

**BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER  
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND**

**AIR MOBILITY COMMAND  
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***Intelligence***

***THREAT WORKING GROUP (TWG)***

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This instruction implements AFD 14-1, *Air Force Intelligence Planning and Operations*, and AFI 14-119, *Intelligence Support to Force Protection (FP)*, at HQ Air Mobility Command (AMC). It prescribes rules, processes, and procedures for the HQ AMC Threat Working Group (TWG), and assigns responsibility for managing TWG processes and conducting TWG business. It also designates organizations and offices that may, if requested, support or facilitate TWG processes in the conduct of TWG business. This instruction applies to all TWG members and individuals and organizations that support the TWG. The 89th Airlift Wing Presidential Airlift Group (PAG) is exempt from compliance to the provisions of this instruction. This instruction will not be supplemented. Failure to comply with this instruction is punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS). Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Form 847s from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command.

***SUMMARY OF CHANGES***

This interim change revises AMCI 14-106 by designating RAVENS as Mission Essential Personnel (MEP) in support of missions requiring Force Protection. A margin bar (|) indicates newly revised material.

## 1. Threat Working Group.

1.1. **Charter.** The Air Mobility Command (AMC) Threat Working Group (TWG) is the Air Forces Transportation (AFTRANS) focal point for coordinated threat and risk analysis in support of global mobility operations. The TWG provides 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC, with functionally integrated risk assessments and mission execution policy recommendations which mitigate threat and security vulnerabilities.

1.2. **Membership.** The TWG consist of experts from intelligence, counterintelligence, medical, communications, Security Forces, tactics, and operations into a single forum to develop risk assessments and Force Protection (FP) policy recommendations for the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC.

1.2.1. The TWG principals are a cross-functional body comprised of senior officers. TWG principles responsibilities:

1.2.1.1. Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (AMC/A2). The A2 chairs the TWG on behalf of 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC and will:

1.2.1.1.1. Deliver actionable mobility-focused intelligence to the TWG.

1.2.1.1.2. Provide administrative oversight to the TWG, to include maintaining TWG assessments, records, reports, and files correspondence.

1.2.1.1.3. Take lead on all threat assessments.

1.2.1.1.4. Schedule TWG meetings.

1.2.1.1.5. The Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations Division (A2O) is the central point of contact for the TWG. A2O chairs the TWG AO meeting, coordinates the agenda for the TWG principals' meeting, provides all administrative support to the TWG, schedules TWG meetings, publishes risk assessment updates, schedules country/airfield reviews, and ensures the timely completion of TWG products (risk assessments, waivers, etc.).

1.2.1.2. Director of Operations (AMC/A3).

1.2.1.2.1. A3D (Combat Operations Division) represents A3 on the TWG and ensures operational issues related to TWG processes, FP and the Cyber domain are addressed. A3D engages other AMC/A3 staff functions, as required, to facilitate TWG issues and tasking.

1.2.1.2.2. A3DI will brief the TWG on any operational threats/incidents to the MAF and will work with A6O and other TWG members in developing countermeasures and mitigating actions. A3DI will enable and protect all aspects of the Mobility Air Force (MAF) mission in the cyberspace domain. Reactively, A3DI will respond to cyber threats and incidents that directly or indirectly affect AMC's ability to employ air mobility forces, by planning and coordinating activities to operate during, and defend against, cyber threats and attacks.

1.2.1.2.3. DOD Commercial Airlift Division (A3B) provides advice and recommendations on issues affecting Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and U.S.-flagged commercial charter operations.

1.2.1.3. Chief, Security Forces (AMC/A7S).

1.2.1.3.1. Assesses adequacy of supported command FP and security policies to ensure adequate protection for AMC resources.

1.2.1.3.2. Assesses adequacy of FP and security for all AMC missions.

1.2.1.3.3. Develops FP and personnel protection policy recommendations.

1.2.1.3.4. Ensures Phoenix RAVEN requirements are accurately reflected in the Global Decision Support System (GDSS) II.

1.2.1.3.5. Maintains the Phoenix RAVEN airfield survey database which is accessible on the A2 SIPRNET website (<http://www.amcin.scott.af.smil.mil>).

1.2.1.3.6. Develops, maintains and disseminates the Phoenix RAVEN Location List (PRL).

1.2.1.4. 18 AF/A3.

1.2.1.4.1. Provides oversight of planned or potential exercises or operations that require TWG assessments or review (e.g., Concepts of Operations (CONOPs), Operational Risk Management (ORM) assessments).

1.2.1.4.2. Provides expertise and recommendations on tactics used to mitigate various threats. In addition, 18 AF/A3 addresses operational issues related to the TWG process.

