

**BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER  
SPACE LAUNCH DELTA 45 (SPACE  
FORCE)**

**SPACE LAUNCH DELTA 45  
INSTRUCTION**

**10-2401**

**21 AUGUST 2025**

**Operations**

**MISSION ASSURANCE – DEFEND THE  
MISSION**



**COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY**

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This instruction implements Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3020.40, Mission Assurance, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3020.45, Mission Assurance Construct, and Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-24, Mission Assurance. It establishes specific roles, responsibilities, and procedures for implementing the Space Launch Delta (SLD) 45 Mission Assurance (MA) program in accordance with Department of the Air Force and United States Space Force policies. This instruction applies to all SLD 45 and Geographically Separated Units (GSU), as well as all tenant units on Patrick Space Force Base (PSFB) and Cape Canaveral Space Force Station (CCSFS), except where noted otherwise. Tenant units shall comply with this instruction in addition to their parent service/agency MA guidance. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in this publication adhere to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-322, Records Management and Information Governance Program, and are disposed in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the Department of the Air Force (DAF) Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route DAF Form 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the publication OPR for consideration. The certifier of this publication has final authority for any waivers. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by the Department of the Air Force.

## **1. Mission Assurance Overview.**

**1.1. The goal of Mission Assurance (MA) is to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of mission capabilities and assets including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains critical to the performance of SLD 45 mission-essential functions (MEFs) in any operating environment or condition.**

**1.2. The SLD 45 uses MA as the structure and process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets by refining, integrating and synchronizing the aspects of security, protection, and risk management programs that directly relate to mission execution.** MA is an integrative framework – not a single policy or program – that emphasizes defensive, resilience and reconstitution actions and prioritizes efforts to reduce risks from a range of complex threats and hazards.

### **1.3. SLD 45 MA functions include:**

1.3.1. Identification. Identify and prioritize critical assets and mission-essential capabilities linked to SLD 45 missions.

1.3.2. Assessment. Support and build upon the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved Mission Assurance Assessment (MAA) program that addresses applicable threats, hazards, vulnerabilities and risk to assets, systems, and essential capabilities supporting mission-essential functions.

1.3.3. Risk Management. Employ risk-informed decision making to optimize remediation/mitigation solutions to achieve an acceptable level of risk.

1.3.4. Monitor. Maintain situational awareness of the risks related to assets supporting mission-essential functions.

1.3.5. Participate in and/or provide information for MA governance forums at the DAF, United States Space Force (USSF), and FLDCOM levels, as required.

**1.4. The SLD 45 MA office will be referred to as Mission Assurance – Defend the Mission (MA-DtM) to avoid confusion with organizations performing launch mission assurance.**

## **2. Roles and Responsibilities.**

**2.1. The Space Launch Delta 45 Commander (SLD 45/CC) is ultimately responsible for risk management decisions affecting SLD 45 assets, processes, and capabilities.**

**2.2. The SLD 45 Deputy Commander (SLD 45/CD) will chair the SLD 45 Mission Assurance Coordination Board (MACB) and bring any unresolved issues to the SLD 45/CC and/or FLDCOM or USSF MA Forums as needed.**

**2.3. Commanders and Directors will elevate MA-related concerns through the SLD 45 Mission Assurance Integration Lead (MAIL) to the SLD 45 MACB, Mission Assurance Working Group (MAWG), and/or other MA-related Working Group (WG), as applicable, to report significant issues up to applicable organization governance structures.**

**2.4. The SLD 45 Mission Assurance Integration Lead (MAIL) provides oversight and integration of programs and personnel required to protect and ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets, including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains, critical to the execution of SLD 45 mission-essential functions in any operating environment or condition. MAIL duties include:**

