judge Advocate
SOFA—Status of Forces Agreement
SSgt—Staff Sergeant
SSI—Special Security Instruction
TTP—Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
TWG—Threat Working Group
UIF—Unfavorable Information File
ULN—Unit Line Number
USAF—United States Air Force
USSS—United States Secret Service
UTC—Unit Type Code
VPOTUS—Vice President of the United States
WMD—Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMP—Weight Management Program
WHMO—White House Military Office

Attachment 2

EXECUTIVE AIRCRAFT SECURITY CHECKLISTS

Table A2.1. Pre-Deployment Checklist.

<i>NOTE:</i> Use this checklist as a tool to aid in the pre-deployment phase of an EAS tasking. Units should develop additional, localized guidance for specific locations or missions as necessary.			
Item	Description	Yes	No
1	Receive a copy of the mission itinerary from current operations.		
2	Contact the AC to receive assembly times and briefing locations.		
3	Contact the following sources for planning information:		
	HQ AMC/A4SC. Obtain specific mission location information or special mission directives not covered in publications, directives, or message traffic.		
	Wing Intelligence Office. Coordinate with Wing leadership to identify threats, AMC TWG force protection policy, and intelligence gaps impacting the mission. Additionally, provide pre-mission briefs to assigned EASs (as required). EASs receive pre-mission briefing from wing intelligence office to obtain current threat overview, in-place force protection measures, and AMC TWG force protection recommendation.		
	Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG). Review this website for arming restrictions, pre-approved billeting locations, and other pertinent force protection information.		
	Wing Staff Judge Advocate's Office. Obtain information pertaining to SOFAs, Rules of Engagement, and legal interpretations pertaining to the FCG.		
	Local AFOSI Detachment. Obtain threat information and personal protection briefing.		
	Research existing reports for pertinent force protection information utilizing the Airfield Survey tool via AMC/A2 Portal Page on SIPRNET (HTTPS://PORTAL.AMCIN.SCOTT.AF.SMIL.MIL/INDEX.CFM?PAGEID=19).		
4	Ensure aircrew pre-departure briefing is received by Wing Intel.		
5	Inspect, function check/test, and pack equipment, rations and water for deployment.		
6	Ensure MEP letters and orders are completed.		
7	Assemble at designated location for aircrew briefing.		

Table A2.2. En Route Location Arrival Checklist.

<i>NOTE:</i> Implement this checklist upon arrival at all stops during an EAS mission.			
Item	Description	Yes	No
1	Conduct a security assessment to determine if HN security is adequate (at all non- DoD/non-NATO country airfields).		

2	Brief the results of your security assessment to the AC. If security is deemed adequate, proceed to item 3. If security is inadequate proceed to item 4.		
3	If security is deemed adequate then:		
3.1	Coordinate additional physical security enhancements/aids (lighting, ropes and stanchions, and patrol coverage/responses).		
3.2	Secure all doors and hatches and seal the main crew entrance door.		
4	If security is deemed inadequate and/or at RRL then:		
4.1	Post EAS members as close-in sentries.		
4.2	Load weapons IAW AFMAN 31-129, <i>USAF Small Arms and Light Weapons Handling Procedures</i> and utilize available safety measures.		
4.3	Coordinate additional physical security enhancement/aids (lighting, ropes and stanchions, and patrol coverage/response).		
4.4	Establish a means of communications with the nearest U.S. facility/installation and/or an English speaking HN facility on the airfield. A radio may be issued by the control tower. Normally an English speaker is available to facilitate emergency response from the host nation. Prior frequency approval from AMC radio frequency (AMC: DSN 576-3134) monitor is required before the EAS radio system is used. AFDW units will make use of the IRIDIUM satellite phone for their communication requirements.		
4.5	Obtain emergency billeting contact numbers for the AC and crew.		
4.6	Establish a posting schedule and coordinate transportation to/from billeting locations for post relief, as necessary.		
4.7	Obtain special entry control instructions from the AC.		

Table A2.3. En Route Location Departure Checklist.

<i>NOTE:</i> Implement this checklist upon departure from remain overnight (RON) locations during a PR mission.			
Item	Item	Yes	No
1	Conduct the following if RON security was provided by the host nation:		
1.1	Remove weapons from storage location if not stored aboard the aircraft.		
1.2	Conduct a search of the aircraft exterior and wheel wells for stowaways, explosive devices, and/or signs of tampering/damage.		
1.3	Conduct a search of the aircraft interior for stowaways, explosive devices, and/or signs of tampering/damage.		
1.4	Assist the crew, as necessary.		
1.5	Once airborne, record any pertinent notes for inclusion in the EAS report.		
2	Conduct the following if RON security was provided by EAS sentries:		
2.1	Conduct a search of the aircraft exterior for stowaways, explosive devices, and/or signs of tampering/damage, prior to the aircrew arriving.		
2.2	Brief the AC on all significant events that occurred during crew rest periods.		
2.3	Return radios issued by host nation for emergency communications purposes.		