1.2.1.4.3. Submits waiver requests for missions requiring exceptions to 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC policy as early as possible to allow full investigation of mitigating factors by the TWG AOs.

1.2.1.5. 618 AOC (TACC).

1.2.1.5.1. The 618 AOC (TACC) Director of Operations (XOZ) and the Director of Command and Control (XOC) are principal members of the TWG. They provide expertise and assistance to the TWG with current mission schedules and in addressing FP issues during planning and mission execution. In addition, XOZ and XOC provide insight on current missions, operations, and organizations affected by TWG decisions. XOZ and XOC will coordinate with the other 618 AOC directorates on products and processes required to facilitate TWG issues.

1.2.1.5.2. 618 AOC (TACC) planning directorates (XOG, XOP, XOO) provide AO representation at TWG AO meetings to facilitate, coordinate and discuss issues relating to future missions, threats, and waiver requests.

1.2.1.6. Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI) Field Investigation Region (FIR) 3. AFOSI Region 3 advises the TWG on criminal, foreign intelligence, cyber, and terrorist issues. AFOSI also facilitates TWG coordination with other AFOSI FIRs, Force Protection Detachments (FPDs), and Seat of Government Embassy personnel for current threat information in foreign countries

1.2.1.7. Surgeon General (SG). The SG is integral to the entire spectrum of in-transit, pre-deployment, deployment, post-deployment, and steady state MAF operations. Planners must consider the safety and security of local food and water sources,

prevention of vector-borne and infectious diseases, sanitation and hygiene of local food services and billeting facilities, and environmental threats prevalent in vicinity of AMC operational locations. The Command Medical Intelligence Officer, Command Medical Intelligence NCO, and/or their representative will represent SG at the TWG and TWG AO meetings as required. The SG representative will:

1.2.1.7.1. Review all available medical threat information concerning AMC operational locations worldwide. The National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI) threat information and threat categorization for AMC operational locations will serve as the baseline.

1.2.1.7.2. Ensure medical issues related to TWG processes and Force Health Protection (FHP) are addressed as required in TWG meetings.

1.2.1.7.3. Provide medical threat updates and medical threat mitigation recommendations when requested at TWG AO meetings for inclusion in ARA/CRAs.

1.2.1.8. Director of Communications (A6).

1.2.1.8.1. Secure, reliable communications and computer system support is integral to the entire spectrum of in-transit, pre-deployment, deployment, post-deployment, and steady state MAF operations. Planners must consider the security and reliability of deployed location communications.

1.2.1.8.2. Ensure communications, systems, and cyber capabilities and issues related to TWG processes and recommendations are addressed in daily TWG meetings.

1.2.1.8.3. The Communications Operations Division (A6O) serves as the A6 principal member to the TWG.

1.2.2. The TWG principals will select highly qualified individuals to work on the TWG at the Action Officer (AO) level. The AOs are responsible for evaluating risk and developing FP recommendations for consideration by the TWG principals. The TWG Coordinator (A2O) chairs the AO meeting and serves as a facilitator for AO level discussion. The following list of primary AO members will participate in the daily AO meeting: A2O, A2A, A3D, A7S, 18 AF/A3D, 18 AF/A2, and 618 AOC Planner. AOs from the following organizations will participate on an as needed basis: SG, A6O, International Airlift Contracting Management (USTRANSCOM/AQ-C), and OSI. The AOs will review existing FP measures to determine whether they are adequate to ensure aircraft and aircrew security.

1.2.3. Although TWG meetings will normally be conducted at the SECRET collateral level, all TWG members (AOs and Principals) should obtain an SCI clearance, including the SI, TK, G and HCS compartments, to ensure members have access to the full range of intelligence reporting related to issues under discussion.

1.2.4. Intelligence Community expertise resides at USTRANSCOM in the form of National Agency Representatives (NARs). In an effort to facilitate cross-talk within the ISR arena, the AMC TWG chairman will request NARs assistance to work on AMC TWG issues, when appropriate.

**1.3. Meetings.** The TWG operates at two levels. The principal members of the TWG normally meet in the morning and the TWG AOs meet separately in the afternoon. The TWG principal's meeting is chaired by the A2 and the AO meeting is chaired by the A2O TWG Coordinator.

1.3.1. The TWG principals meeting provides a forum to raise issues and questions, task the TWG AOs, and review and validate all products and recommendations, prior to submission to 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC. At each meeting, the TWG principals will also conduct a review of all planned 618 AOC (TACC) controlled missions into Tier 1 and Tier 2 locations (see 2.1 for Tier definitions).