- 2.4.1. Lead, define, manage, and integrate the efforts of functional teams across SLD 45 to ensure Department of Defense, United States Air Force (USAF), USSF, FLDCOM, MAJCOM, and SLD 45 objectives are met.
- 2.4.2. Execute an MA program focused on continued function and resilience of SLD 45 capabilities under all circumstances across the spectrum of threats and hazards. Elevate unresolved MA matters to/through higher leadership.
- 2.4.3. Establish the SLD 45 MACB and MAWG.
- 2.4.4. Track the implementation of courses of action, to include low and no cost actions.
- 2.4.5. Serve as a functional authority for all facets of MA within SLD 45.
- 2.4.6. Enable Commander's risk-based decision making by leveraging existing working groups and processes to gain a holistic picture of mission assurance efforts across SLD 45.
- 2.4.7. Provide a platform for information sharing and facilitate stakeholder input required for mission execution. Informed by DAF sustainment and mission partner MA initiatives.
- 2.4.8. Develop goals and objectives and advocate for integration of mission assurance requirements across SLD 45.
- 2.4.9. Provide staff agencies and squadrons with direction and advice regarding mission assurance policies, procedures, and guidelines.
- 2.4.10. Review and structure associated teams, such as the SLD 45 MACB, MAWG, and other MA-related WGs to optimize use of resources and maximize the efficiency and effectiveness to meet mission requirements and objectives.
- 2.4.11. Publish and update SLD 45 MA-DtM policies to synchronize and integrate Department of Defense (DoD) security, protection, and risk management programs and activities within the MA construct. Review and coordinate on all SLD 45 publications and instructions under the MA umbrella.
- 2.4.12. Participate in functional area WGs and advise the Delta Commander, Deputy Commander, or designated military/civilian personnel of any significant security, protection, or risk management topics that shall be raised during the SLD 45 MACB.
- 2.4.13. Maintain and review MA-related security, protection, and risk management data and provide that data to SLD 45 organizations as applicable.
- 2.4.14. Function as the SLD 45 primary point of contact for all MA assessments to include, but not limited to, Joint Mission Assurance Assessments (JMAA) conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

### 3. Process.

**3.1. SLD 45 implements the MA Construct as part of the DoD-wide process to identify, assess, manage and monitor risks to mission.** SLD 45 MA-DtM aims to ensure mission success via the pursuit of three tenets: Defense, Resilience, and Reconstitution.

3.1.1. **Defense.** Activities or operations undertaken to interrupt an adversary kill chain or provide warning or insight to the targeted mission system in support of defensive actions.

3.1.2. **Resilience.** The ability of an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced capability, and across a wide range of scenarios, condition, hazards, and threats.

3.1.3. **Reconstitution.** Plans or operations to bring new assets online to replenish lost or diminished functions to an acceptable level for a particular mission, operation, or contingency after an attack, catastrophic event, or natural disaster.

**3.2. SLD 45 MA-DtM will focus on mission assurance for assets, capabilities, and functions required to execute launch and range operations.** This includes personnel, ground systems, facilities, equipment, and processes related to instrumentation, power, communications, transportation and logistics, security, and other direct support functions.

**3.3. The MA process will follow the DoDI 3020.45, Mission Assurance Construct, four-step risk-management process of Identify, Assess, Manage, and Monitor, tailored for SLD 45. For further information, see Chapter 4.**

### 4. Mission Assurance Construct.

**4.1. The MAIL facilitates implementation of the MA Construct within SLD 45.** The Construct consists of four processes: Identification, Assessment, Risk Management, and Monitoring and Reporting.

4.1.1. SLD 45 implementation of the MA Construct supports and feeds into the higher-level FLDCOM and USSF MA execution.

4.1.2. The MAIL will integrate and synchronize policy, planning, and implementation efforts across SLD 45 Mission Assurance Related Programs and Activities (MARPA), OPRs, Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), and appropriate critical service providers.

4.1.3. The MAIL will leverage established structures and processes imbedded within the SLD 45 Enterprise and coordinate efforts to share information on MA initiatives, while encouraging integration and synchronization to work across stovepipes and improve situational awareness.

#### 4.2. Identification.

4.2.1. The goal of the MA identification process is to synchronize the various MA-related programs and activities to identify a list of mission-essential capabilities. This process includes robust mission decomposition, notification, and validation methodology.

4.2.2. The MAIL will provide support, information, and communications to/from FLDCOM and USSF for the Identification process.

4.2.3. The MAIL will receive guidance and direction from FLDCOM and USSF MA Forums and will relay and revector SLD 45 efforts as necessary to align.

4.2.4. The properly executed Identification process results in validated Defense Critical Asset (DCA) and Task Critical Asset (TCA) lists.

