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**NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF
ASSISTANCE VISIT PROGRAM**

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This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive 91-1, *Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety*. This publication is consistent with Air Force Policy Directive 13-5, *Air Force Nuclear Mission*. The publication contains copyrighted information. It establishes key components of the nuclear surety program according to guidance in Department of the Air Force Instruction 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*. This instruction assigns responsibilities and establishes procedures for conducting Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits and provides guidance to all levels of command participating in the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit process. It applies to designated directorates, Numbered Air Force and Center staff agencies, parent wing main operating bases when augmenting the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team, and all units participating in the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit. This instruction applies to all civilian employees and uniformed members of the Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard. This publication does not apply to the United States Space Force. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in the publication adhere to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, and

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(ACC) AFI 91-121, *Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Program*, is supplemented as follows: This supplement applies to Headquarters Air Combat Command (HQ ACC), applicable subordinate units and supporting agencies. This supplement applies to AFRC and ANG units who are serving on Title 10 active-duty orders performing an ACC mission. This supplement does not apply to the United States Space Force. Users of this instruction must notify Headquarters Air Combat Command, Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration Directorate, (HQ ACC/A10), 190 Dodd Blvd Suite 120, JB Langley-Eustis, VA 23665-1942, DSN 575-1506, Comm 757- 225-9101, ACCA100Operations@us.af.mil, of conflicts between this instruction and other directives, instructions, or technical orders. Commander, Air Combat Command (COMACC) may direct a NSSAV, or the visit may be requested by the unit commander or Higher Headquarters Staff; however, the visit must be approved by the inspected commander (or higher authority within the inspected commander’s chain of command). The authority to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication is hereby identified as **T-2**. See DAFMAN 90-161, *Publications Processes and Procedures*, Table A10.1, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority through the Publication OPR. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the OPR using the DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route DAF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. This publication may be supplemented at any level, but all Supplements must be routed to the OPR of this publication for coordination prior to certification and approval. **Note:** AFI 90-201 has been superseded by DAFI 90-302, *The Inspection System of the Department of the Air Force*.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. It incorporates multiple format changes for ease of use and currency. Changes the minimum percentage of personnel and medical personnel reliability assurance program record that will be reviewed for compliance with governing Department of Defense and United States Air Force (USAF) guidance. Ensures that the use or disclosure of protected health information as part of the medical personnel reliability assurance program Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit process are conducted properly. Changes to proposed report format revised to streamline report writing. Additionally, several publications were deleted as they no longer provided required guidance to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Program.

(ACC) This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. It incorporates multiple format changes for ease of use and currency. Changes align with updates to AFI 91-121 including the updates to disclosure of protected health information, report format, and publication deletions.

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Chapter 1

NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT PROGRAM

1.1. Overview.

1.1.1. Scope of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Program. The Secretary of the Air Force established the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit program to assist nuclear tasked units, on a non-attribution basis, to maintain effective nuclear surety programs. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit is an opportunity to receive assistance from experienced headquarters personnel who write nuclear surety policy and guidance. It is not an inspection nor is it intended to prepare units to pass Nuclear Surety Inspections. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits may not give a rating, score, grade, or assessment. However, the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team may recommend the Wing Commander conduct a root-cause analysis if significant observations are identified during the visit. The Wing Commander should provide the results of the analysis to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit lead division or team chief. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team chief will determine which Major Command (MAJCOM) identified observations require a formal root cause analysis. **(T-1)** Assessment statements will be limited to processes and procedures. **(T-1)** **Attachment 2** outlines typical areas observed during a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit. Wing Commanders may use the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit results to strengthen the unit Nuclear Surety Program. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit also provides an opportunity for resolution and clarification of issues between the unit and headquarters functional managers. The objective is threefold:

1.1.1.1. Determine if higher headquarters guidance is adequate and clear.

1.1.1.2. Provide feedback to the Wing Commander on whether the unit is properly applying sound procedures to implement Nuclear Surety guidance.

1.1.1.3. Provide situational awareness on command nuclear surety to senior leadership in the form of a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit executive summary and crossfeed report (described in **paragraph 2.3**).

1.1.2. Assistance Areas. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team assesses all areas included in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3263.05E, *Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection*, and AFI 90-201, *The Air Force Inspection System* as supplemented. Additional areas may be assessed by MAJCOM staffs as time permits or when requested by MAJCOM Commander or wing leadership. At Joint Bases where USAF is a supported component, installation support is a sister service responsibility and USAF may not control elements of the Nuclear Surety program at that installation. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will either include sister service members to evaluate supporting processes and procedures, or forward team observations to the Joint Base chain of command. **(T-0)**

1.2. Roles and Responsibilities.

1.2.1. MAJCOMs. MAJCOM Headquarters will designate a directorate, division, or special staff as the lead to perform Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits. **(T-1)**

1.2.2. Units. Units will provide a unit point of contact to MAJCOM Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Program Manager. **(T-1)**

1.2.3. **(Added-ACC)** For ACC, the 55th WG is subject to an NSSAV. While not subject to an NSSAV, the 4th FW hosts the 916 ARW, which is subject to an NSSAV from AMC. Additional units include Air Force Technical Applications Center Detachments 1, 45 & 46, and High Frequency Global Communication Stations. All units with nuclear certified equipment (NCE) may also request a limited scope NSSAV.

1.3. Process Overview.

1.3.1. For Technical Operations, Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members will select maintenance teams for each specific technical operation based on team/crew integrity. **(T-1)**

1.3.1. **(ACC)** ACC does not conduct Technical Operations.

