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SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

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Security



**INTEGRATED DEFENSE IN
EXPEDITIONARY ENVIRONMENTS**

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This Air Force Handbook (AFH) provides Security Forces Commanders and planners with operational level guidance for implementing Integrated Defense (ID) throughout the full Range of Military Operations (ROMO) and is not intended to be used as a guide for ID in home station environments. It complements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 31-1, *Integrated Defense*, and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-101, *Integrated Defense*. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located in the Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS). Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*, and route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. This publication may be supplemented at any level. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by the Air Force.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This AFH has been substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. For example, this document has incorporated concepts and terms used in the most recent version of AFI 31-101.

In addition, Ground Defense Postures (GDPs) have been omitted in this version. Finally, new base security assets and concepts are discussed within the contents of this document.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION TO INTEGRATED DEFENSE (ID)

1.1. A7S Vision. Mission-ready, resilient and air-minded Security Forces (SF) organized, trained and equipped to deliver enduring ID against threats to the United States Air Force (USAF), Joint and Coalition missions; recognized and respected for our air-centric expertise.

1.2. Introduction to ID Policy and Guidance Structure. USAF air and space assets are most vulnerable when they are on the ground. Our adversaries' mission is to exploit this vulnerability and it is the duty of every Airman to understand and mitigate these risks through the integration of installation defensive capabilities. Per AFPD 31-1, integrated defense is the integration of multidisciplinary active and passive, offensive and defensive capabilities, employed to mitigate potential risks and defeat adversary threats to Air Force operations. Integrated defense is planned and executed based upon the estimated threat (or combination of threats), and operating environment; it is approved by the installation commander. This handbook is a tool for SF leadership to plan for integrated defense operations in expeditionary environments. It is not an instruction but a guide to help leaders. Finally, it should be understood that this document is not all inclusive, and the references mentioned throughout should be utilized in conjunction with this handbook.

1.3. Key Guidance Structure:

1.3.1. AFPD 31-1 establishes the framework for how the Air Force formulates and applies ID and establishes SF as the enterprise leader for ID operations. Although SF is the enterprise lead, ID is an installation commander's program per AFI 31-101.

1.3.2. AFI 31-101 describes the concept, planning and execution of ID. Capabilities-based ID is a fundamental battle competency for all Airmen, and requires active participation by all to ensure its success.

1.3.3. This publication provides one element of a continually evolving process to provide users with a practical "how-to" reference, complete with links to additional reference material for all ID Forces. Additionally, reference material can be found on the Security Forces SMARTNet at the following link: <https://afsfmil.jackland.af.mil/>. Subjects that are specific to SF are addressed as such. Subjects that apply to all Airmen use terms such as "ID Forces" or "Defenders." Security of assets that defend our nation, people and resources is an inherent responsibility of command and requires the effort of every Airman regardless of Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC), rank or position. Therefore, tactical terms formerly applied specifically to SF such as Fire Team (FT), Squad, etc, are now applicable to all forces when organized for ID.

1.4. Background. In 1985, Joint Security Agreement (JSA) 8 committed the U.S. Army to provide units under the operational control (OPCON) of the appropriate air component commander to perform air base ground defense outside the base perimeter. In 1992, joint doctrine transferred this responsibility to installation commanders. In 2005, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force formally rescinded JSA 8 saying that "Joint Doctrine and the decisions of Joint Force Commanders will be used in place of this document." JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*, assigns base defense as an installation commander responsibility. This required the Air Force to re-look at how it defends its "nests and eggs on the

ground." This doctrinal shift has required SF to push beyond the base perimeter to conduct Area Security Operations (ASO) to secure the Base Security Zone (BSZ), and has required non-SF personnel to assume an increased role in the installation commander's ID program.

1.5. ID as a Fundamental Battle Competency. As previously stated, ID is a fundamental battle competency for all Airmen. AF members are charged to be active participants in the defense of installations, resources, activities and missions. Essentially, the teaming of ID contributors creates a united, seamless defense stronger than the defensive efforts of individual contributors or units. This mutual effort ensures all Airmen are trained to defend themselves and integrate into the defensive scheme to support the ID effort.

1.5.1. AFH 31-305, *Security Forces Deployment Planning*, should be used in conjunction with this handbook as general reference and operational planning guidance. Soldier Training Publication (STP) 21-1, *Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks Warrior Skills Level 1*, covers individual combat skills.

1.6. Threat. As outlined in AFI 31-101, ID forces must be capable of defeating Level I threats and be capable of deterring and defeating Level II threats. Level III threats necessitate a decision to commit a tactical combat force or other significant available forces to counter the threat.

1.7. Operational Environments. ID forces may be called upon to perform a variety of tasks in diverse environments, under joint or combined command, with or without host nation (HN) support, and under adverse or uncertain conditions. ID operations may occur in sustained environments, with in-place and forward deployed ID forces operating out of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). FOBs typically have in-place base support structures and are self-sustaining. ID operations may also occur in bare base environments without an existing base support structure.

1.8. Threat Level Examples:

1.8.1. The threat spectrum is divided into three levels, as outlined in [Figure 1.1](#) (below). These threat levels identify the type of group and the threat they pose against military activities. Moreover, the required responses by ID elements are also annotated below.

Figure 1.1. Threat Spectrum

LEVEL	THREATS	RESPONSE
I	Agents, sympathizers, partisans and terrorists.	Unit, base and base cluster self-defense measures.
II	Small tactical units, unconventional warfare forces and guerrillas.	Self-defense measures and response forces with supporting fire.
III	Large tactical force operations, including airborne, heliborne and major air operations.	Timely commitment of tactical combat forces.

1.8.2. Level I - This threat level is considered a peacetime threat that increases in frequency and transitions to a wartime threat before the beginning of open hostilities and with a rise in hostilities. The best way to defeat these threats is to disrupt the planning process through the application of countermeasures that create the desired ID effects before an attack occurs.

1.8.3. Level II - These activities include long-range reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, diversions and sabotage operations by Special Forces, such as guerrilla forces,

unconventional forces or small tactical units. Most major threat forces maintain special operations forces that are organized and highly trained to operate in the enemy's rear areas.

1.8.4. Level III - This threat level may require timely commitment of tactical combat forces. These forces (conventional airborne forces) can insert enemy forces (up to division size) up to 300 kilometers (km) beyond the front lines into friendly rear areas. In addition, their doctrine stresses the use of battalion size (500-2,000 personnel) units conducting helicopter insertions at a depth of 50 km. Targets for helicopter insertions include nuclear weapon storage sites and launch systems, early warning systems and command and control headquarters.

1.9. ID Force Organization. The composition of ID forces includes small teams less than FT configuration, FT, squad, flight, squadron (i.e., the Defense Force Commander [DFC] and the DFC's staff), and also other commanders and staffs of non-SF units that comprise the ID force.

1.9.1. Small teams, less than a FT configuration in ID: a two-person team is merely an "umbrella term" used to group small 2-3 person teams of various types, missions and configurations. Examples of such teams include: patrol teams, internal security response teams (ISRT), external security response teams (ESRT), entry controllers, teams posted in towers or defensive fighting positions (DFP), etc.

1.9.2. FTs in ID: The FT is typically the basic element in ID; however, Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Time, Troops available and Civil considerations (METT-TC) will dictate the team's configuration.

1.9.2.1. FT Composition: There are two basic FT configurations used by SF: Light and Heavy. The baseline for a Light FT should consist of a Fire Team Leader (FTL) armed with an M-4 and an M-9. The FT should have a light machine gunner with an M-249 and an M-9; a rifleman with an M-4 and an M-9; and a rifleman/grenadier with an M-4/M-203 and an M-9. The Heavy FT configuration consists of an FTL armed with an M-4 and an M-9; a heavy machine gunner with an M-240B, M-4 and M-9; an assistant gunner with an M-4 and M-9; and a rifleman/grenadier with an M-4/M-203 and an M-9.

1.9.3. Squads in ID: A squad consists of 13 personnel: one Squad Leader (SL) and three FTs (two Light and one Heavy) designated Alpha, Bravo and Charlie. In the Air Force, the Alpha and Charlie FTs are configured with the M-249 and the Bravo FT is configured as the Heavy with an M-240B. Additionally, the Charlie FTL is normally designated assistant SL. The squad may accept attachments based upon task/purpose/mission such as the attachment of an interpreter, medic, guide, technology operator, Military Working Dog (MWD) team, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team, Civil Engineering (CE) personnel, etc.

1.9.3.1. To maximize flexibility, the squad should be trained to operate in a mounted or dismounted role, autonomously or as part of a larger unit. Per AFI 31-101, SLs are responsible for all that their squad does or does not do during the course of duty. SLs supervise and are responsible for conducting collective training of the squad and individual training.