1.3.2. The AO meeting is a working-level meeting that analyzes threats, reviews existing FP measures, assesses risks, and recommends risk mitigation measures. TWG AOs will make threat-based FP policy recommendations. These recommendations are forwarded/briefed to the principals for review/validation. Additionally, all waivers, policies and other correspondence will be reviewed at this meeting.

1.3.3. The following representatives or organizations are encouraged to participate in TWG and TWG AO meetings.

1.3.3.1. AMC Staff Judge Advocate (AMC/JA). Serves as legal advisor to the TWG on questions and issues related to contracting and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

1.3.3.2. USTRANSCOM Director of Intelligence (USTC/J2). Provides access to national intelligence community resources and supports TWG collection requirements.

1.3.3.3. USTRANSCOM International Airlift Contract Management Branch (USTC/AQ-C). Serves as the liaison between AMC and commercial carriers and identifies commercial airfield requirements for TWG assessments.

1.3.3.4. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Facilitates access to the TWG with the full range of CIA intelligence, collection capabilities, and all-source analytical products and services necessary to the formulation of TWG and TWG FP decisions and recommendations.

1.3.3.5. National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS). Provides Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Information Assurance (IA) support to the TWG to assist in conducting TWG risk assessments.

1.3.3.6. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Provides the TWG with the full range of DIA intelligence, collection capabilities, and all-source analytical products and services necessary to the formulation of TWG and TWG FP decisions and recommendations.

1.3.3.7. USTRANSCOM J2-X, Counterintelligence and HUMINT Division. The HUMINT Support Enterprise (HSE) representative, in concert with USTRANSCOM J2 Collection Management Office and AMC/A2, will coordinate and deconflict HUMINT collection activities across the HUMINT enterprise to include DIA Headquarters and Defense Attaché Offices (DAO) worldwide. USTRANSCOM J2-

X/HSE will also advocate AMC interests and represent TWG requests for information to DAOs.

1.3.3.8. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). NGA provides geospatial intelligence, imagery, and airfield diagrams in support of TWG briefings and risk assessments. NGA also advises and assists in developing imagery requirements.

**1.4. Internal TWG Coordination.** The TWG is not a voting body, nor does any one member supersede other members of the TWG. TWG members will attempt to reach a consensus position on recommendations, assessments or issues. When a consensus cannot be reached, the TWG chairman will present the competing positions to 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC for a decision. The AOs will review upcoming missions and associated FP measures as they impact the command's mission, and make regular security assessments for countries on the TWG Watch List (TWL). The principals will review and validate all TWG AO recommendations and assessments prior to submission of a final product to the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC. Each TWG principal will signify whether they concur or non-concur with a recommendation on a signature page that will be forwarded to the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC and maintained by A2O. Under some circumstances, not all TWG principals need to coordinate on a TWG recommendation. For example, the SG can independently represent the public health concerns for the command and is not required to validate non-health FP issues.

1.4.1. Theater Coordination. To ensure that AMC's senior leadership receives the best possible recommendations, the AMC TWG will work closely with theater air component threat or FP working group bodies. In order to avoid FP policy disconnects with Theater FP policy, all threat assessments and policy recommendations created by the AMC TWG will be compared with those published by the respective Theater. Assessment differences between AMC and the theater will be resolved at the AO level. If the differences cannot be resolved, the basis for the difference will be presented to the TWG principals prior to forwarding recommendations to the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC.

1.4.2. Contingency Support. The TWG is not manned for 24-hour operations. TWG members will be on-call should a TWG meeting be required during non-duty hours. The TWG Chair, 618 AOC Senior or any GO may convene the TWG. The functional areas represented in the TWG will have AOs to handle specific questions during duty hours and on-call during non-duty hours. When specific questions arise regarding threats to a particular location, the TWG AOs will provide the appropriate response with respect to their functional expertise.

1.4.2.1. TWG Crisis Support. When intelligence assessments change, a new threat emerges or a new time-sensitive airfield requirement is identified, the TWG chairman may convene the TWG principals during non-duty hours to prepare a policy recommendation to the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC for implementation.

**1.5. Approval Authority.** 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC is the approval authority for TWG FP policy recommendations.

## **2. Products.**

2.1. **TWG Watch List (TWL).** The TWL is a list of countries sorted into three tiers according to the level of assessed risk to MAF operations. These tiers define minimum risk

assessment production requirements. The TWG may make policy recommendations for an airfield or country, regardless of a country's tier level. The TWL is a TWG product approved by the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC. The TWL will be updated as required. However, a comprehensive top-to-bottom review of the TWL with revalidation by the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC will be conducted on an annual basis. The three tiers are:

2.1.1. Tier 1. Risk to MAF operations in these countries is significant. An Airfield Risk Assessment (ARA) is required for each airfield transited by AMC aircraft in Tier 1 countries. When AMC aircraft are planned to transit an airfield in a Tier 1 country not supported by an ARA, and there is not enough time to create an ARA, then the mission will be planned in compliance with the TWG Country Risk Assessment (CRA), Theater air component policy for that field, and 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC approval will be required to execute the mission.

