

**BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER  
AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
COMMAND**

**AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
COMMAND INSTRUCTION 31-100**



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Security**

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS SECURITY  
FORCES DEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND  
OPERATIONS**

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This instruction implements United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Directive 525-8, *Joint Special Operations Air Component*; AFI 10-245, *Air Force Anti-Terrorism (AT) Standards*, and AFI 11-2MDS, Volume 3, *Aircraft Procedures*. It provides Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) commanders and planners guidance for Special Operations Security Forces (SF) deployment planning and execution in support of operational and contingency plans. It also clarifies Special Operations Security Forces Unit Type Code (UTC) training requirements, force presentation and capabilities. The instruction highlights security capabilities available to mission commanders via Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) Special Mission Branches (SMB) with Counterintelligence/Force Protection (CI/FP). The AFOSI SMB consists of Special Agents with expertise in CI/FP along with other specialized capabilities dedicated to deploying AFSOC forces. This instruction applies to all Security Forces Special Operations Forces (SOF) enabler postured UTCs, and does not pertain to Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) mobility and generation UTCs. This instruction also applies to the Air National Guard (ANG) and the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) units with SF SOF enabler UTCs. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at <https://www.my.af.mil/afirms/afirms/afirms/rims.cfm>. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the Air

Force (AF) Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. Units are not authorized to supplement any of the contents of this instruction. The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3”) number following the compliance statement. See AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the Publication OPR for non tiered compliance items.

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES**

This instruction has been substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. There are several updates to each chapter to include the appropriate tier. Table 51. Initial Training Requirements and Table 5.2 Training Courses have new class requirements as well as recommended courses.

<b>Chapter 1—RESPONSIBILITIES</b>	<b>5</b>
1.1. Headquarters (HQ) AFSOC/A7. ....	5
1.2. HQ AFSOC/A3 Ensures USSOCOM and AFSOC security and FP requirements are included in operations policy and guidance. ....	5
1.3. HQ AFSOC/A5/8/9 Plans and programs for SOF specific requirements outlined in this instruction. ....	5
1.4. HQ AFSOC/IG Inspects units to ensure compliance with this Instruction. ....	5
1.5. Special Operations Wing (SOW), Special Operations Group (SOG) Threat Working Group (TWG) Develops procedures to assess threats, establish FP measures, and recommend security requirements to protect deployed resources. .	5
1.6. AFSAWC Funds, manages, and instructs initial training for AFSOC SF SOF enabler UTCs. ....	5
1.7. AFOSI 9 FIS SMB (Special Mission Branches) Provides CI/FP expertise to AFSOC via HQ AFSOC, AFOSI/LNO. ....	5
1.8. SOW/Commander (CC), SOG/CC Ensures SF SOF enabler forces are trained, organized, equipped and employed in accordance with (IAW) this instruction. ...	6
1.9. Special Operations Security Forces Squadron (SOSFS)/CC, Special Operation Support Squadron (SOSS)/CC: .....	6
1.10. SF DAGRE Program Manager (DPM): .....	6
1.11. All SF SOF Enabler Personnel: .....	6

<b>Chapter 2—CAPABILITIES</b>	<b>7</b>
2.1. Capabilities: .....	7
2.2. Commander, Air Force Special Operations Forces (COMAFSOF)/Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) (9AAHQ): .....	7
2.3. Air Force Special Operations Detachment (AFSOD)/Joint Special Operations Air Detachment (JSOAD) (9AAHD): .....	7
2.4. SF Flight Leadership Element (QFEBS): .....	7
2.5. SF SOF Security Enabling Equipment (QFL1D): .....	7
2.6. SF SOF Site/Aircraft Security Team (QFM1D): .....	8
2.7. Advanced Designated Marksman Team (QFEBX): .....	8
2.8. SF SOF DAGRE (QFM1C): .....	8
2.9. AFOSI/SMB (QFAAW) or (QFAAG): .....	9
<b>Chapter 3—MISSION PLANNING AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:</b>	<b>10</b>
3.1. Objective: .....	10
3.2. Mission Planning: .....	10
3.3. Lessons Learned: .....	10
3.4. Virtual Risk Assessment Database (vRAD): .....	11
3.5. Deployed Security Requirements: .....	11
3.6. Tailored Security Measures: .....	11
<b>Chapter 4—SOF DEPLOYED AIRCRAFT GROUND RESPONSE ELEMENT (DAGRE)</b>	<b>12</b>
4.1. SOF-DAGRE Definition. ....	12
4.2. SOF-DAGRE will travel in mission essential ground personnel status. ....	12
4.3. Mission Preparation and Execution. ....	13
4.4. DAGRE Standards: .....	14
4.5. DAGRE Program: .....	15
<b>Chapter 5—TRAINING</b>	<b>16</b>
5.1. Required Training. ....	16
Table 5.1. Initial Training Requirements: .....	16
5.2. Recommended Training: .....	17
Table 5.2. Training Courses: .....	18
<b>Attachment 1—GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Attachment 2—AFSOC DAGRE AND AIRCRAFT SECURITY RECOMMENDATION MATRIX CLASSIFICATION: (WHEN COMPLETED)</b>	<b>23</b>

<b>Attachment 3—SAMPLE REGIONAL TRAINING CENTER (RTC) WAIVER REQUEST</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>Attachment 4—DEPLOYED AIRCRAFT GROUND RESPONSE ELEMENT(DAGRE)</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Attachment 5—FORCE PROTECTION SITE SURVEY</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>Attachment 6—AFTER ACTION REPORT(AAR)</b>	<b>35</b>

## Chapter 1

### RESPONSIBILITIES

#### 1.1. Headquarters (HQ) AFSOC/A7.

1.1.1. Establishes and disseminates Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) security and force protection (FP) policy, and provides security and FP oversight on behalf of the AFSOC Commander. (T-1)

1.1.2. Defines, publishes, and manages AFSOC security and FP requirements, guidance, and deployment taskings. Tracks all deployed SOF SF forces and maintains an accurate status of all SOF equipment associated with the following UTCs: QFM1C, QFM1D, and QFL1D. (T-1)

1.1.3. Tracks training status of personnel assigned to QFM1C Deployed Aircraft Ground Response Element (DAGRE) certification and QFM1D (SOF Site Aircraft Teams). (T-1)

1.1.4. Plans and programs formal training and Logistic Detail (LOGDET) requirements. Provides training guidance and ensures availability of training IAW this instruction. Identifies and provides A) Air Force Special Operations Air Warfare Center (AFSOAWC) initial training requirements for AFSOC SF SOF enabler UTCs. B) Validates and approves AFSOAWC SF SOF enabler UTC course curriculum and pamphlets. (T-1)

1.1.5. Defines AFSOC Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) requirements, publishes guidance, and provides program oversight. (T-1)

1.1.6. A7S will archive all site surveys and/or after action reports from returning SOF deployers. Reports will be reviewed for any reoccurring trends and/or training needs. All reports will be kept in A7S sharepoint on NIPR for unclassified and SIPR for classified. (T-2)

**1.2. HQ AFSOC/A3 Ensures USSOCOM and AFSOC security and FP requirements are included in operations policy and guidance.** Identifies and provides HQ AFSOC/A7S all AFSOC unique fly-away security and FP requirements. (T-1)