1.9.4. Flight Leadership (FL) in ID: The Flight Commander and Flight Chief, while individual and distinct duty positions, compose the command element for the flight. As the command element, the Flight Commander and Flight Chief are the senior tactical leaders for the flight. The Flight Commander is responsible for leading and directing all flight activities

and relaying the DFC's orders. The Flight Chief is the Flight's second in command and the tactical level subject matter expert (SME). The Flight Chief is responsible to the Flight Commander for the integration of all flight level activities and provides senior enlisted leadership, discipline, training, welfare and resource allocation and distribution to include manpower of the flight. They exercise command through their assigned SLs.

1.9.4.1. A standard flight consists of 44 personnel: The Flight Commander, Flight Chief and three squads with a Squad Leader (each squad is composed of 13 personnel and a three person radio/telephone operator element). This is the basic flight structure within the AF. However, not all flights will have 44 personnel assigned; some flights may have more or less.

Chapter 2

INTEGRATED DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL

2.1. General. Effective ID requires sound command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I). An effective interrelationship between the DFC, his/her S-Staff and ID forces is the key element to the C3I process. This chapter addresses basic C3I considerations for ID.

2.2. The DFC and the S-Staff. The DFC and the S-Staff plan, direct, coordinate and integrate the efforts of all ID assets under their control. The DFC is also the primary coordinator with other elements, including U.S., HN or allied forces. These assets may be placed under the tactical control (TACON) of the DFC. The base defense operations center (BDOC) is the Command Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) center for all ID operations. Normally, the entire S-Staff operates in the BDOC when space is available. However, the DFC may locate certain S-Staff functions (such as the S-1 and S-4 branches) outside the BDOC. Should the Air Force not be the Base Operation Support Integrator (BOSI), the BDOC serves as a sector command post passing information upward and downward to the Joint Defense Operation Center (JDOC). A JDOC is typically used in a deployed environment when multiple agencies are embedded in the command and control center for the installation. These agencies might include: Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) personnel, Fire Department personnel, Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) camera personnel, Joint Forces, etc.

2.2.1. The DFC. The DFC is responsible for the total execution of the ID mission. This includes tactical employment, training, administration, personnel management and sustainment of ID forces. The DFC must know the capabilities of his/her forces and support weapons. The DFC exercises authority through his/her chain of command and, when necessary, requests support from higher headquarters (HHQ) to accomplish the ID mission. The DFC may delegate authority to their S-Staff to issue plans, orders and other actions without their prior approval. See **Figure 3.8**, "Operations Order" for specific information on preparing orders. The S-Staff keeps the DFC informed of actions affecting their TACON.

2.2.2. The S-1. The S-1 branch is responsible to the DFC for all plans, estimates, reports and requests as they relate to personnel and administrative matters. **Attachment 2** provides the key tasks of the S-1.

2.2.3. The S-2. The S-2 branch provides current information to the DFC on threats affecting installation ID operations through force protection intelligence (FPI) liaison and investigations. The Intelligence Fusion Cell (IFC) is an action group whereby the S-2 function coordinates with SMEs from the Intelligence and Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI) communities to collaborate and conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). The goal is to leverage force protection information to support the timely identification of indicators and warnings of emerging localized threats. The IFC and its products directly support the DFC in making immediate, proactive decisions for ID planning. However, the DFC should use other sources to obtain threat information such as the Antiterrorism Working Group (ATWG), Threat Working Group (TWG) and Integrated Defense Working Group (IDWG). Investigations duties are outlined in AFI 31-206, *Security*

Forces Investigations Program. FPI liaison duties include, but are not limited to, the following:

2.2.3.1. The S-2 should coordinate with Intelligence and AFOSI personnel to ensure identification of areas of interest, and to minimize duplication of effort.

2.2.3.2. The S-2 liaises with AFOSI to obtain local counter intelligence (CI) threat information, analysis of HN or foreign intelligence threats, information regarding criminal activity, local police force capabilities and other information gathered from the local Department of State Regional Security Officer and Station Chief.

2.2.3.3. The S-2 is responsible for all plans, estimates, reports and requests concerning FPI, and supports the SF S-3 and Installation Antiterrorism Officer, as well as the following working groups: Threat Working Group (TWG), Antiterrorism Working Group (ATWG), and Integrated Defense Working Group (IDWG).

2.2.3.4. The S-2 may also complete paragraph 1, Situation, of the squadron operation order (OPORD). Moreover, paragraph 1 will include intelligence information obtained from AFOSI and Intelligence personnel. **Attachment 3** provides the key tasks of the S-2.

2.2.3.5. The S-2 is also the DFC's Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for developing Priority Intelligence Request (PIRs) and Commander Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).

2.2.4. The S-3. The S-3 branch (BDOC Current and Future Operations Cell) is responsible to the DFC for day-to-day operational ID matters, to include all plans, movements, training and communications. The future operations cell takes the IFC's analysis and devises a strategy to counter enemy activities for 24 hours and beyond.

2.2.4.1. The operations function is typically the largest branch and the S-3 is normally the second in command to the DFC. The S-3 branch will typically assist the DFC in the preparation of paragraph 3, Execution, and paragraph 5, Command and Signal, of the squadron OPORD. **Attachment 4** outlines key duties of the S-3 branch and its interrelationship with other members of the S-Staff.

2.2.5. The S-4. The S-4 branch is responsible for all logistical matters affecting SF and may also assist other ID forces' logistics functions with expertise and guidance to ensure compatibility throughout the ID force.

2.2.5.1. The S-4 maintains logistics detail (LOGDETs) paperwork and preparation, mission essential equipment support requirements, unit combat arms program, vehicle maintenance and Unit Deployment Manager (UDM) functions. **Attachment 5** provides the key tasks of the S-4.

2.2.6. The S-5. The S-5 branch performs Strategy and Combat Plans for ID at the tactical level. Functions include pass and ID, reports and analysis, plans administration, installation security, resource protection, physical security, crime prevention, police services planning, Security Forces Management Information System (SFMIS) and contractor oversight. As a base becomes fully operational, the S-5 is also responsible for drafting and coordinating the Integrated Defense Plan (IDP). Thus, the S-5 section has a rather large role in the overall ID concept. **Attachment 6** provides the key tasks of the S-5.

2.2.7. The S-6. If employed, the S-6 branch provides program management, equipment sustainment and force training to ensure the integration and optimal exploitation of ID and FP technologies. The S-6 is responsible for all ID and related communication and electronic systems within a unit to include Tactical Automated Security Sensors (TASS), Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SUAS), Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) and ID navigational systems. When employed, the S-6 branch will typically assist the DFC in the preparation of paragraph 5, Command and Signal, of the squadron OPORD and act as the DFC's liaison with the local Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO).

2.3. Staff Interaction. In addition to interacting with other units on the base, the DFC and his/her staff may need to coordinate, provide liaison and meet with units of other services and nations in order to effectively conduct ID operations. This may include, but is not limited to, meeting with adjacent battle space owners (BSO), coordinating response capabilities and even sharing gathered force protection information.

2.3.1. Combined Operations. Due to the multi-national character of combined operations (vastly different operational methods, language differences, etc), these operations require close coordination between the DFC, the S-Staff and other units of the combined force. Five values, while not specific to joint operations, have special impact on the conduct of joint operations: integrity, competency, physical courage, moral courage and teamwork. The aforementioned values will facilitate smooth working relationships between joint warfighters and ensure joint operational success.

2.4. Staff Control Tools. Control tools are orders, directives, information, visual aids or any other method used to clarify intent, provide focus and ensure synchronization of the ID effort. They assign responsibilities, coordinate fire and maneuver, provide updated information and ensure safety. They can be given graphically, in writing or orally by anyone in the chain of command. These tools include, but are not limited to, those described in the following paragraphs.