2.1.2. Tier 2. Risk to MAF operations in these countries is moderate. A Country Risk Assessment (CRA) is required for all Tier 2 countries. At the TWG's discretion ARAs may be created when, for example, they are subject to frequent AMC use or when airfield policy would differ from overall country policy. Note: A Tier 2 ARA takes precedence over the CRA in all cases. "Denied" countries, as defined by Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), will be designated as Tier 2 countries on the TWL.

2.1.3. Tier 3. Risk to MAF operations in these countries is low and generally require no restrictive FP policies. Risk assessments are only required for Tier 3 when the TWG recommends FP measures.

2.1.4. Out-of-cycle changes to the TWL based upon a new or updated ARA or CRA must be approved by the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC. Out-of-cycle changes will only include recommendations to raise a country's Tier level. Recommendations to lower a country's Tier level will be accomplished during the annual TWL review.

2.2. **RAVEN Policy.** Default RAVEN policy will be based on the TWL as described in paragraph 2.5.4.5.

2.2.1. RAVEN policy for a specific airfield may deviate from default policy based upon a detailed assessment of current airfield security measures.

2.2.2. The TWG may recommend RAVENs for any mission based on threat reporting or current situation.

2.2.3. The TWG AOs will review all missions with ground times over six hours at Tier 3 airfields assessed with inadequate or unknown security. The TWG may recommend RAVENs based on threat reporting or current situation.

2.3. **Secure Launch.** Airfields in Tier 1 and Tier 2 countries will be designated for Secure Launch in GDSS. AMC/A2O is responsible for updating Secure Launch requirements in GDSS.

2.4. **Imagery Requirements.** AMC/A2O will submit imagery requirements for airfields utilized by AMC assets that ensure Tier 1 airfields are imaged at least every six months; Tier 2 airfields are imaged at least annually; and Tier 3 airfields are imaged at least every two years.

2.5. Risk Assessments.

2.5.1. The primary product of the AMC TWG is the risk assessment. These documents contain FP policies approved by 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC. All mission planners and aircrews supporting 618 TACC controlled missions will comply with the approved FP policies denoted in published risk assessments. Both ARAs and CRAs are maintained by A2 in an online Risk Assessment Database (RAD). Assessments are created and maintained for airfields and countries as required by the TWL.

2.5.1.1. The 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC is the approval authority for all new risk assessments. ARA/CRA updates that result in policy change recommendations will be approved by the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC, except for medical only CRAs.

2.5.2. All risk assessments consist of three sections. Section 1 includes imagery and lists the various threat levels and FPCON for the airfield or country. Section 2 contains the approved FP policies for the airfield or country. Section 3 contains threat and vulnerability assessments that support FP policy and are intended for use by intelligence personnel and aircrew members during pre-mission planning.

2.5.2.1. The TWG will monitor the following areas for each country or airfield: Operational Environment, Terrorism Threat, Airfield, Crime Threat, Foreign Intelligence Threat, Airfield Security, Cyber Threat, and Medical Threat. In addition, the TWG will note the applicable FPCON for all assessment locations.

2.5.2.2. For each ARA, the A2 will determine the SAFIRE, Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), and indirect fire attack threats at each airfield.

2.5.2.3. For each airfield the TWG will determine the risk to MAF operations after considering aircraft type, air traffic procedures, volume of traffic, terrain, C2, force protection, and any known or planned threat mitigation measures using a LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH scale. This may be accomplished with the help of a working aid, or may be arrived at after achieving a consensus opinion.

2.5.3. TWG member responsibilities for ARA/CRA content are outlined below. All TWG members will ensure their section of the assessment does not contradict standing FP policy. When AOs update a section with substantive changes, they will brief those changes at the next AO meeting.

2.5.3.1. Intelligence (A2):

2.5.3.1.1. A2A will maintain the Operational Environment, Terrorism, and Cyber Threat sections of each assessment. A2A will provide cyber threat analysis and research and make recommendations for mitigation measures to cyber threat concerns. Note: The cyber section is only required if warranted by the threat at a particular location.

2.5.3.1.2. A2O will maintain the Airfield, Crime, and Foreign Intelligence threat sections of each assessment. A2O is responsible for compiling the final ARA/CRA, monitoring the FPCON level for each airfield and country, performing quality control, and facilitating AO determination of the overall airfield risk.

