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SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
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Operations Support

**IMPLEMENTATION OF, AND
COMPLIANCE WITH, ARMS CONTROL
TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS**

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This publication implements the Department of the Air Force (DAF) Policy Directive (DAFPD) 16-6, *International Arms Control and Non-proliferation Agreements, and the DoD Foreign Clearance Program*. It establishes the requirements for implementing and complying with arms control and non-proliferation treaties and agreements (referred to hereafter as arms control treaties and agreements). This instruction provides guidance for the DAF implementation of, and compliance with, international treaties and agreements in accordance with the U.S. law and policy, as specified, in: Department of Defense (DoD) Directive (DoDD) 2060.01, *Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements*, and Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 2060.03, *Application of the National Security Exclusion to the Agreements Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America*. This instruction is consistent with AFD 13-5, *Air Force Nuclear Mission*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 2030.01E, *Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation and Compliance Policy Guidance*, and incorporates guidance to ensure related publications remain consistent with DAF priorities for the nuclear mission. This publication applies to all civilian employees and uniformed members of the Regular Air Force, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard (ANG), the United States Space Force, and those with a contractual obligation to abide by the terms of DAF issuances, except where noted otherwise. This publication also applies to all employees and contractors at all DAF research and development

laboratories involved in research and development programs, including those associated with any non-lethal agents that may be interpreted to be riot control agents as defined by *The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction*. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in this publication adhere to Air Force Instruction 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, and are disposed in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System. This Department of the Air Force Instruction (DAFI) may be supplemented by subordinate organizations, but all supplements must be routed to Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Policy and Strategy Division (AF/A10P) for coordination prior to certification and approval. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility using the DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*. Route any DAF Form 847s from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. The authorities to waive wing, unit, or delta level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3”) number following the compliance statement. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate tier waiver approval authority or alternately to the publication Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for non-tiered compliance items. See DAF Manual (DAFMAN) 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures*, for a description of the authorities associated with the tier numbers. Include a copy of any waivers or exceptions issued regarding the publications and forms management requirements found in DAFI 90-160, *Publications and Forms Management*, when submitting products to Air Force Departmental Publishing Office for publishing. This publication may be supplemented, further implemented, or extended.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This publication has been substantially revised and needs to be completely reviewed.

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Chapter 1

BACKGROUND ON DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE ARMS CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE

1.1. Overview. Title 10, United States Code, outlines policy, law, and responsibilities for the Department of Defense (DoD) and its activities. DoDD 2060.01 directs DoD Components, including the DAF, to ensure compliance and establish guidance for all applicable arms control agreements. Headquarters Air Force (HAF) Mission Directive (HAFMD) 1-60, *Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration* and DAFFD 16-6, assigns the Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (AF/A10) with the responsibility for developing and synchronizing guidance, policy, and strategies for DAF arms control implementation. This instruction further specifies DAF responsibilities and procedures for arms control implementation and compliance.

Chapter 2

GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (AF/A10) will:

2.1.1. Serve as the DAF Implementation and Compliance Review Manager and central authority for arms control including monitoring the implementation and compliance of arms control treaties and agreements.

2.1.2. Provide DAF arms control policy and guidance, education and training, manpower management, program budgeting and execution, and arms control negotiations support.

2.1.3. Coordinate across DAF as the primary support to the Joint Staff for United States government (USG) negotiations of new or modified arms control treaties and agreements.

2.1.4. Prepare for the implementation of arms control provisions before they enter into force to ensure full DAF compliance with arms control treaties and agreements.

2.1.5. Ensure DAF compliance with Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff arms control guidance.

2.1.5.1. Provide guidance, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force General Counsel (SAF/GC), and the Judge Advocate General (AF/JA), on the interpretation and implementation of arms control agreements.

2.1.5.2. Coordinate with the appropriate DAF organizations on all matters pertaining to arms control treaty and agreement implementation.

2.1.5.3. Provide oversight and monitor implementation of reporting systems for treaties and agreements that require the gathering and reporting of data.

2.1.5.4. Review and validate any data exchanges, including annual exchanges and annual notifications on behalf of the DAF.

2.1.5.5. Submit compliance reports, as directed, to the OSD Treaty Manager.

2.1.5.6. Represent the DAF at arms control-related events and activities and advise interagency and international meetings at the request of OSD and/or Joint Staff treaty representatives.

2.1.6. Provide information to appropriate organizations, respond to congressional requests, and support testimony on the status of arms control implementation and compliance.

2.1.7. Support Department of Energy, OSD, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and DAF organizations in the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of new arms control and verification technologies.

2.1.8. Advise the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (SAF/AQ), and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration (SAF/SQ), and Program Managers on arms control-related responsibilities.

2.1.8.1. Review requirements documents through the Information and Resource Support System to ensure DAF program requirements are compliant with arms control treaties and agreements.

2.1.8.2. Review relevant program documentation of DAF acquisition milestones for arms control treaty and agreement compliance prior to each milestone review and any time compliance concerns arise during the program's life cycle.

2.1.8.3. Review force structure planning with the Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations (SF/S3/4/7), Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection (AF/A4), Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Futures (AF/A5/7), and Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs (AF/A8) to ensure compliance with arms control treaties and agreements.

2.1.9. Appoint a Program Element (PE) Monitor (PEM) to provide oversight and track Air Force and Space Force arms control funding execution.

2.1.9.1. Submit requirements, planning, and programming data to AF/A8, and year-of-execution financial requests to the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Administration and Management (SAF/AM).

2.1.9.2. Provide resource information on arms control implementation and compliance to the appropriate OSD Treaty Manager, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer, OUSD Policy, and as necessary, OUSD for Personnel and Readiness.

2.1.9.3. Coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller (SAF/FM) and AF/A8 to ensure inputs are captured in the President's budget submission to Congress.

2.1.9.4. Coordinate and conduct the budgeting, allocation, reprogramming, and approval of MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU funding to execute arms control activities.

2.1.10. Ensure manpower authorizations align with program requirements, and coordinate with MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU treaty offices to identify the location of authorizations needed to meet arms control treaty and agreement requirements.

2.1.10.1. Coordinate MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU manpower adjustments with applicable stakeholders.

2.1.10.2. Submit arms control manpower inputs to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower, Personnel and Services (AF/A1) to determine future requirements and ensure they are captured in the President's budget submission to Congress.

2.1.11. Manage education and training for arms control-related activities within the DAF.

2.2. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Policy & Strategy Division (AF/A10P) will:

2.2.1. Act as the DAF arms control point of contact (POC) concerning issues of implementation and compliance.

2.2.2. Oversee Strategy, Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System responsibilities for arms control implementation and compliance activities.

- 2.2.3. Serve as the DAF POC for all OSD and Joint Staff arms control-related taskings.
- 2.2.4. Oversee all MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRUs treaty and agreement activities.
- 2.2.5. Coordinate with MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRUs to reduce operational security risk during treaty and agreement implementation and compliance activities.
- 2.2.6. Review, when requested, MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU arms control supplements, Wing/Unit compliance plans, security vulnerability assessments, managed access procedures or any other related issues.
- 2.2.7. Ensure assigned personnel, whose primary duties involve arms control responsibilities, attend initial and recurring arms control education and training.

2.3. The Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations (SF/S3/4/7) will:

- 2.3.1. Designate an appropriate OPR to serve as the SF/S3/4/7's focal point for coordination between Combat Forces Command (CFC)/S10 and AF/A10 on arms control and non-proliferation issues pertaining to the space domain.
- 2.3.2. Coordinate with CFC/S10 in providing arms control manpower inputs to AF/A10 to ensure current and future manpower requirements are met.

2.4. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (SAF/AQ) will:

- 2.4.1. Require Program Managers to provide program and activities documents to AF/A10P for review of compliance with existing arms control agreements prior to program review milestones and throughout the program's life cycle as appropriate.
- 2.4.2. Ensure Program Managers review their program for arms control compliance, in accordance with DAFI 63-101_20-101, *Integrated Life Cycle Management*.
- 2.4.3. Direct Program Managers to obtain AF/A10P guidance when arms control compliance concerns arise due to changes in their program, changes with international law, or if notified by the Office of the General Counsel, Intelligence, International and Military Affairs Division (SAF/GCI), in accordance with [paragraph 2.5](#), or as appropriate, the Office of the Judge Advocate General, Operations and International Law Directorate (AF/JAO), in accordance with AFI 51-401, *The Law of War*.
- 2.4.4. Ensure assigned AF/A10 PEM tracks procurement and RDT&E funding for materiel acquisition programs allocated through the arms control PE Code.
- 2.4.5. Inform AF/A10 of program acquisition issues arising from USG, DoD and DAF implementation of international treaties and agreements.

2.5. The Office of the Air Force General Counsel (SAF/GC) will:

- 2.5.1. Provide primary DAF legal interpretation of international arms control and non-proliferation treaties and agreements, international sovereignty issues, and foreign clearance agreements as they pertain to the DoD Foreign Clearance Program (FCP).
- 2.5.2. Provide legal advice and assistance for negotiation of, implementation of, and compliance with, arms control and non-proliferation treaties and agreements, and counsel

regarding international sovereignty issues and foreign clearance agreements affecting global access and the implementation of the DoD FCP.

2.6. The Director of Public Affairs (SAF/PA). The Director of Public Affairs (SAF/PA) will coordinate with the DoD Office of Public Affairs to provide strategic communication on arms control implementation and compliance activities, as needed.

2.7. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration (SAF/SQ) will:

2.7.1. Require Program Managers to provide relevant program and activities documents to AF/A10P for review of compliance with existing arms control treaties and agreements prior to program review milestones and throughout the program's life cycle as appropriate.

2.7.2. Ensure Program Managers review their program for arms control compliance, in accordance with DAFI 63-101_20-101, *Integrated Life Cycle Management*.

2.7.3. Direct Program Managers to obtain AF/A10P guidance when arms control compliance concerns arise with their programs due to changes in the program, or changes with international law, or if notified by the Office of the General Counsel, Intelligence, International and Military Affairs Division (SAF/GCI), in accordance with [paragraph 2.5](#), or as appropriate, the Office of the Judge Advocate General, Operations and International Law Directorate (AF/JAO), in accordance with AFI 51-401, *The Law of War*.

2.7.4. Ensure assigned AF/A10 PEM tracks procurement and RDT&E funding for materiel acquisition programs allocated through the arms control PE Code.

2.7.5. Inform AF/A10 of program acquisition issues arising from USG, DoD and DAF implementation of international treaties and agreements.

2.8. The Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Security (SAF/OCS), in coordination with AF/A10P and Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). The Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Security (SAF/OCS), in coordination with AF/A10P and Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), will ensure all special access programs, information, and information technology are protected against unnecessary or inadvertent exposure during treaty and agreement inspection, evaluation, and observation activities.

2.9. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (AF/A2). The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (AF/A2) will inform AF/A10P of any intelligence information concerning foreign threats or activities that relate to DAF implementation of, and compliance with, treaties and agreements.

2.10. The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force (AF/JA):

2.10.1. May provide complementary legal interpretation, within the DAF, of international arms control and non-proliferation treaties and agreements.

2.10.2. Will conduct reviews of weapons and weapons systems for compliance with the law of war. AF/JA will coordinate with AF/A10 and SAF/GC to ensure compliance with the provisions of arms control and non-proliferation treaties and agreements as necessary.

2.11. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), Office of Special Projects (AFOSI/PJ) will:

- 2.11.1. Provide counterintelligence support, to include counterintelligence training, to arms control operations and activities upon request.
- 2.11.2. Provide direct support to AF/A10P, as necessary, during DoD directed vetting of inspectors.
- 2.11.3. Provide direct support to AF/A10P and SAF/OCS concerning counterintelligence matters for any arms control visits or inspections involving DAF equities, as requested.
- 2.11.4. Provide representatives to participate in applicable inspection exercises and information exchanges in coordination with SAF/OCS, as required.