**1.3. HQ AFSOC/A5/8/9 Plans and programs for SOF specific requirements outlined in this instruction.** (T-1)

**1.4. HQ AFSOC/IG Inspects units to ensure compliance with this Instruction.** (T-2)

**1.5. Special Operations Wing (SOW), Special Operations Group (SOG) Threat Working Group (TWG) Develops procedures to assess threats, establish FP measures, and recommend security requirements to protect deployed resources.** (T-1)

**1.6. AFSOAWC Funds, manages, and instructs initial training for AFSOC SF SOF enabler UTCs.** See [Attachment 4](#) for course criteria. (T-1)

**1.7. AFOSI 9 FIS SMB (Special Mission Branches) Provides CI/FP expertise to AFSOC via HQ AFSOC, AFOSI/LNO.** Air Force Mission Directive 39, *AFOSI*, directs AFOSI to conduct counterintelligence, specialized investigative activities, basic site exploitation, protective service, and integrated Force Protection for AF in order to find, fix, track, neutralize, and assess enemy threats to create sustained permissive environments. The AFOSI/LNO to AFSOC

provides oversight for CI/FP information provided to deploying AFSOC unit personnel before, during, or after deployments. This support occurs via an AFOSI SMB embedded within each AFSOC Wing and Group. AFOSI SMB Agents maintain flyaway capability to travel independently and ensure heightened security and CI/FP planning and operations based on accurate local threat information. Mission commanders, team sergeants or designated representatives of deploying units are directed to contact their respective AFOSI SMB in the planning stage of any operation involving foreign travel to discuss AFOSI SMB CI/FP capabilities and/or support. AFOSI internally identifies, validates, approves, and provides initial training requirements for AFOSI as well as AFOSI/SMB for SOF enabler UTCs via multiple sources. (T-1)

**1.8. SOW/Commander (CC), SOG/CC Ensures SF SOF enabler forces are trained, organized, equipped and employed in accordance with (IAW) this instruction.** (T-1)

**1.9. Special Operations Security Forces Squadron (SOSFS)/CC, Special Operation Support Squadron (SOSS)/CC:** Maintains visibility on the mission readiness of all assigned SF SOF enabler UTCs/forces and ensures they are properly trained, organized and equipped. Provides HQ AFSOC/A7S Unit's primary and alternate SF Deployed Aircraft Ground Response Element (DAGRE) Program Manager. (T-1)

**1.10. SF DAGRE Program Manager (DPM):** Is an additional duty that serves as the unit's primary point of contact concerning all QFM1C UTCs. Manages taskings and maintains visibility on the mission readiness of all SOF enabler capabilities to include training, personnel, and equipment. Ensures HQ AFSOC/A7S is notified by forwarding all after action reports no later than 15 days after returning from a mission. (T-2)

**1.11. All SF SOF Enabler Personnel:** SOF Enabler Personnel must maintain a valid official US government passport to maintain readiness and rapidly deploy IAW unit Designed Operational Capability (DOC) statements. (T-2)

## Chapter 2

### CAPABILITIES

**2.1. Capabilities:** SF SOF enabler capabilities are defined in Unit DOC statements, UTC Mission Capabilities (MISCAP) statements, Manpower Force Packaging Systems (MANFOR), and Logistics Detail (LOGDET). Units must submit an augmentation request through their chain of command if a mission requires capabilities from other AFSOC units or capabilities not residing in AFSOC. (T-2)

**2.2. Commander, Air Force Special Operations Forces (COMAFSOF)/Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) (9AAHQ):**

2.2.1. Organization. One SF officer or a SF Senior Non-Commissioned Officer (SNCO) (T-2)

2.2.2. Duties: Primary advisor to the SOF Air Component Commander and staff on issues relating to Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) and physical security. This includes but not limited to AFSOC SF SOF enabler requirements including the QFM1C and QFM1D employment IAW this instruction. (T-2)

**2.3. Air Force Special Operations Detachment (AFSOD)/Joint Special Operations Air Detachment (JSOAD) (9AAHD):**

2.3.1. Organization: Two SF 7-levels assigned to the SOF Air Component intermediate level of command; at least one must be a SF SNCO. (T-2)

2.3.2. Duties: Primary advisor to the SOF Air Component Commander and staff on issues relating to Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) and physical security. This includes but not limited to AFSOC SF SOF enabler requirements including the QFM1C and QFM1D employment IAW this instruction. (T-2)

**2.4. SF Flight Leadership Element (QFEBS):**

2.4.1. Organization: A five-person flight leadership element comprised of a SF officer flight leader, SF SNCO flight sergeant, and three 5-level SF radio/telephone operators. Usually required when more than two teams are deployed. (T-2)

2.4.2. Duties: Maintains command and control of up to 60 assigned AFSOC SF SOF enabler personnel. Performs duties as the deployed security coordinator, liaises and coordinates to integrate AFSOC close-in security with other DOD and host nation base defense forces. Reports to the deployed Mission Commander. (T-2)

**2.5. SF SOF Security Enabling Equipment (QFL1D):** Provides equipment to support AFSOC SF UTCs (QFM1D/QFM1C). Equipment includes a wide-area surveillance thermal imager, communications, administrative supplies, three tents, three all-terrain vehicles (ATV) and one multi-use light equipment utility vehicle (MULE). The package is designed to support up to three QFM1D or QFM1C, or any combination of both. Equipment requirements will be determined by a detailed analysis of the deployed site and mission planning. Deploys to all types of bases and supports all AFSOC/SOF contingency operations. This UTC does not include base operating support (BOS) equipment. (T-2)

**2.6. SF SOF Site/Aircraft Security Team (QFM1D):**

2.6.1. Organization: A five-person team comprised of a SF 7-level team leader and four 5-level SF team members. (T-2)

2.6.2. Duties: Provides close-in security for deployed AFSOC/SOF aircraft and command, control, communication, computer and information (C4I) facilities as well as deterrence, detection, and immediate response. Ensures adequate security for AFSOC/SOF resources by assessing and interfacing with other in-place DOD and host nation base defense forces. Teams may perform other security missions at the deployed site as required by the mission commander to ensure SOF mission success. (T-2)

2.6.3. Additional Information: UTC deployment requirements will be determined by the SOW/SOG mission planners in close coordination with SOW/SOG TWG. UTCs may deploy as an independent element (SF flight leadership is required when more than two teams are deployed). The team leader performs deployed security coordinator (DSC) duties when deployed independently; liaises and coordinates to integrate AFSOC close-in security with other in-place DOD and host nation base defense forces and coordinating with OSI when available. One team is capable of providing 24-hour close-in security for one restricted area or C4I facility for up to 7 days. The five-person team composition is based on providing a DSC/area supervisor with two two-person teams working alternating 12-hour shifts. Additional teams are recommended for deployments/exercises requiring 24-hour close-in security longer than 7 days or for large special operations C4I facilities and aircraft packages. SF SOF Security Enabling Equipment UTC (QFL1D) may be required depending on availability of facilities, transportation and other support equipment at the deployed site. (T-1)

**2.7. Advanced Designated Marksman Team (QFEBX):**

2.7.1. Organization: A two-person SF team comprised of one 7-level and one 5-level. (T-2)

2.7.2. Duties: Provides enhanced situational awareness through observation and reporting. Operates overtly or covertly and also provides over-watch security for search and clear operations. Delivers accurate long-range rifle fire out to 500 meters. Augments security systems/devices and provides immediate visual assessment of possible intrusions. (T-2)