1.3.2. Team integrity for maintenance teams will be maintained in accordance with Department of the Air Force 21-101, *Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management*, and Air Force Manual 21-202, *Missile Maintenance Management* requirements. **(T-1)** To demonstrate their knowledge and proficiency, they may be tasked to perform at least one evaluation of a maintenance operation within their area of responsibility. Loading Standardization Crews and Squadron Lead Crews will be observed by the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team. **(T-1)**

1.3.3. For Weapon Security, Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit functional area experts will use performance-based methodology to determine whether a unit meets the Nuclear Weapons Security Standard. **(T-1)** They will observe the integrated execution of security actions and response (performance), and compliance with technical criteria, as applicable. **(T-1)** They will observe execution of applicable plans and tactics, techniques and procedures. **(T-1)** They will assess the effectiveness of active and/or passive defenses, deployed delay and/or denial systems, and other technology. **(T-1)** They will assess the use of available options to deny unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. **(T-1)** If denial is not achieved, the ability to prevent the loss, theft, damage or destruction of nuclear weapons will be assessed by the functional area experts. **(T-1)** Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit functional area members will develop or validate that wing planned exercises are realistic scenarios to determine the wing's ability to meet the Nuclear Weapon Security Standard. **(T-1)** The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will assess the adequacy of and compliance with approved compensatory measures for MAJCOM approved security deviations. **(T-1)**

1.3.3. **(ACC)** ACC does not conduct Weapon Security Operations. NSSAV security activities are listed in section **1.3.9.5**.

1.3.4. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will review nuclear surety training programs and administration to ensure commanders and supervisors at all levels demonstrate effective responsibility, emphasis and focus on nuclear weapons surety per Department of the Air Force 91-101. **(T-1)**

1.3.5. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will review the administrative qualifications, certification, continuing evaluation, removal from Personnel Reliability Assurance Program, Department of Defense Manual 5210.42_Air Force Manual 13-501,

Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program duties, return to duty, and training and management processes to assess the overall effectiveness of the unit's implementation of Personnel Reliability Assurance Program. **(T-0)** The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will focus on Personnel Reliability Assurance Program processes, including scenario-based exercises, formal and informal interviews, and observe day-to-day operations to validate/verify processes employed by the unit. **(T-0)** Ensure that the use or disclosures of protected health information as part of the medical Personnel Reliability Assurance Program Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit process are properly accounted for in accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. **(T-0)**

1.3.5. **(ACC)** The NSSAV team conducts nuclear surety testing for Personal Reliability Assurance Personnel (PRAP) upon HQ ACC or unit commander request/approval. Minimum passing score is 80% IAW DAFI 91-101, paragraph 3.6.2.3.

1.3.6. Command Post Controller and Communication Security Two Person Code Team Member closed book testing will be administered at bases with a strategic tasking as follows:

1.3.6.1. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Teams will test and evaluate eighty percent of available Communication Security Two Person Code Team Members (i.e., not on temporary duty, leave, or just completing a 12-hour Command Post shift). **(T-1)**

1.3.6.2. Command Post will be evaluated with performance evaluations in the same manner as Air Force Manual 10-207 *Command Posts*, including respective MAJCOM supplements and AFI 90-201. **(T-1)** Performance evaluations will include a scenario portion and testing portion. **(T-1)** The Command Post Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members will conduct as many evaluations as possible so the number of evaluated members of the Command Post can be maximized. **(T-1)**

1.3.6.2. **(ACC)** ACC/A10A will develop a USSTRATCOM Emergency Action Procedures (EAPs) test bank with questions comprised of knowledge items a controller must have to process emergency actions without referring to EAPs or a checklist. These questions will be derived from EAP-STRAT Vol I, *Commander United States Strategic Command Emergency Action Procedures*, and applicable appendices. ACC/A10 will use this bank to randomly generate a 30-question test. Minimum passing score is 90%.

1.3.7. For Regular and Reserve/Guard Associate/Total Force Integration units, the sponsoring unit will have responsibility for the Associate/Total Force Integration unit(s) outlined in this instruction. **(T-1)**

1.3.8. MAJCOMs will determine the composition and qualifications required for the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Team. **(T-1)** The composition and qualifications should be based on the scope of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit as required by either the MAJCOM or Wing Commander.

1.3.8. **(ACC)** See [Table 1.1](#) for ACC NSSAV team composition.

1.3.9. **(Added-ACC)** ACC NSSAV Activities. Nuclear mission execution is sub-divided into activities for evaluation purposes. Which activities observed, reviewed, and or examined by the ACC NSSAV team may be tailored to meet the requesting unit commander, HQ ACC or COMACC intent.

1.3.9.1. **(Added-ACC)** Command Post Activities:

1.3.9.1.1. **(Added-ACC)** Administer a performance evaluation, progressive in nature, consisting of at least one emergency management situation, processing of five Emergency Action Messages and processing of two reports applicable to the unit (e.g., AF OPREP-3, STRATCOM reports, etc.) IAW AFMAN 10-207.

1.3.9.1.1.1. **(Added-ACC)** The performance evaluation should be administered by the Primary or alternate Command Post Training Manager under the observation of ACC/A10A.

1.3.9.1.1.2. **(Added-ACC)** A minimum of two teams (A-side [senior controller] and B-side [junior controller] with an optional 3rd controller, equals one team) will be evaluated. Command Post Managers will identify team members, however, ACC/A10 does reserve the right to select team members for evaluation.

1.3.9.1.2. **(Added-ACC)** Administer a 30 question EA closed-book test based upon USSTRATCOM EA procedures listed in EAP-STRAT Vol 1. This test will be administered in conjunction with an administered performance evaluation. The EA test seeks to measure CP controller actions, knowledge, and understanding of EA concepts and their ability to link concepts to actions, and actions to results in performing their OPLAN duties.

1.3.9.2. **(Added-ACC)** Command Post/Communications Squadron Activities:

1.3.9.2.1. **(Added-ACC)** Review unit Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) equipment status and reporting procedures IAW DAFI 21-103, *Equipment Inventory, Status and Utilization Reporting*, Chapter 12 requirements, and TO 00-33A-1001-WA-1, *Methods and Procedures – General Cyberspace Support Activities Management Procedures and Practice Requirements*.

1.3.9.2.2. **(Added-ACC)** Demonstrate setup and operations of transportable Milstar/advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF) terminal, UHF LOS and HF radios. Setup should include any ancillary equipment, such as printers.