2.4	Unload/clear weapons IAW AFMAN 31-129, <i>USAF Small Arms and Light Weapons Handling Procedures</i> and utilize available safety measures.		
2.5	Once airborne, record any pertinent notes for inclusion in the EAS report.		

Attachment 3

EXECUTIVE AIRCRAFT SECURITY AIRCREW PRE-DEPARTURE BRIEFING

Figure A3.1. Operations Order.

SITUATION	
Provide the current situation at the airfields and their surrounding areas for each en route stop that may affect security of the aircraft or personnel, i.e., political, economic, cultural, anti-American sentiments, etc.	
Threats: Any known threats to resources or personnel.	<p>Terrorist: Current threat level and any known groups, how they operate, how they are armed, etc.</p> <p>Military: Any known military threats to the US.</p> <p>Criminal: Current criminal threat level, any known specific activity (carjacking, murder, rape, theft, etc.) and locations.</p> <p>Foreign Intelligence: Any known threat from foreign intelligence services operating in the area that may target US personnel for information.</p>
Friendly Forces: List all known US, allied nation, and host nation forces that will be operating on or near the airfield.	<p>U.S.: List all known US military forces, location, unit's designation, and how to contact. Additionally, provide the RSO's name, location, and phone number.</p> <p>Allied Nation: List any allied nation military forces, location, and how to contact.</p> <p>Host Nation: List all information on host nation forces.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Airfield Security: How many, how they operate, arming, communications, and how to contact. 2. Local Police: How they operate, locations, how to contact. 3. Host Nation Military: Types of units, how many, locations, disposition, how to contact.
MISSION	
Provide a clear and concise mission statement for the upcoming mission.	
EXECUTION	
State where, when, and how you are going to accomplish your mission.	
Concept of Operations:	State how you are going to complete your mission at all en route stops. Include security to be provided and any additional activities to be accomplished, i.e., airfield survey, etc.
Foreign Clearance Guide:	State any pertinent requirements for each en route stop (weapons restrictions, photo restrictions, passport, and visa requirements, uniform wear restrictions, etc.).

Rules of Engagement:	Outline rules of engagement and use of force rules for each en route stop.
In-place Force Protection Measures:	Aircraft parking area lighting. Airfield fencing. Alarm systems/closed circuit television (CCTV). Entry procedures/circulation control.
AMC TWG Force Protection (FP) Recommendations:	State any policies made by the AMC TWG concerning FP issues (billeting, security, personal security measures, etc.).
EAS FP Recommendations:	State any further recommendations/advice you may have concerning force protection issues (billeting locations, routes to and from the airfield, dress, mode of ground transportation, etc.).
SERVICE AND SUPPORT	
State how you will be armed and equipped and any other pertinent services (feeding, lodging and transportation) to be provided/required for the EAS team.	
COMMAND AND SIGNAL	
EAS team chain of command	
Call signs	
Known operating frequencies	
Key Phone Numbers:	Host nation security POC, U.S. Embassy 24 hour desk, HQ AMC/A4SC (DSN: 779-0655), or the RPM on-call phone (618-401-3332), etc.

Attachment 4
AIRFIELD SURVEY

Table A4.1. Airfield Survey Guide.

NOTE: When conducting an airfield survey, use the following questions to complete your report. Reporting will be conducted utilizing pull-down screen menus on the Airfield Survey. Those items identified by an asterisk (*) are considered critical information to be included in your report. Utilize this attachment as a guide when completing the Airfield Survey on SIPRNET. The survey becomes classified when filled out.			
Airfield Name:	Location:	ICAO:	Date:
Fencing/Walls			
Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
*Is the airfield perimeter completely fenced or walled (type, height, condition, gaps, holes, etc.)?			
*Is the flight line/ramp fenced? Describe (type, height, condition, gaps, holes, etc.).			
Are there clear zones on each side of the fence/wall?			
Is the airfield perimeter or flight line area posted “No Trespassing” or “No Admittance”?			
Other Physical Barriers			
Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
List different types, locations and numbers of barriers used on the perimeter, and on/ near the flight line/ramp.			
Is the airfield or aircraft parking areas under CCTV?			
Security Force Level			
Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
*How many guards are typically on duty during the day and night?			
*Are these guards host military units, police or security forces, or contract personnel?			
To what extent and for how long can in-place/nearby personnel augment this force?			