2.12. All DAF organizations. All DAF organizations will refer arms control issues or questions involving special access programs to DAF Security, SAF/OCS, or AFOSI/PJ, as appropriate.

2.13. MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRUs will:

- 2.13.1. Establish a treaty office or assign functions to an existing office, as appropriate, to oversee and manage treaty and agreement responsibilities applicable to their MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU.
- 2.13.2. Develop and maintain a MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU supplement and procedures to execute this DAFI and coordinate plans and procedures with AF/A10P. Ensure development of subordinate Wing/Delta compliance plans, as appropriate.
- 2.13.3. Identify the appropriate number of billets to support and execute MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU headquarters and subordinate Wing/Delta arms control requirements. **NOTE:** In some cases, MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU and/or Wing/Delta arms control positions may be funded by the DAF Arms Control Implementation Program. MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRUs will coordinate any requirements for DAF Arms Control Implementation Program-funded arms control positions with AF/A10P.
 - 2.13.3.1. Ensure installation Commanders designate a Treaty Compliance Officer (TCO) or Treaty Compliance Point of Contact (TC POC) to assist in carrying out arms control treaty and agreement compliance responsibilities. At locations that do not specifically designate a TCO or TC POC, MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU will rely upon the installation Commander or their designee for treaty compliance matters.
 - 2.13.3.2. Establish a regional TCO organization structure in coordination with AF/A10P in situations where the number of Wing/Deltas with significant arms control treaty and agreement compliance responsibilities exceeds the number of funded TCO billets. In a regional organization structure, full-time TCOs at host installations are assigned as MAJCOM/FLDCOM support to multiple Wing/Delta and geographically separated units.
 - 2.13.3.3. Ensure TCOs and TC POCs report directly to their appropriate installation Commander on arms control implementation and compliance matters. In the case of a regional organization structure, the regional TCO will report to the MAJCOM/FLDCOM and DRU/host installation Commander.
 - 2.13.3.4. Ensure installation level TCOs in AF/A10-funded positions are primarily responsible for the accomplishment of all treaty and agreement compliance requirements.

Furthermore, additional duties assigned will not interfere with TCO's primary responsibilities.

2.13.4. Serve as resource managers, monitoring arms control funding and manpower through coordination with the PEM for the DAF Arms Control Implementation Program.

2.13.4.1. Monitor manpower authorizations, identify and defend manpower requirements, and recommend changes to the affected MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU staff and installation Commander. Ensure arms control authorizations (identified and resourced in the DAF Arms Control Implementation Program) at MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRUs, installations, and other organizations are not moved or reclassified without the prior coordination and concurrence from AF/A10P.

2.13.4.2. Manage resources and funding for arms control activities and ensure MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU and subordinate Wing/Delta requirements are included in budget submissions to include budget execution plans.

2.13.4.3. Identify program and budget requirements for arms control implementation and compliance within the command and submit them to AF/A10P annually for review, coordination, and consolidation.

2.13.5. Communicate arms control requests, issues, or concerns to AF/A10P to coordinate expedient resolution, including those involving other DoD components or USG agencies.

2.13.6. Direct arms control activities and maintain oversight of arms control implementation and compliance requirements.

2.13.7. Participate in the development of arms control implementation and compliance policy guidance by reviewing and coordinating on higher headquarters directives and instructions and providing subject matter expertise to Compliance Review Groups (CRG), when requested.

2.13.8. Maintain oversight of subordinate units' implementation and compliance with arms control treaties and agreements and ensure consistent application across the MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU.

2.13.9. Provide AF/A10P information associated with compliance responsibilities for treaties and agreements listed in [Attachment 2](#) affecting MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRUs, and for future treaties as instructed by AF/A10P. The baseline information will include:

2.13.9.1. An OPR and POC.

2.13.9.2. A summary of organizational assets and required activities (e.g., items of inspection).

2.13.9.3. MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU supplement and/or guidance documents outlining implementation requirements for applicable treaties and agreements.

2.13.10. Educate and train MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU headquarters and installation-level personnel whose duties involve specific arms control responsibilities or promoting awareness of arms control. Leverage HAF resources, as required, to support MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU learning objectives.

2.13.11. Ensure Wing/Delta TCOs and TC POCs complete appropriate training and education as specified in [Chapter 3](#).

2.14. The Arms Control Center of Excellence (ACCE) will:

2.14.1. Provide education and training for DAF arms control professionals to meet requirements to ensure the implementation of, and compliance with, arms control and nonproliferation treaties and agreements.

2.14.2. Develop and establish functional core competencies of arms control professionals. Construct associated arms control education and training curriculum.

2.14.3. In coordination with AF/A10P, develop and publish course catalogs, academic calendars, and related instruction materials.

2.14.4. Establish and maintain a centralized archive of DAF arms control treaty and agreement activity, both active and expired.

Chapter 3

ARMS CONTROL EDUCATION AND TRAINING

3.1. DAF arms control education and training resources include, but are not limited to:

- 3.1.1. Directives regarding new treaties and/or agreements or modifications to existing treaties and/or agreements;
- 3.1.2. Briefings, checklists, and background papers;
- 3.1.3. Computer-based training (CBT) modules; and
- 3.1.4. ACCE instruction, and other training aids (e.g., *Treaty Compliance Officer Handbook*).

3.2. Treaty Compliance Officer minimum education and training requirements are:

- 3.2.1. Review orientation and training materials outlined in the *Treaty Compliance Officer Handbook*.
- 3.2.2. Complete all CBT modules on an annual basis. Reference *Treaty Compliance Officer Handbook* and ACCE course catalog. **NOTE:** This requirement does not include the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Base Assistance Team (BAT) CBT, which is only intended for TCOs nominated to the BAT.
- 3.2.3. Attend education and training courses for arms control treaties, agreements and reporting systems, as applicable, but must include the HAF-approved Arms Control Orientation Course (ACOC). These courses must be completed at the earliest opportunity following assignment to the MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU. TCOs will coordinate with their respective MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU for additional education and training guidance. Reference *Treaty Compliance Officer Handbook* and ACCE course catalog.
- 3.2.4. Participate in on-site training events and exercises for arms control treaties and agreements. TCOs will coordinate with their respective MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU for guidance and travel funding options.
- 3.2.5. Review installation-level plans relating to arms control implementation and compliance operations and activities upon assignment, and annually thereafter.
- 3.2.6. Maintain knowledge of changes to applicable treaties, agreements, MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU supplements, implementation and compliance guidance, and DAF implementation and compliance processes.

3.3. Treaty Compliance Point of Contact minimum requirements are as follows:

- 3.3.1. Review orientation materials including the *Treaty Compliance Officer Handbook* and relevant arms control treaty and agreement briefings. **NOTE:** contact your respective MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU, AF/A10P, or ACCE for access to materials, as needed.
- 3.3.2. Complete applicable CBT modules on an annual basis. Consult with MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU TCO for guidance on applicable CBTs. **NOTE:** This requirement does not include the CWC BAT CBT, which is only intended for TCOs nominated for the BAT.

3.3.3. Attend applicable arms control education and training courses. TC POCs will consult with their MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU for guidance on applicable courses to ensure timely attendance.

3.3.4. Review installation-level plans relating to arms control implementation and compliance operations and activities upon assignment, and annually thereafter.

3.3.5. Maintain knowledge of changes to applicable treaties, agreements, MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU supplements, and implementation and compliance guidance, and DAF implementation and compliance processes.

Chapter 4

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ARMS CONTROL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

4.1. Biological Weapons Convention.

4.1.1. Overview. The *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction* (hereinafter referred to as the *Biological Weapons Convention* or BWC) was negotiated to eliminate the threat of biological weapons use. The Treaty was opened for signature in Moscow, London, and Washington, D.C., in April 1972. Entering into force on 26 March 1975, as of August 2025, there are 189 States Parties and 4 signatory States.

4.1.1.1. The Treaty was negotiated as a supplement to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of biological weapons. The BWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and acquisition of biological agents and toxins. However, neither the Treaty nor the United States' implementing legislation, *Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989*, restrict or restrain peaceful research or development involving biological warfare agents. There are no requirements for reporting or verification regimes in this Treaty.

4.1.1.2. The United States, as a State Party to the Treaty, participates in an annual voluntary exchange of data regarding defensive research in the biological arena. As part of the annual data exchange, the DoD compiles and submits relevant information through the Department of State (DOS) on defensive biological research activities and programs based on a regime established during the Second BWC Review Conference in 1986. The reporting regime underwent revision during the Third Review Conference in 1991.

4.1.2. Roles and Responsibilities. In relation to the Biological Weapons Convention, MAJCOM/FLDCOM/DRU Commanders and Air National Guard will provide AF/A10P information on biological defense research activities and related programs, as requested.

4.2. Chemical Weapons Convention.

4.2.1. Overview. *The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction* (hereinafter referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC). The CWC is a legally binding treaty negotiated to prevent the production or use of chemical weapons as defined by the Treaty's scheduled chemicals. The United States is a State Party to the CWC, and is responsible for the implementation of, and compliance with, all Treaty provisions. The DAF is responsible for ensuring the proper implementation and compliance of CWC treaty obligations on DAF-owned and operated facilities and equipment. Entering into force on 29 April 1997, as of August 2025, there are 193 States Parties and 1 signatory State.

4.2.1.1. In response to CWC Challenge Inspection (CI), the DAF will combine base-level planning and preparation with timely deployment of a BAT comprised of subject matter and inspection management experts. DAF installation personnel and BAT members will ensure the USG is in compliance with CWC CI requirements while protecting DoD and DAF national security equities.

4.2.1.2. For additional details on specific inspection requirements, access levels, and procedures for CWC inspection activities, review the *CWC Inspection Support Manual (ISM)* and contact AF/A10P.

4.2.2. Roles and Responsibilities in relation to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

4.2.2.1. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Policy and Strategy Division (AF/A10P) will:

4.2.2.1.1. Provide subject matter expert (SME) support for the DoD Host Team during an Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) sanctioned CWC CI; and

4.2.2.1.2. In accordance with appropriate command authorities and applicable host country agreements, coordinate with USG agencies to gather information if a DAF installation, or equity, is subject to an OPCW inspection.

4.2.2.1.3. Ensure the DAF retains specialized personnel who are organized, trained, and equipped to meet CWC-mandated compliance requirements.

4.2.2.1.4. Appoint a BAT Chief.

4.2.2.2. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Policy and Strategy Division, International Treaties and Agreements Branch (AF/A10PI) will:

4.2.2.2.1. Activate the DAF Response Cell to provide initial site and leadership support.

4.2.2.2.2. Coordinate DAF CWC policy, guidance, and other related staff actions.

4.2.2.2.3. Represent the DAF at the CWC Implementation Working Group.

4.2.2.2.4. Develop, disseminate, and maintain changes to the ISM.

4.2.2.2.5. Activate and deploy the BAT to the designated CWC CI site no later than 12 hours after formal notification of inspection.

4.2.2.2.6. Notify MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRUs of pending CWC CI.

4.2.2.2.7. Provide SME support to the Inspection Team, Host Team, National Escorts, and Requesting State Party Observer, as requested by the U.S. National Authority and/or DTRA National Escorts.

4.2.2.2.8. Provide CWC CI education and training.

4.2.2.2.8.1. Conduct one Activity Focused Training Event (AFTE) every two years and one Timeline Focused Training Event (TFTE) every three years.

4.2.2.2.8.2. Conduct one training event outside of the continental United States and one at a Government-Owned Contractor-Operated facility every three years.

4.2.2.2.8.3. Provide SME support to DoD-level CWC CI training events and observing/supporting partner Service CWC CI exercises.