4.2.5. The Identification process informs the Assessment phase of the MA Construct.

#### **4.3. Assessment.**

4.3.1. The intent of the Assessment process is to identify risks to mission, DCAs, TCAs, critical systems, and their dependent assets, as well as provide recommendations to mitigate those risks.

4.3.2. Mission Assurance Assessments (MAAs), to include local assessments (i.e. All-Hazards Threat Assessment (AHTA), Integrated Defense Risk Management Process (IDRMP), Local Vulnerability Assessment (LVA), etc.), rely on the critical asset lists produced during the Identification process of the MA construct. MAAs are based on the DoD Mission Assurance Assessment Benchmarks.

4.3.3. Joint MAAs (JMAAs) performed by DTRA will require the SLD 45 MAIL to coordinate with DTRA assessment personnel as many as 180 days prior to the assessment. JMAAs may also require the SLD 45 MAIL to coordinate with USAF, USSF, FLDCOM, and/or MAJCOM personnel.

4.3.4. Each SLD 45 unit/staff agency has an MA responsibility and will ensure the MAIL is apprised of all findings discovered during their respective MAAs.

4.3.5. The results of the Assessment phase inform the Risk Management process.

#### **4.4. Risk Management.**

4.4.1. The goal of the MA risk management process is to identify and implement solutions to achieve a level of acceptable risk by mission owners based on a thorough understanding of the limits on DoD resources. Risks may be identified during any MA-related assessment performed by DTRA, other outside agencies, and/or local SMEs.

4.4.2. Upon the discovery/identification of a risk, the MAIL ensures the information is communicated to SLD 45 leadership, the appropriate SLD 45 MARPAs, and to the SLD 45 MACB while ensuring proper classification of data and need-to-know requirements are met by users based upon published DoD security classification guidance.

4.4.3. If an MA-related WG is needed to address the risk, request creation of the WG by the SLD 45 MACB Chair.

4.4.4. Risk management will be coordinated with the appropriate mission and asset owners. Mission owners provide Mission Mitigation Plans and asset owners provide Risk Response Plans, when applicable, to address risks.

4.4.5. SLD 45/CC is the ultimate decision authority to accept, mitigate, or remediate risks to SLD 45 assets.

#### **4.5. Monitoring and Reporting.**

4.5.1. The goal of the Monitoring and Reporting process is to maintain situational awareness of the risks to mission. This is accomplished via updates on plans, projects, and/or processes designed to address the risks identified during the previous phases.

4.5.2. Threat and hazard streams are regularly and routinely monitored by the 45th Security Forces Squadron, Air Force Office of Special Investigations Det 802, SLD 45/Intelligence, 45th Civil Engineering Squadron Emergency Management, 45th Medical Group Force Health Protection, and/or the 45th Weather Squadron, as applicable.

4.5.3. Updates will be provided by the MAIL on SLD 45 Risk Response Plans, when applicable.

4.5.4. Changes in operational status and unanticipated risks, when these affect the overall MA status of critical assets, will be reported to SLD 45 leadership as swiftly as possible.

4.5.5. The MAIL will provide updates at the SLD 45 MACB, MAWG, and/or other MARPA meetings and working groups, as applicable. Information will be reported up to FLDCOM and/or USSF MA Forums, as applicable.

## **5. Mission Partners/Tenants.**

**5.1. All DoD mission partners/tenant units on SLD 45 installations or residing in separate defense agency-owned or commercial leased spaces, will participate in applicable installation MA structures and processes.**

**5.2. Mission partners/tenants participate in SLD 45 MARPAs as stipulated in their respective support agreement.**

**5.3. Mission partners/tenants will elevate risks and MA-related issues through their chain of command to their respective MAJCOM or FLDCOM MA.** Concurrently they should also notify the SLD 45 MACB, MAWG and/or MA-related WGs.

## **6. Information Sharing.**

**6.1. Need to Share.** SLD 45 MACB, MAWG, and MA-related WGs are complimentary in nature and require open cross-communication. Success of the MA Construct relies on information sharing, synchronization, and collaboration.

**6.2. Protection.** Information must be safeguarded and secured appropriately, based on the sensitivity of the information. It should be shared only with authorized DoD personnel and mission partners with the need-to-know. SLD 45 MARPAs performing MA activities will share information, policy, and mission requirements with SLD 45 program OPRs as well as other Assured Access to Space (AATS) POCs as necessary to implement the MA construct.