2.4.1. Orders Group (O-Group). At a minimum, O-Group is a meeting of the key ID leadership and should be held daily in a secure location determined by the DFC. Times for O-Group will vary. All participants should be informed of the times by secure means and additional O-Groups may be scheduled if needed. Attendees should arrive early to coordinate with the S-Staff, turn in required paperwork, coordinate with peers, etc. The on-duty S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, S-5, S-6, Flight Commander and Flight Chief, the MWD headquarters noncommissioned officer-in-charge (NCOIC), the HN/Army/Navy/Marine liaison (if applicable) and any others deemed appropriate by the DFC should attend O-Group. Subject to the DFC's discretion, the following is a recommended order for O-Group:

2.4.1.1. The DFC may open with initial comments.

2.4.1.2. The S-2 begins by covering the following topics and other topics as necessary:

2.4.1.2.1. Time hack.

2.4.1.2.2. Weather for the next 24 hours (if available, a 3-day and 30-day forecast).

2.4.1.2.3. The latest intelligence summary (INTSUM) for the previous 24 hours (air and ground).

2.4.1.2.4. Trends since the initiation of hostilities.

2.4.1.2.5. Projection of enemy activities.

2.4.1.3. The S-3 presents the third briefing. It may consist of, but is not limited to, the following:

2.4.1.3.1. Summary of ID operations to date.

2.4.1.3.2. Future operations.

2.4.1.3.3. Tactical deception operations.

2.4.1.4. The S-4 will give the fourth briefing. It will include, but is not limited to, the following:

2.4.1.4.1. Logistical issues which could affect the ID mission.

2.4.1.4.2. Projected status of supplies and equipment.

2.4.1.4.3. Maintenance services.

2.4.1.4.4. Administrative logistical issues.

2.4.1.5. Invited briefers will give briefings on their subject area (if applicable).

2.4.1.6. The S-1 will give the last briefing. It may include, but is not limited to, the following:

2.4.1.6.1. Personnel present for duty.

2.4.1.6.2. Hospitalized personnel.

2.4.1.6.3. Casualties (deceased or non-returnable to duty) from the previous 24 hours.

2.4.1.6.4. Cumulative casualties.

2.4.1.6.5. Projection of personnel status.

2.4.1.6.6. State of morale.

2.4.1.6.7. Administrative matters (postal, billets, etc).

2.4.1.6.8. The availability or status of local medical support (e.g., beds available) and identify if there is a potential impact on the ID mission. For example, if the local medical facility is beyond capacity and cannot support additional casualties, then this may be a planning consideration for ASO operations.

2.4.1.7. The DFC may conclude O-Group with items of his/her choosing. Examples are:

2.4.1.7.1. Any changes to the ID concept of operation.

2.4.1.7.2. Special interest items.

2.4.1.7.3. Overall state of the ID effort.

2.4.2. Reports. Reports provide key information to the DFC and his/her S-Staff on specific ID activities in order to make decisions and develop and implement tactical plans and orders. **Tables 4.1** through **4.3** are examples of typical reports provided to the DFC and their S-Staff.

2.4.3. Flight Control Tools. Control tools are used to synchronize ID actions, provide tactical updates to the ID chain of command, accomplish critical tasks and control fire. Leaders also use orders, sketches, priorities of work, range cards and other means to control ID forces.

2.4.4. Range Cards. IAW Field Manual (FM) 7-8, *The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, the range card is a sketch of the assigned sector for a direct fire weapon system on a given sector of fire. A range card aids in planning and controlling fires and aids the crews and squad gunners in acquiring targets during periods of limited visibility. Range cards show possible target areas and terrain features plotted in relation to a firing position. Range cards also aid replacement personnel in becoming oriented on the sector. Range cards should be updated as necessary (when new weapons systems are placed within a sector, terrain changes, etc). In establishing defenses, the Flight Chief identifies heavy weapon positions and sights the heavy weapons first, establishing either a final protective line (FPL) or a final protective fire (FPF). An FPL is a line of fire across the flight front. When the terrain does not lend itself to an FPL, an FPF will be designated along a likely avenue of approach or other danger area. The gunner prepares their range card and provides the Flight Chief a copy. Range cards are completed IAW STP 21-1. Further, range cards are also used to aid leaders in completing required sketches. In some locations, panoramic photos have been used as a best practice. Coupled with a data section like the range card, panoramic photos may provide a clearer picture for gunners; however, range cards may still be required for compiling sketches if good imagery isn't available.

2.4.5. As defined in FM 7-8, a range card is a record of the firing data required to engage predetermined targets within a sector of fire during good and limited visibility. In addition, the range card helps identify dead space, where trip flares have been placed, etc. Every direct-fire weapon gunner must prepare a range card for his or her position. Range cards are prepared for primary, alternate and supplementary positions. Range cards are prepared immediately upon arrival to a position, regardless of the length of stay. Range cards are updated as necessary; the range card should be updated if the terrain changes, or if trip flares or similar items have been added to the area.


Figure 2.1. Range Card.

STANDARD RANGE CARD					
For use of this form see FM 7-21.71; the proponent agency is TRADOC.					
SQD _____	May be used for all types of direct fire weapons.				MAGNETIC NORTH
PLT _____					
CO _____					
POSITION IDENTIFICATION			DATE 18 APR 06		
WEAPON M240B			EACH CIRCLE EQUALS 150		
NO.	DIRECTION/DEFLECTION	ELEVATION	RANGE	AMMO	DESCRIPTION
1		-50/3	600	7.62	FPL
2	R 105	+50/40	500	7.62	LONE PINE
3	L 235	0/28	350	7.62	TRAIL JUNCTION
REMARKS: No. 1 - -4 No. 3 - W15/LT					

2.5. Squad Sector Sketch. The squad sector sketch is designed to visually display, in detail, the squad fire plan and other key information. **Figure 2.2** shows an example of a squad sector sketch.

- 2.5.1. Sketch. The SL prepares the sketch and provides a copy to the FL. Each sketch should include:
- 2.5.2. The main terrain features in the sector of fire and the ranges to them.
- 2.5.3. Each primary fighting position and the type of weapon(s) in each position.
- 2.5.4. The primary and secondary fields of fire for each position.
- 2.5.5. Machine gun FPL or FPF.
- 2.5.6. Listening Posts (LP)/Observation Posts (OP) locations and SL positions.
- 2.5.7. Dead space (show coverage by grenade launchers [M-203]).
- 2.5.8. Location(s) of night vision devices/thermal imagers/sensor enunciators.

Figure 2.2. Squad Sector Sketch.



2.6. Flight Sector Sketch. The Flight Chief checks range cards and squad sector sketches. If there are gaps or other flaws in the fire plan, they make necessary adjustments. If they find dead space, they take steps to cover it with the M-203 grenade launcher fire or other indirect fire (IDF) weapons. The Flight Chief compiles two flight sector sketches for the Flight Commander (one for their own use; the other for the DFC and S-3). See **Figure 2.3** for an example. Each sketch should show:

- 2.6.1. Squad sectors of fire.

2.6.2. Machine gun positions and their sectors of fire, to include FPLs and FPFs of the machine guns and Squad Automatic Weapons (SAW). Include target reference points (TRPs) for supporting joint fires.

2.6.3. Sensors and obstacles.

2.6.4. IDF planned in the flight's sector of fire (targets and FPL).

2.6.5. LP/OP locations and patrol routes, if any.

2.6.6. Flight/CP post location with an azimuth and distance to an easily recognizable terrain feature.


2.6.7. Location of casualty collection point (CCP), logistics resupply point and Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) collection point.

2.6.8. Flight and squadron (deployed squadron, not home station) identification.

2.6.9. Date/time group.

2.6.10. Magnetic north.

Figure 2.3. Flight Sector Sketch



2.7. Fire Control Measures. At the onset of a ground attack on an air base, pre-established fire control measures are essential to the successful conduct of ID. FL and Squad Leaders use the following fire control measures to ensure the proper concentration and distribution of fires.

2.7.1. Sectors of Fire. As indicated on flight and squad sector sketches, sectors of fire are designated to ensure adequate distribution and interlocking of fires across the flight front. Flight Chiefs ensure the Flight Commander's sectors of fire interlock with adjacent sectors (as shown in [Figure 2.3](#) above).

2.7.2. Engagement Areas. The Flight Chief and the SLs use engagement areas to concentrate all available fires into a specific area.

2.7.3. Fire Patterns. These include front, cross and depth fires. These patterns describe the relationship between the weapons and the targets. The intent is to ensure weapons do not waste ammunition firing on the same target while other targets remain unengaged.

2.7.4. Engagement Priorities. These designate the priority for engaging key targets.

2.7.5. Rate of Fire. The rate will be designated by the SL or FL.

2.8. Priorities of Work. The priority of work is a list of tasks the DFC and FL can use to control what gets done by whom and in what order in the preparation of ID. He/she can adjust the priorities of work based upon the tactical situation and other considerations. The following is an example of a flight priority of work when occupying a sector:

2.8.1. Establish security. Position LPs and OPs.

2.8.2. Position machine guns and SAWs (and, if applicable, MK-19s, M-2s and M-24s). Designate FPLs for machine guns.

2.8.3. Position remainder of squads and assign sectors of fire for M-4 rifles and M-203 grenade launchers.

2.8.4. Establish flight CP and communications.

2.8.5. Clear fields of fire and prepare range cards and sector sketches.

2.8.6. Coordinate with adjacent flights.

2.8.7. Prepare primary fighting positions.

2.8.8. Emplace obstacles and sensors.

2.8.9. Designate targets for IDF. Coordinate with Joint Fires Fire Direction Center (FDC).

2.8.10. Improve primary fighting positions such as overhead cover.

2.8.11. Prepare alternate positions.

2.8.12. Establish a work rest cycle. Set up latrines.

2.8.13. Conduct reconnaissance of routine patrol routes.

2.8.14. Rehearse engagements, disengagements, stand to and counterattack actions. If possible, include elements of the mobile reserve in the rehearsals.