1.3.9.3. **(Added-ACC)** Nuclear Certified Equipment (NCE) Activities:

1.3.9.3.1. **(Added-ACC)** Observe unit personnel performing NCE validation and verification actions for ensuring equipment items meet NCE standards.

1.3.9.3.2. **(Added-ACC)** Validate NCE documentation procedures (e.g., Maintenance Information System and associated records and forms) are accomplished IAW TO 00-20-1, *Aerospace Equipment Maintenance Inspection, Documentation, Policies, and Procedures*, requirements.

1.3.9.3.3. **(Added-ACC)** Assess NCE Monitor programs for compliance with AFI 63-125, *Nuclear Certification Program*, and AFI 63-125_ACCSUP, *Nuclear Certification Program*, requirements.

1.3.9.3.4. **(Added-ACC)** Assess unit possessed nuclear certified tools and test, tie-down, and handling equipment associated with Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) operations for proper maintenance and inspection documentation.

1.3.9.3.4.1. **(Added-ACC)** Assess nuclear certified hoists, cranes, and slings that are not Real Property Installed Equipment (RPIE) for proper care, maintenance,

and inspection documentation.

1.3.9.3.4.2. **(Added-ACC)** Conduct random sampling of unit personnel (10% minimum, excluding TDY/leave personnel) performing static strap check-out and testing procedures for compliance with governing technical data.

1.3.9.4. **(Added-ACC)** Training Review Activities:

1.3.9.4.1. **(Added-ACC)** Review (10% minimum) of base training records (e.g MyTraining, Training Business Area (TBA), DAF Form 623, *Individual Training Record Folder*, or AF Training Record (AFTR)) for areas directly supporting unit strategic mission requirements. Review to include training records for all unit personnel currently qualified and in upgrade training for mission areas and tasks directly associated or supporting unit strategic mission requirements.

1.3.9.5. **(Added-ACC)** Security Mission Area: (If applicable)

1.3.9.5.1. **(Added-ACC)** For security, the NSSAV team will focus on unit performance and compliance standards as directed in DoD S-5210.92-M, *Physical Security Requirements for Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) Facilities (U)*, AFI 91-117, *Safety Rules for the Airborne Launch Control System*, and applicable AFI 31 and AFMAN 21-series guidance for the protection of NC3 alert aircraft.

1.3.9.5.2. **(Added-ACC)** Security mission area effectiveness and compliance shall be assessed based upon DoD, Service and MAJCOM security requirements and standards for protecting the E-6B-ALCS system. NSSAV team will evaluate the performance of physical and electronic security systems, as defined in the applicable security directives, to ensure operational effectiveness in various environmental conditions. Assess the performance of unit personnel through post checks and performance/task evaluations, to include but not be limited to daily duties, emergency duties, specialized duties, and the care/use of equipment. Compliance with existing requirements will be assessed through random sampling, and where practical, in conjunction with exercise events and/or task evaluations. The NSSAV team will review nuclear surety training programs and administration to ensure commanders and supervisors at all levels demonstrate effective responsibility, emphasis and focus on nuclear weapons surety per DAFI 91-101.

1.3.9.5.3. **(Added-ACC)** Security task evaluations and exercises will focus on a LOOKING GLASS Alert Aircraft Parking Area (AAPA) operational scenario. The NSSAV team members will ensure compliance and validate unit plans to establish PL-1 aircraft restricted areas (as required), implement and maintain entry control, aircraft posting, processing and control of emergency responder personnel and security response force(s). Task evaluations and/or exercises will be used to evaluate the performance and application of individual, team and response force actions and support force personnel, as specified in DoD, AF, MAJCOM and local plans for events up to and including simulated attacks affecting E-6B-ALCS aircraft. NSSAV task evaluations will be performance-based to the maximum extent possible. Unannounced alarms and response tests may be conducted throughout the inspection to cover all security shifts. Security task evaluations will include:

1.3.9.5.3.1. **(Added-ACC)** Emergency Entry Exercise/Task Evaluation. Evaluate

unit ability to accomplish an authorized, yet emergency entrance into a PL-1 aircraft parking restricted area by emergency response assets (e.g., fire department, ambulance) while effectively continuing to protect PL-1 resources IAW applicable security guidance. The exercise will assess SF and emergency responder knowledge, timeliness, and proficiency in emergency entry procedures. On-duty security forces patrols involved in the exercise will be released to normal operations as soon as practical. Selected forces may be retained to allow for exercise realism and continuity.

1.3.9.5.3.2. **(Added-ACC)** Anti-Hijacking Response Exercise/Task Evaluation. Evaluate unit ability to effectively repel and/or initially deny an attempt by adversarial forces to gain unauthorized access and control of a simulated E-6B-ALCS alert aircraft IAW DoD S-5210.92-M, AFMAN 31-123-S, *(U) Physical Security Requirements for Nuclear Command and Control Facilities*, AFI 91-117, DAFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense (ID)*, publications. This task evaluation assesses security systems capabilities and security forces' ability to detect, intercept, respond and defeat a hostile force before it can seize, damage, or attempt unauthorized take-off of the E-6B aircraft. It also evaluates wing-wide response plans, procedures, and reporting requirements to an attack and/or attempt to hijack an alert aircraft. At a minimum, the NSSAV team will observe and evaluate:

1.3.9.5.3.2.1. **(Added-ACC)** Hostile incident reporting and assessment by security forces using available security technology (as applicable).

1.3.9.5.3.2.2. **(Added-ACC)** Adversarial surveillance and tracking (when available and employed).

1.3.9.5.3.2.3. **(Added-ACC)** Response force tactical leadership, to include SF command and control center performance and effective contribution to regaining aircraft custody and/or situational control.

1.3.9.5.3.2.4. **(Added-ACC)** Tactical response and deployment of response force teams and individuals (on foot and mobile).

1.3.9.5.3.2.5. **(Added-ACC)** Use of force by security and support forces and the effective employment of assigned weapons.