4.2.2.2.9. Immediately provide an incident report on recovered and destroyed chemical munitions to DAF leadership and the OSD Threat Reduction and Arms Control office.

4.2.2.3. The Director, Air Force Service Watch Cell will relay CWC CI notification to AF/A10P.

4.2.2.4. SAF/GC will coordinate and provide legal advice concerning emerging CWC-related staff actions and issues.

4.2.2.5. SAF/OCS will advise the Inspection Control Group (ICG) and provide recommendations at the challenged inspection site concerning security and counterintelligence issues and pre-inspection facility preparation activities.

4.2.2.6. MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU will:

4.2.2.6.1. Ensure that installation base support plans, in conjunction with the ISM, can support CWC CIs or that installations develop Challenge Inspection Site Support Plans (CISSP).

4.2.2.6.2. Ensure a TCO and/or TC POC is assigned as the 24-hour POC to receive CWC CI notifications.

4.2.2.6.3. Nominate one or more BAT member(s) per MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG. DRUs are exempt.

4.2.2.6.4. Direct the challenged inspection site to implement the CISSP (if available) or the base support plan in conjunction with the ISM to support execution of CI tasks.

4.2.2.6.5. Ensure TCOs and TC POCs have access to the most recent version of the ISM. Contact AF/A10PI for most recent version.

4.2.2.7. The BAT Chief will:

4.2.2.7.1. Be responsible for inspection site BAT management, to include the designation of BAT member(s) and a Deputy BAT Chief from the affected MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU.

4.2.2.7.2. Determine general and mission-specific BAT support and deployment requirements per the Response Cell guide.

4.2.2.7.3. Ensure the challenged inspection site receives the BAT introductory briefing.

4.2.2.7.4. Provide advice to the inspection site's ICG Chief and site commander/manager.

4.2.2.7.5. Maintain an updated contact list for all BAT members and alert members of an initial notification of a CWC CI.

4.2.2.8. The BAT will reference the ISM throughout the execution of a CWC CI.

4.2.3. Guidance and Procedures for CWC CI.

4.2.3.1. BAT Composition.

4.2.3.1.1. For a CWC CI where either the Air Force or the Space Force is the lead Service, the BAT includes members from the following organizations:

4.2.3.1.1.1. HAF, to include AF/A10P; SAF/OCS; AFOSI; and HAF-sponsored contractors.

4.2.3.1.1.2. DAF components to include MAJCOM/FLDCOM TCOs; and select base-level TCO/TC POCs.

4.2.3.1.1.3. The DTRA liaison(s) and other organizations as necessary.

4.2.3.1.2. BAT Operations. In accordance with the ISM, the first-arriving BAT member needs to execute BAT team functions in the following order: perimeter, self-monitoring, mandate, and prepare for sustained operations, as required. **NOTE:** The first BAT member to arrive at the inspection site becomes the acting BAT Chief until relieved of duties by the AF/A10P-designated BAT Chief. That BAT member makes sure that the site Commander and ICG receive the orientation briefing.

4.2.3.1.3. BAT Qualifications.

4.2.3.1.3.1. BAT members must be an active MAJCOM/FLDCOM TCO, base-level TCO, appointed TC POC, or a member supporting AF/A10P for CWC implementation and compliance.

4.2.3.1.3.2. All BAT members must successfully complete DAF CWC BAT training upon assignment, to include focused instruction on the CWC CI process via ACCE's CWC CI Orientation Course; participation in one DAF CWC CI AFTE or TFTE; and completion of the CWC BAT CBT and comprehensive examination.

4.2.3.1.3.3. Certification and Proficiency. BAT members must complete the following recurring training: attend an annual DAF-sponsored targeted BAT training session; participate in an AFTE every two years; participate in one TFTE every three years; pass the annual CWC CBT examination.

4.2.3.2. CWC Investigations of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons or Riot Control Agents as a Method of Warfare.

4.2.3.2.1. DAF units must report instances of witnessed chemical weapons use or witnessed riot control agents (RCAs) being used as methods of warfare. Collect the following data and forward it to AF/A10P as soon as possible:

4.2.3.2.1.1. The State Party on whose territory the use of chemical weapons or RCAs as a method of warfare is alleged to have taken place;

4.2.3.2.1.2. Extent and nature of alleged use;

4.2.3.2.1.3. Coordinates where chemical weapons or RCAs used as a method of warfare are alleged to have been used in violation of Treaty protocols;

4.2.3.2.1.4. Chemical weapons or RCAs characteristics, if known, and observed effects on humans, animals, and vegetation;

4.2.3.2.1.5. Date and time the chemical weapon or RCAs as a method of warfare is alleged to have been used; and

4.2.3.2.1.6. Any suggested safe routes of access into the area of alleged use.

4.2.3.2.2. DAF-initiated requests for investigations of another State Party will be elevated through the chain of command either through the theater Combatant Command or Joint Staff and OSD.

4.2.3.3. Guidance and Procedures for CWC Recovered Chemical Weapons (RCW).

4.2.3.3.1. Responding Explosive Ordnance Disposal organization collect and report the following information on recovered chemical weapons to the installation Command Post and designated TCO in accordance with DAFMAN 32-3001, *Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program*, paragraph 5.7.6.2.4.3.

4.2.3.3.2. Installation command posts send situation reports in accordance with AFMAN 10-206, *Operational Reporting (OPREP)*, Chapter 4.

4.2.3.3.3. Installation TCOs provide the required information on any RCWs to the respective MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU Treaty Office for situational awareness.

4.2.3.3.4. MAJCOM/ FLDCOM/ANG/DRU provide the required information on any RCWs to AF/A10P for situational awareness.

Chapter 5

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

5.1. Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

5.1.1. Overview. The *Treaty for Conventional Armed Forces in Europe* (CFE) purpose was to establish equal ceilings on conventional forces for 16 North Atlantic Treaty Organization States and 14 former Warsaw Treaty Organization States in the territory defined from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains Area of Application (AoA). Entering into force on 9 November 1992, as of August 2025, there are 29 States Parties and 28 signatory States. The CFE is legally binding and unlimited in duration.

5.1.1.1. The Treaty limits equipment in five categories for each of the two blocks of States Parties: armored combat vehicles, battle tanks, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. Other conventional systems, such as combat support helicopters, are subject to the treaty but not limited.

5.1.1.2. Equipment limited by the Treaty (e.g., combat aircraft) and other conventional equipment subject to, but not limited by, the Treaty that are included in the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment, or that the U.S. has declared as entering into service under the CFE, are subject to notifications, data exchanges, and on-site inspections.

5.1.2. Verification Activities. The Treaty provides for on-site inspections, notifications, and an Annual Exchange of Information (AEI). U.S. forces present in the territory of the CFE AoA, either permanently or temporarily, are subject to the treaty's provisions and may be impacted by the Treaty's verification regime.

5.1.3. DAF units on a U.S. or Host Nation (HN) declared site are subject to CFE declared site inspections. DAF personnel and equipment not located on a declared site may further be subject to specified area inspections. DAF units located in the CFE AoA may require a notification and be reported in the AEI.

5.2. Vienna Document.

5.2.1. Overview. The *Vienna Document* (VDOC) was first signed in 1990 and has been reissued several times since, most recently in 2011 (VDOC 11). Its purpose is to reduce risk and provide transparency among the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) States within the territory defined as the Zone of Application (ZoA) in Europe and parts of Central Asia. VDOC 11 is a politically binding agreement and of indefinite duration.

5.2.1.1. Conventional equipment subject to the VDOC 11 Annual Exchange of Military Information (AEMI) includes battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and look-alike vehicles, anti-tank guided missile launchers, self-propelled and towed artillery pieces/mortars/multiple rocket launchers (100 MM and above in caliber), armored vehicle launched bridges, combat aircraft, and helicopters.

5.2.1.2. The agreement further provides for the prior notification and observation of certain military activities (e.g., exercises) above a defined threshold, an exchange of information provided annually on conventional forces and permanent equipment holdings,

on-site inspections and evaluations, as well as a program of military contacts and cooperation.

5.2.2. All DAF forces present within the territory of the ZoA, either permanently or temporarily, may be impacted by VDOC 11 unit evaluations and/or specified area inspections. Personnel and forces participating in notifiable military exercises may be subject to observation by members of the OSCE.

5.3. Roles and Responsibilities for Conventional Arms Control.

5.3.1. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Policy & Strategy Division (AF/A10P) will:

5.3.1.1. Participate in, and represent the Air Force at, DoD conventional arms control-related meetings and activities, including the Conventional CRG. Upon request, participate as technical advisor at interagency and international meetings.

5.3.1.2. Forward all deployment notifications of treaty/agreement-accountable aircraft entering the European theater to United States Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA) upon receipt.

5.3.1.3. Review and validate data exchange inputs consolidated by the Joint Staff prior to its final submission to the appropriate agency or organization for each applicable treaty and agreement.

5.3.2. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower, Personnel and Services (AF/A1) will coordinate with AF/A10 on all proposed change actions affecting organizations physically located in the European theater (e.g., Organizational Change Requests, Program Action Directives).

5.3.3. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (AF/A3) will inform AF/A10P in advance of deployments of A-, F-, B- series aircraft through the European theater and include treaty/agreement statement in deployment orders. (See [paragraph 5.4.4.](#))

5.3.4. The Commander, HQ United States Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA) will:

5.3.4.1. Ensure all temporary and assigned forces affected by conventional arms treaties and/or agreements are in compliance with treaties and/or agreements.

5.3.4.2. Notify AF/A10PI of official CFE and VDOC 11 notifications initiated by USAFE-AFAFRICA (i.e., 10% change in assigned aircraft, organizational changes, etc.).

5.3.4.3. Initiate and submit any CFE or VDOC 11 required notifications to U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) for Joint Staff submission to ensure compliance with treaty/agreement timelines, as appropriate.

5.3.4.4. Submit CFE AEI and VDOC 11 AEMI data inputs, as well as any other required annual notifications and data exchanges to USEUCOM.

5.3.4.5. Provide guidance to ensure DAF units and forces present in treaty/agreement areas of responsibility are prepared for inspection, evaluation, or observation activities.

5.3.4.5.1. Support host inspection and/or evaluation teams, as well as DTRA escort teams during conventional arms control treaty/agreement activities, as necessary.

5.3.4.5.2. Plan for and host, in coordination with AF/A10P, one Combat Air Base visit during each five-year period consistent with the provisions of the VDOC 11.

5.3.4.5.3. Ensure appropriate units host one arms control event each per calendar year to maintain compliance and readiness for applicable conventional arms control treaties and agreements.

5.3.4.5.4. Provide SME support to DoD-level conventional arms control training events and observing/supporting partner Service conventional arms control exercises.

5.3.4.6. Notify AF/A10PI of any DAF unit/installation impacted by arms control activities (i.e., positive asset scans for CFE, VDOC 11, Open Skies).

5.3.5. DAF MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRUs and Field Operating Agencies (FOAs) will inform AF/A10P of proposed permanent changes to organizations physically located in the European theater (e.g., Organizational Change Requests, Program Action Directives) as early as possible.

5.4. Reporting Procedures for Conventional Arms Control Treaties and Agreements.

5.4.1. The USG may be required to notify partner nations of permanent changes in the organizational structure of conventional armed forces located in the European theater.

