

**BY ORDER OF THE  
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

**AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 91-111**

**5 SEPTEMBER 2019**



**Safety**

**SAFETY RULES FOR US STRATEGIC  
BOMBER AIRCRAFT**

**COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY**

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This instruction implements Department of Defense (DoD) Manual (DoDM), *DoD Nuclear Weapon System Surety Program Manual*, and Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 91-1, *Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety*. It applies to operations with B-52H and B-2A aircraft and nuclear weapons dedicated for use with these aircraft. The safety rules may only be changed or supplemented using procedures in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 91-102, *Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies, Operational Safety Reviews, and Safety Rules*. This instruction applies to all United States Air Force personnel, including Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard personnel, who have responsibilities with Strategic Bomber Aircraft and nuclear weapons dedicated for use with the weapon system. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System Records Disposition Schedule. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Form 847s from the field through the appropriate functional manager's chain of command. The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier ("T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3") number following the compliance statement. See AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the requestor's commander for non-tiered compliance items.

## ***SUMMARY OF CHANGES***

Substantive changes include changing the procedures for Code Enable Switch installation requirements, weapon jettison procedures, Air Launched Cruise Missile fueling requirement, sideflash protection, clarification of special purpose weapons, and removal of B61-7 and B83-1 from B-52H approved weapons configuration.

### ***Section A—Limitations, and Responsibilities***

#### **1. Limitations.**

1.1. Subordinate organizations may impose more restrictive guidance/policy than contained in safety rules, but may not unilaterally change the safety rules. Supplements must follow procedures outlined in AFI 91-102.

#### **2. This publication is consistent with AFPD 13-5, *Air Force Nuclear Mission*.**

#### **3. Roles and Responsibilities.**

##### 3.1. The Air Force Chief of Safety:

3.1.1. Must ensure safety rules provide maximum safety consistent with operational requirements. **(T-0)**.

3.1.2. Ensures Major Commands follow the safety rules. **(T-0)**.

3.1.3. Is responsible for interpretation and clarification of general and specific guidance in sections B and C. **(T-0)**.

##### 3.2. Major Commands:

3.2.1. Ensure their units follow the safety rules. **(T-0)**.

3.2.2. Ensure no manuals, checklists, technical orders and other publications conflict with the safety rules. **(T-0)**.

3.2.3. Inspect for compliance. **(T-0)**.

### ***Section B—General Safety Rules***

#### **4. General Guidance:**

4.1. Per DoDM 3150.02 general safety rules apply to all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems. Safety rules always apply, even during war. **(T-0)**.

4.2. Do not intentionally expose nuclear weapons to abnormal environments except in an emergency as defined in DoDM 3150.02. **(T-0)**.

4.3. Nuclear weapons will not be used for training or for troubleshooting (i.e., to confirm the existence of a fault, identify fault isolation, or verify that a fault has been corrected except as explicitly allowed by the weapons system safety rules.). **(T-0)**.

4.4. Using nuclear weapons for exercises is permissible except when specific safety rules explicitly prohibit their use. **(T-0)**.

- 4.5. Personnel that have physical access to nuclear weapons must be certified under Personnel Reliability Assurance Program, in accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5210.42, *Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Assurance*. **(T-0)**.
- 4.6. Only certified procedures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and organizations, authorized by the appropriate level of authority, will be employed to conduct nuclear weapon system operations. **(T-0)**.
- 4.7. The total number of personnel performing nuclear weapon system operations shall be held to the minimum consistent with the operations performed. **(T-0)**.
- 4.8. At least two authorized persons must be present during any operation with a nuclear weapon, except when authorized by a specific safety rule; i.e., alert fly. They must be able to detect incorrect or unauthorized procedures in the task being performed. They must also have knowledge of and understand applicable safety and security requirements. **(T-0)**.
- 4.9. Physical security will be maintained, in accordance with DoD Directive (DoDD) 5210.41, *Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons*. **(T-0)**.
- 4.9.1. Nuclear weapons will be transported as determined by the Combatant Commander or the Military Department, in accordance with DoDI 4540.05, *DoD Transportation of United States Nuclear Weapons*. **(T-0)**.
- 4.9.2. Additionally, custody and accountability transfers during logistic movements shall be by courier receipt system to ensure positive control. **(T-0)**.
- 4.10. Conduct use control operations in accordance with plans and procedures prescribed by the applicable Combatant Command and technical publications. **(T-0)**.
- 4.11. Verification that a nuclear warhead is not present in a test assembly must be made using nonnuclear assurance procedures at the last practical opportunity agreed upon by the DoD and/or Department of Energy before the conduct of an operational test. **(T-0)**.
- 4.12. Deviations from safety rules are permitted in an emergency **(T-0)**, except as follows:
- 4.12.1. United States custody must be maintained until receipt of a valid nuclear control order that permits transferring United States nuclear weapons to non-United States delivery forces. **(T-0)**.
- 4.12.2. Nuclear weapons shall not be expended unless a valid, properly authenticated nuclear control order conveying release or expenditure authority is received. **(T-0)**.
- 4.12.3. Jettisoning of nuclear weapons is permitted in the event of an emergency, and is to be accomplished according to plans and procedures prescribed for the area of operations. **(T-0)**.