- 2.5.3.2. Security Forces (A7S): A7S will maintain the Airfield Security section of each assessment. A7S will take lead in developing recommendations for RAVEN requirements.
- 2.5.3.3. Public Health (SG): SG will maintain the Medical Threat section of each assessment. SG will take lead in developing policy recommendations for additional medical requirements.
- 2.5.3.4. 18 AF/A3: 18 AF/A3D will take lead and coordinate with AMC/A3D in developing policy recommendations for Defensive Systems (DS) requirements, airfield operations restrictions, personal and aircraft armor requirements, tactical duty day limitations, and any additional flight restrictions that might be required.
- 2.5.4. Policy Options. For each ARA/CRA, the TWG will make recommendations to the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC on the following policy options:
- 2.5.4.1. Defensive Systems (DS). DS may be required to counter a MANPADS threat. Defensive systems are defined as automated threat warning in combination with a countermeasures capability (e.g., flares, Large Aircraft IR Countermeasures (LAIRCM), Directional IR Countermeasure (DIRCM)).
- 2.5.4.2. Personal Armor. Personal armor may be required to protect the aircrew from weapons/shrapnel injury during flight and while conducting ground operations at the airfield.
- 2.5.4.3. Aircraft Armor. Aircraft armor may be necessary to mitigate the effects of SAFIREs, including small arms, AAA, unguided rockets, and MANPADS.
- 2.5.4.4. Tactical Duty Day. The TWG will evaluate the threat to air operations to aid 18 AF/A3D in determining recommendations for tactical duty day requirements.
- 2.5.4.5. RAVEN Support. RAVENs may be required when airfield security is assessed as inadequate or unknown, or as warranted by the threat environment. When airfield security is assessed as inadequate or unknown, the following default RAVEN policies will be implemented:
- 2.5.4.5.1. RAVENs are required for all missions into Tier 1 countries when airfield security is assessed as inadequate or unknown. RAVENs are not required when airfield security is assessed as adequate.
  - 2.5.4.5.2. RAVENs are required for missions with planned ground times exceeding six hours for missions into Tier 2 countries when airfield security is assessed as inadequate or unknown. RAVENs are not required when airfield security is assessed as adequate.
  - 2.5.4.5.3. RAVENs are not required for missions into Tier 3 countries. However, TWG AOs will review all missions with scheduled ground times exceeding six hours at Tier 3 airfields assessed to have inadequate or unknown security.
  - 2.5.4.5.4. To ensure Force Protection of mission aircraft at RAVEN Required locations, RAVENs will be designated Mission Essential Personnel (MEP) and will travel onboard the aircraft. RAVENs traveling via other means elevate the risk to the mission aircraft, aircrew, and RAVEN personnel. Unforeseen

commercial flight delays or cancellations, delays or changes to mission aircraft itineraries, problems obtaining Visas, travel costs, and staffing/coordination requirements to pre-position RAVENs could potentially leave a mission aircraft without necessary security.

- 2.5.4.6. Commercial Aircraft Operations. Commercial aircraft are extremely vulnerable and are considered non-tactical. The TWG will make recommendations specific to the operation of commercial cargo and passenger aircraft to ensure the safety of these missions. 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC approved policies only apply to commercial aircraft controlled by TACC. The TWG may distinguish between passenger and cargo flights, or U.S.-flagged and foreign-flagged aircraft, based on risk.
- 2.5.4.7. VIPSAM Aircraft Operations. Like commercial aircraft, VIPSAM aircraft are considered non-tactical and extremely vulnerable. Additionally, because of their mission to transport U.S. government Distinguished Visitors (DVs) and their paint scheme, VIPSAM aircraft are potential high value targets. For each ARA and CRA, the TWG will make recommendations specific to the operation of VIPSAM aircraft to ensure the safety of these missions.
- 2.5.4.8. RON. The TWG may recommend against allowing aircraft and aircrews to RON due to the extent of the terrorism or criminal threat, security vulnerabilities, or to comply with the requirements in the Foreign Clearance Guide.
- 2.5.4.9. Airfield Operations Restrictions. This option can include restrictions on day or night operations, the need for laser eye protection, or other air or ground-based aircraft operating restrictions as determined by the TWG. Note, when implementing day or night operating restrictions, night is defined as the period from one hour after sunset until one hour prior to sunrise.
- 2.5.4.10. Medical Restrictions. Medical restrictions may be required to mitigate the poor quality of food or water, diseases, or other health concerns that could affect the aircrew or RAVENs.
- 2.5.5. 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC Approval. The 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC may require that sorties into certain locations, or under certain conditions, can only be flown with his/her approval on a case-by-case basis. This policy option is implemented as follows:
- 2.5.5.1. At the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC's discretion.
  - 2.5.5.2. Flights to Tier 1 airfields without ARAs require 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC approval.
  - 2.5.5.3. Initial flights into newly opened Tier 1 airfields (with an ARA) require 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC approval.
  - 2.5.5.4. Flights to airfields in Denied Countries require 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC approval.
  - 2.5.5.5. Flights to airfields where the TWG considers the operational environment to be HIGH risk and "non-permissive" for MAF aircraft require 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC approval.