5.4.2. Following notification to AF/A10 of a proposed DAF change action affecting an organization physically located in Europe, the DAF will accomplish the following actions:

5.4.2.1. As early as possible, but not later than 90 days prior to the desired effective date of the change action, the initiating MAJCOM/FLDCOM/DRU, and FOAs (hereafter referred to as “the initiating organization”) will contact USAFE-AFAFRICA and notify them of the desired change. **(T-1)**

5.4.2.2. Not later than 75 days prior to the desired effective date, the initiating organization will provide USAFE-AFAFRICA with all the required information to draft a treaty/agreement notification, if required. **(T-1)**

5.4.2.3. USAFE-AFAFRICA will submit the treaty/agreement notification, as required, to USEUCOM. USAFE-AFAFRICA will notify the initiating organization as soon as the treaty/agreement notification has been submitted to USEUCOM for coordination. **(T-1)**

5.4.2.4. Following the release of any official notifications by DOS, USAFE-AFAFRICA will notify the initiating organization of the treaty/agreement notification release date and confirm or change (if requirements dictate) the proposed effective date for the change action. **(T-1)**

5.4.3. DAF MAJCOM/FLDCOM/DRUs and FOAs will inform AF/A10P of proposed permanent changes to organizations physically located in the European theater (e.g., Organizational Change Requests, Program Action Directives) early as possible. **NOTE:** When treaty notifications are required, follow the process detailed in section 5.4.4. **(T-1)**

5.4.4. Following the decision to deploy aircraft through the European theater, organizations involved in orders production will include the following statement in all deployment orders involving aircraft movements through Europe: **(T-1)** CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL REPORTING: MOVEMENTS OF AIRCRAFT THROUGH THE EUROPEAN THEATER MAY BE IMPACTED BY THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED

FORCES IN EUROPE, VIENNA DOCUMENT 2011, AND THE OPEN SKIES TREATY. UNITS MUST CONTACT HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE AND PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE TYPE AND NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AS WELL AS THE PLANNED MOVEMENT AND POINT OF CONTACT INFORMATION WHILE OPERATING IN THE USEUCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. CONTACT DETAILS: NIPR EMAIL: USAFE.A8.A8XA.ARMSCONTROLBRANCH@US.AF.MIL DSN: 314- 480-6097/5461 COMMERCIAL: +49-6371-47-6097/5461 SIPR EMAIL: USAF.RAMSTEIN.USAFE.MBX.A8-A8XA-ARMS-CTR@MAIL.SMIL.MIL VOSIP: 304-480-4523

5.4.5. MAJCOM/FLDCOMs will ensure their respective units planning to send aircraft through the European theater provide AF/A10P and USAFE-AFAFRICA (USAFE.A8.A8XA.ARMSCONTROLBRANCH@US.AF.MIL, DSN: 314-480-6097/5461, Commercial: +49-6371-47-6097/5461) with the following information as early as possible, but not later than 14 days before the planned arrival in theater: **(T-1)**

- 5.4.5.1. Type and number of aircraft involved.
- 5.4.5.2. Planned arrival in and departure from the European theater.
- 5.4.5.3. Airfields being used, including for transit.
- 5.4.5.4. Primary, alternate, and 24-hour contact information (email, cell phone and land line) while in the European theater.

Chapter 6

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

6.1. New START.

6.1.1. Overview. The *Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms* (New START) entered into force on 5 February 2011 with an initial duration of 10 years and incurred a mutually agreed upon 5-year extension that expired on 4 February 2026. AF/A10 will publish a Guidance Memorandum and Change 1 to update **Chapter 6**. The following guidance is provided for information purposes.

6.1.1.1. The purpose of the Treaty is to increase transparency, enhance predictability and stability, and reduce and limit the strategic offensive arms and associated warheads of both the United States and the Russian Federation (RF).

6.1.1.2. The Treaty required the Parties to reduce their nuclear forces mutually and transparently over a period of seven years but allows each Party the flexibility to determine the structure of its own strategic forces within the aggregate limits of the Treaty. Verification of New START is carried out using on-site inspections, national technical means, unique identifiers, data exchanges, and notifications.

6.1.2. Roles and Responsibilities under New START

6.1.2.1. The Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Policy & Strategy Division (AF/A10P) will:

6.1.2.1.1. Oversee the force structure development and execution process for implementation of the Treaty in coordination with Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), and CFC.

6.1.2.1.2. Provide oversight toward ensuring all non-nuclear combat operations involving use of New START-accountable forces are conducted in a treaty-compliant manner.

6.1.2.1.3. Elevate concerns regarding DAF operations, or contemplated operations, employing New START-accountable forces to the Chair of the New START CRG for compliance assessment before such operations are initiated. When a compliance issue that may warrant CRG review is identified, raise the issue with the Joint Staff representative for potential review by the CRG.

6.1.2.1.4. Provide updates on New START implementation and compliance activities to the Nuclear Oversight Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Secretary of the Air Force, as necessary.

6.1.2.1.5. Ensure operations are accomplished in a joint manner to support the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and to ensure compliance with New START central limits.

6.1.2.1.6. Participate in, and represent the DAF at, New START Implementation Working Group meetings and activities. When invited, participate as technical advisor

in interagency and international meetings, such as the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

6.1.2.1.7. Review all appropriate DAF acquisition plans and testing documents related to New START-accountable forces/installations for compliance, as required.

6.1.2.1.8. Through the Air Force Central Node (AFCN), provide training to personnel responsible for origination, review, and/or approval of New START notifications contained in Sections I through VII of the Annex on Notifications of the Protocol to the Treaty.

6.1.2.1.9. Coordinate with DTRA and MAJCOM/FLDCOMs to schedule and conduct Strategic Arms Control Training Engagements.

6.1.2.1.10. Ensure the timely and accurate submission of required New START notifications are provided to the Joint Staff for forwarding to the DOS for transmittal.

6.1.2.1.11. Ensure the timely and accurate submission of required New START notifications and data related to telemetric information.

6.1.2.1.12. Collaborate with the U.S. Navy and Joint Staff to develop the annual recommendation of launches for exchange of telemetry with the RF.

6.1.2.1.13. Submit changes to simplified site diagrams and inspection site diagrams of DAF inspectable facilities and diagrams associated with any new inspectable facilities declared after entry into force to the Joint Staff.

6.1.2.1.14. Through the AFCN, manage all aspects of New START reporting and associated requirements, including providing guidance and support for New START notification processing (in accordance with this instruction and the *New START Reporting Handbook* during normal duty hours. After hours, the AFCN duty officer may be contacted through the AFGSC Command Center.

6.1.2.2. The Air Force Central Node (AFCN) will:

6.1.2.2.1. Serve as the releasing authority for DAF New START notifications. Notification routing occurs as directed by the Joint Staff and is incorporated into the New START Arms Control Enterprise System (ACES) software. In unusual situations, the AFCN Duty Officer or higher authority will direct any necessary routing deviations. AFGSC Command Center personnel, acting in support of the AFCN, are authorized to release notifications as directed by the AFCN or AF/A10P.

6.1.2.2.2. Develop, maintain, and administer the New START Notification Training Course. The AFCN delivers the formal curriculum using one of three methods. In order of preference, they are:

6.1.2.2.2.1. Students travel to the AFCN facility at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia, for training (AF/A10P arms control funds temporary duty expenses);

6.1.2.2.2.2. An AFCN instructor travels to the location requiring mass training. **NOTE:** Each training request will be considered on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of AFCN; or

6.1.2.2.2.3. Web-based training will only be considered under extreme

circumstances with AF/A10P approval and must be followed by completion of in-person training as soon as possible.

6.1.2.2.3. Develop, maintain, and publish the *New START Reporting Handbook*.

6.1.2.2.4. Validate the DAF data resident in the New START Database monthly and ensure the accuracy of the DAF portion of semi-annual data exchanges.

6.1.2.2.5. Analyze DAF New START notifications and collect and report accuracy and error statistical data.

6.1.2.2.6. Serve as the interface between DAF New START reporting nodes and DTRA for ACES support issues.

6.1.2.2.7. Manage all ACES accounts for DAF New START users, to include account creation, deletion, and locking/unlocking when required.

6.1.2.3. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection (AF/A4) will coordinate logistical support with the MAJCOM/FLDCOMs to ensure Treaty implementation and compliance activities are fully supported.

6.1.2.4. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Futures (AF/A5/7) will factor New START-required force modifications and limitations into all future Air Force strategic plans and incorporate New START implementation and force reduction requirements into the DAF programming process.

6.1.2.5. The Commander, Combat Forces Command (CFC) will:

6.1.2.5.1. Provide guidance to maintain compliance with New START provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities.

6.1.2.5.2. Ensure appropriate CFC representatives participate in the mission planning, as well as launch day activities and post-mission creation of required telemetry products, for all New START-accountable launches subject to potential exchange of telemetric information and related materials. CFC will provide recommendations to AFGSC on the advisability of exchanging these telemetry-related materials with the RF.

6.1.2.6. All MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG and Air Force Reserve Command will:

6.1.2.6.1. Ensure any proposed modifications to New START-accountable items are submitted to AF/A10P for treaty compliance review prior to approval and funding.

6.1.2.6.2. Ensure logistical support and maintenance of all New START-accountable items are conducted in compliance with New START requirements until the item is removed from accountability in accordance with the Treaty or until the Treaty is no longer in force.

6.1.2.6.3. Ensure contracts involving storage, production, movement, modification, or elimination of New START-accountable items, to include reporting requirements, are in compliance with New START. Propose modifications for deficient contract work statements as soon as possible.

- 6.1.2.6.4. Define procedures and guidance to adhere to New START. **NOTE:** This requirement is only applicable to MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU having, within their infrastructure, wing and/or units designated to support inspection activities.
- 6.1.2.6.5. Ensure AF/A10P and MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU Operations Security are informed of any activity at inspectable DAF facilities that could impact New START inspection activities (i.e., runway closures, air shows, major exercises/operations that impact operational security, ramp space, and billeting challenges).
- 6.1.2.6.6. Ensure all personnel involved with the security, maintenance and operations of New START inspectable facilities and accountable items are trained and educated in Treaty compliance roles and responsibilities.
- 6.1.2.6.7. Ensure assigned units with New START-inspectable items or facilities are prepared to support inspection activities.
- 6.1.2.6.8. Coordinate a New START mock inspection schedule with DTRA. Seek final approval from AF/A10.
- 6.1.2.6.9. Oversee mock inspections and training visits.
- 6.1.2.6.10. Ensure the timely and accurate submission of required New START notifications in accordance with the Treaty and *New START Reporting Handbook* guidelines.
- 6.1.2.6.11. Ensure Command Post Controllers have current voice formats and use proper reporting procedures to notify subordinate Wings/Deltas and tenant organizations of upcoming New START events.
- 6.1.2.6.12. Designate and maintain a 24-hour POC for New START notifications.
- 6.1.2.6.13. Submit changes to, and newly declared, simplified site diagrams and inspection site diagrams of New START inspectable facilities to AF/A10P for approval in accordance with Part Four of the Annex on Inspection Activities of the Protocol to the Treaty.
- 6.1.2.7. The Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) will:
- 6.1.2.7.1. Maintain compliance with New START provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities in the command.
- 6.1.2.7.2. Ensure all assigned forces and installations affected by New START are operated in a treaty-compliant manner until the Treaty is no longer in effect or the systems are removed from accountability in accordance with the Treaty.
- 6.1.2.7.3. Operate assigned converted heavy bombers in a manner consistent with New START commitments and obligations.
- 6.1.2.7.4. Advise AF/A10P prior to taking any actions that affect conversion procedures, to ensure New START compliance.
- 6.1.2.7.5. Prior to New START expiration, ensure converted heavy bomber aircraft in the command's possession remain in their New START-compliant configuration, and

do not plan or apply aircraft modifications to converted New START-accountable aircraft without AF/A10 approval.

6.1.2.7.6. Serve as the first level reviewer for all DAF-originated New START notifications.

6.1.2.7.7. Ensure enough trained personnel are available to support New START notification processing requirements on a continual basis.