### ***Section C—Specific Safety Rules***

#### **5. Specific Guidance.**

- 5.1. These rules, weapon system design and security features, operational and administrative controls, and technical procedures ensure the nuclear weapons meet the Nuclear Weapon System Surety Standards in AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*, and DoDD 3150.02. **(T-0)**.

5.2. Commanders must not deviate from specific safety rules, except in response to an emergency. DoDD 3150.02 defines an emergency as “an unexpected occurrence or set of circumstances in which personnel or equipment unavailability, due to accident, natural event, or combat, may demand immediate action that may require extraordinary measure to protect, handle, service, transport, jettison, or employ a nuclear weapon.” (T-0).

5.3. Any changes that potentially impact nuclear weapon system surety must meet requirements identified in AFI 91-102. (T-0).

5.4. Commander, AF Global Strike Command or designated authority may specifically authorize the use of nuclear weapons for exercises except as restricted elsewhere in this instruction. (T-0).

5.5. Violations of referenced instructions do not constitute Weapons System Safety Rules (WSSR) violations unless specifically identified in this document.

5.6. Only the following weapons are authorized:

5.6.1. B-2A: B61-7, 11; B83-1. (T-0).

5.6.2. B-52H: AGM-86B/W80-1 (T-0).

## **6. Nuclear Identification.**

6.1. Establish administrative controls and procedures to provide positive means of distinguishing between:

6.2. Nuclear munitions and nonnuclear devices (e.g. joint test assemblies, tactical ferry payloads, bomb dummy units, and training shapes) intended to resemble nuclear weapons. (T-0).

6.3. Air-to-Ground (AGM)-86B missiles with nuclear warhead installed from those without nuclear warheads. (T-0).

6.4. Warhead shipping and storage containers that contain nuclear warheads from those containers without nuclear warheads. (T-0).

## **7. Nonnuclear Assurance.**

7.1. Verification that a nuclear warhead is not present in a test assembly must be made using nonnuclear assurance procedures at the last practical opportunity agreed on by the DoD and/or Department of Energy before an operational test. (T-0). This applies to test assemblies which:

7.2. Resemble War Reserve assets (T-0), and

7.3. Will be flown on a combat delivery aircraft as defined in AFI 91-101. (T-0).

## **8. Troubleshooting and Use of Equipment, Procedures, and Checklists:**

8.1. Do not use nuclear weapons to troubleshoot faults. (T-0).

8.2. Only use equipment (e.g. hardware, software, etc.) and procedures that comply with United States Air Force approved publications for nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon system operations. (T-0).

8.3. Training is prohibited with nuclear weapons-loaded aircraft. This includes simulation and partial simulation mode training. **(T-0)**.

8.4. The offices of primary responsibility for publications must ensure applicable publications conform to weapon system safety rules and meet the DoD nuclear weapons system safety standards. **(T-0)**.

8.5. Do not modify the Aircraft Monitoring and Control system, suspension or release systems, associated handling and test equipment, or any other aircraft system that affects nuclear surety without Air Force Safety Center approval. **(T-0)**.

## **9. Security Criteria.**

9.1. DoDM S-5210.41, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*, DoD S-5210.41-M\_AFMAN 31-108-S, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*, and AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, apply. **(T-0)**.

## **10. Critical Components, Tamper Control and Detection.**

10.1. AFI 91-104, *Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs*, which defines Two-person Concept and sealing requirements, applies. **(T-0)**.

10.2. A B-52H aircraft with an operationally coded Code Enable Switch loaded is a critical component and must be handled in accordance with AFI 91-105, *Critical Components*, and AFI 91-104. **(T-0)**.

10.3. A B-2A with all preload functions complete and declared ready to receive weapons is a critical component and handled in accordance with AFI 91-105 and AFI 91-104. **(T-0)**.

## **11. Personnel Reliability Assurance.**

11.1. DoDM 5210.42, DoDM 5210.42\_AFMAN 13-501, and AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force*, apply. **(T-0)**.

