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Operations

BIOLOGICAL AGENT AEROSOL COLLECTION AND IDENTIFICATION

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This publication implements Air Force Policy Directive 10-26, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. This instruction focuses on ambient air screening to identify covert releases of biological warfare agents (within a timeframe to execute effective, available, medical countermeasures before sentinel casualties present for medical care). This Instruction applies to Active Duty, Reserve, Guard, civilians and contractors at all levels who are tasked with biological agent detection and identification activities to include the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, except when noted otherwise. This Air Force Instruction may be supplemented at any level, but all supplements that directly implement this publication must be routed to the Office of Primary Responsibility, AFMSA/SG3XC for coordination prior to certification and approval. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual 33-363, Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Disposition Schedule located in Air Force Records Information Management System. The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier ("T-0, T-1, T-2, and T-3") number following the compliance statement. See Air Force Instruction 33-360, Publications and Forms Management, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternatively, to the Publication Office of Primary Responsibility for non-tiered compliance items. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility using the Air Force Form 847, Recommendation for Changes of Publication; route Air Force Form 847 from the field through appropriate functional chain of command.

Chapter 1

OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE

1.1. Overview. The Air Force Biological Agent Aerosol Collection and Identification instruction implements an operational approach to detection of biological agents/threats for installations and operational sites across the full range of military operations. The method applies new procedures using currently fielded equipment to achieve a viable detect-to-treat capability across the Air Force when a known adversary threat and capability exists, but actionable real-time intelligence information is not immediately available. Commanders retain responsibility for tailored preparation and response activities at each site based on mission/circumstances. This document establishes a degree of uniformity among installations with standardized planning and response measures.

1.2. Purpose. This document provides guidance for one aspect of multi-layered Air Force biological detection activities. The layered defense system is designed to provide commanders multiple opportunities and avenues to be informed of and make decisions on specific biological incident attacks in time to effectively implement the appropriate medical countermeasures and non-pharmaceutical interventions. This cross-functional guidance applies to biological warfare agent threats across the full Range of Military Operations: Major Combat Operations, deployed contingency operations, special events, Homeland defense/security, etc. Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) 3-10.26, Air Force Biological Agent Aerosol Collection and Identification provides guidance to support installations implementation of this instruction to develop biological detection plans for their location and circumstance(s).

Chapter 2

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. Headquarters Air Force

2.1.1. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (A10) will:

2.1.1.1. Through the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Council, in conjunction with the Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy Working Group and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Modernization Working Group, provide oversight of the Air Force biological warfare agent characterization requirements, to include establishing the "acceptable risk" protocols.

2.1.1.2. Provide oversight to the development, integration, and synchronization of Air Force biological warfare concepts, strategies, policies and guidance.

2.1.1.3. Through A10S, provide oversight of the development, coordination and implementation of Air Force cross-functional biological warfare operational concept of operations.

2.1.2. Air Force Surgeon General (AF/SG) will:

2.1.2.1. Establish policy and guidance and obtain and allocate medical resources in support of biological defense operations.

2.1.2.2. Ensure medical equipment and capability requirements for the early detection of aerosolized biological agents are incorporated into medical Unit Type Codes and appropriate Home Station Medical Response allowance standards as outlined in this instruction.

2.1.2.3. Provide staffing and resources to accomplish air screening, environmental sample collection, and identification activities in support of operational plans, contingencies, and special events.

2.1.2.4. Provide funding through appropriate program element codes for biological collection, detection, identification activities, and necessary training associated with handling environmental samples for medical capabilities.

2.1.2.5. Establish medical training guidance through policy to help with the execution of biological collection, detection, and identification activities.

2.1.2.6. Plan for sustainment costs for the medical biological agent collection, detection and identification assets and advocate for resources to address gaps in medical equipment and supplies.

2.1.2.7. Integrate medical-related biological collection, detection, and identification activities into Anti-Terrorism, medical, integrated defense, and Installation Emergency Management Plan policy and guidance.

2.1.2.8. Serve as medical product developer supporting biological defense related research, development, and acquisition activities in accordance with the process outlined in Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operations of the Defense Acquisition.