6.1.2.7.8. Ensure the accuracy and timeliness of all New START notifications in accordance with the Treaty and *New START Reporting Handbook* guidelines. Contact the Air Force Central Node, or the designated Air Force Central Node duty officer, prior to the transmission of any New START notification that does not pass the automated compliance checks.

6.1.2.7.9. Add notification reference information, when required, and forward notifications for additional processing in accordance with the Treaty and *New START Reporting Handbook* guidelines.

6.1.2.7.10. Appoint a primary and alternate POC for local training of AFGSC Command Center personnel supporting New START notification processing. Provide a copy of the appointment letter to the AFCN via e-mail to afcn.nst@us.af.mil. These individuals will be responsible for the following: serve as trusted agents for the request of ACES user accounts; schedule newly assigned personnel to receive local New START notification processing and ACES procedures training and oversee local procedures training in support of New START notification processing. After the initial local ACES instruction, newly assigned personnel can request an ACES training account but will not process actual New START notifications without supervision (by an individual who has completed formal New START and ACES training) until completing the formal New START Notification Training Course. Managers should make every effort to have this training completed as part of a controller's initial training program, prior to certification.

6.1.2.8. The Commander, HQ Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) will:

6.1.2.8.1. Maintain compliance with New START provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities in the command.

6.1.2.8.2. Ensure that any conversions or eliminations of strategic nuclear delivery systems are conducted in accordance with New START procedures.

6.1.2.9. The Commander, Air Mobility Command will:

6.1.2.9.1. Provide airlift to support the DoD, DTRA inspectors, and escort operations as requested through U.S. Transportation Command.

6.1.2.9.2. Provide support, as required, to maintain compliance with New START provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities though not the lead command for any New START-accountable items or inspectable facilities. **NOTE:** Even though a MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU may not own any New START-accountable assets or inspectable facilities, MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU commanders may be required to develop plans to support New START requirements and other commands, as needed, if circumstances change.

6.1.2.10. The Commander, Air Force Reserve Command will:

6.1.2.10.1. Operate heavy bomber aircraft that are transferred from the Regular Air Force in a manner consistent with New START commitments and obligations.

6.1.2.10.2. Ensure converted heavy bombers in the Command's possession remain in their New START-compliant configuration and will not seek aircraft modifications to converted New START-accountable aircraft without AF/A10 approval.

6.1.2.11. The Commander, Air Combat Command will:

6.1.2.11.1. Provide support, as required, to maintain compliance with New START provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities, though not the lead command for any New START-accountable items or inspectable facilities.

6.1.2.11.2. Schedule newly assigned personnel to receive local ACES training and complete the ACES New START Initial User training course.

6.1.2.12. The Commander, Air Education and Training Command will provide support, as required, to maintain compliance with New START provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities, though not the lead command for any New START-accountable items or inspectable facilities. **NOTE:** Even though a MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU may not own any New START-accountable assets or inspectable facilities, MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU commanders may be required to develop plans to support New START requirements and other commands, as needed, if circumstances change.

6.1.2.13. The Commander, Pacific Air Forces will:

6.1.2.13.1. Provide support, as required, to maintain compliance with New START provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities, though not the lead command for any New START-accountable items or inspectable facilities. **NOTE:** Even though a MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU may not own any New START-accountable assets or inspectable facilities, MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU commanders may be required to develop plans to support New START requirements and other commands, as needed, if circumstances change.

6.1.2.13.2. Provide airlift in support of New START requirements as requested by DTRA. Ensure aircrew and logistics support personnel maintain current diplomatic passports through the DTRA representative at Yokota Air Base, Japan.

6.1.2.14. The Commander, HQ United States Air Forces in Europe – Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA) will:

6.1.2.14.1. Provide support, as required, to maintain compliance with New START provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities, though not the lead command for any New START-accountable items or inspectable facilities. **NOTE:** Even though a MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU may not own any New START-accountable assets or inspectable facilities, MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU commanders may be required to develop plans to support New START requirements and other commands, as needed, if circumstances change.

- 6.1.2.14.2. Provide airlift in support of New START requirements as requested by DTRA. Ensure aircrew and logistics support personnel maintain current diplomatic passports through DTRA.
- 6.1.3. Guidance and Procedures Under New START.
- 6.1.3.1. Notifications.
- 6.1.3.1.1. MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRUs will provide notifications to the AFCN via the ACES in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol and the Annex on Notifications to the Protocol of the Treaty. **(T-1)** Most notifications are passed between the Parties through the established National and Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NNRRC). New START has four notifications in the Annex to be employed by inspectors while in-country conducting inspections. These are passed from the inspectors to the DTRA national escorts.
- 6.1.3.1.2. In addition, New START contains provisions for the Parties to address situations where there are no pre-established notifications. Should such situations arise during an inspection on a DAF installation, whether initiated by the Russian inspectors or at the behest of the unit, address the situation through established command channels and escalation processes.
- 6.1.3.2. Database Reporting.
- 6.1.3.2.1. New START establishes a database of information concerning items of accountability that the Parties exchange twice annually in March and September, based on data effective the first day of March and September. MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRUs will process New START notifications through the ACES reporting network.
- 6.1.3.2.2. All Wing and Unit Commanders who own/possess and have responsibility for Minuteman III first stages will ensure a physical inventory is conducted on all non-deployed Minuteman III first stages stored at their facility within 15 days of the semi-annual data exchange **(T-2)**. **NOTE:** Inventories will verify the unique identifier against the New START database.
- 6.1.3.2.3. All Wing and Unit Commanders who own/possess and have responsibility for heavy bombers (B-2A and B-52H) will ensure a physical inventory is conducted of all heavy bombers located at their facility within 15 days of the semi-annual data exchange **(T-2)**. **NOTE:** Inventories will verify the unique identifier against the New START database.
- 6.1.3.2.4. These inventories will be checked against the unit's New START database and then forwarded to the AFCN, either directly or per MAJCOM/FLDCOM/DRU-directed process, for a final check before the semi-annual New START data exchange. **(T-2)**
- 6.1.3.3. Treaty Compliance Officer Reports.
- 6.1.3.3.1. MAJCOM/FLDCOM/DRUs will ensure post-inspection reports are prepared by the host unit TCO seven days following an inspection, exhibition, or demonstration. **(T-2)**

6.1.3.3.2. TCOs forward post-inspection reports through the MAJCOM/FLDCOM to AF/A10P, who will distribute as necessary.

6.1.3.4. Operations Security.

6.1.3.4.1. The purpose of operational security is to reduce the vulnerability of DAF missions to successful adversary collection and exploitation of critical information. Operations security applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces during all phases of operations (see AFI 10-701, *Operations Security (OPSEC)*).

6.1.3.4.2. MAJCOM/FLDCOMs will ensure Wing Operations Security Signature Managers and unit Operations Security Coordinators will annually accomplish risk and vulnerability assessments of facilities subject to New START inspection activities. **(T-2)**

6.1.3.4.3. MAJCOM/FLDCOMs will ensure facility personnel guard against the possibility that someone may attempt to gather information on our abilities, capabilities, operations, intentions, personnel, and organizations. **(T-2)** It is incumbent on facility personnel to be observant and diligent in protecting any sensitive information in line with treaty obligations.

6.1.3.4.4. MAJCOM/FLDCOMs will ensure that if inquiries or actions of a Russian inspection team member raise suspicions, the Host-Unit's escort will notify the TCO, who in turn notifies the DTRA Escort Team Chief. **(T-2)** Base security force representatives and AFOSI are notified of any suspicious situations. Wing Operations Security Signature Manager will also be notified.

6.2. United States-International Atomic Energy Agency Integrated Safeguards Agreements.

6.2.1. Overview. Sections 6.2.1-6.2.3 provide instruction on DAF implementation of, and compliance with, the United States-International Atomic Energy Agency integrated safeguards under the *Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards* in the United States and the *Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America* (Additional Protocol) in accordance with United States law and policy, as specified in: DoDD 2060.01 and DoDI 2060.03.

6.2.1.1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1970 established a safeguards system directed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). While not obligated to do so under the Treaty, the U.S. voluntarily concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which entered into force on 9 December 1980.

6.2.1.2. Under this agreement, the U.S. provides, and annually reviews, a list of facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards, also known as the Eligible Facilities List. The Eligible Facilities List includes Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed facilities, activities, and programs. The agreement excludes any current or former DoD-owned or leased locations, sites, and facilities, or associated information or activities, of direct national security significance, under what is known as the national security exclusion.

6.2.1.3. The U.S. also voluntarily concluded an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, which entered into force on 6 January 2009. For the purposes of this instruction, the safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol are collectively referred to as “integrated safeguards.” The Additional Protocol expands the Eligible Facilities List by requiring declaration of additional facilities and complementary access allowing inspection of undeclared locations with short notice, among other requirements.

6.2.1.4. The U.S. also applies the national security exclusion to exclude IAEA access to activities or information of direct national security significance under the Additional Protocol. In addition, the U.S. has the right under the Additional Protocol to employ managed access to protect activities or information during IAEA inspections. Each location develops its own managed access measures with guidance from appropriate security personnel and AF/A10P. Managed access may include, but is not limited to:

6.2.1.4.1. Removing sensitive papers from office spaces;

6.2.1.4.2. Shrouding sensitive displays and equipment;

6.2.1.4.3. Logging off from computers and turning off data indication devices; and

6.2.1.4.4. Dismissing non-essential personnel during the inspection period.

6.2.1.5. Managed access should always be used to prevent access to equities of direct national security significance during a complementary access visit or inspection.

6.2.1.6. Per DoDI 2060.03, paragraph 1.2.d, the national security exclusion does not apply to USG assets outside of the U.S. Any exclusion of USG assets outside of the U.S. should be addressed with the host country through the applicable host country agreements.

6.2.2. Roles and Responsibilities for *United States-International Atomic Energy Agency Integrated Safeguards Agreements*

6.2.2.1. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (AF/A10) will:

6.2.2.1.1. Ensure all DAF programs and activities are fully compliant with the Integrated Safeguards.

6.2.2.1.2. Ensure the proper protection of national security information from unauthorized disclosure during IAEA Integrated Safeguards inspections.

6.2.2.2. The Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Policy and Strategy Division (AF/A10P) will:

6.2.2.2.1. Coordinate with OSD and the Joint Staff concerning all matters associated with the integrated safeguards, working closely with Offices of the Secretary of the Air Force to include Special Programs (SAF/AQL), SAF/OCS, and SAF/GC.

6.2.2.2.2. Ensure the DAF provides timely and adequate support for IAEA visits to the U.S., as requested by DoD Host Team representatives participating in the inspection management.

6.2.2.2.3. Coordinate with the DoD Treaty Manager in the vetting process of all IAEA inspectors and technicians, if requested.