## **12. Weapon Safety Verification.**

12.1. Using applicable technical orders, verify that the AGM-86B/W80-1 is safe. **(T-0)**. The proper configuration is:

12.2. Warhead Arming Device safing pin is installed and the Warhead Arming Device indicates safe (white "S" on green background). **(T-0)**.

12.3. Rotary separation switch pin is installed (red band is not visible). Remove only when authorized by applicable technical data. **(T-0)**.

## **13. Basic Aircraft Configurations:**

13.1. B-2A. Retain these configurations:

13.1.1. Rotary Launcher Assembly mated with B61-7, B61-11, and/or B83-1 bombs. Mixed nuclear loads are authorized. **(T-0)**.

13.1.1.1. Weapon Jettison Panel:

13.1.1.1.1. ALL ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down. **(T-0)**.

13.1.1.1.2. SEL ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down. **(T-0)**.

13.1.1.2. Pilots Consent Panel:

13.1.1.2.1. NUC UNLK ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.1.1.2.2. NUC PA ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.1.1.3. Mission Commanders Consent Panel:

13.1.1.3.1. Nuclear Unlock/Enable switch (NUC UNLK ENBL) in the OFF position with guard cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.1.1.3.2. Nuclear Prearm Enable switch (NUC PA ENBL) in the OFF position with guard cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.2. B-52H. Retain these configurations:

13.2.1. Install operationally coded Code Enable Switch and disable the Interconnecting Box, prior to electrically connecting Air Launched Cruise Missile to the B-52. **(T-0)**.

13.2.2. Aircraft with Common Strategic Rotary Launcher mated with B61-7 and/or B83-1 gravity bombs or AGM-86B/W80-1 missiles:

13.2.2.1. Pilots Missile/Munitions Consent Panel:

13.2.2.1.1. Off/Prearm switch in the OFF position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.2.2.1.2. Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.2.2.2. Weapon Control Panel:

13.2.2.2.1. Nuclear Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.2.2.2.2. Nuclear Prearm Enable/Off (PA ENBL/OFF) switch in the OFF position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.2.2.2.3. Weapon Jettison Select/Normal (SEL/NORM) switch in the NORM position with cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.2.3. Aircraft with Pylon-Carried AGM-86B/W80-1 (with or without Common Strategic Rotary Launcher):

13.2.3.1. Release Circuits Disconnect disconnected with the cover closed, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.2.3.2. The guards on the left and right Pylon Jettison Consent switches down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.2.3.3. Pylon jettison control indicators show PYLON LOCKED. **(T-0)**.

13.2.3.4. Pilots Missile/Munitions Consent Panel:

13.2.3.4.1. Off/Prearm switch in the OFF position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.2.3.4.2. Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.2.3.5. Weapon Control Panel:

13.2.3.5.1. Nuclear Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.2.3.5.2. Nuclear Prearm Enable/Off (PA ENBL/OFF) switch in the OFF position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.2.3.5.3. Pylon Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

13.2.3.5.4. Weapon Jettison Select/Normal (SEL/NORM) switch in the NORM position with cover down, safety wired, and sealed. **(T-0)**.

#### 14. Cruise Missile Operations:

14.1. Mission Planning:

14.1.1. Develop mission profiles so that the required g-maneuver occurs as late in the mission as practical. **(T-0)**.

14.1.2. Mission planning system operations must ensure that all missions terminate at a valid target in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Requirements and/or United States Strategic Command mission constraints. **(T-0)**.

14.2. Fueling: Fuel/Defuel room doors will remain closed during fuel/defuel operations and with fuel in the fuel set. **Exceptions:** The automatic fire door may remain open. Personnel access doors may be opened to allow entry and exit. Fuel room blast doors may be opened momentarily to allow the movement of Air Launched Cruise Missile bodies while fuel is in the fuel set; however the fuel/defuel set will be isolated from missile bodies. **(T-0)**.

#### 15. Storage, Maintenance, Testing, Ground Transportation, Mating, Demating, Loading and Unloading:

15.1. Use applicable technical data to verify weapon condition, as required ([paragraph 12](#)). **(T-0)**.

15.2. Do not load nuclear and conventional weapons on the same aircraft. **(T-0)**.

15.3. Store nuclear weapons in United States Air Force certified, locked, and secured facilities. **(T-0)**.

15.4. With missiles on a pylon, install the ejector safing pin. When pylons are installed on the aircraft, ensure pylon jettison safing pins are installed (Remove only when authorized by applicable technical data.) **(T-0)**.