1.3.9.5.3.2.6. **(Added-ACC)** Immediate reestablishment of entry and circulation control, PL-1 area and the two-person concept upon conclusion of hostilities.

1.3.9.5.3.2.7. **(Added-ACC)** Removal of dead and wounded adversaries from facilities, aircraft and the adjacent restricted aircraft parking area(s) after custody/situational control is regained.

1.3.9.5.3.2.8. **(Added-ACC)** Return to normal security operations, reconstitution of personnel and ammunition, security for damaged perimeter and structure systems, area sweeps, etc.

1.3.9.5.3.2.9. **(Added-ACC)** Wing command and control operations, implementation of installation emergency response plan(s), and associated incident reporting procedures.

1.3.9.5.4. **(Added-ACC)** Any security deficiency will be judged against applicable DoD, AF and MAJCOM standards. Security deficiencies are those that, in the absence of adequate compensatory measures, could lead to unauthorized access of NC2 resources.

1.3.9.5.5. **(Added-ACC)** Security Deviations. NSSAV functional area experts will review the number and types of approved security deviations and assess the adequacy of/compliance with associated compensatory measures. DoD S-5210.92-M, AFMAN 31-123-S, DAFI 31-101 and AFI 91-117 will be used as the minimum standard for assessing compliance.

1.4. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Trip and Event Scheduling.

1.4.1. MAJCOMs will determine when Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits are scheduled. **(T-1)** Wing Commanders may request a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit outside the MAJCOM recommended schedule. United States Air Forces in Europe may deviate from this schedule as required to accommodate host nation requirements and the Functional Expert Visit Program.

1.4.1. **(ACC)** NSSAVs will occur when requested by the wing commander or directed by COMACC. Requests will be coordinated with ACC/A10, the inspected unit/wing, and wing IG to confirm scheduled dates are not within 180 days of an IG inspection. Once NSSAV dates are finalized, the wing IG will upload the NSSAV event and dates in the Gatekeeper program.

1.4.2. MAJCOMs will provide a notification message to the Numbered Air Force or Center, and unit 60 days prior to the planned visit confirming the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit. **(T-1)** The message will include date(s), lead point of contact, billeting, transportation and work center requirements (A Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team member should provide an info copy to the installation-owning MAJCOM if the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit is for a tenant unit). **(T-1)** Units will appoint a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit point of contact and forward the name to the MAJCOM within one week of receiving the notification message. **(T-1)**

1.4.2. **(ACC)** ACC/A10 will send out the notification message to the appropriate agencies once the date has been confirmed with the wing commander.

1.4.3. Units should locally coordinate and provide inputs on a proposed Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit sequence of events. Units will send a draft schedule of events to the MAJCOM not less than 40 days prior to the scheduled visit. **(T-1)** MAJCOMs will ensure the proposed schedule of events fulfills the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit requirements and coordinate the proposed schedule of events within the staff. **(T-1)** Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members will coordinate functional area specific scheduling requirements with their unit points of contact. **(T-1)** A confirmed schedule of events will be completed by the unit and submitted to the MAJCOM not less than 14 days prior to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team's arrival. **(T-1)** After the visit and schedule of events is confirmed, any scheduling conflicts must be immediately brought to the attention of the MAJCOM Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit point of contact for resolution. **(T-1)**

1.4.3. **(ACC)** ACC/A10 will coordinate the schedule and Sequence of Events (SOE) with the wing commander (or designated wing POC) and send out notification messages to the appropriate agencies once the dates have been confirmed.

1.4.3.1. **(Added-ACC)** Visit requests will be sent to the unit hosting the NSSAV through the Defense Information System for security.

1.5. Unit Preparation.

1.5.1. Units will provide current self-assessment checklists as well as copies of the last self-assessment performed in reviewable areas 30 days prior to the arrival of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team. **(T-1)**

1.5.1.1. **(Added-ACC)** ACC/A10 will coordinate with the wing commander or designated representative for access to list of simulations for applicable NSSAV exercise events and any HQ-approved deviations.

1.5.2. Units will provide a copy of their simulations/deviations to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team not later than 30 days prior to the scheduled visit. **(T-1)** The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team chief(s) will approve or disapprove simulations at least seven days before the visit commences. **(T-1)**

1.5.2. **(ACC)** ACC/A10, in concert with ACC Functional POCs, will coordinate with units to determine required pre-NSSAV deliverables (e.g., training records, local OIs, Installation Support Plan(s), etc.) to enhance NSSAV team awareness and overall NSSAV effectiveness. Wing NSSAV POC will provide ACC/A10 POC requested items and products based upon agreed upon timeline.

1.5.3. **(Added-ACC)** Wing POC will review [Attachment 3](#) and ensure all milestones are met no later than the listed finish date.

1.6. (Added-ACC) NSSAV Funding. ACC/A10 funds the NSSAV program to include travel of augmentees.

1.6.1. **(Added-ACC)** ACC/A10 will annually forecast for all expected NSSAV costs for the given year. ACC/A10 will budget travel based on the following:

1.6.1.1. **(Added-ACC)** To maintain fiscal responsibility and team integrity, ACC/A10 will consider MILAIR, Commercial Air, Contract Air, charter bus, POVs, lodging, transportation, and weigh against both cost and availability limitations. NSSAV team members are required to depart and return via the pre-designated travel plans. Any deviations from approved travel require authorization and excess costs will be assessed to the sending unit IAW the Joint Travel Regulations.

1.6.2. **(Added-ACC)** Each team member will be provided a cross-organizational fund cite from ACC/A10 defining the maximum allowance for travel/per diem.

1.6.2.1. **(Added-ACC)** Civilian team members will not be required to work beyond their standard duty day during an NSSAV. If there is cause for a civilian employee to work longer than their standard duty day, that civilian team member must get approval/funding for compensatory time or overtime from their unit of assignment. Ideally, a blanket approval should be issued by the employee's approving official prior to departing on the trip. ACC/A10 will not be responsible for any overtime associated with an NSSAV.