**6.3. Classification Guidance.** It is the responsibility of the SLD 45 MA-DtM community to safeguard National Defense related interests by protecting information from the compilation of data. All MARPAs will follow the classification guidance prescribed in the Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) Line of Effort (LOE) Security Classification Guide (SCG) as well as any additional applicable security classification guidance.

## **7. Governance and Reporting.**

**7.1. The SLD 45/CD will chair the SLD 45 MACB.** The SLD 45 MACB will review MA efforts across all squadrons and agencies; validate operational risk management priorities, remediation plans, and resource requirements; and when necessary, raise issues to FLDCOM and/or USSF.

**7.2. Unit/Squadron commanders and Delta Staff Agency leaders will identify risks and issues to elevate to the SLD 45 MACB, MAWG and/or MA-related WGs, as required.**

**7.3. The MAIL, under the supervision of SLD 45/CD, will compile results from assessments, risks, and issues to include in annual reporting to FLDCOM and USSF MA authorities as directed.** This reporting will follow FLDCOM defined formats and processes.

**7.4. For issues that require elevation outside the SLD 45 chain, the MAIL will coordinate with the SLD 45 staff and FLDCOM to prepare briefings and documentation for USSF and DAF MA governance boards and working groups when requested.**

**7.5. SLD 45 personnel will support any DoD, DAF, USSF, or FLDCOM Mission Assurance Assessments and/or staff assistance visits related to SLD 45 operations and assets as directed.** This includes providing subject matter experts, access, escorts, data, and other requested resources.

BRIAN L. CHATMAN  
Colonel, USSF  
Commander

**Attachment 1****GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

CJCSI 3209.01A, *Mission Assurance Construct Implementation*, 23 August 2023

DoDD 3020.40, *Mission Assurance (MA)*, November 29, 2016, Change 1, September 11, 2018

DoDI 3020.45, *Mission Assurance (MA) Construct*, August 14, 2018, Change 1, May 2, 2022

*DoD Mission Assurance Assessment (MAA) Benchmarks*, 05 September 2023

*Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) Line of Effort (LOE) Security Classification Guide (SCG)*, 27 July 2018

DoDM 5200.01V2\_AFMAN16-1404V2, *Information Security Program: Marking of Information*, 07 January 2021

AFPD 10-24, *Mission Assurance*, 05 November 2019

AFI 10-2402, *Critical Asset Risk Management (CARM) Program*, 29 August 2017

AFI 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, 23 March 2020, Change 1, 28 July 2021

***Prescribed Forms***

DAF Form 673, *Department of the Air Force Publication/Form Action Request*

***Adopted Forms***

None

***Abbreviations and Acronyms***

**AFI**—Air Force Instruction

**AFPD**—Air Force Policy Directive

**AFMAN**—Air Force Manual

**CARM**—Critical Asset Risk Management

**CBRN**—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

**CBRNE**—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosives

**COOP**—Continuity of Operations

**C-sUAS**—Counter Small Unmanned Aircraft System

**DAF**—Department of the Air Force

**DCA**—Defense Critical Asset

**DCI**—Defense Critical Infrastructure

**DoD**—Department of Defense

**DoDD**—Department of Defense Directive  
**DoDI**—Department of Defense Instruction  
**DTRA**—Defense Threat Reduction Agency  
**EM**—Emergency Management  
**FLDCOM**—Field Command  
**JMAA**—Joint Mission Assurance Assessment  
**LOE**—Line of Effort  
**MA**—Mission Assurance  
**MAA**—Mission Assurance Assessment  
**MACB**—Mission Assurance Coordination Board  
**MA—DtM**—Mission Assurance – Defend the Mission  
**MAIL**—Mission Assurance Integration Lead  
**MAJCOM**—Major Command  
**MARPA**—Mission Assurance Related Program and Activity  
**MAWG**—Mission Assurance Working Group  
**MEF**—Mission Essential Function  
**OPR**—Office of Primary Responsibility  
**POC**—Point of Contact  
**RRP**—Risk Response Plan  
**SCG**—Security Classification Guide  
**SLD**—Space Launch Delta  
**SME**—Subject Matter Expert  
**TCA**—Task Critical Asset  
**USAF**—United States Air Force  
**USSF**—United States Space Force  
**WG**—Working Group

