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SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

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Nuclear, Space, Missile, Command and Control

***OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES-
AIR OPERATIONS CENTER (AOC)
OPERATIONS CENTER (OC)***

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This Department of the Air Force Manual (DAFMAN) implements guidance in Department of the Air Force Policy Directive (DAFPD) 13-1, *Command and Control Enterprise (C2 Enterprise)*; and is consistent with Joint Publication (JP) 3-30, *Joint Operations*; and Annex 3-99, *Department of the Air Force role in Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO)*. It provides guidance for operating the Air Operations Center (AOC) and Operations Center (OC) weapon systems that is provided by the Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR) when supporting Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) in support of air, space, cyberspace, and information operations (IO); and real-world contingencies. This document describes processes used by the AOC and OC, during normal and increased operations. This publication applies to the United States Space Force (USSF), Regular Air Force, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard. This publication does not apply to the Civil Air Patrol. Ensure all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule located in the Air Force Records Information Management System. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the OPR using the Air Force (AF) Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*, route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. This publication may be supplemented at any level, but all supplements that directly implement this publication must be routed through the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for coordination prior to approval. The authorities to waive wing or unit level

requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3”) number following the compliance statement. See Department of the Air Force Instruction (DAFI) 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, through the requester’s commander to the Publication OPR for non-tiered compliance items. Compliance with the attachments are not mandatory. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by the Air Force.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

DAFMAN 13-1 AOC, Volume 3 is part of a 3-volume set. This 3-volume set of publications is converting to DAFMANs. This publication highlights changes in operational-level Command and Control (C2), which have become lessons learned over 10 years of continuous operations. It includes operations center (OC) requirements for integrating aspects of C2 capabilities across global and geographic forces. It corrects office symbols for various organizations including office of primary responsibility, implements waiver authority (tiering) guidance in DAFI 33-360. Additionally, it changes AOC/OC operational processes and guidance. It clarifies the doctrinal and organizational role of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) as part of defensive counterair per JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats* and Air Force Doctrine, Annex 3-01, *Counterair Operations*. This volume updates the terms lethal and non-lethal to Kinetic and non-kinetic operations and planning, and aligns non-kinetic and cyberspace (including the Director of Cyber Forces) organization and procedures with Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-3.AOC, *Operational Employment - Air Operations Center*; includes new sections on database management, Common Tactical Picture (CTP) Management, and the creation of a new chapter concerning AOC/OC communications support and resources. This revision also aligns intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance procedures to current references, and standardizes Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) and grades for air mobility teams. It adds network-enabled weapons to air tasking order (ATO) guidance where applicable; adds network enabled weapons to operational tasking data link guidance, and adds applicable guidance on enabling digitally aided close air support.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. General. This document describes all organization, positions, and processes used by the AOC/OC across the full spectrum of military operations with a primary emphasis on major contingency operations. Henceforth, this publication uses the term “AOC” as a generic term for all AOCs and OCs. During smaller-scale contingencies or day-to-day operations, the AOC may not employ all capabilities or teams described herein. The AOC described in this publication is both an Air Force unit and a Weapon System that the COMAFFOR may employ to exercise control of Air Force forces. It may form the core of a Joint Air Operations Center or combined AOC, and be employed by the Combined or Joint Force Air Component Commander (C/JFACC) to exercise control of joint or combined air forces when designated. In addition, COMAFFORs may tailor the organizational construct of their AOC team as required to support CCDR specific missions.

1.1.1. The AOC normally employs with joint or combined augmentation, under the command of a Joint/Combined Forces Air Component Commander (J/CFACC). The air operations center (AOC), in joint or combined operations is a Joint Air Operations Center or Combined AOC. However, doctrine simply uses the term "AOC." The AOC organization and processes described here should define the essential elements of any Joint Air Operations Center or Combined AOC, regardless of the service or nationality of the leadership and subordinates involved. For the purpose of this publication, the term COMAFFOR, JFACC, and AOC will be used when addressing broader, joint, or combined AOC employment. **Note:** When necessary to distinguish the program or enterprise as a whole from the AOC as a C2 center, this publication uses the term AOC Weapon System for the program or enterprise.

1.1.2. Local Guidance. Should AOC/OC structures or procedures differ from this publication, the applicable unit command shall write a supplement describing their procedures.

1.1.2.1. Air Reserve Component (ARC) units may combine their local operating procedures with their aligned AOC/OC.

1.1.2.2. Units producing a local **Chapter 11** will forward copies to their parent major command (MAJCOM) for approval and publication in accordance with DAFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*. (T-2). Parent MAJCOMs will then forward to Air Combat Command, C2ISR Operations Division (ACC/A3C) and Headquarters Air Force, Command and Control Branch (AF/A3TY) for posting to applicable AOC/OC and Headquarters Air Force websites. Differences identified in an AOC/OC **Chapter 11** will only apply to that AOC/OC and any aligned or associated ARC AOC/OC unit. (T-1).

1.1.2.3. The authorities to waive wing or unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3”) number following the compliance statement. See DAFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the servicing MAJCOM A3, for the AOC requesting the waiver, for non-tiered compliance

items. The Publication OPR will be notified of all servicing MAJCOM level waivers. The servicing MAJCOM A3 can only issue the same waiver 3 times in any fiscal year. After 3 servicing MAJCOM waivers for the same item within a fiscal year, any additional waiver requests, for this item, must be made through the Publication OPR. Send copies of approved MAJCOM AOC/OC waivers to ACC/A3C as lead command office of primary responsibility. **(T-2)**. ACC/A3 will send any waivers they approve to all AOC/OC MAJCOM counterparts.

1.1.2.4. Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 13-1AOC, Volume 2, *Standardization/Evaluation Program/Air Operations Center (AOC)/Operations Center (OC)* outlines Management Internal Control Toolset duties. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by the Air Force.

1.1.2.5. Compliance with attachments in this publication is not mandatory.

1.1.3. This publication applies to teams and processes employed during steady-state operations (Phase 0). In support of national security policy, the United States Air Force (USAF) provides the full range of capabilities to commanders at all levels. The USAF uses the air expeditionary task force concept to present the appropriate mix of ready forces and a means to C2 those forces. In addition, the USAF will transition its C2 systems and processes across the full range and all phases of military operations (Phase 0 – Shape; I – Deter; II – Seize the Initiative; III – Dominate; IV – Stabilize; V – Enable Civil Authority) as outlined in JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (see Table 1.1). While joint and USAF doctrine state that one individual will normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are different. Normally, the COMAFFOR executes operational and administrative control of assigned and attached USAF forces through the Air Force forces (AFFOR) staff. The JFACC executes tactical control of joint air component forces through an AOC.

Table 1.1. Example of Phasing Model for Civil Military Operations.

Phase 0	Shape	Foreign humanitarian assistance supplied and quick impact projects.
Phase 1	Deter	Levels of violent disruptive events.
Phase 2	Seize the Initiative	Integration with host nation civil-military authorities, host nation government, integration with local populace.
Phase 3	Dominate	Decrease in hostilities, decrease in collateral damage, injuries or death.
Phase 4	Stabilize	Foreign humanitarian assistance, restoration of services, repair or rebuilding projects.
Phase 5	Enable Civil Authority	Train and equip law enforcement and military, political elections, mentoring of government officials.
Note: The phasing model for joint operations is flexible and defined by the JFC.		

1.1.4. Based on the tenet of centralized planning and control, and decentralized execution, the AOC, in coordination with the AFFOR staff, enables the JFACC to exercise operational-

level C2 of air, space and cyberspace forces. When combined or multinational operations are involved, the JFACC may be a CFACC or Multinational Force Air Component Commander. This publication does not specifically address how to integrate foreign nationals or foreign disclosure concerns when an AOC becomes a Combined AOC. Although this publication briefly discusses COMAFFOR responsibilities and Component Headquarters organization, its focus is on the AOC. This document assumes Phase 3 ops and a multinational environment, however, it uses the term AOC vice Combined AOC or Joint Air Operations Center from this point forward when discussing operational processes and duties. While the Air Force transitions its C2 systems and process across all phases of military operations, most AOCs require augmentation to support operations above Phases 0 and 1. Commanders determine the number and purpose of phases used during a campaign or operation.

1.2. Employment. When conducting combined and joint air, space, and cyberspace operations, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) normally designates a JFACC in accordance with JP 3-30 *Joint Air Operations*.

1.3. JFACC Additional Responsibilities Supported by an AOC. Normally, the JFC assigns additional responsibilities associated with air operations to the JFACC. Additionally, the JFACC may provide specialized support to other components. When delegated these responsibilities, the JFACC becomes the supported commander for these theater functions.

1.3.1. Area Air Defense Commander. Due to the inherent linkage of air operations and defensive counterair, the JFC normally designates the JFACC as the Area Air Defense Commander to conduct defensive counterair for the joint force. As Area Air Defense Commander, the JFACC has overall responsibility for air and missile defense of the Joint Operations Area (JOA) or area of responsibility (AOR). The JFACC employs the AOC to coordinate with other components and develop the Area Air Defense Plan, which includes defensive counterair inputs from all sources for JFC approval. Once approved, the AOC plans, coordinates, and manages defensive counterair operations.

1.3.2. Airspace Control Authority. The JFC normally designates the JFACC as the Airspace Control Authority. The Airspace Control Authority has overall responsibility for controlling the airspace in the AOR/JOA and operation of the Airspace Control System in the airspace control area. The Airspace Control Authority coordinates, develops, and issues the Airspace Control Plan (ACP) and Airspace Control Order (ACO), which provide guidance and procedures for use and control of airspace activities.

1.3.3. Collection Operations Management. In accordance with JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, collection operations management is the direction, scheduling, and control of specific collection operations and associated processing, exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination resources. In accordance with JP 3-30, the JFACC will normally be the supported commander for the airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) effort. The JFC will normally delegate collection operations management for joint airborne ISR to the JFACC to authoritatively direct, schedule, and control collection operations for use by the Intelligence Directorate (J-2) in associated processing, exploitation, and reporting.

1.3.4. Collection Requirements Management. The JFACC will also likely exercise collection requirements management of assigned units and receive collection requirements from other collection requirements management authorities. In accordance with JP 2-01

collection requirements management is the authoritative development and control of collection processing, exploitation, analysis and production, and/or reporting requirements. These requirements normally result in either the direct tasking of assets over which the Collection Manager has authority, or the generation of tasking requests to the collection management authority at higher, lower, or lateral echelon to accomplish the collection mission. See **Chapter 6** for an explanation of the ISR Division's (ISRD) roles, responsibilities, and processes.

1.3.5. Space Coordinating Authority. The individual designated as Space Coordinating Authority is responsible for coordinating and integrating space capabilities and is responsible for coordination of joint space operations and integration of space capabilities and effects in support of the JFC. Assigned or attached space personnel normally support the Space Coordinating Authority, who serves as the focal point for gathering space requirements in support of the JFC's campaign. These requirements include requesting space capabilities to support joint warfighter functions and requests for space forces with specialized skills. To ensure prompt and timely support, the supported Geographic Combatant Commander and Commander, US Space Command may authorize direct coordinating authority between the Space Coordinating Authority and applicable components of United States Space Command (USSPACECOM). The Space Coordinating Authority develops a recommended prioritized list of space requirements for the Joint Task Force based on JFC objectives.

1.3.6. Electronic Warfare Control Authority. In accordance with JP 3-13.1, *Electronic Warfare*, (https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_13_1.pdf) the Electronic Warfare Control Authority is the commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of electronic attack assets in the AOR/JOA. This responsibility assumes the Electronic Warfare Control Authority can access the Joint Automated Communication-Electronics Operating Instructions System and Joint Restricted Frequency List, can analyze immediate jamming requests for frequency interference issues (to include harmonic interference), and can ensure positive C2 of jamming assets to start or stop jamming activity.

1.3.7. Supported Commander for Personnel Recovery. In accordance with JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*, (<https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=27&pubId=613>) the supported commander for Personnel Recovery is the joint force component commander designated by the JFC with the overall authority to plan, coordinate, and conduct joint Personnel Recovery operations and activities within the JFC's operational area. If the JFC designates the JFACC as the supported commander for Personnel Recovery, the JFACC should integrate the Joint Personnel Recovery Center into the JFACC's AOC. When the JFACC is the supported commander for Personnel Recovery then the AOC must also retain a Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell capability to plan and conduct Personnel Recovery missions in support of JFACC operations. **(T-2)**.

1.3.8. Provision of a Joint Air Component Coordination Element. The JFACC may establish and deploy a Joint Air Component Coordination Element to service land, maritime, and special operations component commanders' headquarters to integrate air, space, and cyberspace operations with surface or subsurface operations. The JFACC may also establish and deploy a Joint Air Component Coordination Element to the JFC or a coalition partner headquarters to integrate air, space, and cyberspace operations within the overall joint or combined force. The Joint Air Component Coordination Element will normally be sourced from the Air Force Component commander's AOC or AFFOR staff, augmentation units or

air expeditionary center or Air Force Personnel Center-identified personnel; as well as subject matter experts from each of the sister services as needed. If possible, the COMAFFOR/JFACC should establish a working relationship with Joint Air Component Coordination Element personnel before deployment and execution.

1.3.8.1. The Joint Air Component Coordination Element director acts as the JFACC's liaison and primary representative to the other commanders in the operation. The Joint Air Component Coordination Element team facilitates interaction and communication between respective staffs. The Joint Air Component Coordination Element performs a liaison function and is responsible for understanding (and participating in, if possible) the JFC/JFACC's initial planning and for understanding the other commanders' plans. The Joint Air Component Coordination Element team works with their respective counterparts in the AOC and AFFOR staff to provide the other HQs commander information on the best way to employ air power. This is a two-way relationship in that the Joint Air Component Coordination Element provides information flow to the JFACC and helps ensure JFACC information is flowing to and understood by the JFC, Joint Force Land Component Commander, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, and/or Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander as applicable. Joint Air Component Coordination Elements will participate in training events and exercises with appropriate headquarters organizations to maintain mission readiness. **(T-2)**.

1.4. AOC Weapon System Program Responsibilities. Note: The use of the term "weapon" is not intended to imply legal review is required, as it does not meet the definition provided in AFI 51-401, *The Law of War*.

1.4.1. Headquarters Air Force. AF/A3TY C2 division provides policy, guidance, and advocacy for the AOC Weapon System. Other Headquarters Air Force staff agencies provide support as required. AOC Weapon System may request Air Force, Directorate for Training and Readiness (AF/A3T) participation in AOC Weapon System forums.

1.4.2. Air Combat Command (ACC) is lead command for the AOC Weapon System. For specific lead command duties and responsibilities, see AFPD 10-9, *Lead Command Designation and Responsibilities for Weapon Systems*. In addition, the Air Combat Command Commander (ACC/CC) and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition will provide additional guidance as required.

1.4.3. USAF Warfare Center. The USAF Warfare Center, through the 505th Command and Control Wing, supports the AOC Weapon System in almost every aspect of training. The Operational Command Training Program's Senior Mentor and subject matter expert Observer and Trainers, with support from the 505th Command and Control Wing, provide peer-level mentoring, training, and feedback to enhance skills at the operational-level of war for the COMAFFOR, JFACC, AFFOR Chief of Staff and Directors, the AOC Commander (AOC/CC), Division Chiefs, and team leads.

1.4.4. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ). Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition assigns the Program Executive Officer and designates the AOC Weapon System Program Manager who leads the AOC Weapon System Program Office for AOC systems development, integration, testing, fielding, sustainment, modernization, and certification to participate in the overall USAF C2 enterprise. Currently, the AOC Weapon System Program Manager is Air Force Life Cycle Management Center/HBH and the

Program Executive Officer is the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Battle Management. For specific Program Manager responsibilities, see Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.02, *Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework* and AFI 63-101/20-101, *Integrated Life Cycle Management*.

Chapter 2


AIR OPERATIONS CENTER

2.1. Mission. An AOC is the JFACC's C2 center that provides the capability to plan, direct, and assess activities of assigned and attached forces. AOCs do not work in isolation. They require appropriate connectivity to the AFFOR staff, higher HQ operations centers (e.g., to the joint force headquarters for the operational branch, and to senior Air Force headquarters for the administrative branch), to other joint or coalition force components, to assigned and attached Air Force units, and to global and geographic AOCs as necessary. The AOC provides operational-level C2 of air, space, cyberspace and IO to meet JFACC operational objectives and guidance. To efficiently and effectively plan and execute their steady-state missions, commanders must tailor geographic and global AOCs. Although the USAF provides the core personnel for the AOC, other service and combined force components provide personnel in support of exercises and contingency operations. Actions at the joint or combined-force level establish requirements for the Theater Air Ground System (see [Paragraph 2.4](#)). CCDR's will provide guidance, perspective, and strategy for the AOR or if designated JOA, establish and provide command organization and relationships, provide a campaign plan, and designate an assignment of objectives, and apportionment of forces.

2.2. Component Headquarters Organizations. AF components to Unified Combatant Commands are made up of a Component MAJCOM (e.g., Pacific Air Forces), or a Component Numbered AF (e.g., 12 AF, 16 AF). The AF Component Headquarters should include, at a minimum, the ability to exercise command and control (normally an AOC or OC) and an AFFOR staff.

2.2.1. Component Headquarters. The Component Headquarters should be properly structured, equipped, manned, and trained to execute C2 of air, space, and cyberspace operations assigned or attached to the AF component commander for day-to-day operations with the ability to accept additional AOC forces for any increase in AF component mission tasking or direction. AF component functions should be integrated into existing MAJCOM and Numbered Air Force structures defined in AFI 38-101, *Manpower and Organization*, and AFI 13-103, *AFFOR Staff Operations, Readiness and Structures*. **Figure 2.1** shows an example of a Component MAJCOM or Component Numbered AF as a Component Headquarters.

2.2.2. AFFOR Staff. The AFFOR staff, in coordination with the AOC, supports USAF requirements and integrates air component capabilities into the CCDR's joint force planning. The AFFOR staff implements and establishes COMAFFOR policies and procedures (supplemental to CCDR policies and procedures) within the theater of operations. The AFFOR staff also plans, organizes, conducts and assesses steady-state campaign activities in support of the CCDR's campaign plan and conducts service, joint and multinational exercises. Refer to AFI 13-103, and Numbered Air Force Supplements to this AFMAN.


Figure 2.1. Sample Component Headquarters Unit Structure.

Note 1: AOCs may use a Group or Squadron organizational construct in place of the Center Division construct for AOCs. In a Component MAJCOM construct, the Air Operations Center reports directly to the A3. DAFPD 13-1 provides additional guidance.

Note 2: When the AOC commands joint and/or coalition forces, whether in peacetime, a contingency, or exercise, it is a Joint Air Operations Center or Combined AOC respectively. As this is an Air Force Manual and Combined AOC is a designation, for ease of use, this publication uses the term AOC to represent Combined AOC, Joint Air Operations Center and AOC.

2.3. AOC Organization. The AOC organization includes an AOC/CC, five divisions (Strategy; Combat Plans; Combat Operations; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; and Air Mobility), command staff and multiple specialty and support teams. Depending upon the phase of operation or Combatant Command guidance, each AOC will appropriately configure and integrate numerous disciplines in a cross-functional team approach to monitor, assess, plan and execute (see [Figure 2.2](#), AOC Organization and Functional Teams.) (T-0). All AOC personnel must possess appropriate security clearances (T-0). Later chapters discuss the specific organization and processes for each AOC division. This volume lists only primary, recommended, personnel or crewmember AFSCs. The unit's Unit Type Code will codify additional and suitable substitute crew position AFSCs.

Figure 2.2. AOC Organization and Functional Teams.



Note 1: Not all of the organizations and capabilities shown in this figure may exist in an AOC during peacetime and/or major contingency operations because of the specific scope or mission of that AOC in support of CDR requirements.

Note 2: Multi-domain Warfare Officers (13O) are an authorized AFSC substitution for AOC positions, both rated and non-rated officers, based on HHQ guidance, MAJCOM, and AOC commander's approval.

2.3.1. AOC Commander. (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O6). The AOC/CC's direct reporting staff includes division chiefs, the Weapon System Manager (WSM), the Configuration Manager, ATO coordinators, and the Chief, AOC Communications Team.

2.3.2. Strategy Division (SRD). The SRD Chief and personnel concentrate on both long-range and near-term planning (Phase 0 to Phase 5) of air, space, and cyberspace operations to achieve theater objectives by developing, refining, disseminating, and assessing the JFACC strategy guidance. The SRD consists of three teams: strategy plans team (SPT), strategy guidance team (SGT), and operational assessment team (OAT). **Chapter 3** contains a more detailed guidance of SRD.

2.3.3. Combat Plans Division (CPD). The CPD Chief and personnel have the responsibility for near-term AOC planning (within 48 hours prior to ATO execution). CPD consists of four teams: Targeting Effects Team (TET), Master Air Attack Planning (MAAP) Team, ATO

Production Team, and C2 Plans Team. Primary products of CPD processes are the Air Tasking Order/ Air Tasking Order-Network Enabled Weapons (ATO/ATONEW), ACO, ACP, joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL), Special Instructions (SPINS), and inputs to operational tasking data link messages. See [Chapter 4](#) for an in-depth guidance on the CPD.

2.3.4. Combat Operations Division (COD). The COD Chief and/or Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) (there may be more than one CCO, but only one division chief) and COD personnel concentrate on execution of the current ATO/ATONEW and ACO (e.g., the 24-hour execution period of the ATO). The COD consists of four teams: Offensive Operations Team, Defensive Operations Team, Component Joint Data Network Team (Joint Data Network Team manages CTP), and the Senior Intelligence Duty Officer (SIDO) team. See [Chapter 5](#) for an in-depth guidance on the COD.

2.3.5. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division (ISRD). The Chief of ISRD (CISR) and ISR personnel are responsible for assessing and anticipating adversary activity in the operational environment, planning ISR operations, and developing dynamic target strategies to rapidly, discreetly and efficiently achieve the JFACC/JFC priority effects. The ISRD is comprised of three teams: Analysis, Correlation, and Fusion (ACF) Team; Targets/Tactical Assessment (TGT/TA) Team; and ISR Operations Team. Additionally, as mission needs dictate, the ISRD integrates ISR personnel within other teams in the AOC. See [Chapter 6](#) for an in-depth guidance on the ISRD.

2.3.6. Air Mobility Division (AMD). The AMD plans, coordinates, tasks, and executes air mobility missions in accordance with the JFACC's guidance and intent. Additionally, the AMD coordinates inter-theater air mobility missions with the 618 AOC, Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC). The AMD consists of four teams: Airlift Control Team (ALCT), Air Refueling Control Team (ARCT), Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team (AECT), and Air Mobility Control Team (AMCT). In addition to these, per JP 3-17, *Air Mobility Operations*, other air mobility teams may augment the AMD as needed. Additionally, as mission needs dictate, the AMD will integrate personnel throughout other divisions. See [Chapter 7](#) for an in-depth guidance on the AMD.

2.3.7. AOC/CC's Staff.

2.3.7.1. Weapon System Manager (WSM) (AFSC 11/12/13B/14/17D or Government Service or Contractor) (Rank O3/4 or equivalent Government Service grade). The WSM is responsible to AOC/CC and Division Chiefs for the setup and successful operation of all systems integrated into the AOC Weapon System site baseline (**T-1**). The WSM should be an operator with extensive knowledge of the AOC operations, processes, and systems. The WSM works with all AOC divisions, teams, and other entities and agencies as required. For information on the approved AOC baseline equipment list, see [Attachment 2](#).

2.3.7.2. Configuration Manager. (AFSC: 17D or Government Service or Contractor) (Rank O3 or equivalent Government Service grade). The Configuration Manager shall ensure compliance with the AOC Weapon System Configuration Management Plan, AOC Weapon System Business Processes (AOCWS-ABP), MAJCOM and site Configuration Management Plans, applicable command guidance, and the site Configuration Management Plan (**T-3**). The Configuration Manager will report

compliance to the AOC/CC through the C-ACT. The Configuration Manager administrates and facilitates AOC Weapon System configuration management for the AOC. The Configuration Manager administers the unit Configuration Review Board, and provides support to the AOC Information System Security Manager (ISSM), Program Office ISSM, and lead command ISSM and assists resolution of AOC site security and accreditation issues. The Configuration Manager will maintain a level of configuration control and security consistent with requirements established in AOC Weapon System Configuration Management Plan and all applicable Department of Defense (DOD) and AF cyberspace security, assessment and authorization directives and instructions. **(T-3).**

2.3.7.3. Information Security System Manager (ISSM). (AFSC: 17D) (Rank O3/equivalent Government Service grade or Contractor) The ISSM is responsible to the AOC/CC through the C-ACT for establishing, implementing, and maintaining the cyberspace security program of a DOD information system or organization. **(T-3).**

2.3.7.4. Non-Kinetic Operations (NKO) Team. The current general definition of the NKO Team is a specialty team. Pending updates to tactics manuals and publications will include non-kinetic teams and specialists in all AOC divisions. The NKO Team is the JFACC/CFACC's theater focal point for planning, execution, and assessment of non-kinetic capabilities, which include electronic warfare, space, cyber, special technical operations, and IO. The NKO Team is integral to providing non-kinetic capabilities to support kinetic operations, as well as supporting kinetic operations to achieve non-kinetic effects. Kinetic and non-kinetic operations are not mutually exclusive; the NKO Team should integrate the two early in the planning processes for successful mutual support. The NKO Team provides specialty expertise across all divisions within the AOC. Due to personnel limitations on the AFFOR staff, the NKO Team also often contributes to AFFOR staff planning. Non-kinetic teams or specialists within divisions report to the division chief, and the Non-Kinetic Duty Officer in COD reports directly to the CCO. **(T-3).** **Chapter 8** of this publication discusses the NKO Team.

2.4. Theater Air Ground System. The AOC plans and executes the ATO/ATONEW, ACO, data link, guidance, etc., with inputs from the entire Command and Control (C2) organization, which includes numerous tactical air and ground C2 weapons systems from all services grouped under the name Theater Air Ground System. Personnel assigned to or working with the Theater Air Ground System should understand decision processes and problems associated with the operational and tactical levels of command. Armed with this knowledge, commanders and staffs will better understand Theater Air Ground System and processes, and thus understand how to receive or provide support.

2.4.1. The AOC is the senior element of the Theater Air Control System (TACS), which along with the Army Air Ground Systems, Marine Air Command and Control System, Navy Tactical Air Control System, and the Special Operations Air Ground System comprise the Theater Air Ground System.

2.4.1.1. The TACS is composed of airborne and ground-based C2 elements. Airborne elements of the TACS are the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).

2.4.1.2. The ground elements are the AOC, Control and Reporting Center, Air Support Operations Center to include Joint Air-Ground Integration Cell support, and Tactical Air Control Party.

2.4.2. To integrate the TACS elements effectively, the AOC develops and establishes theater-wide C2 guidance of regular and irregular warfare, providing overarching direction to all the TACS elements.

2.4.3. For further information on the Theater Air Ground System, recommend reading Air, Land, and Sea Application Center Publication titled Theater Air Ground System (<https://www.alsa.mil/mttps/tags/>). Additional information on the Theater Air Ground System/TACS can be found in MTTP (I) 3-2.17, *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Air-Ground Systems*, and AFTTP 3-3.TACS and other TACS Weapon System tactics, techniques, and procedures.

2.5. Air Reserve Component (ARC). The National Guard Bureau and Air Force Reserve Command assign selected units for dedicated AOC support. The National Guard Bureau and Air Force Reserve Command align each of these units to a Regular Air Force Commander and their respective MAJCOMs. They provide integrated mission support during exercises and contingencies. In addition, they maintain CMR requirements in accordance with AFI 13-1AOC, Volume 1, *Ground Environment Training Air Operations Center (AOC)*, and AFMAN 13-1AOC, Volume 2 and are able to support additional Combatant Commands as required. ARC units are a critical risk mitigation factor for AOC manning, especially in operations that continue beyond Phase 0 and 1.

Chapter 3

STRATEGY DIVISION (SRD)

3.1. General. The SRD will lead joint air planning and the JFACC process of arranging ways, means, and risk to achieve an end state or end states. The division produces a set of options (courses of action) the JFACC can select or modify to achieve JFC/JFACC objectives. The SRD concentrates on deliberate and crisis action planning of joint air operations to achieve JFACC and JFC objectives. To support all phases of a JFC's campaign, the SRD develops, refines, disseminates, and assesses the JFACC's air, space, and cyberspace operations strategy. During deliberate planning, the SRD uses the Joint Planning Process for Air (JPPA) to conduct mission analysis (MA), course(s) of action development, analysis and selection, and ultimately write the Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP). During crisis action planning, the SRD uses same the JPPA to create a Concept of Operations for orders development. The SRD works with higher HQ, AFFOR staff, and other service component staffs, as required, to develop and integrate the air course of action and subsequent JAOP inputs. During execution, the SRD will keep the strategy and planning current, produce and update the Air Operations Directive (AOD), and provide operational assessment throughout the air tasking cycle. **(T-2).**

3.2. Major SRD Process Inputs. The SRD Chief will ensure the SRD considers the following inputs: HHQ policy, planning directives, guidance and intent, tasking, joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and rules of engagement/rules for the use of force (ROE/RUF). Inputs also include other service and global component planning documentation, as appropriate. Within the AOC, the SRD receives the target developers' target system analysis and TET's inputs for the apportionment recommendation to the JFACC. In addition, the SRD receives analytical, targeting, and collection management support from the ISR; combat support status information on assigned and attached USAF forces from the AOC Logistics-Combat Support Team, AFFOR Logistics (A4), and friendly force status from AFFOR staff and other component liaisons. For operational assessment, inputs include tactical assessment and other appropriate reports and performance measurement summaries. Coordinate cyberspace operations portions of the JFACC estimate of the situation through the Combatant Command-level Joint Cyber Center for offensive cyber operations and the 616th Operations Center (OC) for defensive cyber operations.

3.3. SRD Processes. The SRD Chief and subordinate teams will develop, refine, disseminate, and assess the progress of the JFACC's strategy. **(T-2).**

3.4. Major SRD Process Outputs. Key outputs include the JAOP, AOD, and JFACC apportionment recommendation for the JFC, ROE/RUF changes, Commander Critical Information Requirements and operational assessment products. In addition, the SRD will develop branch plans, sequel plans, and special projects and studies as required. **(T-2).** A brief description of the key outputs follows.

3.4.1. JAOP. Joint air, space, IO, and cyberspace operations constitute an integral part of the JFC's plan of operations. The JFC normally assigns JFACC responsibility for joint air and space planning and a supporting role in cyberspace planning. The JAOP documents the JFACC's plan to integrate and coordinate air, space, IO, and cyberspace operations across all phases of the JFC's campaign. The SRD writes the JAOP based on the strategy-to-task

methodology, which consists of objectives, effects, and tasks, along with appropriate assessment criteria that enable an assessment of progress toward achieving objectives and effects.

3.4.2. Air Apportionment Recommendation. The SRD formulates the air apportionment recommendation that the JFACC submits to the JFC for upcoming iterations of the joint tasking cycle. The JFC is the final approval authority for the air apportionment decision.

3.4.3. ROE/RUF. As the lead division for the ROE cell, SRD in coordination with the Judge Advocate, other AOC divisions, and support from the Air and JFC Staff as required, recommends changes to the ROE/RUF to meet operational needs.


3.4.4. Commander's Critical Information Requirements. SRD has the lead to develop and maintain JFACC Commander's Critical Information Requirements. Two key subcomponents of Commander's Critical Information Requirements are priority intelligence requirements and friendly forces information requirements. SRD will coordinate JFACC Commander's Critical Information Requirements across the AOC. ISRD will have special interest in supporting JFACC priority intelligence requirements. The SRD may coordinate JFACC Commander's Critical Information Requirements with the AFFOR staff; however, the staff should be developing a separate Commander's Critical Information Requirement list to support COMAFFOR decision-making.

3.4.5. AOD. The AOD is JFACC's written guidance, which begins the air tasking cycle and ensures air, space, and cyberspace operations effectively support the combined or joint force commander's objectives while retaining enough flexibility to adjust to the dynamics of the range of and phases of military operations. The AOD provides JFACC guidance and intent, concept of operations, prioritized operational objectives and tasks, as well as their measures of effectiveness and measures of performance and coordinating instructions for the ATO/ATONEW execution.

3.4.6. Operational Assessment Products. Operational assessment is the process of relating tactical tasks to operational effects. Operational assessment products consist of operational assessment briefings and operational assessment reports, which normally contain measure(s) of effectiveness and measures(s) of performance from the JAOP and the guidance provided from JFC to JFACC. These products evaluate the JFACC strategy, track progress toward operational and strategic objectives, and make recommendations for strategy adjustments and future action. Forward the completed operational assessment report based on JFC guidance to the JFACC and designated Joint Force Assessment Board representative.

3.5. SRD Organization. The SRD Chief leads SRD and usually organizes it into three functionally oriented teams: SPT, SGT, and OAT (See [Figure 3.1](#), SRD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes). Although the AOC Commander may administratively assign the NKO Team to the SRD, it is a specialty team that provides functional expertise across all divisions within the AOC as discussed in [Chapter 8](#) of this publication.

Figure 3.1. SRD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes.



Note: Other AOC divisions, specialty teams, and service liaison officers provide support and subject matter expertise to SRD.

3.5.1. Strategy Division Chief. (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank O6). The SRD Chief reports to the AOC/CC for the development and assessment of air, space, and cyberspace operations strategy to support the JFC's objectives. While reporting through the AOC/CC, it is vital the SRD Chief has direct access to the JFACC. SRD Chiefs will ensure timely completion of the division's major processes and products. **(T-2)**.

3.5.2. Strategy Plans Team (SPT). The SPT consists of a small group of assigned members along with a tailored group of attached members. The SPT's primary focus is long-term planning (beyond 72 hours from the start of the ATO) or "future plans." The SPT will develop and maintain operational-level joint air plans. They lead the Air Planning Group and coordinate and support HHQ's Joint Planning Group, other components' planning groups, and AFFOR staff Operational Planning Group as appropriate for the JFACC during deliberate and crisis action planning **(T-2)**. SPT will also write branch and sequel plans that support JFACC and JFC objectives. **(T-3)**.

3.5.2.1. Strategy Plans Team Chief. (AFSC: 11/12/13B). (Rank: O5). (Advanced Studies Group [SAASS, SAMS, SAW, MAWS or equivalent] highly desired). The SPT Chief reports to the SRD Chief and ensures the SPT successfully fulfills its responsibilities and the processes, as well as any other assignments by SRD Chief. SPT is the JFACC's focal point for deliberate and crisis action planning (via the Air Planning Group) and serves as the primary interface with the Joint Planning Group and Operational Planning Group (if established).

3.5.2.2. SPT Members. (AFSC: 11/12/13). (Rank O4/O5). The SPT Chief trains core members in wartime planning and its requirements. Additionally, SPT receives support from attached ISRD, special technical operations (STO), and NKO Team personnel. Other AOC divisions, service components, other government agencies, coalition force components, and specialty functions such as space or cyberspace may augment SPT to support Joint Task Force or contingency operations.

3.5.2.3. SPT Responsibilities. The SPT's principal function is the development and maintenance of operational-level, long-range joint air plans, and associated branch and sequel plans that support JFC and JFACC objectives. The SPT leads the AOC in the air estimate process and the associated development of the JAOP to include a prioritized, effects-based, targeting scheme. Because these long-range strategies and branch plans complement the JAOP, the SPT supports development of the Area Air Defense Plan and ACP. During operations execution, the SPT operates beyond the 72-96 hour (ATO execution) period. The SPT integrates non-kinetic plans with overall air operation as directed by the JFACC. Under the Component Headquarters construct, the SPT may support the planning of global strike missions in conjunction with Geographic Combatant Commanders and USSTRATCOM.

3.5.3. Strategy Guidance Team (SGT). The SGT normally consists of a small group of assigned members and has a near term focus (from 48-72 hours), or "future operations." SGT operates within the current phase of the operation and will develop, coordinate and disseminate the AOD, which contains the JFACC guidance for the ATO (**T-3**). SGT works closely with the other teams to insure that AOD guidance reflects the latest guidance, concept of operations, priorities, and operational assessment. (**T-3**).

3.5.3.1. Strategy Guidance Team Chief. (AFSC: 11/12/13B). (Rank O5). The SGT Chief reports to the SRD Chief and ensures the SGT accomplishes the team's responsibilities and processes. (**T-3**).

3.5.3.2. SGT Members. (AFSC: 11/12/13/14). (Rank O4/O5). The SGT Chief trains core members in wartime AOD development and its requirements. Additionally, SGT receives support from all other AOC divisions, service components, other government agencies, coalition components, and specialty functions and teams as required.

3.5.3.3. SGT Responsibilities. As annotated above, the SGT operates within the current phase of the operation. Additionally, a SGT team member should attend the Joint Effects Collaboration Board to synchronize the AOD with the JFC's targeting scheme of maneuver.

3.5.4. Operational Assessment Team (OAT). The OAT normally consists of a small group of assigned members, and has both a long and near term focus. The OAT will analyze the

effectiveness of past and present joint air operations, combining this analysis with a look at future plans and future operations, and recommending adjustments to plans and guidance to achieve the desired end state conditions **(T-3)**. OAT will assess progress of operations relative to established objectives within the specified period. OAT should answer three basic questions: (1) Are we doing “things right?” (Accomplishing the tactical tasks as planned.) (2) Are we doing the “right things?” (Are tactical tasks achieving the objectives and desired or planned effects?) (3) Are we “measuring” the right things? (Are the measures an accurate reflection of the JFACC’s desired effects?) OAT works closely with other AOC and AFFOR staff teams, especially tactical assessment in the ISR/D, to accomplish their processes and complete their products.

3.5.4.1. Operational Assessment Team Chief. (AFSC: 61XX). (Rank O5). The OAT Chief reports to the SRD Chief and leads the OAT. The OAT Chief is the JFACC’s primary assessment interface with the JFC and other components.

3.5.4.2. Operational Assessment Team Members. (61XX) (Rank O3/O4). The OAT Chief trains core members in operational assessment to support requirements. Additionally, OAT receives support from the ISR/D and augmentation as required from other AOC divisions, service components, other government agencies, coalition, components, and specialty functions such as cyberspace, special technical operations, space, and IO.

3.5.4.3. OAT Responsibilities. The OAT provides assessments that the JFACC requires to make informed decisions concerning the execution of air, space, information, and limited cyberspace operations strategy **(T-2)**. The OAT reviews past events to identify and describe progress in meeting current objectives **(T-2)**. The OAT then forecasts possible results and outcomes of current and future operations based on this historical analysis **(T-2)**. The OAT organizes and exploits a constant flow of information from a wide variety of sources. The team identifies and evaluates the effectiveness of friendly operations, highlighting opportunities to influence adversary courses of action and evaluating effects achieved on the adversary’s strategic and operational centers of gravity.

Chapter 4

COMBAT PLANS DIVISION (CPD)

4.1. General. The CPD will apply near-term operational planning art to develop detailed execution plans for air, space, and limited cyberspace operations. Based on JFC objectives and apportionment, the AOD, forces made available for JFACC tasking, and the operational environment, these plans apply specific capabilities and assets to accomplish JFACC tasks to support campaign objectives. The result is publication and dissemination of the ATO and other planning and tasking documents.

4.2. Major CPD Process Inputs. The CPD will use the following inputs when executing CPD processes: JFC and JFACC plans, directives and other guidance, target lists, allocation and air support requests, airspace requests, SPINS change requests, ISR products, summaries, plans and requirements, electronic warfare coordination and guidance, and formal or informal feedback. Specific inputs include:


- 4.2.1. JAOP
- 4.2.2. AOD
- 4.2.3. Other JFACC guidance
- 4.2.4. Changes to JFC's critical asset list
- 4.2.5. Joint Target List/No-Strike List/Restricted Target List
- 4.2.6. Daily component target nomination lists
- 4.2.7. Component allocation requests
- 4.2.8. Component air support requests
- 4.2.9. Requests for airspace coordinating measures
- 4.2.10. SPINS change requests
- 4.2.11. Enemy order of battle
- 4.2.12. Joint ISR collection requirements and associated data
- 4.2.13. Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Annex
- 4.2.14. Any draft ISR mission-type orders
- 4.2.15. Joint Communications Electronics Operating Instruction
- 4.2.16. Joint Restricted Frequency List
- 4.2.17. Operational Assessment Report
- 4.2.18. Feedback from AOC divisions

4.3. Major CPD Process Outputs. Outputs include data inputs for the air apportionment recommendation, the JIPTL with selected joint desired points of impact for effects and collection requirements, ROE change recommendations, MAAP, ATO, SPINS, ACO, Area Air Defense

Plan, ACP; C2 communications plan, and C2 architecture plan. (Refer to other chapters for a complete list of responsibilities for other division-embedded personnel in the CPD).

4.4. CPD Organization. The CPD Chief typically organizes the division into four functionally oriented teams: TET, MAAP Team, the C2 Plans Team, and the ATO Production Team. (See [Figure 4.1](#), CPD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes).

Figure 4.1. CPD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes.



Note 1: Other teams and liaisons support CPD as required during operations: Judge Advocate, Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell, Combat Reports Cell, Airspace Management Cell, ATO Coordination Team, Weather Specialty Team (WST), Cyberspace Support Element, NKO Team, Army Air and Missile Defense Command, IAMD, Marine Liaison Element, NALE, and coalition personnel.

Note 2: The C2 Plans Team may publish SPINS with the ATO or as a separate document. For further information, see AFTTP 3-3.AOC or Annex 3-30, Command and Control, Appendix B: The Air Operations Center.

Note 3: Currently, C2 Battle Management and Communications system is not part of the AOC baseline. Therefore, an IAMD cell with joint personnel is located near, but not considered part of Combat Operations. It provides input to the Area Air Defense Plan, missile defense planning data and information to C2 Plans team as required.

4.4.1. Combat Plans Division (CPD) Chief. (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank O6). The CPD Chief is directly responsible to the AOC/CC for the planning, allocation, and tasking of air, space, and limited cyberspace operations forces in accordance with JFACC guidance. Depending on the scenario and level of effort during operations, the CPD Chief may need several deputies to help monitor and supervise the extensive and complex planning tasks involved in the CPD. As an example, a deputy with a background in space operations would normally be assigned to oversee the space and special technical operations activities within the division, while a pilot or navigator with fighter or bomber experience could work the night shift and oversee the MAAP process.

4.4.2. Targeting Effects Team (TET). The TET mission is to prioritize and integrate component target nominations for a given execution period into a draft JIPTL. These should achieve desired kinetic and non-kinetic effects reflected in guidance from the AOD.

4.4.2.1. The TET consists of:

4.4.2.1.1. TET Chief. (AFSC: 11/12). (Rank O5). The TET Chief will develop a draft JIPTL and any associated approval briefings. **(T-3)**.

4.4.2.1.2. TET Members. (AFSC: 11/12/13/14/17/51J/1N1/1N8) (Rank Officer O4/O5, Enlisted E7/8).

4.4.2.2. TET Responsibilities. The TET will select daily targets that reflect the guidance in the AOD **(T-3)**. It produces the daily draft JIPTL, as well as makes inputs into the JFACC's Component Prioritized Collection List. The TET will ensure this strategy-to-task methodology exists for every target on the JIPTL **(T-3)**. The effects on JIPTL targets will integrate kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. The TET also provides inputs to the SPT/SGT for use in the initial development of the AOD **(T-3)**. It also ensures kinetic and non-kinetic effects are included in all target development processes. **(T-3)**.

4.4.3. Master Air Attack Planning (MAAP) Team. The MAAP Team will develop the daily MAAP and transform it into an electronic format to produce the ATO/ATONEW **(T-3)**. The MAAP is the JFACC's time-phased air, space, and cyberspace operations scheme of maneuver for a given ATO period, and it synthesizes JFACC guidance, desired effects, and supported components' schemes of maneuver, available resources, and friendly and enemy capabilities. Based on this, the MAAP Chief must place individuals with the correct skill sets and experience in the appropriate job areas. Otherwise, MAAP Team processes, timelines, and outputs may experience detrimental delays or errors.

4.4.3.1. MAAP Chief. (AFSC: 11/12/13B). (Rank O5). The MAAP Chief should be mission commander qualified, and is responsible to the CPD Chief for overall development of the daily MAAP and associated approval briefing.

4.4.3.2. MAAP Team Members. (Rank O4/O5). MAAP Team members come from all theater weapon system resources and are directly responsible to the MAAP Chief. Each member brings unique mission system knowledge and specialty skills to help plan and develop a daily MAAP to support daily ATO/ATONEW development.

4.4.3.3. MAAP Team Responsibilities. The MAAP Team will develop the daily MAAP and MAAP briefing **(T-3)**. The team transforms the MAAP product (MAAP Toolkit flat files) for import into the air battle plan (ABP). To develop the MAAP successfully, the

team should maintain clear, two-way lines of coordination and liaison with other CPD teams, other AOC divisions, AFFOR staff, component or service or other government agencies personnel, coalition, and host nation representatives.

4.4.4. C2 Plans Team. The C2 Plans Team is composed of airspace management, C2 IAMD, C2 architecture, C2 communications planning, air support, and SPINS cells. The functions of these cells support the JFACC's roles as the Airspace Control Authority and Area Air Defense Commander. The airspace management-planning cell, which the AOC airspace specialty team supports, will develop the ACP and produce the ACO. **(T-3)**.

4.4.4.1. C2 Plans Chief. (AFSC: 11/12/13B). (Rank O4/O5). The C2 Plans Chief will develop detailed execution plans for C2 of air, space, and limited cyberspace operations forces, including production or development support of the ACP, Area Air Defense Plan, ACO, C2 communications plan, C2 architecture plan, SPINS, and air support C2 procedures. **(T-3)**.

4.4.4.2. C2 Plans Members:

4.4.4.2.1. C2 IAMD Planners. (AFSC: 11F/12F/13B/13S) (Rank: O4/O5)

4.4.4.2.2. C2 Architecture Planner. (AFSC: 13B/1C5) (Rank: Officer O4/O5, Enlisted E6-E8)

4.4.4.2.3. Airspace Managers. (AFSC: 13M/13B/1C1/1C5) (Rank: Officer O4/O5, Enlisted E6-E8)

4.4.4.2.4. C2 Communications Planners. (AFSC: 17D/3DX) (Rank: Officer O4/O5, Enlisted E6-E8)

4.4.4.2.5. SPINS Coordinator/Technician. (AFSC: 11/12/13/1C5) (Rank: Officer O4/O5, Enlisted E6-E8)

4.4.4.2.6. Space Planners. (AFSC: 13S/1C6) (Rank: Officer O4/O5, Enlisted E6-E8)

4.4.4.3. C2 Plans Responsibilities.

4.4.4.3.1. The C2 Plans Team is supported and augmented by other service and component liaisons. Service specialties include experience in Navy ballistic missile defense equipped AEGIS and E-2C/D Hawkeye, Army Patriot, Army Tactical Missile System, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, and airspace experience to assist C2 architecture development and defensive counterair planning. It is essential that C2 plans be incorporated, if possible, into deliberate and crisis action planning process soonest to design command, control, communications, air and space architecture that form the execution framework of the overall ABP.

4.4.4.3.2. C2 planners take JFC/JFACC guidance and all available information in the existing Operations Order and Operations Plan and capabilities (includes but is not limited to, satellite support capabilities, space support and theater C2 assets from the JFACC, service coalition, Partner Nation, and other government agencies partners), and design the JFACC's theater C2 structure. C2 Planners should also consider CCDR coordination required based on theater and adjacent command threats. Upon publication, the ACP and ACO describe theater airspace system, airspace users, C2 nodes, and delineate service and C2 responsibilities. Planners take operational

considerations, safety, host nation and international agreements, and political issues into consideration during the development of the ACP. Additionally, airspace planners produce the ACO on a recurring basis using guidance from the ACP, an Operations Order, or to update missile engagement zones, surveillance and air defense sectors to the defense design.