15.5. For rotary launchers, verify ejector safing mechanism lockpin is engaged and ejector safing mechanism levers indicate locked. **(T-0)**.

15.6. Fuel aircraft for the assigned mission before loading nuclear weapons. **(T-0)**.

15.7. Do not load an aircraft unless it is capable of performing its assigned mission. **(T-0)**.

15.8. Ensure a minimum unimpeded line-of-sight separation distance of 850 feet between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons identified with Bomb Live Unit nomenclature in the item Technical Order and Joint Hazard Classification System. Munitions in transit are exempt. If a separation of 850 feet cannot be maintained, place significant barricades (such as Massive Modular Blocks) to prevent free-field fragment impact to nuclear weapon(s). **(T-0)**.

15.9. Side-flash Protection for Nuclear Weapons. Maintain at least seven feet of free space between the nuclear weapon and the facility structural members (walls, ceiling, columns), metallic attachments and conductive objects during the disassembly or performance of maintenance operations as currently approved, that breaches the minimum lightning safe configuration provided by the weapon IAW AFMAN 91-201.

## **16. Logistics Movement of Nuclear Weapons by Cargo Aircraft:**

16.1. AFI 91-115, *Safety Rules for Nuclear Logistics Transport by Prime Nuclear Airlift Force*, applies. **(T-0)**.

## **17. Ground Operations Involving Nuclear Weapon-Loaded Aircraft:**

17.1. Maintain aircraft in their basic configuration ([paragraph 13](#)). **(T-0)**.

17.2. Electrically verify safe status of the weapons with the applicable aircraft stores management system after weapons upload. **(T-0)**.

17.3. After completing the upload and postload functions, apply power to an uploaded nuclear weapon only for authorized permissive action link (PAL) operations, command disable (CD) operations, or to monitor the weapon. **Note:** Keep weapon monitoring to a minimum. **(T-0)**.

17.4. Apply power to a nuclear weapon-loaded aircraft only to:

17.4.1. Perform maintenance or preflight operations. **(T-0)**.

17.4.2. Monitor the weapons or ejector rack locks **(T-0)**.

17.4.3. Start or run engines. **(T-0)**.

17.4.4. Monitor the radio. **(T-0)**.

17.4.5. Perform authorized PAL, CD, or coded switch operations. **(T-0)**.

17.5. Do not start or run engine(s) unless:

17.5.1. Checking aircraft status. **(T-0)**.

17.5.2. Performing minor aircraft maintenance as defined in AFI 91-107, *Design, Evaluation, Troubleshooting, and Maintenance Criteria for Nuclear Weapons Systems*. **(T-0)**.

17.5.3. Conducting practice alerts, exercises, inspections, evaluations, taxiing, and flying operations. **(T-0)**.

17.6. Engine starts and engine runs must:

17.6.1. Be kept to a minimum. **(T-0)**.

17.6.2. Be done by at least two authorized and qualified aircrew members (Two-Person Concept applies). **(T-0)**.



17.7. Aircraft towing:

17.7.1. Keep towing to a minimum **(T-0)**.

17.7.2. Two authorized and qualified individuals must be in the cockpit during towing (Two Person Concept applies). **(T-0)**.

17.8. Taxi.

17.8.1. Keep taxiing to the minimum consistent with operational requirements. **(T-0)**.

17.8.2. At least two authorized and qualified aircrew members must be in the aircraft during taxiing (Two-Person Concept applies). **(T-0)**.

17.9. Perform fuel management actions on loaded aircraft only as necessary to support a particular aircraft's assigned mission. **(T-0)**.

**18. Flying Operations Involving Carriage of Nuclear Weapons in a Nonstrike Configuration:**

18.1. Conduct only when:

18.1.1. Directed by appropriate authority. **(T-0)**.

18.1.2. PAL is locked. **(T-0)**.

18.1.3. The aircraft is in its basic configuration ([paragraph 13](#)). **(T-0)**.

18.2. Plan flight routes to avoid populated areas to the maximum extent possible. **(T-0)**.

18.3. If loss of the aircraft is anticipated, CD the weapons if the aircraft is capable and time and conditions permit. **(T-0)**.

18.4. B-2A:

18.4.1. Retain CD capability. **(T-0)**.

18.4.2. When authorized to jettison weapons, break the locking/release system safety wires and seals and operate the controls by following applicable technical orders. CD weapons if time and conditions permit. **(T-0)**.

18.5. B-52H:

18.5.1. With cruise missiles loaded, disconnect the Code Enabling Switch and attach the connector to the storage receptacle. **(T-0)**.

18.5.2. When authorized to jettison weapons, break the locking/release system safety wires and seals and operate the controls by following applicable technical orders. **(T-0)**.