*Office Symbols*

**SLD 45/CC**—Space Launch Delta 45 Commander  
**SLD 45/CD**—Space Launch Delta 45 Deputy Commander  
**SLD 45/CDM**—Space Launch Delta 45 Mission Assurance Integration Lead

### *Terms*

**Air Force Task List (AFTL)**—Provides a comprehensive framework for all the tasks that the Air Force performs in contribution to national defense. These tasks include Air Force capabilities provided in support of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) across the spectrum of conflict and operations, as well as the tasks required of the Air Force to organize, train, equip, and provide capable aerospace forces. Source: Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1

**Asset**—A distinguishable entity that provides a service or capability. Assets are people, physical entities, or information located either within or outside the United States and employed, owned, or operated by domestic, foreign, public, or private sector organizations. Source: DoDD 3020.40

**Asset Owner**—The DoD Component or subcomponent with PPBE responsibility for a DoD asset, or organizations that own or operate a non-DoD asset. Source: DoDI 3020.45

**Critical**—The designation assigned to a capability, system, or asset that without which will significantly degrade or prevent execution of a supported strategic mission. Source: DoDI 3020.45

**Defense Critical Asset (DCA)**—An asset of such extraordinary importance to operations in peace, crisis, and war that its incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of the DoD to fulfill its missions. Source: DoDD 3020.40

**Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI)**—Department of Defense and non-Department of Defense networked assets and facilities essential to project, support, and sustain military forces and operations worldwide. Source: DoDD 3020.40

**Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) Line of Effort (LOE)**—Those selective actions under the MA Construct directly related to the risk management of DCI. This effort is asset-focused, whereas MA manages all risks to strategic missions, including those from DCI. Source: DoDI 3020.45

**Hazard**—A condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation. Source: DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

**Infrastructure**—The framework of interdependent physical and cyber-based systems comprising identifiable industries, institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow of products and services essential to the defense and economic security of the United States, to the smooth functioning of government at all levels, and to society as a whole. Source: DoDD 3020.40

**Mission Assurance (MA)**—A process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets - including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains - critical to the execution of DoD mission-essential functions in any operating environment or condition. Source: DoDD 3020.40

**Mission Assurance Assessment (MAA)**—Assessment of the disciplines under the mission assurance umbrella (antiterrorism; DCI; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosives (CBRNE) preparedness; Chemical, Biological Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) survivability; emergency management; cybersecurity; explosives safety; physical security; continuity of operations, force health protection) to identify vulnerabilities and gaps that could prevent accomplishment of a unit, installation, or higher authority mission. Source: DoDD 3020.40

**Mission Assurance Construct**—The DoD-wide risk management approach that synchronizes and integrates aspects of multiple security, protection, and risk management efforts throughout DoD to manage the risk to the Department’s strategic missions. The MA Construct is made up of four processes: identification, assessment, risk management, and monitoring. Source: DoDI 3020.45

**Mission Essential Function (MEF)**—Select function that is necessary to lead and sustain the United States during a catastrophic emergency and that, therefore, must be supported through Continuity of Operations (COOP), Continuity of Government (COG), and Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG) capabilities. Source: DoDD 3020.26

**Mission Essential Task (MET)**—Task based on mission analysis and approved by the commander that is necessary, indispensable, or critical to the success of a mission. Source: DoDD 7730.65

**Mission Essential Task List (METL)**—An operational readiness construct that describes capabilities for assessment and reporting of readiness to conduct the missions prescribed in the National Military Strategy. A METL consists of mission essential tasks (METs) with associated conditions and standards and appropriate supporting tasks. Source: DoDD 7730.65

**Mitigation**—Actions taken in response to a warning or after an incident occurs that are intended to lessen the potentially adverse effects on a given military operation or infrastructure. Source: DoDD 3020.40

**Remediation**—Actions taken to correct known deficiencies and weaknesses once a vulnerability has been identified. Source: DoDD 3020.40

**Resilience**—The ability of an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, in spite of hostile action or adverse conditions. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative government, commercial, or international capabilities. Source: DoDD 3100.10