4.4.4.3.3. The team manages the SPINS development process by coordinating with designated SPINS subject matter experts, who may reside in other cells and teams within the AOC. SPINS subject matter experts will arbitrate and validate inputs and deletions to the SPINS and provide them to the SPINS cell in C2 plans for publication in the next SPINS release. The team also provides guidance and support to the Knowledge Management (KM) Officer on creating and updating the CPD portion of the AOC KM Plan.

4.4.5. ATO Production Team. The ATO Production Team will construct, publish, and disseminate the daily ATO/ATONEW and applicable SPINS to appropriate joint forces which tasks JFACC allocated air, space, and cyberspace operations capabilities and assets in accordance with the MAAP. **(T-3)**.

4.4.5.1. ATO Production Team Chief. (AFSC: 11/12/13B/18) (Rank: O4/O5). The ATO Production Team Chief will produce and disseminate the daily ATO/ATONEW and associated SPINS. **(T-3)**.

4.4.5.2. ATO Production Team Members:

4.4.5.2.1. ATO Production non-commissioned officer in charge (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank E7).

4.4.5.2.2. ATO Technicians (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E3-E6).

4.4.5.2.3. Air Operations Database Manager (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E5/E6).

4.4.5.3. ATO Production Team Responsibilities. Team personnel integrate detailed execution plans and supporting SPINS to produce the ATO/ATONEW. They create and maintain accurate planning and operational databases that interface with various applications. The team creates and maintains a comprehensive address list of approved ATO/ATONEW recipients, and develops redundant procedures to ensure timely ATO/ATONEW dissemination.

Chapter 5

COMBAT OPERATIONS DIVISION (COD)

5.1. General. The COD will direct the current ATO, ACO, and the Area Air Defense Plan (T-3). Additionally, the COD develops and implements the Operational Task Link and Operational Task Link Network Enabled Weapons messages to support network-enabled weapons employment via Link 16 and variable message format using UHF Combat Net Radios. (T-1). Combat Net Radios are used primary in support of Digitally Aided Close Air Support.

5.1.1. The COD accomplishes these tasks through constant monitoring of the operational environment and leveraging subordinate C2 capabilities within the Theater Air Ground System elements, as well as other assets made available for use to the JFACC by component, ally and coalition partners on the current ATO. In general, the COD responds to battlespace dynamics by orchestrating offensive operations, defensive counterair operations, NKO; and by modifying the published ATO and ACO to facilitate changes in mission requirements.

5.1.2. Depending on the scenario, the COD is composed of Offensive Operations, Defensive Operations (to include missile defense) teams, the SIDO team (providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations execution support), Component Joint Data Network Officer Equivalent (CJE) Team, and numerous specialty teams. Specialty teams may include non-kinetic operations, airspace management, weather, Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell, and various experts from other weapons systems. Liaison teams also support COD as needed. Examples of these teams are the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), Army Air and Missile Defense Command, Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE), Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE), Marine Liaison Element, coalition and partner nation liaison teams, and other governmental agency liaisons.

5.2. Major COD Process Inputs. Inputs include JFC and JFACC plans, directives and other guidance, ATO and associated documents (ATO folder or football), environmental conditions, ISR reports, updates and requirements, target lists, and updates from other sources. Specific inputs include:


- 5.2.1. JAOP
- 5.2.2. AOD
- 5.2.3. ATO Folder
- 5.2.4. ATO/ATONEW with SPINS
- 5.2.5. ACP
- 5.2.6. Area Air Defense Plan
- 5.2.7. ACO
- 5.2.8. ROE/RUF
- 5.2.9. Time sensitive target matrix
- 5.2.10. NK synchronization matrix
- 5.2.11. Friendly order of battle

- 5.2.12. Enemy orders of battle
- 5.2.13. Restricted target list, no strike list, JIPTL, Component Prioritized Collection List
- 5.2.14. JIPCL
- 5.2.15. RSTA Annex
- 5.2.16. Operational Tasking Common Operational Picture/CTP
- 5.2.17. Battlespace events
- 5.2.18. Weather

5.3. Major COD Process Outputs. Outputs include: ATO, ACO, RSTA, operational task link, Operational Task Link Network Enabled Weapons, annex changes and other subsequent orders to subordinate C2 agencies, assessment data, and consolidated reports to HHQ.

5.4. COD Organization. The CCO tailors COD to a specific contingency or operation, **Figure 5.1**, COD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes depicts the typical structure. The COD is normally task-organized into four functionally oriented core teams: offensive operations, defensive operations, CJE Team, which consists of CTP cell and Interface Control Cell, and SIDO Team. Integrated specialty and support teams and cells; component, coalition, Partner Nation, combined and other government agency liaisons; and communications provide support.

Figure 5.1. COD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes.



Note 1: Other teams and liaisons support COD: Judge Advocate, Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell, Combat Reports Cell, Airspace Management Cell, ATO Coordination Team, WST, NKO Team, Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer, Army Air and Missile Defense Command, BCD, Marine Liaison Element, NALE, SOLE, and Coalition.

Note 2: Currently, the C2 battle management and communications system is not part of the AOC baseline. Therefore, an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Cell with joint personnel is located near AOC Operations (Ops floor) but not considered part of the Ops floor. It provides data and information to the CCO as required, and advises the Defensive Operations Team.

5.4.1. COD Chief and Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) (AFSC: 11/12/13B). (Rank: O6). The COD Chief is directly responsible to the AOC/CC for direction and supervision of combat operations. The COD Chief will apply JFACC guidance to ensure current tactical air, space, and non-kinetic operations attain established objectives at the operational-level of war (T-3). Normally, there is only one COD Chief but there can be numerous CCOs during increased operations. The CCO is responsible to the COD Chief and is the senior position on the COD operations floor. The CCO monitors the current situation and advises the AOC/CC of dynamic mission requirements and the status of resources. **Note:** There may be time-critical issues that require the CCO to interface directly with the JFACC, especially when changes are made to the ATO/ATONEW that change (or appear to change) guidance from

the JFACC. The primary considerations in the CCO's approval of any adjustment to the ATO/ATONEW are battlespace dynamics and JFACC/JFC guidance. Continuous communication and timely coordination with JFACC, AFFOR staff, AOC/CC, and associated component staffs are essential to ensure combat support forces can generate and sustain combat operations.

5.4.2. Offensive Operations Team. The offensive operations team will monitor and adjust force application and support sorties and missions during ATO/ATONEW execution **(T-3)**. Team members work closely with specialty and support teams; component coalition, Partner Nation and other government agency liaisons; and others to ensure the most effective application of air and space operations power with JFACC guidance through the AOD. This team directs engagement of dynamic targets and time sensitive targets either through a subordinate targeting cell or as a fully embedded function. **(T-3)**.

5.4.2.1. Senior Offensive Duty Officer. (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O5). The Senior Offensive Duty Officer will direct and supervise all offensive operations on behalf of the CCO, and may assist with CCO responsibilities **(T-3)**. The Senior Offensive Duty Officer should be package mission commander qualified. The Senior Offensive Duty Officer supervises the activities of all offensive duty officers, offensive duty technicians, dynamic targeting cell members, and ATO Change Technicians. The Senior Offensive Duty Officer coordinates with the Senior Air Defense Officer to utilize multi-role assets effectively in support of CCO directions. **(T-3)**.

5.4.2.2. Senior Offensive Duty Officer Technician. (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E7/E8). The Senior Offensive Duty Officer Technician is normally a senior non-commissioned officer with an in depth knowledge of COD functions and responsibilities, as well as a comprehensive knowledge of C2 system operations. The Senior Offensive Duty Officer Technician is directly responsible to the Senior Offensive Duty Officer and will support the Senior Offensive Duty Officer, as required. **(T-3)**.

5.4.2.3. Offensive Duty Officers. (AFSC: 11/12/13B/14) (Rank: O3-O5) The offensive operations team consists of duty officers from various individual mission design series engaged in the theater of operations and from cells organized by function. Those functions include electronic warfare, close air support, interdiction, IO, tanker, space or along other lines established by COD leadership (e.g., F-16, A-10, F-15E, C-130, and KC-135 Offensive Duty Officers reporting directly to the Senior Offensive Duty Officer). During all periods of increased activity, applicable mission and capability experts should be on the COD floor. During periods of reduced activity, COD may share this expertise with CPD. CPD and COD personnel should clearly understand this arrangement, in terms of when personnel "on loan" return to COD. Offensive Duty Officers should know the details of each mission or package in which their aircraft participate, such as: ordnance, primary target, secondary target, assigned pre-strike and post-strike tanker(s) orbits, off-load, required electronic warfare support, and mission results. Offensive Duty Officers are also responsible for coordination with other AOC divisions, subordinate TACS units as necessary, and passing critical information to and from their respective units (e.g., air defense warnings, significant battle damage, unexpected changes, diverted aircraft, and airfield status) as required.

5.4.2.4. Offensive Duty Technicians. (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E3-E6). Offensive Duty Technicians provide critical continuity and technical expertise on the COD floor. Additionally, they understand and support setup, connectivity, and operation of applicable communication equipment, to include cryptographic keying and shutdown of the KY-68, Secure Telephone Unit -III, and other theater battle-management systems. If necessary, they also maintain and update situational awareness displays in the COD. They provide any needed support to Offensive Duty Officers as required.

5.4.2.5. Dynamic Targeting Cell. The Dynamic Targeting Cell coordinates the dynamic targeting process, by rapidly integrating inputs from COD and specialty teams, developing a strike package and gaining CCO or higher approval, as required by guidance in the AOD. The cell typically consists of:

5.4.2.5.1. Dynamic Targeting Cell Chief. (AFSC: 11/12/13B). The Chief supervises Dynamic Targeting Cell comprehensive, but time-constrained planning and coordination, to prosecute dynamic targets effectively by using available joint or coalition force assets, while concurrently mitigating risk to friendly forces and non-combatants. Dynamic Targeting Cell Chief will evaluate all reasonable courses of action and recommend the most suitable in accordance with all targeting guidance and the operational situation to Senior Offensive Duty Officer and CCO for engagement approval. **(T-3)**.

5.4.2.5.2. Ground Track Coordinator. (AFSC: 1C5). This position works closely with the CJE Team and BCD to incorporate all ground tracks into the CTP. The Ground Track Coordinator also works closely with the Tactical Data Link Manager, track data coordinator, and the C2 Duty Officer, correlating tracks with them for any dynamic targeting inputs **(T-3)**. Additionally, the Ground Track Coordinator will coordinate with Senior Air Defense Officer, Senior Offensive Duty Officer, C2 Duty Officer, Joint Interface Control Officer and other liaisons for the execution of digital control messages via the tactical data link to include dynamic target tasking. **(T-3)**.

5.4.2.5.3. Attack Coordinator. (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O3/O4). Position provides target prosecution analysis and coordinates effective target engagement solutions that integrate and synchronize survivable force packages that meet desired effects at acceptable risk levels to the Dynamic Targeting Cell Chief for evaluation. **(T-3)**.

5.4.2.5.4. Target Duty Officer (AFSC: 14N/1N8X1) (Rank: O3, E5/6). The SIDO may assign a Target Duty Officer to the Dynamic Targeting Cell. The Target Duty Officer provides targeting and weaponeering solutions that will meet desired effects while simultaneously identifying potential collateral damage concerns and then recommending and coordinating mitigation options such as delayed fusing or heading restrictions **(T-3)**. The Target Duty Officer will also conduct precise point mensuration or coordinate it through the ISRD targets/tactical assessment team for the employment of precision guided munitions **(T-3)**. The Target Duty Officer will evaluate unit-submitted Target Mensuration Only (TMO) recommendations and conduct coordinate verification along with collateral damage estimate and weaponeering modifications as required. **(T-3)**.

5.4.2.5.5. Target Duty Technician. (AFSC: 1N8X1) (Rank: E3/E5). Target Duty Technician are directly responsible to the Target Duty Officer. The Target Duty Technician are the technical and analytical expertise for completing the targeting and weaponing solutions that will meet desired effects while simultaneously identifying potential collateral damage concerns and then recommending and coordinating mitigation options such as delayed fusing or heading restrictions.

5.4.2.5.6. ATO Change Technicians. (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E3-E5). ATO Change Technicians input changes to the ATO as developed by Offensive Duty Officers and approved by the Senior Offensive Duty Officer or CCO. The ATO Change Technicians may also provide computer-based Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS) applications support to COD augmentees or installation control center personnel. They will maintain logs as required. **(T-3)**.

5.4.2.6. Offensive Operations Team Responsibilities. Responsibilities include monitoring current air, space, and IO. The team also maintains situational awareness, recommends ATO/ATONEW and ACO changes as required, maintains currency on applicable documents such as the AOD, keeps ATO coordinators apprised of changes as needed, provides assessment inputs, provides updates on available resources, coordinates with C2 agencies and other services, supports combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations, and assists subordinate units whenever needed. **(T-3)**.

5.4.3. Defensive Operations Team. The Defensive Operations Team has authority delegated from the Area Air Defense Commander and/or JFACC through the CCO to execute C2 battle management within the theater. Using this authority, it will execute overall coordination of theater defensive counterair operations and if warranted, supports the global ballistic missile defense operations **(T-3)**. The team directs attached and supporting tactical C2 and air and missile defense operations, monitors the status of associated assets, and assists the Senior Offensive Duty Officer as required **(T-3)**. For air and missile defense within the theater, the Area Air Defense Commander may establish regional and sector air and missile defense commanders. The defensive operations team provides requirements to, and the Interface Control Cell supports the defensive operations team on issues concerning the recognized air picture. This effort facilitates rapid and timely decision-making processes required for the C2 of defensive air operations. The team directs attached units relative to air and missile defense operations and changes to air and missile defense warning-condition and weapons control status. **(T-3)**.

5.4.3.1. Senior Air Defense Officer. (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O5). When in joint operations, it is also possible to have a Navy Surface Warfare Officer (NOBC: 1110) with KA6 (AEGIS Qualification). The Senior Air Defense Officer works directly for the CCO, provides the leadership for the defensive operations team, and is the Area Air Defense Commander representative charged with executing the area air and missile defense plan. The Senior Air Defense Officer will direct and manage all theater defensive C2 assets, theater defensive counterair operations, and direct the efforts of the Senior Air Defense Officer technicians, Defensive Duty Officers, and technicians **(T-3)**. The Senior Air Defense Officer recommends changes to air defense warning; weapons control states, and delegation of battle management authorities to subordinate Regional Air and Missile Defense Centers and Sector Air and Missile Defense Centers. Coordinate with the Senior Offensive Duty Officer to utilize multi-role assets effectively

in support of CCO directions and to maximize offensive counterair opportunities. The Senior Air Defense Officer will coordinate directly with all leadership and liaison positions on the combat operations floor to support the full spectrum of operations from defensive to offensive operations. **(T-3). Note:** Some theaters utilize the term Senior Air and Missile Defense Officer. Using Senior Air and Missile Defense Officer places emphasis on both air and missile operations. However, Joint Publication 3-01 and JP 3-30 defines the term defensive counterair to encompass air and missile defense, so that terminology is used in this publication.

5.4.3.2. Senior Air Defense Technician. (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E7/E8). The Senior Air Defense Technician is responsible to the Senior Air Defense Officer and supervises performance of various functions of air and missile defense operations. The Senior Air Defense Technician supervises the duties and functions of all enlisted defensive operations crewmembers, is the defensive operations team-equipment-outage point of contact, and maintains a logbook.

5.4.3.3. Defensive Operations Team Members.

5.4.3.3.1. Defensive Duty Officers. (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O3/O4). Defensive Duty Officers will provide operational direction to the defensive air battle. **(T-3).** They are responsible to the Senior Air Defense Officer for the timely display of air and missile defense information and continuous evaluation of air and missile defense elements of the TACS. In the absence of a C2 Duty Officer, the Defensive Duty Officer coordinates with the Senior Offensive Duty Officer on providing real-time guidance and direction to C2 and strike assets for air to ground targeting.

5.4.3.3.2. Defensive Duty Technicians. (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E3-E6). Defensive Duty Technicians assist Defensive Duty Officers in a variety of ways such as monitoring defensive counterair fighters, alert and combat air patrol status, and coordination with Army Air and Missile Defense Command and the BCD. When scrambles are centralized, Defensive Duty Technicians send the scramble orders to installation control centers.

5.4.3.4. IAMD Cell. Currently, the C2 battle management and communications system is not part of the AOC baseline. Therefore, an additional IAMD cell with joint personnel will sit near defensive operations, but will not be considered part of the Defensive Operations Team. It provides data and information to the CCO and advises the Defensive Operations Team concerning theater missile alerts, active and passive missile defense operations, warning dissemination, and the evaluation of areas of theater missile activity and interest. Other service and USAF specialties with missile defense training typically augment the IAMD cell. Additionally, integrated air and missile defense emphasizes the integration of offensive counterair attack operations, defensive counterair operations, and other capabilities to create the JFACC's and Area Air Defense Commander's desired effects.

5.4.3.4.1. The IAMD team monitors the status of active air and missile defense assets and coordinates with the SIDO team to determine expected enemy air and missile attacks **(T-3)**. It monitors the capability of the entire air and missile defense force to engage enemy missiles attacking or expected to attack defended assets, and makes recommendations to the Senior Air Defense Officer for re-tasking of active air and

missile defense assets. **(T-3)**. IAMD personnel also coordinate with global ballistic missile defense force representatives at higher and lower levels on long-range threats, which could affect other Combatant Commands operations. The Area Air Defense Commander may establish a theater missile defense net for voice warning. IAMD personnel will serve as the primary coordinator with external, joint, and multinational air and missile defense organizations. **(T-3)**. Within the AOC, the IAMD cell will coordinate and align procedures with applicable cells and organizations including, the Army Air and Missile Defense Command, AOC Space Support Cell, CJE Team, and the offensive operations team. **(T-3)**. The team normally assists with development and coordination of the missile-warning grid to ensure applicability for the theater. Members should have a thorough knowledge of Tier 1 and Tier 2 lay-down for effective missile warning.

5.4.3.4.2. IAMD Officer: (AFSC: 11/12/13B/13S) (Rank: O3/O4). The IAMD Officer is the primary point of contact within the AOC for air and missile defense current operations. The IAMD Officer will provide status and course of action recommendation for all active and passive missile defense operations to the Senior Air Defense Officer and CCO for current and projected threats. **(T-3)**. The IAMD Officer will coordinate and synchronize inputs from external air and missile defense organizations and internally within the AOC from the IAMD Technician, Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer, ballistic missile defense weapons officer, AEGIS liaison officer, Space Specialty Team, and SIDOs to ensure accurate missile defense operations information is available to leadership **(T-3)**. The IAMD Officer may recommend changes to the Air Defense Warning and Weapons Control Status for each region and sector assigned to the Senior Air Defense Officer/CCO based on current indications and warnings. The IAMD Officer will provide input for CPD/C2 Plans to consider during the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Board, to reallocate air and missile defense assets. **(T-3)**.

5.4.3.4.3. IAMD Technicians: (AFSC: 1C5/1C6) (Rank: E3-E6). IAMD Technicians will understand the air and missile defense framework and monitor missile-warning systems (Defense Support Program/Overhead Persistent Infrared) to provide warning to both the AOC operations floor and the tier 1 and tier 2 commands via the Theater Missile-Warning net. Technicians, in conjunction with IAMD Officers, will assist with development and coordination of the missile-warning grid to ensure applicability for the theater. IAMD Technicians are responsible for ensuring that the information systems required for air and missile defense are available to the maximum extent. IAMD Technicians will maintain a log of relevant information to provide continuity for the cell. IAMD Technicians will be knowledgeable on ballistic missile defense assets and will advise IAMD Officers on current operations. **(T-3)**.

5.4.3.5. C2 Duty Officer. (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O3/O4). The C2 Duty Officer supports the Senior Air Defense Officer and/or Senior Offensive Duty Officer. The C2 Duty Officer will have an in-depth knowledge of ROE/RUF, brevity code words, weapons capabilities, ground and air deconfliction measures, Personnel Recovery operations, and coordination procedures required for other key liaison officers (BCD, NALE, Marine Liaison Element, and SOLE). The C2 Duty Officer may be required to assist Defensive Duty Officers depending on the phase of the operations. The C2 Duty

Officer supports transmitting targeting information to the appropriate tactical C2 node for air-to-surface targeting during dynamic targeting, close air support or interdiction operations. **(T-3)**.

5.4.4. Senior Intelligence Duty Officer (SIDO) Team. The SIDO team is the focal point for ISR support to the COD.


5.4.4.1. SIDO. (AFSC: 14N3) (Rank O4/O5) The SIDO leads a team of ISR personnel assigned to the COD who will provide situational awareness, predictive analysis, and targeting support. Additionally, the SIDO team monitors and adjusts ISR employment in support of the COD's ATO execution processes. The SIDO works for the CCO and will coordinate current ISR operations activities with the Senior Offensive Duty Officer, Dynamic Targeting Cell, Senior Air Defense Officer, CJE, and the ISRD. **(T-3)**.

5.4.4.2. SIDO Team Members. (AFSC: 14N/17D/1N). (Rank O3/O4 and E4-E7) The SIDO team may be comprised of Intelligence Duty Officers, ISR Operations Duty Officers, Target Duty Officers, Target Duty Technicians, ISR Platform Duty Officers and Liaison Officers, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Managers and Liaison Officers, Imagery Support Element personnel, all source analysts, Reconnaissance Duty Officers, National Tactical Integration Element personnel, and others as available.

5.4.4.3. SIDO Team Responsibilities. The SIDO team will provide threat warning, real-time situational and predictive analysis of the adversary, monitoring and supporting dynamic targeting, and dynamic ISR operations. **(T-3)**. The SIDO team is the ISR focal point during ATO execution, and coordinates C2 decisions with the CCO to execute theater ISR in accordance with JFC and JFACC guidance. The SIDO team works closely with all other team and process functions in the AOC. The SIDO team interacts extensively with the ISRD, who directly supports the SIDO team with timely and accurate analysis and intelligence products and services. **(T-3)**.

5.4.5. Joint Data Network Operations. Per Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3115.01, *CTP Reporting Requirements*, the Joint Data Network is comprised of several digital data networks, optimized to enable improved situational awareness and commander's decision cycle. The generation and display of a CTP within the Joint Task Force headquarters, shared with the Joint Task Force's component commanders, and forwarded to the CCDR as an input to the Common Operational Picture enables operational situational awareness.

5.4.5.1. A CTP consists of a collection of air, space, land, and maritime tracks and units. A track is a single entity reported on a CTP such as an aircraft, ship, theater ballistic missile, or emitter location, which is then reported by each component up to the Joint Task Force where it is collated and fused to create the theater picture (**Figure 5.2**).

Figure 5.2. Basic CTP Development.

Note 1: Figure 5.2 depicts the information exchanges in a single theater of operations among the Joint Task Force Commander and component commanders for maritime, air/space, land, and special operations forces to form the CTP.

Note 2: Each component commander is responsible for the development of the tactical picture. The depicted CTP is a distributed data processing and exchange environment for developing and displaying a dynamic operational picture of the CCDR's AOR or JOA. The components portion of the CTP (maritime, land, air and space tactical picture) provides planning applications and theater-generated overlays and projections such as environmental, battle plans, force position projections that may include location of enemy, friendly, and neutral forces, assets, and reference points.

Note 3: The CTP displays accurate, relevant tactical data and meteorological information that integrates information from multiple operational environment components. CTP data comes from the service's data links, sensors, uninhabited aerial vehicles, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, satellites and other sources that provide a current depiction of the operational environment. CTP management is a continuous process of maintaining an accurate and current picture of the operational environment. This continuous process encompasses configuring and maintaining related Global Command and Control System - Joint CTP systems, establishing and managing communications and messaging services, and ensuring filters are set for the exchange of data. While the CTP function is at the component level, the Common Operational Picture resides at the Joint Task Force level or higher within the Joint Data Network Officer cell. Within the AOC, the primary team supporting CTP is the CJE Team.

5.4.5.2. CJE Team. The CJE leads the team, which is comprised primarily of two cells: the Global Command and Control System - Joint CTP Track Management Cell, and the Interface Control Cell. Additionally, the CJE gets inputs from multiple other electronic

sources internal and external to the AOC network. Performs theater Joint Interface Control Officer responsibilities on behalf of the Combined or JFACC.

5.4.5.2.1. CJE. (AFSC: 13B/Government Service) (Rank: O5 or equivalent Government Service grade). The CJE works for the CCO during execution of the ATO. The CJE is also the senior expert in the AOC advising the AOC Commander and Component MAJCOM (JFACC/Area Air Defense Commander) staff on service, joint and coalition interoperability issues. The CJE receives inputs from intelligence, operations, and communications teams to establish the JFACC's CTP architecture properly. The CJE should serve as an advisor on the configuration review board.

5.4.5.2.2. CTP Track Management Cell:

5.4.5.2.2.1. CTP Track Manager (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E7). Position will establish and maintain the air component Global Command and Control System - Joint CTP. Provides oversight and leadership of CTP Track Manager Technicians. **(T-3)**.

5.4.5.2.2.2. CTP Track Manager Technicians. (AFSC: 1C5/1N0) (Rank E3-E6) CTP Track Manager Technicians are responsible to the CTP Track Manager. CTP Track Manager Technicians utilize the Global Command and Control System - Joint integrated communication system framework client for displaying and manipulating the AOC CTP air picture and are required to maintain constant vigilance of the air picture to ensure tracks are processed and updated in a timely manner. CTP Track Manager Technicians collect, index, and disseminate CTP track data and other related information throughout the AOC. This function should resolve naming conflicts using the processes of correlation (matching tracks plotted on the tactical display with the contacts they represent) and fusion (integrating correlated track data with amplifying information) on the CTP. CTP Track Management Cell will create, edit, delete, merge, monitor tracks, track groups, overlays, and routes. CTP Track Management Cell will resolve CTP track conflicts and anomalies (dual designations, duplicate tracks, false targets, runway tracks, identification, and category conflicts, etc.) and inputs appropriate track amplifications as required. **(T-3)**. Additionally, CTP Track Management Cell works closely with interface control, ACF team, C-ACT, Weapon System Manager, and Configuration Manager, to ensure compliance with Operational Task Link Common Operational Picture-CTP parameters, maintenance of intelligence feeds, and correlation of the ATO and other messages into the air picture displayed on the CTP. Intelligence personnel assigned to the SIDO team normally perform CTP management of intelligence tracks. This position would support the CJE for intelligence CTP management duties.

5.4.5.2.3. Interface Control Cell. The cell works for the CJE and supports multi-tactical data link network (MTN) inputs to the CTP supporting the CDR's Common Operational Picture (COP) and CTP. One of the primary systems supporting the CTP is the MTN. The Interface Control Cell will manage the JFACC's and AOC's digital input to the MTN. **(T-3)**. In accordance with AFMAN 13-116, *Tactical Data Link Planning and Operations*, a MTN should be reliable, survivable, flexible, interoperable, timely, and secure. The exchange of tactical information between

participants on a real-time or near-real-time basis with tactical data links supports the concept of joint combat operations. The exchange of real-time tactical information between C2 systems, weapon systems, and intelligence systems provides mutual support, allows coordinated action, and prevents interference between interfaced forces for the efficient and effective application of military force.

5.4.5.2.3.1. Interface Control Officer. (AFSC: 13B) (Rank: O3/O4). The Interface Control Officer will ensure that the current MTN includes planning, execution, management, and analysis. **(T-3)**. If tasked by the Joint Task Force, the AOC Interface Control Officer may function as the Joint Interface Control Officer, the senior element in the MTN architecture. If designated the Joint Interface Control Officer, he/she may also designate subordinate Regional Interface Control Officer and Sector Interface Control Officer as required. **(Note:** The Joint Interface Control Officer may further delegate authority for control of Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corp interface operations to the applicable component Regional Interface Control Officer cell, if available.) Regional Interface Control Officers also could be assigned specific geographic and/or force specific area(s) of interest. In addition, the Interface Control Officer works closely with the C2 Plans Team in developing and updating of operational tasking data link messages.

5.4.5.2.3.2. Interface Control Watch Officer. (AFSC: 13B/1C5) (Rank: O3/O4, E7 or equivalent Government Service grade). The Interface Control Watch Officer will conduct interface control operations and active management of MTN operations. **(T-3)**. The Interface Control Watch Officer supervises the team personnel during data link planning, management, and execution. The position monitors the overall quality of the MTN, and directs actions to rectify the problems as they occur. The Interface Control Watch Officer will conduct dynamic planning to adjust the MTN and interfaces to meet changing requirements and operations. **(T-3)**. The Interface Control Watch Officer shall coordinate, brief and debrief subordinate MTN units daily or as necessary to ensure corrective action. When multiple regions or sectors are established, the Interface Control Watch Officer coordinates and has resolution authority to resolve cross-regional MTN issues with the Regional Interface Control Officer and the Sector Interface Control Officers AOR/JOAs. **(T-3)**.

5.4.5.2.3.3. Track Data Coordinator. (AFSC: 1C5) (Rank: E7). The Track Data Coordinator is responsible to the Interface Control Watch Officer for the accuracy, currency, and quality of the air, ground, maritime, and space picture. The Track Data Coordinator will monitor air, ground, and space track classification, identification, and track quality. **(T-3)**. The Track Data Coordinator facilitates the resolution of dual track designation and identification conflicts that are a result of system interoperability problems or operator error. The Track Data Coordinator functionality is an integral component of the combat identification process, and assists the theater identification authority in timely and accurate assessment of tracks of interest. When multiple regions and/or sectors are established, the Track Data Coordinator coordinates, and is the ultimate resolution authority to resolve cross-regional track management and identification

issues. (T-3).

5.4.5.2.3.4. Tactical Data Link Managers. (AFSC: 1C5) (Ranks E3-E6) Tactical Data Link Managers are responsible to the Interface Control Watch Officer and manage the technical aspects of the data link interfaces to provide an accurate and consolidated air picture to the JFACC, AOC, or others as required. Tactical Data Link Managers are responsible for the initiation, operations, and termination of data link operations with respect to Link 11 A/B, Link 16, beyond line of site protocols and any future links initiated by the AOC.

Chapter 6

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE DIVISION (ISR/D)

6.1. General. The ISR/D will provide the JFC, JFACC, AOC staff, and units with intelligence preparation of the operational environment and predictive battlespace awareness, target development, tactical assessment, and ISR operations that help drive the air tasking cycle. The ISR/D accomplishes these tasks in support of JFC and JFACC objectives through constant monitoring of the operational environment and maintenance of a common threat, targeting, and ISR picture supporting theater-wide air, space, and cyberspace operations. ISR/D personnel conduct joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and integrated analysis and production, ISR planning, and targeting processes to shape decision-making and enable operations. ISR/D personnel coordinate with the AOC, JFC, and component staffs and direct distributed and reach-back ISR processes that allow commanders to visualize the operational environment, prioritize operations, anticipate adversary actions, and respond more effectively to unanticipated developments. (T-2).

6.2. Major ISR/D Process Inputs. Inputs include JFC and JFACC guidance, ISR preparation, reports and requirements, target lists, reports, and feedback. Specific inputs include:

- 6.2.1. JAOP and associated plans
- 6.2.2. AOD
- 6.2.3. ATO
- 6.2.4. ACO
- 6.2.5. SPINS
- 6.2.6. ROE
- 6.2.7. Commander's Critical Information Requirements
- 6.2.8. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and other components' intelligence preparation of the operational environment products
- 6.2.9. All-source intelligence reporting
- 6.2.10. Target systems analysis products
- 6.2.11. Target materials
- 6.2.12. JIPTL, joint target list, no strike list, restricted target list, and daily component Target Nomination Lists
- 6.2.13. Component and/or joint ISR collection requirements
- 6.2.14. Processing, exploitation, and dissemination requirements
- 6.2.15. ISR sensor and platform availability
- 6.2.16. Unit mission reports
- 6.2.17. Intelligence Requests for Information (RFIs)
- 6.2.18. Feedback from AOC divisions

6.3. Major ISRD Process Outputs. Major process outputs include, but are not limited to:

6.3.1. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment products: adversary order of battle, geospatial intelligence and reference overlays, threat updates, and assessments.

6.3.2. Intelligence summaries, daily intelligence summaries, mission summaries.

6.3.3. RFIs and RFI responses.

6.3.4. Targeting materials: Electronic target folders, standard and supplemental target materials, air component target nomination list, integrated target nomination list, JIPTL, weaponeering solutions, collateral damage estimate, sensitive target approval and review packages, and mensurated aimpoints.


6.3.5. Component Prioritized Collection List, collection decks, ISR synchronization matrix, and RSTA Annex.

6.3.6. Battle damage assessments, ISR assessment reports, and assessment information requirements inputs to operational assessment.

6.3.7. Additionally, other intelligence products and/or services may be required in accordance with AFMAN 14-401, *Intelligence Analysis and Targeting Tradecraft/Data Standards*.

6.4. ISRD Organization. The CISR is responsible for the following core teams: Analysis, Correlation, and Fusion (ACF), TGT/TA, and ISR Operations. These core teams provide intelligence products and services that support the entire AOC, the JFACC, air component units, other components, and joint, coalition, Partner Nation forces, and government agencies. ISRD core teams work closely with all AOC divisions and specialty and support teams such as Judge Advocate, NKO, Space Operations Specialty Team, WST, and STO, and will embed or attach intelligence personnel as required to support AOC processes and battle rhythm based on division requests and resource availability. In addition to the ISRD core teams, two specialized ISRD organizations provide support to the ISRD and AOC: Imagery Support Element and the National Tactical Integration Element, both of which the CISR will task organize as required to support requirements throughout the AOC. Other division (e.g., AMD) and specialty team (e.g., NKO) intelligence personnel may also integrate with ISRD for easier access and synchronization of ISR activities. To facilitate analysis, targeting, and ISR operations, the ISRD may host liaisons from various national agencies, service centers, other components, and coalition and Partner Nations. The ISRD coordinates regularly with various AOC liaisons (BCD, SOLE, etc.) JFC staff, component and coalition intelligence staffs, national intelligence agencies, and service production centers as required. See **Figure 6.1**, ISRD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes.

Figure 6.1. ISRD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes.



Note 1: Other teams and liaisons support COD: Judge Advocate, Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell, Combat Reports Cell, Airspace Management Cell, ATO Coordination Team, WST, NKO Team, Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer, Army Air and Missile Defense Command, BCD, Marine Liaison Element, NALE, SOLE, and Coalition.

Note 2: Currently, the C2 battle management and communications system is not part of the AOC baseline. Therefore, an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Cell with joint personnel is located near AOC Operations (Ops floor) but not considered part of the Ops floor. It provides data and information to the CCO as required, and advises the Defensive Operations Team.

6.4.1. Chief of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division (CISR). (AFSC: 14N3) (Rank: O6). The CISR is the JFACC’s senior intelligence officer and has overall authority and responsibility for the ISR processes within the AOC. The CISR fully integrates intelligence personnel within the core ISRD teams and other AOC divisions as required. This symmetry ensures consistency of function and general alignment of responsibilities. Depending on the scenario and level of effort during operations, the CISR may need several deputies to help monitor and supervise the extensive and complex planning tasks involved in the ISRD’s battle rhythm. The CISR reports to the AOC/CC and works closely with the

AFFOR staff, Joint Forces Command Intelligence Directorate (JFC/J2), and other organizations as necessary.

6.4.2. Analysis, Correlation, and Fusion (ACF) Team. The ACF Team will conduct analysis, production, and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and support unit intelligence requirements. **(T-3)**. The ACF team is typically comprised of an Analysis Cell and a Unit Support Cell and can be task organized to support ISRD intelligence requirements and to host other AOC division, team and external organizational personnel working intelligence issues within the AOC. The Analysis Cell conducts joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment and develops assessments that provide the context for understanding adversary capabilities and intentions. The Unit Support Cell oversees theater intelligence reporting procedures, the ISRD request for information process, and unit support requirements. **(Note:** depending on requirements and operations tempo, the CISR will subordinate the ISRD RFI Management Element to either the ACF Team or the ISR Operations Team.)

6.4.2.1. ACF Team Chief. (AFSC: 14N3) (Rank: O4-O5). The ACF Team Chief is responsible to the CISR for overall analysis and production, joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, theater intelligence reporting, intelligence RFI management, and unit intelligence support.

6.4.2.2. ACF Team Members. (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank: O2-O4/E4-E7). ACF team members include analysts, intelligence technicians, and unit intelligence experts. The ACF Team Chief will establish duty positions as required to support JFACC mission tasking. These may include, but are not limited to the following: Deputy ACF Team Chief (consider multiple deputies depending on battle rhythm and operations tempo), Analysis Cell Chief, lead analysts, Order of Battle Maintenance Officer(s), reports monitor(s), Production Chief, Priority Intelligence Requirements Manager(s), ISRD Watch Officer(s), Unit Support Cell Chief, RFI Manager(s), and mission report monitor(s). **(T-3)**.

6.4.2.3. ACF Team Responsibilities. The ACF Team will provide all-source intelligence analysis and production while integrating national level agency (National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, etc.) predictive assessments that drive ISR operations and targeting. **(T-3)**. ACF Team focus is on identifying and depicting adversary capabilities to exploit centers of gravity and enemy weaknesses while identifying adversary signatures exploitable to collection, generation of collection requests, and incorporating collected data into AOC inputs and outputs (JAOP, AOD, ATO, etc.). The team oversees the development and maintenance of JFACC intelligence requirements, supporting information requirements, and the recommendation of priority intelligence requirements and essential elements of information. The team will also manage theater intelligence reporting, mission report analysis, threat update dissemination, ISRD RFI management, and other unit support functions as required. **(T-3)**. The ACF team typically operates 24/7 and is responsible for continuous intelligence support to all AOC Divisions throughout the ATO planning, execution, and assessment phases.

6.4.2.4. Analysis Cell. (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank: O2-O4/E4-E7). The Analysis Cell is usually focused on the adversary IAMD system and theater ballistic missile forces, however the cell may task organize into any combination of analysis elements depending upon the operational environment, including, but not limited to adversary integrated air defense systems, theater ballistic missile, weapons of mass effect, special operations forces, political-military, economic, asymmetric threats, etc. The Analysis Cell also provides analytical support to ISR personnel attached or embedded in the SRD, CPD, and COD.

6.4.2.5. Unit Support Cell. (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank: O2-O4/E4-E7). The Unit Support Cell serves as the office of primary responsibility for substantive intelligence requirements for units within the theater. The Unit Support Cell often acts as the entry point for unit intelligence requirements and ensures the appropriate ISRD team addresses requirements. The Unit Support Cell executes the ISRD's RFI Management processes and oversees theater intelligence reporting processes and products for all air component units.

6.4.3. TGT/TA Team. The TGT/TA Team will manage target development and battle damage assessment functions within the AOC. The team is responsible for managing the reachback and federated targeting-related architectures and for integrating all targeting effects, including kinetic and non-kinetic, throughout the targeting cycle. The Target Development Cell evaluates, nominates, and supports the execution of potential adversary targets based on intended effects within the JAOP, AOD, and other AOC Division guidance. The Tactical Assessment (TA) Cell manages, conducts, and reports on physical damage and change assessments and functional damage and change assessments to measure JFACC and JFC effectiveness and objectives. It also provides the SRD, CPD, and COD, as appropriate, with targeting intelligence support in the conduct of munitions effectiveness assessments and restrike recommendations. **(T-3)**.

6.4.3.1. TGT/TA Team Chief. (AFSC: 14N3) (Rank: O4-O5). TGT/TA Team Chief will coordinate all JFACC targeting processes for the AOC, the JFC, and with reachback and federated targeting enterprises.

6.4.3.2. TGT/TA Team Members. (AFSC: 14N3/1N8X1) (Rank: O2-O4/E4-E7). TGT/TA Team members include targeteers and analysts trained in all targeting skills-sets. The TGT/TA Team Chief will establish duty positions as required to support JFACC mission tasking, which may include but are not limited to the following: Deputy TGT/TA Team Chief, Target Systems Analysis Chief, Target Folder/Materials Chief, Analysts, Battle Damage Assessment Chief, munitions effectiveness assessments Chief, Reports Monitor, and others as required. **(T-3)**. Typically, the TA cell is composed primarily of target intelligence personnel, but other analysts and operations liaison officers may also augment the team. TGT/TA Team members may also serve in various attached or embedded capacities with other AOC divisions.

6.4.3.3. TGT/TA Team Responsibilities. The TGT/TA Team will integrate all targeting effects, including kinetic and non-kinetic, throughout the targeting cycle. **(T-3)**. The Target Development Cell is responsible for examining an adversary's target systems and effectively matching target nominations to JFC/JFACC objectives to ensure a coherent targeting strategy. **(T-3)**. The TA Cell is responsible for determining the overall

effectiveness of kinetic and non-kinetic tactical military operations in support of the AOC operational assessment processes.

6.4.3.4. Target Development Cell. (AFSC: 14N3/1N8X1) (Rank: O2-O4/E4-E7). The Target Development Cell conducts target development as part of the AOC's or OC's strategy-to-task process, which supports strategy development, TET and MAAP Team processes, and the Joint Targeting Coordination Board.

6.4.3.5. TA Cell. (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank: O2-O4/E4-E7). The TA Cell conducts assessments in conjunction with the execution of the AOC's/OC's ATO and cyber tasking order. As such, The TA Cell should be thoroughly familiar with JFACC objectives, operations plans, other component commanders' objectives, ROE, RUF, and target systems being affected and should be involved in AOC processes related to strategy-to-task development, measures and indicators development, target selection, and target nomination.

6.4.4. ISR Operations Team. The ISR Operations Team will manage theater airborne ISR collection requirements, theater airborne ISR operations and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination and supports operational reconnaissance planning and operations. **(T-3)**. ISR Operations Team personnel support all AOC divisions to ensure ISR integration in the JAOP and daily ATO cycle. The ISR Operations Team also coordinates continuously with JFC, component, and national intelligence collection managers to synchronize airborne ISR and operational reconnaissance operations with the theater's overall collection strategy. The ISR Operations Team is comprised of the Collection Management Cell and Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Management Cell. At the CISR direction, the RFI Element may also be included within the ISR Operations Team.

6.4.4.1. ISR Operations Team Chief. (AFSC: 14N3) (Rank: O4-O5). The ISR Operations Team Chief is responsible to the CISR for the overall management of ISR operations processes in support of JFACC and JFC objectives. The Team Chief will represent the JFACC at various joint collection management boards/forums.

6.4.4.2. ISR Operations Team Members. (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank: O2-O4/E4-E7). ISR Operations Team members include ISR sensor experts, planners, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination experts. The ISR Operations Team Chief will establish duty positions as required to support JFACC mission tasking. **(T-3)**. These positions include, but are not limited to the following: Deputy ISR Operations Team Chief (multiple deputies should be considered depending on battle rhythm and operations tempo); Collection Management Cell Chief; Collection Requirements Manager(s); individual discipline "deck" planners; ISR Strategist(s); RSTA Production Manager; Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Management Cell Chief; Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Report and Product Manager(s); and platform, agency, and component liaison officers as required.

6.4.4.3. ISR Operations Team Responsibilities. The ISR Operations Team will develop and integrate the theater airborne ISR strategy with the overall JFACC air campaign plan **(T-3)**. Collection management authority is the responsibility of the JFC (unless the JFC delegates those responsibilities to the JFACC). The ISR Operations Team executes collection operations management and collection requirements management functions for the JFACC and JFACC-apportioned assets. The team develops the RSTA Annex to the

ATO daily, which provides detailed tasking and specific guidance to JFACC-tasked ISR assets; including ISR platforms, sensors, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination nodes and architecture for each ATO (at multiple classification levels as required). ISR Operations Team personnel support operational reconnaissance operations and planning requirements in other AOC divisions and ensure airborne component collection requirements are satisfied with adequate reporting and products. **(T-3)**.

6.4.4.4. Collection Management Cell. (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank: O2-O4/E4-E7). The Collection Management Cell is responsible for ISR operations planning and requirements management, which generate executable ISR missions with optimal sensor collection to meet JFC, JFACC, and component intelligence requirements.

6.4.4.5. Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Management Cell. (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank: O2-O4/E4-E7). The Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Management Cell is the ISRD focal point for coordinating processing, exploitation, and dissemination operations for air component ISR missions with in-theater and distributed and federated architectures. The cell will monitor and maintain situational awareness on processing, exploitation, and dissemination activities with air component, joint, coalition, Partner Nation, and national agency intelligence producers in support of JFACC ISR operations. **(T-3)**. In cases where the Distributed Common Ground System is responsible for providing processing, exploitation, and dissemination, the 480 Intelligence Coordination Center manages the majority of the exploitation and dissemination process. Additionally, the Air Force Special Operations Air Warfare Center tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination management team executes C2 for ISR assets supporting special operations forces. The cell also assesses processing, exploitation, and dissemination effectiveness.

6.4.5. Imagery Support Element. (AFSC: 1N1X1A) (Rank: E4-E8). The Imagery Support Element directly supports the AOC with 1N1X1A Geospatial Analysts. Through trained, mission certified imagery analysts, the Imagery Support Element provides a focused, specialized skill set enabling elements of the ISRD and other AOC divisions to achieve JFACC objectives. The CISR assigns Imagery Support Element personnel as required within the AOC, to support mission tasking.

6.4.6. National Tactical Integration Element. (AFSC: 14N3/1NX) (Rank O2-O4/E4-E8). The National Tactical Integration Element typically consists of 16 Air Force signals intelligence analysts embedded in the ISRD with the capability to reach back to the national intelligence community to provide a national intelligence presence with releasability and declassification authority in support of ATO planning and execution. The National Tactical Integration Element is the primary source within the AOC ISRD for perishable national level intelligence data to support dynamic and time-sensitive operations and planning.

6.5. ISRD Support to Other Divisions and AOC Teams. When manning permits, the CISR embeds or attaches ACF, TGT/TA, and ISR Operations Team personnel within the SRD, CPD, and COD during all phases of operations to ensure the best integration of ISR support to strategy, planning, execution, and assessment activities. ISRD personnel provide a conduit for the exchange of information between the ISRD and other AOC divisions. Embedded or attached personnel respond to the operational guidance of the respective division chiefs with functional guidance provided by the CISR. When individuals are not embedded or attached to other

divisions due to manpower shortages, the CISR should put processes in place to provide required support.

6.5.1. AMD Support. The ISRD does not typically embed or attach personnel within the AMD. However, during contingency and exercise situations, it may become necessary to embed intelligence analysts in AMD to provide intelligence support for combat operations. Additionally, the imagery support element should be prepared to support Airdrop Damage Estimation Methodology with imagery support. AMD intelligence personnel coordinate specific intelligence requirements affecting theater mobility planning and mission execution with the ISRD. The ACF Unit Support Cell supports intra- and inter-theater mobility mission requirements in accordance with normal Unit Support Cell tactics, techniques, and procedures.

6.5.2. Specialty Team Support. The ISRD provides support to all CFACC and AOC activities. Coordinate specific specialty team and other element intelligence requirements through the appropriate ISRD team or with the ISRD's RFI Manager. Validate, monitor and satisfy intelligence RFIs, collection requirements, and production requirements in accordance with overall ATO planning priorities.

6.5.3. Reach-back and Federated Support. The CISR should ensure ISRD functions integrate with distributed, reach-back, and federated support as required and appropriate rather than conducting all ISRD functions internally. Base relationships and assignments upon each organization's functional production capabilities (orders of battle, intelligence preparation of the environment, courses of action analysis, target systems analysis, battle damage assessment, etc.), expertise, and capacity. The intent of distributed, reach-back and federated operations is to leverage sufficient production resources and expertise to meet required operations tempos.