1.7. (Added-ACC) NSSAV Team Composition and Requirements.

1.7.1. **(Added-ACC)** **Table 1.1.** provides a generic NSSAV team composition. ACC functional directors may fund additional team members to meet a wing commander's requested

or COMACC-directed NSSAV. The priority, in descending order, for NSSAV team augmented support is ACC staff, NAF staff, other MAJCOM staff, and other operational units.

Table 1.1. (Added-ACC) Generic NSSAV Team Composition (personnel as required).

Wing	Duration (Days)	A10 Team Chief & Deputy	Operations / Weather (A100, A3W*)	NC3 (A10A)	Security Forces (A10R, A4S)	NCE / Maintenance (A10A, A4)	NC2 / Command Post (A10A, A3O)	PRAP (A10R, SG*)	Safety (SEW)
55 WG	3-5	1-2	1-2	1-2	1-4	1-2	1-2	1-2	1-2
AFTAC	3-5	1-2	1-2	1-2	1-2	1-2	1-2	1-2	1-2

1.7.2. **(Added-ACC)** The ACC/A10 Deputy Director or designated representative will be the NSSAV Team Chief (min O-5).

1.7.3. **(Added-ACC)** ACC/A10 will coordinate work center requirements with the unit POC. The minimum requirements include phones, LAN access, NIPR and SIPR computers with DVD-RW capability, color printers, a color copier, a GSA-approved classified shredder, and GSA approved classified storage.

1.7.3.1. **(Added-ACC)** Base communication support must be present or readily available for the duration of the NSSAV.

1.7.3.2. **(Added-ACC)** Units receiving an NSSAV will provide unit-specific gear and equipment (i.e., hard hat, safety glasses, etc.) for NSSAV members, as required.

1.8. (Added-ACC) NSSAV Duration and Meetings.

1.8.1. **(Added-ACC)** Duration will be based on [Table 1.1](#); however, it may vary according to schedule of events and team composition (approx. 3-5 days). Team arrival time(s) and method(s) will be coordinated with the wing POC.

1.8.2. **(Added-ACC)** The visited wing or unit commander and key staff will provide an inbrief to the NSSAV team. This in brief will include any local conditions and safety briefings required by the unit (if not accomplished upon team arrival).

1.8.3. **(Added-ACC)** The team chief will provide an inbrief to the host wing commander. inbrief content includes: NSSAV purpose, team composition, and expectations.

1.8.3.1. **(Added-ACC)** The team chief will meet with the wing commander or designee to discuss prior day events and any schedule adjustments.

1.8.4. **(Added-ACC)** Team chief will provide an outbrief to the host wing commander.

1.8.4.1. **(Added-ACC)** Out brief content includes report overview, report areas, outstanding performers, ACC takeaways, and recommendations for improvement.

Chapter 2

NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT SUMMARY

2.1. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Report.

2.1.1. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit reports assist units in identifying strengths and areas for improvement in order to enhance overall nuclear surety effectiveness. Identified deficiencies will reference governing instructions and guidance (i.e., Air Force Instruction, MAJCOM Instructions, Technical Order, United States Strategic Command Publications, etc.) **(T-0)** Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit reports will be classified in accordance with CJCSI 3263.05E, Enclosure F, paragraph 2. **(T-0)** Unclassified information to include observations, corrective actions, or significant observation resolutions, when separated from its final report, must be handled according to its respective portion markings by the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members. **(T-0)** Final release of any data separated from its final report is subject to guidance defined in section 3 of CJCSI 3263.05E. **(T-0)**

2.1.1. **(ACC)** NSSAV report and observations, when required, will be classified IAW applicable security classification guide, with specific paragraph marking to highlight classified information. NSSAV report will require wing commander approval prior to dissemination.

2.1.2. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team project officer uses inputs provided by each functional team member to build the report in accordance with the contents listed at [Attachment 2](#). The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team chief will provide a draft copy of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit report to the Wing Commander prior to the team's departure and provide a copy to the lead division upon return to the staff location. **(T-1)** The authority for further distribution resides with the Wing Commander and/or MAJCOM Commander.

2.1.2. **(ACC)** The team chief will provide a copy to ACC/A10 and to COMACC (if the NSSAV was directed by COMACC) upon return to JB Langley-Eustis. ACC/A10 retains an office record copy on file but will not release the report outside of ACC/A10 without the permission of the wing commander.

2.1.3. To preserve program integrity, the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members will not be used as Inspector General augmentees at a wing or unit where they have performed a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit in the past 12 months. **(T-1)**

2.1.4. Team members must include all safety, security, and weapon system reliability related observations in the detailed report, referenced by published guidance, with paragraph numbers to the maximum extent possible. **(T-1)** Overall and sub-area ratings are not assigned. Observations are categorized in the following categories:

2.1.4.1. **STRENGTH** — An observation that highlights strong processes, knowledge, or performance.

2.1.4.2. **REPEAT SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS** — Any significant observation not corrected from a previous Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit or Nuclear Surety Inspection report.

2.1.4.3. **SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATION** — Any deficiency having or likely to have a major negative effect on the nuclear weapons mission of the activity.

2.1.4.4. REPEAT OBSERVATION — Any observation not corrected from a previous Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit or Nuclear Surety report.

2.1.4.5. OBSERVATION — Any deficiency not meeting, having or likely to have a major negative effect on the nuclear weapons mission of the activity, but requires corrective action.

2.1.4.6. RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENT AREA — These suggestions to improve a process (Does not require referencing governing instruction or guidance).

2.1.5. MAJCOMs will determine the guidance for recognizing outstanding performers. **(T-1)**

2.1.5. **(ACC)** Outstanding Performers will be recommended to the team chief by team leads based on observations made during the visit. Team leads will confirm with the owning unit that the individual has no quality indicators that would preclude recognition. Final approval rests with the team chief, in coordination with the wing commander.