**Risk**—Probability and severity of loss linked to threats or hazards and vulnerabilities. Source: DoDD 3020.40

**Risk Management**—A process by which decision makers accept, reduce, or offset risk and subsequently make decisions that weigh overall risk against mission benefits. Risk management is composed of risk assessment and risk response. Source: DoDD 3020.40

**Task Critical Asset (TCA)**—An asset that is of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or destruction would have a serious, debilitating effect on the ability of one or more DoD or OSD Components to execute the capability or mission-essential task it supports. TCAs are used to identify defense critical assets (DCAs). Source: DoDD 3020.40

**Threat**—An adversary having the intent, capability, and opportunity to cause loss or damage. Source: DoDD 3020.40

**Vulnerability**—A weakness or susceptibility of an installation, system, asset, application, or dependencies that could cause it to suffer a degradation or loss (incapacity to perform its designated function) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of threat or hazard. Source: AFPD 10-24

**Attachment 2****SLD 45 MISSION ASSURANCE RELATED PROGRAMS & ACTIVITIES (MARPAS)**

- A2.1. Antiterrorism.**
- A2.2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosives (CBRNE).**
- A2.3. Communications and Network Infrastructure.**
- A2.4. Continuity of Operations (COOP).**
- A2.5. Counter-Insider Threat.**
- A2.6. Counter Small Unmanned Aircraft System (C-sUAS).**
- A2.7. Cybersecurity/Cyber Defense/Operations.**
- A2.8. Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) & Supporting Infrastructure.**
- A2.9. Defense Security Enterprise.**
- A2.10. Emergency Management (EM).**
- A2.11. Energy Resilience.**
- A2.12. Explosive Safety and Munitions Risk Management.**
- A2.13. Fire Prevention and Protection.**
- A2.14. Force Health Protection.**
- A2.15. Law Enforcement.**
- A2.16. Operational Energy.**
- A2.17. Physical Security.**
- A2.18. Range Management.**
- A2.19. Range Operations.**
- A2.20. Readiness Reporting.**
- A2.21. Safety.**
- A2.22. Space Launch Mission Assurance.**

### Attachment 3

#### SLD 45 MISSION ASSURANCE COORDINATION BOARD (MACB) CHARTER

**A3.1. Introduction.** The Space Launch Delta 45 Mission Assurance Coordination Board (SLD 45 MACB) is a Delta-level board to address risks to mission due to threats and hazards.

**A3.2. Purpose.**

A3.2.1. Identify and address SLD 45 Mission Assurance-Defend the Mission (MA-DtM) issues.

A3.2.2. Advise SLD 45 senior leadership on DoD, USAF, USSF, FLDCOM, and SLD 45 MA-DtM policies and issues.

A3.2.3. Foster MA awareness within SLD 45 by providing a forum for collaboration on MA-DtM efforts.

A3.2.4. Provide a common management environment for planning, coordinating, integrating, and administering all SLD 45 MA-DtM efforts.

A3.2.5. Develop positions and policy recommendations for submission to a formal coordination process, as applicable.

**A3.3. Objectives.**

A3.3.1. Serve as the principal, working-level, advisory forum for developing and providing SLD 45 MA-DtM policy, programs, and oversight recommendations.

A3.3.2. Assist the USAF, USSF, MAJCOM, and/or FLDCOM MA POCs by:

A3.3.2.1. Monitoring activities relating to overall USAF, USSF, MAJCOM, and/or FLDCOM MA planning, program development, and execution.

A3.3.2.2. Supporting and leveraging Air Force and Space Force MA-related programs.

3) Ensuring MA policies and standards are integrated into appropriate policy guidance.

A3.3.3. Develop SLD 45 MA-DtM functional objectives, as well as processes, definitions, critical asset criteria, and data collection methodology to:

A3.3.3.1. Support the assessment of risks to SLD 45 missions and capabilities.

A3.3.3.2. Provide situational awareness of critical infrastructure asset availability and reliability.

A3.3.3.3. Support consequence management and continuity of operations decisions.

d. Provide a forum for the SLD 45 MA-DtM community to vet MA-related policies and procedures, raise MA-related issues, share information of mutual interest, and coordinate issues and recommendations among the members prior to formal staffing.