What is shift duration and shift change procedures/times?			
What local customs might result in decreased security (e.g., national holidays, traditional daily rest periods.)?			
Security Personnel			
Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
Are personnel well trained and professional? Does this vary by position? Are the supervisory personnel better trained or more motivated?			
What factors make individual members or groups susceptible to blackmail/bribery (e.g., low pay, irregular pay, and mistreatment by senior leadership etc.)?			
*What is the predominant language/dialect spoken by security forces (also indicate what percentage speak English, if applicable)?			
*To what degree are they willing to work with U.S./Allied personnel?			
*Are security forces willing/able to provide increased security for U.S./Allied missions? If so, how are such arrangements made? Through USDAO?			
Patrols			
Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
*Is the perimeter and/or flight line controlled by armed guards?			
*Frequency and regularity of patrols. (Are the patrols conducted on a predictable schedule or does the airport security force conduct them randomly? If not on a regular schedule, is the variance purposeful [i.e., a security measure])?			
*Is patrol made on foot, on animals, or vehicles?			

How many people are on each patrol?			
Do patrols use military working dogs?			
Security Equipment			
Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
*What types of weapons are carried by guards?			
What additional weapons are available (what weapons can be used, if needed; what weapons are used on vehicles, at entry points, guard towers, etc.)?			
*What forms of communications gear do the security personnel use?			
Watch Towers/Fixed Guard Positions			
Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
Number, location, and description (ground level guard shack, elevated tower, fixed fighting positions/bunkers, etc.).			
Number of guards at each location.			
Quick reaction/Counterterrorist Units			
Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
*Does such a force exist?			
*Is it on or near the airport?			
*What is its reaction time?			
*How large a force is it?			
To what degree is responsibility delegated in crisis situations?			
How is the force trained and equipped?			
Does it have higher morale than the regular guard force?			
Has it successfully conducted operations in the past?			
Entry Control Points			
Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
*Is entry controlled to the installation and flight line/ramp?			
*Number, location and description of ECPs at the perimeter and flight line/ramp areas.			
Are gates locked if unmanned?			

*Number of guards at each entry point (military/civilian, airport police, day/night).			
Are X-Ray machines and/or metal detectors used at any of the entry points?			
If entry is controlled, what form of personal identification is required for individuals and vehicles?			
*Are private vehicles allowed? If so, what method of registration is required?			
Are all persons in a vehicle required to show identification?			
What are visitor control procedures (i.e., procedures for visitor approval, identification of same)?			
What are visitor escort procedures?			
To what degree are vehicles, personnel, and their possessions searched?			
*Do any of the above procedures vary at night (e.g., all personnel must show identification at night when entering the installation.)?			
Lighting			
Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
*Is entire boundary, flight line, and parking ramp lighted at night?			
Are additional fixed spotlights located at watchtowers/entry points?			
Are mobile mounted/towable spotlights available?			
Parking			
Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
*Are U.S. Government aircraft parked in special locations? *If so, are additional guards posted?			
Is the area clearly marked as a restricted area?			
*Are U.S. personnel authorized to have weapons on the flight line/ramp?			

Are weapons storage facilities available to transient crews?			
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<p>Billeting Use when aircraft must RON at foreign airfields.</p>			
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Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
Does the American Embassy (AMEMBASSY) provide billeting in its compound? If billeting is unavailable at the compound, USDAO will provide a list of vetted of hotels.			
<p>If AMEMBASSY maintains a standing list of recommended hotels, request the following information on each, if available:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Basic description (design, height, towers, interior/exterior entrances, number of rooms). - General Layout (parking areas, fencing, lighting, proximity to highways/major roads). - Number of elevators/stairways (internal/external), building entrances/exits, vehicle entrances/exits. - Are U.S. personnel billeted in the same areas of the hotel or are they separated? - How is the crew transported to and from the hotel? - Are metal detectors/x-ray machines used at hotel entrances? - Are security forces available to escort crews transiting to/from airport? 			

<p>Off Installation Route Security</p>			
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Use when aircraft must RON at foreign airfields.			
Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
Distance from airport to hotel.			
Number of different routes from airport to hotel.			
Route description.			
Choke points on route (to include excessive traffic lights, congestion).			
Number of lanes each way.			
One-way streets?			
Number and location of safe houses (i.e., police stations) along route.			
Does host nation regularly patrol these routes?			
Any bridges overpasses or tunnels along the route?			
Personnel Threat			
Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
Are dissidents known to operate in the area of the airport?			
Identify these groups by name with leaders, if known.			
Are dissidents known to possess standoff weapons (SAMS, RPG, mortar, etc. [specific type and any known modification])?			
Are these groups known to possess communications monitoring equipment (identify type and capability if known)?			
Are these groups known to have anti-U.S. sentiments?			
What past incidents have occurred? Which targeting of U.S. personnel, equipment, or facilities occurred?			
Do hostile elements have any specific times/dates when they are historically active?			
Do they have the support of the local populace?			