2.1.2.9. Establish medical training policy and guidance to help with the execution of biological collection, detection, and identification activities described in this publication.

2.1.2.10. Work with the Readiness/Emergency Management community to ensure all aspects of biological agent sample collection, transport, documentation and delivery to the designated laboratory are fully integrated.

2.1.3. Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection (AF/A4) will:

2.1.3.1. Develop, review, and update the Civil Engineering supplement to War Mobilization Plan-1 Appendix 10, Readiness and Emergency Management and Appendix 11, Emergency Management. Ensure war and contingency plans address Air Force Emergency Management program requirements including non-medical biological collection, detection, and identification capability.

2.1.3.2. Integrate non-medical biological collection, detection, and identification activities into Anti-Terrorism, medical, Integrated Defense, and Installation Emergency Management Plan policy and guidance.

2.1.3.3. Advocate for funding through appropriate joint and Air Force Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear-related programs for non-medical biological collection, detection, and identification activities associated with environmental samples.

2.1.3.4. Establish non-medical training guidance through policy to help with the execution of biological collection, detection, and identification activities described in this publication.

2.1.3.5. Ensure non-medical biological defense surveillance measures are integrated and coordinated into applicable Air Force Instructions, Air Force Manuals, and Air Force Policy Directives.

2.1.3.6. Ensure Emergency Management personnel are trained and equipped to respond to biological events across the full Range of Military Operations, for all Emergency Management designated tasks.

2.2. Field Operating Agencies and Direct Reporting Units

2.2.1. Air Force District of Washington will perform all duties assigned to Major Commands in paragraphs **2.3.1.1**. through **2.3.1.2**.

2.3. Major Commands

2.3.1. Major Commands will:

2.3.1.1. Provide operational guidance as appropriate for installations under their control, to include those with limited response capabilities. Major Commands with Joint Bases will consult Memorandum of Understanding to delineate rolls of CBRND response on the installations.

2.3.1.2. During non-Military Contingency Operations conditions, allocate resources to installations based on the threat level and incident action plan requirements. Note: See Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-10.26 for additional Operational Guidance.

2.3.2. Air Combat Command (ACC) will:

2.3.2.1. Serve as Unit Type Codes (UTCs) Manpower and Equipment Force Packaging responsible agency for incorporating medical-related biological collection, detection, and identification resources into medical ground UTCs and Home Station Medical Response activities.

2.3.2.2. Track and monitor for sustainment costs for the medical biological agent collection, detection and identification assets fielded on medical UTCs and Home Station Medical Response 886 allowance standards (Bioenvironmental Flight) assigned to medical units.

2.3.2.3. Develop and sustain medical-related biological collection, detection, and identification equipment storage and deployment plan e.g., centralized storage, assets maintained at each AF installation.

2.3.3. Air Mobility Command (AMC) will:

2.3.3.1. Develop and implement policy on the transportation by air of biological environmental samples.

2.3.3.2. Develop aircraft handling procedures following the transport of biological environmental samples by air.

2.3.3.3. Transport biologically-contaminated human remains by air that have been certified as having been properly decontaminated in accordance with procedures established in Joint Publication 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations for additional guidance.

2.3.3.4. Receive and process biologically-contaminated human remains that have been certified as having been properly decontaminated in accordance with procedures established in. Reference Joint Publication 4-06 for additional guidance.

2.3.3.5. Processes request(s) from Headquarters Air Force and other authorized requestors for support in transporting biological samples to their destination via air. This includes all overflight and landing requests required to complete the movement. Air Mobility Command is not responsible for ground transportation to and from the airfield.

2.3.3.6. Provide oversight for Civil Reserve Air Fleet activities in the aftermath of Biological Warfare Agent events to include identifying required protective equipment for aircrew, developing and executing plans for use of the aircraft during contingencies, aircraft decontamination following operations.

2.3.3.7. Support contamination mitigation assessments through the provision of air passenger and aircraft movement records in the aftermath of events in which personnel and/or aircraft might have been exposed to Biological Warfare Agent.