A3.3.4. Identify and prioritize critical SLD 45-owned and/or managed assets and assess risk to mission due to threats and hazards. Assist SLD 45 asset owners and units in the development of Risk Response Plans (RRPs) for critical assets and infrastructure.

A3.3.5. In case of loss or disruption to a critical infrastructure, develop strategies for mitigating the effects of such loss or disruption and include in Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans.

A3.3.6. Incorporate MA concepts into SLD 45 installation-level exercises to instill an awareness of the impact caused by the loss of critical assets through the exploitation of their vulnerabilities so that lessons learned are applied to remediate such vulnerabilities.

#### **A3.4. Membership.**

A3.4.1. The SLD 45/CD will chair the SLD 45 MACB.

A3.4.2. The MACB membership consists of designated representatives from the following SLD 45 Mission Assurance Related Programs and Activities (MARPAs). These representatives should have subject matter expertise and the capacity to view topics from an Enterprise perspective.

A3.4.2.1. Antiterrorism

A3.4.2.2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosives

A3.4.2.3. Communications and Network Infrastructure

A3.4.2.4. Continuity of Operations

A3.4.2.5. Counter-Insider Threat

A3.4.2.6. Counter Small Unmanned Aircraft System

A3.4.2.7. Cybersecurity/Cyber Defense/Operations

A3.4.2.8. Defense Critical Infrastructure Program & Supporting Infrastructure

A3.4.2.9. Defense Security Enterprise

A3.4.2.10. Emergency Management

A3.4.2.11. Energy Resilience

A3.4.2.12. Explosive Safety and Munitions Risk Management

A3.4.2.13. Fire Prevention and Protection

A3.4.2.14. Force Health Protection

A3.4.2.15. Law Enforcement

A3.4.2.16. Operational Energy

A3.4.2.17. Physical Security

A3.4.2.18. Range Management

A3.4.2.19. Range Operations

A3.4.2.20. Readiness Reporting

A3.4.2.21. Safety

A3.4.2.22. Space Launch Mission Assurance

A3.4.3. Other members of the SLD 45 MACB may include asset owners, process owners, and unit leadership.

A3.4.4. Membership in the SLD 45 MAWG (see charter item 7.) will consist of the SMEs and asset/process owners.

A3.4.5. Membership in other MA-related WGs is dependent on the topic.

### **A3.5. Organization.**

A3.5.1. The SLD 45/CD will chair the SLD 45 MACB. He or she will:

A3.5.1.1. Act as the OPR for identification, assessment, and enhancement of SLD 45 MA-DtM.

A3.5.1.2. Provide direction to the SLD 45 MACB to facilitate execution of its assigned MA responsibilities.

A3.5.1.3. Represent SLD 45 in MA-related discussions and agreements with USSF & FLDCOM.

A3.5.1.4. Prepare and present submissions to FIELDOM as needed in support of the planning, programming, and budgeting and execution process.

A3.5.1.5. Establish and oversee a staff to maintain and administer the SLD 45 MA-DTM program.

A3.5.1.6. Implement policies and establish procedures, plans, and operations to reduce the risk to critical SLD 45 infrastructures and assets.

A3.5.2. The SLD 45 Mission Assurance Integration Lead (MAIL), SLD 45/CDM, is the office of primary responsibility to integrate and synchronize MA activities at the local level who is responsible for:

A3.5.2.1. Developing and maintaining an SLD 45 MA strategy, defining goals and performance objectives, and establishing timelines.

A3.5.2.2. Coordinating the activity and participation of the SLD 45 MACB members as well as invited guests.

A3.5.2.3. Maintaining oversight of SLD 45 MACB and MAWG operations and administration such as scheduling meetings and maintaining minutes.

A3.5.2.4. Ensuring all participants remain informed of related functional group's activities to examine consequences and adjust action plans accordingly.

A3.5.2.5. Establishing and coordinating SLD 45 positions on MA issues for SLD 45 MACB consideration.

A3.5.2.6. Establishing and maintaining liaison with USSF and FLDCOM MA POCs.

### **A3.6. Functions and Tasks.** The SLD 45 MACB will:

A3.6.1. Serve as the primary SLD 45 forum responsible for coordination of SLD 45 MA-DtM activities and information with all MA and MA-related organizations.