- 6.2.2.2.4. Participate in DoD-level meetings and discussions regarding guidance for integrated safeguards implementation and compliance.
- 6.2.2.2.5. Represent the DAF in all OSD-sponsored Additional Protocol exercises and/or mock inspections. MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRU and select TC POC and program managers may also participate in such activities on request.
- 6.2.2.2.6. Lead DAF efforts in identifying DAF facilities, programs, activities, and equities located at or near declared facilities.
- 6.2.2.2.7. Conduct outreach within the DoD and with the Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure DAF equities are incorporated into integrated safeguards planning.
- 6.2.2.2.8. In coordination with the MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRUs, develop and lead processes for DAF actions to identify and protect DAF equities of national security significance that may be at risk of exposure under the integrated safeguards.
- 6.2.2.2.9. Provide integrated safeguards awareness training and subject matter expertise for DAF personnel, activities, and programs affected by the agreements so that informed decisions can be made regarding implementation and compliance with the integrated safeguards, while protecting sensitive or national security information.
- 6.2.2.2.10. Ensure required security and counterintelligence training concerning the integrated safeguards and their impact on DAF programs and activities is developed by the appropriate DAF organizations and provided to affected DAF organizations and commands, as necessary.
- 6.2.2.3. The Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Competitive Activities, Office of Security, Special Program Oversight, and Information Protection (SAF/OCS) will:
- 6.2.2.3.1. Conduct a separate analysis of declarations provided by the Department of Commerce OC, Department of Energy, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission to determine security implications of any complementary access visits or inspections on any DAF acquisitions programs, operations at logistics centers, or special programs.
- 6.2.2.3.2. Notify AF/A10P and seek assistance in determining whether to seek a national security exclusion or permit managed access to IAEA visits to these locations.
- 6.2.3. Guidance and Procedures for United States-*International Atomic Energy Agency Integrated Safeguards Agreements* Implementation Activities.
- 6.2.3.1. Data Collection.
- 6.2.3.1.1. As directed by the DoD and the Joint Staff, AF/A10P facilitates annual data calls to review/assess proposed declarations lists generated by other USG agencies, including any updates to the Eligible Facilities List, and determines potential impacts of routine and complementary access visits or inspections on DAF equities. Data calls entail dissemination of declarations proposed by the Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the appropriate MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRUs and organizations.
- 6.2.3.1.2. AF/A10P determines whether any sites, facilities, or activities should be excluded or removed from the declaration list or be subject to a national security

exclusion. AF/A10P ensures compliance with DoDI 2060.03 and coordinates the gathering of data and supporting information necessary to seek a national security exclusion. The DAF's final determination is reported to the Joint Staff and the OSD Treaty Manager.

6.2.3.2. Security Vulnerability Assessments.

6.2.3.2.1. DAF equity stakeholders will conduct the necessary security vulnerability assessments of sites, facilities, or activities identified in a data call as vulnerable to exposure during Additional Protocol visits. (T-0) This assessment may be performed by the stakeholder unit's leadership in coordination with security personnel. Conducting a security vulnerability assessment involves identifying DAF equities that could be compromised during international inspections and rating the threat level to each equity.

6.2.3.2.2. Program managers comply with DAFI 63-101_20-101, *Integrated Life Cycle Management*, to ensure all activities within the acquisition life cycle are compliant with all USG arms control obligations and prepare program protection plans to ensure programs are protected, if necessary.

6.2.3.2.3. If local units and/or program managers believe they need additional security vulnerability assessment support beyond the scope of what is available at their level, they are encouraged to request it from AF/A10P through intermediate headquarters.

6.2.3.2.4. AF/A10 seeks assistance from policy, treaty, and security experts from SAF/OCS, Directorate of Special Investigations (SAF/IGX), AFOSI, and other SMEs as needed for security vulnerability assessment support.

6.2.3.3. Air Force Integrated Safeguards Equity Database.

6.2.3.3.1. AF/A10P maintains an internal electronic database of DAF equities based on input from the MAJCOM/FLDCOM/ANG/DRUs and HAF.

6.2.3.3.2. The DAF database contains information gathered during initial, annual, and other data calls. The database contains a description of the DAF program or activity, its geographic location, contact information (e.g., program manager or commander), and results of security vulnerability assessments.

6.2.3.4. Inspections and Complementary Access Visits.

6.2.3.4.1. The IAEA is provided access to inspect declared locations. In accordance with the integrated safeguards, IAEA inspectors will also have the right to request complementary access to undeclared locations either at or near the declared location.

6.2.3.4.2. In the event of a complementary access request to an undeclared location, DAF equities and activities of national security significance may be inadvertently exposed to IAEA inspectors. These types of visits may be requested with short notice, from 2 to 24 hours depending upon the specific circumstances of the request. In exceptional circumstances, the IAEA may provide less than two-hour notice. This provision in the Additional Protocol is designed to permit inspectors to "follow the trail" of nuclear material diversion from legitimate activities to possibly illegitimate activities. Because of the short notice, ordinary security provisions for DoD equities and activities may not be adequate to protect national security information.

6.2.3.4.3. The USG employs an interagency host team process to monitor and manage the risks associated with IAEA inspections, whether these are pre-notified or short-notice requests for complementary access to undeclared locations. The DAF supports the DoD representative on the USG Host Team with technical advice concerning DAF equities and activities at or near the visited site derived from the Air Force Integrated Safeguards Equity Database.

6.2.3.5. Notification and Command and Control.

6.2.3.5.1. The Air Force Service Watch Cell, situated within the National Military Command Center, serves as the 24-hour POC for receiving formal notifications from the DoD. The Air Force Service Watch Cell relays notifications to AF/A10P via email to usaf.pentagon.af-a10.mbx.af-a10-p-workflow@mail.mil.

6.2.3.5.2. The Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Policy & Strategy Division (AF/A10P) will:

6.2.3.5.2.1. Receive notifications of IAEA visits as the DAF's central office, and ensure notifications are passed to affected units and organizations;

6.2.3.5.2.2. Disseminate notifications and other messages associated with the integrated safeguards via email to designated points of contact with follow-up voice notifications;

Chapter 7

SPACE AND BALLISTIC MISSILE ARMS CONTROL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

7.1. Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement.

7.1.1. Overview. *The Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement (BMLNA)* is a bilateral politically binding agreement that was signed by the U.S. and Russian Federation (RF) at the 1988 Moscow Summit and entered into force 31 May 1988 and of indefinite duration.

7.1.2. The purpose of the Agreement is to increase bilateral cooperation and transparency in ballistic missile launches, and to reduce the risk of nuclear war due to misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident.

7.1.3. Under the BMLNA, each Party agrees to provide the other Party, through the NNRRC, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the planned launch date, launch area, and area of impact for every launch of a strategic ballistic missile: an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Additionally, Parties mutually agree to consult on implementation questions and possible amendments. AF/A10 and CFC/S10 will coordinate on notifications required under this Agreement.

7.2. Hague Code of Conduct.

7.2.1. Overview. *The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)* is a politically binding agreement, which entered into force on 25 November 2002, and is indefinite.

7.2.1.1. The purpose of the Agreement is to increase transparency in Space Launch Vehicle programs and enhance cooperation to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles in accordance with several United Nations (UN) Declarations related to the peaceful use of space and nonproliferation of ballistic missiles.

7.2.1.2. The Agreement establishes guidelines for Subscribing States to abide by, both in the peaceful use of space, and in ballistic missile technologies. HCOC States Parties will:

7.2.1.2.1. Have access to space for peaceful uses;

7.2.1.2.2. Recognize the necessity of transparency measures in ballistic missile programs; and

7.2.1.2.3. Support the broader adherence of states to multilateral and bilateral disarmament and nonproliferation mechanisms.

7.2.1.3. The Agreement encourages Subscribing States to adhere, at a minimum, to the following norms:

7.2.1.3.1. Abide by the Outer Space Treaty (*Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies*) and other UN Space agreements;

7.2.1.3.2. Pursue multilateral, bilateral, and national endeavors to prevent ballistic missile proliferation;

7.2.1.3.3. Not contributing to any ballistic missile programs in countries interested in developing or acquiring the weapons; and

7.2.1.3.4. Voluntarily make annual declarations of ballistic missile policies, information on number and generic class of ballistic missiles launched the preceding year, outlines of space launch vehicle policies, test launch sites, and number and generic class of launches made the previous year.

7.3. Outer Space Treaty.

7.3.1. Overview. The *Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies* (hereinafter referred to as the Outer Space Treaty) entered into force on 10 October 1967, as of August 2025, there are 117 States Parties and 117 signatory States. The Outer Space Treaty has an indefinite duration.

7.3.2. The purpose of the Treaty is to increase international cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space, and to establish the international rule of law in the space domain.

7.3.3. The Treaty requires Parties to commit to norms of exploration in the space domain. These norms include, but are not limited to:

7.3.3.1. Allowing free access, by all States, for exploration of outer space including the moon and other celestial bodies;

7.3.3.2. Refraining from claiming national sovereignty in outer space including the moon or other celestial bodies;

7.3.3.3. Adhering to international law throughout activities in the space domain; no stationing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space; and

7.3.3.4. Maintaining State responsibility for national activities in outer space, including those of non-governmental entities; providing authorization and continuing supervision of such activities, as appropriate; and assuming liability, when acting as a launching state, for damage caused by space objects.

7.3.3.5. Refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

7.3.3.6. Registering space objects and exercising jurisdiction and control over such objects as prescribed by the treaty.

7.3.3.7. Conducting activities in outer space with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.

7.4. Roles and Responsibilities for Space and Ballistic Missile Arms Control Treaties and Agreements.

7.4.1. The Director, Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3), Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) Enterprise and Arms Control (HQ CFC/S10), on behalf of the Commander, Combat Forces Command, will:

7.4.1.1. Maintain compliance with the provisions of all space and ballistic missile arms control treaties and agreements to include the BMLNA, HCOC, and the Outer Space Treaty.

7.4.1.2. Ensure launch operations policy and guidance complies with the BMLNA and HCOC.

ANDREW J. GEBARA, Lt Gen, USAF
DCS, Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe signed 19 November 1990, entered into force 9 November 1992

Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States, signed 18 November 1977, entered into force 9 December 1980

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Adopted Forms

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACCE—Arms Control Center of Excellence

ACES—Arms Control Enterprise System
ACOC—Arms Control Orientation Course
AEI—Annual Exchange of Information
AEMI—Annual Exchange of Military Information
AFI—Air Force Instruction
AFTE—Activity Focused Training Event
ANG—Air National Guard
AoA—Area of Application
AFCN—Air Force Central Node
AFGSC—Air Force Global Strike Command
AFMC—Air Force Materiel Command
AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive
BAT—Base Assistance Team
BMLNA—Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement
BWC—Biological Weapons Convention
CBT—Computer Based Training
CFC—Combat Forces Command
CFE—Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
CISSP—Challenge Inspection Site Support Plan
CWC—Chemical Weapons Convention
CRG—Compliance Review Group
DAF—Department of the Air Force
DAFI—Department of the Air Force Instruction
DAFMAN—Department of the Air Force Manual
DAFPD—Department of the Air Force Policy Directive
DoD—Department of Defense
DoDD—Department of Defense Directive
DoDI—Department of Defense Instruction
DoDM—Department of Defense Manual
DOS—Department of State
DRU—Direct Reporting Unit
DTRA—Defense Threat Reduction Agency

FLDCOM—Field Command (Space Force)
FOA—Field Operating Agencies
HAF—Headquarters Air Force
HAFMD—Headquarters Air Force Mission Directive
HCOC—Hague Code of Conduct
HN—Host Nation
IAEA—International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICG—Inspection Control Group
ISM—Inspection Support Manual
MAJCOM—Major Command (Air Force)
NRRRC—National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center
NPT—The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OPCW—Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility
OSD—Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUSD—Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
PE—Program Element
PEM—Program Element Monitor
POC—Point of Contact
RCA—Riot Control Agents
RDT&E—Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
SLBM—Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile
SME—Subject Matter Expert
TC POC—Treaty Compliance Point of Contact
TCO—Treaty Compliance Officer
TFTE—Timeline Focused Training Event
RF—Russian Federation
UN—United Nations
USAFE-AFAFRICA—United States Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa
USEUCOM—United States European Command
USG—United States Government

VDOC 11—Vienna Document 2011

ZOA—Zone of Application

Office Symbols

AF/A1—Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower, Personnel and Services

AF/A2—Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence

AF/A3—Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

AF/A4—Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection

AF/A5/7—Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Futures

AF/A8—Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs

AF/A10—Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration

AF/A10P—Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Policy and Strategy

AF/A10PI—Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Policy and Strategy, International Treaties and Agreements Branch

AF/JA—Judge Advocate General of the Air Force

AFOSI—Air Force Office of Special Investigations

AFOSI/PJ—Air Force Office of Special Investigations Office of Special Projects

AF/JAO—Office of the Judge Advocate General, Operations and International Law Directorate

CFC/S10—Director, Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3), Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) Enterprise and Arms Control

OCSO—Office of the Chief of Space Operations

SAF/AAP—Directorate of Special Investigations

SAF/AM—Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Administration and Management

SAF/AQ—Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

SAF/FM—Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller

SAF/GC—The Office of the Air Force General Counsel

SAF/IGX—Directorate of Special Investigations

SAF/OC—Office of Competitive Activities

SAF/OCS—The Secretary of the Air Force Office of Security, Special Program Oversight, and Information Protection

SAF/PA—Director of Public Affairs

SAF/SQ—Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration

SF/S3/4/7—Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations

Terms

Note—For full lists of treaty-specific terms and their definitions, refer to relevant treaty texts.