Chapter 7

AIR MOBILITY DIVISION (AMD)

7.1. General. The AMD Chief works for the AOC/CC and will ensure the AMD works as an effective division of the AOC in operational planning and execution processes. The AMD will plan, coordinate, task, and execute air mobility missions in accordance with the JFACC's guidance and intent. In addition, the AMD coordinates with the Director of Mobility Forces, the JFC movement requirements and control authority (e.g., the Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC), COMAFFOR A-4 division staff, and the 618 AOC (TACC)). The Director of Mobility Forces is the COMAFFOR's designated coordinating authority for air mobility operations. The Director of Mobility Forces, normally a senior AF air mobility officer familiar with the theater AOR, coordinates and integrates the total air mobility effort for the COMAFFOR or C/JFACC. In this capacity, the Director of Mobility Forces provides mobility guidance to the AOC AMD to execute the air mobility mission; for more doctrinal information regarding the Director of Mobility Forces, refer to Air Force Doctrine, Annex 3-17, *Air Mobility Operations* or JP 3-17, *Air Mobility Operations*.

7.1.1. Phase 0/1 Operations. The AMD will plan, coordinate, task and execute intra-theater airlift, aeromedical evacuation (AE) and air refueling (AR) missions. **(T-2).** The AMD provides for integration and support of all air mobility missions. The AMD schedules theater airlift requests in conjunction with the Geographic Combatant Commander's airlift priorities through the CDR's DDOC, if established, and the 618 AOC (TACC), as required. The AMD Chief ensures that the AMD works as an effective division of the AOC in the air planning and execution process. The AMD will integrate and direct execution of allocated, apportioned, and assigned theater-mobility forces operating in the AOR/JOA in support of the JFC requirements and objectives. **(T-2).** The AMD should plan and direct air mobility missions in high threat environments (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear or Integrated Air Defense Systems).

7.1.2. Beyond Phase 0/1 Operations. In contingencies, air mobility requirements peak during the deployment and build-up stage of the operation. As the contingency transitions into the sustainment phase, requirements decrease to a near-steady level. Once the redeployment stage begins, air mobility requirements will once again peak. The increased use of non-linear air mobility assets across the range of military operations will also increase the demand for airlift and refueling and may require the need for increased AOC AMD readiness. Therefore, the AOC AMD will be prepared to quickly transition from normal to contingency surge operations at the very outset of a contingency response and be ready to maintain a surge ops tempo through the redeployment stage of a contingency. **(T-2).**

7.2. Major AMD Process Inputs. The AMD will provide inputs to: DDOC, joint theater patient movement and air refueling planner, and other validated requirements, timed phased force deployment data, JAOP, ACP, Area Air Defense Plan, ACO, ATO, SPINS, ROE/RUF, Operations Order, as well as inputs from US Transportation Command and 618 AOC (TACC). **(T-3).**


7.3. Major AMD Processes. The AMD Chief and all team chiefs will establish effective procedures for managing AMD activities within their span of control. These activities include

establishing and enforcing procedures that ensure all personnel provide complete, accurate, properly formatted, and timely inputs to the global air mobility scheduling systems, and developing and managing the battle rhythm sufficient to support JAOP, AOD, SPINS and ATO/ACO development, Threat Working Group policy recommendations, operational assessment, and special projects, as required. (T-2).

7.4. Major Process Outputs. Outputs include: the airlift schedule, tanker schedule, air mobility support schedule, SPINS, Joint Integrated Prioritized Requirements List, daily situation reports to inform all HHQ and commanders of air mobility activity in the AOR/JOA, after-action reports, lessons learned inputs, and airspace control measure requests.

7.5. Organization. The AMD is comprised of four functionally oriented teams led by the AMD Chief. The functional teams are the ALCT, ARCT, AECT, and AMCT. Tailor functional team composition (e.g., numbers, specialties, and skill levels) to meet unique mission requirements as shown below in [Figure 7.1](#)

Figure 7.1. AMD Organization, Functional Teams, and Major Processes.



7.6. AMD Personnel and Responsibilities.

7.6.1. Air Mobility Division Chief. (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank O6). The AMD Chief is responsible to the AOC/CC for the direction and supervision of the AMD. The AMD Chief will know and ensure AMD personnel know the JFC's and JFACC's guidance, intent, and daily apportionment. If there is no Director of Mobility Forces, the AMD Chief will coordinate directly with CCDR Staff (which will coordinate with United States Transportation Command) and Air Force Transportation Component for inter-theater mobility forces and airlift tasking requirements as needed. **(T-2)**.

7.6.2. AMD Strategy. AMD strategy reports directly to the AMD Chief and maintains a working relationship with the Director of Mobility Forces staff. AMD strategy provides mission assessment. They provide inputs to the OAT and apply guidance from the SRD to air mobility operations. AMD strategy may be appropriate in some theaters but not in others (ensure security and program clearance).

7.6.3. Airlift Control Team (ALCT). The ALCT provides intra-theater airlift functional expertise to plan and coordinate intra-theater airlift operations in the AOR/JOA. Airlift planners within the ALCT will complete the airlift portion of the ATO by processing validated airlift requests received from the DDOC, opportune cargo, and merging them with forecast inter-theater airlift movements into the AOR/JOA. **(T-3)**. The ALCT also ensures the integration of inter-theater air mobility missions with intra-theater and other service teams and operations planning. **(T-3)**. This includes air mobility integration and coordination of United States Transportation Command-controlled air mobility forces. **(T-3)**. Direct-delivery inter-theater air mobility missions, if required, will be coordinated with the AMD, and planned and tasked by the 618 AOC (TACC). **(T-3)**. The ALCT coordinates with Mobility Air Forces- Mobile C2 units (Contingency Response Group) deployed within the AOR/JOA to identify airfield capabilities and mobility support requirements. The ALCT should integrate its activities with the ARCT, AMCT, AECT, and specialty and support functions to the maximum extent possible to support the total air mobility effort. The AMD may embed an airlift planner in the MAAP Team to coordinate airlift mission planning with CAF mission planning and/or to assist the MAAP Chief in planning airlift mission execution.

7.6.3.1. ALCT Chief. (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank O5). The ALCT Chief is directly responsible to the AMD Chief for the intra-theater airlift functional expertise from the theater organizations to plan and coordinate intra-theater airlift operations in the AOR/JOA for the JFACC. The ALCT Chief will ensure the integration of inter-theater air mobility missions with intra-theater air operations. **(T-3)**. This includes coordination with 618 AOC (TACC) to resolve problems and provide C2 information on air mobility operations (e.g., airspace deconfliction, airfield operations, and other assets) to ensure the seamless integration of intra-theater and inter-theater air mobility operations. The team functional areas normally include airlift operations, aerial port, logistics, airlift requirements, tactics, plans, and Contingency Response Group management.

7.6.3.2. Airlift Planner. (AFSC: 11M/12M/1A1X1/1A2X1) (Rank: O3/O4, E5/E7). Airlift planners are responsible to the ALCT Chief for planning theater airlift missions.

7.6.4. Airlift Tactics. (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank: O3/O4). The airlift tactics officer is responsible to the ALCT Chief for providing airlift tactics support required for planning

theater airlift missions that may be appropriate in some theaters but not others (ensure security and program clearance).

7.6.4.1. Airlift Requirements Planner. (AFSC: 21R/2T2X1) (Rank: O3/O4, E5/E7). Airlift requirements planners are personnel who work in the ALCT responsible to the ALCT Chief for receiving and planning validated airlift movement requests based on the Joint Integrated Prioritized Requirements List.

7.6.4.2. Mobility Air Force Air Tasking Order Integrator. (1C5X1/1C3X1) (Rank: E5/E7) The Mobility Air Forces ATO Integrator is the functional expert for integrating the air mobility movement plan (schedule) into TBMCS.

7.6.4.2.1. Mobility Air Forces ATO Integrator Inputs:

7.6.4.2.1.1. Receive and review component-planning shells from ATO production (referred to as the “O” shell ABP).

7.6.4.2.1.2. External airlift missions. Theater and non-theater missions built directly into GDSS or Consolidated Air Mobility Planning System imported into TBMCS.

7.6.4.2.1.3. Manual built missions. Theater missions built directly into TBMCS.

7.6.4.2.1.4. Changes to Friendly order of battle data (e.g., new units, aircraft mission design series, and/or International Civil Aviation Organization).

7.6.4.2.1.5. Mission changes received via GDSS, written changes form (if required), and/or theater specific procedure.

7.6.4.2.2. Mobility Air Forces ATO Integrator Processes:

7.6.4.2.2.1. Allocate Friendly order of battle, call-words, call-numbers and Identification Friend or Foe/Selective Identification Feature codes in the “O” shell ABP and ensure they are correct for the daytime group of the ABP.

7.6.4.2.2.2. Coordinate Friendly order of battle data changes with ATO production Air Operations Database Manager.

7.6.4.2.2.3. Residual missions are those that fly in more than one ATO. Copy residual missions from previous ABP; check they are imported properly.

7.6.4.2.2.4. Check the GDSS ATO Integrator Summary screen throughout shift to ensure external airlift missions send successfully (identified with an S). Identify and fix errors for failed missions (identified with an F) and send unsent missions (identified with an N).

7.6.4.2.2.5. Ensure external airlift missions successfully processed through the airlift import tool. Identify and fix errors for non-processed missions.

7.6.4.2.2.6. Continually import air mobility missions into the “O” shell ABP/ATO. Fix errors identified on the theater air planner and execution management re-planner error tab.

7.6.4.2.2.7. Ensure call-words and call-numbers match between TBMCS and GDSS.

7.6.4.2.2.8. Assign Identification Friend-or-Foe/Selective Identification Features to all ATO missions. If not enough Identification Friend-or-Foe/Selective Identification Features assigned in the “O” shell ABP, coordinate with ATO production to add Identification Friend-or-Foe/Selective Identification Features.

7.6.4.2.2.9. Input manual built missions into TBMCS as needed.

7.6.4.2.2.10. Assist and support the AMCT on integrating immediate airlift missions.

7.6.4.2.2.11. Ensure the ATO change technician imports external airlift mission changes/add-ons into the executing ABP, ATO, ACO and ATO incremental changes. Complete ATO change sheet and submit to ATO change technician (if required).

7.6.4.2.2.12. Coordinate ABP backups with ATO production.

7.6.4.2.2.13. Inform ATO production when “O” shell ABP is complete.

7.6.4.2.2.14. Upon release of the two-digit ABP, review and quality control check it for the correct number of mission and tactical information.

7.6.4.2.3. Outputs:

7.6.4.2.3.1. Completed “O” shell ABP.

7.6.4.2.3.2. Mobility Air Forces mission changes to executing ATO.

7.6.4.2.3.3. Changes to Mobility Air Forces Friendly order of battle data (new units, aircraft mission design series, and/or International Civil Aviation Organization requirements).

7.6.4.3. Airlift Processes:

7.6.4.3.1. AMD should plan for 96+ hours to complete the JFACC/JFC Guidance Input Process.

7.6.4.3.1.1. Determine future airlift, AE and enroute support equipment capabilities.

7.6.4.3.1.2. AMD will gather airlift capability and availability data from beddown information, maintenance (MX). **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.1.3. AMD will gather enroute support equipment capability and availability data from beddown information, MX, AFFOR A4 staff. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.1.4. AMD tactics will assess airfield capability and availability (coordinate with intelligence, and BCD or Army liaison officer and AFFOR A4) per AFTTP 3-3.AOC, Table 7.14, ALCT Mission Planning Checklist. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.1.5. AMD will determine if airlift movement is operating in accordance with AFMAN 24-604, *Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments*, Chapter 3. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.1.6. AMD strategy will provide future airlift capability inputs to the SRD and DDOC futures division. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.1.7. AMD strategy will identify shortfalls and make allocation recommendations to the SRD for incorporation into the AOD. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.1.8. AMD strategy will determine availability of joint and coalition aircraft from liaison officers. The allocation requests process should be utilized. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.2. Long-Range Airlift Allocation Process (96 to 84 hours prior to AOD development):

7.6.4.3.2.1. ALCT Chief will review and confirm accuracy of input data. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.2.2. AMD strategy will determine and acquire joint and coalition airlift aircraft allocation from liaison officers. AMD strategy should use the allocation requests process. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.2.3. Allocate mobility aircraft based on JFACC guidance. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.2.4. ALCT Chief will make inputs for course of action development and determine associated risks and shortfalls to AMD strategy, utilizing inputs from the BCD and/or Army liaison officer, intelligence, tactics, weather and airspace. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.2.5. ALCT Chief will implement JFACC approved courses of action. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.2.6. Annotate all pertinent events in a daily events log. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.3. Requirement Movement Development Process (84 to 72 hours prior to ATO execution and requirements development.):

7.6.4.3.3.1. AMD strategy will recommend an airlift apportionment plan based on DDOC guidance for inclusion in the AOD. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.3.2. ALCT requirements will obtain validated movement requests from DDOC and include movement assessment of previous requirements scheduled but not moved. Identify time phased force deployment document requirements needing intra-theater onward movement. **(T-3)**. ALCT requirements planners will utilize the Joint Integrated Prioritized Requirements List to prioritize and schedule cargo and passengers during the ATO process; factor in shipments that require re-planning due to mission cancellations; consider priority and routine patient movement and/or short-notice airlift requests; and determine cargo-handling requirements (e.g., hot cargo, married pallets, and materials handling equipment requirements and aircraft configuration) from validated airlift movement requests. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.3.3. Airlift Tactics will coordinate delivery method and airfield approval status. Airdrop missions or airland missions to currently unapproved airfields require additional planning consideration. **(T-3)**. Airlift Tactics will convene the feasibility team consisting of, as a minimum: tactics, intelligence, weather, airspace, Contingency Response Group and BCD or Army liaison officer. Airlift Tactics will provide the preliminary airdrop/air-land feasibility study and draft plan to the AMD MAAP representative. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.3.4. Annotate all pertinent events in a daily events log. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.4. Airlift Movement Plan Development Process (72 to 36 hour Weaponing and Allocation):

7.6.4.3.4.1. ALCT airlift planner will confirm and deconflict scheduled meetings and inputs with the ATO process schedule. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.4.2. ALCT airlift planner will verify projected availability of resources (airframe, enroute support, number of coalition aircraft and aircrew) with AFFOR A4 staff, AMCT and Installation Control Center. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.4.3. Airlift planner will obtain information products to assess potential impact on airlift plan. **(T-3)**. The Airlift Planner will revalidate and incorporate AMD intelligence update into airlift plan; revalidate and incorporate AMD and BCD or Army liaison officer update into airlift plan; review long-range weather forecast with AMD weather for mission impact; review current ACO for existing suitable airspace coordinating measures or create and adjust as necessary (airspace control measure requests) with the Airspace Management Team (AMT); and review theater ATO/ACO and specifically airlift SPINS and create or adjust as necessary. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.4.4. Review airfield operating restrictions and requirements (operating hours; crash, fire and rescue; security; Air Traffic Control; and navigation aids, etc.).

7.6.4.3.4.5. ALCT airlift planner assigns aircraft type and numbers to the airlift plan.

7.6.4.3.4.6. ALCT airlift planner, in coordination with 618 AOC (TACC) Theater Direct Delivery as required, will develop a coordinated airlift plan. ALCT airlift planner passes a coordinated (inter and intra-theater) initial airlift plan to MAAP airlift planners to initiate coordination. With a Geographic Combatant Commander-United States Transportation Command support relationship, the 618 AOC (TACC) may send a coordinating planning element as the Theater Direct Delivery to work with the AMD theater planners and executioners. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.4.7. Annotate all pertinent events in a daily event log. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.5. Airlift Mission Schedule Process (36 to 18 hours/MAAP):

7.6.4.3.5.1. ALCT airlift planner will confirm and deconflict scheduled meetings and inputs with the ATO process schedule. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.5.2. AMD MAAP representative will attend MAAP chief briefing to coordinate airlift operations and requirements with the MAAP development. The AMD MAAP representative will need knowledge of all planned airlift and DV movement for the ATO in MAAP. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.5.3. AMD MAAP representative will make inputs for missions requiring support for mission package integration. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.5.4. ALCT airlift planner will obtain information products to assess potential impact on airlift plan. **(T-3)**. The ALCT airlift planner will review the

long-range weather forecast with AOC weather for mission impact; review the current ACO for existing suitable airspace coordinating measure or create and adjust as necessary (airspace control measure requests) with the AMT; and review theater ATO/ACO and specifically airlift SPINS and create or adjust as necessary. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.5.5. ALCT airlift planner will assign missions to satisfy requirements identified in the Joint Integrated Prioritized Requirements List. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.5.6. Ensure crew duty day is in accordance with (D)AFMANs and theater direction. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.5.7. Establish diplomatic requirements and submit requests. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.5.8. Assign call signs and mission numbers. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.5.9. The ALCT airlift planner will provide the daily airlift schedule to ALCT requirements with assigned missions and/or call signs. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.5.10. ALCT airlift planner will obtain information products to assess potential impact on airlift plan. **(T-3)**. The ALCT airlift planner will revalidate and incorporate both the AMD intelligence update and the AMD and BCD or Army liaison officer update into airlift plan. The ALCT airlift planner will review the long-range weather forecast with AOC weather for mission impact; review the current ACO for infrastructure and schedule with TBMCS and create or adjust as necessary with AMD airspace using an airspace control measure requests; and review theater ATO/ACO and specifically airlift SPINS and create or adjust as necessary. **(T-3)**. While reviewing the ATO/ACO the ALCT airlift planner will review airfield operating restrictions and requirements; request prior permission required clearances, request and review diplomatic clearances as required and coordinate slots with Regional Air Movement Control Center (RAMCC); and deconflict maximum (aircraft) on ground for inter-theater and intra-theater airlift. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.5.11. The airlift planner will build missions in the applicable Mobility Air Forces C2 system and transmit airlift schedule messages. Missions requiring mission package integration must be input directly into TBMCS. **(T-3)**. The airlift planner populates the requirements section of the Mobility Air Forces C2 system with movement requests (unit line numbers and transportation control numbers for passengers and cargo); includes mission-specific remarks as required (e.g., engine running on and offload, overt versus covert lighting, daylight-only airfields, Raven requirements, secure launch requirements); and during the airlift mission schedule process and as required for timing and unit coordination, distributes an Initial Frag (Fragmentation Order), referred to the "Soft Frag" and a Final Frag, aka "Hard Frag," prior to ATO push. **(T-3)**.

7.6.4.3.5.12. Airlift planner compares allowable cabin load versus fuel to meet mission requirements. Adjust accordingly.

7.6.4.3.5.13. Airlift tactics personnel will coordinate with AOC airspace to build, submit and activate or verify airspace using an airspace control measure requests.

(T-3).

7.6.4.3.5.14. ALCT airlift plans will pass the airlift movement plan (schedule) to the AMD ATO integrator and disseminate to appropriate agencies. **(T-3).**

7.6.4.3.5.15. Annotate all pertinent events in a daily events log. **(T-3).**

7.6.4.3.5.16. Positive Launch Procedures. Positive launch may be used to ensure flow control and for management reasons. When implemented, notify departure station C2 agencies of applicable missions. One hour prior to aircrew alert at crew rest locations and one hour prior to departure at enroute stops, theater C2 agencies will call the AMD AMCT for alert and launch coordination and approval. Determine whether to implement positive launch procedures, and assign to specific mission.

7.6.4.3.5.17. Secure Launch Control. The secure launch program attempts to minimize exposure of forces by identifying potential high threat locations and areas and maintaining timely intelligence information during mission execution. AMD AMCT monitors daily launches for mission segments transiting unstable regions. After receiving the latest threat assessment from ISRD, AMD AMCT will approve or disapprove launch into high threat areas. Enter this secure launch control decision into GDSS and telephonically forward it to the departure C2 agency or directly to the aircraft commander as applicable. Determine launch approval by weighing the intelligence assessment of the potential threat against mission requirements. Determine whether to implement secure launch procedures, and assign to specific mission.

7.6.5. Air Refueling Control Team (ARCT). The ARCT will plan, task, and execute air refueling missions to support theater air operations and coordinates air refueling planning, tasking, and scheduling to support an air bridge and/or global attack missions within the AOR/JOA. Air refueling planners assigned to ARCT will provide air-refueling expertise to the MAAP Team to incorporate tanker missions into the ATO and meet JFACC objectives within air refueling resource limitations. Based on JFC and JFACC guidance, theater-assigned tankers may also provide air-refueling support to inter-theater air operations (fighter deployments, long-range bomber strikes, etc.). The ARCT should ensure close coordination with other AMD teams, COD, and CPD on all aspects of the air-refueling mission. Normally, the 618 AOC (TACC) plans inter-theater air refueling missions; however, it is possible the ARCT could be tasked with this responsibility. For inter-theater operations, the ARCT may also coordinate aircraft location and redeployment of inter-theater tanker assets and fighter unit movements requiring tanker support. Tanker Duty Officers (TDOs) assigned to the ARCT provide AAR expertise to the COD. TDOs will monitor and execute the AAR missions under their control. **(T-3).** They facilitate how AAR missions in the ATO contribute meet the JFACC's objectives.

7.6.5.1. ARCT Chief. (AFSC: 11M/12M). (Rank: O5). The ARCT Chief reports directly to the AMD Chief, and should ensure close coordination with the CCO and CPD Chief on all theater air refueling operations. The ARCT Chief provides the JFACC with intra-theater air refueling functional expertise. The ARCT Chief plans and tasks air refueling missions to support theater air operations and coordinates air refueling planning, tasking and scheduling to support an air bridge and/or global attack missions

within the AOR/JOA. Functional areas managed by the ARCT Chief include intra and inter-theater air refueling integration, planning and execution.

7.6.5.2. Long-Range Air Refueling Planner. (AFSC: 11M/12M/1A0X1/1A1X1) (Rank: O3/O4, E5/E7).

7.6.5.2.1. The long-range tanker planner conducts future tanker planning and analysis (assessment), embeds in the SRD normally, and may be part of the AMD strategy cell. The long-range tanker planner makes tanker inputs to the JAOP. **Note:** In the absence of a dedicated long-range tanker planner, the ARCT Chief or designated alternate normally accomplishes the following functions.

7.6.5.2.2. Master Air Attack Plan Tanker Planner. (AFSC: 11M/12M/1A0X1/1A1X1) (Rank: O3/O4, E5/E7).

7.6.5.2.2.1. The MAAP tanker planner (MTP), normally embedded in the CPD MAAP team, is responsible for planning and scheduling AR missions. **Note:** In the absence of a dedicated inter-theater tanker planner, the MTP will fulfill those functions. **(T-3)**.

7.6.5.2.3. Intra-theater Air Refueling Planner. (AFSC: 11M/12M/1A0X1/1A1X1) (Rank: O3/O4, E5/E7).

7.6.5.2.3.1. The intra-theater tanker planner normally embeds in the CPD, ensures correct entry of all tanker missions into TBMCS and Mobility Air Forces C2 systems, and crosschecks the tanker plan prior to submission to ATO production.

7.6.5.3. Inter-theater Air Refueling Planner. (AFSC: 11M/12M/1A0X1/1A1X1) (Rank: O3/O4, E5/E7).

7.6.5.3.1. The inter-theater air-refueling planner is responsible for inter-theater AR missions in coordination with Combatant Commands, MAJCOMs, Numbered Air Forces and AOCs, etc. Coordinate deployment and redeployment of inter-theater tanker assets and unit movement requirements.

7.6.5.4. Tanker Duty Officer (TDO). (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank: O3/O4).

7.6.5.4.1. The TDO manages execution of AR missions supporting theater air and space operations as well as air-bridge and global strike missions within and transiting the AOR/JOA. The TDO is normally assigned to the ARCT and embedded in the COD.

7.6.5.4.2. The TDO will monitor the current tanker situation including weather, threat, airborne fuel available, MX, aircraft available, diplomatic clearances, airborne picture, base capabilities, late tankers and tanker and receiver cancellations. **(T-3)**.

7.6.5.5. Air Refueling Tactics Officer. (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank: O3/O4).

7.6.5.5.1. The AR (tanker) tactics officer produces and modifies plans and theater tactics to mitigate threats to the AR system and maximizes AR effectiveness. **Note:** In the absence of a dedicated AR tactics officer, these duties will normally be performed by the ARCT Chief and/or W-coded personnel within the ARCT (ensure security and program clearance). **(T-3)**.

7.6.6. Air Refueling Control Team Processes. Air Tasking Order Tanker Allocation Process. (84 to 48 Hours.)

7.6.6.1. Review planning guidance from JFC/Joint Task Force, JFACC, ACP, AOD, ROE, SPINS, ATO, ACO and communications plans and annotate weights of effort, operational planning and execution of air and space operations during the particular ATO period **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.2. Review the ATO cycle to include the ABP identification, valid ABP times, ATO cut-off, ATO push time, ATO changes and daily SPINS inputs. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.3. Review the theater tanker basing plan including aircraft types, number of aircraft, locations, configurations, number and qualifications of crews, boom versus drogue, wing air refueling pod system, multipoint refueling system, special operations air refueling, aircraft fuel and coalition aircraft as well as C2 connectivity and operational control, tactical control, direct support and waivers and waiver authority. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.4. Review overflight issues affecting tanker operations and ensure appropriate diplomatic clearance. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.5. Establish communication with divisions, teams and liaison elements within the AOC, Installation Control Center, 618 AOC (TACC), US Defense Attaché Office, and DDOC, Contingency Response Group, coalition coordination cell and other AOCs as appropriate. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.6. Assist development of ATO coordination folder initiated by the SGT and ensure information flow through MAAP, execution and operational assessment. **(T-3)**. **Note:** In smaller operations, a briefing from the intra-theater tanker planner to the TDOs may accomplish this function.

7.6.6.7. Compute and monitor utilization rates (surge and non-surge) and use this information for proactive force sizing in anticipation of campaign phasing. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.8. Identify available fuel resources by type, quantity and delivery capability. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.9. Annotate airfield and runway restrictions (e.g., ramp fuel weight, obstacles, night and instrument meteorological conditions, maximum (aircraft) on ground). **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.10. Resolve Air Traffic Control issues (routing that may affect flight time to and from tracks and fuel available, slot times, Standard Arrival Route, base departure and arrival procedures, etc.). **(T-3)**

7.6.6.11. Provide SPINS inputs as required in coordination with ARCT Chief. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.12. Review and ensure the Friendly order of battle in TBMCS has correct data resources for aircraft types, configurations, beddown, utilization rates, burn rates, fuel on-load rates, turn times, call signs, codes and additional planning factors required to accurately plan missions within TBMCS and other C2 systems. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.13. Review planning factors for standard fuel loads, flight distances within theater, flight times within theater, standard theater airlift routes, instrument departure procedures and diplomatic clearance considerations. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.14. Establish and publish mission report policies. Require coordination between the TDO and Installation Control Center for on-time takeoff, situation reports. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.15. Threat mitigation process (72 to 48 Hours Target Development):

7.6.6.15.1. Review threats to tankers with ISRD unit support. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.15.2. Adjust airspace and routing as required to mitigate known threats. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.15.3. Provide tanker units with threat mitigation procedures at least 72 hours prior to arriving in theater and daily to units in AOR. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.16. MAAP Process (36 to 24 Hours): **Note:** Conventional tanker mission planners are not normally qualified to plan special operations air refueling missions. Special operations air refueling missions are normally the planning responsibility of the joint special operations air component or equivalent.

7.6.6.16.1. Attend MAAP meeting. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.16.2. Threat mitigation process will contact units to monitor available tanker capabilities.

7.6.6.16.3. Review TBMCS and update tanker database as required. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.16.4. Threat mitigation process defines macro-MAAP (defensive counterair, Airborne Warning and Control System, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System and other constants) and identifies constant requirements with input from the MAAP chief.

7.6.6.17. Assign tankers to constant requirements (macro-MAAP). **(T-3)**. Considerations include:

7.6.6.17.1. Boom versus drogue receiver requirements.

7.6.6.17.2. Soft versus hard baskets receiver requirements.

7.6.6.17.3. Coalition and US tanker aircraft capabilities and ROE, versus receiver requirements and ROE.

7.6.6.17.4. Ensure deconfliction by altitude and time. Check for 4,000 feet between the high tanker in the low cell and the low tanker of the high cell while in the same track at the same time.

7.6.6.17.5. Ensure fuel offload does not exceed unit takeoff capabilities.

7.6.6.17.6. Identify remaining MAAP receiver requirements.

7.6.6.17.7. Identify NALE, Marine Liaison Element, SOLE, and coalition requests not included in MAAP.

7.6.6.17.8. Identify number of alert sorties required, the response timing required and the refueling configuration required.

7.6.6.17.9. Pair tanker to requirements in accordance with guidance issued above for macro-MAAP as well as the following.

7.6.6.17.10. Ensure carry-over missions are de-conflicted between ATOs.

- 7.6.6.17.11. Create and update ATO coordination folder and pass to or brief the TDO.
- 7.6.6.18. ATO Production Process (24 to 12 Hours). ATO will push for execution in accordance with JFACC guidance, normally 12 hours prior to execution. After ATO push, COD is responsible for all ATO changes.
- 7.6.6.18.1. For unit posturing, intra-theater tanker planner will send intends (intended tanker schedule or sortie allotment messages) to the Installation Control Center as soon as possible, normally no later than four hours prior to ATO push. **(T-3)**.
- 7.6.6.18.2. Intra-theater tanker planner will ensure complete executable tanker plan entered into TBMCS. **(T-3)**.
- 7.6.6.18.3. ATO Production Team will produce ATO, ACO and SPINS for dissemination in accordance with coalition clearance levels. **(T-3)**.
- 7.6.6.19. ACO Production Process (36 to 12 Hours):
- 7.6.6.19.1. Refer to ACP for complete airspace procedures.
- 7.6.6.19.2. Cross-check SPINS and ACO for conflicting information. **(T-3)**.
- 7.6.6.19.3. All AR airspace changes should be coordinated through the ARCT Chief. However, any tanker planner may coordinate with AMT plans for inputs to the ACO.
- 7.6.6.19.4. ARCT notifies units of changes to ACO.
- 7.6.6.20. Special Instructions Production Process (48 to 12 Hours):
- 7.6.6.20.1. ARCT Chief or MTP will receive and review feedback from units, Installation Control Center and TDO. **(T-3)**.
- 7.6.6.20.2. ARCT Chief or designated representative submits inputs to SPINS Manager for JFACC approval.
- 7.6.6.21. ATO/ACO/SPINS Transition Process from Plans to Operations (12 hours to execution):
- 7.6.6.21.1. For major combat operations, ARCT creates the tanker execution portion of the ATO folder with next day's ATO/ACO/SPINS, TBMCS deconfliction sheet, fuel available spreadsheet, tanker flow sheet and comments on this ATO development cycle.
- 7.6.6.21.2. For other than major combat operations, intra-theater tanker planner briefs TDO on issues that may affect ATO/ACO execution.
- 7.6.6.21.3. TDO will make changes to ATO/ACO during transition process with assistance as required from other ARCT members. **(T-3)**.
- 7.6.6.22. Tanker Execution Process (12 Hours to ATO Closeout):
- 7.6.6.22.1. Review ATO coordination folder and provide feedback to MAAP cell, ARCT Chief, AMCT Chief, ALCT Chief and liaison officers as needed. **(T-3)**. **Note:** In smaller operations, a handover briefing from the intra-theater tanker planner to the TDO may accomplish this function.

- 7.6.6.22.2. Identify waiver authority for theater-assigned tankers. **(T-3)**.
- 7.6.6.22.3. In coordination with CCO, liaison officers and units, ensure support for receivers. **(T-3)**.
 - 7.6.6.22.3.1. Determine additional fuel availability. **(T-3)**.
 - 7.6.6.22.3.2. Ensure real-time tanker deconfliction by time and/or altitude. **(T-3)**.
 - 7.6.6.22.3.3. Accomplish ATO/ACO/SPINS changes and enter changes into TBMCS if required. Send information to units as required. **(T-3)**.
 - 7.6.6.22.3.4. Maintain liaison with Installation Control Center to update aircrew availability, airfield status, weather, status of alert jets and other factors affecting execution. **(T-3)**.
 - 7.6.6.22.3.5. Consider different ROEs for coalition and US aircraft when matching tankers to receivers. **(T-3)**.
- 7.6.6.22.4. Coordinate real-time tanker diverts arising from operational considerations such as low fuel, weather, MX, diplomatic clearance, runway closures and changing tactical operations, etc. **(T-3)**.
 - 7.6.6.22.4.1. Brief CCO on tanker plan. **(T-3)**.
 - 7.6.6.22.4.2. Communicate changes to tanker aircraft and units. **(T-3)**.
 - 7.6.6.22.4.3. Complete a detailed changeover brief between shifts. **(T-3)**. to include:
 - 7.6.6.22.4.4. Current weather conditions affecting the AOR.
 - 7.6.6.22.4.5. Brief all current and pending ATO/ACO changes. (Check status of alert jets and aircrew availability.)
 - 7.6.6.22.4.6. Current airborne picture including extra fuel available, late tankers and tanker and receiver cancellations.
 - 7.6.6.22.4.7. Changes that affect tanker execution including track changes, guidance, airfield status and CCO and deputy of combat operations priorities.
 - 7.6.6.22.4.8. Review ATO coordination folder with oncoming TDO.
 - 7.6.6.22.4.9. Ensure all daily ATO/ACO changes have been input into daily log and are accurate in the ATO/ACO.
 - 7.6.6.22.4.10. Collect ATO closeout and mission analysis data in accordance with ARCT Chief direction.
 - 7.6.6.22.4.11. Provide feedback to MAAP team, ARCT Chief and liaison officers, as needed.
- 7.6.6.23. ATO Closeout Process (End of Execution to 6 Hours). TDO in coordination with the COD ensures ATO closeout and data collection and reporting. TDO will provide tanker assessment feedback to SRD and ARCT Chief regarding items such as the ability to execute a tanker AR plan, tanker ground alert plan, tanker reliability plan,

receiver supportability issues, and any other factors that affected the tanker portion of the ATO. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.24. Information Gathering and Analysis Process (Mission Assessment and Operational Assessment):

7.6.6.24.1. ARCT determines tanker effectiveness definition in coordination with AMD Chief and Combat Plans Division chief or deputy (CPD Chief).

7.6.6.24.1.1. The number AR requested versus number AR supported (booms in the air) is used to show if the booms in the air are being used optimally (e.g., offload may be available; however, there may not be enough physical booms in the air).

7.6.6.24.1.2. Tanker sorties scheduled versus tanker sorties flown. If different, include reasons why (e.g., MX, weather, receiver cancel, late additions to the airfield suitability report).

7.6.6.24.1.3. Offload scheduled versus actual offload. Include numbers of missed ARs, receiver type and reason.

7.6.6.24.1.4. Amount of fuel dumped, and reasons why.

7.6.6.24.1.5. ARCT Chief develops courses of action and recommendation to present to chief of Combat Plans for incorporation in MAAP.

7.6.6.24.2. Ensure standardized format for situation report per theater intelligence reporting directive instructions.

7.6.6.24.3. Establish collection process with TDO.

7.6.6.24.4. Collect mission report and situation report and TDO execution data.

7.6.6.24.5. OAT will analyze collected data to determine if the tanker mission is effective and supporting JFC objectives under current guidance. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.25. ATO Tanker Tactics Process (Continuous):

7.6.6.25.1. Evaluate tanker airspace in coordination with AOC intelligence for threats to tankers and effect support to receivers.

7.6.6.25.2. Provide proactive tactics information and recommendations to AMD Chief and Director of Mobility Forces as appropriate.

7.6.6.25.3. Coordinate with inbound aircrews and tasking agencies to ensure appropriate tactics-related information is available.

7.6.6.26. Air Mobility Control Team (AMCT). The AMCT provides centralized control of all intra-theater airlift operations in the AOR/JOA. The AMCT tasks, coordinates, and flight-follows subordinate air mobility units and mission forces. The AMCT directs and redirects air mobility forces in concert with air, space, and cyberspace operations forces to respond to changing requirements, priorities, and immediate execution limitations. The AMCT will deconflict all air mobility operations into, and out of, the AOR/JOA and facilitates integration of mobility assets into the ATO. **(T-2)**. The AMCT's integration of direct-support and direct-support apportioned users, AECT, Mobility Air Forces

Mobile C2 units (Contingency Response Group, Contingency Response Element and Contingency Response Team), and other specialized functional requirements supports the total air mobility effort. On occasion, the AMCT coordinates with 618 AOC (TACC) to resolve problems and provide C2 information on air mobility operations. Alternatively, the AMD may establish an airlift execution officer to oversee airlift mission execution. The construct employed is at the discretion of the AOC/CC.

7.6.6.26.1. AMCT Chief. (AFSC: 11/12M). (Rank: O5). The AMCT Chief directs or redirects air mobility forces to respond to requirements changes, higher priorities, or immediate execution limitations. The AMCT Chief will deconflict all air mobility operations into, out of, and within the AOR/JOA. The AMCT Chief maintains the execution process and communications connectivity for tasking, coordinating, and flight following with the AOC COD, subordinate air mobility units, and mission forces.

7.6.6.26.2. Airlift Execution Officer. (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank: O3/O4).

7.6.6.26.2.1. The Airlift Execution Officer is responsible to the AMCT Chief for performing C2 tasks of theater airlift operations (also known as senior director).

7.6.6.26.2.2. Delegates duties to the Airlift Mission Manager as required. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.26.3. Airlift Mission Manager. (AFSC: 1C3X1/1C5X1) (Rank: E5/E7).

7.6.6.26.3.1. The Airlift Mission Manager updates mission data (e.g., additions, changes, and deletions) in Mobility Air Forces C2 systems and ensure it reflects in TBMCS. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.26.4. Airlift Requirements Executor. (21R/2T2X1) (Rank: O3/O4, E5/E7).

7.6.6.26.4.1. Airlift requirements personnel working in the AMCT are responsible to the AMCT Chief for execution of the air mobility portion of the current ATO by monitoring and ensuring the timely flow of cargo and passengers. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.26.5. AMD Logistics/Maintenance. (AFSC: 21A/2A5X1) (Rank: O3/O4, E5/E8).

7.6.6.26.5.1. Duty Description. AMD logistics/MX (sometimes referred to as mobility aircraft recovery or maintenance recovery) personnel are responsible to the AMD Chief and direct, monitor, coordinate, control and expedite movement of aircraft equipment, supply spares and maintenance recovery teams for recovery of operationally-controlled mobility aircraft including intra-theater and inter-theater recoveries. Recoveries of disabled aircraft transiting or enroute through another MAJCOM or Component Numbered AF theater will be coordinated with that MAJCOM or Component Numbered AF staff and AOC or AMD. The AMD logistics/MX may be composed of MX, supply and transportation personnel. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.26.6. Airlift Duty Officer. (AFSC: 11M/12M) (Rank: O3/O4)

7.6.6.26.6.1. Duty Description. The Airlift Duty Officer is responsible to the AMCT Chief to perform liaison and integration duties between the AMD and

COD in executing the ATO. The Airlift Duty Officer ensures the seamless execution of the airlift mission in the ATO while the liaison function also ensures a feedback loop exists to highlight COD impacts to the airlift mission (AMCT Chief or Airlift Execution Officer can assume the responsibilities of this position during smaller scale operations as required).

7.6.6.26.7. Flight Managers.

7.6.6.26.7.1. Duty Description. Flight Managers are Federal Aviation Administration and USAF-trained and certified aircraft dispatchers who perform many sortie-related tasks traditionally accomplished by aircrews serving as the primary point of contact for real-time support to Mobility Air Forces aircrews. Flight Managers collaborate with aircraft commanders for the safety and operational control of sorties in collaboration with air traffic service agencies. **Note:** Position may be appropriate in some theaters, but not in others.

7.6.6.27. Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team (AECT). The AECT will conduct operational planning, scheduling and execution of intra-theater AE missions. The AECT advises and briefs the AMD Chief on AE issues. The AECT provides C2 of all theater assigned and attached AE units and operations within the specified AOR/JOA and assists with inter-theater AE operations arriving, departing or transiting the AOR/JOA. The AECT receives validated patient movement requirements from the Patient Movement Requirements Center supporting the AOR/JOA. The AECT Theater Aeromedical Evacuation System (TAES) Manager will coordinate with theater medical planners and develop plans and strategies to determine appropriate force lay-down of AE ground forces and AE crews in support of joint patient movement operations. The AECT maintains secure and non-secure communications links with all AE elements, Patient Movement Requirements Centers, theater medical planners and the DDOC. The AECT should coordinate closely with the Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell and Joint Personnel Recovery Center to establish and develop integrated AE support following Personnel Recovery operations. The AECT integrates its activities with the ARCT, AMCT, ALCT, and specialty and support functions to the maximum extent possible to support the total air mobility effort. **(T-3).**

7.6.6.27.1. AECT Chief. (AFSC: 46F). (Rank O5). The AECT Chief is directly responsible to the AMD Chief for operational planning, scheduling, and execution of AE missions and positioning of AE ground support assets. The AECT Chief monitors execution of AE missions, coordinates and communicates with theater planning cells and AE elements. The functional team duties include AE operations, AE plans, and TAES management.

7.6.6.27.2. Aeromedical Evacuation Operations. (AFSC: 46F/4N0X1) (Rank: O3/O4, E5/E7).

7.6.6.27.2.1. Duty Description. AE operations is responsible to the AECT Chief for centralized control of intra-theater AE operations and coordination of inter-theater AE operations.

7.6.6.27.2.2. Aeromedical Evacuation Operations Process. In conjunction with the AE mission planning process, AECT operations personnel use this process to

execute AE missions. AE plans and operations officers and noncommissioned officers should use the AE operations checklist to assist them with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3.3.AOC, section 7.6 (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.6.27.2.3. Initial Operations Process. Use this process at the outset of air mobility operations to integrate AE into the overall theater patient-movement plan, and upon new personnel assignment or rotation into the AECT. Use the AE initial operations checklist to assist with completion of the initial operations process. Review tables in AFTTP 3.3.AOC, section 7.6 (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.6.27.2.4. Daily Operations Process. AECT plans and operations personnel use the daily operations process to conduct day-to-day AE operations. Use the AE daily operations checklist to assist with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3.3.AOC, section 7.6 (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.6.27.2.5. Aeromedical Evacuation Mission Planning Process. AECT personnel use the AE mission planning process in conjunction with the AE plans and AE operations process, to plan and execute AE missions. Use the AE mission-planning checklist to assist with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3.3.AOC, section 7.6 (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.6.27.3. Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) Plans. (AFSC: 46F/4N0X1) (Rank: O3/O4, E5/E7).

7.6.6.27.3.1. Duty Description. AE plans is responsible to the AECT Chief for planning and scheduling of AE missions.

7.6.6.27.3.2. Aeromedical Evacuation Plans Process. AECT plans personnel use the AE plans process in conjunction with the AE mission planning process, to plan AE missions. Use the AE plans checklist to assist with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3.3.AOC, section 7.6. (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.6.27.3.3. Initial Operations Process. Use this process at the outset of air mobility operations to integrate AE into the overall theater patient movement plan, and upon new personnel assignment or rotation into the AECT. Use the AE initial operations checklist to assist with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3.3.AOC, section 7.6. (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.6.27.3.4. Daily Operations Process. AECT plans and operations personnel use the daily operations process to conduct day-to-day AE operations. Use the AE daily operations checklist to assist with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3.3.AOC, section 7.6. (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs).

7.6.6.27.3.5. Aeromedical Evacuation Mission Planning Process. AECT

personnel use this process in conjunction with AE plans and AE operations processes, to plan and execute AE missions. Use the AE mission-planning checklist to assist with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3.3.AOC, section 7.6. (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.6.27.4. Theater Aeromedical Evacuation System Management (TAES). (AFSC: 41A) (Rank: O3/O4).

7.6.6.27.4.1. Duty Description. TAES will provide AE expertise within the AOC/AMD. TAES addresses TAES-specific issues at the appropriate level, manages deployed AE elements, and coordinates with theater medical planners on integration of AE support into the theater patient movement plan. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.27.4.2. TAES Management Process. The process used by the AECT TAES Manager to coordinate AE deployment and redeployment operations into the Theater Patient Movement Plan. Also, use the TAES management process to manage AE personnel and equipment Unit Type Codes and associated logistical support. Use the TAES management checklist to assist with completion of this process. Review tables in AFTTP 3.3.AOC, section 7.6. (AECT) for detailed inputs, checklists, and outputs.

7.6.6.28. Air Mobility Division Support Activities. **Note:** The following applies in the event of embedded specialty and support functions within the AMD. If not embedded, the described specialty and support functions, AMD and the pertinent specialty and support teams must coordinate these activities. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.28.1. AMD Intelligence Support. (AFSC: 14N/1N0X1) (Rank: O3/O4, E5/E7) Air Mobility Intelligence Support is responsible for all intelligence required for planning and executing theater airlift and AR missions (ensure security and program clearance).The AMD may be augmented by ISR Division personnel that are responsible for evaluating ISR information for its effect on air mobility planning, execution, and force protection. The AMD does not produce ISR information but uses ISR information and products developed by other ISR division functions within the AOC. Refer to **Chapter 6** for a complete description of ISR analysis, unit support, targeting, and operations that will help support AMD processes.

7.6.6.28.2. Air Mobility Division Knowledge Operations (AMD KO). (AFSC: 3A1X1) (Rank: E4/E7) The AMD KO is responsible to the AMD Chief for all administrative functions, to include AMD client support administrator.

7.6.6.28.3. Airspace Management. (AFSC: 1C1X1) (Rank: E5/E7) The AMD may have organic airspace management personnel that coordinate air mobility airspace requests and issues with the AOC Airspace Managers to ensure air mobility airspace requests and issues are integrated into ATO, ACO, and ACP production and execution.

7.6.6.28.4. AMD Communications Support. (AFSC: 3D0X1) (Rank: E5/E7) AMD communications support personnel are responsible to the AMD Chief for ensuring all AMD communications requirements are rapidly established and maintained. The size and make-up of the AMD communications package will be determined by the ability

of the AOC Communications Team (ACT) to support the unique requirements of the AMD during a specific exercise or contingency.

7.6.6.28.5. Army Liaison Officer. The Army Liaison Officer provides liaison with appropriate Army organizations and special staff assistance to the Air Force Commander. Assign liaison officers to the appropriate Army organization with duty at the supported Air Force headquarters. Liaison officers will participate in all training events for and operations of the supported organization. **(T-3)**.

7.6.6.29. Specialty Teams Supporting the Air Mobility Division.

Reference **Chapter 8** for more details on the following supporting functions:

7.6.6.29.1. Weather. WST provides environmental impacts on intra-theater and inter-theater airlift assets, missions and beddown locations during planning and execution to the AMD Chief and disseminate appropriately to AMD personnel.

7.6.6.29.2. Communications. Communications personnel support the entire AOC by providing C2 communications system ISR support and communication architecture to facilitate ATO production, dissemination, execution and combat operation assessment.

7.6.6.29.3. NKO. The NKO team is the JFACC's theater focal point for NKO planning and execution. The NKO team integrates into all AOC divisions and provides dedicated support to the SRD, CPD, COD and ISRD. If the AMD needs dedicated NKO support for mobility operations, Air Mobility Command and A3D provide assistance.

7.6.6.29.4. Airspace Management. AMT acts as the JFACC's focal point for coordinating airspace matters with civilian and coalition airspace authorities.

7.6.6.29.5. Judge Advocate. The Judge Advocate serves as the single point of contact to the JFACC for all operational legal issues within the AOC, coordinates all legal inputs from other Judge Advocates in the AOC and ensures uniform legal advice in the AOC.

7.6.6.29.6. Combat Support Team. The Combat Support Team supports all AOC sections with combat support information for recurring reports. At a minimum, Combat Support Team maintains logistics status reports, combat support status reports and ensures automated planning systems data and other combat support-related decision tools reflect the most current information. AMD logistics/MX will coordinate with Combat Support Team for air mobility aircraft information.

Chapter 8

SPECIALTY/SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

8.1. General. The specialty/support functions provide the AOC with diverse capabilities to help orchestrate theater air operations power. Agencies external to the AOC organization provide many of these capabilities to the AOC. It is crucial to the success of the AOC to integrate these capabilities into the air operations planning and execution process to ensure the best use of available assets. The AFFOR staff coordinates regularly with the AOC and often provides specialized expertise. The following paragraphs list specialty and support functions.