2.8.15. Adjust positions or control measures as required.

2.8.16. Stockpile ammunition, food and water.

2.8.17. Dig trenches to connect positions.

2.8.18. Continue to improve positions.

2.9. ID Communications. Effective communication is essential in ID operations. The DFC should ensure a secure, reliable communications system is established between the Command Post (CP), BDOC, Tactical Operation Center (TOC), host nation forces, and most importantly, the flights, mobile reserve elements, MWD elements, all heavy weapons and the FDC.

2.10. Communication Means. There are several means of communication. Each complements the other and provides redundancy in the total communications system. The following are common means of communication used by ID forces:

2.10.1. Hand and arm signals, whistle, flashlights, flares, smoke and other means provide quick transmission of messages and instructions. FLs and SLs use hand and arm signals to control individual, FT and squad movement.

2.10.2. Messenger. This is the best way to send long messages and documents. However, messengers are the slowest means and are vulnerable to enemy action. When using a messenger, messages are normally written with clear, concise text. Nonetheless, the messenger is the most secure means of communication.

2.10.3. Wire. This is a dependable, reasonably secure means of communication and involves the use of field wire, telephones, switch boards and other associated equipment. Squads normally establish a "hot loop" configuration between fighting positions and the SL has a direct line to the flight CP. If landline communications to the BDOC from the flight CP do not exist, wire communications should be established. Wire should be buried deep in the ground (personnel should inspect the wire prior to installation). If possible, request telephone support from the communications unit. Tactical wire emplacement procedures can be found in FM 7-8.

2.10.4. Audible. These include whistles, horns, sirens, bells, voice amplifiers and explosives. This means of communication is used to attract attention, transmit pre-arranged messages or spread alarms. They are good for only short distances and range and reliability is reduced by battle and aircraft noise, weather, terrain or vegetation. Sound signals should be simple to avoid misunderstandings.

2.10.5. Radio. Radios are the most flexible means of communication. ID radio communications typically involve tactical radio procedures which are outlined in FM 7-8 and STP 7-11B1-SM-TG, *Infantry*. Tactical radio procedures may involve the use of Signal Operating Instructions (SOI). An SOI contains call signs, frequencies, sign/countersigns and other key communications information. SOIs will be maintained and trained as determined by local plans. Defenders should closely coordinate with communications experts to ensure SOI requirements are met. Lastly, personnel should understand that radios are one of the least secure means of communication on the battlefield. If a post is outfitted with a hard line, personnel should use the hard line before the radio.

2.10.6. Cellular or mobile phones and satellite phones are sometimes used in ID operations. This should only be used for basic communication. These forms of communication are not secure and could be intercepted by the enemy. If a post is outfitted with a hard line, use this method to communicate before using a cell phone. In addition, Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) could block cellular signals on the battlefield. Be aware that taking pictures with personal cell phones and posting on social networks (FaceBook, Twitter, MySpace, etc) can be detrimental to ID forces. When taking a picture, some phones show the location of where the activity took place. This is known as geo-tagging. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the adversary has been known to collect intelligence for military operations using this technique.

2.10.7. In the recent past, technology has become more and more prevalent on the battlefield. ID forces must be aware of this technology and seek to exploit it. Technologies used in previous operations include the Blue Force Tracker (BFT), portable laptops, Satellite Communications (SATCOM) and radio-frequency jammers or ECMs are just a few examples. In many cases battlefield Airman have improvised and used the heads up display

(HUD) in the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles in order to locate Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) during nighttime patrols. AF personnel should be aware of new and emerging technology, and seek to exploit it on today's ever-changing battlefield.

2.10.8. Communications Security (COMSEC). Mobile operations inherently require communications with greater range than typical static posts. The FT's primary means of communication may be the tactical radio. Along with an in-depth knowledge of how to properly utilize the radio net, FTLs must ensure all teams are fully trained on radio operation, net protocols and safeguarding COMSEC material. As communications networks are susceptible to monitoring, jamming and disruption by the enemy, effective COMSEC procedures are essential. The DFC should design an efficient authentication system to protect the communications network. In the absence of secure voice radios, proper adherence to transmission procedures is essential and use of transmission codes (normally found in the SOI) is recommended. If the network is experiencing any type of interference, ensure all radio equipment is functioning properly. If the equipment is unusable due to interference, use alternative communications means, relocate the antenna or change the frequency. Immediately report the interference up the chain of command. This is especially true if you believe the interference to be due to the enemy. A good acronym to remember is Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming and Interference (MIJI).

2.10.8.1. Meaconing is the interception and rebroadcast of navigation signals.

2.10.8.2. Intrusion is defined as any attempt by an enemy to enter U.S. or allied communications systems and simulate our traffic to confuse and deceive.

2.10.8.3. Jamming is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation or reflection of electromagnetic signals to disrupt enemy use of electronic devices, equipment or systems.

2.10.8.4. Interference is normally a non-deliberate intrusion upon a circuit. It unintentionally degrades, disrupts, obstructs or limits the effective performance of electronic or electrical equipment. NOTE: Additional USAF-specific COMSEC requirements can be found in AFI 33-201, Volume 1, Communications Security, and Volume 2, Communications Security User Requirements (both publications are only issued by the OPR).

Chapter 3

PLANNING FOR INTEGRATED DEFENSE

3.1. ID Planning:

3.1.1. Per AFI 31-101, the Integrated Defense Risk Management Process (IDRMP) forms the basis for all installation security planning. Generally, ID forces secure four broad categories during contingencies: installations, compounds, airfields and other individual resources (such as lines of communication, off-station aircraft, etc). Securing these assets can be critical to operations. ID Forces also conduct missions to secure other individual resources outside the base perimeter (BP) but inside the BSZ through ASO such as patrolling, convoy operations, off-station aircraft security, Counter Surface to Air Fire (C-SAFIRE), Counter Indirect Fire (C-IDF), Tactical Security Element (TSE), etc. These missions require thorough planning and leadership.

3.1.2. The entire IDRMP is explained in AFI 31-101 and will not be restated here. However, it should be understood that AFI 31-101 is the premier document when seeking information on this doctrine and its application within the operational arena.

3.1.3. Most reference material regarding military planning and orders begins with the unit deriving its mission from Paragraph 3 (Execution) from their “parent unit’s” OPORD. The required documents for beginning the IDRMP are utilized to understand the commander’s intent. If the Installation Commander has not authored his/her intent, the DFC should draft it for them and obtain approval. Again, the commander’s intent is absolutely necessary for ID planning; you cannot effectively conduct or implement the IDRMP without it. AFI 31-101 provides an example of a commander’s intent.


3.2. The Base Boundary (BB) and BSZ. Before planning begins, all ID Forces must be familiar with certain terms to ensure unity of action. These include the BB and BSZ.

3.2.1. Base Boundary. AFDD 3-10, *Force Protection*, defines the BB as a line that delineates the surface area of a base for the purpose of facilitating coordination and de-confliction of operations between adjacent units, formations or areas (see also AFI 31-101). Therefore, the BB is not necessarily the base perimeter; rather, it should be established based upon the factors of METT-TC, specifically balancing the need of the base defense forces to control key terrain with their ability to accomplish the mission. These measures decrease the likelihood of fratricide, prevent non-combatant casualties and minimize collateral damage to the property of friendly civilians. Boundaries may not necessarily coincide with the “fenced” perimeter, property lines or legal boundaries. Nevertheless, while tactical considerations will ideally determine ID boundaries, the DFC will strictly adhere to legal, jurisdictional, HN constraints, commander’s intent and higher echelon orders and directives when conducting operations within the BB.

3.2.2. Base Security Zone. The BSZ is an Air Force unique concept and term to be used intra-Service only. The Air Force uses the planning term BSZ to describe the area of concern around an air base and to support the establishment and adjustment of the BB. As identified in AFDD 3-10, the BSZ is the area outside the base perimeter from which the base may be vulnerable from standoff threats (e.g., mortars, rockets, man portable aerial defense systems [MANPADS]) (see also AFI 31-101). The Installation Commander should identify the BSZ

and coordinate with the host nation or area commander (OCONUS) for the BSZ to be identified as the BB. If the BB does not include all of the terrain of the BSZ, the Installation Commander is still responsible for either mitigating (through coordination with the host nation or area commander [OCONUS]) or accepting the risks of enemy attack from the terrain outside the BB. The BSZ is, in its simplest terms, the area from which a threat can launch an attack against base personnel and resources or aircraft approaching/departing the base. Air-minded forces must consider the BSZ for planning constructs. **Figure 3.1**, below shows the base perimeter, BB and BSZ.