2.3.3.8. Serve as Unit Type Code Manpower and Equipment Force Packaging responsible agency for incorporating medical-related biological collection, detection, and identification resources into medical air Unit Type Codes.

2.3.4. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) will:

2.3.4.1. Serve as Unit Type Code Manpower and Equipment Force Packaging responsible agency for incorporating medical-related biological collection, detection, and identification resources into medical special operations Unit Type Codes.

2.3.5. Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) will:

2.3.5.1. Oversee the incorporation of biological defense operational concepts into appropriate USAF School of Aerospace Medicine (USAFSAM) training courses.

2.3.5.2. Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center (AFIMSC) will:

2.3.5.2.1. Serve as an intermediate-level organization providing Installation and Mission Support oversight and capabilities for biological warfare defense activities to Air Component Commands, Major Commands/Field Operating Agencies/Direct Reporting Units and their subordinate organizations and installations.

2.3.5.2.2. Coordinate with Air Component Commands, Majors Commands/Direct Reporting Units, plan and develop posturing recommendations for organizational approval, and prepare forces and equipment to accomplish specific biological warfare defense objectives for Air Expeditionary Forces.

2.3.5.2.3. Provide staffing and resources at the earliest feasible time through the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data or alternative process to accomplish air screening and environmental sample collection activities in support of Operational Plans, contingencies, and special events. This includes accomplishing environmental sample identification activities as required.

2.3.5.2.4. Program for sustainment costs for the non-medical biological agent collection, detection and identification assets fielded on 4F9W series Unit Type Codes and organizational allowance standards assigned to Civil Engineer units.

2.3.5.2.5. Air Force Civil Engineer Center Emergency Management Branch (AFCEC/CXR) will:

2.3.5.2.5.1. Provide asset visibility for Emergency Management equipment items and supplies required to execute the requirements outlined in this document and Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-10.26.

2.3.5.2.5.2. Ensure equipment and supplies required to support this document and Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-10.26 are included in PE 27593F Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense and PE 27574F Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat Response resourcing requirements.

2.3.5.2.5.3. Develop training programs, tactics, techniques and procedures for Emergency Management to support this document and Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-10.26.

2.3.5.2.5.4. Work with the medical community to fully integrate all aspects of biological agent sample collection, transport, documentation and delivery to the designated laboratory.

2.3.5.2.5.5. Develop and sustain Unit Type Codes with resources to respond to biological events both Continental United States and Outside the Continental United States with sufficient assets to sustain operations for 10-30 days in Military Contingency Operations and 4 days (unless otherwise directed) for home station.

2.3.5.2.5.6. Develop and sustain Emergency Management-related biological collection, detection, and identification equipment storage and deployment scheme e.g., centralized storage, assets maintained at each installation, etc.

2.3.5.2.5.7. Incorporate required resources for Emergency Management-related biological collection, detection, and identification activities into 4F9W series Unit Type Codes.

2.3.5.2.5.8. Provide instructional and Subject Matter Expertise (SME) guidance capability for biological event response.

2.3.6. Air Education and Training Command (AETC) will:

2.3.6.1. Oversee the incorporation of biological defense operational concepts into appropriate Air Force training courses.

2.3.7. Air National Guard: NGB/SG will only fund biological agent aerosol collection equipment if it is listed on the 976H allowance standard. NGB/SG is only required to fund biological agent aerosol collection equipment on the 976H allowance standard at installations that have their sources to perform this function, as evidenced by inclusion of biological agent aerosol collection and identification capabilities in the Installation Emergency Management Plan (IEMP) or similar local plan.

2.4. Installations/Operational locations will:

2.4.1. Identify off site laboratories (organic Air Force, Laboratory Response Network, Defense Laboratory Network assets, host nation, etc.) to use if on-site capabilities are not available or have insufficient capacities. (T-1).

2.4.2. Develop a Dry Filter Unit siting plan that is to be reviewed biannually and when significant installation modifications take place e.g., modifications to the air operations areas, addition of new facilities - particularly multi story buildings and dormitories or other living structures. (T-3).