8.2. Component Liaisons. Component liaisons work for their respective component commanders and with the JFACC, AFFOR staff and AOC. Each component normally provides liaison elements (BCD, SOLE, NALE, Marine Liaison Element, etc.) that work within the AOC. These liaison elements consist of experienced specialists who provide component planning and tasking expertise and coordination capabilities. They help integrate and coordinate their component's participation in joint air operations. The AOC may identify a requirement for other liaison augmentation to support mission operations such as Coast Guard, space forces, cyberspace forces, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, 16 AF, National Reconnaissance Office, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and Federal Aviation Administration in various operational and support areas. The appropriate AOC will maintain a contact list and leverage the joint and interagency chain of command to secure additional liaison expertise as needed. Once senior leadership has agreed at the appropriate level, the Navy for example would contact the Coast Guard and facilitate the integration of LNOs, the COD would contact, facilitate and integrate the FAA, and the ISRD would contact, facilitate and integrate the respective intelligence agency.

8.2.1. Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD). The BCD supports the integration of Army Forces air and ground maneuver operations, with air component operations. Integrate BCD personnel into AOC divisions to support planning, operations, air and missile defense, intelligence, airlift and logistics, airspace control, and communications. It brings ground order of battle (friendly and enemy), situational awareness and expertise into the AOC. The BCD may also provide current ground situation inputs to AOC teams for incorporation into daily briefings and intelligence summaries. When the Commander, Army Forces is the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC), the BCD may expedite coordination of air component operations and fires within the CFLCC operating area.

8.2.2. Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE). The NALE will represent the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander's interests with the JFACC and AOC. The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander should establish a NALE to meet maritime scheme of maneuver and coordination requirements. The NALE consists of Navy personnel facilitating integration of Joint Force Maritime Component Commander and Network Control Center guidance and intent into joint air operations. As collaboration tools and network-centric operations between the AOC, the MOC, and CTFs become more enhanced and reliable, the NALE activities will become more focused on those activities requiring rapid or uninterrupted responses for Joint Force Maritime Component Commander support. When the Commander, Navy Forces is the Combined Forces Maritime Component

Commander (CFMCC), the NALE may expedite coordination of air component operations and fires with the CFMCC operating area.

8.2.3. Marine Liaison Element. The Marine Liaison Element represents the Commander, Marine Corps Forces and his associated Aviation Combat Element Commander. Marine Liaison Elements support the JFACC in integrating Marine Air-Ground Task Force fires, maneuver, and Marine air into the theater campaign and supporting JAOP. This team will be well versed in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Commander's guidance, intentions, schemes of maneuver, and direct support aviation plan.

8.2.4. Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE). The Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander, or Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force provides a SOLE to the JFACC to coordinate and integrate special operations forces activities in the entire operational environment. This joint SOLE is comprised of representatives from special operations forces aviation, intelligence, airspace, logistics, AF Special Tactics Teams, Army Special Forces, Navy Sea-Air Land Teams, and Marine Special Operations Forces, as required. Depending upon command structure agreements, the SOLE may, or may not represent coalition or allied special operations forces. The prevention of fratricide is a critical objective of the SOLE's efforts.

8.2.4.1. As the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander, Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force and the JFACC share a common environment throughout the entire operational environment, they must integrate special operations forces aviation and surface forces into joint air, space, and cyberspace operations planning and execution to prevent fratricide, duplication of effort, and conflict. The AOC/CC will ensure the SOLE actively participates in the development of air, space, and cyberspace operations strategy and the supporting plans to the theater campaign plan ensures that special operations forces efforts will, in fact be a force multiplier for the theater campaign plan.

8.2.4.2. Special operations forces normally pursue special operations forces-unique objectives, which prepare, shape or enhance broader JFC objectives. They may also operate in support of conventional objectives, or require conventional support of their objectives.

8.2.4.3. Additionally, SOLE will provide inputs and guidance to the IO team. It acts as the focal point for raising JFACC concerns or military information support operations objectives and tasking to the JFC for consideration, planning, and execution. SOLE provides support to the NKO team's Mission Information Support Operations (MISO) effort to synchronize and deconflict MISO with air, space, and cyberspace operations (leaflet drops, message broadcasts, and aircraft missions are included in the ATO, etc.)

8.2.5. Coalition/Allied Liaison Officers. Liaison officers representing coalition and allied forces are integrated into the AOC and improve situational awareness regarding the disposition of friendly forces, especially when those forces do not have a mature TACS. They are also essential for unity of effort for coalition air and missile defense operations and airspace deconfliction. Liaison officers who possess sufficient foreign and English language skills, or if teamed with linguists, can also help overcome language barriers with remote allied and coalition forces. In force projection scenarios into an immature theater, the AOC/CC should anticipate the need for liaison officers and actively seek them out via the

JFC staff, in-country military group, staff country team, or direct contact with coalition forces. Normally use the request for forces process, either in the operational pre-planning or during specific operations, to request these liaisons. Request specific expertise to assist in planned or continuing operations.

8.3. Army Air and Missile Defense Command. As the senior Army air and missile defense element at the Area Air Defense Commander's location, the Army Air and Missile Defense Command serves as the primary interface at the AOC for all land-based active air and missile defense. The Army Air and Missile Defense Command is normally under the operational control of the Commander, Army Forces. When directed by the JFC, Army Air and Missile Defense Command assets may directly support or be under tactical control of the JFACC/Area Air Defense Commander as appropriate. The roles of the Army Air and Missile Defense Command include Senior Army Air Defense Artillery lead and theater Army air and missile defense coordination. Coordination and liaison functions between all three components and coalition partners are essential to effective air and missile defense operations within a given theater. The Army Air and Missile Defense Command and AOC intelligence personnel build a collaborative air and missile defense intelligence preparation of the operational environment, which serves as the basis for joint theater air and missile defense strategies and plans. They also send a robust liaison officer team (active defense, intelligence, and attack operations personnel) to support the JFACC and Area Air Defense Commander requirements and may deploy the Army Air and Missile Defense Command TOC (Main) to the JFACC, Area Air Defense Commander location.

8.4. Combat Reports Cell. (Any AFSC) (Rank E3-O4) The combat reports cell reports directly to the CCO for guidance and direction. The manning of the combat reports cell is contingent upon the level of operations. Unless the AOC Commander assigns responsibility to knowledge operations personnel elsewhere in the AOC, combat reports personnel are the focal point for collection of current operations information provided to the AOC by all elements of the TACS and employed forces. Required reports address the operational status of forces, weapons, and control system equipment employed by an AOC. Reports Cell personnel should be knowledgeable on US Message Text Format and understand how to complete additional reports such as Operational Taskings, Operations Reports, nuclear, biological and chemical reports, and search and rescue requests. Personnel are required to access and manipulate sortie data within the TBMCS database; parse the ATO; coordinate and obtain results of flying operations from other agencies within the AOC. Personnel are also required to perform any other duties assigned by the JFACC.

8.5. Airspace Management Team (AMT). (AFSC: 13M/13B/1C1/1C5D) (Rank: 04-O5/E4-E8). The goal of the AMT is to enhance air, land, maritime and special operations forces components' effectiveness in accomplishing the JFC's objectives, while decreasing the potential for fratricide. The AMT will effectively coordinate, integrate and de-conflict airspace and implement Coordination Measures within the Joint or Coalition AOR to accomplish this objective. The AMT is a cross-functional specialty team with representatives in CPD and COD.

8.5.1. Airspace Management Team Chief. (AFSC: 13M/13B) (Rank: O4/O5).

8.5.1.1. Directs operations of the AMT supporting all AOC airspace needs especially within the CPD and COD. The AMT Chief is normally the senior airfield operations officer in the AOC.

8.5.1.2. Acts as the AOC/CC's focal point for coordinating all airspace matters with civilian, coalition and host nation airspace authorities and users. Ensures sufficient trained and qualified manning is available to support JFACC mission needs.

8.5.2. Airspace Management Team Superintendent. (AFSC 1C1 or 1C5D) (Rank E8). The AMT superintendent provides oversight and direction to the enlisted members of the AMT and reports to the AMT Chief. The AMT superintendent also fulfills the duties of the AMT Chief in his or her absence and is normally the senior Air Traffic Control non-commissioned officer in the AOC. His specific duties are the same as the AMT Chief.

8.5.3. Airspace Management Technicians. (AFSC 1C1 or 1C5D). (Rank E4-E7). The AMTs work for the AMT superintendent.

8.5.4. Airspace Management Team Limitations.

8.5.4.1. Cannot provide real-time tracking of airspace use or aircraft within active airspace coordinating measures.

8.5.4.2. Cannot identify airspace coordinating measure conflicts that no one has entered into the appropriate automation tool.

8.5.4.3. Cannot provide battlefield data such as fire support coordination line, forward edge of the battle area, forward line of own troops, or other fire support coordinating measures unless coordinated and entered into airspace tool following coordination with the BCD.

8.5.4.4. In accordance with the *DoD Foreign Clearance Manual* (FCM), requests for diplomatic clearances are the responsibility of the unit to which aircraft are assigned. Tracking progress of diplomatic clearances is the responsibility of the Service component (AFFOR staff, MARFOR staff, etc.) to which the unit is assigned **(T-0)**.

8.6. Space Operations Specialty Team. (AFSC: 13S/1C6) (Rank: O3-O4/E5-E7).

8.6.1. Director of Space Forces. The Director of Space Forces is the senior space advisor to the JFACC with broad space expertise, theater familiarity, and who provides advice on the planning, executing, and assessing of space operations. The Director of Space Forces facilitates coordination, integration, and staffing activities on behalf of the JFACC to include providing support for joint space operations to the Space Coordinating Authority. The JFACC can also direct the Director of Space Forces to sit on the special staff of the Space Coordinating Authority to provide advice on space forces and capabilities. When the JFACC is designated the Space Coordinating Authority, the Director of Space Forces will typically accomplish the day-to-day duties assigned to the Space Coordinating Authority.

8.6.2. The space operations team is the primary linkage with the Joint Space Operations Center, the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center, and the National Space Defense Center. The Space Operations Specialty Team is a horizontally cross cutting capability integrated into all five AOC divisions to enable space operations responsibilities as outlined below and the Senior Air Defense Officer when supporting theater air component units with theater ballistic missile defense warning. The team may develop, maintain, and provide passive theater ballistic missile-warning if identified as the lead team for passive warning.

8.6.3. Space Control Operations. Space Control includes defensive and offensive operations. The entire joint force (air, space, land, maritime, cyberspace, and special operations forces) conducts space control operations across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Space control operations include: protective and defensive measures to ensure friendly forces can continuously conduct space operations across the entire spectrum of conflict; and operations to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy adversary space capabilities.

8.6.3.1. Defensive Space Control. Defensive Space Control operations preserve US and friendly ability to exploit space to its advantage. Active and passive actions both protect friendly space-related capabilities from enemy attack or interference. Friendly space-related capabilities include space systems such as satellites, terrestrial systems such as ground stations, and communication links. Defensive Space Control operations are key to enabling continued exploitation of space by the US and its allies by protecting, preserving, recovering, and reconstituting friendly space-related capabilities before, during, and after an attack by an adversary. Defensive Space Control operations may target an adversary's space control capability to ensure access to space capabilities and freedom of operations in space. Demonstrated Defensive Space Control capabilities may deter adversaries from attacking US space systems by convincing them that an attack against a space system will be ineffective and will not significantly impair warfighting capabilities.

8.6.3.2. Offensive Space Control. Offensive Space Control operations preclude an adversary from exploiting space to their advantage. Offensive Space Control operations may target an adversary's space capability (space systems, terrestrial systems, links, or third party space capability), using a variety of permanent and/or reversible means. As adversaries become more dependent on space capabilities, space control operations have the ability to produce effects that directly affect their ability and will to wage war at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Denying adversary space capabilities may hinder their ability to effectively organize, coordinate, and orchestrate a military campaign. For example, employ offensive space control operations against an adversary's use of satellite communications, while precision bombing targets their ground-based communications network, resulting in the synergistic effect of reducing or eliminating their C2 capabilities to communicate with their forces.

8.6.3.3. Space Force space control operations support both the space control mission of USSPACECOM and theater military operations. USSPACECOM space control mission includes surveillance of space, protection of US and friendly space systems, prevention of an adversary's ability to use space systems for hostile purpose, and negation of adversarial capability if necessary.

8.7. Non-Kinetic Operations Team (NKO Team).

8.7.1. General. The NKO Team is a single organization that serves as an administrative grouping of non-kinetic and information-related capability subject matter experts. The NKO Team provides the core membership of the Information Operations Working Group (IOWG), which serves as the JFACC's theater focal point for planning, execution, and assessment of non-kinetic operations and IO. The IOWG is an adaptable forum to ensure coordinated use of different non-kinetic and information-related capabilities; ensure coordinated use of non-

kinetic and information-related capabilities with kinetic capabilities; ensure comprehensive planning of influence activities against desired audiences; and help ensure the congruence of words and actions presented by the AF in support of component and CCDR or JFC objectives. The IOWG accomplishes this by integrating expertise and capabilities into the ATO cycle, other AOC processes, and AFFOR staff planning activities via various teams and working groups. As the IOWG is the primary integration venue for non-kinetic and information-related capabilities, IOWG membership is situation-dependent and will include other capability specialists (from across the AOC and AFFOR staff) as required. The IOWG battle rhythm and agenda will adapt to the supported activity or planning meeting as necessary. (See AFTTP 3-3.AOC for additional information.) These processes primarily apply to geographic AOCs. Global AOCs may have different organizations and processes. NKO Teams should coordinate with other NKO Teams for support, unity of effort, and situational awareness when necessary.

8.7.1.1. The AOC NKO Team includes planning, execution, and assessment capabilities in the following mission areas: electronic warfare, space control, offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, MISO, operations security, military deception, counter propaganda, and engagements. In addition, the NKO Team often serves as IO, information-related capabilities, and non-kinetic operations capability specialists for the AFFOR staff.

8.7.1.2. The NKO Team will normally report to the SRD chief during steady-state operations and to the AOC commander during contingency operations. Directed by a team chief, the NKO Team normally supports each step of the ATO cycle by integrating NKO Team members into divisions and teams, including SGT, SPT, OAT, TET, MAAP Team, ACF, ISRD Targets Team, and duty positions in the COD. NKO Team members should attend training based on commander determination of principal duty position during contingency operations. For example, a crewmember assigned to be a Non-kinetic Duty Officer should attend COD initial qualification training.

8.7.1.3. As the team lead, the NKO Team Chief handles administrative non-kinetic operations issues for the team. At a minimum, the NKO Team Chief will address information-related capabilities and non-kinetic capability issues, including: organization, training, and equipping issues; manning and personnel issues (including annual reports); financial issues; and team member work schedules, including whom should attend which meetings or working groups. **(T-3)**.

8.7.1.4. At a minimum, there should be one subject matter expert for each of the functions described in the following sections. If manning does not allow for separate subject matter experts to perform each of the functions listed in the subsequent sections, the NKO Team Chief will identify an individual to be responsible for each function and ensure proper training. **(T-3)**. **(Note:** operations security is a commander's program and the commander formally appoints the Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Manager for the command. The AOC operations security point of contact may be the Program Manager for the entire Component MAJCOM or Component Numbered AF or just a coordinator (depending on who the commander appoints)). NKO Team members may come from any AFSC, however, 12B/F/R, 14N, 17D/17S, 14F, 1B4, 1Nx are the most common AFSCs on the team, with 35P supporting synchronization and deconfliction

with command information and media activities. NKO Team members should attend applicable division training.

8.7.1.5. NKO Team members will lead or participate in various cells and working groups, related to their particular specialty. **(T-3)**. Working groups are enduring or ad hoc organizations within the AOC formed around a specific function whose purpose is to provide analysis to users. The working group consists of a core functional group and other staff and capability specialists. Cells and working groups may include: IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MISO Working Group, Military Deception (MILDEC) Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, offensive cyberspace working group, defensive cyberspace working group, Combat Information Cell, Threat Working Group, joint working groups and the Special Technical Operations working group.

8.7.1.6. Depending on mission tasking and available manpower, the AOC Commander may modify the organizational structure of the NKO Team. If the situation arises where other non-kinetic and/or information-related capabilities require inclusion on the NKO Team (such as Public Affairs) or existing manpower is augmented, the team may be adapted. If, for example, electronic warfare or cyberspace missions and manning increase, there may be a need to have a Cyberspace team, an Electronic Warfare team or even a combined Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Cell in addition to the NKO Team. In major combat operations, the COD may need a Non-Kinetic Duty Officer team to monitor and make dynamic changes during execution. These additional team(s) would normally operate independently of, but should integrate planning and execution efforts with the NKO Team via the IOWG. See AFTTP 3-3.AOC for additional information.

8.7.1.7. Ensure full integration of the NKO team with special technical operations planning.

8.7.2. Information Operations (IO).

8.7.2.1. IO is an integrating staff function; do not consider it a non-kinetic capability.

8.7.2.1.1. IO involves the systematic consideration and coordination of all planned verbal, visual, and symbolic activities, employed at the operational and tactical levels, to convey themes, intentions, messages or meet behavior-related operational objectives.

8.7.2.1.2. IO planners consider the use of tools, techniques, or activities employed within a dimension of the information environment to create expected behavioral effects and operationally desirable conditions. These tools, techniques, and activities are information related capabilities. IO planners also assess the adversary's behaviors in response to the blue-force application of kinetic and/or non-kinetic capabilities.

8.7.2.1.3. The Component Commander's Communication Strategy is the commander's process to coordinate and synchronize themes, messages, images, and actions to support operational-level, communication-related objectives and ensure the integrity and consistency of themes and messages to the lowest tactical level. This process should coordinate with those above, below and adjacent to deliver a mutually supporting communication to the intended audiences. At a minimum, the Component Commander's Communication Strategy is comprised of an activity synchronization chart in support of component inform and influence related objectives, and

consolidated lists of talking points for specific audiences of concern. Although the IO planner (or designated communication synchronization lead) is the overall responsible person to develop the Component Commander's Communication Strategy, all AOC planners may be involved in the process.

8.7.2.1.4. Normally several individuals will perform the IO function under the direction of a lead IO subject matter expert (IO Planner), who may be dual-hatted as the NKO Team Chief. The IO Planner will serve as the primary focal point for all IO matters, coordinating with the AFFOR staff, HHQ, and other government and military agencies in support of IO-related objectives and activities.

8.7.2.1.5. The IOWG is the lead by the IO Planner. The IOWG will normally:

8.7.2.1.5.1. Meet on a regular scheduled basis as well as on an as needed basis to provide the IO Planner subject matter expert with information or analysis necessary to perform their tasks. **(T-3)**.

8.7.2.1.5.2. Consist of IO, MISO, OPSEC, MILDEC, electronic warfare, cyberspace operations, space operations, public affairs, CP, counter-intelligence, Office of Special Investigations, and other planners as required. **(T-3)**.

8.7.2.1.5.3. Participate in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, Joint Task Force and/or CCDR IOWG's, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**.

8.7.3. Non-kinetic and information-related capabilities: IO and non-kinetic operations utilize and integrate the same capabilities. The focus of IO is the information environment, targeting the decision-making cycle of adversaries. Non-kinetics focuses on the operational environment, targeting the kill-chain analysis of adversary systems. Non-kinetic and information related capabilities and activities include, but are not limited to: MISO, operations security, military deception, electronic warfare, cyberspace operations, space operations, public affairs, counter propaganda, counter-intelligence, commander's communication planning, and engagements. The following sections describe these capabilities, and the responsibilities of their associated subject-matter experts.

8.7.3.1. Military Information Support Operations (MISO). MISO are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in support of military mission objectives. The MISO subject matter expert(s) will serve as the expert on human influence and the cognitive domain and is responsible for the development and inclusion of MISO and human influence related objectives into operational-level planning.

8.7.3.2. Operations Security (OPSEC). OPSEC is a process of identifying, analyzing and controlling critical information indicating friendly actions associated with military operations and other activities. This process identifies actions that adversary intelligence systems can observe, and determines which specific indications they could collect, analyze, and interpret to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. The OPSEC process also selects and executes measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. The

person(s) responsible for the OPSEC function will perform applicable responsibilities found in AFI 10-701, *Operations Security* and applicable MAJCOM supplement.

8.7.3.3. Military Deception (MILDEC). MILDEC actions are those actions executed deliberately to mislead adversary military, paramilitary or violent extremist organization decision makers; thereby causing the adversary decision maker to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. MILDEC is applicable at all levels of war, across the range of military operations, and during all phases of military operations. Integrate MILDEC at the earliest possible phase of an operation to ensure its effectiveness. Base MILDEC on the specific situation and the supported commander's objectives for the operation or campaign. Do not confuse MILDEC with perfidy. Perfidy is the false claim to protections under the law of war to secure a military advantage over the opponent. Acts of perfidy invite the confidence of enemy persons to lead them to believe they are entitled to, or are obligated to accord, protection under the law of war, with intent to betray that confidence.

8.7.3.4. Electronic Warfare. Electronic warfare is any military action involving the use of the EM spectrum, to include directed energy to control the EM spectrum, or to attack an enemy. Within the AOC, electronic warfare should be fully integrated into strategy development, operational-level assessment, detailed planning, ATO production, and execution functions.

8.7.3.5. Cyberspace Operations. These organizations, capabilities, processes, and procedures are rapidly evolving. Refer to the most recent AFTTP 3-3.AOC for definitive guidance. Cyberspace operations is the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace (a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers). Cyberspace operations have applicability across the range of military operations. Address the application of cyberspace capabilities in operations plans and integrate them across all warfighting domains during operational planning and execution. Cyberspace capabilities are most effective when synchronized with other kinetic and non-kinetic operations.

8.7.3.5.1. When established, the Director of Cyberspace Forces is the senior cyberspace advisor for the integration of the Department of Defense Information Network, defensive cyberspace operations, and offensive cyberspace operations capabilities in support of air component operations. The Director of Cyberspace Forces will coordinate and synchronize cyberspace operations through the planning, targeting, and execution processes, and facilitate integration of cyberspace capabilities through coordination of cyberspace capabilities, authorities, and priorities with the Joint Cyber Center and supporting Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber. **(T-3).**

8.7.3.5.2. Cyberspace Operations Cell: The Cyberspace Operations Cell will work with the Director of Cyberspace Forces (when established) to coordinate and integrate cyberspace capabilities with the IO NKO Team, cyberspace planners, and the Joint Cyber Center. Refer to AFTTP 3-3.AOC for a more detailed list of responsibilities and actions. **(T-3).**

8.7.3.6. Public Affairs. Public Affairs comprises public information, command information, and public engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. One or more Public Affairs personnel assigned to or deployed to augment the Component Numbered AF or Component MAJCOM Public Affairs office will normally provide Public Affairs planning capability.

8.7.3.7. Counter Propaganda (CP). Counter propaganda operations are efforts used to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from, foreign psychological operations or propaganda efforts, including misinformation and disinformation. Adversary propaganda frequently targets the resolve of American and allied publics through national and international mass media. In these cases, Public Affairs will normally lead the counter propaganda effort and aim to inform friendly or neutral audiences appropriately about military operations. Adversary propaganda also may target audiences within the theater of operations through more localized or segmented methods of communication. In these cases, there may be increased emphasis placed on information-related capabilities outside of Public Affairs, and an IO or MISO specialist should lead the effort. A combination of global and local propaganda efforts requires careful synchronization of information-related capabilities activities by the person(s) best equipped to manage the component's communication efforts, which may vary from scenario to scenario.

8.7.3.8. Counter Intelligence. Office of Special Investigations agent(s) will normally provide counter intelligence support to the entire AFFOR and its elements.

8.7.3.9. Engagements. An engagement is a personal interaction by an Airman with an audience in the AOR, designed to inform and/or influence. The AOC should plan for engagements in support of Component Commander's Communication Strategy and component commander's objective(s). The AOC should also ensure that those persons involved in engagements are aware of CCCS talking points and objectives they should support while interacting with others.

8.8. Judge Advocate. (AFSC: 51J) (Rank: O4/O5). The role of Judge Advocates in an AOC is to provide legal expertise and resources in support of the JFACC, each of the five AOC divisions, as well as specialty and support functions within the AOC. The size and nature of the air operations, the tempo, and the number of processes in use by the AOC will assist in determining the number of Judge Advocates assigned to support an AOC. However, the AOC should have dedicated Judge Advocates for the JFACC, SRD, CPD, and COD on all shifts when all processes are in regular use.

8.8.1. The Judge Advocate assigned to the JFACC will also be the lead AOC Judge Advocate, and coordinate the activities of and be responsible for all Judge Advocates assigned to the AOC. To advise the JFACC, a Judge Advocate will attend the major briefings or decision meetings attended by the JFACC. Judge Advocates assigned to the JFACC staff will provide advice on and responsibilities under international agreements and international agreements as well as HHQ guidance, Law of War, and ROE/RUF. Additionally, a Judge Advocate will attend any other meetings necessary to gather information to provide the JFACC timely and accurate advice. **(T-3).**

8.8.2. Judge Advocates advising the SRD will ensure that all proposed strategy is consistent with international law (which includes the Law of War), domestic law, ROE/RUFs, orders from superior headquarters, and any other specific guidance or constraints specified by the JFC, other superior commanders, or the JFACC. **(T-0)**. Judge Advocates advising this division will serve as principal assistants in the process of drafting requests for supplemental ROE/RUF and reviewing ROE/RUF approved by the CCDR or other higher echelons of command. **(T-0)**. The AOC generates ROE/RUF inputs with representatives from all of the major weapon systems, Personnel Recovery, IO, Space, ISRD, Legal, all the Services Liaisons, and others designated by the JFACC. Although ROE/RUF development is the responsibility of the SRD, Judge Advocates should brief ROE/RUF or assist others who brief ROE/RUF.

8.8.3. Judge Advocates advising the COD will provide legal counsel on all matters within the purview of that division, including conducting a thorough legal analysis for selected targets and weaponeering. **(T-3)**. In some circumstances, they will work closely with the ISRD targets analysts, TET Chief, and MAAP Chief in reviewing the choice of tactics for certain sensitive targets. This requires Judge Advocates to participate in the development of the JIPTL and MAAP throughout the ATO cycle. The Judge Advocate assigned to CPD will also be responsible for working with the C2 plans Chief to develop the ROE/RUF chapter for the SPINS **(T-3)**. The Judge Advocate assigned to the SRD or CPD also provides support to the special technical operations team as needed.

8.8.4. Judge Advocates advising the COD will provide legal counsel on all matters within the purview of that division, including insuring Law of War and ROE/RUF compliance for dynamic targeting, Personnel Recovery, interpreting SPINS and ROE/RUF, and addressing other emergent legal issues that arise during the execution of the current ATO. **(T-3)**.

8.8.5. Judge Advocates advising the ISRD will provide legal counsel on all matters within the purview of that division. This includes intelligence authorities, law of war considerations (e.g., military objective, feasible precautions, proportionality analyses) and ROE limitations and restrictions. **(T-3)**.

8.8.6. Judge Advocates advising the AMD will provide legal counsel on all matters within the purview of that division including international laws and agreements affecting landing rights, over-flights, sovereignty, taxes, customs, aircraft accidents, and civil reserve air fleet. These issues need to be coordinated with the JFACC Judge Advocate staff. **(T-3)**.

8.8.7. Judge Advocates advising specialty teams or AOC personnel in communication roles, such as the NKO Team, IO Cell, or Combat Information Cell, will provide legal counsel on all matters within the purview of that team or role, including reviewing communications and assisting in the development of communication courses of action and products. **(T-3)**.

8.9. Weather Specialty Team (WST). Administratively assigned to the COD, the WST is a horizontally crosscutting capability integrated into all five AOC divisions to enable ATO mission planning and execution. The composition and size of the WST will be dependent on the size and scope of operations. WST members must possess security clearances that provide the ability to support each AOC division effectively. **(T-3)**. The WST provides timely notification of Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) impacts affecting launch and recovery bases, active orbits or tracks, routes of flight, and other areas of operations as directed by the CCO. The WST will generate tailored weather graphics derived from the assigned theater Operational

Weather Squadron (OWS) surface forecast and aviation hazard charts, 14th Weather Squadron, and appropriate Naval METOC centers that depict weather impacts across the planning and execution cycle for the JOA. METOC refers to the whole range of atmospheric, oceanographic, and space environment phenomena. **(T-3)**.

8.9.1. Weather Specialty Team Chief. (AFSC: 15W) (Rank: O3/O4). The WST chief is responsible for integrating METOC and METOC effects information into all AOC planning and execution processes. Information provided by the WST Chief, in general, consists of daily briefings to AOC and JFACC staff, with updates as required, on significant METOC impacts to strategic and operational-level planning and execution. The WST Chief also defines requirements for reachback support from the appropriate METOC organization.

8.9.2. SRD Support. Immerse the WST in strategic planning from the outset to gain a complete understanding of JFACC intentions in meeting JFC objectives and to ensure consideration of climatological and current METOC conditions in the forming of strategy. The WST uses medium to long-range forecasts and climatological information to identify potential environmental impacts to enemy and friendly operations. During development of the joint air estimate, JAOP, and branch and sequel plans, the strategy plans team will use meteorological information to mitigate impacts to friendly forces while capitalizing on advantages due to asymmetric environmental effects on enemy capabilities. **(T-3)**. Additionally, the WST will focus the strategy guidance team on METOC conditions in the 48-96 hour timeframe that could degrade friendly force capabilities to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess potential targets. **(T-3)**. Thorough weather information at this stage of planning can have a greater and more influential impact on operations than weather information delivered closer to execution. For this reason, it is imperative to integrate one or more members of the WST into long-range planning. The more familiar the WST member is with the planners, the mission, and the weapon systems used to accomplish the mission, the more effective will be the exploitation of weather information.

8.9.3. CPD Support. The WST will provide medium to near term METOC information to the MAAP Team and TET to support all aspects of mission planning, including target area METOC effects information, predictions of METOC impacts on missile effectiveness, and METOC impacts to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensors. Provide the MAAP team METOC-effects decision aids, including electro-optical and space METOC-effects guidance, for determination of timing and weapons selection. Properly integrated, METOC operations play a key role, especially during development of the MAAP. The WST should highlight METOC conditions in the next 48-72 hours that could degrade friendly forces' ability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess potential targets. These forecasts provide the TET and MAAP Team an opportunity to adjust the timing of missions as necessary. In addition, the MAAP Team can exploit target METOC information and METOC impacts to sensors, weapons, weapons systems, and platforms to modify weapons and sensor configurations and system mixes. By optimally pairing weapons systems and platforms to targets based on METOC conditions, the MAAP Team can maximize the probability of achieving desired effects. The WST should study METOC effects on enemy weapons systems and provide METOC influences on enemy systems so that the MAAP and TET understand threats to friendly forces. **(T-3)**.

8.9.4. COD Support. The WST will support all aspects of mission execution including dynamic targeting and time sensitive targeting and Personnel Recovery missions, the BCD,

and other emerging targeting decisions. **(T-3)**. The WST will maintain situational awareness of the meteorological, oceanographic and solar conditions and provide timely notification of METOC elements affecting launch and recovery bases, active orbits and tracks, route of flight, and other operations or areas as directed by the CCO. **(T-3)**. To increase mission effectiveness, the WST should inject relevant, accurate METOC and space environment information as early as possible into the daily ATO process, enabling decision-makers to mitigate risks and optimize the pairing of capabilities to targets. The WST should also be responsive to the need for real-time or near real-time forecasts in support to dynamic retargeting; time sensitive targets; combat search and rescue operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection activities; and other emerging requirements.

8.9.5. ISRD Support. The WST will provide METOC information and predicted impacts on ISR sensors, and other friendly and enemy assets and activities. **(T-3)**. The WST will collect any METOC information and imagery available from hostile areas or other areas where routine METOC data is unavailable. **(T-3)**. To support ISR operations effectively, the WST should have access to detailed ISR mission profiles and collaborate with appropriate analysts to identify the probable METOC sensitivities of enemy capabilities. The security classification of this information may demand that the WST Chief directly support the ISRD. During joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, analysts should leverage METOC information to help determine likely enemy courses of action, but more importantly, to highlight instances in which enemy capabilities are degraded more than friendly capabilities (i.e., asymmetrically), offering friendly force commanders an exploitable advantage. The ISRD should employ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensor and system capabilities to provide non-traditional collection of METOC information in data-sparse and data-denied areas. METOC forces leverage this information to formulate a more accurate depiction of current and predicted METOC conditions in the operational environment, enhancing support to the joint force. The environmental information obtained from the ISRD should be reintegrated into the forecast process of the theater Operational Weather Squadron and weather flights or detachments providing mission execution forecasts.

8.9.6. AMD Support. The WST will provide the AMD with tailored information on any METOC impacts to air mobility operations. **(T-3)**. This should include impacts to theater air mobility operations such as transport, air refueling, paradrop, and medical evacuation. In particular, the WST delivers strategic and operational-level environmental impacts on areas of departure and recovery bases (including alternates), landing and drop zones, and air refueling routes throughout the designated AOR/JOA. The WST should keep the AMD staff and Director of Mobility Forces apprised at all times of significant METOC impacts to mobility operations. The WST will coordinate with the 618 AOC/WST for mobility missions controlled by the TACC. **(T-3)**.

8.10. Logistics-Combat Support Team. The Logistics- Combat Support Team is the AOC's focal point for all Combat Support related issues affecting the AOC's ability to plan and execute combat air power. When conducting joint operations, other service or coalition logisticians should supply combat support information affecting support and sustainment to the Logistics-Combat Support Team. During strategy development and other planning processes, the AFFOR staff will provide the Logistics-Combat Support Team assessments of potential impact to beddown decisions, impacts of time phased force and deployment data, and feasibility and forces closure estimates. The Logistics-Combat Support Team is comprised of officers and non-

commissioned officers from across the Agile Combat Support community, as the mission or situation requires. The Logistics-Combat Support Team gives the AOC an on-site team with a broad range of combat support expertise as well as a direct line of communication to the combat support expertise on the AFFOR staff. The Logistics-Combat Support Team is a part of the AFFOR staff, and reports directly to the AFFOR A4 staff. A field-grade combat support officer familiar with AOC processes and the broad range of combat support operations that may affect AOC processes and ATO execution leads the Logistics-Combat Support Team.

8.11. Knowledge Management (KM) Team. The Component Headquarters organization will establish an effective KM structure and flow strategy throughout the air and space component. Design this strategy to meet the entire Component Headquarters and subordinate organizations' needs for seamless, relevant and timely information, while optimizing the use of information infrastructure resources. The AOC KM support team is a sub-element of the Component Headquarters KM organization. The goal of KM is to provide relevant, precise, accurate, timely, usable, and complete information that supports the commander in obtaining situational awareness, and an understanding that allows him to make timely and effective decisions faster than the adversary can react. In a non-combat situation, it enables a tempo that allows the force to shape the situation or react to changes and accomplish the mission.

8.11.1. General Information. General information is a weapon and a target. The intent is to treat information as an asset, just like any other weapon or tool of warfare. It controls forces and delivers precise effects. Command and control of information supports the commander in three main areas: achieving situational awareness and understanding, making decisions, and communicating execution information to implement those decisions. In that context, everyone in the AOC is an information manager with an inherent responsibility to acquire, assess, reason, question, correlate, and disseminate quality information to other users, and to maintain and protect it throughout its life cycle.

8.11.2. Supported and Supporting Division or Team Relationships. The division or team chiefs, information and information system users have a shared, corporate responsibility with the KM support team for the effectiveness and efficiency of the KM processes supporting AOC operations.

8.11.3. KM Team Responsibilities. The AOC KM Team is responsible for the AOC KM Plan that documents applicable processes and knowledge flow optimizing the availability of timely and relevant information required for AOC decisions. The KM Officer leads the AOC KM Team. The AOC KM plan is created in collaboration with all divisions, and the AOC/CC approves it. The KM Team synchronizes the KM Plan with applicable AFFOR staff and Combatant Command KM teams. **(T-3)**.

8.11.3.1. AOC KM Officer. (AFSC 17D or any KM Trained Officer as assigned by AOC/CC). (Rank O4/O5). The KM Officer is directly responsible to the AOC/CC with functional coordination responsibilities to the AOC Divisions, AFFOR KM Team, and Combatant Command KM Team. Provide the KM Officer and respective KM Team members with any applicable training offered by both AFFOR and Combatant Command KM Team. The KM Officer must proactively engage with the respective KM community to ensure the KM Plan is synchronized and implementable. The AOC KM Team is normally composed of the KM Officer, KM non-commissioned officer in charge, and KM Team members. The AOC/CC, in coordination with AFFOR staff and Combatant

Command KM leadership, will make the final decision on composition of the AOC KM Team depending upon each unique circumstance. **(T-3)**.

8.11.3.2. Division and Specialty/Support KM Team. Team personnel are directly responsible to the division and specialty or support team chiefs they are supporting. They are responsible for assuring that the supported division or specialty or support team is complying with the KM plan. Specialty or Support team KM personnel serving in functional specific positions such as AOC special security office, etc. are also responsible to their team for performing KM duties.

8.11.3.3. KM Superintendent. (AFSC: 3D0X1 preferred) (Rank: E5/E6/E7).

8.11.4. **AOC KM Personnel.** (AFSC: 3D0X1) (Rank: E3 – E6).

8.12. Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell. The Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell will plan, coordinate, and direct the execution of Personnel Recovery missions for the JFACC. The Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell may vary in size and composition; organize it based upon mission requirements. Duties involve coordinating the five Personnel Recovery execution tasks of reporting, locating, supporting, recovering, and reintegrating isolated personnel. Isolated personnel are, in effect fleeting targets of critical value—available capabilities and assets should be expeditiously coordinated and employed to effect successful recoveries. The JFACC, through the AOC and Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell, exercises tactical control of joint force-assigned, Personnel Recovery-capable assets made available for Personnel Recovery tasking. The Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell is typically composed of a chief or deputy chief, duty officers, planners, controllers; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape personnel; and intelligence specialists. The Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell is typically a specialty team in the AOC with the Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell Chief responsible to the CCO during daily execution. To optimize support capabilities, the Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell should be located on the COD floor. Some of the Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell personnel integrate or closely work with various sections of the AOC.

8.13. Special Technical Operations (STO) Team. The STO team will ensure proper integration of special technical capabilities with conventional operations to meet JFC and JFACC objectives as defined in the JAOP. **(T-3)**. The STO works for the AOC/CC and supports all divisions within the AOC. The STO planning process mirrors the conventional planning process, and differ only in their special security requirements. The STO team relies on collaboration with STO briefed individuals in the AOC divisions and teams to develop the separate but necessary classified concepts, briefings, legal reviews and documents for strategy, guidance, targeting, apportionment, plans, and operations.

8.13.1. STO Team Composition. Positions annotated below represent core team members, permanently assigned to the AOC. As contingencies evolve, additional STO manning may be required. Augmentation from other service components and/or weapon system subject matter experts should be anticipated.

8.13.1.1. AOC STO Chief: (AFSCs: 11X, 12X, 13B, 13S, 14X, 17S) (Rank O5). The AOC STO Chief facilitates all STO security and operationally sensitive military capabilities activities in the AOC. The AOC STO Chief's primary focus is to support all AOC divisions and teams, and appropriately integrate sensitive military capabilities into Joint strategy, plans, and operations. Additionally, the AOC STO Chief coordinates with

other components and JFC STO teams to synchronize plans and operations. This coordination includes requesting reach back support. The STO Chief will appoint a deputy from the officers within the cell to act as Chief in his/her absence, requesting additional capabilities, and obtaining necessary authorities to deploy and employ STO capabilities. **(T-3)**.

8.13.1.2. STO Intelligence Officer. (AFSC 14N) (Rank O4). The STO intelligence officer works with other AOC Divisions to coordinate STO specific collection plan requirements, RFIs, target nominations, and updating the STO team on the current battle situation. In addition, this position is responsible for coordinating STO mission intelligence assessment and provides those STO assessments back to AOC STO planners.

8.13.1.3. STO Duty Officers (AFSCs 11, 12, 13, 17) (Rank: O3/O4). The STO Duty Officers will monitor, coordinate, and direct STO efforts during ATO execution. STO Duty Officers monitor STO-related missions on the ATO, issue execute or terminate instructions, and participate in the dynamic targeting or time sensitive targeting process, to ensure retargeting of STO targets as appropriate. STO Duty Officers feed results of STO execution back to STO planners for consideration in devising follow-on plans and to SRD operational assessment personnel to help them evaluate effectiveness and efficiency of air, space, and cyberspace operations in achieving JFC and JFACC objectives.

8.13.1.4. STO KM Manager: (AFSC 3DX) (Rank E5/E6). The STO KM Manager ensures proper setup, maintenance, and operation of STO equipment. This position manages access to STO information, systems, and facilities for all briefed personnel. Additionally, the STO KM Manager transmits, receives, and distributes special capabilities information.

8.13.1.5. STO Security. (AFSC 3P or 1NX) (Rank E5/E6). The STO security member manages access to STO information, capabilities and facilities. Transmits, receives, and distributes special capabilities information. Additionally, assists the AOC STO Chief in billet management actions.

8.13.1.6. STO Planners (Varies). STO planners provide inputs to the divisions that affect or support division products and processes.

8.14. Regional Air Movement Control Center (RAMCC). As a specialty team reporting to the AOC/CC, the RAMCC serves two specific functions with regard to assisting the JFACC in the role of Airspace Control Authority. The first function of the RAMCC is to provide airspace control when there is an inadequate Air Traffic Control infrastructure. In this capacity, the RAMCC uses procedural measures to deconflict air traffic transiting the AOR/JOA. The second function of the RAMCC is to provide contingency airflow management, of civilian and military air traffic, at designated airfields within the AOR/JOA. This ensures interagency coordination during planning and execution to prevent exceeding airfield capabilities with respect to parking and support.

8.14.1. RAMCC Organization.

8.14.1.1. Long-Range Plans. Focusing on operations beyond 24 hours, the Long-Range Plans Section coordinates with the air space planners to develop airspace requirements, procedures for deconfliction and slot times for aircrew, planners and C2 agencies.

8.14.1.2. Current Operations. Focusing on plan as established by Long-Range Plans Section, the Current Operations Section focuses on making mission adjustments as required to maximize throughput and maintain systemic velocity.

8.14.1.3. Airfield Operations. Liaising with Airfield Managers and C2 elements, Airfield Operations identifies capabilities such as parking and working maximum (aircraft) on ground that have a direct impact airflow planning and executions. Capabilities are coordinated with Long-Range Plans and Current Operations for the purpose of planning and execution. This team is necessary, at the discretion of the RAMCC Team Chief, if Long-Range Plans and Current Operations are unable to coordinate with Airfield Managers and C2 elements.

8.14.1.4. Mission Support. Mission Support provides communications and administrative support for the RAMCC. This is of particular need when the RAMCC is not collocated with the AOC. This team is generally not required when the RAMCC is collocated with the AOC.

8.14.1.5. RAMCC Team Chief. (AFSC: 11/12 Rated Officer/13M). (Rank O5) The RAMCC Team Chief is responsible to the AOC/CC for the overall management of air traffic deconfliction and airflow management. Serving as a focal point for interagency coordination, the team chief will ensure the RAMCC is a fair and impartial broker in satisfying the airspace and airflow needs of all its customers. **(T-3)**.

8.14.1.6. Long Range Plans Section Chief. (AFSC: 11/12 Rated Officer/13M). (Rank O4) The Long Range Plans Section Chief is responsible to the RAMCC Team Chief for coordinating with airspace planners, aircrew, mission planners and C2 agencies to develop a sound deconfliction and airflow plan to facilitate operations within the AOR/JOA. The Long-Range Plans Chief will establish processes and procedures and directs planners for the issuing of slot times. **(T-3)**.

8.14.1.7. Current Operations Section Chief. (AFSC: AFSC: 11/12 Rated Officer/13M). (Rank O4) The Current Operations Section Chief is responsible to the RAMCC Team Chief for coordinating with aircrew mission planners and C2 agencies to monitor and adjust the deconfliction and airflow management plan to ensure successful operations in the AOR/JOA.

8.14.1.8. Airfield Operations Section Chief. (AFSC: 11/12 Rated Officer/13M). (Rank O4) The Airfield Operations Section Chief is responsible to the RAMCC Team Chief for liaising with Airfield Managers and C2 elements to identify airfield requirements and coordinate with Long Range Plans and Current Operations.

8.14.1.9. Mission Support Section Chief. (AFSC: 17D). The Mission Support Section Chief is responsible to the RAMCC Team Chief for ensuring the RAMCC computer and communications systems are adequate and maintained to ensure mission success. The Mission Support function also provides administrative support to the RAMCC.

8.15. ATO Coordination Team. (AFSC: 11/12/13/14) (Rank O4/O5). The AOC/CC will determine the size of the overall ATO coordination team **(T-3)**. Assign each ATO to an experienced two-person or greater cell. ATO coordinators are active participants in key AOC battle rhythm processes throughout the entire ATO cycle. They help ensure effective and efficient production, dissemination, and execution of each assigned ATO, and ensure guidance is

integrated and maintained in all applicable AOC processes. As the primary focal point for their assigned ATO, ATO cells help maintain continuity of effort across the seams between AOC divisions or teams and resolve issues as required. ATO coordinators should have appropriate special technical operations and special access program clearances to facilitate coordination required to integrate the planning and execution of each ATO and associated special technical operations and special access program activities. If required, add additional expertise from space, IO, and intelligence to the team. Find specific ATO Coordinator functions in AFTTP 3-3.AOC.

8.16. Standoff Weapons Management. Any AOC anticipating standoff weapon operations should establish a Standoff Attack Coordination Cell. This Cell will synchronize and integrate standoff munition operations with other missions in the AOR. The Standoff Attack Coordination Cell will be a specialty team supporting AOC operations. The cell will work primarily within the AOC's/OC's CPD with the MAAP Team, although the cell may also support the AOC's/OC's COD. Draw the Standoff Attack Coordination Cell Chief from within the AOC. The cell and chief's position are not full-time manned organizations or positions with dedicated personnel from the AOC. Activate the cell when anticipating or conducting military operations that include standoff weapon systems. The Standoff Attack Coordination Cell Chief may elect to augment his support staff with other personnel from within the AOC, manpower permitting.

8.16.1. Standoff Munitions Application Center (SMAC). The SMAC is located at Barksdale AFB, LA, has direct liaison authority with geographic combatant commands, and reports directly to the Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike (JFCC-GS/CC). The Standoff Munitions Application Center is composed of personnel trained in planning cruise missile routes and will have the expertise to synchronize and integrate cruise missile operations to include integration with other air operations.

8.16.1.1. Standoff Munitions Application Center (SMAC) Contingency or Planned Operational Roles. The SMAC provides training to the Standoff Attack Coordination Cell. The SMAC, although outside the supported Geographic Combatant Commander and AOC, will support the Standoff Attack Coordination Cell or AOC through deployment to the supported AOC or through reachback **(T-3)**. If the Standoff Attack Coordination Cell Chief uses the reachback option, he/she may elect to have one or more liaison officers from Standoff Munitions Application Center deploy forward to the supported AOC.

8.16.1.2. Standoff Munitions Application Center (SMAC) Peacetime or Steady State Ops Roles. During peacetime, the Standoff Munitions Application Center will provide ongoing expertise in standoff munitions planning and coordinating cruise missile operations **(T-3)**. Standoff Munitions Application Center representatives will be able to travel to the AOC to support periodic deliberate planning sessions and exercises **(T-3)**. The standoff munitions or cruise missiles that the Standoff Attack Coordination Cell and Standoff Munitions Application Center will integrate into other combat operations include the conventional air launched cruise missile; all versions of the Tomahawk land attack missile, joint air-to-surface standoff missile and joint air-to-surface standoff missile - Extended Range, and Miniaturized Air Launched Decoy and Miniaturized Air Launched Decoy-Jammer. **(T-3)**.