2.7.3. Additional Information: While this is not a standalone capability, the team deploys in conjunction with other AFSOC SF SOF enabler forces. Enhances security of AFSOC aircraft and C4I sites. Both members must be trained and qualified IAW an advanced designated marksman course. Supports both day and night operations. (T-2)

**2.8. SF SOF DAGRE (QFM1C):**

2.8.1. Organization: A five-person QFM1C, must have at least three qualified DAGRE team member and is comprised of one SF 7-level team leader and four 5-level SF team members. (T-1)

2.8.2. Duties: Provides rapidly deployable, focused FP for USSOCOM SOF and aircraft transiting airfields where security is unknown or deemed inadequate to counter local threats. Advises the mission commander on FP measures, conducts FP surveys, provides close-in security, and assists with SOF led protective service operations. Ensures adequate security for AFSOC/SOF resources by assessing and interfacing with other in-place DOD and host

nation base defense forces and coordinating with OSI when available. Teams may perform other security missions as required by the mission commander to ensure SOF mission success. (T-2)

2.8.3. Additional Information: UTC deployment requirements will be determined by the SOW/SOG mission planners in close coordination with the SOW/SOG TWG. UTCs may deploy as an independent element (SF flight leadership is required when more than two teams are deployed to the same location). The team leader performs DSC duties when deployed independently; liaises and coordinates to integrate close-in security with other in-place DOD and host nation base defense forces. The five-person team composition is based on providing a DSC/area supervisor with two 2-person teams working alternating 12-hour shifts. Additional teams are required for multiple aircraft and/or extended deployments/exercises. SF SOF Security Enabling Equipment UTC (QFL1D) may be required depending on availability of facilities, transportation, and other support equipment at the deployed site. Personnel deploy as mission essential ground personnel. DAGRE teams remain operational control (OPCON) and tactical control (TACON) to the deployed Mission Commander. (T-1)

## **2.9. AFOSI/SMB (QFAAW) or (QFAAG):**

2.9.1. Duties: Provide rapidly deployable, CI/FP or Counter-Threat Operations (CTO) capability to the deployed mission commander and available U.S. country team. UTCs normally deploy as an independent element and should nearly always be tasked in pairs to meet the two-person concept for safety. Personnel deploy as mission essential personnel. AFOSI/SMB TACON to the deployed mission commander. (T-2)

2.9.2. Contact the AFOSI LNO to AFSOC to delineate which UTC to utilize for mission planning. QFAAW is the primary UTC. (T-2)

## Chapter 3

### MISSION PLANNING AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:

**3.1. Objective:** Provide a right-sized force to ensure adequate security for deployed USSOCOM resources. (T-1)

**3.2. Mission Planning:** The required SF capability will be tailored based on a detailed mission analysis/estimate of the situation IAW AFSOCI 14-102, *Threat Working Group*. SOW/SOG mission planners will work with their local SF, AFOSI SMB and TWG to identify when security and/or CI/FP are recommended to support exercises, training missions, contingency operations and small/large scale deployments. The minimum members of the threat working group will be Security Forces, Intelligence, OSI and Medical. The most critical input for the development of the force protection posture for the security team comes from the current and relevant intelligence fused with all available data from the TWG. The role of intelligence in force protection is critical and every effort should be made to mitigate any gaps that do exist in support to force protection and the mission (AFI 14-119 Intelligence Support to Force Protection (FP)). (T-1)

3.2.1. The MC will receive an aircraft security recommendation from their local TWG based on current intelligence reporting and local and regional threat status using the standardized AFSOC DAGRE and aircraft security recommendation matrix ([Attachment 2](#)). Compliance with the Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG), coordination with the applicable US embassy, and an informed risk management decision is integral to the SOW/SOG mission planning process. The MC must approve any tailored security measures during the planning process. (T-2)

**3.3. Lessons Learned:** HQ AFSOC/A7S records and addresses issues, best practices and lessons learned from major exercises, contingency operations and deployments as a basis for future mission planning through AARs, Lessons Learned Reports (LL), Trip Reports and Site Surveys. Active participation of the program will ensure the most current information is readily available to the deploying members. Reports and surveys should include an executive summary covering the event information (i.e., dates, locations, participant units/organizations, etc.), lessons observed, issues/problems encountered with recommended corrective actions. Approved AARs, Lessons Learned, Trip Reports, and Site Surveys will be stored and centrally managed in the JLLIS--Joint Lessons Learned Information System database, IAW CJCSI 3150.25E, and also available on the HQ AFSOC/A7S Lessons Learned Program SharePoint Sites: (T-0)

NIPR: <https://eis.afsoc.af.mil/sites/A7/A7S/AAR/default.aspx>

SIPR: <https://afsofnet.afsoc.af.mil/sites/A7/A7S/AAR/default.aspx>

3.3.1. Submission Process: The senior deployed team leader will consolidate AARs, Lessons Learned Reports, Trip Reports, and Site Surveys inputs from subordinate unit members, validate observations and once approved, submit the signed report to the AFSOC (HQ AFSOC/A7S) central repository NLT end-event +15 days (or as directed). **Note:** Units will email HQ AFSOC/A7SO Email Distribution list to request access to Lessons Learned Program SharePoint Site. AFI 90-1601 directs submission of AARs within 30 days following operation or exercise end. Chain of command involvement is key in validating all AARs and LL--Lessons Learned submissions. Use AAR format IAW this instruction see

(Attachment 5). In addition to local instructions, all validated AFSOC LL are entered into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System by AFSOC A7S at <http://www.JLLIS.mil/usaf/> <http://www.jllis.smil.mil/usaf/>. Per CJCSI 3150.25E, the JLLIS database is the official designated system of record for storing lessons learned. AARs and LL are also submitted to AFSOC A3 which serves as the A3 gatekeeper for the AFSOC Lessons Learned Program. HQ AFSOC A7S will ensure all AARs are sent to these directorates for review. Refer to USSOCOM Directive 11-3, AFI 90-1601, AFSOC SUP 90-1601, and CJCSI 3150.25E for further guidance on both active and passive collection of LL. (T-0)

**3.4. Virtual Risk Assessment Database (vRAD):** AMC vRAD, although not binding for AFSOC forces, is a useful reference tool to use during initial planning to determine the terrorist and criminal threat level as well as if the location is identified as a Raven required location. This listing is updated daily by a multitude of intelligence and security professionals. It can be found on the SIPR AMC FP page at <http://www.amcin.scott.af.smil.mil>. (T-3)

3.4.1. SODARS: [SOFonline.socom.smil.mil/sites/j2/jicsoc/sodars](http://SOFonline.socom.smil.mil/sites/j2/jicsoc/sodars) (T-3)

3.4.2. ISP: [Hotr.dia.smil.mil](http://Hotr.dia.smil.mil) (T-3)

3.4.3. HOTr: [SOFreonline.socom.smil.mil/sites/j2/public/isppages/isp% 20products.aspx](http://SOFreonline.socom.smil.mil/sites/j2/public/isppages/isp%20products.aspx) (T-3)