2.2. Tracking Requirements.

2.2.1. MAJCOMs will determine any tracking requirements. **(T-1)**

2.2.2. MAJCOMs will determine the need for follow-up reports on any observations identified during Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits. **(T-1)**

2.2.2. **(ACC)** Recommend assisted unit document NSSAV observations requiring corrective action and monitor until closed using the AF Inspection System Tool – Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT) or Inspector General Evaluation Management System (IGEMS) (IGEMS-C for classified observations). Should IGEMS or IGEMS-C be selected, the wing will comply with DAFI 90-302, Chapter 9 and Attachment 9 requirements. ACC takeaways will be tracked by ACC/A10 and monitored for ACC staff action and resolution.

2.3. Crossfeed Reports.

2.3.1. The MAJCOM lead will publish semi-annual Nuclear Surety crossfeed reports. **(T-1)** These reports will identify deficiencies and their associated root cause(s) and corrective action(s) for significant observations if determined by the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team Chief, but will not attribute the deficiency to a particular wing. **(T-1)** Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit crossfeed reports will be classified in accordance with CJCSI 3263.05E, Enclosure F, paragraph 2. **(T-0)**

2.3.1.1. Semi-Annual crossfeed reports will be distributed electronically by the lead to the MAJCOM Commander, MAJCOM Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Leads, Numbered Air Force and/or Center Commanders, Air Force Safety Center (Weapons Safety Division), Air Force Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection (AF/A4), and all subordinate units at which Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits occur prior to 1 April and 1 October each calendar year. **(T-1)** In addition, the lead will provide these semi-annual crossfeed reports prior to 1 April and 1 October each calendar year to other MAJCOMs having a nuclear surety mission, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Office (AF/A10), and Studies, Analysis, and Assessments (AF/A9), for posting in a nuclear surety lessons learned database. **(T-1)**

2.3.1.2. MAJCOMs will determine an appropriate forum (e.g., Nuclear Surety Council Meetings, Nuclear Surety Working Groups) for discussing Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit-highlighted trends on an annual basis.

JEANNIE M. LEAVITT,
Major General, USAF
Chief of Safety

(ACC)

LAWRENCE M. AVERBECK, GS-15, DAF
Director, Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear
Integration

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

Department of Defense Manual 5210.42_ Air Force Manual 13-501, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program*, 19 December 2018

Department of the Air Force Instruction 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*, 26 March 2020

Department of the Air Force Instruction 21-101, *Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management*, 16 January 2020

Department of the Air Force Manual 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures*, 15 April 2022

Air Force Manual 21-202, *Missile Maintenance Management*, 29 August 2019

Air Force Manual 10-207, *Command Posts*, 11 April 2018

Air Force Policy Directive 91-1, *Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety*, 24 October 2019

Air Force Policy Directive 13-5, *Air Force Nuclear Mission*, 17 July 2018

Air Force Instruction 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, 23 March 2020

Air Force Instruction 90-201, *The Air Force Inspection System*, 20 November 2018

Air Force Instruction 63-125, *Nuclear Certification Program*, 16 January 2020

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3263.05E, *Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System*, 28 September 2020

(Added-ACC) AFI 21-103_ACCSUP, *Equipment Inventory, Status and Utilization Reporting*, 10 December 2020

(Added-ACC) AFI 91-117, *Safety Rules for the Airborne Launch Control System*, 29 August 2022

(Added-ACC) AFMAN 31-123-S, (U) *Physical Security Requirements for Nuclear Command and Control Facilities*, 29 July 2015

(Added-ACC) DAFI 21-103, *Equipment Inventory, Status and Utilization Reporting*, 1 November 2022

(Added-ACC) DAFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense (ID)*, 25 March 2020

(Added-ACC) DAFI 90-302, *The Inspection System of the Department of the Air Force*, 15 March 2023

(Added-ACC) EAP-STRAT Vol 1, *Commander United States Strategic Command Emergency Action Procedures*, 01 October 2022

(Added-ACC) TO 00-20-1, *Aerospace Equipment Maintenance Inspection, Documentation, Policies, and Procedures*, 26 September 2022

(Added-ACC) TO 00-33A-1001-WA-1, *Methods and Procedures – General Cyberspace Support Activities Management Procedures and Practice Requirements*, 11 May 2023

Prescribed Forms

None

(Added-ACC) None

Adopted Forms

(Added-ACC) DAF Form 623, *Individual Training Record Folder*

DAF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication

Abbreviations and Acronyms

(Added-ACC) **AEHF**—Advanced Extremely High Frequency

AFI—Air Force Instruction

(Added-ACC) **AFRC**—Air Force Reserve Command

(Added-ACC) **AGE**—Aerospace Ground Equipment

CJCSI—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

(Added-ACC) **COMACC or ACC/CC**—Commander, ACC

DAF—Department of the Air Force

(Added-ACC) **EA**—Emergency Action

(Added-ACC) **EAP**—Emergency Action Procedures

(Added-ACC) **IGEMS**—Inspector General Evaluation Management System

MAJCOM—MAJCOM

(Added-ACC) **MICT**—Management Internal Control Toolset

(Added-ACC) **NC2**—Nuclear Command and Control

(Added-ACC) **NC3**—Nuclear Command, Control and Communications

(Added-ACC) **NCE**—Nuclear Certified Equipment

(Added-ACC) **PRAP**—Personal Reliability Assurance Program

(Added-ACC) **RPIE**—Real Property Installed Equipment

(Added-ACC) **SOE**—Sequence of Events

(Added-ACC) **TBA**—Training Business Area

USAF—United States Air Force

Office Symbols

AF/A4—Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection

AF/A9—Air Force Director, Studies, Analyses and Assessments

AF/A10—Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration

(Added-ACC) HQ ACC/A10—ACC Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration Directorate

Terms

None

Attachment 2

NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT REPORT FORMAT

A2.1. Major Commands.

A2.1.1. MAJCOMs will determine which sections of the standardized format apply to their unique mission requirements. **(T-1)** This list is not all-inclusive, and MAJCOMs are encouraged to focus on additional areas identified as trends within the MAJCOM or specifically requested by the Wing Commander. MAJCOMs will adhere to the following format to the maximum extent practical to improve standardization across the USAF. **(T-1)**

A2.1.1.1. Executive Summary.