A3.6.2. Communicate and recommend resources and actions to mitigate identified risks that endanger the execution of mission essential functions.

A3.6.3. Provide a platform for MARPAs to share/inform/collaborate with others.

A3.6.4. Determine solutions for complex operating environments to include creative solutions for a resource-constrained and/or manpower-constrained environment(s).

A3.6.5. Evaluate first, second, and third order effects of COAs

A3.6.6. Establish MA-related Working Groups (WGs) as needed for special activities, efforts, or topics.

### **A3.7. MA Working Group (MAWG).**

A3.7.1. Installation/program SMEs will participate in the SLD 45 MAWG. The SLD 45 MAWG will advise the SLD 45 Commander, Deputy Commanders, or designated O-6/Civ equivalent of any significant mission assurance, security, protection, or risk management topics that shall be raised during the SLD 45 MACB.

A3.7.2. The SLD 45 MAWG will meet monthly when there is no scheduled MACB (i.e. monthly except for months when there is a scheduled MACB). Exceptions can be made in the case of a significant schedule conflict (ex: during a significant event that affects a majority of SLD 45.)

A3.7.3. When necessary, the SLD 45 MACB chair may establish other MA-related WGs to address topics of special interest.

A3.7.4. MA-related WGs will meet as needed to address the topic of special interest.

### **A3.8. Meetings.**

A3.8.1. Meeting Management.

A3.8.1.1. The SLD 45 MACB will meet once a quarter.

A3.8.1.2. Representatives attending meetings are expected to represent their organization's and/or program's position on SLD 45 MACB matters.

A3.8.1.3. The SLD 45 MACB will address each issue on the agenda with the intent to agree upon a position, as needed. If more information is required, an MA-related WG may be established to work the issue.

A3.8.2. Agenda. Any MARPA SME, Unit/CC, Delta Staff Agency leader, or asset owner may submit items for the agenda. MARPA SMEs and project managers are always welcome to provide an update on their program or project at any SLD 45 MACB.

A3.8.3. Meeting Minutes will be published within 10 business days of each SLD 45 MACB meeting.

A3.8.4. Unresolved Issues.

A3.8.4.1. Issues not resolved by the SLD 45 MACB will be referred to SLD 45/CD for a final decision.

A3.8.4.2. When a decision on an issue is not achieved at a SLD 45 MACB, dissenting parties will develop position papers for review by SLD 45/CD.

A3.8.4.3. SLD 45/CDM will prepare appropriate staff correspondence with recommendations for each unresolved agenda item based on position papers prepared by

SLD 45 representatives. All such correspondence will be coordinated with the SLD 45 MAIL prior to being sent to SLD 45/CD.

### **A3.9. Security.**

A3.9.1. Classification Guidance. The Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) Line of Effort (LOE) Security Classification Guide (SCG), known as the DCI LOE SCG, is the primary source for classification guidance. It will be cited as the basis for classification, reclassification, and declassification of information and materials under DoD cognizance and control related to MA. Refer to other classification guidance such as original classification authority (OCA) or original agency's determination required (OADR) for specific classification information, for specific classification information.

A3.9.2. Compiled Information. See the DCI LOE SCG and DoDM 5200.01 Vol 2\_AFMAN 16-1401 Vol 2, Information Security Program: Marking of Information, for guidance on compiled information, such as when information otherwise marked UNCLASSIFIED could become classified if the compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship.

A3.9.3. Public Release. Unclassified MA information is not automatically releasable to the public. See the DCIP SCG and DoDD 5230.09, Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release, for details.

A3.9.4. Operations Security. Use appropriate guidelines when developing and transmitting information identifying critical infrastructures, threats, vulnerabilities, risks, and recommended responses. This information will be marked a minimum of "Controlled Unclassified Information" when it identifies SLD 45 mission-critical information. Refer to the SLD 45 Critical Information and Indicators List (CIIL) for more detailed information.

### **A3.10. Reviews and Updates.**

A3.10.1. This charter will be reviewed at least annually and when major program changes dictate the charter be revised.

A3.10.2. The SLD 45 MACB POC is the SLD 45 MAIL and can be reached at 321-494-6207, DSN 312-854-6207.