2.4.3. Ensure Wing/installation leadership is aware of information on the biological threat and installation capabilities to counter that threat. (T-2).

2.4.4. Utilize the Threat Working Group to periodically assess biological threats to ensure plans are appropriate. Reassess response plans and resource allocations if changes in threats are identified. (T-1).

2.4.5. Immediately report response activities and the results of any testing done on site in accordance with Air Force Instruction 10-206, Operational Reporting, and Chemical, Biological ,Radiological, and Nuclear Warning and Reporting System guidelines (Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.56, Multiservice tactics, techniques and procedures for Chemical, Biological ,Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance). (T-1).

2.4.6. Verify region specific hand-held assays are available and appropriate for the threat environment, and determine on hand quantities to assist in planning activities and funding requirements. (T-2).

2.4.7. Incorporate biological collection, detection, and identification activities into wing exercises as appropriate. (T-3)

2.4.8. At Continental United States locations, consider collaboration with local Law Enforcement Fusion Centers as these centers will likely be the first intelligence processing bodies to recognize a likely biological warfare Continental United States threat.

2.4.9. Bioenvironmental Engineering will:

2.4.9.1. Serve as co-Office of Primary Responsibility with installation's Emergency Management Flight/contingent in development of Biological Warfare Agent sampling strategies to include sampling protocols (monitoring period and sample handling procedures), locations, sample analysis, and decontamination procedures. (T-3).

2.4.9.2. Provide a 7-level Bioenvironmental Engineering technician, 3-level Bioenvironmental Engineering Officer, or civilian equivalent to analyze potential Biological Warfare Agent toxin samples at an appropriate location during elevated threat levels in accordance with the Installation Emergency Management Plan and other base-level plans. (T-3).

2.4.9.3. Provide educational materials and/or training on the installation's medical biological collection, detection, and identification activities to key advisors and appropriate installation working groups (e.g. Installation Threat Working Group). (T-3).

2.4.10. Laboratory Services will:

2.4.10.1. Analyze environmental samples collected by Bioenvironmental Engineering and Emergency Management or process samples for shipment to state/Department of Defense reference laboratories. (T-3).

2.4.10.2. Ship Biological Warfare Agent samples for further analysis to higher analytical echelons. (T-3).

2.4.11. Public Health Office will:

2.4.11.1. Investigate positive Biological Warfare Agent identification in the context of other pertinent information to make subsequent assessments and interpretation of findings. (T-1).

2.4.11.2. Report in accordance with Department of Defense, International, Federal, State and local requirements (reference: Air Force Instruction 48-105, Surveillance, Prevention, and Control of Disease and Conditions of Public Health or Military Significance). (T-0)

2.4.12. Readiness and Emergency Management (Readiness & Emergency Management Flight/Contingent Will:

2.4.12.1. Provide capability to collect, detect, identify, and monitor biological hazards for mission continuation during response and recovery operations across the range of military operations. (T-1).

2.4.12.2. Serve as co-Office of Primary Responsibility with installation's Bioenvironmental Engineering office in development of Biological Warfare Agent sampling strategies to include sampling protocols (monitoring period and sample handling procedures), locations, sample analysis, and decontamination procedures. (T-3).

2.4.12.3. Provide educational materials and/or training on the installation's non-medical biological collection, detection, and identification activities to key advisors and appropriate installation working groups (e.g. Installation Threat Working Group). (T-1).

2.4.13. Air National Guard Medical Units will: As limited response capability (LRC) medical units, Guard Medical Units are only required to include biological agent aerosol identification capability in their IEMP or similar local plans if they are resourced to perform this function. Medical personnel at Guard Medical Units are required to perform all functions specified in the IEMP or similar local plans. Air National Guard medical personnel will continue to follow training guidance as specified in 36-series Air Force Instructions.