Activity Focused Training Event—The CWC CI AFTE focuses on individual tasks and activities of the CI timeline. These tasks are exercised outside of the inspection timeline framework. Exercises focus on accuracy and completeness without being evaluated on completion.

Area of Application—Territory subject to the provisions of the CFE, defined as the entire land territory of the States Parties in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. A more detailed description can be found in Article II, paragraph 1(B) of the CFE.

Activities of direct national security significance—any current or former DoD Component activity associated with military, national security, or homeland defense capability or intent including but not limited to: operations and training; intelligence; materiel production, maintenance, and supply; research, development, test, and evaluation; and infrastructure support, manning, or readiness.

Additional Protocol—Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America. International Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular/288.Add.1.

Air Force equities—All nuclear and non-nuclear Air Force facilities, sites, programs, and activities conducted by the Air Force or contracted by the Air Force.

Arms Control—Any plan, treaty, or agreement to limit the number, size, or type of weapons or armed forces of the participating nations.

Arms Control Implementation Program—A structured plan designed to put into practice the provisions of an arms control treaty or agreement, typically involving monitoring, verification measures, and compliance mechanisms to ensure participating nations adhere to the agreed-upon limitations on weapons development, production, and deployment.

At or near—Treaty term that refers to the proximity (or relative position, space, or time) of DoD locations, sites or facilities or associated information or activities of direct national security significance to an eligible or potentially eligible facility under the United States-International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, or a declared or potentially declarable activity under the Additional Protocol. The terms are not defined in the agreement or Additional Protocol. The Air Force has defined the term “at” as equities physically located at the declared location. The Air Force has defined “near” to mean equities within ten miles of the declared location or having a business relationship (regardless of physical proximity) with the declared location.

Bilateral Consultative Commission—The Bilateral Consultative Commission, which convenes at least twice per year, promotes the implementation of the provisions of the *New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty* by resolving questions relating to compliance. For additional information, refer to the *New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty* Protocol, Part 6.

Challenge Inspection (CWC) —A short-notice, on-site inspection conducted under the CWC to investigate allegations of non-compliance with the treaty. It is a key mechanism for verifying that States Parties are not developing, producing, stockpiling, or using chemical weapons. The inspections are designed to be intrusive and can be carried out at any location within a state party’s jurisdiction, including those not previously declared.

Combat aircraft—A fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft armed and equipped to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons, or other weapons of destruction. For the U.S. Air Force, this includes the A-10, B-1, B-2, B-52, F-15, F-16, F-22, and F-35 aircraft.

Compliance Review Group—DoD body chaired by the appropriate Treaty Manager which includes members provided by the OUSD(P), the General Counsel of the DoD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to monitor compliance of all DoD activities and to coordinate DoD guidance on issues arising from questions of compliance.

Enter into force—When the terms and provisions of a particular treaty or agreement come into effect.

Escort—An individual from any State Party who accompanies the inspectors of another State Party.

Equal ceilings—Equivalent numerical limitations on battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters established for each block of States Parties (i.e., the 16 North Atlantic Treaty Organization States and 14 former Warsaw Treaty Organization States) in the CFE AoA.

Execution Plan—Developed to ensure an equitable distribution of the President's Budget consistent with accomplishing DAF program objectives and to produce a plan that executes within budgetary limitations while supporting the DAF mission.

Facility—Reactor, critical facility, conversion plant, fuel fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, isotope separation plant, separate storage installation, or any location capable of making more than one kilogram of nuclear materiel suitable for a nuclear device.

Information Circular—The primary means whereby the International Atomic Energy Agency publishes documents, including agreement texts.

Information associated with activities of direct national security significance—Pertains to any unclassified or classified information (including data, text, drawings, or graphics) that is communicated or recorded in any form (including hardcopy, electronic or softcopy, verbal, or as imagery, signals, or materials) related to national security or homeland defense, including but not limited to: military operations or training; intelligence; materiel production, maintenance, or supply; research, development, test, or evaluation; infrastructure or personnel.

Information Circular 153—Information Circular/153 is the Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Non-nuclear weapons States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are required to submit to a comprehensive safeguards program and sign an individual agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency based on Information Circular 153. It is designed to verify declared nuclear materials and activities.

Information Circular 540—Information Circular/540 (Corr.), also referred to as the Model Additional Protocol, is the model for all Additional Protocol agreements signed by countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Information Circular 540 was designed to enhance the original safeguards agreements and includes measures to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide greater assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities.

Inspector—An individual from any State Party who conducts an inspection of sensors or observation aircraft of another State Party.

Interagency—Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense.

Integrated Safeguards—A regime describing entry into force of the United States-International Atomic Energy Agency voluntary offer safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol. The provisions of the Additional Protocol are applied in conjunction with those of the safeguards agreement. The International Atomic Energy Agency refers to the integrated safeguards as the combination of all safeguards measures available to the International Atomic Energy Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting its safeguards obligations within available resources.

International Atomic Energy Agency—The International Atomic Energy Agency is the world's center of cooperation in the nuclear field. It was established as the world's “Atoms for Peace” organization in 1957 within the United Nations family. The Agency works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure, and peaceful nuclear technologies, and to enforce nuclear safeguards agreements.

International Atomic Energy Agency complementary access visit or inspection—Access provided by the United States to International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors in accordance with the provisions of the United States Additional Protocol. Access can be requested on short notice, within two to 24 hours of the requested visit. The International Atomic Energy Agency must have complementary access for three purposes: to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at sites, mines, concentration plants and other locations where nuclear material has been declared; to resolve a question on the correctness or completeness of the information provided by the United States pursuant to Article 2 of the Additional Protocol, or to resolve an inconsistency relating to that information; and to confirm, for safeguards purposes, the declaration of the decommissioned status of a facility or a location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used.

Locations, sites, or facilities associated with information or activities of direct national security significance—Pertains to any current or former DoD-owned, -leased, -funded, or -used space, structure, facility, installation, or land occupied by, or associated with, national security or homeland defense, including but not limited to: military operations or training; intelligence; materiel production, maintenance, or supply; research, development, test, or evaluation; infrastructure or personnel.

Location outside facilities—Any installation or location, which is not a facility, where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less.

Managed access—Measures that restrict inspector access to certain spaces or activities to avoid compromise of national security, proprietary or other sensitive information, or safety requirements while facilitating arms control treaty and agreement access to activities, locations, or information relevant to demonstrating United States compliance.

National security exclusion—The unilateral right of the United States to exclude the International Atomic Energy Agency from access to locations, sites, or facilities, or associated information or activities, of direct national security significance.

Non-proliferation—The prevention of an increase or spread of something, especially the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons.

Point of entry—A point designated by the observed Party for the arrival of aircraft and personnel of the observing Party on the territory of the observed Party.

Point of exit—A point designated by the observed Party for the departure of aircraft and personnel of the observing Party from the territory of the observed Party.

Program Element Monitor—Person within HAF, office of primary responsibility who is directly responsible for a given program and all documentation needed to harmonize the program in the budget.

Program Manager—Designated individual with responsibility for and authority to accomplish program objectives for development, production, and sustainment to meet the user's operational needs. The PM will be accountable for credible cost, schedule, and performance reporting to the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA).

Program Objective Memorandum—The final product of the programming process within the DoD, a Component's Program Objective Memorandum displays the resource allocation decisions of the military department in response to, and in accordance with, the Defense Planning Guidance. The Program Objective Memorandum shows programmed needs five years hence.

Program protection plan—The principal document that identifies a system's critical program elements (critical program information and critical components), threats, and vulnerabilities throughout the system's life cycle. Program protection is a comprehensive effort that encompasses all security, technology transfer, intelligence, and counterintelligence processes through the integration of embedded system security processes, security manpower, equipment, and facilities.

Refueling airfield—An airfield designated by the observed Party used for refueling and servicing of observation aircraft and transport aircraft.

Security vulnerability assessment—The analysis of threats from potential International Atomic Energy Agency inspector visits to determine the susceptibility and vulnerability of Air Force equities. Conducting security vulnerability assessments involves determining the risk of exposure of Air Force equities to International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors during an inspection under the Additional Protocol.

Site—A more narrowly defined term than "facility" that refers to the specific area within a facility/location where International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors are allowed to conduct an inspection. If the inspectors wish to go beyond the demarcated boundary of the site, complementary access must be requested in accordance with the Additional Protocol provisions. Examples of a site include, but are not limited to, a room, storage vault, or specific building.

Targeted Training—Training aimed at specific CWC CI timeline activities or events (i.e., building preparation, perimeter analysis, mandate analysis, escort training, etc.) as identified through one or more training events.

Territory—The land, including islands, and internal and territorial waters over which a State Party exercises sovereignty.

Timeline Focused Training Event—The CWC CI TFTE focuses on tasks and activities of the CI timeline. Exercises follow the CI timeline and all activities therein. All tasks exercised in a TFTE are evaluated for accuracy and completeness.

Transit flight—A flight of an observation aircraft or transport aircraft conducted by or on behalf of an observing Party over the territory of a third State Party en route to or from the territory of the observed Party.

Treaty—A formal, legally binding agreement between the United States and one or more other nations, ratified under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.

Treaty Compliance Officer—Individual designated to perform treaty compliance activities at Command and Unit-level.

Treaty Compliance Point of Contact—Individual designated to perform treaty compliance activities at the Unit level as their secondary duty. These individuals are usually assigned at installations which do not have an established and persistent arms control mission.

Treaty Manager—Individual in government services, agencies, activities, or commercial facilities with responsibilities generally associated with implementation and compliance of a particular arms control agreement.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—Entered into force in 1970 and aims to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide. The Treaty prohibits nuclear weapon States from assisting non-nuclear weapon States in acquiring nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapon States are afforded opportunities to use nuclear technologies/materials for civil purposes but must subject these materials and the associated activities to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

United States Additional Protocol Declaration—Refers to a list of those civilian nuclear or nuclear-related activities disclosed by the United States to the International Atomic Energy Agency for verification, pursuant to Article 2 of the United States-International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol. The International Atomic Energy Agency may request complementary access to verify the completeness or correctness of the declaration.

United States Eligible Facilities List—The list is confidential and contains specific information (i.e., building numbers, maps, etc.) regarding facilities containing special fissionable material, or nuclear source material, where the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors have been permitted to conduct inspections in the past. In accordance with Article 1 (b) of the United States-International Atomic Energy Agency voluntary offer safeguards agreement, Eligible Facilities List refers to “a list of facilities within the United States that are not associated with activities with direct national security significance to the United States....” A facility is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards when selected from the list by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

United States-International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol / Information Circular 288/Add.1—The Additional Protocol was signed by the United States on 12 June 1998 and the United States Senate provided advice and consent to ratification on 31 March 2004. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 6 January 2009. The United States-International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol was based on the Model Additional Protocol, which was aimed at providing greater assurance to the International Atomic Energy Agency that nuclear materials are not diverted for illegal purposes. Unlike the Model Additional Protocol, the United States-International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol includes a national security exclusion clause in Article 1 which allows the United States to preclude, without justification, the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards measures to materials, activities,

and facilities of direct national security significance. In addition, the Additional Protocol allows the right to use managed access to protect activities or information of national security significance during International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.