Figure 3.1. Base Perimeter, Base Boundary and Base Security Zone.



3.2.3. Optimally, the BSZ and the BB are the same. However, most locations will have a BSZ that extends beyond the BB when surface to air missiles and/or stand-off threats are factors/capabilities identified during the process of conducting IPB. There may be circumstances where the BSZ, for planning purposes, incorporates more geographical area than the BB. For example, there may be key terrain outside the BB from which adversaries can impact air operations. The key is coordination as outlined in paragraph 3.2.2. The ID Desired Effects for the BB and BSZ are listed in **Table 3.1**

3.2.4. BB/BSZ Coordination and METT-TC Factors. BB/BSZ coordination is explained in AFI 31-101.

Table 3.1. ID Desired Effects in the Base Boundary and Base Security Zone.

ID DESIRED EFFECTS IN THE BASE BOUNDARY and BASE SECURITY ZONE	
Anticipate	Anticipate threat intentions and actions (IPB or crime trend analysis).
Deter	Deter threat activity through active community policing (e.g., Eagle Eyes Program), boundary and internal circulation control, controlled area markings and prudent physical security measures.
Detect	Detect threats through the use of lighting, Intrusion Detection System (IDS)/Early Warning System (EWS), closed-circuit television (CCTV), etc.
Assess	Assess to identify friend or foe using cameras, posted sentries, response forces, IDS, etc.
Warn	Warn friendly forces of adversary activity through systems such as mass notification, radio, public address, commander's access channels, voice, hand and arm signals, cellular telephones, instant messenger (IM)/short message system (SMS) texting, etc.
Defeat	Defeat threats through appropriate, progressive force application, coordinated security force response and integration of the total force.
Delay	Delay adversaries using a layered application of barriers, obstacles, technology,

	physical security measures and forces (defense-in-depth).
<i>Defend</i>	Defend assets through threat- and effects-based planning that integrates all friendly forces into a single, comprehensive plan; ensure friendly forces are trained and qualified on arming and UOF; and fighting positions are positioned, where prudent, based upon risk analyses.
<i>Recover</i>	Recover from adversarial events by applying effective command and control, and developing and exercising the Installation Emergency Management Plan (IEMP) 10-2.

3.3. The goal of ID is to neutralize security threats throughout the BSZ in order to ensure unhindered USAF, joint and coalition missions. Through ID, commanders must:

3.3.1. Minimize mission degradation from threat activity within the BB and coordinate necessary security operations support within the BSZ when the BSZ is not congruent with the BB.

3.3.2. Minimize loss of life and injury from threat activity.

3.3.3. Protect government property and personnel from hostile and criminal acts.

3.3.4. The end state is to create a flexible, responsive ID operation within varying expeditionary threat environments. **NOTE:** All ID measures must be IAW with applicable laws and regulations.

3.3.5. ID Forces must:

3.3.5.1. Implement baseline physical security measures IAW AFI 31-101, as well as other applicable USAF, Department of Defense (DoD) and HHQ directives. ID forces should have a basic understanding of their base IDP and IDRMP. General knowledge about the IDRMP concepts can be found in AFI 31-101.

3.3.5.2. Dominate the BB. This includes a visible ID force presence (when possible), community integration in security operations, reliability screening and access control.

3.3.5.3. Operationalize Force Protection Intelligence (FPI) in order to maintain optimal situational awareness throughout the BB and BSZ. This can be accomplished through the development of a robust intelligence/information collaboration, analysis and fusion capability, utilizing the support prescribed in AFI 14-119, *Intelligence Support to Force Protection (FP)*, and FM 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace (IPB)*.

3.3.5.4. Increase ID force readiness as threats and Force Protection Condition (FPCON) levels escalate.

3.3.5.5. Apply appropriate lethal and non-lethal force IAW AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*, local rules of engagement (ROE) and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA).

3.3.5.6. Execute emergency response procedures designed to isolate, contain and defeat hostile actions and restore normal operations as quickly and efficiently as possible.


3.4. Military Symbolology. Standard military symbolology is used by the DFC, their S-Staff and FLs to show, in graphic form, ID operations on maps, overlays and various other displays. Symbols are used to indicate specific units, boundaries and weapon systems, and are

standardized for common understanding and use. A comprehensive list of military symbols can be found in FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*.

3.5. Overlays. These tools are used primarily by the DFC's staff to keep the DFC and FLs informed of vital ID information using standard military symbols. Each map overlay should have a legend containing a title, date and time prepared, author, map references, unit designation and a security classification. Contemporary systems allow for overlays to be in digital form, making them easy to produce, update and share. Some example types of map overlays are in **Figure 3.2** and normally include, but are not limited to, the following:

- 3.5.1. Defensive fighting positions and ID force posting overlay.
- 3.5.2. Critical Resources.
- 3.5.3. Fire plan overlay (normally composed of a combination of all flight fire plans).
- 3.5.4. Support weapons emplacement overlay.
- 3.5.5. Integrated detection, obstacle and routine patrol route overlay.
- 3.5.6. Service and support overlay.
- 3.5.7. Enemy activity overlay.

Figure 3.2. Overlays.




3.6. Troop Leading Procedures (TLP).

3.6.1. This planning procedure is used by the DFC and their subordinate FLs to prepare their units to accomplish an ID mission. They use it upon initial mission notification and whenever there is a change to that mission. The TLPs are comprised of the steps listed in **Figure 3.3**. Steps 3 through 8 may not follow a rigid sequence and may be accomplished concurrently. The DFC and FLs use the procedure to ensure nothing is left out of planning and preparation,

and their forces fully understand the mission and prepare adequately. The DFC and FLs continuously update their estimates throughout the planning process and adjust as appropriate. Detailed information on TLPs can be found in FM 7-8.

Figure 3.3. Troop Leading Procedures.



3.6.2. Step 1. Receive the Mission. Leaders may receive the mission tasking either in writing or verbally. A mission may encompass ID as well as other security-related factors. The DFC/commanders must immediately begin to analyze the mission using the factors of METT-TC. What is the **mission**? What is known about the **enemy** (threat)? How will **terrain** and weather affect the operation? Consider Observation and Fields of Fire, Avenues of Approach, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles and Key Terrain (OACOK). What **troops** are available? How much **time** is available? What are the **civil considerations** that must be taken into account?

3.6.2.1. Leaders should use no more than one third of the available time for their own planning and for issuing their OPORD. The remaining two thirds is for subordinates to prepare for the operation. They should also consider other factors such as available daylight and travel time.

3.6.2.2. In establishing a defense schedule, the leaders should work backwards from the time ID forces are expected to fully defend assets to the time the leaders received the mission. Scheduled time lines should be realistic and somewhat flexible. However, failure to meet time lines will be detrimental to mission accomplishment. The reverse planning process is outlined in the warning order. Backwards planning allows leaders to establish deadlines for subordinate task completion keeping the "when" requirement of the concise mission statement in mind.

3.6.3. Step 2. Issue a Warning Order. The leaders provide initial instructions in a warning order. The warning order contains enough information to begin preparation as soon as

		local. The squadron OPORD will be briefed at 0400 local, tomorrow.”
	Tasks to subordinate key personnel: Flight Commanders, S-Staff, RTOs, Fire Direction Center, Host Nation/Army liaisons, etc.	“S-2, you will prepare paragraph 2 of the squadron OPORD. S-3, you will assist me in preparation of paragraph 3. S-4, you will prepare paragraph 4. Lead RTO, prepare paragraph 5.
Service Support	Additional general instructions.	“FDC, you and the S-3 will work out the details of our indirect fire support and include in the OPORD. After briefing the squadron OPORD, flight commanders will prepare and brief their flight OPORD to their flights.”
Command and Signal	Support/logistics tasks to be accomplished. Signal Operating Instructions (SOI) in effect (if applicable). Sign/countersign/code words.	“Coordinate with the squadron S4 for any logistical needs.” “We are currently in time period 2 in the SOI. Up-to-date sign/countersign will be provided in the OPORD.” “The time is now 2300 local. Are there any questions?”

Figure 3.5. Example of a Flight Warning Order.