Chapter 3

POLICY CONCERNS

3.1. Policy Considerations. In some cases, the guidance in this document and in Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-10.26 may differ from the guidance provided in Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.44, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Reconnaissance and Surveillance. In those cases, the guidance in this publication must be followed and the guidance in Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-10.26 should be followed. Air Force organizations at all levels may encounter several situations throughout the biological agent detection and identification process that are not clearly defined. In some cases clear-cut policies exist, while in other circumstances the Department of Defense has not published standardized guidelines. In these instances of incomplete guidance, command leadership at each level will make decisions based on AFPD 10-26, the availability of relevant guidance, the situation at the time of execution, the projected impact of the decision on immediate and long-term critical mission operations, and the degree of risk involved.

3.2. Factors to Consider. Commanders should consider the following factors when making decisions regarding the use of actual or suspected biologically contaminated resources and areas when uncontaminated alternatives (to include decontamination activities) do not exist, and personnel are unable to accomplish or sustain the mission/task while wearing the appropriate protective equipment.

3.2.1. Degree of certainty that resource/area has residual contamination present

3.2.2. Criticality of the mission/task in relation to total war effort

3.2.3. Time sensitive aspects of the mission/task e.g., can project be delayed

3.2.4. Vaccination status of people in relation to agent(s) involved

3.2.5. Virulence (severity of effects) of agent(s) involved

3.2.6. Communicability of the agent(s) involved from environment to person and from person-to-person

3.2.7. Availability and effectiveness of post-exposure medical countermeasures for agent(s) involved

3.2.8. Viability of the agent(s) in relation to the current and projected weather conditions—for instance Yersinia pestis is expected to dissipate outdoors to the point that masks are not required beyond three hours after the attack on a hot, dry day.

3.2.9. See Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-10.26 for an example decision aid for this area based on a comprehensive risk management approach.

3.3. Risk-Based Approach. The Air Force uses a risk-based approach for biological defense actions and the following policy decisions support this strategy.

3.3.1. The installation commander has the authority to initiate prophylaxis when the benefits of doing so outweigh the possible negative results, such as individual reactions to medications, possible use of supplies that might be required later in the event etc., after consultation with appropriate medical representatives. (T-1)

3.3.2. The Air Force will use the best available resources to detect, collect, and identify biological agents. Once an agent is identified with the best available technology, senior leadership will be provided recommendations for response measures based on the testing results accompanied by the caveats associated with the resources used to make that identification.

3.3.3. The Air Force has no accepted "central laboratory" responsibilities, but might be asked, as a Lab Response Network member, to process samples from sister service units. The installation commander may refuse samples from off-site locations if deemed detrimental to the installation detection and identification plan unless directed otherwise by the Air Component Commander or Combatant Commander.

Chapter 4

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE

4.1. Security Classification Guides. There are a number of Security Classification Guides that apply to biological warfare-related items. The primary Security Classification Guides Air Force personnel must comply with are the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 5225.01C, Classification Guide for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction) Information (classified document); Army Regulation 380-86, Classification of Former Chemical Warfare, Chemical and Biological Defense, and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Contamination Survivability Information; and the Critical Reagents Program Security Classification Guide. **NOTE:** Personnel must also maintain situational awareness of any applicable security classification guides that exist for specific biological detection systems.

4.2. Essential Elements of Friendly Information. There are subject areas within the biological threat assessment and response profiles that are not necessarily classified but should be treated as Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFIs). There are multiple EEFIs. Some more common examples are included below:

4.2.1. Number of sample collection teams available for each shift and/or time(s) Dry Filter Unit filters are collected

4.2.2. Specific routes sample collection teams take when pulling Dry Filter Unit filters

4.2.3. Identification of agents in the Department of Defense Biological Detection kits being used at the location

4.2.4. Radio frequency the sample collection teams use to communicate with their control center

4.2.5. Shift change times if not staggered

4.2.6. Limitations in the collection network e.g., Dry Filter Unit locations not covered by a functioning Dry Filter Unit

4.2.7. Laboratory limitations e.g., throughput restrictions, testing issues etc.

4.2.8. Installation specific responses to indicators to include when the network is established, when prophylaxis will be initiated etc.

4.2.9. Code translations used to transfer information between collection teams or from collection teams to the control center

4.2.10. Timing of when biological collection, detection, and identification assets are expected to arrive through the Time Phased Force Deployment List process.