**3.5. Deployed Security Requirements:** Deployed aircraft security requirements are mandated by AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*; AFI 31-101, AFSOCSUP, *Integrated Defense*; and AFI 10-245, *Air Force Antiterrorism (AT) Standards*. Additional aircraft specific security procedures can be found in the applicable AFTTP 3-3MDS, *Combat Aircraft Fundamentals*; AFTTP 3-1MDS, *Combat Aircraft Training*; and AFI 11-2MDS, Volume 3, *Aircraft Procedures*. Arrangements must be made to protect the aircraft while at deployed locations if SF do not deploy with the aircraft. In those cases, the MC will work with the US Embassy responsible for that country, the requesting agency, and/or security personnel at the deployed location to coordinate for adequate security. (T-1)

### **3.6. Tailored Security Measures:**

3.6.1. Tailored security measures at deployed locations must be approved by the MC and the respective Operations Center (OC) should be notified as soon as possible. (T-1)

3.6.2. Compliance with established security requirements may be impractical at times due to mission, terrain, climate, sociopolitical sensitivities, or other factors. At a minimum, aircraft entry points and hatches should be locked. If it is not possible to lock the aircraft, secure aircraft entry points and hatches in a manner to indicate unauthorized entry, e.g., taping hatch release handles or using seals. Contact with the US Embassy is required at locations where security agreements do not exist. (T-1)

## Chapter 4

### SOF DEPLOYED AIRCRAFT GROUND RESPONSE ELEMENT (DAGRE)

**4.1. SOF-DAGRE Definition.** The QFM1C provides rapidly deployable, dedicated force protection for AFSOC forces. The DAGRE team is a 5-person, specially trained UTC designed to provide world-wide deployed aircraft weapons system and critical C4I security, as well as Force Protection (FP) for missions under the control of the AFSOC Mission Commander. DAGRE missions include: protecting Special Operation's aircraft, resources and personnel against sabotage and direct attack by providing deterrence, detection and response. DAGRE teams perform aircraft security, aircrew advisory on FP measures, and accomplishment of airfield, aircraft/personnel beddown and vehicular route assessments to document existing security measures, vulnerabilities and mitigation options. Team members are available as a Protective Security Detail (PSD) for Very Important Personnel/Distinguished Visitors (VIP/DV) when required. Multiples of this UTC can be used to provide FP/security operations for large Special Operation's aircraft packages and critical C4I resources in locations with limited/no BOS support. Teams interface with host nation security forces and deployed base defense forces when collocated. DAGRE Teams remain under the operational control (OPCON) of the deployed mission commander. The primary mission of DAGRE teams is to provide fly away and or ground security for all AFSOC aircraft (fixed and rotary wing) while deployed away from home-station, in locations where security is not provided by AFI 31-101 Protection Level III (PL3) standards or is not provided by DOD personnel (Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines or **any civilian component of said branch**). (T-2)

#### 4.1.1. DAGRE Mission Essential Task List (METL):

- 4.1.1.1. Fly-Away security for USSOCOM aircraft, resources, and personnel.
- 4.1.1.2. AT/FP advisor.
- 4.1.1.3. Combat Controller/Pararescue security escort.
- 4.1.1.4. Flight deck denial.
- 4.1.1.5. Forward Aerial Refueling Point (FARP) security.
- 4.1.1.6. Downed aircraft security.
- 4.1.1.7. Landing Zone/Drop Zone (LZ/DZ) security.
- 4.1.1.8. Protective Service Operations.
- 4.1.1.9. Focused Exchange Training.
- 4.1.1.10. Airfield/Beddown/Route Vulnerability Assessments.
- 4.1.1.11. Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief security.
- 4.1.1.12. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations.

**4.2. SOF-DAGRE will travel in mission essential ground personnel status.** Due to the sensitivity of carrying weapons in foreign countries, many missions will call for weapons to remain inside the aircraft and outside of sight from foreign nationals. Additional information will be provided by AFSOC A7S in coordination with AFSOC A4 for theatre specifics. (T-2)

### 4.3. Mission Preparation and Execution.

4.3.1. AFSOC is not required to comply with AMC fly-away security requirements for Raven required locations, but instead will use this information as an important factor to consider when determining if security is needed. (T-3)

4.3.2. DAGRE teams will normally not be transported on gunships. If gunship security is required, DAGRE or a QFM1D team will normally be transported separately to the required location. (T-3)

4.3.3. Low visibility procedures:

4.3.3.1. DAGRE personnel must be capable of blending in with the aircrew and/or airport personnel in order to avoid attracting unnecessary attention. As such, DAGRE personnel are authorized wear flight suits and civilian attire as required when performing official duties. Additionally, DAGRE personnel must be trained and qualified to carry a concealed weapon in order to provide armed security in a low visibility posture. Members will also wear concealable body armour. (T-2)

4.3.3.1.1. If necessary for mission specific duties, unit commanders will certify the need for DAGRE members to receive a civilian clothing allowance IAW AFI 36-3014, *Clothing Allowance for Air Force Personnel*, Chapter 3, through the base finance office. (T-2)

4.3.3.2. DAGRE personnel must be trained and qualified to carry a concealed weapon in order to provide armed security in a low visibility posture. (T-2)

4.3.3.2.1. Unless mission requirements dictate otherwise, DAGRE personnel will wear concealable body armor when carrying a concealed weapon. (T-2)

4.3.3.3. DAGRE must be capable of providing both overt and covert lighting for parked aircraft in order to enhance aircraft security and provide a low visibility lighting option. (T-2)

4.3.4. Recommended team size for DAGRE missions:

4.3.4.1. When security is required and the aircraft ground time is less than 12- hours, two to three DAGRE personnel are recommended to support the mission. Generally, two personnel remain with the aircraft and the team leader coordinates security with forces at the offsite airfield/aircraft staging area and conducts a FP survey. On rare occasions, one DAGRE member could be teamed with either an OSI agent or another crew member, but this should only occur when the employment of two DAGRE personnel is not possible. (T-2)

4.3.4.2. When security is required and the aircraft ground time is more than 12-hours but less than 7-days, five DAGRE personnel are recommended for mission support. Generally, two personnel work alternating 12-hour shifts and the team leader performs duties as the area supervisor, coordinates security with forces at the offsite airfield/aircraft staging area and conducts an FP survey. The team is capable of providing security for multiple aircraft parked in the same area. (T-2)

4.3.4.3. For missions where aircraft are operating from an airfield for longer than 7-days, additional DAGRE personnel or AFSOC Site/Aircraft Security Teams (QFM1D) are recommended to sustain security. (T-2)

**4.4. DAGRE Standards:** Because USSOCOM aircraft transit through higher threat areas and at times stay on the ground longer, this exposes both aircraft and personnel to additional risk necessitating a higher skill level in Security Forces. A DAGRE qualified individual is that highly-trained Security Forces Air Commando who is prepared to perform a wide-range of SOSF missions. DAGRE members are subject matter experts at fly-away security, but also possess additional capabilities specifically geared for special operations not usually found in traditional Security Forces training. As such, the standards expected and demanded from DAGRE personnel must be higher than a traditional Security Forces member. (T-2)

4.4.1. DAGRE Physical Training (PT) standards:

50 pushups in one minute

50 situps in one minute

1.5 mile in 11:30 or less

4.4.2. In order to attend DAGRE training, members will have met the above PT standard no earlier than 60 days before the first day of training. Unit commanders must certify this, as well as the requirements identified through ETCA, through an official memorandum to HQ AFSOC/A7SX 30 days prior to class start for any member nominated for the DAGRE Qualification course. (T-2)