Chapter 9

AIR OPERATIONS CENTER COMMUNICATIONS TEAM

9.1. General. The AOC Communications Team (ACT), under the leadership of the Air Communications Squadron Commander, provides critical communications and cyberspace support to the AOC, ensuring continuous security, operational availability, and reliability of resources (systems and people) in support of the AOC mission. The ACT integrates AOC systems with other USAF, DOD, joint, and coalition systems. Its goal is to deliver reliable secure communication and cyberspace capabilities to the AOC/CC and the AOC staff, enabling air, space and cyberspace operations throughout the tactical or joint operations area. The Chief, ACT (C-ACT) works for Air Communications Squadron Commander but routinely coordinates directly with the AOC/CC and leads the ACT. The C-ACT works on a regular basis with the unit's AOC Configuration Manager, ISSM, and WSM to configure AOC networks, keep them on-line for AOC users, and control them in accordance with guidance provided by the AOC/CC, AOC Weapon System Configuration Review Board, and site AOC Configuration Review Board.

9.1.1. The ACT is typically composed of six functions: CFP, Network Operations, C2 Systems, Data Links and Radio Frequency Transmissions, and Plans and Programs. Collectively, the functions provide AOC-unique communications services and tools for planning, generating, employing, and directing air, space, cyberspace, and IO forces. Some communications and cyberspace personnel may be embedded in core AOC divisions and specialty or support teams, and they may or may not operate as extensions of and in coordination with the C-ACT (i.e., they may work for the chief of their assigned division or team and not for the C-ACT). Operations, reporting instructions, and responsibilities for communications support will follow guidance in Methods and Procedures Technical Order, 00-33A-1001, *General Cyberspace Support Activities Management Procedures and Practice Requirements*, applicable joint and AF directives, operation plans or orders, and local supplements. If any guidance conflict occurs, joint publications take precedence; personnel will follow the joint publication pending guidance or clarification from proper authorities. (T-2).

9.1.2. The ACT receives information exchange requirements or communications system requirements from AOC divisions and teams; the ACT collaborates with the WSM, Configuration Manager, ISSM, and other AOC personnel as required to staff and process AOC Configuration Review Board-approved requirements. The C2 Plans Team often consults AOC communications personnel, who may support C2 communications planning, and support COD during execution of those plans. The ACT's roles and responsibilities for cyberspace security (formerly known as Information Assurance) is key to ensuring efficient flow of information into, through and out of the AOC, while providing the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information and their systems.

9.2. Major ACT Process Inputs. Communications support requirements include, but are not limited to, spectrum and frequencies, internal and external data networks (Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network, Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, etc.), email and message services, cryptographic support, data link networks, line of sight and beyond line of sight secure and non-secure voice, video teleconference, Multilevel Secure Voice (formerly DRSN), computer hardware, and special circuits (e.g., Intel distribution networks). Communications


system and service requirements will be coordinated and managed via local change management process with inputs from the site's C-ACT, WSM, ISSM, and Configuration Manager. **(T-2)**.

9.3. Major ACT Processes. The major communications support processes are communications integration, system administration, planning, cyberspace security, network operations, configuration management, spectrum management, system monitoring and outage reporting, system maintenance, requirements management, project management, and client systems support. Additionally the team works with the MAJCOM/Air Force Forces Communication Control Center, 16 AF (AFCYBER), 616 OC, the assigned Cyberspace Liaison/Support Element, host base communications squadron, and the AOC Weapon System Help Desk, as required. **Note:** In some cases, the host base may provide some services, such as long haul communications connectivity, telephone and network services, power, heating, ventilation and air conditioning, etc.; in those instances, the support should be documented in appropriate agreements (memoranda of agreement, service-level agreements, etc.).

9.4. Major ACT Process Outputs. Major ACT process outputs are communications planning and communications plans; communications systems (phones, computers, switches, routers, etc.); communications system planning, configuration management and maintenance; network architecture planning, configuration, operations and management; cyberspace security; cryptographic management; information exchange requirements and communications system (CS) requirements management; project management; help desk support; and systems technical expertise.

9.5. Organization. The C-ACT leads the ACT and works for the Air Communications Squadron Commander, but routinely coordinates directly with AOC commander. The ACT is typically organized into six functional areas (see **Figure 9.1**, Typical ACT Organization and Functions). The ACT organization and functions at any AOC may differ based on the mission and the structure of a particular AOC or theater command. A C-ACT may combine or increase ACT functions and/or sections as a matter of mission support or efficiency of operation; when this happens, the C-ACT must ensure each of the responsibilities in the six-function model described herein are covered. **(T-3)**.

Figure 9.1. Typical ACT Organization and Functions.



9.6. ACT Personnel Responsibilities:

9.6.1. Chief, AOC Communications Team (C-ACT). The C-ACT provides guidance and direction to all ACT personnel and provides guidance on communications and cyberspace matters to other communications and cyberspace personnel assigned to other AOC divisions and teams.

9.6.2. Communications Focal Point (CFP) Function. The CFP is a support staff for the C-ACT comprised of communications and cyberspace personnel who have a working knowledge of the AOC mission. As the operational arm of the C-ACT, the CFP oversees operations and maintenance of site communications systems and services supporting the AOC and maintains situational awareness of systems and services external to the AOC that support the AOC and air operations. The CFP assists the C-ACT in managing and maintaining communications support for the AOC, as well as directing the activities of personnel who work for the C-ACT. In addition, the CFP usually provides coordination with AOC area support units that provide or support long-haul transmission, voice and data services, C2 radios, electrical power, heating, ventilation and air conditioning and other services supporting AOC operations. The CFP function monitors and coordinates production and execution of scheduled and unscheduled maintenance while maintaining visibility of communications system and service metrics and indicators. CFP personnel evaluate communications management requirements and direct timely corrective actions. CFP actions

follow guidance in Methods and Procedures Technical Order 00-33A-1001 and are based on local conditions.

9.6.3. Networks Operations Function. The AOC Network Operations function is a staff management element of the C-ACT that focuses on network administration to include applications services, configuration management, and messaging. It provides AOC network operations, cyberspace security, and defensive cyberspace operations using network boundary protection, intrusion detection and vulnerability assessment techniques, and software tools. The function consists of network management technicians, client support technicians, infrastructure technicians, system controllers, and web applications technicians.

9.6.4. Command and Control (C2) Systems Function. The C2 Systems function works for the C-ACT and ensures servers and workstations (which include peripherals, communications devices, and on-line software) are available to the user. The responsibility of the C2 system within the AOC is from the user's terminal to the server. This function normally contains the Chief, C2 Systems; Messaging Administrator Technicians; and Application Services Administrator Technicians.

9.6.5. Data Links and Radio Frequency Transmissions Function. The Data Links and Radio Frequency Transmissions function works for the C-ACT; the function helps plan, coordinate, and establish the AOC connections to the MTN and AOC C2 radio networks. The function's primary customer is the AOC's Interface Control Cell, but it may also provide data link and radio support to other AOC entities, such as the ISRD, Senior Offensive Duty Officer, Senior Air Defense Officer, CTP Management Cell and the Dynamic Targeting Cell. This function is normally comprised of a chief and Radio Frequency transmission technicians who setup and maintain data link, gateway and C2 radio systems and networks supporting data link operations.

9.6.6. Plans and Programs Function. The AOC Weapon System has a dynamic baseline with changes that accommodate the fielding of new capabilities, systems, applications, updates to existing products, and the incorporation of unique unit variances to the approved site baseline. The Plans and Programs function is the AOC's central point for AOC baseline hardware and software configuration and change management, and project management. Additionally, the Plans and Programs Function must coordinate both the changes to the site AOC's baseline and new requirements through the site Configuration Review Board, Configuration Manager, Weapon System Manager, ISSM, AOC divisions and teams, MAJCOMS, and AOC Weapon System Program Office, as appropriate. **(T-3)**.

9.6.7. Defensive Cyberspace Operations. The goal of the Defensive Cyberspace Operations Team is to mitigate active vulnerabilities, determine the presence of an advanced persistent threat, and if possible eliminate that Advanced Persistent Threat and its artifacts from the AOC networks. The Defensive Cyberspace Operations Team is comprised of the Chief (or Flight Commander), AOC Cyberspace Defense, Cyberspace Defense Technicians, and Network Operation Technicians. While it is important for the team to have a variety of cyberspace AFSCs, it is critical that the team contain a 1B4 cyberspace defense operations or 17S, cyberspace warfare operator.

Chapter 10

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

10.1. AOC. The AOC provides operational-level C2 of air, space, cyberspace and IO to meet JFACC operational objectives and guidance. The AOC is responsible for:

10.1.1. Developing strategy and planning documents from phase 0 through phase 5 (JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*) that integrate air, space, cyberspace, IO, ground and maritime operations to meet JFACC objectives in support of CCDR or JFC guidance. **(T-2).**

10.1.2. Tasking, integrating, and executing day-to-day air, space, cyberspace, and IO; provide rapid reaction, positive control, and coordinate and deconflict weapons employment. **(T-2).**

10.1.3. Receiving, assembling, analyzing, filtering, and disseminating all-source intelligence and meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) effects information to support air, space, and cyberspace operations planning, execution, and assessment. **(T-2).**

10.1.4. Issuing airspace control procedures and coordinating airspace control activities for the Airspace Control Authority when the JFACC is designated the Airspace Control Authority. **(T-2).**

10.1.5. Integrating space and cyberspace capabilities and coordinating space and cyberspace activities for the JFACC. **(T-2).**

10.1.6. Issuing space control procedures and coordinating space control activities for Space Coordinating Authority, when the JFACC is the Space Coordinating Authority. **(T-2).**

10.1.7. Providing overall direction, through the Area Air Defense Plan, for air and missile defense, including ballistic missile defense, when the JFACC is designated the Area Air Defense Commander. **(T-2).**

10.1.8. Planning, tasking, and executing the theater airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission, and integrate national technical means into JFACC planning and execution of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. **(T-2).**

10.1.9. Conducting operational or tactical level assessment to determine mission and overall effectiveness as required by the JFC to support the theater assessment. **(T-2).**

10.1.10. Producing and disseminating ATOs, ACOs, Special Instructions (SPINS), Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Annexes, ISR Mission-Type Order, and (as required) operational tasking data link, and any associated changes. **(T-2).**

10.1.11. Planning, tasking, and directing execution of air mobility operations according to the theater priorities. **(T-2).**

10.1.12. AFTTP 3-3.AOC and unit standard operating procedures detail specific functions of the AOC. **(T-2).**

10.2. JFACC. JFACC is responsible for:

10.2.1. Developing the Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP). **(T-0).**

10.2.2. Coordinating with other component commanders and then develop apportionment recommendation for the joint air effort. **(T-0)**.

10.2.3. Providing centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of capabilities and forces made available. **(T-0)**.

10.2.4. Providing control, oversight, and guidance during the execution of joint air, space, and cyberspace operations. **(T-0)**.

10.2.5. Coordinating and integrate joint air operations with the operations of other component commanders and forces. **(T-0)**.

10.2.6. Assessing operational and tactical results of joint air operations. **(T-0)**.

10.2.7. Functioning as supported and supporting commander as directed. **(T-0)**.

10.2.8. Producing the Air Operations Directive (AOD) in accordance with JP 3-30. **(T-0)**.

10.2.9. Producing the ATO, ATO Network-Enabled Weapon (ATONEW) supplement, Airspace Control Plan (ACP), Airspace Control Order (ACO), and other plans and orders as required by JP 3-30. **(T-0)**.

10.3. Headquarters Air Force:

10.3.1. AF/A3TY serves as the Headquarters Air Force Functional Area Manager for the AOC Weapon System to include organizational constructs, crew constructs, training, operations and maintenance funding, Unit Type Code approval, special experience identifier approval and other related issues.

10.3.2. AF/A3T is responsible for establishing continuity standards for AOCs. **(T-0)**.

10.4. Air Combat Command (ACC) is responsible for:

10.4.1. Serving as the lead command for the AOC Weapon System. **(T-0)**.

10.4.2. Coordinating information operations program requirements with appropriate elements of 688th Cyberspace Wing, who provides information operations, military information support operations (MISO), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC) reach-back support to Component Numbered Air Force/Component MAJCOMs. **(T-0)**.

10.4.3. Approving all formal AOC training developed by the 505th Command and Control Wing. **(T-0)**.

10.5. Air Combat Command C2ISR Operations Division (ACC/A3C) is responsible for:

10.5.1. Creating, maintaining and updating this publication and for current operations, training, and maintenance issues. **(T-0)**.

10.5.2. Developing, overseeing and managing Unit Type Codes and special experience identifiers. **(T-0)**.

10.5.3. Providing oversight for the AOC Formal Training Unit and additional AOC courses such as Joint Air and Space Operations Senior Staff Course. **(T-0)**.

10.5.4. Providing guidance for the initial qualification training, mission qualification training, and continuation training of AOC personnel and crewmembers. **(T-0)**.

10.5.5. Providing leadership, guidance, and management of AOC tactics, techniques, and procedures, training task list development, standards and evaluation, lead command and ACC AOC units Management Internal Control Toolset oversight, publication development, configuration management, and operating, functional, and employment concept development as well as other areas as determined by AF/A3T. **(T-0)**.

10.6. Air Combat Command AOC/AFFOR Division (ACC/A5C). is responsible for:

10.6.1. AOC Weapon System requirements, sustainment, and modernization. **(T-0)**.

10.6.2. Coordinating with the AOC Program Office regarding AOC Weapon System sustainment and fielding. **(T-0)**.

10.7. MAJCOMs and Field Commands. (Air Mobility Command, United States Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa, Pacific Air Forces, AF Global Strike Command, AF Special Operations Command and Space Operations Command (SpOC)) are responsible for:

10.7.1. Training all augmentees in AOC operations and processes to the maximum extent possible, as well as provide support and guidance in systems and configuration management. **(T-0)**.

10.7.2. Ensure Expeditionary Operations School Detachment 1 (EOS Det 1), as part of the AOC Formal Training Unit, and Joint Space Operations Center train personnel in initial AOC Air Mobility Division (AMD) and space support tasks respectively (Air Mobility Command, ACC and SpOC). **(T-0)**.

10.7.3. Ensuring specific training, certification, and evaluation requirements for enabler personnel and Global AOCs under their direction are identified in supplements to AFI 13-1 AOC Volume 1 and AFMAN 13-1 AOC, Volume 2. **(T-0)**.

10.7.4. Appointing Management Internal Control Toolset Functional Area Managers for their respective AOC units to monitor and assist with any issues identified. **(T-0)**.

10.8. Air Reserve Component (ARC): National Guard Bureau and Air Force Reserve Command is responsible for:

10.8.1. Identifying, associating and earmarking selected units for dedicated AOC support. **(T-0)**.

10.8.2. Providing headquarters oversight for all ARC units associated with AOCs. **(T-0)**.

10.8.3. Ensuring specific training and evaluation requirements for units selected for dedicated AOC support are identified in supplements to AFI 13-1 AOC, Volume 1 and AFMAN 13-1 AOC, Volume 2. **(T-0)**.

10.8.4. Appointing Management Internal Control Toolset Functional Area Managers for their respective AOC units to monitor and assist with any issues identified. **(T-0)**.

10.9. The USAF Warfare Center. (505th Command and Control Wing) is responsible for:

10.9.1. Providing formal initial AOC operations training, as well as supports AOC unit continuation and exercise training. **(T-1)**.

10.9.2. Supporting weapons system testing.

10.9.3. Providing support to the Operational Command Training Program operations managed by HQ USAF. **(T-1)**.

10.10. AOC Commander. (AFSC: 11/12/13B) (Rank: O6) is responsible for:

10.10.1. Conducting joint air, space and IO operations, coordinating cyberspace operations, and establishing the AOC battle rhythm. **(T-2)**.

10.10.2. Directing processes to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, execute, monitor and assess air, space, and cyberspace operations in the JFC-designated AOR based on JFACC guidance and in coordination with the Director of Mobility Forces and Director of Space Forces. **(T-2)**. These responsibilities are conducted through the AOC division, specialty, and support team chiefs.

10.10.3. Supervising and directing the operations of the AOC, to include all periodic JFACC update briefings, crew changeover briefings, training, and orientation. Additionally, provide guidance and leadership to five core division chiefs and component liaison teams as well as establish a daily AOC lead coordination meeting to ensure effective, coherent execution of the ATO/ATONEW. **(T-2)**.

10.10.4. Providing expertise to the Air Planning Group to assist in translating JFC and JFACC guidance into a coherent air, space, and cyberspace operations plan (JAOP, Area Air Defense Plan, ACP, etc.). Provide updates to JAOP and supporting plans as required and oversee development of AOD. **(T-2)**.

10.10.5. Providing the JFACC a recommendation that apportions joint air, space, and limited cyberspace capabilities, proposing allocation guidance, and prioritizing activities for accomplishing air, space, and cyberspace tasks, to include targeting. **(T-2)**.

10.10.6. Translating JFC and JFACC guidance into the appropriate resource allocation necessary to develop the Air Battle Plan (ABP). Expressing allocation as a weight of air, space, and cyberspace operations effort applied to accomplish air, space, and cyberspace operations tasks in support of joint objectives. **(T-2)**.

10.10.7. Ensuring the planning, execution, and assessment actions include consideration of the information environment; integrate employment of information-related capabilities; and ensure consistency of messages and actions. **(T-2)**. All will be done in accordance with CCDR or JFC guidance and in relation to an adversary or potential adversary's use of information.

10.10.8. Integrating operations security into all plans and operations. **(T-2)**.

10.10.9. Directing the monitoring, evaluation, and adjustments needed to execute the ATO/ATONEW to meet changing theater situations. **(T-2)**.

10.10.10. Acting as the approval authority for prioritization of those communications essential to the AOC. **(T-2)**.

10.10.11. As directed by JFACC, identifying operational priorities and intelligence needs for appropriate intelligence collection; analysis, production, and dissemination actions; coordinating information and displaying requirements necessary to support the AOC divisions. **(T-2)**.

10.10.12. Coordinating support procedures with the Army Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), NALE, Marine Liaison Element, Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE), allied nations, and any other support agencies. **(T-2)**.

10.10.13. Establishing contingency plans and procedures for elements of the Theater Air Control System (TACS) that may be disabled or forced into performing autonomous or decentralized control operations. **(T-2)**. Normally, this includes an alternate or backup AOC capability.

10.10.14. Ensuring division, specialty, and support team chiefs develop, review and update positional guides, worksheets, and procedural checklists biannually. **(T-2)**.

10.10.15. Maintaining configuration control within AOC systems. **(T-2)**. Chair a site Configuration Review Board. Recommended Configuration Review Board membership should include representation from each AOC division. Recommended Configuration Review Board advisors include: The Air Communications Squadron representative, Configuration Manager, WSM, Information System Security Manager (ISSM), Component Joint Data Network Officer Equivalent (CJE), AOC Weapon System Program Office, specialty, support, and other service liaison teams.

10.10.16. Appointing a Configuration Manager in writing, and forwarding a copy of the appointment letter to ACC/A3C. **(T-2)**.

10.10.17. Ensuring a site Configuration Management Plan is developed, published, followed, and updated to maintain configuration control of their AOC Weapon System as-built site baseline. The site Configuration Management Plan is subordinate to the AOC Weapon System Configuration Management Plan and applicable operating command guidance. The AOC Program Office Configuration Manager will approve the site Configuration Management Plan. **(T-2)**.

10.10.18. Ensuring development and maintenance of a continuity of operations plan (COOP) to ensure continuation of mission-essential functions. A continuity of operations plan must address not only catastrophic failure or destruction of the weapon system, but also the full spectrum of contested or degraded operations. **(T-2)**.

10.10.19. Ensuring the development and maintenance of an AOC Battle Rhythm and Joint Air Tasking Cycle. The JFACC and JFC battle rhythms will determine the AOC battle rhythm or tasking cycle. **(T-2)**.

10.10.20. Establishing ATO coordinator teams to facilitate communication of JFACC intent through the entire air tasking cycle from strategy to assessment. ATO coordinators should be experienced in AOC processes and have appropriate program clearances to facilitate coordination required to integrate planning and execution of each ATO/ATONEW and associated activities. **(T-2)**.

10.10.21. Appointing an AOC Knowledge Management (KM) Officer whose responsibility it is to coordinate the flow and management of information throughout the AOC including the control of processes linking sensors and the discovery of knowledge to the AOC KM Plan. The KM Officer and associated KM team will work with the AOC/CC and divisions to ensure the Knowledge Management Plan meets the operational needs of the AOC. **(T-2)**. The KM Officer in conjunction with AFFOR KM and Combatant Command KM teams will

document which knowledge management tools apply to knowledge management discovery, and synchronize the Knowledge Management Plan with AFFOR staff and Combatant Command KM Plans. (T-2).

10.10.22. Appointing an Information System Security Manager (ISSM) in writing and forwarding a copy of the appointment letter to Air Combat Command, Warfighter Capabilities and Integration Division (ACC/A6C). (T-2).

10.11. Weapon System Manager (WSM) is responsible for:

10.11.1. The setup and successful operation of all systems integrated into the AOC Weapon System site baseline. (T-2).

10.11.2. Liaising with the AOC/CC, the AOC Weapon System Program Office, the Chief, AOC Communications Team (C-ACT), and the Configuration Manager to identify, validate, and prioritize requirements. (T-2).

10.11.3. Managing the installation, configuration, integration, and operation of AOC systems in a manner that meets operational needs and satisfies the site-specific engineering plan. (T-2).

10.11.4. Working with the AOC Weapon System Program Office to provide on-site engineering and technical support as needed. (T-2). Additional WSM information can be found in AFTTP 3-3.AOC.

10.11.5. Developing the AOC floor plan in coordination with AOC division leads for AOC/CC approval. (T-3).

10.11.6. Developing the AOC systems significant events calendar. (T-3).

10.11.7. Developing systems permissions matrices. (T-3).

10.11.8. Providing support to AOC configuration management team. (T-3).

10.11.9. Providing inputs to management of all systems in the AOC. (T-3).

10.11.10. Conducting comprehensive system validation testing. (T-3).

10.11.11. Supporting the Configuration Manager in maintaining the site-specific engineering plan to reflect the site operational baseline. (T-3).

10.12. Configuration Manager is responsible for:

10.12.1. Reporting the implementation status of AOC Weapon System Configuration Review Board-approved and released enterprise change notices. (T-2).

10.12.2. Developing the site Configuration Management Plan for AOC/CC's approval and ensuring the site Configuration Management Plan reflects current AOC-Weapon System and applicable operating command guidance (T-2). The Configuration Manager is also responsible for developing and maintaining the site Configuration Management Plan and ensuring changes are coordinated with the site Configuration Review Board chair. (T-2). The Configuration Manager is also responsible for posting the current site Configuration Management Plan to the AOC Weapon System SharePoint® site-specific documentation folder. (T-2).

10.12.3. Serving as the focal point and principle advisor for AOC configuration management decisions, site Configuration Review Board meetings, and any other duties and responsibilities assigned via site Configuration Management Plan. **(T-2)**.

10.12.4. Maintaining current as-built site configuration via the approved configuration management status accounting tool including the site Configuration Management Plan and operating command Configuration Review Board-approved variances. **(T-2)**.

10.12.5. Establishing and maintaining strict control of master media and the documentation library. **(T-2)**.

10.12.6. Hosting configuration meetings and assisting with activities to include site activation task forces, site surveys, configuration management staff assistance visits, configuration management audits, and physical inventories. **(T-2)**.

10.12.7. Coordinating with site users and develop procedures to prepare and submit AOC Weapon System enterprise change requests via the configuration management status accounting tool in accordance with the AOC Weapon System Configuration Management Plan, applicable commander's configuration management guidance and site Configuration Management Plan. **(T-2)**.

10.12.8. Processing site requests for variance in accordance with AOCWS-ABP-005-U-R2, *Variance Business Process for the Air Operations Center Weapon System (AN/USQ-163)*, applicable operating command guidance, and the site Configuration Management Plan. Ensuring the AOC/CC is aware and accepts all risk and operations and maintenance responsibilities associated with the variance. **(T-2)**. It is important to state that, while the AOC/CC cannot accept risk for the network, he can accept risk for the mission by using network-approved applications and systems, which are not a part of the AOC Weapon System baseline.

10.12.9. Participating in AOC Weapon System Working Group activities as requested. **(T-2)**.

10.12.10. Establishing separate organizational e-mail accounts on the Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network and the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network to facilitate communication on configuration management issues. **(T-2)**.

10.12.11. Establishing and conducting initial and annual configuration management training to brief/inform all AOC personnel of the site Configuration Management Plan and local configuration standards. Conduct initial training within six weeks of arrival of newly assigned AOC personnel and annually thereafter. **(T-2)**.

10.12.12. Performing and documenting semi-annual configuration management audits. **(T-2)**.

10.12.13. Keeping site point of contact and shipping information current and posted in the appropriate site folder in the AOC site-specific document library. **(T-2)**.

10.12.14. Posting the approved site Configuration Management Plan in the appropriate site folder in the AOC site-specific document library. **(T-2)**.

10.12.15. When triggered by site installation or change events, the Configuration Manager will coordinate via the site Configuration Review Board to ensure the site-specific engineering plan continuously reflects the site's current operational baseline. **(T-2)**.

10.13. Information Security System Manager (ISSM) is responsible for:

10.13.1. Acquiring or developing protection and detection capabilities, which are consistent with the DOD Component-level information assurance architecture. **(T-2)**.

10.13.2. Following the Risk Management Framework (RMF) process to assess and authorize software, hardware, etc. for operation. **(T-2)**.

10.13.3. Addressing cyberspace security in the management of the DOD information system configuration. **(T-2)**.

10.13.4. Mitigating identified cyberspace security vulnerabilities, and reporting and responding to cyberspace security violations and incidents. **(T-2)**.

10.13.5. Ensuring the continuity of information technology and cyberspace security services. **(T-2)**.

10.13.6. Tracking compliance with the cyberspace security controls applicable to the DOD information system and report cyberspace security management review items, and other directed solutions. **(T-2)**.

10.13.7. Serving as an advisor to the Configuration Review Board. **(T-2)**.

10.13.8. Ensuring each implementation of cross domain solution has a separate Defense Information Assurance Security Accreditation Working Group approval and Defense Information Services Agency authority to connect or interim authority to connect for each AOC location or site in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 6211.02D, *Defense Information System Network (DISN) Responsibilities*. **(T-2)**.

10.13.9. Ensuring any secure wireless connection (e.g., SecNet-11 or SecNet-54) has a separate Defense Information Systems Agency connection approval authority to operate for each implementation, at each AOC location or site. **(T-2)**. These connections are a special case of Secret Internet Protocol Router Network connection approvals per CJCSI 6211.02D.

10.13.10. Ensuring any instance of connection from the AOC to the Internet has an OSD DOD Information Network waiver approval prior to implementation per CJCSI 6211.02D. **(T-2)**.

10.13.11. Ensuring separate approval of any foreign national presence or foreign software use, in accordance with AFI 17-101, *Risk Management Framework (RMF) For Air Force Information Technology* and other Air Force Systems Security Instructions. **(T-2)**.

10.13.12. Ensure reaccreditation of any major modification or changes to the security architecture, security configuration set up, or security posture that deviates from the system(s) as accredited, in accordance with AFI 17-101 and DODI 8510.01, *Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DOD Information Technology*. **(T-2)**.

10.13.13. Supporting WSM to maintain the site-specific engineering plan to reflect the sites operational baseline. **(T-2)**.

10.13.14. Coordinating Joint World Wide Intelligence Communications Systems Certificate to Field and Approval to Operate with the DOD Intelligence Information Systems Site ISSM. (T-2).

10.13.15. Managing AOC firewall rules and policies. Executing firewall exemption requests with advisement from the WSM and defensive cyber operations team. (T-2).

10.14. Strategy Division (SRD) is responsible for:

10.14.1. Developing the JFACC air, space, and cyberspace operations estimate of the situation to produce a recommended JFC course of action. (T-2).

10.14.2. Translating President of the United States (US), US Secretary of Defense, JFC, and JFACC guidance into objectives, tasks, and assessment measures and indicators. (T-3).

10.14.3. Coordinating the development of the approved JFACC course of action into a comprehensive JAOP or order with appropriate annexes. (T-2).

10.14.4. Developing and coordinating the JFACC air estimate of the situation that recommends a course of action for the JFC. (T-2).

10.14.5. Liaising and integrating as required. (T-2). Successful accomplishment of each of the above processes requires liaising with HHQ, other components and AFFOR staff.

10.14.6. Developing alternative contingency plans, branches and sequels. (T-2).

10.14.7. Developing proposed changes to the ROE/RUF. (T-2).

10.14.8. During execution, providing the JFACC a recommended air apportionment in each AOD. (T-2).

10.14.9. During execution and normally daily directing, developing, coordinating, publishing, and as necessary updating the AOD. (T-2).

10.14.10. Integrating global or service component task requirements into the AOD. (T-2).

10.14.11. Monitoring the progress of air phases and making an operational assessment in relation to achieving the JFC/JFACC objectives. (T-2).

10.14.12. Fully integrating NKO planning throughout entire planning process to produce a comprehensive JAOP, and subsequently, the AODs. (T-2).

10.15. Strategy Division Chief is responsible for:

10.15.1. Maintaining an understanding of commanders' (JFC, JFACC, etc.) mission, intent, concept of operations, relevant theater plans, existing ROE/RUF, related policy documents, and enemy capabilities and limitations as well as those of friendly forces. (T-3).

10.15.2. Establishing appropriate contacts with JFC, Joint Task Force, and Component Headquarters to insure necessary access to higher and lateral headquarters policy, guidance, plans, and intent. (T-3).

10.15.3. Relaying HHQ and other components' policy, guidance, plans, and intent to the AOC as appropriate. (T-3).

10.15.4. Integrating and coordinating SRD planning efforts with all AOC divisions and specialty or support teams to produce a coherent, executable plan that meets the commander's guidance and intent. **(T-3)**.

10.15.5. Ensuring the SRD battle rhythm is sufficient to accomplish JAOP development, branch and sequel planning, AOD development, operational assessment, and special projects, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.15.6. Ensuring each of the SRD output (e.g., JAOP, AOD, operational assessment products) correctly conveys JFACC's guidance and intent. **(T-3)**.

10.15.7. Establishing procedures to secure the JFACC and/or AOC commander approval prior to publication and release, as appropriate. **(T-3)**.

10.15.8. Ensuring positional guides, worksheets, and procedural checklists are developed by SRD teams, reviewed, and updated for all appropriate duty positions. **(T-3)**.

10.15.9. Filing critical planning materials, such as draft and record documents, slides or briefing materials, minutes from meetings as determined by the KM Plan. **(T-3)**.

10.15.10. Ensuring SRD KM Plan is consistent with the larger AOC plan and meets requirements. **(T-3)**.

10.15.11. Identifying SRD manning requirements and fill positions with trained and qualified personnel. **(T-3)**.

10.15.12. Ensuring SRD facilities and equipment meet requirements. **(T-3)**.

10.16. Strategy Plans Team (SPT) is responsible for:

10.16.1. Liaising, supporting, coordinating, and integrating planning with HHQ Joint Planning Group, component Operational Planning Group, and AFFOR Operational Planning Group. **(T-3)**.

10.16.2. Supporting the Air Planning Group, Joint Planning Group or component liaisons for air operations planning. Conduct operational design and problem framing activities with the JFC, JFACC and other components as required. **(T-3)**.

10.16.3. Leading the AOC in all aspects of joint planning process for air as required. **(T-3)**.

10.16.3.1. Developing JFACC's mission, intent, objectives, and concept of operations. **(T-3)**.

10.16.3.2. Developing and coordinating the JFACC air estimate of the situation that recommends a course of action for JFC approval. **(T-3)**.

10.16.3.3. Using strategy-to-task methodology to develop objectives and tasks, to include assessment measures, in conjunction with the OAT and TET. **(T-3)**.

10.16.3.4. Developing detailed phase plans. **(T-3)**.

10.16.3.5. Coordinating the development of the approved JFACC course of action into a comprehensive JAOP or order with appropriate annexes. **(T-3)**.

10.16.4. Developing air apportionment recommendations based on the phased air-targeting scheme from TET. **(T-3)**.

10.16.5. Developing alternative contingency plans such as branch and sequel plans. (T-3).

10.16.6. Leading the ROE cell to develop recommended suggested changes to the ROE/RUF. ROE cell composition will vary with each situation, but should include a Judge Advocate at a minimum. (T-3).

10.16.7. Leading the development and coordination of JFACC Commander's Critical Information Requirements. (T-3).

10.16.8. Ensuring consistency between the JAOP and other plans (e.g., the C2 Plans developed ACP and Area Air Defense Plan). (T-3).

10.16.9. Working with SGT and OAT to keep plans current. (T-3).

10.16.10. Anticipating changes in the battlespace to foresee the progress of the air operation and identify any potential problems to the JFACC. (T-3).

10.17. Strategy Guidance Team (SGT) is responsible for:

10.17.1. Supporting SPT during deliberate and crisis action planning as required. (T-3).

10.17.2. Conducting regular, scheduled meetings with AOC, AFFOR staff and liaison teams to develop and coordinate the near term guidance, concept of operations, priorities, weights of effort and other guidance for the AOD. (T-3).

10.17.3. Developing, coordinating, updating and gaining JFACC approval of the AOD and disseminate it once approved. (T-3).

10.17.4. Attending other AOC meetings (e.g., TET) as necessary to clarify guidance questions. (T-3).

10.18. Operational Assessment Team (OAT) is responsible for:

10.18.1. Supporting SPT during deliberate and crisis action planning as required. (T-3).

10.18.2. Developing assessment criteria (measures of effectiveness and measures of performance) to support the strategy-to-task methodology used in strategy development during joint planning process for air. (T-3).

10.18.3. Developing and coordinating the operational assessment plan, including measure(s) of effectiveness and measures(s) of performance. (T-3).

10.18.4. Conducting operational assessments to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of air, space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and IO in achieving JFACC objectives and integrating this assessment to provide a predictive assessment. (T-3).

10.18.5. Preparing operational assessment briefings and operational assessment reports and disseminating and coordinating them as appropriate. (T-3). This includes coordinating the operational assessments with the JFC to develop and maintain a consolidated campaign assessment, providing an overall evaluation of combat operations in relation to command objectives.

10.19. Combat Plans Division (CPD) is responsible for:

10.19.1. The TET conducting the target development process to determine target sets to achieve tasks, to create desired effects, and produce the draft JIPTL. (T-2).

10.19.2. The MAAP Team determining the optimal combination of target, platform, weapon, and timing for missions included in the ATO. **(T-2)**.

10.19.3. Ensuring air, space, limited cyberspace operations, and IO planning and tasks are fully integrated and support the overall JFC campaign. **(T-2)**.

10.19.4. The C2 Plans Team producing and disseminating the current defense design guidance in the Area Air Defense Plan and SPINS, and publishes change. **(T-0)**.

10.19.5. Producing and disseminating the ACP. **(T-2)**.

10.19.6. Producing and disseminating an operationally and tactically sound ATO. **(T-0)**.

10.19.7. Generating SPINS, ACP, and ACO updates. **(T-0)**.

10.20. Combat Plans Division (CPD) Chief is responsible for:

10.20.1. Reviewing and understanding relevant theater campaign plans, existing ROE/RUF, and related policy documents. **(T-3)**.

10.20.2. Maintaining a comprehensive understanding of current and forecast enemy capabilities and limitations. **(T-3)**.

10.20.3. Coordinating JAOP and AOD planning and implementation issues with the SRD Chief. **(T-3)**.

10.20.4. Ensuring the production, revision, and dissemination of detailed execution plans required to develop, publish, and disseminate the ATO/ATONEW with the associated ACO. Detailed execution plans include but are not limited to the AOD, ACP, the Area Air Defense Plan, the C2 Communications Plan, and supporting SPINS. **(T-3)**. These may be stand-alone plans, or annexes to the JAOP.

10.20.5. Arbitrating and resolving potential conflicts within the SPINS when contributing team chiefs cannot agree to a resolution. **(T-3)**.

10.20.6. Establishing the CPD battle rhythm for sustained execution planning and ATO/ATONEW production. **(T-3)**.

10.20.7. Approving the draft JIPTL for submission. **(T-3)**. As necessary, arbitrate and resolve component conflicts resulting from the TET meeting.

10.20.8. Reviewing the developed MAAP and establishing procedures to secure JFACC approval prior to ATO production. **(T-3)**.

10.20.9. Ensuring CPD core teams develop and transmit an executable ATO/ATONEW in a timely manner. **(T-3)**.

10.20.10. Coordinating with other AOC divisions and external liaison officers to incorporate requests for air, space, and cyberspace operations support. The CPD Chief will annotate and resolve ATO/ATONEW implementation issues. **(T-3)**.

10.20.11. Ensuring positional guides, worksheets, and procedural checklists are developed, reviewed, and updated for all appropriate CPD duty positions. **(T-3)**.

10.20.12. Ensuring division compliance with the KM Plan to include archiving critical planning materials and final versions of unpublished daily execution plans (such as the MAAP). The CPD Chief is also responsible for ensuring all published documents (to include

detailed execution plans, the JIPTL, and the ATO/ATONEW) are filed and stored for the historical record, as well as ensuring division compliance with executing electronic data transfer (compressing files, minimizing pictures, using black and white, etc.) (T-3).

10.20.13. Reviewing incoming message traffic and tasks and ensuring proper distribution and tracking within the CPD. (T-3).

10.20.14. Ensuring adequate training for all augmentees assigned to the CPD. (T-3).

10.21. Targeting Effects Team (TET) is responsible for:

10.21.1. Developing and supporting development of draft JIPTL. (T-3).

10.21.2. Providing inputs to JFACC's Component Prioritized Collection List. (T-3).

10.21.3. Providing target strategy inputs and apportionment recommendations to SRD for AOD development. (T-3).

10.21.4. Participating in Joint Targeting Coordination Board/Joint Effects Collaboration Board process and associated working groups. (T-3).

10.21.5. Reviewing current enemy disposition, proposed enemy and friendly course of action, daily AOD guidance, combat assessment, and operational assessment results. (T-3).

10.22. Master Air Attack Planning (MAAP) Team is responsible for:

10.22.1. Developing MAAP. (T-3).

10.22.2. Providing SPINS inputs for the C2 Plans Team. (T-3).

10.22.3. Developing and delivering MAAP decision brief. (T-3).

10.22.4. Developing, arbitrating, and disseminating MAAP changes. (T-3).

10.22.5. Interfacing with tanker, airlift, collection platforms, and other planners as needed. (T-3).

10.23. C2 Plans Team is responsible for:

10.23.1. Developing and publishing the ACP. (T-3).

10.23.2. Developing and publishing the ACO. (T-3).

10.23.3. Developing the SPINS. (T-3).

10.23.4. Developing and publishing the Area Air Defense Plan. (T-3).

10.23.5. Providing inputs to the AOC C2 Communications Plan. (T-3).

10.23.6. Supporting the Joint Communications Electronics Operating Instruction. (T-3).

10.23.7. Developing and publishing the C2 architecture. (T-3).

10.23.8. Coordinating with CJE Team for C2 Architecture, operational tasking common tactical picture, and operational tasking data link and operational tasking data link network enabled weapons development and synchronization. (T-3).

10.24. ATO Production Team is responsible for:

- 10.24.1. Setting up, managing, and maintaining databases to include air operations database resets and theater battle management core systems (TBMCS) reboots. **(T-3)**.
- 10.24.2. Developing the ABP. **(T-3)**.
- 10.24.3. Creating ATO/ATONEW.
- 10.24.4. Providing ATO/ATONEW quality control. **(T-3)**.
- 10.24.5. Disseminating ATO/ATONEW and obtaining receipts for ATO/ATONEW as required/able. **(T-3)**.
- 10.24.6. Importing SPINS from all locations if published with ATO/ATONEW. **(T-3)**.
- 10.24.7. Creating and managing Identification Friend-or-Foe/Selective Identification Feature (IFF/SIF) plan, as required. **(T-3)**.
- 10.24.8. Managing connectivity with external systems. Setting up Global Decision Support System (GDSS) import parameters, managing imports, and coordinating with the Communications Support Team to ensure system integration. Coordinating with MAAP Chief to ensure MAAP Toolkit database is current, and the data properly transfers to Theater Air Planner. **(T-3)**.
- 10.24.9. Archiving all ATO/ATONEW and ATO/ATONEW database files for recovery and/or historical reference. **(T-3)**.
- 10.24.10. Maintaining and managing exercise, planning, and operational databases. **(T-3)**.
- 10.24.11. Synchronizing all ATO functions. Troubleshooting system issues from GDSS imports, airspace imports, target list imports, ATO shell manipulation, ATO/ATONEW mission approval, and ATO/ATONEW push. Coordinating with Airspace Management Planning Cell to deconflict current ATO airspace usage. **(T-3)**.
- 10.24.12. Advising COD/CCO of significant issues encountered in ATO/ATONEW production and dissemination to enhance situational awareness and mission execution. **(T-3)**.

10.25. Combat Operations Division (COD) is responsible for:

- 10.25.1. Providing constant monitoring and support of air missions under tactical control of the COMAFFOR or, if so designated, the JFACC. **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.2. Adjusting the ATO as necessary in response to operational environment dynamics (e.g., assigned targets are no longer valid, detection of high priority targets, or enemy action threatens friendly forces). **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.3. Coordinating and facilitating the execution of emergency and immediate air support requests with the Air Support Operations Center. **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.4. Executing the Area Air Defense Plan on behalf of the C/JFACC. **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.5. Publishing changes to the ATO and ACO, and recommending updates to RSTA Annex and coordinating with CPD to publish ATONEW changes. **(T-2)**.

- 10.25.6. Managing ballistic missile defense and/or theater missile-warning operations. **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.7. Developing reports as required (COD inputs to situation report, passing of daily mission reports, etc.) **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.8. Managing theater tactical data link interface control systems. **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.9. Managing the Air and Space tactical portion of the CCDR/Joint Task Force CTP. **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.10. Conducting dynamic targeting and time-sensitive targeting operations. **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.11. Monitoring and executing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations directed by the RSTA Annex. **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.12. Coordinating and executing changes to collection operations and processing, exploitation and dissemination in support of higher priority activities. **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.13. Coordinating and monitoring when tasked of real-time space operations support. **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.14. Conducting airspace management. **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.15. Providing recommendations for non-kinetic operations planners and Cyberspace Support Element for desired cyberspace effects. **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.16. Providing recommendations to CPD for changes to SPINS, Component Prioritized Collection List, and ATO scheme. **(T-2)**.
- 10.25.17. Providing execution assessment data to SRD daily or as requested. **(T-2)**.

10.26. Chief of Combat Operations (CCO) is responsible for:

- 10.26.1. Maintaining awareness of all theater air, space, and cyberspace operations including force bed-down, sortie rates, airspace procedures, communications, ROE/RUFs, munitions capabilities, and individual unit capabilities and limitations. **(T-3)**.
- 10.26.2. Scheduling and supervising all periodic JFACC update briefings, crew changeover briefings, training, and orientation. **(T-3)**.
- 10.26.3. Determining reporting responsibilities and establishing procedures for preparing reports from the COD for the commander's situation report going to Joint Task Force Headquarters, lateral headquarters, and subordinate TACS elements. **(T-3)**.
- 10.26.4. Developing procedural guidance for each duty position in the COD based on this manual, doctrine, weapon systems capabilities, and theater directives applicable to the actual contingency or exercise being supported. **(T-3)**.
- 10.26.5. Developing COD communications requirements and recommending priorities for submission to communications operations personnel. **(T-3)**.
- 10.26.6. Supervising the preparation and operation of the COD to include manning, systems requirements, and seating. **(T-3)**.
- 10.26.7. Overseeing development, dissemination, and implementation of AOC chat plan. **(T-3)**.

10.26.8. Determining subordinate TACS reporting responsibilities and determining the delegation of authority desired for decentralized execution (accomplished in coordination with the C2 Plans Team). **(T-3)**.

10.26.9. Coordinating procedures with internal and external agencies concerning briefings, displays, information needs, and routing of immediate requests and threat alerts. **(T-3)**.

10.26.10. Ensuring that backup procedures are prepared and can be rapidly implemented if automated support systems fail. **(T-3)**.

10.26.11. Coordinating applicable ROE/RUF changes with JA, SPT, ATO Coordinators, C2 Plans Team, AOC/CC, JFACC, and JFC staff, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.26.12. Ensuring positional guides, worksheets, and procedural checklists are developed and current for all appropriate combat operations duty positions. **(T-3)**.

10.26.13. Developing ATO/ATONEW and ACO change coordination and approval procedures. **(T-3)**.

10.26.14. Advising CPD of significant problems encountered in implementing and managing the current ATO/ATONEW to help improve the quality and effectiveness of future ATO/ATONEW tasking. **(T-3)**.

10.26.15. Supervising execution of the ATO/ATONEW/ACO and specifically:

10.26.15.1. Ensuring situation and status displays are current and accurate. **(T-3)**.

10.26.15.2. Keeping the AOC/CC informed on unanticipated developments, enemy initiatives or problems that might either impact planned operations or reduce the effectiveness of any TACS element or joint/coalition asset on the ATO or supporting it. **(T-3)**.

10.26.15.3. Being prepared to receive execution authority from the JFACC/Area Air Defense Commander. **(T-3)**. (The JFACC/Area Air Defense Commander may, by written or verbal order, delegate responsibility for selected authorities to the CCO or other TACS elements.)

10.26.15.4. Recommending delegation of selected execution authorities to subordinate TACS elements when ROE/RUF allows and subordinate TACS elements are capable of conducting the mission. **(T-3)**.

10.26.15.5. Approving ACO and ATO/ATONEW changes as required. Additionally, ensuring any ATO database changes and issues are coordinated and worked with CPD, air operations database management cell. **(T-3)**.

10.26.16. Consulting with the AOC/CC on the delegation of air and missile defense, close air support, and Airspace Control Authority to subordinate TACS units. **(T-3)**.

10.26.17. Keeping the AOC/CC and TACS informed of the latest mission objectives, priorities, and ROE/RUFs. **(T-3)**.

10.26.18. Relaying air defense warnings and threat alerts to subordinate units and other C2 agencies in a timely manner. **(T-3)**. **Note:** In some cases, making this notification directly to the JFACC with a back brief to the AOC/CC due to immediate needs.

10.26.19. Through timely coordination with JFACC and AFFOR staffs and similar agencies, acting to ensure that preventive maintenance, stand-downs, or other scheduled maintenance for ground TACS elements does not negatively affect effective ATO/ATONEW execution and defense of friendly forces. **(T-3)**.

10.26.20. Ensuring communications changes or reprioritization affecting the AOC are coordinated and communicated with associated C2 units, applicable agencies, and the Chief AOC communications team. **(T-3)**.

10.26.21. Directing the operations of the TACS. **(T-3)**.

10.26.22. Maintaining mission log summaries for appropriate teams that capture major actions taken during execution of the ATO. **(T-3)**.

10.26.23. Providing guidance and support to the KM Officer on creating and updating COD portion of the AOC KM plan. **(T-3)**.

10.26.24. Acting as approving or disapproving authority for preventive maintenance, stand-downs, other scheduled maintenance, or alterations to the AOC Floor. **(T-3)**.