2.5.6. Policy Change Recommendations. When AOs recommend a change to FP policy, they will submit the respective assessment to the TWG principals for review/concurrence. Upon TWG principal concurrence, recommendations are forwarded to the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC for approval.

2.5.7. Risk Assessment Updates. The TWG will initiate a complete assessment and policy review as noted below:

2.5.7.1. All ARAs will be reviewed, at a minimum, semiannually.

2.5.7.2. CRAs will be reviewed immediately when significant threat changes occur. When a significant threat change occurs in a Tier 3 country, the TWG will prepare a new CRA, if one isn't already published.

2.5.7.3. All CRAs will be reviewed, at a minimum, annually.

2.5.7.4. ARAs that are no longer needed will be archived at the point the ARA is outdated. CRAs are archived 1 year after being lowered from Tier 2 to Tier 3 as long as there are no policy restrictions in effect (i.e., medical restrictions). Archived assessments will be retained in draft form by A2O should it be necessary to reinstate the ARA/CRA in the future. When an assessment is archived, any corresponding FP policy restrictions are no longer in effect.

2.5.8. A2O responsibilities in the ARA/CRA review process are:

2.5.8.1. To manage the review process. A2O will ensure assessment reviews are conducted IAW para 2.5.7 above. A2O will update the principals on the status of the ARA/CRA review process during each TWG meeting.

2.5.8.2. To publish assessments on the A2 SIPRNET website. A2O will perform a quality control review of each ARA/CRA prior to publication. A2O will also ensure that assessments which have undergone policy changes are not published until they are approved by the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC. Assessment updates with no corresponding policy changes may be published after review by A2O.

2.5.8.3. To facilitate the waiver request process for the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC.

2.5.9. Dissemination. TWG risk assessments and approved FP policies will be published on the A2 SIPRNET website (<http://www.amcin.scott.af.smil.mil>).

2.6. **Special Mission Review.** The TWG may review individual missions well in advance of mission execution. This will ordinarily be done at the request of the unit or TACC mission planners, 18 AF/A3, or any member of the TWG. Note that this process does not preclude the mission planners from complying with published AMC FP policy, or when deviating from policy, submitting a formal waiver request through the TWG for review.

2.6.1. 618 AOC Primary Nuclear Airlift Fleet (PNAF) planners are required to provide missions information upon receipt of the setup message for TWG review.

2.7. **Waiver Authority.** The 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC is the waiver approval authority for all TACC controlled missions, including DV airlift and commercial missions which deviate from established FP policy. The 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC is the FP policy waiver authority for AMC.

2.7.1. Waiver Requests. Deviations from established policy may be approved by the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC, after a case-by-case review and recommendation by the TWG. Waiver requests may be submitted to the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC through the TWG via the A2's classified website ([http://www.amcin.scott.af.smil.mil/waiver/waiver\\_main.asp](http://www.amcin.scott.af.smil.mil/waiver/waiver_main.asp)), email, or in writing. A2O will facilitate waiver review by the TWG and then forward the waiver request and the TWG's recommendation to the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC.

2.7.2. The waiver request should fully explain the requirement to deviate from policy. It should include, at a minimum, the purpose and importance of the mission, as well as any planned threat mitigation measures, including the presence of RAVENs, on the mission, USDAO or Embassy coordination, aircraft parking and aircrew billeting and transportation plans for RONS. Waivers should be submitted as early in the planning process as possible.

2.7.2.1. Execution Waivers. Waiver requests submitted for missions scheduled to execute within 24 hours (or on the last duty day if the mission will execute on a weekend or holiday), or for missions already in execution, may bypass the normal TWG process. Waiver requests for missions in execution will be submitted directly to the Senior Controller, who, in coordination with the Senior Intelligence Duty Officer (SIDO), will obtain 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC approval. The Senior Controller may direct the SIDO to contact and obtain the recommendations of any other TWG on-call members he/she deems necessary. The full TWG will only be recalled if deemed necessary by the TWG chairman. Under no circumstances should planners delay waiver requests in order to avoid TWG review and receive last minute expedited approval through the 618 TACC.

2.7.3. Given the high visibility and importance of VIP missions, the TWG will process all waiver requests supporting VIP flights within the requested suspense or within 24 hours of receipt, whichever is less.