A2.1.1.2. Management.

A2.1.1.3. Operations.

A2.1.1.4. Personnel Reliability Assurance Program. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.5. Nuclear Surety Program.

A2.1.1.6. Civil Engineers. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.7. Munitions/Maintenance.

A2.1.1.8. Nuclear Security. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.9. Intrusion Detection System Maintenance. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.10. Nuclear Weapons Loading and Mating Exercise.

A2.1.1.11. Recapture/Recovery Exercise.

A2.1.1.12. Special Assignment Airlift Mission.

A2.1.1.13. Vehicle Management. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.14. Emergency Response

A2.1.1.15. Outstanding Performers.

A2.1.1.16. **(Added-ACC)** Area Denial/Anti-Hijacking Exercise.

A2.1.2. Operations.

A2.1.2.1. Nuclear Control Order Procedures.

A2.1.2.1.1. Command Post Nuclear Control Order Procedures.

A2.1.2.1.2. Aircrew/Missile Crew Nuclear Control Order Procedures.

A2.1.2.2. Aircrew/Missile Crew Nuclear Operations.

A2.1.2.2.1. Combat Mission Folders.

A2.1.2.2.2. Positive Control Documents.

A2.1.2.2.3. Coded Switch Procedures.

A2.1.2.2.4. Missile Crew Weapon System Procedures

- A2.1.2.2.5. Missile Control Procedures
- A2.1.2.3. Command Post Security. (**Note 3**)
- A2.1.2.4. Top Secret Control Accounts.
- A2.1.2.5. Single Channel Anti-Jam Man-Portable Operations.
 - A2.1.2.5.1. Fixed Site Single Channel Anti-jam Man-Portable Operations.
 - A2.1.2.5.2. Mobile Single Channel Anti-jam Man-Portable Operations.
- A2.1.2.6. Safe Passage Procedures
 - A2.1.2.6.1. (**Added-ACC**) COMSEC Support.
 - A2.1.2.6.2. (**Added-ACC**) Mission Support.
- A2.1.3. Personnel Reliability Assurance Program.
 - A2.1.3.1. Force Support Squadron, Personnel Reliability Assurance Program Satellite Offices, Security Forces Squadrons, and Unit Programs. (**Note 3**)
 - A2.1.3.2. Military Treatment Facility Support. (**Note 3**)
- A2.1.4. Nuclear Surety Program.
 - A2.1.4.1. Program Management.
 - A2.1.4.2. Inspection Program.
 - A2.1.4.3. Nuclear Surety Training.
 - A2.1.4.4. Nuclear Weapon Access/Two-Person Concept.
 - A2.1.4.5. Nuclear Certified Equipment Program. (**Note 5**)
 - A2.1.4.6. Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance Program.
 - A2.1.4.7. Radiation Safety Program.
 - A2.1.4.8. Miscellaneous Programs.
- A2.1.5. Civil Engineers. (**Note 3**)
 - A2.1.5.1. Operations.
 - A2.1.5.1.1. Lightning Protection, Static Bonding, and Grounding.
 - A2.1.5.1.2. Emergency Backup Power.
 - A2.1.5.1.3. Nuclear Hoists.
 - A2.1.5.1.4. Blast Door Inspection.
 - A2.1.5.1.5. Earth Covered Magazine.
 - A2.1.5.1.6. Nuclear Haul Routes.
 - A2.1.5.1.7. Facility Maintenance and Upkeep.
 - A2.1.5.2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
 - A2.1.5.2.1. Management.

- A2.1.5.2.2. Render Safe/Continuation Procedures.
- A2.1.5.2.3. Emergency Response.
- A2.1.6. Munitions.
 - A2.1.6.1. Management.
 - A2.1.6.2. Stockpile and Housekeeping.
 - A2.1.6.3. Key and Lock Management.
 - A2.1.6.4. Tools, Test, Tiedown and Handling Equipment.
 - A2.1.6.5. Technical Operations.
 - A2.1.6.6. Munitions Control.
 - A2.1.6.7. Nuclear Weapons Loading and Mating.
 - A2.1.6.8. Supply Support. (**Note 3**)
- A2.1.7. Nuclear Security.
 - A2.1.7.1. Operations.
 - A2.1.7.2. Administration.
 - A2.1.7.3. Training and Resources.
 - A2.1.7.4. Standardization/Evaluation.
 - A2.1.7.5. Response Force Exercise.
- A2.1.8. Intrusion Detection System Maintenance. (**Note 3**)
- A2.1.9. Nuclear Weapon Loading and Mating Exercise.
- A2.1.10. Recapture/Recovery Exercise.
- A2.1.11. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force.
- A2.1.12. Logistics Readiness. (**Note 3**)
 - A2.1.12.1. Materiel Management.
 - A2.1.12.2. Deployment and Distribution.
 - A2.1.12.3. Vehicle Management.
- A2.1.13. Air Force Major Graded Area Emergency Exercises. (**Note 4**)
- A2.1.14. Outstanding Performers.

Note 1: Order categories in each section as follows:

Strength

Repeat Significant Observation

Significant Observation

Repeat Observation

Observation

Recommended Improvement Areas

Note 2: Observation (with references) will include:
Impact.
Recommendation.

Note 3: At a Joint Base where Air Force is a supported service, these functions are performed either partially or wholly by the sister service for the Air Force mission. In reference to Joint Bases, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal function is considered mission support. Where Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal is assigned at non-lead joint bases and the nuclear mission is primarily Air Force, the Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal flight will respond as the initial response force.

Note 4: Emergency Exercises along with sub areas in accordance with AFI 90-201, paragraph 4.11.3. Emergency Exercises (e.g., Command Disablement, Emergency Response, Disaster Response Force, Security Force, Munitions/Maintenance....)

Note 4: (ACC) Reference to AFI 90-201, Paragraph 4.11.3 replaced with DAFI 90-302, Paragraph A2.1 and Table A2.1.