4.4.3. All personnel will be administered a PT test on their first day of training. Students must be able to pass by Air Force PT standards to continue the course or they will be dismissed back to their unit. If a student passes the PT test by the DAGRE standards listed above, they will be allowed to complete the entire DAGRE pipeline without another test. Any student only passing Air Force PT standards will be retested and required to pass to DAGRE standards before being allowed to enter the DAGRE Qualification phase of the pipeline. Any student unable to pass the PT test to DAGRE standards prior to the DAGRE Qualification phase of the pipeline will be dismissed back their unit. (T-2)

4.4.4. The DAGRE qualification is awarded to an individual upon completion of the following training requirements: (T-2)

4.4.4.1. AF Certified AT Level II Course (T-2).

4.4.4.2. Introduction to Special Operations Course (T-2).

4.4.4.3. Tactical Combat Casualty Care (T-2).

4.4.4.4. SOF-Fly-Away Security Team Course (T-2).

4.4.4.5. SOSF Communications Course (T-2).

4.4.4.6. SOSF Combatives Course (T-2).

4.4.4.7. SOSF Tactics Course (T-2).

4.4.4.8. SOSF Tactical Vehicle Operations (T-2).

4.4.4.9. SOSF DAGRE Qualification Course (T-2).

- 4.4.5. Team Leaders must be a 7-level SF member and have completed SOSF Leadership Course. (T-2)
- 4.4.6. Team Members will be a minimum grade of Senior Airmen and have 18 months' time in service. Or A1C within 12 months of promotion to SrA (CONUS ONLY). (T-2)
- 4.4.7. Possess a medical profile that doesn't preclude worldwide deployment. (T-2)
- 4.4.8. Have received no Article 15 action during the current term of enlistment. (T-2)
- 4.4.9. Have not been placed on the control roster or subject of an unfavorable information file. (T-2)
- 4.4.10. Have consistently excelled on performance evaluations and have a written recommendation letter from both the squadron commander and senior enlisted member. Member must not have a UIF, control roster or Article 15 action. (T-2)
- 4.4.11. Not be on the AF Weight Management Program (WMP) or remedial fitness program. (T-2)
- 4.4.12. Possess at least two years retainability after completion of training. (T-2)
- 4.4.13. Possess an official passport. (T-2)

**4.5. DAGRE Program:** The commander designates in writing a DAGRE Program Manager (DPM) and a deputy DPM to serve as managers of the DAGRE program. (T-2)

4.5.1. Each unit is also responsible for establishing an effective training plan to ensure their personnel sustain their qualifications. Standardization Evaluations (Stan-Eval) should be established to ensure DAGRE personnel are certified on all Job Qualification Standard Continuation/Command JQS and AF FM 797s. All DAGRE assigned personnel will have AF FM 797s signed off by their DAGRE team leads prior to Stan-Eval. (T-2)

4.5.1.1. Any USSOCOM exercise will count as the annual Stan-Eval certification for DAGRE members who attend, provided individual members pass the necessary evaluation. (T-2)

## Chapter 5

### TRAINING

#### 5.1. Required Training.

5.1.1. Personnel assigned to SF SOF enabler UTCs will complete required AF ancillary and currency training IAW with AF instructions and unit operating instructions. Note: Personnel changing duty stations from stateside to overseas SOGs will have priority for attending Deployed Aircraft Ground Response Element (DAGRE) training pipeline. SOGs will coordinate with HQ AFSOC/A7SX during the PCS to coordinate slots in the subsequent DAGRE training pipeline. (T-1)

5.1.2. The below table identifies initial training requirements for personnel assigned to each UTC. (T-1)

**Table 5.1. Initial Training Requirements:**

Required Courses/PDS	Course #	9AAHQ/D	QFM2D	QFM1D	QFM3C	QFM1C
ISOC/LZL	SOED-ISOC	All	All	All	All	All
DIT/ROC, TFPC, or other AF approved AT Level II course /X9D-AFI	SOED-DIT/ROC SOED-TFPC	All	2 (O3/E7)	1 (TL)		3 (TL/ 2 mbrs)
ADM	N/A				All	
Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC)	Local Medical Group or other certified provider	All	All	All	All	All
SOSF Leader Crse/IMU	AFSOC SF LEADER	All	2 (O3/E7)	1 (TL)		1 (TL)
SOF-FAST/IMW	AFSOC SF FLYAWY			2		All
SOSF Comm Crse/IN1	AFSOC SF COMMS		3 (E4/5)	2	All	All
SOSF Combatives/IMV	AFSOC SF COMBAT					3 (TL/ 2 mbrs)
SOSF Tactics Course/INC	AFSOC SF TACTIC					3 (TL/ 2 mbrs)
SOSF Tactical Vehicle Ops/INB	AFSOC SF TACVEH					3 (TL/ 2 mbrs)
SOSF DAGRE Qual/DKI	AFSOC SF DAGRE					3 (TL/ 2 mbrs)

5.1.3. Commanders will provide nomination letter for each SOF enabler attending and will ensure all course prerequisites are met prior to unit members attending any of the above listed courses (see the respective course announcement at <https://etca.randolph.af.mil/default1.asp>). Initial request will be sent to AFSOC/A7SX for each member. (T-2)

5.1.4. Individuals assigned to a 9AAHQ or 9AAHD Security Forces UTC position are serving in an ATO position and must maintain current ATO certification IAW AFI 10-245, *Air Force Antiterrorism (AT) Standards*, paragraph 2.26. AT Level II training is a onetime requirement for personnel assigned to all other UTCs listed above. (T-1)

5.1.5. Any SOCOM/Emerald Warrior exercise will count as the annual Stan-Eval certification for DAGRE members who attend. A certified DAGRE team leader will be detailed as the certifying official. (T-2)

5.1.6. The unit commander should certify the need for DAGRE team members to receive a civilian clothing allowance IAW AFI 36-3014, Clothing Allowance for Air Force Personnel, Chapter 3, through the base finance office (if required to perform DAGRE duties on select, sensitive missions). (T-2)

## **5.2. Recommended Training:**

5.2.1. Units must forecast (funding, quotas and scheduling) for these courses in order to exceed the minimum training requirements. Forecast funding requirements for the management and maintenance of the program with the base comptroller and wing leadership. This includes costs associated with gear and uniform item replacement. Funding requests are submitted to the MAJCOM as part of wing funding submissions. The DFC should certify the need for DAGRE team members to receive a civilian clothing allowance IAW AFI 36-3014, Clothing Allowance for Air Force Personnel, Chapter 3, through the base finance office (if required to perform DAGRE duties on select, sensitive missions). (T-2)

5.2.2. The below table is not a comprehensive list, but identifies highly encouraged advanced training courses to enhance the overall effectiveness of the unit. (T-3)

Table 5.2. Training Courses:

Recommended Courses	Course #	9AAHQ/D	QFM2D	QFM1D	QFM3C	QFM1C
ID Command Course/54L	L3OZR31P4 0S0A	X	X			
Intel Formal Trng Unit Crse	AF FP IFTU	X	X			X
ECAC	S-V88-AF	X	X	X	X	X
SERE/ERR	S-V80/V84/V90-A	X	X	X	X	X
Air Assault	071-SI/ AS12B					X
Pathfinder/7GM	L5ASA1C451 0T0A					X
SOCOM SSE	N/A			X		X
CPEC/ADM	CPEC or ADM			X	X	X
Combat Leader Course/NGI	L3AZR3P071 0S0A			X	X	X
EMT	Local MTF Education and	X	X	X	X	X
DIT/ROC, , or other AF approved AT Lvl II	SOED-DIT/ROC	X	X	X	X	X
Full Spectrum Ops Course	<a href="http://www.pfctraini ng.com">http://www.pfctraini ng.com</a>	X	X	X	X	X
Other certified shooting	N/A	X	X	X	X	X
Krav Maga Advance Course	N/A	X	X	X	X	X
Ranger/2HR	L5OZA31P3 0S1A	X	X	X	X	X
SOSF Leader Course/IMU	AFSOC SF LEADER	X	X	X	X	X
SOF-FAST/IMW	AFSOC SF FLYAWY	X	X	X	X	X