4.2.11. Re-leveling of biological collection, detection, and identification assets either in or out of the location.

4.2.12. Specific locations of medical countermeasure Points of Distribution on the installation.

4.2.13. Limitations of pharmaceuticals in relation to specific agents.

Chapter 5

EDUCATION, TRAINING AND EXERCISES

5.1. Education and Training. The Air Force's revised biological collection, detection, and identification activities as described in this document will recommend education and training for several functional areas. Biological agent aerosol collection and identification training is recommended either through Air Force awarding courses, supplemental training courses under the purview of the Air Education and Training Command and Air Force Material Command, included in Career Development courses, added to contingency training location curricula, reinforced during internal training sessions, or completed as "just-in-time training". This publication provides an agreed upon methodology for collection, detection, and identification of environmental samples that might contain biological warfare agents. These samples can be collected anywhere and anytime a biological threat exists: during Military Contingency Operations, contingencies other than Military Contingency Operations, or during homeland defense operations. (T-1).

5.1.1. Biological collection, detection, and identification activities require a unified response across several functional areas to include the Public Health Emergency Officer, Emergency Management, Bioenvironmental Engineering, Public Health, Laboratory, medical senior leadership, Fire and Emergency Services, and others depending on the circumstances, to include civilian partners. As such, educational materials and training courses should include the various functional area roles and responsibilities in the process, integration and overlap points, etc. Successful protection of the force will depend upon having well-trained personnel capable of effectively handling the wide variety of potential scenarios across the threat spectrum e.g., attacks occurring early in the deployment process, not all functional areas or biological identification resources available at the site at the time of attack, etc.

5.1.2. Personnel assigned to Unit Type Codes FFBAT (Biological Augmentation Team) attend Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System Training (or current Polymerase Chain Reaction technology) within six months of initial assignment to the Unit Type Codes. Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System Training is conducted at the U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School, Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Formal Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System Training is a one-time requirement. Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System proficiency/competency testing is required every 12 months. Competency training is conducted using the Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System equipment system assigned locally to the MCRP team. (T-1).

5.1.3. Laboratory Biological Detection Team: Laboratory teams maintaining Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System, will have at least 2 members of the team current in the requirements for each platform maintained. Requirements for each platform include both completion of the Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System formal course and currency in the proficiency/competency program. Formal course attendance is a one-time requirement. Proficiency testing must be accomplished every 12 months by each member. Note: testing occurs 6 times each year with 3 of these being physical samples requiring hands-on testing. (T-1).

5.1.4. Bioenvironmental Engineering team members should conduct joint training with their Emergency Management counterparts on use of the hand-held assays, collection of air samples, etc. Bioenvironmental Engineering personnel receive additional training through the Bioenvironmental Engineering Readiness & Deployment Skills course. (T-3).

5.1.5. Emergency Management and Bioenvironmental Engineering personnel will provide educational materials and/or training on the installation's biological collection, detection, and identification activities on an annual basis to key leadership and appropriate installation working groups (e.g. Installation Threat Working Group). These actions will enable affected personnel to understand their role in the decision making process and facilitate the development of recommendations for senior leadership consideration. (T-3).

5.1.6. Public Health personnel will provide guidance on reporting diseases, in accordance with International, Federal, State and local laws, regulations, and guidance (reference Air Force Instruction 48-105). (T-1).

5.2. Exercises

5.2.1. Exercises should embody a realistic operational philosophy and should employ actual command relationships as much as possible. Exercises should provide opportunities to assess installation capabilities consistent with safety, security, and overall exercise objectives. When appropriate, exercises should also incorporate other requirements, such as logistics, support, force protection, and the ability to operate in a degraded/contaminated environment, including Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear environments. Whenever possible, exercises should seek to employ and evaluate current or proposed plans, policies, procedures, processes, and doctrine.

5.2.2. For AFRC units, the frequency for CBRN exercises should be a minimum of every 18 months.

MARK A. EDIGER, Lieutenant General, USAF, MC, CFS
Surgeon General

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

Air Force Policy Directive 10-26, *Air Force Emergency Management Program*, 17 June 2015

Air Force Manual 33-363, *Management of Records*, 1 March 2008

Air Force Instruction 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, 1 December 2015, AFGM 15 February 2018.