Format	Annotated Format	Oral Example
		“This is a warning order. Please hold your questions until I finish.”
Situation	Brief description of the enemy and friendly situations (can be taken directly from squadron warning order).	“Numerous probes of the base perimeter have been attempted with limited success by irregular forces up to squad size. We are also faced with a Level I threat consisting of local sympathizers conducting random acts of terrorism. As a result, the base is currently in FPCON Charlie.” “Friendly Forces. The 9th Security Forces Squadron is attached to our unit to assist off-base.”
Mission	Concise statement of the ID task and	“The mission of Delta flight is to

	purpose (who, what, when, where and why). If not all information is known, state which parts are tentative. NOTE: Leaders should make every effort to receive and clarify mission requirements prior to mission brief.	defend a sector of the tactical perimeter from ground attack for an indefinite period for the purpose of allowing sustained air operations.”
Execution	Brief statement of the tentative concept of the operation.	“We will occupy static defensive positions along the sector tactical perimeter, providing final protective fire to our flight front. Two squads will occupy the positions, with a squad in reserve/rest status.”
	<p>Time Schedule:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NLT defend time - NLT sector occupation time - Flight OPORD time - Squadron OPORD time <p>Tasks to key subordinate personnel:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Flight Sergeant - Squad leaders - RTOs <p>Additional general instructions.</p>	<p>“We must be fully capable to defend our assigned sector NLT 2200 local, tomorrow evening. We will occupy our sector NLT 1400 local. I will brief our flight OPORD at 0800 local and receive the squadron OPORD at 0400 local tomorrow morning.”</p> <p>“MSGT Smith (flight sergeant), you will prepare paragraph 1, Situation; and paragraph 4, Service Support, of the flight OPORD. Lead RTO, you will prepare paragraph 5, Command and Signal, of the flight OPORD. I will prepare paragraph 3, Execution. I may require some assistance from my squad leaders to finalize.”</p> <p>“Squad 1 and squad 2 will occupy the static positions initially, with squad 3 in reserve”</p>
Service Support	Any support/logistical needs that may deviate from flight Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).	“Each squad will carry an extra 2,000 rounds of 7.62 ammunition.”
Command and Signal	<p>State chain of command (if not SOP).</p> <p>SOI in effect (if applicable). Sign/countersign/code words</p>	<p>“No change in flight organization.</p> <p>“Currently we are in time period 2 in the SOI. Up-to-date sign/countersign will be provided in the OPORD.”</p> <p>“The time is now 2400 local. Are there any questions?”</p>

3.6.4. Step 3. Make a Tentative Plan. Leaders develop an estimate of the situation to use as the basis of their tentative plan. It consists of three steps: a detailed mission analysis, an analysis of the situation and the course of action (COA) determination (JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*). COA determination consists of four primary activities: development, analysis and war gaming, comparison and approval (decision). The decision represents the tentative plan. Leaders update their estimate of the situation continuously and refine their plans accordingly. They also use the tentative plan as the start point for coordination, reconnaissance, task organization (if required) and other instructions. Leaders should be cautious to consider the principal of war simplicity, which calls for avoiding unnecessary complexity in organizing, preparing, planning and conducting military operations.

3.6.4.1. COA Development. A COA consists of the following information: what type of military action will occur; why the action is required (purpose); who will take the action; when the action will begin; where the action will occur; and how the action will occur (method of employment of forces). In developing COAs, leaders at all levels must work through these sequences as time allows.

3.6.4.2. To develop COAs, leaders focus on key information necessary to make decisions, using the data from mission analysis. They develop COAs to provide options to the commander. All COAs selected for analysis should be valid. A valid COA is one that is adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable and complete. Potential COAs that do not meet all five criteria should be rejected. A good COA accomplishes the mission within the commander's guidance and positions the force for future operations. It also provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution and gives forces the maximum latitude for initiative. See **Figure 3.6**.

3.6.4.3. During COA development, leaders continue risk assessment, focusing on identifying and assessing hazards to mission accomplishment.

Figure 3.6. COA Development.

Adequate	COA can accomplish the mission within the commander's guidance.
Feasible	COA can accomplish the mission within the established time, space and resource limitations.
Acceptable	COA must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained.
Distinguishable	COA must be sufficiently different from the other COAs.
Complete	COA must incorporate: Objectives, effects and tasks to be performed Major forces required Concepts for deployment, employment and sustainment Time estimates for achieving objectives Military end state and mission success criteria

3.6.4.4. COA Analysis. Leaders analyze each tentative COA separately according to the DFC's guidance. COA analysis identifies advantages and disadvantages of each proposed friendly COA. Leaders should be cautious to consider the principal of simplicity which

calls for avoiding unnecessary complexity in organizing, preparing, planning and conducting military operations. Analysis of the proposed COAs should reveal a number of factors which include:

- 3.6.4.4.1. Potential decision points.
- 3.6.4.4.2. Task organization adjustment.
- 3.6.4.4.3. Identification of plan branches and sequels.
- 3.6.4.4.4. Risk assessment.

3.6.4.4.5. COA war gaming.

3.6.4.5. War gaming provides a means for leaders and participants to analyze a tentative COA, improve their understanding of the operational environment and obtain insights that otherwise might not have occurred. An objective, comprehensive analysis of tentative COAs is difficult even without time constraints. War gaming provides a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint force strengths and dispositions, adversary capabilities and possible COAs, the operational area and other aspects of the operational environment. It also identifies requirements needed to synchronize mission execution.

3.6.4.6. War gaming facilitates a total understanding of the plan. It is not a rehearsal, but a “what-if” analysis. The war game is designed to synchronize all flight actions, whereas during COA development the leader is focused on simply integrating flight assets.

3.6.4.7. COA Comparison. COA comparison is an objective process whereby COAs are considered independently of each other and evaluated/compared against a set of criteria that are established by the S-Staff and commander.

3.6.4.8. The goal is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of COAs so that a COA with the highest probability of success can be selected or developed. During this step, leaders develop and evaluate a list of important criteria or governing factors; consider each COA’s advantages and disadvantages; identify actions to overcome disadvantages; make final tests for feasibility and acceptability; and weigh the relative merits of each. Selected COAs should:

- 3.6.4.8.1. Mitigate risk to the force and mission to an acceptable level.
- 3.6.4.8.2. Place the force in the best posture for future operations.
- 3.6.4.8.3. Provide maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates.
- 3.6.4.8.4. Provide the most flexibility to meet unexpected threats and opportunities.

3.6.4.9. COA Approval. Once the analysis, war gaming and comparison have been completed, leaders will select the best COA based upon the results, the recommendations of others and the leader’s personal estimate, experience and judgment.

3.6.5. Step 4. Initiate Movement. Leaders initiate any movement that is necessary to continue preparations or to posture the unit for the operation. As such, this step is more than actual physical movement; it also includes initiating preparatory actions. This may include movement to an assembly area (AA), battle position, perimeter defense or attack position; movement of reconnaissance elements; or movement to compute time-distance factors for the

unit's mission. Forces may need to start movement to occupy their sectors while the leadership elements are still planning. The DFC and FLs may order this at any time during the troop leading procedures.

3.6.6. Step 5. Conduct Reconnaissance. If possible, the DFC and FLs make a personal reconnaissance to verify the terrain analysis, avenues of approach, sectorization and other aspects of the plan. When time does not allow, the DFC and FLs should at least make a map reconnaissance and use aerial photography, if available. Based upon the reconnaissance, they adjust the plan as appropriate.

3.6.6.1. Planners should be aware of the general/direct support ISR assets that are available, capabilities of ISR assets and the means to request ISR support if it becomes available. ISR assets include SUAS such as the Raven RQ-11B, the Wasp Micro Air Vehicle (MAV), Puma All Environment (AE), the Shrike Vertical Take-Off and Land Micro Air Vehicle (VTOL Mav) system, etc. In addition, ISR assets also include the ScanEagle, MQ-1 Predator, Persistent Ground Surveillance Systems (PGSS), RAID cameras, etc. Planners must become familiar with the ISR assets available to them at their location as assets will vary location to location.

3.6.7. Step 6. Complete the Plan. The DFC and FLs complete their plan based upon their reconnaissance and any changes in the situation. They should again review the ID mission to ensure their plan is in accordance with the original tasking. They gather the information delegated to subordinates to complete and compile the entire plan into a comprehensive OPOD.

3.6.8. Step 7. Issue the Complete Order. An OPOD is a directive issued by the DFC and FLs to subordinates in order to effect the coordinated execution of a specific ID mission. The DFC normally issues the squadron OPOD to their key staff members, flight commanders and any others affected by the plan. Upon receiving the squadron OPOD, the FLs complete and issue their OPOD. The FL's OPOD is normally briefed down to the fire team leader level. However, at the FL's discretion, it can be briefed to the entire flight. Examples of squadron and flight OPODs are in **Figures 3.7** and **3.8**

3.6.8.1. OPODs are verbally issued to aid subordinates in understanding the mission, the concept of the operation and their assigned tasks. The OPOD needs to be tailored to the level of leadership putting it together. A squadron or higher level OPOD should be much less specific and provide a higher commander's intent, a leader's intent and then mission type orders (effects based orders to accomplish a task, but not how to get it done). The lower level OPODs are then developed from that to the level of detail necessary to accomplish the task. Whenever possible, visual aids in the form of sketches, maps and terrain models should be used to increase clarity. OPODs should be as detailed as possible and leaders should question subordinates to ensure full understanding of the mission and assigned tasks, Service and Support, Command and Signal and any support/logistical needs that may deviate from flight Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).