10.26.25. Training and equipping all assigned or attached personnel to perform assigned duties. **(T-3)**.

10.27. Offensive Operations Team is responsible for:

10.27.1. Executing ATO/ATONEW. **(T-3)**.

10.27.2. Execute and monitoring dynamic targeting or time sensitive targeting. **(T-3)**.

10.27.3. Providing battle damage assessments and operations assessments, as able. **(T-3)**.

10.27.4. Changing ATO/ATONEW and executing re-roles. **(T-3)**.

10.27.5. Scrambling air assets when required. **(T-3)**.

10.28. Defensive Operations Team is responsible for:

10.28.1. Monitoring current air, space, and information operations. **(T-3)**.

10.28.2. Maintaining situational awareness. **(T-3)**.

10.28.3. Recommending ATO/ACO changes as required. **(T-3)**.

10.28.4. Maintaining currency on applicable documents such as Area Air Defense Plan and AOD. **(T-3)**.

10.28.5. Keeping ATO coordinators apprised of changes as needed. **(T-3)**.

10.28.6. Providing assessment inputs. **(T-3)**.

10.28.7. Providing updates on available resources. **(T-3)**.

10.28.8. Coordinating with C2 agencies, other services, etc. as needed. **(T-3)**.

10.28.9. Supporting Personnel Recovery operations. **(T-3)**.

10.28.10. Assisting subordinate units whenever needed. **(T-3)**.

10.28.11. Executing the Area Air Defense Plan. **(T-3)**.

10.28.12. Providing C2 battle management to include air and missile defense scrambles. (T-3).

10.28.13. Executing ATO and ACO. (T-3).

10.28.14. Supporting dynamic targeting or time sensitive targeting execution. (T-3).

10.28.15. Relay battle damage assessment, in-flight reports, etc. to appropriate AOC teams and divisions. (T-3).

10.29. Senior Intelligence Duty Officer (SIDO) Team is responsible for:

10.29.1. Conducting threat warning. (T-3).

10.29.2. Supporting dynamic targeting and ISR tasking operations. (T-3).

10.29.3. Supporting Personnel Recovery and troops in contact. (T-3).

10.29.4. Supporting situational and predictive analysis of the battlespace. (T-3).

10.30. Common Tactical Picture (CTP) Track Management Cell is responsible for:

10.30.1. Managing AOC CTP architecture. (T-3).

10.30.2. Managing Global Command and Control System CTP Track data and associated tables. (T-3).

10.30.3. Implementing and managing CTP track data filters. (T-3).

10.30.4. Creating and managing CTP communication channels and associated client gateways. (T-3).

10.30.5. Correlating ATO with the air and space tactical picture. (T-3).

10.30.6. Maintaining a complete, timely, and accurate CTP in accordance with the Joint Data Network Officer Operational Tasking Common Operational Picture-CTP. (T-3).

10.30.7. Directing and supervising the resolution of track data anomalies (e.g., dual designations, duplicate tracks, false targets, runaway tracks, identification, and category conflicts). (T-3).

10.30.8. Coordinating with the Joint Interface Control Cell and Air Support Operations Squadrons/Direct Air Support Center for production of the Combat Net Radios segment of the Operational Task Link and Operational Task Link Network Enabled Weapons messages. (T-3).

10.30.9. Managing overlays and tactical graphics as required. (T-3).

10.30.10. Managing CTP big screen display as required. (T-3).

10.30.11. Managing CTP machine-to-machine external interfaces as required. (T-3).

10.30.12. Managing CTP user profiles and permissions as required. (T-3).

10.31. Interface Control Cell is responsible for:

10.31.1. Managing assigned MTN and MTN architecture in accordance with AFMAN 13-116. (T-3).

10.31.2. Managing data and track coordination voice networks (Air Defense C2, Data Link Control, Track Synchronization, and Voice Product) as well as chat systems to ensure transfer and display of air and missile defense information. **(T-3)**.

10.31.3. Supporting operational tasking data link development and execution in accordance with AFMAN 13-116. **(T-3)**.

10.31.4. Planning and implementing, as required, contingency procedures for MTN and Cell interface systems. **(T-3)**.

10.31.5. Managing data exchange for MTN to ensure accuracy. **(T-3)**.

10.31.6. Managing theater digital datalink interface systems and displays. **(T-3)**.

10.31.7. Requesting and coordinating MTN design and configuration changes. **(T-3)**.

10.31.8. Reviewing JFCs, JFACCs, Area Air Defense Commanders, Joint Data Network Officer's, and other supported commander's plans and information exchange requests. **(T-3)**.

10.31.9. Developing and reviewing tactical data link requirements for the area of operations. **(T-3)**.

10.31.10. Coordinating with CJE and CTP Manager for the development and dissemination of the Combat Net Radios segment of the Operational Task Link and/or Operational Task Link Network Enabled Weapons messages. **(T-3)**.

10.31.11. Cross-referencing Link 16 and Combat Net Radios parameters in the ATONEW and Operational Task Link/Operational Task Link Network Enabled Weapons messages. **(T-3)**.

10.31.12. Incorporating national technical means tracks into the MTN in coordination with Senior Air Defense Officer, Senior Offensive Duty Officer, and SIDO team's information exchange requirements. **(T-3)**.

10.32. Component Joint Data Network Officer Equivalent (CJE) is responsible for:

10.32.1. Providing, in accordance with joint data network published Operational Task Link Common Operational Picture-CTP and other higher headquarter guidance, an accurate and consolidated air and space tactical picture to all AOC divisions as well as the JFACC. **(T-3)**.

10.32.2. Establishing settings (per guidance) for the tactical management system, universal communications processor, and filters at appropriate levels of detail and coordinating with Common Operational Picture Correlation Sites and the Combatant Command Joint Data Network cell. **(T-3)**.

10.32.3. Setting up and managing the AOC Global Command and Control System - Joint architecture and provides CTP subject matter expert support to AOC personnel. **(T-3)**.

10.32.4. Ensuring, along with WSM and other AOC staff members, that the feeds, tasked sensors, and reporting systems support AOC CTP requirements.

10.32.5. Ensuring all CTP feeds correlate together to provide an accurate display of the battle space, ensures CTP data is distributed to subordinate TACS elements equipped with the appropriate Global Command and Control System - Joint client software, manages CTP permissions, and monitors and resolves connectivity and interoperability issues. **(T-3)**.

10.32.6. Configuring the pseudo identification feature, arbitrary electronic intelligence notation, and joint unit tables as required. **(T-3)**.

10.32.7. Supporting and coordinating with the Joint Task Forces Joint Data Network Officer to resolve CTP anomalies and interoperability issues and meet JOA information exchange requirements (IERs). **(T-3)**.

10.32.8. **(Per CJCSI 3115.01)** Coordinating with the Joint Data Network Officer and Air Support Operations Squadrons and Direct Air Support Center units to execute effective Digitally Aided Close Air Support. **(T-0)**. The CJE accomplishes this by developing machine-readable uniform resource names, internet protocols and operating area parameters, via the Combat Net Radios segment of the Operational Task Link and/or Operational Task Link Network Enabled Weapons messages. **(T-3)**.

10.32.9. Direct the Joint Interface Control Officer to plan the integration of network-enabled weapons via the Operational Task Link and/or Operational Task Link Network Enabled Weapons messages that includes Combat Net Radios. **(T-3)**.

10.33. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Division (ISRD) is responsible for:

10.33.1. Synchronizing JFACC ISR operations with joint air strategy, planning, and operations assessments. **(T-2)**.

10.33.2. Managing priority intelligence requirements, RFIs, intelligence reporting, and analytical support from national, theater and component intelligence organizations. **(T-2)**.

10.33.3. Developing target analysis and materials to support JFACC strategy and daily ATO execution. **(T-2)**.

10.33.4. Producing and disseminating the RSTA Annex to the ATO and any mission-type orders required for focused collection operations. **(T-2)**.

10.33.5. Providing constant monitoring of adversary actions, threat warning, and analytic products and services in support of all ATO missions. **(T-2)**.

10.33.6. Planning and managing collection and processing, exploitation, and dissemination operations throughout the ATO period to support targeting and ISR missions. **(T-2)**.

10.33.7. Developing assessments on adversary courses of action, ISR operations effectiveness, and targeting effects. **(T-2)**.

10.33.8. Managing unit intelligence support (order of battle, target materials, operational reconnaissance, mission report coordination, target mensuration only (TMO) guidance, Intelligence Reporting Directives, etc.). **(T-2)**.

10.33.9. Coordinating reachback and federated architectures for order-of-battle, target development, combat assessment, fusion analysis, processing, exploitation, and dissemination, and other intelligence reporting responsibilities and processes with the JFC, components, and other intelligence staffs as necessary. **(T-2)**.

10.33.10. Coordinating ISRD responses to all requests for intelligence, information, and support. **(T-2)**.

10.33.11. Providing guidance and support to the KM Officer on creating and updating ISRD portion of the AOC Knowledge Management plan. **(T-2)**.

10.34. Chief of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division (CISR) is responsible for:

10.34.1. Integrating ACF, TGT/TA, and ISR Operations Teams' processes, personnel, and support across all AOC divisions to ensure JFACC guidance, objectives, and tasks are executed in all planning, operational, and assessment phases. **(T-3).**

10.34.2. Stating JFACC and AOC intelligence requirements optimally, to ensure that national or theater ISR operations supplement and complement JFACC airborne ISR operations. **(T-3).**

10.34.3. Evaluating the adequacy of national or theater ISR systems supporting the JFC and JFACC strategies and advise the AOC/CC, JFACC, AFFOR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Cyber Effects Operations (A2/6) staff, JFC/J2, and supporting Joint Intelligence Operations Center of any deficiencies or additional requirements. **(T-3).**

10.34.4. Coordinating with the JFC/J2, component intelligence directors, production centers, and other supporting agencies as required to establish reach-back and federated architectures for order-of-battle, target development, combat and tactical assessment, processing, exploitation, and dissemination, and other reporting and production responsibilities and processes. **(T-3).**

10.34.5. Reviewing ISRD estimates, intelligence summaries, daily intelligence summaries, and other ISRD products and services for release as required. Ensuring all joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment products reflect the most current adversary courses of action, and make them available to all appropriate customers. **(T-3).**

10.34.6. Ensuring ISR systems support effective and efficient operations and are managed throughout the targeting and collection processes to optimize JFACC operations. **(T-3).**

10.34.7. Ensuring all ISRD personnel, including augmentees, are trained and certified (if required) in assigned intelligence positions and have access to current positional guides, materials, and procedural checklists; support training and certification of intelligence personnel assigned to the COD SIDO team as required. **(T-3).**

10.34.8. Ensuring national agency and other intelligence liaisons are supported and integrated into AOC ISR processes, and deploy ISRD liaisons to non-AOC organizations as required or as resources permit. **(T-3).**

10.34.9. Integrating Imagery Support Element and National Tactical Integration Element personnel, specialty team personnel, and other AOC elements into AOC ISR processes as required. **(T-3).**

10.34.10. Identifying ISRD floor space, systems, equipment, and communications requirements, conform to the AOC Weapon System baseline and Configuration Management Plan, and ensuring they are consistent and compatible with theater intelligence architectures. **(T-3).**

10.34.11. Coordinating intelligence security requirements in accordance with Special Security Officer guidance and directives. **(T-3).**

10.34.12. In coordination with the AOC foreign disclosure officer, developing foreign disclosure office procedures and processes to accommodate coalition, Partner Nation, and other government operations as required. **(T-3)**.

10.34.13. Coordinating duty positions requirements and access which support Special Access Program, Special Access required (SAR), STO, or other restricted access operations. **(T-3)**.

10.34.14. Coordinating all support requests, system limitations, manpower shortfalls, and other operational deficiencies with the AOC/CC and AFFOR staff, MAJCOM staff, and other component staffs as required. **(T-3)**.

10.34.15. Ensuring adequate ISRD communication with and substantive intelligence support to all theater air units as required. **(T-3)**.

10.34.16. In coordination with MAJCOM and Numbered Air Force A2 staffs, publishing an ISRD Support Plan and Theater Guide as part of the JFACC's overall theater ISR support plan to describe theater supported or supporting ISR planning and execution responsibilities and provide planning considerations for tactical air units and AOC augmentation forces that deploy or employ within the theater. **(T-3)**.

10.35. Analysis, Correlation, and Fusion (ACF) Team Chief is responsible for:

10.35.1. Providing guidance to Analysis and Unit Support Cells and ensuring both cells have sufficient resources to accomplish their missions (trained personnel, intelligence systems and connectivity, communication equipment, adequate office space, etc.) including those ISRD functions in support of or embedded in other AOC divisions. **(T-3)**.

10.35.2. Directing the conduct of dynamic all-source analysis and production and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment to meet JFACC, AOC, air component unit, and joint intelligence gaps and requirements. **(T-3)**.

10.35.3. Establishing support procedures for unit intelligence requirements. **(T-3)**.

10.35.4. Coordinating the production, review, and approval of the ACF Team's primary deliverables (intelligence summaries, daily intelligence summaries, briefings, assessments, order of battle, etc.). **(T-3)**.

10.35.5. Directing the ACF Team efforts to characterize adversary activity in the AOC's/OC's CTP through analysis, correlation, and fusion of all-source information and data. **(T-3)**.

10.35.6. Overseeing the development, publication, and maintenance of the JFACC Theater Intelligence Reporting Directive. **(T-3)**.

10.35.7. Providing air component joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment requirements (IAMD system analysis, order of battle, etc.) to the JFC/J2, theater Joint Intelligence Operations Center, other components, and national agencies as requested. The ACF Team Chief is also responsible for rectifying differences between air component joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment assessments and JFC, theater, or national level joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment reporting for air component customers. **(T-3)**.

10.35.8. Establishing a timely and responsive ISRD request for information process to satisfy both internal and external AOC RFIs. **(T-3)**.

10.35.9. Coordinating ACF support requests from other AOC divisions, specialty teams, and other ISRD teams as required. **(T-3)**.

10.35.10. Ensuring adequate support for all liaison elements within the ACF Team workspaces. **(T-3)**.

10.36. ACF Team is responsible for:

10.36.1. Developing and disseminating analysis and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment products and services. **(T-3)**.

10.36.2. Producing and maintaining order of battle updates. **(T-3)**.

10.36.3. Developing and maintaining JFACC intelligence requirements and recommend priority intelligence requirements and essential elements of information. **(T-3)**.

10.36.4. Collecting, tracking, and resolving intelligence RFIs. **(T-3)**.

10.36.5. Tracking, analyzing, and disseminating mission reports and other unit reporting as required. **(T-3)**.

10.36.6. Coordinating with and providing support to theater air units. **(T-3)**.

10.36.7. Supporting other AOC division and team analytical requirements. **(T-3)**.

10.37. Analysis Cell is responsible for:

10.37.1. Conducting all-source analysis of adversary kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, tactics, and courses of action in conjunction with joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment efforts of other components and appropriate reachback and federated intelligence organizations; analysis should feed directly into strategy, planning, execution, and assessment processes and meet overall AOC battle-rhythm requirements. **(T-3)**.

10.37.2. Fusing all-source intelligence information (data, reports, etc.) into a common intelligence understanding of the operational environment which can be fed into the AOC's/OC's CTP and, using systems of record, disseminated throughout the theater via analysis products and services such as event templates, event matrices, intelligence summaries, daily intelligence summaries, mission summary briefings, or other products and services as required. **(T-3)**.

10.37.3. Developing, maintaining, and disseminating orders of battle, which identify and depict adversary force locations, unit size, activity, etc., in accordance with theater intelligence databases, timelines, formats, and subordinate unit mission planning systems; coordinating and deconflicting analysis within the AOC and with the JFC/J2 and Joint Intelligence Operations Center as appropriate. **(T-3)**.

10.37.4. Developing, publishing, and maintaining JFACC intelligence requirements and supporting information requirements to JFACC priority intelligence requirements and essential elements of information; monitoring the operational environment for indications of such activities and, upon detection, validating and disseminating in accordance with AOC and theater procedures. **(T-3)**.

10.37.5. Identifying intelligence gaps relevant to JFACC operations strategy, planning, and execution, and preparing, submitting, and monitoring RFIs, collection requirements and/or production requirements to eliminate identified gaps; apprising air component senior leadership of these gaps. **(T-3)**.

10.37.6. Creating named areas of interest with associated indicators to focus ISR operations strategy and planning on those indicators, which can most efficiently confirm or refute specific adversary course(s) of action. **(T-3)**.

10.37.7. Efficiently acquiring and prosecuting high pay-off targets, developing and maintaining target areas of interest in conjunction with the Targets/Tactical Assessment (TGT/TA) Team. **(T-3)**.

10.37.8. Reviewing all-source incoming message traffic and data; ensuring appropriate distribution and threat warning throughout the ACF, ISRD, SIDO, attached or embedded analysts in other AOC divisions, and all air component units. **(T-3)**.

10.37.9. Coordinating with BCD; NALE; Marine Liaison Element; SOLE; coalition, partner nation and government agency liaisons; and other AOC elements such as NKO Team, to monitor the battlespace, adversary actions, and operational effects. **(T-3)**.

10.37.10. Assisting ACF strategists, target strategists, and the OAT in development and maintenance of measure(s) of effectiveness, success indicators, and ACF AIR. **(T-3)**.

10.37.11. Supporting special intelligence requirements for other AOC divisions, teams, and elements (AMD, STO, Space Operations Specialty Team, etc.) as required. **(T-3)**.

10.37.12. Coordinating domain specific (IO, electronic warfare, cyberspace, space, etc.) assessments with the appropriate AOC specialty team. **(T-3)**.

10.38. Unit Support Cell is responsible for:

10.38.1. Coordinating with AFFOR A2/6 staff, JFC/J2, theater Joint Intelligence Operations Center, and 16 AF/480 ISRW/70 ISRW/363 ISRW on the development of theater intelligence reporting directives and dissemination procedures to subordinate and supporting units. **(T-3)**.

10.38.2. Receiving, tracking, and validating unit intelligence reports and ensuring timely distribution within the ISRD and to other AOC, JFC, and external organizations (e.g., reachback and federated partners) with valid requirements; providing constructive feedback to units on format, content, and completeness of intelligence reports in accordance with theater reporting directives. **(T-3)**.

10.38.3. Tracking mission reports (and associated weapons system video) for all ATO sorties and develop mission summaries, which identify adversary tactics and trends; disseminate relevant information to the TGT/TA Team and others as required. **(T-3)**.

10.38.4. Coordinating with the SIDO team and ACF Analysis Cell on establishment of threat update criteria and procedures for effective dissemination of threat update codes and other time-sensitive threat warning information to subordinate units in accordance with theater intelligence reporting directives. **(T-3)**.

10.38.5. Developing and disseminating a production schedule of theater intelligence products to ensure all subordinate units are aware of available intelligence data and production timelines.

10.38.6. Establishing ISRD indoctrination and theater familiarization procedures for new air units arriving or operating in theater. **(T-3)**.

10.38.7. Managing the ISRD RFI system for units, AOC divisions or teams, JFC/J2, Joint Intelligence Operations Center, other components, and outside agencies with valid requirements **(T-3)**. (**Note:** the ISR Ops Team may also conduct RFI Management in accordance with CISR guidance.) 10.38.8. Coordinating unit requirements with AFFOR A2/6 staff and MAJCOM staff A2/6 as required. **(T-3)**.

10.39. RFI Management Element is responsible for:

10.39.1. Receiving, validating, prioritizing, processing, and tracking ISRD RFIs for satisfaction with ACF, JFC, Joint Intelligence Operations Center, other component, and reach-back and federated analysts as required. **(T-3)**.

10.39.2. Coordinating required Collection Requests with the ISR Operations and ACF Teams to satisfy RFIs where no current data exists for a satisfactory response. **(T-3)**.

10.39.3. Implementing and maintaining procedures for RFI submission, response dissemination, and theater-wide visibility (Community On-line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers, e-mail, web sites, etc.) in accordance with AFMAN14-401, publishing and updating request for information procedures in the RSTA Annex and on the Unit Support/ISR Operations web sites. **(T-3)**.

10.39.4. Implementing and maintaining a formal customer feedback mechanism to determine RFI satisfaction and track RFI process feedback. **(T-3)**.

10.40. TGT/TA Team Chief is responsible for:

10.40.1. Leading, supervising, coordinating, and conducting the AOC targeting process in support of JFACC, JFC, and other component objectives. **(T-3)**.

10.40.2. Providing guidance to the Target Development and TA Cells and ensuring both cells have sufficient resources to accomplish their missions (trained personnel, intelligence systems and connectivity, communication equipment, adequate office space, etc.) including those ISRD functions in support of or embedded in other AOC divisions. **(T-3)**.

10.40.3. Overseeing the establishment of full-spectrum, effects-based targeting strategies, target development, weaponeering options, and combat assessment methodologies in accordance with Service, theater, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance in the form of the National Intelligence Support Plan (NISP), but more specifically, Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETs), Agency Mission Essential Task Lists (AMETs), when garnering target intelligence from a national intelligence agency, and Modernized Integrated Database standards. **(T-3)**.

10.40.4. Enforcing target database and target material standards in accordance with Service, theater, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance; coordinating required support agreements for target materials and analysis with reach-back and federated targeting organizations as required. **(T-3)**.

10.40.5. Establishing and maintaining the necessary training, processes, and organizational construct to ensure organizational and personnel certifications and readiness in accordance with Service, theater, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff targeting-related guidance. **(T-3).**

10.41. TGT/TA is responsible for:

10.41.1. Developing, maintaining, and managing target systems analysis processes and support. **(T-3).**

10.41.2. Developing and managing target nominations to meet JFC and JFACC objectives and guidance. **(T-3).**

10.41.3. Conducting and managing support for weaponeering, collateral damage estimate (estimation), target coordinate mensuration, and supplemental material development of executable target materials. **(T-3).**

10.41.4. Producing and maintaining electronic target folders. **(T-3).**

10.41.5. Conducting and managing battle damage assessment physical and functional damage or change assessment processes. **(T-3).**

10.41.6. Coordinating target system assessments. **(T-3).**

10.41.7. Supporting AOC, JFACC, and JFC operational munitions effectiveness assessments and restrike recommendations processes with targeting intelligence. **(T-3).**

10.41.8. Establishing, documenting, and managing reach-back and federated targeting partnerships. **(T-3).**

10.42. Target Development Cell is responsible for:

10.42.1. Reviewing and assisting in the development of JFACC objectives, strategy-to-task analysis, operations plans, and other component commander objectives to perform target development in conjunction with the JFC, AOC divisions, and other agencies as required. **(T-3).**

10.42.2. Performing target systems analysis by systematically evaluating elements of potential target systems to determine which critical and vulnerable nodes could or should be attacked or affected to achieve objectives. **(T-3).**

10.42.3. Maintaining and updating target databases and online electronic target folders, and verifying local target database updates to national database authorities in accordance with automated capabilities and theater policies. **(T-3).**

10.42.4. Identifying potential high payoff targets and associated target areas of interest for inclusion in the Target Nomination List; coordinating target areas of interest with the ACF Team. **(T-3).**

10.42.5. Providing mensurated coordinates for selected aimpoint location assignments. **(T-3).**

10.42.6. Calculating and managing reach-back support of weaponeering solutions for nominated targets to achieve desired effects in support of JFACC tasks; providing the

weaponized JIPTL to the TET and MAAP Teams; ensuring weaponized scenarios are included within the electronic target folders and target database. **(T-3)**.

10.42.7. Coordinating aimpoint and weaponizing requirements for specialized munitions such as the Tomahawk land attack missile, joint air-to-surface standoff missile, and conventional air launched cruise missile with appropriate agencies. **(T-3)**.

10.42.8. Developing or coordinating for development with appropriate organization (Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, etc.) supplemental target materials needed to characterize the target (e.g., physical vulnerability graphics), analyze collateral effects due to the nature of the target (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazard prediction), and other products as required. **(T-3)**.

10.42.9. Tracking target nominations and target data history for kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities. **(T-3)**.

10.42.10. Coordinating with AOC Specialty Team, ACF, and ISR Operations Teams to determine collection requirements and essential elements of information for deliberate and time-sensitive target development and nomination; establishing standing collection requirements where appropriate. **(T-3)**.

10.42.11. Maintaining and disseminating as well as making accessible target materials (e.g., electronic target folders) and associated Geospatial Information and Services products in accordance with Service, theater procedures, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance to units prior to mission tasking. **(T-3)**.

10.42.12. Reviewing, monitoring, maintaining, disseminating, and submitting recommended changes to joint target list, restricted target list, and no strike list. **(T-3)**.

10.42.13. Identifying potential collateral damage concerns, conducting collateral damage estimates, and managing supporting reach-back and federated collateral damage estimate (estimation) production activities. **(T-0)**. The Target Development Cell identifies high collateral damage estimates or sensitive targets and coordinating for approval (e.g., sensitive target approval and review packages) in accordance with JFACC, theater, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance for selected aimpoint location assignments and coordinating requirements for 'target mensuration only' with appropriate units.

10.42.14. Coordinating with Judge Advocate to ensure all potential targets comply with ROE, RUF, and Law of War and with Public Affairs efforts to counter false or inaccurate claims and reports of collateral damage. **(T-0)**.

10.42.15. Coordinating with SOLE/BCD and AOC specialty teams to deconflict nominated and time sensitive targets. **(T-3)**.

10.42.16. Enforcing component target nomination format and process standards for targets nominated for JFACC execution and tie component Target Nomination Lists to prioritized tactical tasks for specific ATO periods. **(T-3)**.

10.42.17. Validating all nominated targets in accordance with theater and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance to link every nominated target to specific and appropriate JFC and JFACC objectives. **(T-0)**.

10.42.18. Developing, maintaining, and merging the air component Target Nomination List with all other component target nomination lists to form one integrated target nomination list (draft JIPTL); providing the integrated target nomination list with prioritized inputs to the TET. **(T-3)**.

10.42.19. Incorporating TA Cell feedback, mission report reporting, ACF Team analysis, and combat assessment results from previously prosecuted ATOs into deliberate and time sensitive target nomination processes as required. **(T-3)**.

10.42.20. Coordinating, documenting, and managing support from external targeting and analysis agencies (JFC/J2, Joint Intelligence Operations Center, Air Force Targeting Center, Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Defense Intelligence Agency, etc.) to support establishment and sustainment of commonly understood reach-back and federated targeting architecture and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures. **(T-3)**.

10.43. TA Cell is responsible for:

10.43.1. Reviewing JFACC objectives, strategy-to-task analysis, operations plans, other component commanders' objectives, ROE, RUF, JIPTLs, target status, and attack results for incorporation into the combat assessment. **(T-3)**.

10.43.2. Reviewing intelligence reports and summaries, battle damage assessment reporting, and target system assessments to evaluate JFACC objective attainment. Coordinating analysis of non-kinetic missions with NKO Team personnel for inclusion into the AOC assessment process. **(T-3)**.

10.43.3. Coordinating with the OAT and other AOC divisions and specialty teams to determine specific requirements (product information, formatting, timing, etc.) and assisting in the development of the daily assessment briefing to the JFACC. **(T-3)**.

10.43.4. Coordinating with the JFC/J2 in the development of the JFACC battle damage assessment Concept of Operations, including roles, duties, and communications architectures of the AOC, JFC, other components, reach-back organizations, and federated partners to support the battle damage assessment process. **(T-3)**.

10.43.5. Identifying and coordinating battle damage assessment collection, reporting requirements, and intended targeting and weapons effects to the ISR Operations and ACF Teams, Imagery Support Element, National Tactical Integration Element, AOC specialty teams, etc., for application during post-strike collection and exploitation. **(T-3)**.

10.43.6. Coordinating with the ACF Team to determine how friendly operations are affecting the enemy. **(T-3)**.

10.43.7. Working with the ACF Unit Support Cell to include combat assessment data requirements in the Theater Intelligence Reporting Directive and ensuring mission summaries, mission reports, and associated non-traditional ISR and operational reconnaissance collections (e.g., weapons system video or tactical electronic intelligence) are accessible in accordance with automated capabilities and theater policies. **(T-3)**.

10.43.8. Managing local, reach-back, and federated physical damage/change assessment and functional damage/change assessment battle damage assessment processes. **(T-3)**. These processes include the preparation and dissemination of associated initial and supplemental reports as required by the JFACC. The processes also include the theater battle damage

assessment concept of operations; update and verify reach-back; and federated updates to the electronic target folders target database per initial and supplemental reporting.

10.43.9. Conducting estimated damage analysis and including it in battle damage assessment results as appropriate. Identifying target categories appropriate and suitable for estimated damage analysis consideration in the AOD, pre-coordinating with the JFC, documenting in the JFACC battle damage assessment concept of operations, and disseminating accordingly. **(T-3)**.

10.43.10. Feeding restrike recommendations to appropriate AOC teams for immediate action and future ATO planning as appropriate. **(T-3)**.

10.43.11. Establishing processes to use battle damage assessment reporting and ACF Team analysis in support of operational munitions effectiveness assessments (e.g., trend analysis of employed weapons and tactics). **(T-3)**.

10.43.12. Coordinating with JFC, JFACC, and AOC staffs to identify, collect, analyze, and submit recommended changes in targeting methodology, tactics, fusing or weapons selection to appropriate AOC teams (target developers, MAAP Team, SIDO team, etc.) and units to improve mission effectiveness. **(T-3)**.

10.43.13. Compiling a list of recommended targets that should have priority for munitions effectiveness assessments exploitation teams when friendly forces occupy enemy territory. Compiling, verifying and making available all related targeting intelligence data for each recommended target. **(T-3)**.

10.44. ISR Operations Team Chief is responsible for:

10.44.1. Overseeing ISR operations processes and supporting operational reconnaissance processes throughout the ATO cycle in support of JFACC and JFC objectives to ensure synchronization with the theater collection strategy. **(T-3)**.

10.44.2. Providing guidance to the Collection Management Cell and Program Manager. Ensuring both cells have sufficient resources to accomplish their missions (trained personnel, intelligence systems and connectivity, communication equipment, adequate office space, etc.) including those ISR Operations team members supporting or embedded in other AOC divisions. **(T-3)**.

10.44.3. Coordinating with ISR operations strategists on the development of the JFACC ISR strategy and ISR operational assessment as part of the overall air operations strategy, JAOP, and AOD to ensure ISR Operations Team understanding of that strategy. **(T-3)**.

10.44.4. Presenting the air component ISR strategy, plan, and requirements at the theater Joint Collections Working Group and, as required, represent the JFACC and/or CISR at the Joint Collection Management Board in the JIPCL approval process. **(T-3)**.

10.44.5. Overseeing the development of JFACC Component Prioritized Collection List. **(T-3)**.

10.44.6. Developing, updating, and publishing asset cross cueing, mission-type orders, and other planning guidance for theater airborne ISR operations as required. **(T-3)**.

10.44.7. Coordinating RSTA Annex approval by the JFACC. **(T-3)**.

10.44.8. Coordinating with AOC, AFFOR staff, JFC staff, and other component staffs as required for additional ISR capabilities and architecture improvements. **(T-3)**.

10.45. ISR Operations Team is responsible for:

10.45.1. Developing the JFACC ISR strategy and ISR operational assessment(s). **(T-3)**.

10.45.2. Developing the JFACC Component Prioritized Collection List and supporting the theater Joint Collections Working Group and Joint Collection Management Board. **(T-3)**.

10.45.3. Developing and publishing the RSTA Annex and the ISR Synchronization Matrix. **(T-3)**.

10.45.4. Coordinating national intelligence requirements in accordance with theater processes. **(T-3)**.

10.45.5. Coordinating dynamic ISR and processing, exploitation, and dissemination operational support. **(T-3)**.

10.45.6. Coordinating requirements and products with reachback or distributed processing, exploitation, and dissemination organizations. **(T-3)**.

10.45.7. Integrating operational reconnaissance capabilities into ISR strategy, collection plan, and dynamic ISR processes. **(T-3)**.

10.45.8. Coordinating JFACC's priority lines of effort from the AOD with the 616 OC for inclusion in the 16 AF ISR Ops Directive (IOD). **(T-3)**.

10.46. Collection Management Cell is responsible for:

10.46.1. Coordinating ISR planning with appropriate AOC, theater, and external agencies to integrate theater airborne ISR into the ATO cycle to meet JFACC and JFC objectives. **(T-3)**.

10.46.2. In coordination with ISR operations strategists, assisting the ACF team in creating and maintaining priority intelligence requirements; tracking air component collection requirements; and establishing and refining essential elements of information. **(T-3)**.

10.46.3. Coordinating with JFC and Component Collection Managers to synchronize the JFACC ISR strategy with the theater ISR strategy. **(T-3)**.

10.46.4. Maintaining a collection requirements database (planning tool for resource integration, synchronization, and management or locally approved requirements systems) and executing collection requirements management (if the JFC has delegated that responsibility to the JFACC). **(T-3)**.

10.46.5. Building ISR and operational reconnaissance asset missions and sensor capacity for all air component assigned and/or allocated ISR assets in Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization, and Management or other locally approved system. **(T-3)**.

10.46.6. Building sensor collection decks for all air component ISR assets for inclusion in the RSTA Annex. **(T-3)**.

10.46.7. Coordinating national collection requests with JFC Collection Managers and deconflicting taskings for national, theater, and component ISR assets with JFC and Component Collection Managers. **(T-3)**. This is done to ensure efficient use of limited ISR and operational reconnaissance assets, and to prevent redundant ISR coverage.

10.46.8. Compiling, validating, and prioritizing the Air Component Prioritized Collection List and developing the JIPCL (if the JFC has delegated that responsibility to the JFACC). The Collection Management Cell is responsible for representing these JFACC air component priorities at the Joint Collections Working Group and Joint Collection Management Board as required. **(T-3)**.

10.46.9. Coordinating with other Component Collection Managers to request support for air component requirements not on the JIPCL. **(T-3)**.

10.46.10. Planning ISR and operational reconnaissance operations in close coordination with CPD personnel and platform liaison officers to develop the ISR synchronization matrix and ensure it meets AOD guidance and matches the ATO. **(T-3)**.

10.46.11. Supporting ISR Ops planners in the MAAP Team during development and compilation of the RSTA Annex with inputs from the Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Management Cell, ISR operations strategists, and platform liaison officers. **(T-3)**. This includes guidance for cross-cueing, mission-type orders, and other ISR employment considerations as required.

10.46.12. Coordinating operational reconnaissance planning, requirements, taskings, and opportunities (e.g., assets, locations, times, ad-hoc requirements) with the MAAP Team and SIDO Team ISR planners and duty officers; recommending ISR aircraft track and mission adjustments as required for final MAAP Team completion. **(T-3)**.

10.46.13. Monitoring weather, ad hoc requirements, maintenance, mission shifts, emerging targets and threats, processing, exploitation, and dissemination nodes, or CPD changes that affect the ISR synchronization matrix and RSTA Annex prior to ATO/RSTA publication; updating all planning products (collection decks, ISR Synch Matrix, RSTA, operational reconnaissance opportunities, etc.) as required in support of the MAAP. **(T-3)**.

10.46.14. Coordinating with the SIDO Team, MAAP Team ISR Ops Planners and others (Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Cell liaison officers, National Tactical Integration Element personnel, ISR platform liaison officers, etc.) as required to ensure adequate comprehension of daily ISR and operational reconnaissance tasking in the ATO/RSTA. **(T-3)**.

10.46.15. Coordinating with ISR collection and processing, exploitation, and dissemination units as required to ensure receipt and understanding of ATO/RSTA tasking. **(T-3)**.

10.46.16. Supporting SIDO intelligence gain-loss assessments as requested, and tracking ISR and operational reconnaissance mission changes during ATO execution that impact future ATO planning cycles. **(T-3)**.

10.46.17. Coordinating with the TGT/TA Team to ensure intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations support target development and the theater combat assessment plan, including requirements of reach-back and federated partners. **(T-3)**.

10.46.18. Recommending ISR strategy modifications based on the current collection posture and readiness, operational environment, JFC and JFACC objectives changes, and ISR effectiveness assessments. **(T-3)**.

10.47. Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Management Cell is responsible for:

10.47.1. Confirming with Collection Managers and ISR operations planners whether processing, exploitation, and dissemination nodes can support the ISR and operational reconnaissance operations tempo reflected in the ISR synchronization matrix. **(T-3)**.

10.47.2. Providing processing, exploitation, and dissemination guidance and recommendations to support development of the JAOP, AOD, and RSTA Annex; develop and presenting platform and sensor-to-target recommendations as required. **(T-3)**.

10.47.3. Coordinating with theater and reachback processing, exploitation, and dissemination organizations (480 ISRWG, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, etc.) on Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Tasking Order development and other tasking guidance as required. **(T-3)**.

10.47.4. Implementing and maintaining a formal customer feedback mechanism that tracks collection requirements, processing, exploitation, and dissemination requirements, and exploitation request satisfaction. **(T-3)**.

10.47.5. Monitoring processing, exploitation, and dissemination node status. Alerting ISR Ops Planners and Collection Managers of processing, exploitation, and dissemination impacts to the ATO and Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Tasking Order planning. Alerting SIDO team of processing, exploitation, and dissemination impacts to ATO or Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Tasking Order execution. **(T-3)**.

10.47.6. Advising and coordinating with ISR Operations and SIDO Team personnel and platform liaison officers on immediate processing, exploitation, and dissemination issues (architecture issues, outages, etc.) affecting current or upcoming operational missions. **(T-3)**.

10.47.7. Coordinating with ISRD teams, subordinate units, and JFC and other component staffs to ensure processing, exploitation, and dissemination processes are responsive and requested products, intelligence, and essential elements of information are available and disseminated in a timely manner. **(T-3)**.

10.47.8. Supporting ISR Operations Team collection requirements analysis (satisfied or unsatisfied and why), ISR utilization trends, processing, exploitation, and dissemination effectiveness and efficiency analysis, specific platform and sensor assessments, and target-set recommendations for measure(s) of effectiveness and measures(s) of performance development, and SRD strategy development and operational assessment efforts, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.47.9. Providing processing, exploitation, and dissemination status and effectiveness assessments at the Joint Collections Working Group, Joint Collection Management Board, and other theater and reach-back ISR events as required. **(T-3)**.

10.47.10. Coordinating processing, exploitation, and dissemination architecture issues, problems and solutions, and enhancements with AFFOR staff, JFC, component, and agency staffs as required. **(T-3)**.

10.48. Imagery Support Element is responsible for:

10.48.1. Providing 24/7 tailored analysis, production support, and exploitation for air component collection requirements for threat warning, ballistic missile defense, dynamic

targeting, irregular warfare and other time-sensitive operations to support various teams within the AOC through the request for information process. **(T-3)**.

10.48.2. Supporting ISR Operations Team planning and assessments of theater airborne ISR and operational reconnaissance operations. **(T-3)**.

10.48.3. Monitoring, assessing, and exploiting full-motion video and imagery products as required to support dynamic targeting and time-sensitive operations and the ATO planning cycle. **(T-3)**.

10.48.4. Supporting the Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Management Cell overseeing imagery tasking, collection, exploitation, and dissemination for processing, exploitation, and dissemination nodes tasked in the RSTA Annex to the ATO. **(T-3)**.

10.48.5. Coordinating geospatial analysis, production, exploitation, and other imagery support element support with distributed or reach-back processing, exploitation, and dissemination units, including collocated Distributed Common Ground System or other processing, exploitation, and dissemination units if available. **(T-3)**.

10.48.6. Confirming or denying intelligence obtained through other disciplines. **(T-3)**.

10.48.7. Providing 24/7 access into the Distributed Common Ground System architecture and providing limited exploitation of imagery, non-traditional ISR, tactical reconnaissance and ground moving target indicator feeds within the AOC. **(T-3)**.

10.49. National Tactical Integration Element is responsible for:

10.49.1. Providing robust intelligence reach-back to, and push-forward from, national and regional-focused intelligence organizations. **(T-3)**.

10.49.2. Coordinating with the Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Management Cell to establish guidelines for national community reach-back, coordination, and dissemination; monitoring the operational status and dissemination capabilities of national and theater intelligence systems. **(T-3)**.

10.49.3. Relaying AOC products (e.g., JAOP, AOD, MAAP, ATO, RSTA Annex) to national and regional-focused intelligence organizations to maximize responsive collection and reporting for air component operations. **(T-3)**.

10.49.4. Providing intelligence-derived analytic input to ISRD analytical products, to include classification guidance and sanitization; assisting the ISRD in development of priority intelligence requirements, essential elements of information, and named areas of interest indicators. **(T-3)**.

10.49.5. Providing signals intelligence expertise to the TGT/TA Team for target development and combat assessment processes. **(T-3)**.

10.49.6. Operating and exploiting signals intelligence systems and databases as required to support ACF, SIDO, and other team or division requirements; assisting the ISRD in consolidating, disseminating, and archiving intelligence data derived from national sources. **(T-3)**.

10.49.7. Sanitizing classified intelligence information to collateral-levels and pushing it from compartmented systems to collateral-level AOC systems as required, and developing

procedures to disseminate compartmented information when sanitization is not authorized. **(T-3).**

10.50. ACF Team is responsible for:

10.50.1. Providing all-source analysis of adversary capabilities, tactics, and courses of action in support of the JOPP-A during crisis action planning and overseeing the development of the adversary forces portion of the JAOP. **(T-3).**

10.50.2. Providing current and predictive briefings and assessments on the operational environment, adversary capabilities, tactics, centers of gravity, and courses of action relevant to strategy development, planning, and assessment; including an operational environment and adversary summary for the AOD. **(T-3).**

10.50.3. Supporting development of air component strategy-to-task, measures, and success indicators that convey JFC and JFACC objectives and desired effects. **(T-3).**

10.50.4. Identifying intelligence gaps impacting strategy development, planning guidance, and operational assessment and, in coordination with ACF Team, generating, monitoring, and updating the status of RFIs, collection requirements, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination requirements to close gaps. **(T-3).**

10.50.5. Coordinating with ISR Ops and Targets/TA Strategists to develop and update commander's priority intelligence requirements. **(T-3).**

10.50.6. Providing analytical support to the OAT, including identification, understanding, and responses to appropriate assessment information requirements. **(T-3).**

10.50.7. In coordination with ACF Team, ensuring CPD teams are aware of significant adversary activities within the operational environment affecting the ATO planning process; providing tailored and predictive intelligence estimates, briefings, and other products and/or services that support ATO and RSTA Annex development to the TET and MAAP Team. **(T-3).**

10.50.8. Coordinating named areas of interest and target areas of interest with the ISR Operations and TGT/TA Teams and CPD ISR operations planners. **(T-3).**

10.50.9. Assisting CPD embedded target planners with target development and modification. **(T-3).**

10.50.10. Identifying intelligence gaps affecting the ATO planning process, and, in coordination with the ACF Team, generating, monitoring, and updating the status of RFIs, collection requirements and PRs to close gaps. **(T-3).**

10.50.11. Monitoring the operational environment and coordinating with the SIDO Team on adversary operations, threat warning, and other time-sensitive activity that necessitates dissemination outside of normal analytical production cycles. **(T-3).**

10.50.12. Disseminating time-sensitive mission report and other intelligence reporting to ensure the SIDO Team has the most current mission results, adversary tactics, and order of battle updates. **(T-3).**

10.50.13. In coordination with the NTI Element, sanitizing and coordinating compartmented threat warning and for other time-sensitive intelligence with the SIDO Team. **(T-3).**

10.50.14. Generating, monitoring, and updating the status of SIDO Team RFIs, collection requirements, and production requirements to close gaps affecting ATO execution. **(T-3)**.

10.50.15. Assisting SIDO and COD embedded targeteers with intelligence support to dynamic targeting and time sensitive targeting operations. **(T-3)**.

10.51. TGT/TA Team is responsible for:

10.51.1. Acting as the primary liaison between the TGT/TA Team and the SRD for targeting and assessment related issues. **(T-3)**.

10.51.2. Assisting SRD in defining air component objectives, tasks, measures, and SIs that meet JFC and JFACC objectives and desired effects. **(T-3)**.

10.51.3. Assisting SRD in developing, evaluating, and refining JFC and JFACC targeting strategies and assessment methodologies, and coordinating with ISR Operations Strategists to synchronize ISR and targeting strategies. **(T-3)**.

10.51.4. Providing targeting and assessment inputs to SRD briefings and operational assessment processes; participating in the AOD breakout session with TET leadership and ISRD targeteers. **(T-3)**.

10.51.5. Conveying JFC and JFACC objectives and guidance to the TGT/TA Team. **(T-3)**.

10.51.6. Coordinating with ACF Team to provide adversary target systems and center of gravity analysis and assessments for attack considerations and operational assessment. **(T-3)**.

10.51.7. Acting as the primary liaison between the TGT/TA Team and the CPD for targeting, weaponeering, and assessment related issues. **(T-3)**.

10.51.8. Assisting CPD planners in validating all targets and aimpoints on the draft JIPTL and MAAP in accordance with theater guidance. **(T-3)**.

10.51.9. Assisting the TET in prioritizing nominated targets on the draft JIPTL by their associated prioritized tasks and with an evaluation of target criticality to the overall joint campaign. **(T-3)**.

10.51.10. Coordinating approval of potential high collateral damage or sensitive targets on the JIPTL in accordance with theater guidance. **(T-3)**.

10.51.11. Providing weaponeering recommendations and options for achieving desired effects against nominated aim points and targets. **(T-3)**.

10.51.12. Coordinating force application for all targets, including those identified for non-kinetic and special technical operations effects, and coordinating with NKO Team and others as required to synchronize/deconflict non-kinetic effects against JIPTL targets. **(T-3)**.

10.51.13. Notifying the Target Development Cell of any JIPTL targets that did not make it to the MAAP. **(T-3)**.

10.51.14. Providing the completed MAAP to the TGT/TA and ISR Operations Teams. **(T-3)**.

10.51.15. Submitting targeting and combat assessment related collection requirements to ISR Operations Planners. **(T-3)**.

10.51.16. Supporting the Joint Targeting Coordination Board with draft JIPTL and other target planning issues as required. **(T-3)**.

10.51.17. Providing target intelligence materials, weaponeering, collateral damage estimate, pulse position modulation (PPM), and other support as required to the SIDO and Offensive Duty Officers Teams to support dynamic targeting and time sensitive targeting operations. **(T-3)**.

10.51.18. Coordinating any battle damage assessment results affecting current ATO cycle operations with the SIDO Team. **(T-3)**.

10.51.19. In coordination with the imagery support element, making all imagery support products required for dynamic targeting and time sensitive targeting, processing, exploitation, and dissemination requirements, and other dynamic missions available to the SIDO Team. **(T-3)**.

10.51.20. Monitoring ATO execution and supporting dynamic targeting and time sensitive targeting processes, including immediate reporting, strike assessment, and execution of re-role or restrike for dynamic targeting and time sensitive targeting; providing feedback of ATO execution and dynamic targeting and time sensitive targeting to TGT/TA team. **(T-3)**.

10.51.21. Coordinating ad hoc collection requirements with ACF embedded personnel. **(T-3)**.

10.52. ISR Ops Team is responsible for:

10.52.1. Assisting SRD in the development of the JAOP and AOD; coordinating the ISR strategy as part of the overall JFACC strategy for incorporation into the JAOP and AOD; including ISR objectives and tasks, measure(s) of effectiveness, narrative ISR guidance, and JFACC priority intelligence requirements as required. **(T-3)**.

10.52.2. Coordinating the JFACC ISR strategy with JFC Collection Managers through the Joint Collections Working Group to ensure synchronization with the overall theater ISR strategy in support of JFC objectives. **(T-3)**.

10.52.3. Advising the SRD on ISR platform, sensor, processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities and limitations. **(T-3)**.

10.52.4. Consolidating SRD RFIs, collection requirements, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination requirements and submitting them to the ISR Operations and ACF Teams as required. **(T-3)**.

10.52.5. Conducting ISR operations assessment and providing input to the operational assessment process. **(T-3)**.

10.52.6. Receiving the draft RSTA Annex from ISR Operations Planners and completing it in conjunction with MAAP development and completion. **(T-3)**.

10.52.7. Briefing the MAAP Team on ISR collection requirements to include necessary sensor locations and collection timelines, as well as any ISR limitations that may affect planning and the overall air scheme of maneuver. **(T-3)**.

10.52.8. Working with MAAP personnel and ISR platform liaison officers to coordinate air component ISR asset on-station times and planning and employment requirements (e.g.,

airspace, refueling, retrograde and threat warning procedures) to optimize collection operations. **(T-3)**.

10.52.9. Identifying CPD intelligence gaps affecting ISR planning and employment and, in coordination with ISR Operations Team, generating, monitoring, and updating the status of RFIs, collection requirements and processing, exploitation, and dissemination requirements to close gaps. **(T-3)**.