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Civil Engineering Supplement to War Mobilization Plan -1 Appendix 10, *Readiness and Emergency Management and* Appendix 11, *Emergency Management*

Joint Publication 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations*, 12 October 2011

Air Force Instruction 10-206, *Operational Reporting*, 11 June 2014

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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 5225.01C, *Classification Guide for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Information* (classified document)

Army Regulation 380-86, *Classification of Former Chemical Warfare, Chemical and Biological Defense, and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Contamination Survivability Information*, 22 Jun 2005

Critical Reagents Program Security Classification Guide, 3 November 2005

Air Force Instruction 48-105, *Surveillance, Prevention, and Control of Disease and Conditions of Public Health or Military Significance*, 19 January 2016

Prescribed Forms

None

Adopted Forms

AF Form 847, Recommendation for Changes of Publication

Terms

Biological Agent—A microorganism (or a toxin derived from it) that causes disease in personnel, plants, or animals or causes the deterioration of material. (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).

Biological Threat—A threat that consists of biological material planned to be deployed to produce casualties in personnel or animals or damage plants. (Joint Publication 3-11/DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).

Biological Warfare—**-**Voluntary use of living organisms or their toxic products with the intent of killing or harming persons, useful animals or plants.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear—Operations that include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, either individually or in combination. Collectively known as Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear replaces "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical" when used in reference to operations or incidents limited to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical-only issues. Toxic Industrial Material (TIM) and Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) are considered part of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment—An operational environment that includes chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards and their potential resulting effects. (Joint Publication 3-11/DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).

Combatant Command—A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Joint Publication 1)

Contaminated remains —Remains of personnel which have absorbed or upon which have been deposited radioactive material, or biological or chemical agents. (Joint Publication 4-06)

Contamination—(1) The deposit, absorption, or adsorption of radioactive material or of biological or chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel, or objects, or in aerosolized clouds. (2) (DOD only) Food or water made unfit for consumption by humans or animals because of the presence of environmental chemicals, radioactive elements, bacteria, or organisms, the by-product of the growth of bacteria or organisms, the decomposing material (to include the food substance itself) or waste in the food or water. (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).

Decontamination—The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).

Detection—(1) In tactical operations, the perception of an object of possible military interest but unconfirmed by recognition. (2) In surveillance, the determination and transmission by a surveillance system that an incident has occurred. (3) In Chemical, Biological ,Radiological, and Nuclear environments, the act of locating Chemical, Biological ,Radiological, and Nuclear hazards by use of Chemical, Biological ,Radiological, and Nuclear detectors or monitoring and/or survey teams. (Joint Publication 3-11/DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).

Environmental Sampling—Collecting environmental Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear samples is described as obtaining a representative amount of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear hazard for subsequent analysis later. Environmental samples are used to determine if a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear material has been released into the environment. These samples include air, water, soil, and vegetation. They can include liquids, solids, or vapors. They do not include clinical/medical specimens. (See Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.44 for further detail)

Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI)—Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. (Joint Publication 2-01)

Incident—An occurrence, natural or manmade, that requires a response to protect life or property. For example, incidents can include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, civil unrest, wild land and urban fires, floods, hazardous material spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, tsunamis, war-related disasters, medical and public health emergencies, and other occurrences requiring an emergency response.

Integrated Defense (ID)—The integration of multidisciplinary active and passive, offensive and defensive capabilities, employed to mitigate potential risks and defeat adversary threats to Air Force operations. (Air Force Policy Directive 31-1)

Lab Response Network - A national security asset that, with its partners, will develop, maintain and strengthen an integrated domestic and international network of laboratories to respond quickly to biological, chemical, and radiological threats and other high priority public health emergencies needs through training, rapid testing, timely notification and secure messaging of laboratory results.

Medical—Services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel.

Threat—Natural or manmade occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or property.