18.5.3. Do not apply missile power. Keep application of missile interface unit power to a minimum. **(T-0)**.

**19. Flying Operations Involving Carriage of Nuclear Weapons in a Strike Configuration:**

19.1. Conduct only when:

19.1.1. Directed by appropriate authority. **(T-0)**.

19.1.2. Ordered to launch for survival under positive threat of imminent attack. **(T-0)**.

19.1.3. Authorized to fly in a strike configuration as part of a deployment or dispersal. **(T-0)**.

19.2. Keep nuclear weapons in a safe configuration until authorized to prearm. **(T-0)**.

19.3. Keep the aircraft in its basic configuration (**paragraph 13**) until authorized to prepare weapons for release. **(T-0)**.

19.4. If loss of aircraft is anticipated or jettison of weapons is required, safe the weapon. If the aircraft is capable and time and conditions permit, PAL lock and CD the weapons. **(T-0)**.

19.5. Plan flight routes to avoid populated areas to the maximum extent possible. **(T-0)**.

## **20. PAL Procedures:**

20.1. Use PAL codes and PAL controllers only as directed by appropriate authority. **(T-0)**.

20.2. For aircraft with cockpit PAL control, relock PAL as soon as practicable when:

20.2.1. In receipt of a termination or recall message. **(T-0)**.

20.2.2. After the failsafe point. **(T-0)**.

20.2.3. Post-strike on retained weapons. **(T-0)**.

## **21. CD Procedures.**

21.1. CD weapons in accordance with appropriate guidance. **(T-0)**.

## **22. Dispersal**

22.1. All planned dispersal operations will comply with WSSRs. If a situation arises where dispersal operations conflict with the WSSRs, then those operations must be approved by the Secretary of Defense prior to execution. **(T-0)**.

22.2. Ensure a minimum unimpeded line-of-sight separation distance of 850 feet between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons identified with Bomb Live Unit nomenclature in the item Technical Order and Joint Hazard Classification System. Munitions in transit are exempt. If a separation of 850 feet cannot be maintained, place significant barricades (such as Massive Modular Blocks) to prevent free-field fragment impact to nuclear weapon(s). **(T-0)**.

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Major General, USAF  
Chief of Safety

**Attachment 1****GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

- DoDD 3150.02, *DoD Nuclear Weapon Systems Safety Program*, 24 April 2013, Incorporating Change 4, 31 August 2018
- DoDD 5210.41, *Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons*, 22 January 2015, Incorporating Change 1, 31 August 2018
- DoDI 4540.05, *DoD Transportation of United States Nuclear Weapons*, 23 June 2011, Incorporating Change 4, 31 August 2018
- DoDI 5210.42, *DoD Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Assurance*, 27 April 2016, Incorporating Change 2, 31 August 2018
- DoDM 3150.02, *DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Manual*, 31 January 2014, Incorporating Change 3, 31 August 2018
- DoDM S-5210.41, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*, 11 August 2016
- DoDM 5210.42, *Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program*, 13 January 2015, Incorporating Change 3, 31 August 2018
- DoDM 5210.52\_AFMAN 13-501, *Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program*, 19 September 2018
- DoD S-5210.41-M\_AFMAN 31-108-S, *Nuclear Weapons Security Manual*, 15 June 2017
- AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, 5 July 2017
- AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*, 2 February 2016
- AFI 33-360, *Publications and Form Management*, 1 December 2015
- AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*, 15 August 2014
- AFI 91-102, *Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies, Operational Safety Reviews, and Safety Rules*, 12 April 2017
- AFI 91-104, *Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs*, 23 April 2013
- AFI 91-105, *Critical Components*, 22 July 2016
- AFI 91-107, *Design, Evaluation, Troubleshooting, and Maintenance Criteria for Nuclear Weapons Systems*, 11 December 2012
- AFI 91-115, *Safety Rules for Nuclear Logistics Transport by the Prime Nuclear Airlift Force*, 30 November 2016
- AFPD 91-1, *Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety*, 30 November 2016

***Adopted Forms***

- AF IMT 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

*Abbreviations and Acronyms*

**AFI**—Air Force Instruction

**AFMAN**—Air Force Manual

**AFPD**—Air Force Policy Directive

**CD**—Command Disable

**DoD**—Department of Defense

**DoDD**—Department of Defense Directive

**DoDI**—Department of Defense Instruction

**DoDM**—Department of Defense Manual

**OPR**—Office of Primary Responsibility

**PAL**—Permissive Action Link

**WSSR**—Weapon System Safety Rules