2.7.4. The SIDO will pay special attention to waived missions during the Secure Launch review. If significant changes to the operational or threat environment occur after the waiver is approved, the SIDO should consider recommending a rescission of the waiver to the Senior Controller.

2.8. **7-Day Mission Review.** Each time the TWG meets, it will review a list of all AMC missions planned to launch over the next seven days to locations in Tier 1 and Tier 2 countries. When missions are not in compliance with published AMC policy (e.g., ground times greater than six hours, but RAVENs are not assigned), or when TWG members detect a potential vulnerability (e.g., missions scheduled same time every day) that significantly increases risk, the mission will be referred back to the planner through TACC/XOZ and/or TACC/XOC to be re-planned, processed for waiver, or cancelled.

2.9. **Phoenix RAVEN Location List (PRL).** The PRL identifies the requirement for RAVEN support at all airfields transited by AMC aircraft. A7S maintains the PRL. When updated, A7S will forward the PRL to A2O for publication on the A2 SIPRNET website. Additionally, when RAVEN requirements change for a given location, either the PRL or ARA/CRA with updated RAVEN policy will be reviewed by the TWG principals and then forwarded to the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC for approval.

## 2.10. TWG Support to CRAF or AMC Charter Carriers.

2.10.1. Upon CRAF activation, the TWG is responsible for evaluating the need for threat mitigation for CRAF assets. The TWG will perform this support via the normal TWG process, or additionally as required by the DOD Commercial Airlift Division (A3B).

2.10.2. Civilian carriers under charter by AMC will comply with approved FP policies and requirements. In addition, the TWG will provide semi-annual threat update briefings and monthly base attack and SAFIRE reports for contracted carriers to include all countries or airfields where restrictive measures on commercial operations are in place. The TWG may also provide threat updates to individual carriers as required by 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC, in coordination with TCAQ-C. TCAQ-C will act as intermediary between the TWG and commercial carriers in this process.

2.10.3. Technical Stops and Weather Alternates. Technical Stops are operations stops at the convenience of the carrier. A technical stop is not a contracted mission stop and, therefore, does not include scheduled on-loading or off-loading of passengers or cargo. Because technical stops are at the convenience of the carrier, AMC will not accept the same level of risk as it does for required mission stops. Similarly, planned weather alternates selected by carriers must meet stricter risk mitigation requirements than for mission stops. To support commercial carrier technical stops and weather divert requirements, the TWG will conduct airfield reviews to determine where risk is acceptable.

2.10.3.1. To be acceptable as a technical stop or weather divert location, an airfield must be assessed as LOW risk, have no restrictions on U.S. commercial flight operations, be approved for RONs, and have acceptable flight line security (i.e., non-RAVEN required). Additionally, commercial technical stops must be able to be performed in compliance with the Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG). Use of military airfields solely for the servicing of transient aircraft is not authorized. If the FCG directs the use of a military airfield, prior approval by the Senior Airfield Authority (SAA) is mandatory. Commercial carriers are not authorized to RON while transporting DOD passengers.

2.10.3.2. The TWG will review a location as a potential technical stop when requested by TCAQ. The TWG will review approved technical stop locations at least annually.

2.10.3.3. For Tier 3 airfields with inadequate or unknown flight line security, or when RAVENs are required for extended ground times, technical stops will be limited to cargo flights only.

2.10.3.4. TCAQ will coordinate passenger technical stop locations with the respective USDAO prior to requesting a new passenger technical stop to ensure personnel are able to deplane in the event of an unplanned extended ground time or RON at the technical stop location.

2.10.3.5. The 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC is the approval authority for planned technical stop and weather alternate locations. Approved technical stops and weather divert locations will be noted in published risk assessments, and will be compiled in a single unclassified list for dissemination to AMC commercial carriers.

MARTIN L. MACNABB, Colonel, USAF  
Director of Intelligence, Surveillance and  
Reconnaissance

## Attachment 1

## GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

*References*

DODI 2000.12, *DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program*, March 1, 2012

DODI 2000.16, *DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards*, December 8, 2006