3.6.8.2. Tasks.

3.6.8.2.1. Specified Tasks. These are tasks specifically assigned to a subordinate team by the leader. **Paragraphs 2 and 3** from the OPORD state specified tasks. Specified tasks may also be found in annexes and overlays.

3.6.8.2.2. Implied Tasks. These are tasks that must be performed to accomplish a specified task, but which are not stated in the OPORD. Implied tasks are derived from a detailed analysis of the OPORD, the enemy situation, the COAs and the terrain. Analysis of the team's current location in relation to future areas of operation as well as the doctrinal requirements for each specified task also might provide implied tasks. SOP tasks are not considered implied tasks.

3.6.8.2.3. Essential Tasks. An essential task is one that must be executed to accomplish the mission derived from a review of the specified and implied tasks. This is normally the task found in the mission statement.

Figure 3.7. Example of a Squadron OPORD.

Format	Annotated Format	Oral Example
<p>1. Situation</p> <p>a. Enemy Forces</p>	<p>Provide information essential to the subordinate leaders' understanding of the situation.</p> <p>Include pertinent Ground Combat Information (GCI) provided by the S-2 (as gathered through AFOSI and AF/IN channels). As much detailed information about the threat as can be obtained should be provided. Areas to be addressed are current FPCON; threat level facing ID forces; their disposition, composition, strength, capabilities and their probable courses of action; and the weather and terrain.</p>	<p>“Situation. Enemy forces. We are faced with an ongoing level I threat. Local sympathizers loyal to the enemy’s cause have conducted acts of terrorism, such as bombings and assassinations, against the local government and its officials. While there is no indication Air Force installations have been targeted, we are taking the necessary precautions. We are currently in FPCON Charlie.”</p> <p>“On two separate occasions, probes of the base perimeter have been attempted by an unknown irregular force believed to be approximately squad size. That is all that is known. AFOSI is investigating.”</p> <p>“General weather conditions in the Shindand Air Base area are dry and hot. Terrain is hilly - limiting fields of fire - with some vegetation. Current weather conditions will be provided each day at O-Group.”</p>
<p>b. Friendly Forces</p>	<p>Provide information subordinates need to accomplish</p>	<p>“Friendly Forces. We are subordinate to the 345th</p>

	the ID mission. Mention wing or group mission and any attachments, host nation, Army or other units in support of the ID mission.	Expeditionary Wing whose mission is to provide close air support (CAS) to forward units in the AO. Elements of the 18 MP Brigade are located on the air base to secure Army assets. The 9th Special Police Force of the Shindand Militia is attached to our unit. Their specific mission is to assist in patrolling off base and to be a liaison information source. We also have 60 armed SF augmentees attached to our unit.”
2. Mission	Provide a clear, concise statement of the ID mission to be accomplished and the purpose (who, what, when, where and why).	“Mission: The mission of the 345 ESFS is to defend Shindand Air Base from ground attacks for an indefinite period for the purpose of allowing sustained air operations. We must be prepared to defend NLT 2200 local this evening.”
3. Execution a. Concept of Operation	Normally referring to an operation overlay, concept sketch, terrain model or other visual aide; explain in general terms how the squadron, as a whole, will accomplish the ID mission.	“Execution. Concept of operation. My intent is to provide in-depth defense by building sectors from the inside out. Flights designated for close-in security duties will provide all-around defense of aircraft restricted areas and designated resources as determined by the vulnerability and criticality analysis. Close-in defense units will provide entry control, integrated 360 degree fire and response forces. Flights providing defense in the tactical perimeter sectors will also provide entry control and have integrated fire. Mobile response will be provided by the mobile reserve flight.”
b. Flight Sector Assignments	Again, using a map, terrain model or other visual aid, address all aspects of the assigning of sectors to include covering key avenues of	“Sector Assignments. Based upon the vulnerability and criticality analysis, we have determined specific critical resources must be defended by ID forces and they

c. Patrols	<p>approach and terrain; establishment of blocking positions, barriers and sensors; outlining sector boundaries; and other pertinent sector data.</p> <p>Address patrol instructions and patrol state.</p>	<p>run along these boundaries. Alpha flight, you will be responsible for close-in defense of the aircraft restricted area, to include entry control. I want 360 degree integrated fires and this ditch leading into the area covered, as a minimum, with sensors and machine gun fire. Bravo flight, you will be responsible for close-in defense of the water and Liquid Oxygen (LOX) plant. I want 360 degree coverage, plus a barrier in place to cover this avenue of approach by the LOX plant. Again, 360 degree coverage and entry control will be established. Delta, Echo, Foxtrot and Golf flights will occupy these sectors on the tactical perimeter. Golf, I want this hilltop in your sector front manned with a thermal imager concentrating on this vegetated avenue of approach. Delta, I want heavy sensor coverage in this dry stream bed in the aircraft final approach path. In addition, I want heavy patrol coverage in this same area. Hotel flight, these are pre-designated drive in position locations for the vehicles mounted with MK-19s. I want you to work with civil engineer to construct these positions.”</p> <p>“Patrols. Upon implementation of defense operations, Echo, Foxtrot and Golf flights will...”</p>
4. Service Support	Outline combat service support instructions and arrangements. Include arms and ammunition requirements, special equipment requirements, messing instructions, transportation requirements, method of	“Service Support. MSgt Smith will ensure the logistics update is provided to the S4 NLT 1500 local daily. Coordinate the update through me. Immediate requests for resupply will be made to me immediately to be forwarded to

	handling EPWs and casualties and resupply.	the S4. MSgt Smith, ensure proper rotation of squads through the mess tent at least once a day and coordinate with the S4 for an adequate supply of MREs. We will be transported via truck to our sector. MSgt Smith will ensure coordination is accomplished. Casualties will be rendered first aid, and if possible, moved to a secure location. Casualty name, rank and squad will be forwarded to me or MSgt Smith. Arrangements for extraction will be made through the S1. EPWs will be searched, tagged, reported, evacuated and segregated to the EPW collection point at Building 52 ASAP. Ammunition and equipment requirements are per the flight logistics detail. However, M-240B gunners will carry an additional 2,000 rounds of 7.62 ammunition.”
5. Command and Signal a. Command	Include the location of the DFC and the flight command post. Include chain of command if not already established.	“Command and signal. Command. I will provide all frequencies and channels the flight will be operating in, respective battle spaces and pertinent call signs.”
b. Signal	Include radio call signs, frequencies, procedures, passwords, emergency signals, flares and restrictions on communications.	“We will be using hand and arm signals. Upon contact with the enemy we will switch over to voice commands.”

Figure 3.8. Example of a Flight OPORD.

Format	Annotated Format	Oral Example
1. Situation	Provide information essential to the subordinate leaders’ understanding of the situation.	
a. Enemy Forces	Include GCI pertinent to the flight such as the current FPCON; the ground threat	“Situation. Enemy forces. Our area of operation has been subject to probes of an unknown irregular

	level facing ID forces; their disposition, composition, strength and capabilities; and their probable course of action. Include current weather information and describe the terrain in the flight's sector.	force believed to be squad size. AFOSI is currently investigating. There is also a Level I threat facing the air base and we are currently in FPCON Charlie." "Weather is hot and dry. Terrain is hilly in our sector, hindering our ability to integrate fields of fire and observe avenues of approach. There are also patches of vegetation to our flight front."
b. Friendly Forces	Provide friendly information pertinent to the flight.	"Friendly forces. Our flight is subordinate to the 345 ESFS whose mission is to defend Shindand Air Base from ground attacks. To our right and left, Echo and Golf flights are providing defense of the base security zone. To our rear, Alpha, Bravo and Charlie flights are providing close-in defense of critical air base resources. Hotel flight is the mobile reserve flight. Elements of the 9th Special Police Force of the Shindand Militia are to our front providing off-base patrols."
2. Mission	Provide a clear, concise statement of the ID mission to be accomplished and the purpose (who, what, when, where and why).	"Mission. The mission of Delta flight is to defend a sector of the tactical perimeter from ground attacks for an indefinite period of time for the purpose of allowing sustained air operations. We must be prepared to defend NLT 2200 local this evening."
3. Execution a. Concept of the Operation	Referring to an operation overlay, concept sketch, terrain model or other visual aid, explain in general terms how the flight will accomplish the assigned ID mission. Identify the most important task for the flight (mission essential task) and any other essential tasks. If	"Execution. Concept of the operation. My intent is to occupy our assigned sector with two squads in static defensive positions and one squad in reserve. Our primary task is to detect enemy forces attempting to enter the air base or destroy approaching aircraft. We will then delay and/or destroy the enemy