United States-International Atomic Energy Agency voluntary offer safeguards agreement / Information Circular 288—Signed by the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency on 18 November 1977 and the United States Senate provided advice and consent to ratification on 2 July 1980. President Carter ratified the Agreement on 31 July 1980, and it entered into force on 9 December 1980. Information Circular 288 requires the United States to declare only commercial nuclear power reactors, research reactors, and fuel fabrication plants as eligible for safeguards. Under this agreement, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors regularly visit four United States nuclear facilities to verify records of nuclear material in storage, to check and maintain International Atomic Energy Agency-installed instruments and surveillance equipment, and to confirm physical inventories of nuclear material. The United States Government reserves the right to add or remove facilities, at any time and for any reason, from the Eligible Facilities List, but is required to notify the International Atomic Energy Agency when it does so.

United States Lead Agencies—Those Executive Departments or Agencies designated as having jurisdiction over locations of declarable activities and/or national security equities as well as responsibility for implementation of the Additional Protocol's requirements to provide information or declarations to the International Atomic Energy Agency and/or provide complementary access. The Lead Agencies are the Departments of Energy, Defense, Commerce and State, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Zone of Application—Territory subject to the provisions of the *Vienna Document*, defined as the whole of Europe, and parts of Central Asia, as well as the adjoining sea area and air space. A more detailed description can be found in Annex I to the *Vienna Document 2011*.

Attachment 2

ARMS CONTROL TABLES

Table A2.1. Summary of Arms Control and Non-proliferation Treaties and Agreements Currently Applicable to the DAF.

<p>The list below of treaties, agreements, and commitments is provided for information purposes only and is not intended to be comprehensive. Do not rely on the abbreviated treaty description to determine potential treaty obligations. All questions regarding treaty applicability and/or obligations should be routed through the servicing legal office directed to SAF/GCI and AF/A10.</p>		
TREATY / AGREEMENT	DESCRIPTION	DAF FACILITIES, PROGRAMS, PLATFORMS AFFECTED
<i>Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War</i>	The U.S. and the RF agree to immediately notify the other in event of accident or incident resulting in nuclear detonation, and detection of unidentified objects by, or interference of, early warning systems. Parties also agree to advance notification of planned missile launches traveling beyond national territory and in the direction of the other party.	The agreement provides for advance notification of missile launches beyond U.S. territory and in the direction of the RF.
<i>Antarctic Treaty</i>	The Antarctic Treaty is an agreement between countries that governs activities in Antarctica and its surrounding seas. The treaty's goals are to demilitarize Antarctica, promote scientific cooperation, and preserve the environment.	Observers from contracting parties will be given open access to all stations, installations and equipment, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargo or personnel, which includes any DAF assets that may be present.

<i>Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement</i>	This agreement requires notification of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs by the U.S. or the RF no less than 24 hours in advance. Information includes planned date of launch, launch area, and area of impact.	The agreement impacts ICBM and certain space launch vehicle launches.
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC); full name <i>The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction</i>	The BWC is a multilateral convention prohibiting development, stockpiling, acquisition, and retaining: (1) microbial or other biological agents or toxins that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes and, (2) weapons, equipment, or means to deliver such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.	Facilities are affected if visitation protocols are developed and implemented. Provide information on DAF biological defense programs for annual Confidence Building Measures submission to the United Nations. Provide response to annual Congressional Treaty Chemical and Biological Weapons Compliance Review Group data call for chemical and biological defense programs and research.
<i>Biological Weapons Trilateral Agreement</i>	The Trilateral Agreement between the US/United Kingdom/RF is a joint statement designed to alleviate U.S. and United Kingdom concerns on RF noncompliance with the <i>Biological Weapons and Toxin Convention</i> .	Facility inspections of sites identified in United Nations <i>Biological Weapons and Toxin Convention</i> confidence-building declarations.

<p>Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); full name <i>The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction</i></p>	<p>The CWC is a multilateral convention banning the production, development, possession, transfer, and use of chemical weapons by the signatories. Parties must destroy all chemical stockpiles and chemical weapon production facilities.</p>	<p>DAF facilities are not subject to routine inspections, except in cases where recovered weapons are temporarily stored awaiting destruction. All DAF facilities are subject to CI.</p>
<p><i>Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)</i></p>	<p>The CCW consists of five protocols addressing: (1) non-detectable fragments (2) mines, booby traps and other devices, (3) incendiary weapons, (4) blinding lasers, and (5) explosive remnants of war.</p>	<p>The U.S. is party to the CCW. DAF antipersonnel landmines comply with CCW requirements and are equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms. DoD policy is that the U.S. will not develop lasers intended for blinding. Lasers that are part of DAF systems comply with the CCW protocol addressing blinding laser weapons.</p>
<p><i>Treaty for Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)</i></p>	<p>The CFE reduces conventional forces of 30 North Atlantic Treaty Organization and former Warsaw Pact countries to eliminate the capability to launch a surprise attack and to initiate large-scale offensive action in Europe. It restricts the amount of military equipment a group of States Parties could concentrate in designated sections of Europe and includes a detailed verification regime.</p>	<p>Reporting of data and numerical limits on Europe-located combat aircraft and combat helicopters, and accounting for combat support helicopters. USAFE bases, units and equipment are subject to inspections by representatives from other participating States. Deployed DAF Forces within the CFE AoA may also be subject to inspection.</p>

CFE 1A Agreement	The CFE 1A Agreement sets numerical limits on military manpower levels in Europe.	Reporting of data and numerical limits on military manpower in Europe.
<i>Environmental Modification Convention</i>	The Environmental Modification Convention prohibits use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to another party for military purposes.	DAF acquisitions, activities, and operations must comply with U.S. obligations under the Environmental Modification Convention.
<i>Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI)</i>	GEMI is a politically binding transparency measure established in 1994 under the auspices of the OSCE. GEMI provides for an annual information exchange among Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe States on the command structure, peacetime authorized personnel strengths, and global holdings of specified military equipment (including imports and national production). The annual exchange is due 30 April and covers the preceding calendar year to reflect holdings as of 1 January.	The DAF reports on its command structure, peacetime authorized personnel strengths, and specified military equipment, to include imports and national production, on a global level annually.
<i>Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)</i>	HCOC is a political commitment to “exchange pre-launch notifications on their Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Vehicle launches and test flights.”	The DAF must send notification of applicable DoD space launches and ICBM launches; and contributes to the annual report sent to other participating States (145 Subscribing States as of January 2024).

<p>IAEA Additional Protocol; full name <i>Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America</i></p>	<p>The Additional Protocol, developed following the discovery of Iraq’s illicit nuclear weapons program after the first Gulf War, supplements a State’s safeguards agreement. It grants the IAEA inspection rights to investigate potential discrepancies, undeclared stockpiles, and/or covert efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The U.S. concluded an Additional Protocol with the IAEA to demonstrate its commitment to the NPT and its support of the increased transparency provided for by the protocol.</p>	<p>As with the US IAEA safeguards agreement, the US IAEA Additional Protocol includes a “national security exclusion” for all U.S. military sites. DAF sites are not subject to IAEA inspection. U.S. civilian nuclear sites, however, are subject to inspection. As such, there is a risk that inspections may occur at sites that are near DAF facilities or sites where the DAF has active programs or other equities. MAJCOM/FLDCOM/DRU are responsible for conducting Security Vulnerability Assessments for applicable DAF facilities and programs.</p>
<p>IAEA Safeguards Agreements; full name <i>Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards</i></p>	<p>These bilateral agreements negotiated with the IAEA permit the international agency to verify a State’s declared types, quantities, and locations of nuclear material. All NPT non-nuclear weapon States must accept IAEA safeguards.</p>	<p>The U.S. is a nuclear weapon State under the NPT. The US-IAEA safeguards agreement excludes facilities of direct national security significance: all U.S. military sites, to include all DAF sites, are not subject to safeguards.</p>
<p><i>Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)</i></p>	<p>The LTBT prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, underwater, or anywhere the explosion causes radioactive debris outside the territory of the State conducting the explosion.</p>	<p>N/A</p>

<i>Major Strategic Exercise Notification Agreement</i>	Requires the U.S. and the RF to provide annual notification of one major strategic exercise which includes heavy bomber participation. Notification must be made at least 14 days in advance. Requirements of the 1990 agreement are incorporated into New START Protocol (Part 4, Section III, #5).	The agreement impacts heavy bomber exercises.
<i>Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)</i>	The MTCR provides export policy guidelines meant to limit the spread of missiles and unmanned delivery systems capable of carrying at least a 500-kilogram payload traveling at least 300 kilometers.	Under this informal political understanding among States, the sale of DAF missiles and unmanned delivery systems captured under the MTCR is restricted.
<i>New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)</i>	This treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation (RF) required each side to reach the following central limits for strategic offensive nuclear arms by February 2018 or, if applicable, to remain below these numbers: 700 deployed ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bombers; 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers; and 1550 warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and warheads counted for heavy bombers (by the terms of the treaty, one warhead per heavy bomber regardless of loading). The Treaty expires on 5 February 2026 with no provisions for extension.	All ICBMs, ICBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments are subject to the treaty. In addition, all facilities where these are based, stored, maintained, converted/eliminated, and tested are subject to inspection. Production facilities are declared under New START but are not subject to inspection.

<p><i>The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)</i></p>	<p>The NPT recognizes five nuclear weapon States (the US, RF, United Kingdom, France, and China); all other States Parties are non-nuclear weapon States. It obligates nuclear weapon States not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons States or to assist these States in manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. All States Parties to the treaty agree, however, to take steps to ensure that all NPT non-nuclear weapon States can utilize “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” Non-nuclear weapon States also agree to accept safeguards to prevent the diversion of nuclear material and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.</p>	<p>See “IAEA Safeguards Agreement” and “IAEA Additional Protocol”</p>
<p>Outer Space Treaty; full name <i>Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies</i></p>	<p>Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits signatories from placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies, and limits use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively to “peaceful purposes.”</p>	<p>U.S. obligations under the Outer Space Treaty must be considered when planning and executing DAF activities, operations, and acquisitions.</p>

<i>Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)</i>	As a supplement to the TTBT, the PNET prohibits any nuclear explosion by the U.S. or the RF outside the test sites exceeding a yield of 150 kilotons, any group explosion exceeding a yield of 150 kilotons that will not permit the identification and determination of the yield of each individual explosion in the group, or any group explosion with an aggregate yield of more than 1.5 megatons.	N/A
Proliferation Security Initiative	The Proliferation Security Initiative is an international cooperative effort focused on stopping trafficking of Weapons of Mass Destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from State and non-State actors of proliferation concern.	The DAF provides planning support as required for Proliferation Security Initiative activities; coordinates subordinate organizations' participation in Proliferation Security Initiative activities; provides support to operational elements; provides necessary operations, communications, and logistics support; and participates as observers or controllers during exercises, as required.
<i>Vienna Document 2011 (VDOC 11)</i>	It is a politically binding confidence and security building measure among participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It limits the number and scope of large-scale military activities. It requires military information exchange and prior notification of exercises.	USAFE must track assets (e.g., combat aircraft, helicopters) and provide reports consistent with required information exchanges. Certain USAFE bases are subject to inspections and evaluations by representatives from other participating States. Deployed DAF units within the VDOC 11 zone of application may also be subject to inspections or observations.