AFDD 3-10, *Force Protection*, 28 Jul 2011

AFPD 14-1, Air Force Intelligence Planning and Operations

AFI 11-2 VIP Volume 3, *VIP Operations Procedures*, 12 Feb 2010

AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense (FOUO)*, 8 Oct 2009

AFI 31-104, *The Air Force RAVEN Program (FOUO)*, 27 Dec 2004

AFJI 31-102, *Security Forces Standards and Procedures*, 30 Mar 2009

AFI 71-101, Volume 4, *Counterintelligence*, 8 Nov 2011

AMCI 10-249, *AMC Force Protection Corporate Structure*, 28 Mar 2007

Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, 1 Mar 2008

*Prescribed Forms*

None

*Adopted Forms*

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

*Abbreviations and Acronyms*

**ARA**—Airfield Risk Assessment

**CRA**—Country Risk Assessment

**FIR**—Field Investigative Region

**FPCON**—Force Protection Condition

**FPD**—Force Protection Detachment

**HSE**—HUMINT Support Enterprise

**IA**—Information Assurance

**LOAC**—Law of Armed Conflict

**MAF**—Mobility Air Force

**ORM**—Operational Risk Management

**PNAF**—Primary Nuclear Airlift Force

**PRLL**—Phoenix RAVEN Location List

**RAD**—Risk Assessment Database

**SIDO**—Senior Intelligence Duty Officer

**TCAQ**—C – Commercial Contracting

**USTRANSCOM**—United States Transportation Command

**VIPSAM**—Very Important Person Special Airlift Mission

### *Terms*

**AMC Policy Matrix**— FP policies approved by 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC are published in the AMC Policy Matrix and made available to mission planners and executors worldwide via A2's SIPRNET website (<http://amcin.scott.af.smil.mil>). This product is provided as a quick reference tool, summarizing the policies listed in each risk assessment. The Policy Matrix does not replace the risk assessment. Each policy block in the matrix is expanded in the remarks section of the risk assessment (explained further in section 2.5) and must be reviewed by crews and mission planners at all levels prior to initiating operational planning.

**Anti-terrorism**— Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces.

**Civil Reserve Air Fleet**— Selected aircraft from United States airlines, contractually committed to support United States Department of Defense airlift requirements in emergencies when the need for airlift exceeds the capability of military aircraft.

**Collateral Risk**— The risk of incidental harm, injury, or damage to AMC aircrew members or aircraft when the intended target was other than U.S., DOD, or AMC personnel or equipment.

**Foreign intelligence**— Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations, etc. conducted for, or on behalf of, foreign powers, organizations, or persons; or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document, or communications security programs.

**Counterterrorism**— Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism.

**Force Health Protection (FHP)**— Integrated preventive, surveillance, and clinical programs designed to protect the 'total force.' The goal of FHP is to provide a fit and healthy force when and where the mission requires. FHP is about preventing medical threats from affecting military forces. It is designed to improve existing health, proactively address health threats, and finally provide care for any illness or injury that does occur.

**Force Protection (FP)**— An integrated application of offensive and defensive actions that deter, detect, preempt, mitigate, or negate threats against Air Force air and space operations and assets, based on an acceptable level of risk. (AFDD 2-4.1)

**Information**— Data and the instructions required giving that data meaning.

**MANPADS**— The Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) is an effective series of weapons proliferated worldwide. Having great mobility, relatively low cost, and simple operation, these missile systems are popular among non-state actors such as terrorist and insurgent groups. These systems represent one of the greatest threats to mobility aircraft. Typically containing an Infrared (IR) seeker, these systems often offer little opportunity for a warning before impact.

**Phoenix RAVEN Location List (PRL)**— This list identifies the RAVEN support requirement for all airfields transited by AMC aircraft worldwide. The PRL can be found under the Force Protection tab on the A2's SIPRNET website.

**Phoenix RAVEN Team**— Two to six-person security team tasked with providing close-in security for AMC aircraft at OCONUS areas where the local security has been assessed as inadequate or the security situation is not fully known.

**Remain Overnight (RON)**— A RON is defined as a mission stop for the crew during which the crew will enter crew rest.

**Risk Assessment**— A risk assessment is an online document published on the A2's SIPRNET website that includes threat assessments and approved FP policies for a specific airfield or country.

**Risk Assessment Database (RAD)**— The RAD is a compilation of all risk assessments into an online SIPRNET database accessible worldwide from the A2 website ([www.amcin.scott.af.smil.mil](http://www.amcin.scott.af.smil.mil)).

**Technical Stop**— An intermediate temporary stop used by commercial carriers to perform routine servicing of the aircraft or mission, to include refueling, loading food/water, minor maintenance, and crew swaps. Carriers will not RON during a technical stop.

**TWG Watch List (TWL)**— The TWG Watch List is a list of countries, broken into Tiers based on threat level, which defines TWG production requirements. The TWG Watch List is approved by the 18 AF (AFTRANS)/CC.

**Very Important Person Special Airlift Mission (VIPSAM)**— VIPSAM missions are special missions operated by aircrews assigned to the 89 AW at Andrews AFB, Maryland, the 6 AW at MacDill AFB, Florida, the 932 AW at Scott AFB, Illinois and the 113 AW at Andrews AFB, Maryland.