Recommended Courses	Course #	9AAHQ/D	QFM2D	QFM1D	QFM3C	QFM1C
SOSF Comm Course/IN1	AFSOC SF COMMS	X	X	X	X	X
SOSF Combatives/IM V	AFSOC SF COMBAT	X	X	X	X	X
SOSF Tactics Course/INC	AFSOC SF TACTIC	X	X	X	X	X
SOSF Tactical Vehicle Ops/INB	AFSOC SF TACVEH	X	X	X	X	X
SOSF DAGRE Qual/DKI	AFSOC SF DAGRE	X	X	X	X	X

5.2.3. Commanders will ensure that all course prerequisites are met prior to unit members attending any of the above listed courses (see the respective course announcement at <https://etca.randolph.af.mil/default1.asp>). (T-3)

5.2.4. Additional training can be acquired through home station or outside agencies such as LRS for pallet build up, Life support for rescue equipment, SERE (for survival training, Emergency Parachute training, fixed wing and rotary. Peace time gov detention/hostage detention PG/HD familiarization. ATO and Special Instructions (SPINS) brief with radio and signal procedures IAW AFI 16-1301) this is not limited to other available training from other agencies for all AFSOC fixed or rotary wing aircraft. In the event members are not able to attend training a waiver letter must be submitted, see **Attachment 3**. (T-3)

DAVID C. PIECH, Colonel, USAF  
Director, Installations & Mission Support

**Attachment 1****GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

AFTTP 3-1.MDS, *Combat Aircraft Training July 2010*

AFTTP 3-3.MDS, *Combat Aircraft Fundamentals*

AFI 10-245, *Air Force Antiterrorism (AT) Standards*, 30 Mar 09

AFI 11-2MDS, Volume 3, *Aircraft Procedures*

AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, 8 Oct 09

AFI 31-101 AFSOC Sup, *Integrated Defense Mar 13*

AFH 31-305, *Security Forces Deployment Planning Handbook*, 26 Feb 03

AFMAN 33-363, *Management of Records*, 1 Mar 08

AFSOCI 14-102, *Threat Working Group*, 1 Mar 04

USSOCOM Directive 525-8, *Joint Special Operations Air Component*, 18 Jun 07

***Prescribed Forms***

No forms are prescribed in this publication.

***Adopted Forms***

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*.

***Abbreviations and Acronyms***

**A/C**—Aircraft

**AC**—Aircraft Commander

**AEF**—Air Expeditionary Force

**AF**—Air Force

**AFH**—Air Force Handbook

**AFI**—Air Force Instruction

**AFMAN**—Air Force Manual

**AFOSI**—Air Force Office of Special Investigation

**AFRC**—Air Force Reserve Command

**AFRIMS**—Air Force Records Information Management System

**AFSOC**—Air Force Special Operations Command

**AFSOD**—Air Force Special Operations Detachment

**AFSOTC**—Air Force Special Operations Training Center

**AMC**—Air Mobility Command

**ANG**—Air National Guard  
**AOC**—Air Operations Center  
**AT/FP**—Antiterrorism/Force Protection  
**AT**—Antiterrorism  
**ATO**—Antiterrorism Officer  
**ATV**—All Terrain Vehicle  
**BOS**—Base Operating Support  
**CC**—Commander  
**C2**—Command and Control  
**C4I**—Command, Control, Communications, Computers, & Intelligence  
**CI**—Counterintelligence  
**COMAFSOF**—Commander, Air Force Special Operations Forces  
**DAGRE**—Deployed Aircraft Ground Response Element  
**DOC**—Designed Operational Capability  
**DOD**—Department of Defense  
**DSC**—Deployed Security Coordinator  
**FAST**—Fly-Away Security Team  
**FCG**—Foreign Clearance Guide  
**FP**—Force Protection  
**HQ**—Headquarters  
**IAW**—In Accordance With  
**ISOC**—Introduction to Special Operations Course  
**JLLIS**—Joint Lessons Learned Information System  
**JSOAC**—Joint Special Operations Air Component  
**JSOAD**—Joint Special Operations Air Detachment  
**LOGDET**—Logistics Detail  
**MANFOR**—Manpower Force Packaging System MC—Mission Commander  
**MEGP**—Mission Essential Ground Personnel  
**MISCAP**—Mission Capabilities  
**MULE**—Multi-Use Light Equipment Utility Vehicle  
**OPCON**—Operational Control  
**OPR**—Office of Primary Responsibility

**ORM**—Organizational Risk Management  
**OSS**—Operational Support Squadron  
**OSI**—Office of Special Investigation  
**PL**—Protection Level  
**RAD**—Risk Assessment Database  
**RDS**—Records Disposition Schedule  
**RRL**—RAVEN Required Locations  
**SF**—Security Forces  
**SIPR**—Secure Internet Protocol Router  
**SMB**—Specialized Mission Branch  
**SNCO**—Senior Non Commissioned Officer  
**SOF**—Special Operations Forces  
**SOG**—Special Operations Group  
**SOCOM**—Special Operations Command  
**SOMSG**—Special Operations Mission Support Group  
**SOSF**—Special Operations Security Forces  
**SOSFS**—Special Operations Security Forces Squadron  
**SOW**—Special Operations Wing  
**SSE**—Sensitive Site Exploitation  
**TACON**—Tactical Control  
**TCCC**—Tactical Combat Casualty Care  
**TWG**—Threat Working Group  
**USSOCOM**—United States Special Operations Command  
**UTC**—Unit Type Code