Note 5: Verification or current training and accountability of Nuclear Certified Equipment is integral to Nuclear Surety. All units whether nuclear tasked or non-nuclear tasked will have nuclear certified equipment monitors responsible for annual inventory of assets in accordance with AFI 63-125.

Attachment 3

PREPARING FOR NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT

A3.1. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Preparation Guide.

A3.1.1. Preparation for Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits should use this guide.

A3.1.2. MAJCOMs may deviate from this guide as required to meet their requirements.

A3.2. Schedule of Events.

A3.2.1. INITIAL NOTIFICATION: SCHEDULE OF EVENTS PREP: start T-60 days, finish T-45 days

A3.2.2. Send formal visit message to the unit and info copy the Numbered Air Force and/or Center, and host MAJCOM (as required).

Note: Verify the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit days with a point of contact from the unit prior to formal visit message.

A3.2.3. Determine unit point of contact.

A3.2.4. Ensure unit point of contact begins coordination on the draft schedule of events. (It is common to use a prior year's schedule as a starting point).

A3.2.5. Designate team chief. Notify team chief of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit dates.

A3.2.6. Update and verify appropriate MAJCOM Functional Organization list.

A3.2.7. Notify MAJCOM Functional Organization list.

A3.2.8. Update appropriate MAJCOM long range schedules.

A3.2.9. Schedule conference room for pre-departure briefing.

A3.3. Team Support: start T-45 days, finish T-25.

A3.3.1. Obtain team member names from the staff. Required information: Full Name as it appears for personnel shortages, have appropriate functional area arrange for augmentees. Request Numbered Air Force/Center augmentees if necessary. Request email address for augmentees in addition to standard team member personal information.

A3.3.2. Send team roster, vehicle needs and special requests to the unit point of contact so that they can begin making billeting/vehicle/work center arrangements. Update any subsequent changes with point of contact as they occur. Find out if team will be staying on or off base. Request wing key personnel roster and base map.

A3.3.3. Make travel arrangements for MAJCOM team members (travel/aircraft validation).

A3.3.4. Email team roster/Organizational Defense Travel Administrator fund authorization letter to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members for order preparation.

A3.3.5. Email travel information, itinerary, per diem costs, pre-departure briefing time/location and any miscellaneous information to local team members. Have them arrange temporary duty orders.

A3.3.6. Send team travel info, fund cite/Organizational Defense Travel Administrator fund authorization letter and approximate travel/per diem costs to augmentees. Have them make their arrival times as close to the team arrival times as possible, so the base can pick everyone up together. Have them create their own orders.

A3.4. Schedule of Events Coordination: start T-40 days, finish T-30 days.

A3.4.1. Receive draft schedule of events from wing point of contact.

A3.4.2. E-mail draft schedule of events to team members for review/input.

A3.4.3. Coordinate schedule of events with other MAJCOMs if conducting a multi-MAJCOM Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit.

A3.4.4. Compile schedule of events inputs/recommendations/changes.

A3.5. Trip Preparation Actions: start T-20 days, finish T-10 days.

A3.5.1. Re-confirm travel, billeting, and transportation arrangements.

A3.5.2. Arrange bus transportation to/from airport as required.

A3.5.3. Receive travel verification/itineraries from augmentees.

A3.5.4. Finalize the schedule of events with the unit and send to all team members.

A3.5.5. Generate entry authorization list for review at pre-departure briefing. Ensure entry authorization list is marked Controlled Unclassified Information and contains the Privacy Act Statement. Have team chief sign first sheet.

A3.5.6. Prepare laptop computer and/or disk for the visit.

A3.5.7. Update the pre-departure briefing with pertinent info.

A3.5.8. Verify conference room date and time at least 7 days prior to briefing.

A3.6. Team Chief Book: start T-14 days, finish T-3 days.

A3.6.1. Build team chief book no later than the day before the brief. Include: team roster, Entry Authorization List, schedule of events, wing key personnel list, base map, unit observation forms, travel itinerary, inbrief, draft out brief, draft report, AFI 90-201 and MAJCOM supplements, AFI 91-121, and a copy of the unit's previous Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit report.

A3.6.2. Present team chief book no later than the day before the brief.

A3.7. Team Documents: start T-14 days, finish T-3 days. Assemble team member documents. Include: finalized schedule of events, unit/team member observation forms, outstanding performer forms, team roster, wing key personnel list, pre-departure briefing, draft out brief, draft report, AFI 90-201 and MAJCOM supplements, AFI 91-121, and anything else that might be useful.

A3.8. Pre-Departure Brief: start and finish T-3 days.

A3.8.1. Email out team documents.

A3.8.2. Present briefing and address any outstanding issues.

A3.8.3. Have team members review Entry Authorization List for correctness.

A3.9. Conduct Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit: start T-0 days, finish T+5 days.

A3.10. Post Temporary Duty Actions: start T+6 days, finish T+25 days.

A3.10.1. Send out Augmentee "Thank You" letters from lead division.

A3.10.2. Send significant observation message to wing, listing a MAJCOM point of contact for each significant observation (usually the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team member that authored the observation in the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Report).

A3.10.2. (ACC) Recommend wing IG enter IG-validated observations into IGEMS/IGEMS-C for appropriate tracking, root-cause analysis, and monitoring until closure.

A3.11. Significant Observation Resolution: start T+6 days, finish T+60 days. Receive Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit significant observation resolution message from wing.

A3.12. Significant Observation Resolution Coordination: start T+60 days, finish T+90 days. Forward resolution message to appropriate MAJCOM points of contact.

A3.13. Tracking/Follow-up: When MAJCOMs determine tracking and follow up reports are required, the following actions will be taken: Forward resolution message to appropriate MAJCOM points of contact. **(T-1)** Once all MAJCOM points of contact are satisfied that the wing's corrective action addresses the root cause of the discrepancy, the lead division will forward a message to the wing to confirm that all significant observations have been closed. **(T-1)**