10.52.10. Coordinating operational reconnaissance requirements with appropriate aircraft liaison officers and MAAP Team personnel to determine availability and feasibility of operational reconnaissance tasking. **(T-3)**.

10.52.11. Working with target planners in the TET and MAAP Team to address appropriate collection requirements to include pre-strike collection and battle damage assessment associated with JIPTL/MAAP targets scheduled for strike. **(T-3)**.

10.52.12. Coordinating with the Collection Management Cell, platform liaison officers, and appropriate MAAP Team personnel to develop the ISR Synchronization Matrix, and ensuring the ATO accurately reflects the intended scheduling and employment of ISR and operational reconnaissance assets as depicted on the ISR Synchronization Matrix. **(T-3)**.

10.52.13. Ensuring the ISR Operations and SIDO Teams understand the MAAP, air scheme of maneuver, ISR Synchronization Matrix, ISR and strike integration plan for pre-strike collection and battle damage assessment, operational reconnaissance opportunities, and other planning considerations for the current ATO period. **(T-3)**.

10.52.14. Assisting SIDO Team in maintaining situational awareness on ISR and operational reconnaissance asset execution during the ATO period, and coordinating any RSTA Annex changes and ISR Synchronization Matrix updates as required. **(T-3)**.

10.52.15. Providing recommendations to the SIDO Team for dynamic ISR and operational reconnaissance operations in response to mission and priorities shifts, environmental factors, or emerging threats and targets as required. **(T-3)**.

10.52.16. Coordinating with the SIDO Team to process any ISR and operational reconnaissance mission changes affecting future planning and ATO cycles; disseminating planning changes affecting the theater ISR strategy to JFC collection planners and reach-back support organizations. **(T-3)**.

10.52.17. Coordinating with the SIDO Team for operational reconnaissance tasking and mission results; adjusting collection decks and tactical assessments as required to reflect current operations. **(T-3)**.

10.52.18. Notifying the SIDO Team of any processing, exploitation, and dissemination node issues (sensor, architecture, etc.) affecting current ATO execution; providing processing, exploitation, and dissemination recommendations as required for emerging target opportunities. **(T-3)**.

10.53. Air Mobility Division (AMD) is responsible for:

10.53.1. Planning, coordinating, tasking, and executing air mobility missions in accordance with the JFACC's guidance and intent. **(T-0)**.

10.53.2. Coordinating inter-theater air mobility missions with the 618 AOC, Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC). **(T-0)**.

10.53.3. Integrating personnel throughout other divisions as mission needs dictate. **(T-0)**.

10.53.4. Maintaining maximum (aircraft) on ground management. **(T-0)**.

10.53.5. Planning and executing air mobility support for user requirements identified and validated by the DDOC. **(T-0)**.

10.53.6. Participating in air and space planning and execution processes and coordinating with the AOC Commander to ensure the (ATO/ACO incorporates air mobility missions. **(T-0)**.

10.53.7. Coordinating with the CISR to fulfill all mobility intelligence requirements. **(T-0)**.

10.53.8. Ensuring air mobility missions are visible in Mobility Air Forces C2 systems and reflected in the ATO/ACO. **(T-0)**.

10.53.9. Integrating, planning and executing combat support AR operating in the AOR/JOA in support of JFACC requirements and objectives. **(T-0)**.

10.53.10. Providing theater information to support in-transit visibility, total asset visibility and global transportation network. **(T-0)**.

10.53.11. Identifying IO and Public Affairs requirements to support the air mobility mission and integrate and deconflict IO and Public Affairs with respective specialty teams. **(T-2)**.

10.54. Air Mobility Division Chief is responsible for:

10.54.1. Being the point of contact for all air mobility operations in the AOR/JOA. **(T-3)**.

10.54.2. Filling valid air mobility requirements based on JCS and Geographic Combatant Commander priorities and air mobility asset availability. **(T-3)**.

10.54.3. Considering Director of Mobility Forces recommendations to ensure smooth coordination of all air mobility and air mobility support assets. **(T-3)**.

10.54.4. Keeping the Director of Mobility Forces and AOC/CC informed on air mobility actions and issues. **(T-3)**.

10.54.5. Tailoring AMD manning levels to achieve effective and efficient capability to meet anticipated mission requirements. **(T-3)**.

10.54.6. Reporting manning shortfalls to the AOC/CC, Component MAJCOM, Numbered Air Force, and AFFOR Manpower, Personnel and Services (A1). **(T-3)**.

10.54.7. Selecting team chiefs and deputy team chiefs for each of the AMD teams from among the AMD staff. **(T-3)**. Base selection on individual expertise and scope of planned operations.

10.54.8. Selecting the AMD Superintendent from among the AMD staff. **(T-3)**.

10.54.9. Providing guidance and support to the KM Officer on creating and updating AMD portion of the AOC KM plan. **(T-3)**.

10.54.10. Ensuring positional guides, worksheets, and procedural checklists are developed, reviewed, and updated for all appropriate AMD duty positions. **(T-3)**.

10.54.11. Ensuring theater air mobility command and control concept of operations are developed. **(T-3)**.

10.54.12. Coordinating with the Chief, Combat Support Team for overall logistics and supplying expertise for intra-theater air mobility operations. **(T-3)**.

10.54.13. Integrating all airlift missions into the ATO/ACO. **(T-3)**.

10.54.14. Coordinating with AFFOR A4 staff, JFC/J4 staff, DDOC, and the AOC's Logistics- Combat Support Team to establish & facilitate seamless processes for in-transit visibility and total asset visibility of passengers, equipment, and materiel between strategic and intra-theater airlift distribution channels. **(T-3)**.

10.54.15. Understanding and incorporating *Notice to Airmen* procedures and criteria into all planning and execution activities. This is especially imperative to ensure that pertinent airfield conditions are available for the international flying community to avoid accidents or incidents. During planning and execution, coordinating with and ensuring all appropriate AMD teams and personnel and other AOC divisions review NOTAMs and AFTTP 3-3.AOC for AOC airfield status considerations that apply to the theater of operations. **(T-3)**.

10.55. AMD Strategy is responsible for:

10.55.1. Acting as a liaison between the AMD and the SRD. **(T-3)**.

10.55.2. Establishing relationships with Air Mobility Liaison Officer and Joint Air Component Coordination Element. **(T-3)**. Air Mobility Liaison Officer and Joint Air Component Coordination Element personnel can aid in advance notification for planning airlift operations.

10.55.3. Keeping AMD Chief and Director of Mobility Forces informed of potential changes to future airlift and tanker requirements. **(T-3)**.

10.55.4. Providing guidance and apportionment inputs to the SRD for inclusion in the AOD. **(T-3)**.

10.55.5. Coordinating course(s) of action, branch and sequel development as well as analysis with Director of Mobility Forces, AMD Chief, and SRD. **(T-3)**.

10.55.6. Conducting periodic meetings with the DDOC futures division to assess long-range airlift requirements in relation to airlift capacity. **(T-3)**.

10.55.7. Assessing utilization of DDOC validated theater channels or standard theater airlift routes and recommending changes to maximize effectiveness of airlift assets. **(T-3)**.

10.55.8. Providing inputs to TGT/TA team (e.g., airfields that should maintain a minimum operating surface for future airlift operations, or aerial surveillance of potential airlift operating locations). **(T-3)**.

10.56. Airlift Control Team (ALCT) Chief is responsible for:

10.56.1. Integrating intra-theater airlift into the ATO/ACO. **(T-3)**.

10.56.2. Obtaining intra-theater airlift requirements from the DDOC. **(T-3)**.

10.56.3. Planning and scheduling airlift missions to satisfy validated airlift requirements. **(T-3)**.

- 10.56.4. Monitoring available airframes and aircrews to meet airlift tasking. **(T-3)**.
- 10.56.5. Coordinating and supporting immediate airlift requests with AMCT. **(T-3)**.
- 10.56.6. Coordinating air mobility airspace requirements with the AMD Airspace Manager prior to coordination with CPD C2 Plans Team Airspace Managers. If the AMD does not have an Airspace Manager, coordinate directly with CPD C2 Plans Team and Airspace Management Team (AMT). **(T-3)**.
- 10.56.7. Coordinating with Installation Control Center, Contingency Response Group, Special Tactics Team, and fixed enroute Air Mobility Control Centers on daily taskings. **(T-3)**.
- 10.56.8. Coordinating AOR/JOA transponder code management for all airlift assets. **(T-3)**.
- 10.56.9. Coordinating with Airlift Tactics and Aerial Port Management to determine requirements for airdrop loads. **(T-3)**.
- 10.56.10. Obtaining diplomatic clearances as required. **(T-3)**.
- 10.56.11. Managing movement of distinguished visitors in the AOR/JOA. **(T-3)**.
- 10.56.12. Coordinating with AFFOR A4 staff, JFC/J4 staff, DDOC, and the AOC's Logistics- Combat Support Team to establish and facilitate seamless processes for in-transit visibility and total asset visibility of passengers, equipment, and materiel between inter-theater and intra-theater airlift distribution channels. **(T-3)**.
- 10.56.13. Monitoring inter-theater airlift missions to integrate inter-theater and intra-theater cargo and passenger movement seamlessly within the AOR/JOA. **(T-3)**.
- 10.56.14. Ensuring airlift tactics coordinates tactical support requirements with the MAAP Team **(T-3)**. The MAAP Team develops package support requirements, including support to landing zones and drop zones. By integrating airlift tactics experts into MAAP meetings, the airlift tactics experts will be able to articulate airlift tactical support requirements in the most appropriate venue.

10.57. Airlift planners are responsible for:

- 10.57.1. Planning airlift missions to meet validated theater airlift requirements and requests. **(T-3)**.
- 10.57.2. Coordinating mission plans with AOC functional areas, Installation Control Center, Contingency Response Group, tailored elements. **(T-3)**.
- 10.57.3. Identifying and coordinating airspace requirements with AMT plans. **(T-3)**.
- 10.57.4. Monitoring available airframes and aircrews to meet airlift taskings (identify procedures to obtain prioritization from theater DDOC and users). **(T-3)**.
- 10.57.5. Assisting AMCT in planning missions that support immediate airlift requests. **(T-3)**.
- 10.57.6. Entering planned missions into Mobility Air Forces C2 systems, as required. **(T-3)**.
- 10.57.7. Coordinating diplomatic clearances for intra-theater airlift as required (e.g., aircraft and personnel automated clearance system). **(T-3)**.

- 10.57.8. Coordinating prior permission required clearance at airfields. **(T-3)**.
- 10.57.9. Producing daily airlift flying schedule. **(T-3)**.
- 10.57.10. Providing long-range mission planning for maximum threat mitigation. **(T-3)**.

10.58. Airlift Tactics are responsible for:

- 10.58.1. Convening and chairing the mission feasibility team, consisting of tactics, ISRD (to include Air Force National Tactical Integration), weather, airspace, TGT/TA, TET, Contingency Response Group and BCD or Army liaison officer, as a minimum. **(T-3)**. Coordinating Special Tactics Team support as required. **(T-3)**.
- 10.58.2. Planning and coordinating all airdrop missions and missions scheduled to locations requiring additional approval. **(T-3)**.
- 10.58.3. Providing assistance or support to the AMCT on tactical airlift execution issues including operations in high threat environments. **(T-3)**.
- 10.58.4. Establishing relationships outside of AMD with the SOLE, Marine Liaison Element, NALE, Air Mobility Liaison Officer, coalition forces and BCD to keep the AMD apprised of the changing battlespace. **(T-3)**.
- 10.58.5. Coordinating with applicable liaison officers to evaluate low-level flight route deconfliction. **(T-3)**.
- 10.58.6. Developing and disseminating tactical information and procedures to the Installation Control Center and coalition liaison officers. **(T-3)**. Airlift Tactics should create an AMD tactics website.
- 10.58.7. Identifying and submitting tactical route requirements for the ACP and ACO to AMT plans. **(T-3)**.
- 10.58.8. Attending AOC meetings as required. **(T-3)**. For example, SGT, SPT, TET and MAAP.
- 10.58.9. Creating and submitting SPINS inputs for all tactical considerations. **(T-3)**.
- 10.58.10. Maintaining a database of airfield and landing or drop zone planning factors for the entire AOR. Developing, publishing and maintaining airfield capability, airfield approval and airfield threat matrices. **(T-3)**.
- 10.58.11. Maintaining airdrop data regarding crew qualifications, pallet availability, parachute availability, buffer stop assemblies, centerline vertical restraints and container delivery system kits. **(T-3)**.
- 10.58.12. Verifying and coordinating airdrop load plans with the Installation Control Center and user. **(T-3)**.
- 10.58.13. Coordinating with ISRD, SOLE, Air Mobility Liaison Officers and Joint Air Component Coordination Element on airdrop and landing or drop zone requirements.
- 10.58.14. Coordinating with the TA/TET and Installation Control Center on aircraft airdrop configurations. **(T-3)**.
- 10.58.15. Maintaining data on airdrop malfunctions, accuracy and usage. **(T-3)**.

10.59. Airlift Requirements Planners are responsible for:

10.59.1. Monitoring time phased force deployment document to identify inter-theater cargo and passengers requiring onward intra-theater lift. **(T-3)**. Coordinating with DDOC to ascertain priority of movement. **(T-3)**.

10.59.2. Receiving validated movement requests from the DDOC (include unit line numbers and transportation control numbers). **(T-3)**. The AECT will provide validated patient movement requirements received from the Patient Movement Requirements Center for planning. Identifying requirements for short tons; over, out and bulk cargo; passengers and litter patients and hazardous material requirements per required delivery date and operating location. **(T-3)**.

10.59.3. Developing movement plan based on inputs (e.g., Joint Integrated Prioritized Requirements List, patient movement requirements) from DDOC, AECT and distinguished visitor (DV) movement requests and provide to ALCT airlift planners. **(T-3)**.

10.59.4. Contacting air terminal operations centers to confirm cargo and passengers available for airlift as required. **(T-3)**.

10.59.5. Inputting load data into Mobility Air Forces C2 systems as required and inform DDOC/AECT of movement request status. **(T-3)**.

10.59.6. Re-planning movement requests not executed as scheduled. Maintaining a daily event log. **(T-3)**.

10.59.7. Deconflicting validated airlift requests with the DDOC and providing the DDOC with a feasible closure date for the requirements. **(T-3)**.

10.60. The Mobility Air Forces ATO Integrator is responsible for:

10.60.1. Coordinating with ATO Production to receive cutoff and ATO push times. **(T-3)**.

10.60.2. Integrating airlift missions into the ATO using GDSS and TBMCS. **(T-3)**.

10.60.3. Continually importing external airlift missions throughout the ATO cycles (planning and execution). **(T-3)**.

10.60.4. Manually building theater missions directly into TBMCS throughout ATO cycles (planning and execution). **(T-3)**.

10.60.5. Coordinating the establishment of and continually monitoring the operational connectivity between GDSS and TBMCS through the GDSS system administrator help desk at Scott AFB, local TBMCS system administrator, and the AOC Communications Team. **(T-3)**.

10.60.6. Configuring and managing GDSS Mission Partner Interface (MPI) Tools, ensuring GDSS AOR airlift is contained on the ATO, monitoring airlift flow, and ensuring ATO accuracy and coordinating database updates and changes with the GDSS system administrator at Scott AFB. **(T-3)**.

10.60.7. Reviewing TBMCS Friendly order of battle to ensure current air mobility data for appropriate AOR. **(T-3)**.

10.60.8. Coordinating TBMCS Friendly order of battle changes through ATO production cell chief and/or Data Base Manager. (T-3).

10.60.9. Determining and ensuring the AOR flags, for applicable AOR, are set in the force status and monitoring base status screen. (T-3).

10.60.10. Monitoring the Airlift Import Tool application. (T-3).

10.60.11. Monitoring the GDSS MPI tool, ATO Integrator Summary, to identify, correct and resend failed missions. (T-3).

10.60.12. Allocating Friendly order of battle, Call-words, call-numbers and Identification Friend or Foe/Selective Identification Feature codes in the "O" shell ABP and are correct for the day-time group of the ABP. (T-3).

10.60.13. Ensuring call-words and call-numbers match between TBMCS and GDSS. (T-3).

10.60.14. Assigning Identification Friend-or-Foe/Selective Identification Features to all ATO missions. (T-3).

10.60.15. Completing ATO change sheet and submitting to ATO change technician (if required). (T-3).

10.60.16. Reviewing and quality control checking the "O" shell prior to handing it off to ATO Production, and upon release of the two-digit ABP, to ensure that the number of missions and tactical information is correct. (T-3).

10.61. Air Refueling Control Team (ARCT) Chief is responsible for:

10.61.1. Building and scheduling tanker missions using the appropriate TBMCS applications to satisfy air-refueling requests. (T-3).

10.61.2. Ascertaining tanker user requirements and number of tanker sorties available for each specified operational period. (T-3).

10.61.3. After air-refueling conflicts have been resolved, ensuring planners assign the best available type of tanker selected from the most appropriate base, and ensuring planners build these air-refueling missions into the appropriate TBMCS applications. (T-3).

10.61.4. Coordinating controlling agency and airspace requirements. (T-3).

10.61.5. Communicating with the tanker units on a daily basis, monitoring the status of tanker aircraft and aircrews and providing open lines of communication with the tanker units throughout the daily ATO planning cycle. (T-3).

10.61.6. Developing and ensuring ATO, ACO, SPINS, and C2 Communication Plans are distributed and received at the tasked air refueling units. (T-3).

10.61.7. Establishing TDO as the senior air refueling C2 officer reporting directly to the CCO. Managing the daily air-refueling plan via COD. Routing ATO changes appropriately during execution. (T-3).

10.61.8. Analyzing mission results and post-mission reports from TDOs and unit staffs for improvements in SPINS, airspace, communications plans, and tanker utilization. (T-3).

10.61.9. Determining long-range air refueling requirements. (T-3).

10.61.10. Coordinating aircraft location and deployment and redeployment requirements of inter-theater tanker assets. Supporting air bridges as required. (T-3).

10.62. Long-Range Air Refueling Planner is responsible for:

10.62.1. Providing broad-based plans of AR assets for incorporation into JAOP/AOD. Monitoring campaign progression and providing force-sizing recommendations through the ARCT Chief. (T-3).

10.62.2. Planning tanker airspace requirements to meet JFACC order of battle and ensuring it conforms to established regulations. Coordinating airspace construction through ARCT Chief. (T-3).

10.62.3. Coordinating air-bridge, global strike missions, deployment and redeployment of inter-theater tanker assets and fighter-unit movement requirements with 618 AOC (TACC) and inter-theater tanker planner. (T-3).

10.62.4. Monitoring tanker basing through the ARCT Chief and review Operations Orders and deployment orders for operational control, tactical control, direct support and waiver authority. (T-3).

10.62.5. Collecting data from situation reports, mission reports and TDO and coordinating with AMD strategy and SRD to determine if tanker planning and execution effectively supports JFC and JFACC objectives under current guidance. Reporting analysis to AMD Chief and ARCT Chief. (T-3).

10.63. The MAAP tanker planner (MTP) is responsible for:

10.63.1. Reviewing tanker allocation and reviewing operations and deployment orders for operational and tactical control as well as direct support and waiver authority. (T-3).

10.63.2. Making tanker force sizing recommendations to ARCT Chief. (T-3).

10.63.3. Presenting tanker inputs as appropriate at pre-MAAP brief. Identifying constraints on aircraft availability resulting from weather, MX, airfield issues, aircraft configuration. Monitoring deployment and redeployment of intra/inter-theater tanker assets and fighter and bomber unit movement requirements through ARCT Chief, as required. (T-3). These will affect numbers of tanker sorties available for tasking in the MAAP.

10.63.4. Reviewing mission routings to include AR tracks and orbits, ingress and egress, retrograde, arrival and departures, and altitude deconfliction. (T-3).

10.63.5. Constructing and coordinating airspace for tanker missions in coordination with ARCT Chief and airspace management team. (T-3).

10.63.6. Reviewing diplomatic clearance issues affecting tanker operations and obtain appropriate diplomatic clearances as required. (T-3).

10.63.7. Resolving Air Traffic Control issues to include routing and deconfliction of tanker orbits with airspace management team. (T-3).

10.63.8. Coordinating air-bridge and global strike missions with appropriate external agencies Combatant Commands, MAJCOMs, Numbered Air Forces and AOCs, etc. (T-3).

10.63.9. Establishing and reviewing ground and airborne alert AR requirements (number, response time and locations) in conjunction with MAAP Chief and ARCT Chief. **(T-3)**.

10.63.10. Maintaining knowledge of beddown locations, type aircraft available for tasking, configurations, utilization rates (surge and non-surge) and maximum fuel availability for departure. **(T-3)**.

10.63.11. Providing briefing inputs on tanker airspace and aircraft and aircrew utilization to MAAP team chief, ARCT Chief, reports and brief team, Director of Mobility Forces and others as required. **(T-3)**.

10.63.12. Fulfilling MAAP AR requests for ISR, defensive counterair, close air support, strike packages and airlift support in conjunction with identified priorities. **(T-3)**.

10.63.13. Entering and/or monitoring mission data in appropriate C2 system (TBMCS/GDSS). **(T-3)**.

10.63.14. Providing SPINS inputs as required through ARCT Chief. **(T-3)**.

10.63.15. Monitoring active and planned tanker missions for their effect on the number of tanker sorties available for MAAP planning. Factors to consider may include diverted aircraft, threat assessments and pending waivers. **(T-3)**.

10.63.16. Reviewing and highlighting carry-over missions. **Note:** Carry-over missions are particularly risky due to the possibility of scheduling more than one aircraft into the same airspace at the same time across two ATOs. **(T-3)**.

10.63.17. Providing inputs to and receiving feedback from AMD strategy and SRD for tanker operational assessment. **(T-3)**.

10.64. Intra-theater Air Refueling Planner is responsible for:

10.64.1. Entering AR missions into TBMCS as required. **(T-3)**.

10.64.2. Maintaining knowledge of basing locations, type aircraft for taskings, configurations, utilization rates (surge and non-surge) and maximum fuel availability for departure. **(T-3)**.

10.64.3. Ensuring ground and airborne alert AR requirements (number, response time and locations) are satisfied. **(T-3)**.

10.64.4. Reviewing status of active and planned tanker missions to include diverted aircraft and/or other changes to aircraft available for tasking. **(T-3)**.

10.64.5. Reviewing and highlighting carry-over missions. Carry-over missions consist of residual missions from previous ATO that cross over into current ATO, and sequential missions that exist at the end of current ATO that cross over into following ATO. **(T-3)**. **Note:** Carry-over missions are particularly risky due to the possibility of scheduling more than one aircraft into the same airspace at the same time across two ATOs.

10.65. The inter-theater air-refueling planner is responsible for:

10.65.1. Coordinating air-bridge and global strike missions with appropriate AOCs. **(T-3)**.

10.65.2. Resolving diplomatic issues affecting tanker operations and coordinating with 618 AOC (TACC), as required. Entering appropriate mission information into C2 system (GDSS, aviation resource management system, TBMCS, and MAAP toolkit). **(T-3)**.

10.65.3. Coordinating all inter-theater tanker movement with the MTP for deconfliction, ATO integration and safe passage. **(T-3)**.

10.65.4. Knowing lines of command: operational control, tactical control and supported and supporting. **(T-3)**.

10.65.5. Knowing waiver authority, processes and tracking for operational control and tactical control assets. Submitting and reviewing waiver requests as required. **(T-3)**.

10.65.6. Complying with JFC/JFACC guidance including, but not limited to ACP, AOD, ROE, and SPINS. **(T-3)**.

10.66. Air Refueling Tactics Officer is responsible for:

10.66.1. Evaluating tanker airspace for air-to-air and surface-to-air threats. **(T-3)**.

10.66.2. Recommending changes to tanker planning and execution to mitigate threats to tankers in coordination with JFC/JFACC in accordance with JFACC guidance. **(T-3)**.

10.66.3. Providing tanker inputs to quarterly AMD tactics review board (TRB) and quarterly theater TRBs, and WEPTAC. **(T-3)**.

10.66.4. Assessing combat effectiveness of AR procedures and recommending changes to increase tactically sound support to receivers. **(T-3)**.

10.66.5. Developing and disseminating tactical procedures as appropriate for tanker units. **(T-3)**.

10.66.6. Recommending changes and inputs to ATO/ACO/SPINS. **(T-3)**.

10.66.7. Providing real-time tactics guidance and support to TDOs. **(T-3)**.

10.66.8. Providing pertinent tactics information to inter-theater crews. **(T-3)**.

10.67. Air Mobility Control Team (AMCT) Chief is responsible for:

10.67.1. Exercising airlift C2 in the AMD and providing centralized control of all allocated, apportioned, and assigned airlift assets. **(T-3)**.

10.67.2. Directing aircraft diverts when required. **(T-3)**.

10.67.3. Planning and executing immediate airlift missions when necessary. **(T-3)**.

10.67.4. Developing positive and secure launch procedures with the coordination of tactics, intelligence, IO, and under the guidance of the AMD Chief. **(T-3)**.

10.67.5. Launching ground alert aircraft when required. **(T-3)**.

10.67.6. Coordinating actions with appropriate AMD and AOC functional areas for ATO changes. **(T-3)**.

10.67.7. Entering correct mission data inputs into automated systems. **(T-3)**.

- 10.67.8. Acting as AOR/JOA C2 focal point for all mobility Interface Control Cells, Contingency Response Group and fixed enroute Air Mobility Control Center locations. **(T-3)**.
- 10.67.9. Monitoring inter-theater mobility crews staging within the AOR/JOA, as coordinated with 618 AOC (TACC). **(T-3)**.
- 10.67.10. Monitoring and reporting airfield capability issues (maximum (aircraft) on ground, fuel, materials handling equipment, etc.). **(T-3)**.
- 10.67.11. Interfacing with 618 AOC (TACC) on inter-theater airlift missions and other supporting theater AMD (if applicable) for intra-theater missions. **(T-3)**.
- 10.67.12. Coordinating Operations Event/Incident Report (OPREP 3) reporting through the AOC Combat Report Cell. **(T-3)**.
- 10.67.13. Monitoring aerial port activities and movement of passengers and cargo. **(T-3)**.
- 10.67.14. Coordinating with AFFOR A4 staff, JFC/J4 staff, and DDOC to ensure processes established for total asset visibility effort. **(T-3)**.
- 10.67.15. Supporting the Airlift Duty Officer. **(T-3)**.
- 10.67.16. Coordinating actions by off-station maintenance repair teams, and assist in support of theater air mobility maintenance. **(T-3)**.
- 10.67.17. Ensuring slot times (airspace and landing) are coordinated and deconflict with the appropriate agencies. **(T-3)**.
- 10.67.18. Coordinating immediate airspace change requirements with AMD Airspace Managers prior to coordination with COD Airspace Managers. **(T-3)**. If the AMD does not have internal airspace management support, then coordinate directly with the AMT.

10.68. The Airlift Execution Officer is responsible for:

- 10.68.1. Directing diverts, as required. **(T-3)**.
- 10.68.2. Planning and scheduling immediate and urgent missions, as required. **(T-3)**.
- 10.68.3. Launching ground alert aircraft, as required. **(T-3)**.
- 10.68.4. Coordinating actions with appropriate AMD and AOC functions for ATO/ACO changes. **(T-3)**.
- 10.68.5. Submitting and following-up on inputs for immediate and urgent missions to intelligence and airspace. **(T-3)**.
- 10.68.6. Coordinating with Mobility Air Forces ATO integrator on airlift mission integration into TBMCS. **(T-3)**.
- 10.68.7. Coordinating with 618 AOC (TACC) on inter-theater airlift missions, as required. **(T-3)**.
- 10.68.8. Identifying and resolving issues in execution related to airfield limitations (e.g., maximum (aircraft) on ground, fuel, materials handling equipment, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear contamination status). **(T-3)**.

10.68.9. Coordinating airlift planning and tactical support from the ALCT for urgent or immediate missions. **(T-3)**.

10.68.10. Serving as AOR C2 focal point for all airlift Installation Control Center, Contingency Response Group and enroute Air Mobility Control Center locations. **(T-3)**.

10.68.11. Maintaining and executing applicable Quick Reaction Checklists. **(T-3)**.

10.68.12. Entering appropriate information into the event log. **(T-3)**.

10.68.13. Utilizing two-way communications capability for global, real-time, reliable and rapid information exchange with enroute sorties. **(T-3)**.

10.69. The Airlift Mission Manager is responsible for:

10.69.1. Updating mission data (e.g., additions, changes and deletions) in Mobility Air Forces C2 systems and reflect in TBMCS. **(T-3)**.

10.69.2. Entering mission movement data (arrivals, departures, etc.) and airlift advisories information in Mobility Air Forces C2 systems when mission support forces are not able. **(T-3)**.

10.69.3. Ensuring information in Mobility Air Forces C2 systems and TBMCS is complete and accurate. **(T-3)**.

10.69.4. Coordinating with Mobility Air Forces ATO integrator on integration of air mobility mission into TBMCS. **(T-3)**.

10.69.5. Aiding in mission coordination, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.69.6. Collecting and recording mission data. **(T-3)**.

10.69.7. Maintaining and executing applicable Quick Reaction Checklists. **(T-3)**.

10.69.8. Maintaining event logs. **(T-3)**.

10.70. Airlift requirements personnel are responsible for:

10.70.1. Coordinating with theater AFFOR A4 as appropriate, for aerial port capabilities. **(T-3)**. Recommend calling individual ports to confirm capabilities.

10.70.2. Monitoring aerial port materials handling equipment and providing in-transit visibility for the AMD. **(T-3)**.

10.70.3. Monitoring aerial port cargo-station inventories. Monitoring force flow (unit line number) and theater priority movements. **(T-3)**.

10.70.4. Monitoring airlift execution and loads that require re-planning due to weather or maintenance cancelations or divers. Coordinating undelivered cargo with Airlift Requirements Planners as required. **(T-3)**.

10.70.5. Executing validated immediate airlift requests. **(T-3)**.

10.70.6. Maintaining current cargo and passenger's backlog reports for theater aerial ports. **(T-3)**.

10.70.7. Maintaining liaison with DDOC/AFFOR A4. **(T-3)**.

10.70.8. Coordinating actions with appropriate AMD personnel for airlift missions executing current ATO. (T-3).

10.70.9. Maintaining a daily event log. (T-3).

10.71. AMD Logistics/Maintenance is responsible for:

10.71.1. Establishing aircraft recovery responsibilities for mobility aircraft not mission capable or partially mission capable away from home-station in accordance with command-to-command relationships. (T-3).

10.71.2. Upon request, assisting AFFOR A4 staff concerning aircraft beddown and intra-theater off-station MX requirements. (T-3).

10.71.3. Maintaining liaison with respective AFFOR A4 staff concerning MX issues (e.g., time-compliance technical orders). (T-3).

10.71.4. Maintaining a mission capability sourcing capability separate from the centralized Mobility Air Forces logistics support center. (T-3).

10.71.5. Providing inputs to AFFOR A4 staff on plans, execution, sustainment, and reachback issues as requested. (T-3). Collaboration between the AFFOR A4 staff and AMD logistics/MX is essential.

10.71.6. Obtaining air mobility MX status for each beddown and point of delivery location from AFFOR A4 when requested. (T-3).

10.71.7. Monitoring, controlling and implementing priority movement of equipment, supply spares and maintenance Recovery Teams with ALCT Requirements/Aerial Port Control Center, as appropriate. (T-3).

10.71.8. Following current USAF, Air Mobility Command and theater guidance for airlift of contaminated or contagious passengers, cargo and casualties. (T-3).

10.71.9. Providing MX expertise to AMD and Director of Mobility Forces for waivers, as appropriate. Coordinating with respective theater AMD and/or wing agencies for facility requirements (e.g., fuel cell, jacking, and hangar space). (T-3).

10.71.10. Implementing and developing supply project codes to facilitate special handling and shipment of mission capability supply spares or equipment. (T-3).

10.72. Airlift Duty Officer is responsible for:

10.72.1. Coordinating with ATO/ACO changes with COD personnel, as required. (T-3).

10.72.2. Coordinating mission changes with the airlift execution officer. (T-3).

10.72.3. Monitoring the inter-theater and intra-theater air movement. (T-3).

10.72.4. Coordinating with the Mobility Air Forces ATO integrator on integrating air mobility mission into TBMCS. (T-3).

10.72.5. Updating the CCO about theater airlift. (T-3).

10.72.6. Updating the AMD Chief and AMCT Chief regarding combat operations. (T-3).

10.72.7. Coordinating with AMCT Chief as necessary. (T-3).

10.73. Flight Managers are responsible for:

- 10.73.1. Expediting mission accomplishment and ensuring safety of flight. Flight Managers are also responsible for performing final validation of information (e.g., weather, Notices to Airmen), and planning for assigned sorties. **(T-3)**.
- 10.73.2. Creating flight profiles. **(T-3)**.
- 10.73.3. Filing flight plans. **(T-3)**.
- 10.73.4. Producing and distributing aircrew departure papers. **(T-3)**.
- 10.73.5. Providing direct support to Mobility Air Forces aircrews. **(T-3)**.
- 10.73.6. Coordinating all relevant activities directly related to the accomplishment of the sortie according to military instructions and applicable civil regulations. **(T-3)**.
- 10.73.7. Serving as primary agents on the ground responsible for sortie situational awareness, including knowledge of the position and the endurance of the airborne sortie at all times. Flight Managers are responsible for proactively flight following each Mobility Air Forces operational sortie and facilitating required changes in the plan during execution. **(T-3)**.
- 10.73.8. Utilizing two-way communications capability for global, real-time, reliable and rapid information exchange with enroute sorties. **(T-3)**.

10.74. Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team (AECT) Chief is responsible for:

- 10.74.1. Monitoring execution of the theater AE plan. **(T-3)**.
- 10.74.2. Obtaining validated patient movement requests from the appropriate Patient Movement Requirements Center supporting the AOR/JOA. **(T-3)**.
- 10.74.3. Coordinating with deployed AE elements and component medical planners, component liaisons (NALE, Marine Liaison Element, SOLE and BCD) on AE issues within the AOR/JOA. **(T-3)**.
- 10.74.4. Coordinating with deployed AE elements, component medical planners, and component liaisons for pre-planned intra-theater airlift, the AMCT for immediate intra-theater airlift, and 618 TACC for inter-theater airlift requests. **(T-3)**.
- 10.74.5. Ensuring operational support of AE missions. **(T-3)**.
- 10.74.6. Ensuring the AE section of the JAOP, Operations Order and theater AE plan is developed and coordinated. **(T-3)**.
- 10.74.7. Coordinating logistics support for TAES forces. **(T-3)**.
- 10.74.8. Establishing information flow of airlift schedules and patient movements with supporting Patient Movement Requirements Center and AE ground support elements. **(T-3)**.
- 10.74.9. Monitoring and coordinating inter-theater airlift supporting aeromedical evacuation requirements using Mobility Air Forces C2 Systems. **(T-3)**.
- 10.74.10. Coordinating with AFFOR A4 staff, JFC/J4 staff, DDOC, and the AOC's Logistics- Combat Support Team to establish and facilitate seamless processes for in-transit

visibility and total asset visibility of passengers, equipment, and materiel between inter-theater and intra-theater airlift distribution channels. (T-3).

10.74.11. Applying precautionary measures to the movement of contaminated and/or contagious patients in accordance with Air Mobility Command contamination and biological Concept of Operations and applicable directives. (T-3).

10.74.12. Keeping the AMD Chief, Director of Mobility Forces, AOC/CC, JFACC informed of significant events. (T-3).

10.74.13. Monitoring and coordinating AE operations with other AOC divisions, teams and functions as required. (T-3).

10.74.14. Maintaining real-time information on TAES capability (Unit Type Codes, equipment and personnel available) at each deployed location. (T-3).

10.74.15. Establishing frequency requirements for AE channel missions. (T-3).

10.74.16. Notifying supporting Patient Movement Requirements Center of scheduled missions to maintain patient in-transit visibility. (T-3).

10.75. Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) Operations is responsible for:

10.75.1. Monitoring theater AE missions. (T-3).

10.75.2. Coordinating with AMCT on AE ATO/ACO changes. (T-3).

10.75.3. Analyzing patient movement requirements and coordinating airlift to meet AE requirements. (T-3).

10.75.4. Analyzing PMR and task-appropriate AE elements to meet special medical requirements and pass mission information to the Patient Movement Requirements Center. (T-3).

10.75.5. Contacting appropriate AE elements with airlift and patient information to ensure they properly prepare patients for the AE mission. (T-3).

10.75.6. Monitoring patient movement. (T-3).

10.75.7. Establishing information flow of airlift schedule and patient movements with appropriate AE element. (T-3).

10.75.8. Establishing multimode secure and non-secure communications capability within the TAES. (T-3).

10.76. Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) Plans is responsible for:

10.76.1. Developing and establishing a theater AE plan in conjunction with theater AE policy. (T-3).

10.76.2. Notifying supporting Patient Movement Requirements Center of scheduled missions to maintain patient in-transit visibility. (T-3).

10.76.3. Establishing information flow of airlift movement plan (schedule) and patient movements with deployed AE elements. (T-3).

10.76.4. Coordinating with the ALCT, AMCT, 618 AOC (TACC), and other agencies as appropriate to support AE airlift missions. (T-3).

10.76.5. Coordinating with the appropriate Patient Movement Requirements Center for validated mission requirements. **(T-3)**.

10.76.6. Coordinating with DDOC on integration of patient movement priorities into the JFC priority list to meet AE requirements and optimize the use of limited airlift assets. **(T-3)**.

10.76.7. Establishing frequency requirements for AE channel missions. **(T-3)**.

10.76.8. Coordinating with SRD and CPD, component liaisons (NALE, Marine Liaison Element, SOLE) and theater medical planners (joint, component and coalition) for integration of AE operations into theater patient movement plan and JAOP/Operations Order. **(T-3)**.

10.76.9. Providing mission information to the Patient Movement Requirements Center and deployed AE elements for patient in-transit visibility. **(T-3)**.

10.76.10. Assisting in the development of a theater repatriation plan with the Joint Personnel Recovery Center as required. **(T-3)**.

10.77. Theater Aeromedical Evacuation System Management (TAES) is responsible for:

10.77.1. Coordinating with deployed AE elements, Joint Task Force and user service (United States Navy, USAF and special operations forces) medical planners on AE issues within the AOR. **(T-3)**.

10.77.2. Coordinating movement of TAES equipment and personnel. **(T-3)**.

10.77.3. Coordinating logistics support for TAES forces. **(T-3)**.

10.77.4. Maintaining real-time information on TAES capability (Unit Type Codes, equipment and personnel available) at each deployed location. **(T-3)**.

10.77.5. Collecting daily situation reports from deployed AE elements and providing them to appropriate personnel (delegate this duty to AECT ops or plans when a TAES Manager is not assigned). **(T-3)**.

10.77.6. Providing measures and indicators inputs to future operations applicable to TAES. **(T-3)**.

10.77.7. Briefing AECT Chief, AMD Chief, on TAES information, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.78. AMD Intelligence Support is responsible for:

10.78.1. Identifying and forwarding to the ISRD all Director of Mobility Forces and AMD Chief priority intelligence requirements, essential elements of information, collection requirements, RFIs, and requests for assistance (RFA). **(T-3)**.

10.78.2. Interfacing with other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance functions within the AOC to ensure the most current information on surface operations is being linked to air, space, and cyberspace operations and the airspace structure. **(T-3)**.

10.78.3. Coordinating and providing intelligence for planned or immediate air mobility missions and force protection information, including direct and coordinated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to airdrop planning and execution. **(T-3)**.

10.78.4. Working closely with ISRD to develop the theater intelligence reporting directive to ensure mobility fields are included in the standardized theater mission report format. **(T-3)**.

10.78.5. Coordinating with other theater intelligence functions and the command net to supply required intelligence information. (T-3).

10.78.6. Assisting ISRD unit support with ensuring the quality, timeliness and dissemination of intra-theater mobility asset mission reports. ISRD will ensure the AMD receives and assesses the impact of mobility mission reports in a timely manner. (T-3).

10.78.7. Assisting in planning and execution of intra-theater airlift, airdrop, AE, and AR missions. (T-3).

10.78.8. Assessing threat at theater airfields and landing and drop zones and assisting airlift/tanker tactics planner with the development of airfield threat matrices. (T-3).

10.78.9. Providing recommendations to AMD AMCT/ALCT based on threat situation for all secure launch missions through the Threat Working Group. (T-3).

10.78.10. Monitoring threats to mobility missions in execution, identifying changes to the Operational Environment and working with airlift/tanker tactics planners to recommend mission changes to appropriate C2 nodes. (T-3).

10.78.11. Supporting deployed intelligence assets at Contingency Response Group locations and Mobility Air Forces unit locations. (T-3).

10.79. Air Mobility Division Knowledge Operations (AMD KO) is responsible for:

10.79.1. Preparing and disseminating messages, reports, schedules and general correspondence. (T-3).

10.79.2. Maintaining message traffic logs, read files, suspense control documents, classified and unclassified files, file plan and publications. (T-3).

10.79.3. Suspense control of documents, classified, unclassified and publication files. (T-3).

10.79.4. Ensuring proper procedures for handling, dissemination, storage and destruction of classified material. (T-3).

10.79.5. Providing administrative support and materials to all functional areas of the AMD. (T-3).

10.79.6. Posting briefings to the appropriate website. (T-3).

10.79.7. Monitoring security requirements. (T-3).

10.79.8. Establishing and maintaining an air mobility historical database. (T-3).

10.80. Airspace Management is responsible for:

10.80.1. Interfacing with AOC and Theater Airspace Managers to obtain or deconflict AMD airspace requirements. (T-3).

10.80.2. Maintaining current display of the theater operating locations, airspace structure, and airspace coordinating measures as necessary to support air mobility operations. (T-3).

10.80.3. Integrating with intelligence, IO, and airlift tactics to create and adjust airspace coordinating measures based on the threat and integrate airspace coordinating measure change requests with COD and AMT. (T-3).

10.80.4. Coordinating with airlift tactics to publish appropriate information in the SPINS and ACO. (T-3).

10.80.5. Linking current information on surface operations to AMD airspace planning, and ensuring compatibility with AOC operations airspace structure. (T-3).

10.81. AMD Communications Support (regardless of their size) is responsible for:

10.81.1. Acting as the single focal point for tracking and resolving all AMD communications issues. (T-3).

10.81.2. Coordinating with Communications Focal Point (CFP) on computer and software problems that team technicians cannot correct. (T-3).

10.81.3. Establishing and maintaining all Air Mobility Command provided deployable communications equipment in direct support of the AMD. (T-3).

10.81.4. Coordinating with Air Mobility Command for user access to mobility specific C2 systems such as GDSS and Consolidated Air Mobility Planning System. (T-3).

10.81.5. Coordinating with supporting AFFOR A2/6 and C-ACT for any non-organic communications support including but not limited to network access, telephone connectivity and frequency requirements. (T-3).

10.81.6. Maintaining a Master Station Log and logging all AMD communications issues that require action. (T-3).

10.82. Airspace Management Team is responsible for:

10.82.1. Developing, generating, disseminating, executing, and managing the ACP and daily ACO and any required changes as they occur. (T-3).

10.82.2. Identifying conflicts with airspace control means requests and facilitating airspace integration and deconfliction utilizing appropriate automation tools. (T-3).

10.82.3. Ensuring airspace integration and real-time airspace C2 is coordinated with appropriate tactical C2 nodes. (T-3).

10.82.4. Providing inputs on airspace considerations for ATO development and execution. (T-3).

10.82.5. Coordinating with the integrated air and missile defense planners, ATO Production Team, MAAP Team, COD teams, and other airspace liaisons and users on matters concerning ACP/ACO development, production, dissemination, and changes. (T-3).

10.82.6. Assisting in procedural deconfliction between airspace coordinating measures entered into the current airspace tool and interfacing with the C2 nodes for effective real-time airspace integration. (T-3).

10.82.7. Inputting and evaluating airspace coordinating measure requests based on the ACP separation rules and JFACC priorities in the AOD.

10.82.8. Providing expertise on operating within existing Air Traffic Control and civil airspace systems. Coordinating with the Air Traffic Control cell; International Civil Aviation Organization; and joint, coalition, host nation and other airspace users as required. (T-3).

10.83. Space Control is responsible for:

- 10.83.1. Recommending appropriate command relationships for space forces to the JFC. **(T-3)**.
- 10.83.2. Establishing, deconflicting, prioritizing and recommending military space requirements. **(T-3)**.
- 10.83.3. Recommending guidelines for employing space capabilities, such as ROE, for the joint force. **(T-3)**.
- 10.83.4. Guiding strategy development, operational planning, and space integration. **(T-3)**.
- 10.83.5. Providing status of space assets that affect the JOA to key theater staffs. **(T-3)**.
- 10.83.6. Maintaining Space Situational Awareness. **(T-3)**.
- 10.83.7. Ensuring optimum interoperability of space assets with coalition forces. **(T-3)**.
- 10.83.8. Providing space perspective for strategy and daily guidance development, effects and target selection, and space integration throughout joint operations. **(T-3)**.
- 10.83.9. Monitoring status of space forces that affect the JOA and providing status to JFC staff and components. **(T-3)**.
- 10.83.10. Requesting space inputs from JFC staff during planning and operations. **(T-3)**.
- 10.83.11. Coordinating optimum interoperability of space assets with coalition forces. **(T-3)**.
- 10.83.12. Coordinating day-to-day Space Coordinating Authority responsibilities on behalf of the JFACC or representing the JFACC's equities if Space Coordinating Authority is not the JFACC. **(T-3)**.
- 10.83.13. Advising the COMAFFOR on command and control of USSF if another component is JFACC. **(T-3)**.
- 10.83.14. Participating in the IO Working Group (IOWG), OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.84. Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) is responsible for:

- 10.84.1. Coordinating ground force priorities, requests, and items of interest. **(T-3)**.
- 10.84.2. Coordinating boundary line and fire-support coordination line changes and timing. **(T-3)**.
- 10.84.3. Briefing the ground situation and the intelligence update. **(T-3)**.

10.85. Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE) is responsible for:

- 10.85.1. Coordinating the inclusion of Joint Force Maritime Component Commander objectives and maritime requirements in the JFACC AOD. **(T-3)**.
- 10.85.2. Advocating for the inclusion of Joint Force Maritime Component Commander targets into the joint integrated prioritized target list. **(T-3)**.

10.85.3. Collaborating on maritime airspace requirements and developing appropriate airspace coordinating measure. (T-3).

10.85.4. Facilitating integration of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander ABP into the ATO. (T-3).

10.85.5. Deconflicting all naval air and surface activities in the JFACC's ATO and assisting air missions planning. (T-3).

10.85.6. Monitoring execution of joint air operations, ensuring effects on maritime targets, and integration and coordination of organic missions in support of maritime operations. (T-3).

10.85.7. Coordinating Tomahawk land attack missiles. Including airspace coordinating measures with the AOC. (T-3).

10.86. Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) is responsible for:

10.86.1. Coordinating, integrating and synchronizing with various AOC functional areas to ensure that all special operations forces targets, special operations forces teams, and special operations forces air tasks and/or missions are deconflicted, properly integrated, and coordinated during planning and execution phases. (T-3).

10.86.2. Providing inputs into the JFACC strategy, ATO and ACO. (T-3).

10.86.3. Providing real-time mission support coordination with the Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander with special emphasis on airspace deconfliction, operational and intelligence inputs into the targeting process, and close coordination with the Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell and Joint Personnel Recovery Center. (T-3).

10.87. Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) is responsible for:

10.87.1. Submitting theater missile target nominations directly to the AOC for inclusion as JFACC nominated targets. (T-3).

10.88. Combat Reports Cell is responsible for:

10.88.1. Collecting and consolidating COD inputs to the JFACC update briefing and the daily situation report. (T-3).

10.88.2. Accessing and manipulating sortie data within the TBMCS database; parsing the ATO; coordinating and obtaining the results of flying operations from other agencies within the AOC. (T-3).