## Attachment 2

**AFSOC DAGRE AND AIRCRAFT SECURITY RECOMMENDATION MATRIX  
CLASSIFICATION: (WHEN COMPLETED)**

Airfield: _____		ICAO: _____		Country: _____		Date : _____	
FACTORS	0 Points	1 Point	2 Points	3 Points	4 Points	5 Points	Points/Comments
1. Terrorist Threat	There is no known threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a negligible threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is LOW threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a MODERATE threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a SIGNIFICANT threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a HIGH threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	
2. Criminal Threat	There is no known threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a negligible threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is LOW threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a MEDIUM threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a HIGH threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	There is a CRITICAL threat against US, Coalition, or Host Nation Forces	
3. Security Personnel	US Forces have complete control over all airfield security	Coalition Forces have complete control over all airfield security	US, Coalition and/or Host Nation Forces share control over all airfield security	Host Nation Forces have complete control over all airfield security	Host Nation Forces have some control of airfield security	There is no visible control over airfield security or unknown	
4. Aircraft Security Standards	US Forces provide aircraft security that meets or exceeds min required PL security IAW AFI 31-101	Coalition Forces provide aircraft security that meets or exceeds min required PL security IAW AFI 31-101; reliability not in question	Host Nation Forces provide aircraft security that exceeds min required PL security IAW AFI 31-101; reliability not in question	Coalition and/or Host Nation Forces provide aircraft security that meets min required PL security IAW AFI 31-101; reliability is uncertain	Host Nation Forces provide aircraft security that meets min required PL security IAW AFI 31-101; reliability is questionable	Forces do not provide aircraft security that meets min required PL security IAW AFI 31-101 or unknown	
5. Response Forces	US Forces have a response force dedicated specifically to the airfield	Coalition Forces have a response force dedicated specifically to the airfield	Host Nation Forces have a response force dedicated specifically to the airfield	Response forces are available but not specifically dedicated to the airfield	Host Nation Forces have a response force dedicated specifically to the airfield; reliability is questionable	No response forces are available or unknown	
6. Aircraft Parking	US aircraft are parked together in a specific area	US and Coalition aircraft are parked together in a specific area	US and/or Coalition aircraft are parked together with Host Nation military aircraft in a specific area	US aircraft are parked near Host Nation commercial aircraft	US aircraft are parked among Host Nation commercial aircraft	US Aircraft are parked everywhere or unknown	

Airfield: _____		ICAO: _____		Country: _____		Date : _____	
FACTORS	0 Points	1 Point	2 Points	3 Points	4 Points	5 Points	Points/Comments
7. Entry Control	Strict entry control; entry credentials used; escort program	Multiple forces control entry to the airfield; strict entry control; entry credentials used; escort program	Entry credentials used; reliability is uncertain	Entry credentials used; problems with entry control and/or escort program	Entry credentials not used	There is no control over entry to the airfield or unknown	
8. Perimeter Fencing	Installation AND airfield are completely surrounded by a fence or wall; both well maintained	Installation OR Airfield is completely surrounded by a fence or wall; well maintained	Installation OR Airfield is completely surrounded by a fence or wall; perimeter not well maintained	Installation OR Airfield is not completely surrounded by a fence or wall	Installation OR Airfield is not completely surrounded by a fence or wall; perimeter not well maintained	There is no perimeter of any kind around the installation/airfield or unknown	
9. Intrusion Detection	Extensive coverage; systems operable and monitored (sensors, cameras, night vision, observation posts, MWD, etc.)	Good coverage; systems operable and monitored (sensors, cameras, night vision, observation posts, MWD, etc.)	Key areas covered; systems operable and monitored (sensors, cameras, night vision, observation posts, MWD, etc.)	Limited coverage; some systems operable and monitored (sensors, cameras, night vision, observation posts, MWD, etc.)	Some coverage; systems and monitoring reliability is questionable (sensors, cameras, night vision, observation posts, MWD, etc.)	There is no coverage or unknown coverage (sensors, cameras, night vision, observation posts, MWD, etc.)	
10. Lighting	Airfield has complete lighting for all parking areas and entry points; well maintained and illuminated	Airfield has complete lighting for all parking areas and entry points; maintained illumination is lacking in a few areas	Airfield has some lighting for all parking areas and entry points; well maintained but several areas not well illuminated	Airfield has some lighting for all parking areas and entry points; not maintained and limited illumination	Airfield has little lighting for all parking areas and entry points	Airfield has no lighting at all or unknown	

INSTRUCTIONS: Circle/mark the items that apply; consider other factors listed on the bottom of the sheet after determining the total point value. Provide a completed copy of this matrix to the mission commander with any supporting documents and comments.

**Attachment 3**

**SAMPLE REGIONAL TRAINING CENTER (RTC) WAIVER REQUEST**

**“FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY”**

(ORGANIZATIONAL LETTERHEAD)

DATE

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AFSOC/A71

FROM: YOUR UNIT/CC

SUBJECT: Regional Training Center (RTC) Waiver Request

1. Units will state why they are requesting a RTC waiver (exact details surrounding circumstances of waiver submission). Be sure to indicate the previous deployment location and date returned (if applicable). Additionally, include the date and location where the member previously attended RTC.

RANK	NAME	SSN

2. If you have any questions or concerns regarding these guidelines, please contact the AFSOC Contingency Operations Branch Manager at DSN 579-2049 or Commercial (850) 884-2049.

(LAST, FIRST, MI), Rank, USAF  
Commander

1st Ind to HQ AFSOC/A71

MEMORANDUM FOR

Recommend approval/disapproval.

(LAST, FIRST, MI), Rank, USAF  
Deputy Director, Installations and Mission  
Support

“The information herein is For Official Use Only (FOUO) which must be protected under the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, and Privacy Act of 1974, as amended. Unauthorized disclosure or misuse of this PERSONAL INFORMATION may result in criminal and/or civil penalties.”

**Attachment 4****DEPLOYED AIRCRAFT GROUND RESPONSE ELEMENT(DAGRE)****Course Criteria**

- I. Leadership--3 Days
  - a. Fitness/Nutrition
  - b. Integrated Defense
  - c. AFSOC SF UTC's
  - d. AFSOC SF METLs
  - e. JSOAC SF Operations
  - f. COIN
  - g. Military Decision Making Process
  - h. Operational Risk Management
  - i. Troop Leading Procedures
- II. Fly-Away Security--3 Days
  - a. FAS Concept of Operations
  - b. Cross Cultural Communications
  - c. Force Continuum
  - d. Intelligence Programs
  - e. Airfield Survey
  - f. Pre-Departure Briefing
  - g. Practical Exercise
    - i. Students complete an airfield survey via multiple SIPR resources and give a pre-departure briefing with FAST recommendations IAW AFSOCI 31-100.
- III. Communications (AN-PRC 117G, AN-PRC 152) --3 Days
  - a. General Description
  - b. Controls/Indicators
  - c. Utility Functions/Self Test
  - d. VULOS Fixed Frequency Programming
  - e. Other Modes and Capabilities
  - f. COMSEC
  - g. Dedicated UHF SATCOM
- IV. Combatives (MAC-P lvl 1) --5 Days
  - a. Dominant Body Positions
  - b. Dominant Body Position Sparring
  - c. Submissions
  - d. Submission Sparring
  - e. Full Ground Fighting
  - f. Pummeling
  - g. Clinches and Takedowns
  - h. Student Teaching Evaluation
  - i. Achieve the Clinch Evaluation

- V. Tactics--5 Days
  - a. Small Unit Tactics
  - b. Tactical Combat Casualty Care
  - c. Land Navigation
- VI. Tactical Vehicle Operations Course--5 Days
  - a. Mounted Operations
  - b. Dynamics of Defensive Driving
- VII. DAGRE Qualification Course--15 Days
  - a. Mission Planning
  - b. Small Unit Tactics
  - c. M-9/M-4 Weapons Firing/Shoot Move Communicate (Live Fire)
  - d. Close Quarters Battle (Sim Munitions)
  - e. Deployment Preparation
  - f. Field Training Exercise
    - i. Orders
      - 1. Warning
      - 2. Operations
      - 3. Fragmentary
    - ii. Student Evaluations
      - 1. Team Leader
      - 2. Alternate Team Leader
      - 3. Radio Telephone Operator
      - 4. Patrolling
      - 5. Leaders Reconnaissance
      - 6. Actions on the Objective
      - 7. After Action Reports