Physical Location			
Survey Question	Yes	No	Notes
What natural/manmade obstacles are in the vicinity of the airport (e.g., power lines, tall buildings.)?			
Identify areas surrounding flight line parking that could be used by hostile elements to covertly survey airport operations and to launch attacks.			
How suitable is the surrounding terrain and vegetation for a standoff attack? Does this vary seasonally?			

Reporting Procedure
<p>Utilize the Airfield Survey tool via AMC/A2 Portal Page on SIPRNET (HTTP://PORTAL.AMCIN.SCOTT.AF.SMIL.MIL/INDEX.CFM?PAGEID=19&CONTROL=LOGIN) to report your findings.</p> <p>NOTE: Please include scanned maps or a sketch locating security information (aircraft parking areas, fencing, lighting, ECPs, etc.). Digital photos of all items are requested, if capabilities exist. Upon completion of downloaded requested information, turn electronic media over to local Intel squadron for proper disposition.</p>

Attachment 5

EXECUTIVE AIRCRAFT SECURITY EQUIPMENT

Table A5.1. Equipment List.

Mission Required Equipment	Required Uniform Items	Recommended Equipment
AF Form 523	Aviator Jackets (Green/Brown)	Medication
Batons, Tactical ASPs (4)	Aviator Sunglasses	3 Day Pack
Binoculars	Bemard Cap	Extension cord pigtail
Bug Spray	Black Kevlar Gloves	Feminine Hygiene Products
Ear Protection	Blues Lightweight Jacket	Hand warmers
Flexy Cuffs (4)	Blues Overcoat	Luggage (non-military)
GTC	Flight Suit (Green/OCP)	Noise Cancelling Headphones
Handheld Metal Detectors*	Khakis/Polos (min 4 sets)	Sanitary Wipes
Holster	Required Patches	Second Form of Identification
IFAK	Service Uniform	Second Passport
Immunization Records/Card	Shirt (min 4)	Universal Electrical Adapters
M4 case	Suit/Tie (min 4)	Sunblock
M4/M18 (w/ammo)	Tan Boots	
Magazine Pouch		VP Team Equipment
Medicine		Radios w/Earpiece (min 4)
Night Vision Goggles		Ropes and Stanchions
Passport (OCONUS missions)		
Phone Chargers		
Rangefinders*		
Restricted Area Badge		
SF Badge/Badge Holder		
Shoulder Holster Kit		
Sunglasses (Ballistic)		
Surefire Flashlight (compact model)		
Worldwide Capable Phone (2)		
* Not currently provided		

Attachment 6

SAMPLE COURSE NOMINATION MEMORANDUM

Figure A6.1. Sample Course Nomination Memorandum, Part 1.

SQUADRON/UNIT LETTER HEAD

(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AMC/A4SC

FROM: UNIT/CC

SUBJECT: Phoenix Raven Candidate(s)

The following candidate(s) has/have completed the Air Force Fitness Test, has/have no physical profiles, and will be attending the Phoenix Raven Qualification Course scheduled for Day/Mon/Year. All personnel listed below meet the following requirements:

1. Has a minimum of 18 months, time in service.
2. Successfully completed 5-Level Career Development Course (CDC).
3. No medical profile precluding worldwide deployment.
4. No Article 15 action during the current term of enlistment.
5. Currently not on a control roster or the subject of an unfavorable information file.
6. Received overall rating of "Exceeded some, but not all expectations" or better on the last three Enlisted Performance Reports (EPRs).
7. Not enrolled in the Fitness Improvement Program (FIP).
8. Possesses at least two years retainability in service after completion of training.
9. Possess at least a Secret clearance or U.S. equivalent.
10. Complete the Air Force Fitness Assessment with a minimum of 90% overall.

Figure A6.2. Sample Course Nomination Memorandum, Part 2.

Rank/Last, First, MI	Age	Full SSN	Run	A/C	Push -Ups	Sit- Ups	Total Score
Add additional rows as needed							

11. Excluding multi-vitamins, no supplements or medications have been taken within 30 days of the class start date, except those prescribed by a physician. List medications below.

- Type and prescription date:

Please forward comments or questions to my [Unit Raven Program Manager], at [DSN ###-####].

Commander's Signature Block