10.88.3. Establishing computer information pipeline requirements (Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network, Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, UNCLAS e-mail, Coalition networks, TBMCS, etc.). (T-3).

10.88.4. Posting JFACC briefings to the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network. (T-3).

10.89. Airspace Management Team (AMT) Chief is responsible for:

10.89.1. The development and currency of the ACP. (T-3).

10.89.2. Developing, generating, and disseminating the ACO and all applicable changes to the daily ACO. (T-3).

10.90. Space Operations Specialty Team is responsible for:

10.90.1. Coordinating space operations and assessing their effectiveness in support of AOC operations. **(T-3)**.

10.90.2. Monitoring status of friendly, hostile, and neutral space forces and assesses the impact of those on theater air operations. **(T-3)**.

10.90.3. Coordinating battlespace awareness, Personnel Recovery, national space support, Global Positioning System support, satellite communications support, and space control operations. **(T-3)**.

10.91. Information Operations (IO) Planner is responsible for:

10.91.1. Providing, as needed, subject matter expert support to all AOC divisions and AOC processes. **(T-3)**.

10.91.2. Coordinating with Combatant Command, service component, AOC, AFFOR staff planners and reachback entities on IO operational issues, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.91.3. Providing IO inputs and insights into all component planning efforts. **(T-3)**.

10.91.4. Integrating behavioral, media, and nodal analysis considerations into appropriate AOC processes, especially the targeting process. **(T-3)**.

10.91.5. Working with planners to ensure all plans support the Component Commander's Communication Strategy to the maximum extent possible and minimize misinterpretation of friendly actions as being counter to Component Commander's Communication Strategy. **(T-3)**.

10.91.6. In coordination with appropriate planners, developing and planning for the use of non-kinetic capabilities and information-related capabilities to meet IO-related objectives and support the Component Commander's Communication Strategy. **(T-3)**.

10.91.7. Synchronizing themes, messages, images, and actions to support the JFC's objectives for adversary, neutral and friendly audience communications. **(T-3)**.

10.91.8. Coordinating and consolidating information related inputs from information-related subject matter experts and providing a consolidated input to the planning process at each of the appropriate planning steps. **(T-3)**.

10.91.9. Supporting the joint planning process for air throughout the entire process. **(T-3)**.

10.91.10. Ensuring identification and analysis of stakeholders, including key communicators, potentials, and tendencies. **(T-3)**.

10.91.11. Ensuring identification, analysis, and segmenting of specific audiences occurs. **(T-3)**.

10.91.12. Ensuring analysis of cognitive dimension within the information environment. **(T-3)**.

10.91.13. Ensuring analysis of narrative, themes, and messages. **(T-3)**.

10.91.14. Ensuring higher authorities' themes, messages, images, and actions are included in planning. **(T-3)**.

10.91.15. Developing (or assist in developing) and maintaining a Component Commander's Communication Strategy for audiences of concern. **(T-3)**.

10.91.16. Ensuring air component words and actions are mutually supportive, consistent, and are aligned with Component and CCDR guidance and objectives and the Component Commander's Communication Strategy. **(T-3)**.

10.91.17. Ensuring development of assessment measures and indicators to assess performance and effects achievement that result from IO, and relate them to IO-related objectives and the Component Commander's Communication Strategy. **(T-3)**.

10.91.18. Developing and maintaining a synchronization chart depicting all projected IO-related activities and their relationship with measures of performance, measure(s) of effectiveness, and relevant objectives and the Component Commander's Communication Strategy. **(T-3)**.

10.91.19. Developing or helping to develop the consolidated staff estimate, key audience identification and segmentation, message and action alignment, stakeholder analysis, desired effects, desired communication means and conduits, identification of high-payoff individuals, risk assessment, decision points, and assessment measures and means. **(T-3)**.

10.91.20. Providing Signature Management recommendations through operations security and military deception personnel to maximize desired effects of planned activities. **(T-3)**.

10.91.21. Informing Public Affairs of planned activities, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.91.22. Coordinating assessment and intelligence support (including the submittal of RFIs). **(T-3)**.

10.91.23. Coordinating with other AOC IO teams for support, unity of effort, and situational awareness. **(T-3)**.

10.91.24. Leading the IOWG. **(T-3)**.

10.92. Non-Kinetic Duty Officer (when tasked by the IO Planner) is responsible for:

10.92.1. Monitoring the execution for all information-related capabilities activities performed to meet objectives related to IO and the Component Commander's Communication Strategy. **(T-3)**.

10.92.2. Maintaining IO situational awareness and recommending changes to on-going operations or future plans, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.92.3. Providing assessment inputs and updates for all activities performed to meet objectives related to IO or the Component Commander's Communication Strategy. **(T-3)**.

10.92.4. Coordinating with the Electronic Warfare Duty Officer and others as needed. **(T-3)**.

10.92.5. Serving as focal point for IO support to COD. **(T-3)**.

10.93. Military Information Support Operations (MISO) is responsible for:

10.93.1. Planning for and integrating air component MISO activities with the AFFOR staff and AOC planning processes, developing MISO measure(s) of performance and measure(s)

of effectiveness, and coordinating with the joint MISO development and approval cycle. **(T-3)**.

10.93.2. Coordinating and liaising between the AOC, AFFOR staff, Combatant Command, and the Joint Military Information Support Task Force to plan, execute, and assess MISO activities in support of national, theater, and component objectives. **(T-3)**.

10.93.3. Coordinating influence strategies and target audience analysis in support of CCDR and component influence activities. **(T-3)**.

10.93.4. Coordinating with the Combat Information Cell and the Joint Military Information Support Task Force to analyze potential adversary MISO courses of action, identify blue vulnerabilities to enemy propaganda, and develop plans to counter enemy propaganda. **(T-3)**.

10.93.5. Incorporating planned dissemination mechanisms for MISO (COMMANDO SOLO, COMPASS CALL, Cyberspace Operations, leaflet drops, etc.) into the ATO. **(T-3)**.

10.93.6. Ensuring MISO activities are coordinated and synchronized with all kinetic or non-kinetic operations. **(T-3)**.

10.93.7. Providing guidance in the employment of MISO activities and developing measure(s) of performance and measure(s) of effectiveness supporting JFC and/or JFACC. **(T-3)**.

10.93.8. Keeping Public Affairs informed about MISO operations to deconflict objectives and activities and strengthen communication plans, as appropriate. **(T-3)**.

10.93.9. Coordinating assessment and intelligence support (including submitting RFIs). **(T-3)**.

10.93.10. Considering and planning for the psychological effects of airpower on the adversary and target audiences. **(T-3)**.

10.93.11. Documenting tactics, techniques, and procedures and lessons learned. **(T-3)**.

10.93.12. Reviewing pertinent plans and MISO annexes annually. **(T-3)**.

10.93.13. Reviewing CCDR and JFACC guidance and direction for MISO purposes annually. **(T-3)**.

10.93.14. Maintaining a schedule of planned MISO activities. **(T-3)**.

10.93.15. Performing or assisting with the joint planning process for air process from a MISO perspective, as appropriate. **(T-3)**.

10.93.16. Performing or assisting with Air Tasking Cycle activities from a MISO perspective, as appropriate. **(T-3)**.

10.93.17. Leading, co-leading or supporting component efforts in MISO related areas. **(T-3)**.

10.93.18. Leading, co-leading or supporting the planning of engagements, to include key leader engagements. **(T-3)**.

10.93.19. Leading, co-leading or supporting the counter propaganda process. **(T-3)**.

10.93.20. Leading, co-leading or supporting the Component Commander's Communication Strategy function (e.g., strategic communication or commander's communication synchronization at the operational-level). **(T-3)**.

10.93.21. Participating in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.94. Operations Security (OPSEC) is responsible for:

10.94.1. Assisting the commander, strategists, and planners in identifying critical information and OPSEC indicators from all functional areas requiring protection for air operations plans and activities throughout the AOR to include inter-theater air mobility and support missions. **(T-3)**.

10.94.2. Assisting in making vulnerability assessments using intelligence reports and threat analysis from the ISRD, Office of Special Investigations, Air Communications Squadron, to identify appropriate protective measures to mitigate unacceptable operational risks. **(T-3)**.

10.94.3. Determining potential OPSEC countermeasures to reduce vulnerabilities with unacceptable risk. **(T-3)**.

10.94.4. Presenting potential countermeasures to leadership for implementation decision. **(T-3)**.

10.94.5. Developing measure(s) of performance and measure(s) of effectiveness for each countermeasure. **(T-3)**.

10.94.6. Ensuring that OPSEC activities are coordinated and deconflicted with all kinetic and non-kinetic plans and operations. **(T-3)**.

10.94.7. Participating in the OAT predictive performance and applicable combat assessment analysis. **(T-3)**.

10.94.8. Using the OPSEC process to increase the chance of mission success by eliminating or reducing vulnerabilities to an acceptable level through the application of OPSEC countermeasures, including, but not limited to: cover, concealment, camouflage, deception, intentional deviations from normal patterns, and direct strikes against adversary collection. **(T-3)**.

10.94.9. Providing guidance and tasking to subordinate units to protect operation details. Providing guidance and coordinating with supporting units prior to deployment from home station, if called for by operational plans. **(T-3)**.

10.94.10. In coordination with the military deception point of contact, developing Signature Management tasks for Air Force units identified to support the JFACC and communicating the tasks to the supporting units. **(T-3)**. The supporting unit tasks will focus on the JFACC's desired signatures, observables, and/or indicators of unit activity that are required to achieve his objectives. Tasked units will use data obtained from their respective Base Profiling Process products to provide the correct presentation of their unit activities to meet the tasks received from the supported JFACC.

10.94.11. Developing, presenting, and tracking mission specific, unit oriented OPSEC training as required by AFI 10-701. **(T-3)**. Presenting this training to all new personnel upon

arrival, or more often by request of the commander. Considering training when the mission, threat, or vulnerabilities change. **(T-3)**.

10.94.12. Leading the OPSEC Working Group. **(T-3)**. The OPSEC Working Group will normally meet on a regular scheduled basis as well as an as needed basis to provide the lead OPSEC subject matter expert with information or analysis necessary to perform OPSEC functions. Additionally, it should include electronic warfare, Cyberspace, Space, IO, military deception, public affairs, Office of Special Investigations representatives and other planners, as required.

10.94.13. Participating in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.95. Military Deception (MILDEC) is responsible for:

10.95.1. Obtaining behavioral influence analysis on specific adversary military decision makers and/or non-state sponsored leaders of adversary militants within the AOR, and identifying friendly actions to affect their behaviors in ways that are beneficial to friendly operational objectives. **(T-3)**.

10.95.2. Acting as primary advocate for MILDEC within the JFACC's strategy team. The MILDEC planner's principal functions are the development, maintenance, integration, and assessment of operational-level MILDEC activities in support of the JFACC's courses of action, objectives and plans. **(T-3)**.

10.95.3. In coordination with the operations security point of contact, developing Signature Management tasks for units identified to support the JFACC and communicate those tasks to the supporting units through official channels. **(T-3)**. Supporting unit tasks will focus on the JFACC's desired signatures, observables, and/or indicators of unit activity that are required to achieve his objectives. Tasked units will use data obtained from their respective Base Profiling Process products to provide the correct presentation of their unit activities to meet the tasks received from the supported JFACC.

10.95.4. Assessing all aspects of the MILDEC plan against measure(s) of effectiveness and measure(s) of performance as identified in the JAOP, and recommending continuation, change, or termination measures accordingly. **(T-3)**.

10.95.5. Ensuring that MILDEC activities are coordinated and deconflicted with all other kinetic and non-kinetic operations within the JFACC's operation. **(T-3)**.

10.95.6. Ensuring MILDEC planning documents are stored and controlled separately from the supported plan. **(T-3)**.

10.95.7. Leading the MILDEC Working Group. **(T-3)**. The MILDEC Working Group should normally meet on an as needed basis and consist of subject matter experts from across all air component staff functions and specialty teams, as needed for a particular MILDEC plan. Additionally, the working group should develop, integrate and coordinate MILDEC tasks for the AOC and units identified as assets for the supported commander's deception plans as well as participate in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group,

Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. (T-3).

10.96. Electronic Warfare is responsible for:

10.96.1. Performing operational-level planning (including target systems analysis, links, and nodal analysis) and integrate electronic warfare into the overall planning, operations execution, and assessment effort. (T-3).

10.96.2. Developing a coherent, synchronized plan to employ electronic warfare assets to achieve JFC/JFACC objectives. (T-3).

10.96.3. Planning, managing and assessing air and space component electronic warfare operations. (T-3).

10.96.4. Developing electronic warfare support, deconfliction, and targeting priorities and recommendations. (T-3).

10.96.5. Coordinating activities and reachback as outlined in AFI 10-703, *Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming*. (T-3).

10.96.6. Providing support to electronic warfare integrated reprogramming, support suppression of enemy air defenses, enemy C2 data and communication links, enemy navigation aids, and anti-radiation weapon planning. (T-3).

10.96.7. Preparing and submitting electronic warfare asset requests for forces to appropriate staff. (T-3).

10.96.8. Providing inputs to jamming control authority, Joint Restricted Frequency List, and to the SPINS via the C2 plans team. (T-3).

10.96.9. Assisting in the development of electronic warfare measures and indicators for operational assessment. (T-3).

10.96.10. Providing inputs to the development of methodologies to defeat and attack adversary electronic emitters, aids in developing electronic warfare courses of action to achieve JFC and/or JFACC objectives, and recommends jamming aircraft flight profiles necessary to satisfy IO or non-kinetic operations requirements. (T-3).

10.96.11. Coordinating assessment and intelligence support (including submittal of RFIs). (T-3).

10.96.12. Performing Electronic Warfare Duty Officer duties to include:

10.96.13. Monitoring the execution and assessment of electronic warfare missions. (T-3).

10.96.14. Maintaining electronic warfare situational awareness and recommending changes to on-going operations or future plans. (T-3).

10.96.15. Coordinating with internal and external agencies to include the 616 OC when required. (T-3).

10.96.16. Leading the Electronic Warfare Cell when required. Electronic Warfare Cell will normally meet to provide the Lead electronic warfare subject matter expert with information or analysis necessary to perform electronic warfare functions. (T-3).

10.96.17. Participating in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.97. The Director of Cyberspace Forces (when established), Cyberspace Operations Cell or Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber liaison element responsible for the cyberspace operations is responsible for:

10.97.1. Integrating cyberspace effects into the COMAFFOR/JFACC's time-phased scheme of maneuver and fires based on commander's guidance, desired effects, friendly capabilities, and likely adversary courses of action. **(T-3)**.

10.97.2. Integrating 616 OC cyberspace support into the COMAFFOR/JFACC's planning and execution. **(T-3)**.

10.97.3. Coordinating cyberspace activities and reachback with 616 OC, Combatant Command, and other Joint and USAF agencies, as required, to integrate offensive and/or defensive cyberspace operations into the AOC mission. **(T-3)**.

10.97.4. Fully integrating cyberspace operations planning into the joint planning process for air. **(T-3)**.

10.97.5. As appropriate, synchronizing the Cyber Tasking Order and the theater ATO throughout the tasking cycle, working closely with those at the 616 OC. **(T-3)**.

10.97.6. Developing cyberspace courses of action in support of theater operations. **(T-3)**.

10.97.7. Assessing cyberspace operations; developing cyberspace operations measure(s) of performance and measure(s) of effectiveness. **(T-3)**.

10.97.8. Coordinating the development and implementation of defensive cyberspace operations measures with the Air Communications Squadron or ACT, and the 616 OC. **(T-3)**.

10.97.9. Determining operational impact of information conditions and/or tailor response options, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.97.10. Consulting with non-kinetic operations planners prior to, and during, all cyberspace operations to ensure operational-level synergy with other kinetic and/or non-kinetic engagements. **(T-3)**.

10.97.11. Leading the Cyberspace Working Group, which will normally meets on a regular scheduled basis to provide the lead AF Cyberspace Operations subject matter expert with information or analysis necessary to perform cyberspace operations functions. The Cyberspace Working Group will propose SPINS and ROE changes. **(T-3)**. Additionally, members of the working group should participate in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required.

10.98. Public Affairs is responsible for:

10.98.1. Directly advising the AOC/CC and directors, division chiefs, and team chiefs on implications of command decisions, actions, and operations on foreign and domestic public perceptions. **(T-3).**

10.98.2. Coordinating with senior staff and other information-related capabilities to develop the commander's communication plan in support of operational objectives. **(T-3).**

10.98.3. Communicating accurate, truthful, timely, and useful information about USAF operations to inform internal and external audiences and to meet the commander's desired effects. **(T-3).**

10.98.4. Planning for Public Affairs operations as part of the joint planning process for air. **(T-3).**

10.98.5. Ensuring Public Affairs is part of strategy development, planning, and execution phases of the Air Tasking Cycle. **(T-3).**

10.98.6. Providing the JFACC with communication advice in support of operations. **(T-3).**

10.98.7. Integrating Public Affairs into the AOC working groups and meetings, as required. **(T-3).**

10.98.8. Providing support to AOC planned activities and operations. **(T-3).**

10.98.9. Deconflicting Public Affairs and IO-related activities, as required. **(T-3).**

10.98.10. Monitoring current operations for emerging issues that have the potential to affect the overall operation in a positive or negative fashion (a successful strike using a new weapon system, civilian casualties, fratricide, etc.). **(T-3).**

10.98.11. Planning, executing, and evaluating Public Affairs activities to support and achieve the desired effects necessary to accomplish the commander's operational objectives. **(T-3).**

10.98.12. Providing security and policy review for official information, including imagery, weapons and cockpit video, for release to the public. **(T-3).**

10.98.13. Having the clearances and unescorted access (where permitted) to all elements of the AOC, including intelligence, special access programs or special access requirements (SAR) facilities. **(T-3).**

10.98.14. Considering all Public Affairs tasks (command information, media operations, public engagement, visual information, security review, and communication synchronization) to achieve desired effects in the information environment. **(T-3).**

10.98.15. Considering all products and resources available (internal print, web and social media products, radio and television broadcasting, visual information services, civic groups and community engagement, Combat Camera, and musical programs) when planning. **(T-3).**

10.98.16. Overseeing activities of Combat Camera teams producing visual information products used to inform communication, operational planning, and decision-making as well as provide historical documentation of operations. **(T-3).**

10.98.17. Contributing to counter propaganda functions. **(T-3).**

10.98.18. Leading the Combat Information Cell if designated the counter propaganda lead. **(T-3)**.

10.98.19. Participating in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.99. Counter Propaganda (CP) is responsible for:

10.99.1. Conducting counter propaganda to minimize friendly vulnerabilities to disinformation in coordination with Component Numbered AF Public Affairs and higher-level IO and Public Affairs organizations. **(T-3)**.

10.99.2. Gaining and maintaining the information initiative to help defeat propaganda. **(T-3)**.

10.99.3. Integrating use of Public Affairs operations and other information-related capabilities to respond to propaganda and collateral damage charges. **(T-3)**.

10.99.4. Considering all available assets to counter adversary propaganda. **(T-3)**. Efforts may range from specific public IO to convey accurate information to the audiences and mitigate the intended effects of adversary propaganda, to efforts to destroy adversary propaganda resources and assets kinetically.

10.99.5. Planning, coordinating, and assessing kinetic and non-kinetic contributions to counter propaganda objectives of disrupting, degrading, and disabling adversary propaganda mechanisms. **(T-3)**.

10.99.6. Not intentionally misinforming the US Congress, public, or media. **(T-3)**.

10.99.7. Minimizing friendly vulnerabilities to disinformation and enemy propaganda via timely information release, countering enemy propaganda or misinformation that may affect unit morale and readiness. **(T-3)**.

10.99.8. Developing a process to develop appropriate response to propaganda issues, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.99.9. Leading the Combat Information Cell. **(T-3)**.

10.99.10. Participating in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.100. Combat Information Cell is responsible for:

10.100.1. Meeting on an as needed basis and will be comprised of experts and planners from: public affairs, IO, operations security, military deception, and MISO, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.100.2. Assisting with development and coordination of counter propaganda communication courses of action and plans. **(T-3)**.

10.100.3. Assisting the C/JFACC in developing rapid, accurate, fact based responses to significant ATO events. **(T-3)**.

10.100.4. Being prepared to contend with various high-profile operational scenarios. **(T-3)**.

10.100.5. Helping to mitigate C/JFACC strategic exposure to propaganda and to maximize domestic and international support for coalition and partner nation air efforts. **(T-3)**.

10.101. Counter Intelligence is responsible for:

10.101.1. Providing the AOC with required counter intelligence support. **(T-3)**.

10.101.2. Serving as the Component MAJCOM and Component Numbered AF's counter intelligence AOR expert in their region of the world. **(T-3)**.

10.101.3. Supporting operational-level planning, execution and assessment. **(T-3)**.

10.101.4. Coordinating with other counter intelligence personnel and external agencies, as required, to provide the AOC information necessary to plan, execute and assess missions. **(T-3)**.

10.101.5. Identifying which counter intelligence tools and techniques to employ to protect air, space, cyberspace and information-related capabilities. **(T-3)**.

10.101.6. Serving as the focal point for advising, coordinating and assessing air component counter intelligence activities in AFFOR staff and AOC plans and activities to include detecting, analyzing, exploiting, mitigating, and engaging adversary intelligence collection efforts. **(T-3)**.

10.101.7. Providing information that may be used to develop future plans, support Target Audience Analysis and Human Terrain Factors development, change current planning efforts or on-going operations, or information that can be used to develop courses of action and operational assessments of activities. **(T-3)**.

10.101.8. When augmented by AF Office of Special Investigations for counter intelligence support, the counter intelligence planner will be the focal point for coordinating air component counter intelligence plans and activities, to include detecting, analyzing, exploiting, and engaging adversary intelligence collection efforts. **(T-3)**.

10.101.9. Participating in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.102. Engagements (in conjunction with AFFOR) is responsible for:

10.102.1. Preparing "Themes and Messages Cards" and/or "Cultural Smart Cards," for Airmen to carry in theater, as appropriate, to synchronize words and activities all the way down to the individual level. Cultural Smart Cards serve as a quick-guide to cultural understanding. They may contain key religious facts (five pillars of Islam, key dates, and associated behaviors), customary dress (male and female) and gestures, major ethnic and cultural groups, cultural customs, and history. **(T-3)**.

10.102.2. Planning for engagements to help meet command objectives, when appropriate. **(T-3)**.

10.102.3. Linking engagements to component objectives. **(T-3)**.

10.102.4. Preparing individuals for deliberate (planned) or dynamic (unplanned or unanticipated) engagements for all ranks. **(T-3)**.

10.102.5. Understanding cultural context, cognitive orientation patterns, communication methods, cultural and social background, perspectives, capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, authorities, spheres of influence, and motivators of target audience(s). **(T-3)**.

10.102.6. Building relationships with enough strength and depth over time, so that they can then support our interests during times of crisis. **(T-3)**.

10.102.7. Developing and tailoring topics and messages to local conditions for Airmen involved in engagements. **(T-3)**.

10.102.8. Ensuring Airmen deliver an effective, consistent message that supports the command's goals, when possible. **(T-3)**.

10.102.9. Assessing engagement performance and effectiveness. **(T-3)**.

10.102.10. Coordinating assessment and intelligence support (including submittal of RFIs). **(T-3)**.

10.102.11. Participating in the IOWG, OPSEC Working Group, MILDEC Working Group, Electronic Warfare Cell, Cyberspace Working Group, Operational Planning Group, Air Planning Group, AOD Working Group and the Combat Information Cell, as required. **(T-3)**.

10.103. Knowledge Management Superintendent is responsible for:

10.103.1. Performing all KM officer duties, if KM officer not assigned. **(T-3)**.

10.103.2. Preparing and presenting a KM procedures briefing to AOC personnel. **(T-3)**.

10.103.3. Establishing liaison with JFC/J1 and AFFOR A1 and A2/6 staffs for combat service support. **(T-3)**.

10.103.4. Maintaining a shift log. **(T-3)**.

10.103.5. Managing the master actions suspense log. **(T-3)**.

10.103.6. Processing incoming and outgoing correspondence, messages, and reports (includes situation report). **(T-3)**.

10.103.7. Retrieving briefing inputs and preparing update briefing. **(T-3)**.

10.103.8. Performing duties as the AOC Functional Area Records Manager at the discretion of the commander. Ensuring AOC and division inventories of records are prepared and coordinated with communications focal point. **(T-3)**.

10.103.9. Serving as AOC privacy act officer and/or monitor. **(T-3)**.

10.103.10. Serving as Freedom of Information Act Manager in accordance with DODM 5400.07_AFMAN 33-302, *Freedom of Information Act Program*. **(T-3)**.

10.104. AOC KM Personnel are responsible for:

10.104.1. Creating and maintaining a collection point for after action feedback and/or Joint Lessons Learned Information System inputs. **(T-3)**.

10.104.2. Creating and maintaining web pages and TBMCS AOC Portal structure, policy, and knowledge operations content. **(T-3)**.

10.105. Special Technical Operations (STO) Team is responsible for:

10.105.1. Facilitating the development of STO and operationally sensitive military capabilities supplements to the JAOP, AOD, MAAP, etc. **(T-3)**. The STO team will facilitate coordination for planners and other specialty teams and special mission units to provide additional assistance to the planner. For example: As the AOD and AOD supplement are developed by the SRD, the STO team makes available resources and facilities to the strategy representatives in obtaining the information necessary to complete the AOD supplement and preparation of the AOD decision brief.

10.105.2. Ensuring adequate facilities are available to facilitate compartmented planning and briefings. Ensuring these facilities will have proper accreditations, compartmented approvals, and security measures in-place to enable compartmented-level planning operations. The STO team will ensure that personnel are available to manage physical and personnel security requirements consistent with AOC planning, execution and assessment schedules. **(T-3)**.

10.105.3. Ensuring communications and information systems are available to facilitate compartmented planning. **(T-3)**.

10.105.4. Providing the status of capabilities and making other pertinent information necessary for planning and operations available. **(T-3)**.

10.105.5. Delivering STO and advanced program tasking orders and SPINS to affected units. **(T-3)**.

10.106. ATO Coordination Team is responsible for:

10.106.1. Developing and posting ATO coordination team schedule with ATO association. **(T-3)**.

10.106.2. Attending and participating in meetings and activities of key AOC teams during ATO development process. **(T-3)**.

10.106.3. Monitoring and managing the ATO Folder to include feedback and supplemental sheet production. **(T-3)**.

10.106.4. Executing the ATO coordinator checklist. An example of checklist is available in AFTTP 3-3.AOC. **(T-3)**.

10.107. Chief, AOC Communications Team (C-ACT) is responsible for:

10.107.1. Maintaining situational awareness and status reporting on communications systems and services specified to sustain AOC operations in accordance with unit and cyberspace security procedures. **(T-3)**.

10.107.2. Coordinating current and new AOC communications requirements with the AOC commander, AFFOR A2/6 staff, support group commander (if applicable), Configuration Manager, WSM, CJE and ISSM to determine activation and restoration priorities. **(T-3)**.

10.107.3. Possessing authoritative knowledge of communications tasking in applicable AFIs, TOs, Operations Orders, Operations Plans, Concept of Operations and Defense Information Systems Agency Security Technical Implantation Guide. **(T-3)**.

10.107.4. Advising the AOC commander, AFFOR A2/6 staff, support group commander (if applicable), WSM, and appropriate division and team chiefs on the mission impacts of scheduled and unscheduled communications equipment and service outages and recommending the best methods for mitigating or eliminating outage impacts. The Configuration Manager will be involved prior to any system configuration changes. **(T-3)**.

10.107.5. Coordinating communications system and service requirements with appropriate ACT functions and other AFFOR staff, Service, joint, coalition, allied and commercially-based communications systems and services providers who support AOC operations. **(T-3)**.

10.107.6. Maintaining all AOC communications systems and services at the highest possible level to maintain information and information system confidentiality, integrity and availability. **(T-3)**.

10.107.7. Acting as liaison between the supporting component AOC Spectrum Manager and AOC operators. Coordinating with CPD on frequency assignments for ATO and ATO SPINS and maintaining an accurate list of satellite communications users to include the mission of each assigned channel to enable the AOC/CC to prioritize satellite communications. **(T-3)**.

10.107.8. In close coordination with WSM and CJE, actively participating in the site Configuration Review Board as lead for the AOC systems management process. This process includes the Configuration Manager as the AOC commander's orchestrator for configuration management and representatives from AOC divisions and teams. Ensuring any changes or additions to AOC systems include sufficient technical and configuration management support material, identify and address any maintenance concerns, and be approved by AOC commander. **(T-3)**.

10.107.9. Ensuring all systems within the AOC are certified and accredited in accordance with DODI 8500.01, *Cybersecurity*, and AFI 17-101. **(T-0)**.

10.107.10. Ensuring all systems within the AOC connecting to the Air Force Network comply with the DODI 8510.01. **(T-0)**.

10.107.11. Verifying all cyberspace security requirements are met in accordance with DODI 8500.01 for all platform information technology and platform information technology interconnections. **(T-0)**.

10.107.12. Develop plans to achieve maximum availability of the AOC communications systems and services when operating in a contested, degraded or denied environment. **(T-3)**.

10.108. Communications Focal Point (CFP) is responsible for:

10.108.1. Acting as the single focal point for AOC communications problem resolutions. The CFP is also responsible for communicating with AOC CS customers on problems with communications systems and services, and coordinating with other functions (internal or external to the AOC) to ensure that problems and issues are addressed and resolved. **(T-3)**.

10.108.1.1. Establishing a site help desk capability (either integrated into or separated from the CFP) to provide AOC system users a central service point to report communications system and service problems, regardless of whether the problem is internal or external to the AOC. **(T-3)**. The site help desk capability provides Tier 0 support.

10.108.1.2. Reporting external infrastructure component problems impacting an AOC to the host base Network Control Center, the Air Force Forces Communication Control Center, and/or its servicing Integrated Network Operations and Security Center, as appropriate, and tracking any problem until it is resolved. **(T-3)**.

10.108.2. Maintaining situational awareness of all links, circuits, systems, and networks supporting the AOC and air operations. **(T-3)**.

10.108.2.1. Continuously tracking system and circuit status and updating the C-ACT and appropriate divisions and teams of communications system, network or circuit outages that impact AOC operations. **(T-3)**.

10.108.2.2. Accessing AOC Weapon System internal and external network connectivity diagrams. **(T-3)**.

10.108.2.3. Displaying system, network, link, and circuit status charts that identify communications systems and services supporting the AOC and air operations and updating these status charts to reflect activations, deactivations and outages. **(T-3)**. **Note:** the Plans and Programs function develops these status charts and updates them when configuration changes occur.

10.108.3. Maintaining the ACT Master Station Log and logging all activities or events that affect communications or cyberspace support to AOC and air operations. **(T-3)**.

10.108.4. Collecting trouble tickets and job information, assigning control numbers and maintaining the status of all active, scheduled, unscheduled, and deferred trouble tickets and jobs in an approved Automated Information System such as Remedy and/or the Integrated Maintenance Data System. **(T-3)**.

10.108.5. Reporting problems to the MAJCOM/Air Force Forces Communication Control Center and AOC commander that affect communications support to the AOC and air operations, especially those that require coordination or support with outside agencies for resolution. **(T-3)**.

10.108.6. Collecting outage and incident information on all communication degradations and outages to help identify and mitigate vulnerabilities, deliberate attacks, and alternate procedures to assist the C-ACT in making system and network configuration corrective action decisions. **(T-3)**.

10.108.7. Supporting configuration management by notifying the C-ACT, WSM, Configuration Manager, ISSM, Plans and Programs function of any intentions to change AOC Weapon System configuration. **(T-3)**.

10.108.8. Determining, managing and overseeing communications and maintenance efforts. **(T-3)**.

10.108.9. Passing to the Plans and Programs function any new information exchange requirements or communication requirements presented to the CFP. **(T-3)**.

10.109. Network Operations Function is responsible for:

10.109.1. In conjunction with AOC Weapon System program office, implementing and enforcing national, DOD and USAF security policies to protect networks from internal and external threats. **(T-3)**.

- 10.109.2. Coordinating Multiple Discipline Vulnerability Assessment and configure Program Office approved network hardware and software patches to specifications. **(T-3)**.
- 10.109.3. Updating and accurately maintaining configuration documents and records (e.g., network topologies and rack elevation drawings). **(T-3)**.
- 10.109.4. Assisting in the testing and validation of network security. **(T-3)**.
- 10.109.5. Monitoring C2 system network capabilities and limitations. **(T-3)**.
- 10.109.6. Ensuring AOC Weapon System Program Office direction on network security is enforced. **(T-3)**.
- 10.109.7. Coordinating with the IO Team and assigned Cyberspace Liaison/Support Element to support defensive cyberspace operations response actions. **(T-3)**.
- 10.109.8. Coordinating with appropriate agencies (such as the base Network Control Center, AFFOR Communication Control Center, Integrated Network Operations and Security Center or 616 OC) to monitor and maintain AOC networks. **(T-3)**.
- 10.109.9. Helping ensure each cross-domain solution implementation has a Defense Information Assurance Security Accreditation Working Group approval and a Defense Information Systems Agency authority to connect or interim authority to connect for each AOC location and site in accordance with CJCSI 6211.02D. **(T-0)**.
- 10.109.10. Helping ensure any secure wireless connection (e.g., SecNet-11 or SecNet-54) has separate Defense Information Systems Agency Connection Approval Office approval for each implementation at each AOC location and site since these connections are a special case of Secret Internet Protocol Router Network connection approval per CJCSI 6211.02D. **(T-0)**.
- 10.109.11. Helping ensure any AOC connection to the Internet has a DOD Chief Information Officer Global Information Grid waiver approval prior to implementation per CJCSI 6211.02D **(T-0)**. The Global Information Grid is now called the DOD Information Network.
- 10.109.12. Ensuring any foreign national presence or use of foreign software has a separate approval, in accordance with AFI 17-101 and other Air Force System Security Instructions. **(T-3)**.
- 10.109.13. Helping re-accredit any major modification or change to the security architecture, security configuration, or security posture that deviates from the system(s) as accredited, in accordance with AFI 17-101 and DODI 8510.01. **(T-0)**.
- 10.109.14. Coordinating with appropriate agencies to monitor and maintain AOC video teleconferencing suites and audio-visual networks. **(T-3)**.
- 10.109.15. Monitoring and maintaining all circuits supporting AOC C2 Radio Frequency transmissions. **(T-3)**.
- 10.109.16. Coordinating with AOC divisions, teams and the C2 Systems function to provide support for common information technology assets (e.g., monitors, keyboards, voice over internet protocol phones). **(T-3)**.

10.110. Command and Control (C2) Systems Function is responsible for:

- 10.110.1. Installing, configuring, maintaining, and administering C2 systems. **(T-3)**.
- 10.110.2. Performing backup of C2 systems as designated by the C-ACT and/or AOC commander. **(T-3)**.
- 10.110.3. Managing users' computer software configurations and local area network systems. **(T-3)**.
- 10.110.4. Coordinating with users, the CFP, client support technicians, and other ACT functions to resolve computer software and hardware problems. **(T-3)**.
- 10.110.5. Coordinating configuration changes with the CFP, the Plans and Programs function, the site Configuration Manager, and the site Configuration Review Board. **(T-3)**.
- 10.110.6. Updating and maintaining rack elevation drawings, floor plans, and hardware inventories, and coordinate any updates with the Configuration Manager. **(T-3)**.

10.111. Data Links and Radio Frequency Transmissions Function is responsible for:

- 10.111.1. Helping the AOC Interface Control Cell plan, manage, and coordinate the MTN architecture. **(T-3)**.
- 10.111.2. Establishing and maintaining data links, gateways, and C2 radio networks and circuits supporting data link operations. **(T-3)**.
- 10.111.3. Maintaining data link, gateway, and C2 radio system software and hardware. **(T-3)**.
- 10.111.4. Ensuring mission critical voice, data and video services and circuits, links, nodes, and networks supporting data link and C2 radio networks remain operational; coordinating with internal and external entities to resolve problems outside the AOC's/OC's control. **(T-3)**.
- 10.111.5. Performing intricate alignment and calibration procedures to ensure maximum operating efficiency and complete repair procedures necessary to correct defective equipment. **(T-3)**.
- 10.111.6. Establishing priorities, maintaining, testing, troubleshooting, and repairing MTN and C2 radio systems. **(T-3)**.
- 10.111.7. Conducting gateway operational system checks and monitoring performance of systems and circuits. **(T-3)**.
- 10.111.8. Using approved floor plans, properly position data link and C2 radio equipment in the AOC. **(T-3)**.
- 10.111.9. Monitoring the MTN to ensure datalink information integrity and availability. **(T-3)**.
- 10.111.10. Monitoring AOC communications networks supporting distribution and display of MTN and CTP situational awareness information. **(T-3)**.
- 10.111.11. Resolving installation, repair, overhaul, and modification problems associated with communication and cyberspace changes or upgrades. **(T-3)**.

10.111.12. When tasked to coordinate with AFFOR A2/6 staff, maintaining configuration control of airborne and ground-based data link and communication relays and gateways, such as the Battlefield Airborne Communications Node or roll-on beyond line of sight enhancement packages. (T-3).

10.111.13. Updating and maintaining rack elevation drawings, floor plans, and hardware inventories. (T-3).

10.112. Plans and Programs Function is responsible for:

10.112.1. Managing the as-built site configuration and coordinating changes and requests for variances in accordance with [paragraph 9.6.6](#) of this publication. (T-3).

10.112.2. Managing activities related to CS planning, to include communications support planning and plan development, cyberspace security support, engineering support, strategic planning, and requirements analysis. (T-3).

10.112.3. Managing CS hardware and software implementation, including architectures, integration, direction, and standards as outlined in Methods and Procedures Technical Order 00-33A-1001, the AOC Weapon System Program Office, MAJCOM and site Configuration Management Plan, and joint publications. (T-3).

10.112.4. Managing internal support efforts of the ACT to include asset management and coordination of CS support agreements with the host base, service-level communications entities, customers or lateral units. (T-3).

10.112.5. Monitoring and maintaining the quality of ACT-provided communications systems and services. (T-3). While quality assurance is a function of an Air Communications Squadron or Support Squadron, it supports communications systems and services requirements of the AOC and its ability to meet operational requirements, and it applies to all communications and cyberspace personnel who install, configure, operate, inspect, maintain, repair, and remove CS equipment. Quality assurance is responsible to the Air Communications Squadron and the Support Squadron commander, providing status on unit training, equipment and other activities, all of which benefit the ACT. As such, the Plans and Programs function will support the Air Communications Squadron and the Support Squadron quality assurance function and its efforts; if tasked, Plans and Programs will manage the Air Communications Squadron, Support Squadron and ACT quality assurance program. Methods and Procedures Technical Order 00-33A-1001 outline the roles and responsibilities of quality assurance.

10.112.6. Updating and maintaining rack elevation drawings, floor plans, and hardware inventories. (T-3).

10.113. AOC Defensive Cyberspace Operations Section is responsible for:

10.113.1. Advising the AOC/CC on policies and plans to better posture the AOC for cyberspace defense. (T-3).

10.113.2. Advising the ISSM on AOC firewall vulnerabilities. (T-3).

10.113.3. Monitoring all AOC sensors and logs to determine the presence of an advanced persistent threat. (T-3). Keep and monitor logs from all network devices.

10.113.4. Performing cyberspace reconnaissance to discover unknown threats within the AOC terrain. **(T-3)**.

10.113.5. Performing cyberspace surveillance to monitor any known threats within the AOC terrain. **(T-3)**.

10.113.6. Performing cyberspace defensive operations to block the adversary's maneuver within the AOC terrain. **(T-3)**.

10.113.7. Performing cyberspace strike to eliminate adversary artifacts from AOC networks. **(T-3)**.

10.113.8. Conducting frequent vulnerability scans and mitigation actions to reduce the cyberspace attack surface for an adversary. **(T-3)**.

10.113.9. Coordinating with the Information Operation and Non-Kinetic Operations team to support Cyberspace Response activities. **(T-3)**.

10.113.10. Coordinating with appropriate agencies to defend AOC networks. **(T-3)**.

Chapter 11

LOCAL OPERATING PROCEDURES

11.1. General. This chapter is reserved for AOC units, and associated units below MAJCOM level to publish a supplement to this publication. Differences identified in an AOC supplement should only apply to that AOC and any aligned or associated ARC AOC unit. Publish in accordance with DAFI 33-360. Units will follow instructions on page 1 of this volume for approval and distribution of the MAJCOM Supplement. **(T-2).**

11.1.1. Procedures in the supplement shall not be less restrictive than specified elsewhere in this publication. This chapter's intent is for all units to highlight their specific differences in operation procedures or organization dictated by their local AOR/JOA, CCDR guidance or functional command. Most geographic AOCs and the 608 AOC have an organization structure aligned with this basic manual. Global AOCs should provide their organization structure and processes not included in this publication. **(T-2).**

11.1.2. The supplement will contain a statement in the opening paragraph advising the reader that it further implements and is incomplete without DAFMAN 13-1AOC, Volume 3. **(T-2).** The supplement is not a single source document for procedures contained in other official publications, directives, or regulations. Avoid unnecessary repetition of guidance provided in other official publications; however, reference to those publications is acceptable when it serves to facilitate location of information necessary for local operating procedures.

11.2. Organization. The supplement should be organized in the following format and, as a minimum, include the following: **(Note:** Due to the diversity of AOC missions, units are authorized to organize their supplement which will best suit their mission.)

11.2.1. Introduction.

11.2.2. General Policy.

11.2.3. Unit Mission.

11.2.4. Unit Peacetime Organization.

11.2.5. Command and Control.

11.2.6. Unit Standards (Optional).

11.2.7. OPSEC/Communications Security procedures.

11.2.8. Associated Unit Organization and Support Mission.

JOSEPH T. GUASTELLA JR., Lt Gen, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

- DAFPD 13-1, *Command and Control Enterprise*, 6 August 2012
- JP 3-30, *Joint Air Operations*, 25 July 2019
- Annex 3-99, *Department of the Air Force Role in Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO)*, 8 October 2020
- AFI 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, 23 March 2020
- DAFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, 1 December 2015
- AFMAN 13-1 AOC, Volume 2, *Standardization/Evaluation Program – (AOC)/Operations Center (OC)*, 18 February 2020
- JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*, 21 April 2017
- Air Force Doctrine, Annex 3-01, *Counterair Operations*, 6 September 2019
- AFTTP 3-3.AOC, *Operational Employment - Air Operations Center*, 15 March 2018
- JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, 16 June 2017
- JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, 5 July 2017
- JP 3-13.1, *Electronic Warfare*, 8 February 2012
- JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*, 2 October 2015
- JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, 9 July 2018
- AFI 51-402, *International Law*, 6 August 2018
- AFPD 10-9, *Lead Command Designation and Responsibilities for Weapon Systems*, 8 March 2007
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Prescribed Forms

None

Adopted Forms

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABP—Air Battle Plan

ACC—Air Combat Command

ACF—Analysis, Correlation, and Fusion

ACO—Airspace Control Order

ACP—Airspace Control Plan

ACT—AOC Communications Team

AE—Aeromedical Evacuation

AECT—Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team

AF—Air Force

AFFOR—Air Force Forces
AFI—Air Force Instruction
AFSC—Air Force Specialty Code
AFTTP—Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
ALCT—Airlift Control Team
AMCT—Air Mobility Control Team
AMD—Air Mobility Division
AMT—Airspace Management Team
AOC—Air Operations Center
AOC/CC—AOC Commander
AOD—Air Operations Directive
AOR—Area of Responsibility
AR—Air Refueling
ARC—Air Reserve Component
ARCT—Air Refueling Control Team
ATO—Air Tasking Order
ATONEW—Air Tasking Order-Network Enabled Weapons
BCD—Battlefield Coordination Detachment
C2—Command and Control
C-ACT—Chief, AOC Communications Team
CCDR—Combatant Commander
CCO—Chief, Combat Operations
CFP—Communications Focal Point
CISR—Chief of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division
CJCSI—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJE—Component Joint Data Network Officer Equivalent
COD—Combat Operations Division
COMAFFOR—Commander, Air Force Forces
CPD—Combat Plans Division
CS—Combat Support, communications system
CTP—Common Tactical Picture
DAFI—Department of the Air Force Instruction

DDOC—Deployment and Distribution Operations Center
DOD—Department of Defense
DODI—Department of Defense Instruction
GDSS—Global Decision Support System
IAMD—Integrated Air and Missile Defense
IO—Information Operations
IOWG—Information Operations Working Group
ISR—Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
ISRD—Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division
ISSM—Information System Security Manager
JADO—Joint All-Domain Operations
JAOP—Joint Air Operations Plan
JFACC—Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC—Joint Force Commander
JIPTL—Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List
JOA—Joint Operations Area
JP—Joint Publication
KM—Knowledge Management
MAAP—Master Air Attack Plan(ning)
MAJCOM—Major Command
METOC—Meteorological and Oceanographic
MILDEC—Military Deception
MISO—Mission Information Support Operations
MTN—Multi-Tactical Data Link Network
NALE—Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element
NKO—Non-Kinetic Operations
OAT—Operational Assessment Team
OC—Operations Center
OPSEC—Operations Security
RAMCC—Regional Air Mobility Control Center
RFI—Request for Information
ROE—Rules of Engagement

RSTA—Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition

RUF—Rules for Use of Force

SGT—Strategy Guidance Team

SIDO—Senior Intelligence Duty Officer

SMAC—Standoff Munitions Application Center

SOLE—Special Operations Liaison Element

SPINS—Special Instructions

SPT—Strategy Plans Team

SRD—Strategy Division

STO—Special Technical Operations

TA—Tactical Assessment

TACC—Tanker Airlift Control Center

TACS—Theater Air Control System

TAES—Theater Aeromedical Evacuation System

TBMCS—Theater Battle Management Core Systems

TDO—Tanker Duty Officer

TET—Targeting Effects Team

TGT/TA—Targets/Tactical Assessment

US—United States

USAF—United States Air Force

USSF—United States Space Force

USSTRATCOM—United States Strategic Command

WSM—Weapon System Manager

WST—Weather Specialty Team

Terms

AOC—C2 center that provides the capability to plan, direct, and assess the activities of assigned and attached forces.

Commando Solo (EC130E)—USAF aircraft whose military information support operations (MISO) and civil affairs broadcasts in FM radio, television, and military communications bands.

Compass Call (EC—130H)—USAF aircraft whose mission is to disrupt enemy command and control communications, perform offensive counter-information operations, and carry out other kinds of electronic attack.

Cyberspace—A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.

Cyberspace Operations—Employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace.

Electronic Warfare—Military action involving the use of the EM spectrum, to include directed energy to control the EM spectrum, or to attack an enemy.

Information Operations—The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.

Joint Planning Process for Air (JPPA)—The process used to develop a Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP) that guides employment of the air capabilities and forces made available to accomplish missions assigned by the JFC.

Link 16—A military tactical data link network used by military aircraft, ships and ground forces to exchange their tactical picture in near-real time.

METOC—The entire range of atmospheric, oceanographic, and space environment phenomena.

Military Deception (MILDEC)—Actions executed deliberately to mislead adversary military, paramilitary or violent extremist organization decision makers; thereby causing the adversary decision maker to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

Nodal Analysis—Analysis of the effects of actions at the communications system locations that support information exchange.

Operations Security (OPSEC)—The process of identifying, analyzing and controlling critical information indicating friendly actions associated with military operations and other activities.

“O” Shell ABP—Component-planning shells from ATO production.

Signature Management—The process used to profile day-to-day observable activities and operational trends. SM incorporates the analytical methods of OPSEC.

Attachment 2**AOC EQUIPMENT/SYSTEMS LIST****A2.1. AOC Equipment/Systems List.**

A2.1.1. The official list of approved baseline AOC equipment/systems along with additional information can be found on the AOC Intelink Site. For the specific location of the list, contact the lead MAJCOM AOC Programming Branch at ACC/A5C, (<https://usaf.dps.mil/sites/ACC-A589/A5C/default.aspx>).