**Attachment 5**  
**FORCE PROTECTION SITE SURVEY**

**1. Perimeter**

a. FENCE/WALLS

1. Is the airfield completely fenced or walled?(type, height, condition, gaps, etc)
2. Are there clear zones on each side of the fence/wall?
3. Is the area posted “No Trespassing” or “No Admittance?”

b. OTHER PHYSICAL BARRIERS

1. List different types, locations, and numbers of barriers observed
2. Is the perimeter under close circuit TV (CCTV)?

c. PATROLS

1. Is perimeter controlled by armed guards?
2. Frequency and regularity of patrols (predictable?, random?)
3. Is patrol conducted on foot, animals, or vehicles?
4. How many people are on each patrol?
5. Do patrols use MWDs?

d. ENTRY CONTROL POINTS (ECP)

1. Number and location of ECPs into/out of airfield or a/c parking ramp.
2. Number of guards at each ECP.

e. WATCHTOWERS/FIXED GUARD POSITIONS

1. Number, location, and description.
2. Number of guards at each location.

f. ENTRANCE PROCEDURES

1. If entry is controlled, what type of identification is required?
2. Are private vehicles allowed?

3. If so, what method of registration is required?
4. Are all persons in a vehicle required to show ID?
5. What are visitor control and escort procedures?
6. To what degree are vehicles, personnel, and their possessions searched?
7. Do any of the above vary at night?

g. LIGHTING

1. Is the perimeter lighted at night?
2. Are additional fixed spotlights located at watchtowers/ECP?
3. Are mobile mounted/towable spotlights available?

## II. FLIGHT LINE/RAMP SECURITY

a. FENCING

1. Is the flight line/ramp fenced? What type??
2. Are there clear zones on each side of the fence?
3. Is the area posted “No Trespassing” or “No Admittance?”

b. OTHER PHYSICAL BARRIERS

1. List different types, locations, and numbers of barriers observed.
2. Is the flight line/ramp under CCTV?

c. PATROLS

1. Is flight line/ramp controlled by armed guards?
2. Frequency and regularity of patrols.
3. Is patrol made of foot, animal, or vehicle?
4. How many people are in each patrol?
5. Do patrols use MWDs?

d. ECPs

1. Number, location, and ECPs at flight line/ramp.

2. Number of guards at each ECP.

e. WATCHTOWERS/FIXED GUARD POSITIONS AROUND FLIGHTLINE/RAMP

1. Number, location, and description.
2. Number of guards at each location.

f. FLIGHT LINE/RAMP ENTRANCE PROCEDURES

1. If entry is controlled, what type of identification is required?
2. Are private vehicles allowed?
3. If so, what method of registration is required?
4. Are all persons in a vehicle required to show ID?
5. What are visitor control and escort procedures?
6. To what degree are vehicles, personnel, and their possessions searched?
7. Do any of the above vary at night?

g. LIGHTING

1. Is flight line/ramp lighted at night?
2. Are additional fixed spotlights located at watchtowers/entry points?
3. Are mobile mounted/towable spotlights available?

h. PARKING

1. Are US Gov't aircraft parked in special locations?
2. If so, are additional guards posted?
3. As the area clearly marked as a restricted area?
4. Are US personnel authorized to have weapons on the flightline or ramp?
  - a. Are weapons storage facilities available to US crews?

### III. SECURITY FORCE

#### a. FORCE LEVEL

1. How many guards are typically on duty during day and night?
2. Are these guards host military units? Police or security force? Contracted?
3. To what extent and for how long can this force be augmented by in-place or nearby personnel?
4. Shift duration and shift change procedures/times?
5. What local customs might result in decreased security (holiday, prayer, daily rest period, etc.)?

#### b. PERSONNEL

1. Are personnel well trained and professional (variations by positions, officer & enlisted, etc.)?
2. What factors make individual members or groups susceptible to blackmail/bribery (i.e., low/irregular pay, mistreatment by leaders, etc.)?
3. What is the predominant language/dialect spoken by Security personnel?
  - a. What percentage speak English?
4. To what degree are they willing to work with US/Allied personnel?
5. Are security forces willing/able to provide increased security for US/Allied personnel?
  - a. If so, how are such arrangements made? Through DAO?

#### c. EQUIPMENT

1. What types of equipment are carried by guards?
2. What additional weapons are available? (at ECPs, towers, patrols, etc.)?
3. What forms of communications gear do the security personnel use?

d. QUICK REACTION/COUNTER-TERRORIST UNITS

1. Does such a force exist?
2. Is it on or near the airfield/airport?
3. What is its reaction time?
4. How large is the force?
5. To what degree is responsibility delegated in crisis situations?
6. How is the force trained and equipped? How is the morale and discipline compared to the regular security force? History of success?

**IV. BILLETING/ROUTE SECURITY**

a. BILLETING

1. Does the AMEMBASSY provide billeting in its compound?
2. If billeting is unavailable at compound, does AMEMBASSY maintain a list of hotels that meet minimum security requirements?
3. If AMEMBASSY maintains a standing list of recommended hotels, request the following for each, if available:
  - a. Basic description (design, height, towers, int/ext entrances, # rooms)
  - b. Gen Layout (parking, fences, walls, lighting, proximity to roads)
  - c. Number of elevators/stairways (int/ext), building entrances/exits, vehicle entrances/exits.
4. Are US personnel billeted in the same areas of the hotel or are they separated?
5. How is the crew transported to and from the hotel?

b. SECURITY AT HOTEL

1. If hotel has organic security force, use section III, SECURITY questions.

2. Are metal detectors/x-ray machines used at hotel entrances?
3. Are security forces available to escort crews transiting to/from airfield? If so, what is required to arrange this?

c. ROUTE SECURITY

1. Distance from airport to hotel.
2. Number of different routes available from airport to hotel.
3. Route description (s).
  - a. Choke points on route (includes traffic lights, congestion)
  - b. Number of lanes each direction
  - c. Number and location of safe houses (police stations) along route.
  - d. Does HN regularly patrol these routes?
  - e. Any bridges overpasses, one-ways, or tunnels along route?

V. OTHER AREAS

a. PERSONNEL THREAT

1. Are dissidents known to operate in the area of the airport?
2. ID these groups by name and leader(s), if known.
3. Are dissidents known to possess stand-off weapons (SAM, RPG, mortar, etc)
4. Are these groups known to possess comm monitoring equipment? (ID type and capability, if known)
5. Are these groups known to have anti-US sentiment?
6. What past incidents have occurred which targeting of US personnel, equipment facilities occurred?

7. Do hostile elements have any specific times/dates when they are historically active?
8. Do they have the support of the local populace?

b. PHYSICAL LOCATION

1. What natural/manmade obstacles are in the vicinity of the airport/airfield (i.e., power lines, tall buildings, dense forestry/vegetation, etc.)
2. ID areas surrounding flight line parking which could be used by hostile elements to covertly surveil airport operations and to launch attacks.
3. How suitable is the surrounding terrain and vegetation for a stand-off attack? Does this vary seasonally?

**Attachment 6**  
**AFTER ACTION REPORT(AAR)**

Date

MEMORANDUM FOR

FROM: Unit name

SUBJECT:

**1. Purpose:**

**2. Traveler:** Name

**3. Itinerary:**

**4. Points of Contact:**

**5. Pre-deployment from Unit**

**6. Lodging:**

**7. Facilities:**

**8. Employment:**

**9. Employment Recommendations:**

**10. Threat:**

**11. Observations:**

Name RANK  
DUTY position and or title