	applicable, designate key points of defense and terrain and discuss any other significant factors or principles.	with appropriate fire power. We will accomplish this by actively covering this likely avenue of approach - the dry stream bed - with sensors, machine gun fire and frequent patrols. I want to detect the enemy as far out as possible.”
b. Tasks to Squads	Address all squads outlining their essential tasks. Designate the flight main effort and their role in accomplishing it. If possible, use a visual aid to outline the tasks.	“Tasks to squads. Squad 1, you will defend this terrain. I will sight in the M-240B and designate the FPL. Squad 2, you will defend this terrain adjacent to Squad 1. I will sight in the M-240B here as well. Squad 3, you will be my patrol and LP/OP elements. As we will be in Patrol State 4 at defend time, you will be extremely active. In addition, you will be responsible for placing the sensors in this area and I want your LP/OP elements to monitor the annunciators.”
c. Coordinating Instructions	List details of coordination and control applicable to two or more elements in the flight. Items to be addressed are fire support, rules of engagement, priorities of work, sector sketches and other details deemed important by the FL.	“Coordinating Instructions. Squad leaders will provide their fire support requirements to me as designated on your squad sector sketch ASAP. This is so I can compile and coordinate with the FDC. As a reminder, we have priority on calls for fire. Rules of engagement are IAW the 345 EW ROE directive. Squad leaders will coordinate to ensure fires interlock between squads and everyone knows the location of the LP/OPs and sensors. The priority of work will be accomplished IAW the 345 ESFS SOP instructions. Critical tasks in the work priority will be accomplished prior to defend time. We are in MOPP level 0.”
4. Service Support	Outline combat service support (CSS) instructions and arrangements. Include	“Service Support. MSgt Smith will ensure the logistics update is provided to the S4 NLT 1500

	arms and ammunition requirements, special equipment requirements, messing instructions, transportation requirements, method of handling EPWs and casualties and resupply.	local daily. Coordinate the update through me. Immediate requests for resupply will be made to me immediately to be forwarded to the S4. MSgt Smith, ensure proper rotation of squads through the mess tent at least once a day and coordinate with the S4 for an adequate supply of MREs. We will be transported via truck to our sector. MSgt Smith will ensure coordination is accomplished. Casualties will be rendered first aid, and if possible, moved to a secure location. Casualty name, rank and squad will be forwarded to me or MSgt Smith. Arrangements for extraction will be made through the S1. EPWs will be searched, tagged, reported, evacuated and segregated to the EPW collection point at Building 52 ASAP. Ammunition and equipment requirements are per the flight logistics detail. However, M-240B gunners will carry an additional 2,000 rounds of 7.62 ammunition.”
5. Command and Signal		
a. Command	Include the location of the DFC and the flight command post. Include chain of command if not already established.	“Command and signal. Command. I will provide all frequencies and channels the flight will be operating in, respective battlespaces and pertinent call signs.”
b. Signal	Include radio call signs, frequencies, procedures, passwords, emergency signals, flares and restrictions on communications.	“We will be using hand and arm signals. Upon contact with the enemy, we will switch over to voice commands.”

3.6.9. Step 8. Supervise and Rehearse. The DFC and FLs supervise their respective unit’s (squadron/flight) preparation by monitoring the priorities of work, inspecting the ID forces and rehearsing critical ID actions. Items to inspect are weapons and ammunition, uniforms and equipment, individual Airman understanding of the mission and their specific responsibilities, communications, water and rations, camouflage, night vision goggles

(NVG), infrared (IR) strobes, blood chits (if issued) and other important items. This inspection is usually called a pre-combat inspection (PCI) or pre-combat check (PCC). An example of a PCI/PCC checklist can be found in **Attachment 7**, but it is not all inclusive and should be used only as a guide. Battle drills that should be rehearsed are fire control actions, mobile reserve actions, call for indirect fire, downed driver, downed gunner, vehicle rollover, vehicle towing procedures and other mission essential battle drills. What battle drills are conducted will be determined by the type of mission (mounted or dismounted).

3.6.9.1. The FLs supervise the unit's preparation for combat by conducting confirmation briefs, rehearsals and inspections. FLs should conduct a confirmation brief after issuing the oral OPORD to ensure subordinates know the mission, the commander's intent, the concept of the operation and their assigned tasks. Confirmation briefs can be conducted face to face or by radio, depending on the situation. Face to face is the desired method, because all section and squad leaders are together to resolve questions and it ensures each leader knows what the adjacent squad is doing.

3.6.9.2. The Flight conducts rehearsals. During the rehearsals, leaders practice sending tactical reports IAW the unit's SOPs. Reporting before, during and after contact with the enemy is rehearsed in detail starting with actions on the objective. Rehearsals are not intended to analyze a COA. The FL uses well-planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish the following:

3.6.9.2.1. Reinforce training and increase proficiency in critical tasks.

3.6.9.2.2. Reveal weaknesses or problems in the plan.

3.6.9.2.3. Integrate and synchronize the actions of attached elements.

3.6.9.2.4. Confirm coordination requirements between the flight and adjacent units.

3.6.9.2.5. Confirm each Airman understands the mission, concept of operation, the direct fire plan, anticipated contingencies, and possible actions and reactions for various situations that may arise during the operation.

3.6.9.3. Rehearsal techniques include the following:

3.6.9.3.1. Map Rehearsal. A map rehearsal is usually conducted as part of a confirmation brief involving subordinate leaders or portions of their elements. The leader uses the map and overlay to guide participants as they brief their role in the operation. If necessary, they can use a sketch map. A sketch map provides the same information as a terrain model and can be used at any time.

3.6.9.3.2. Sand Table or Terrain Model. This reduced-force or full-force technique employs a small-scale sand table or model that depicts graphic control measures and important terrain features for reference and orientation. Participants walk around the sand table or model to practice the actions of their own elements or vehicles (if working with mobile units) in relation to other members of the flight.

3.6.9.3.3. Radio Rehearsal. This is a reduced-force or full-force rehearsal conducted when the situation does not allow the flight to gather at one location. Subordinate elements check their communications systems and rehearse key elements of the flight plan.

3.6.9.3.4. Reduced-Force Rehearsal. In this rehearsal, leaders discuss the mission while moving over key terrain or similar terrain.

3.6.9.3.5. Full-Force Rehearsal. This technique is used during a full-force rehearsal. Rehearsals begin in good visibility over open terrain and become increasingly realistic until conditions approximate those expected in the Area of Operation (AO). Sometimes commonly referred to as “battle drills.”

3.7. ID Patrol Organization and Planning. A patrol is a detachment dispatched by a larger unit to conduct a combat or reconnaissance mission. Typical ID patrols are conducted by fire team and squad sized elements. However, flight sized patrols may also be conducted, dependent upon METT-TC. Routine ID patrols focus on reconnaissance, early detection of the threat, checking LP/OPs and sensors and other routine actions in a sector.

3.7.1. Directed patrols may be either reconnaissance or combat. Regardless of the patrolling mission, there are four key principles to a successful patrol:

- 3.7.1.1. Detailed planning.
- 3.7.1.2. Thorough reconnaissance.
- 3.7.1.3. Positive control.
- 3.7.1.4. All-around security.

3.8. Organizing for a Patrol. Depending upon the factors of METT-TC, a patrol leader (PL) will organize the patrol to meet the needs of the mission. The PL must decide what elements and teams are needed for the patrol, select personnel or units for these elements and teams, and decide what weapons and equipment are needed. They should use the unit’s normal organization and chain of command as much as possible to meet these needs. A patrol generally consists of a patrol leadership element and those elements needed for the mission.

3.8.1. The leadership element may consist of the PL, the assistant PL (APL) and a radio-telephone operator (RTO). However, in a small patrol, the PL may be the only person in the leadership element.

3.8.2. Team organization for reconnaissance patrols will be based upon the mission tasking; in particular whether it is an area or zone reconnaissance patrol. The elements needed for an area reconnaissance patrol are a reconnaissance element and a security element. In a zone reconnaissance, the patrol is organized into several reconnaissance elements. A two-, three- or four-man reconnaissance patrol is not organized into elements. Instead, it operates as a single unit providing its own security while reconnoitering.

3.8.3. Combat patrols are normally organized into assault elements, security elements and support elements. The PL will also normally designate an aid and litter team, a search team, an EPW team and other special purpose teams based upon the factors of METT-TC.

3.8.4. The PL will select members, weapons and equipment based upon the factors of METT-TC. Only weapons and munitions needed to accomplish the mission should be carried. Equipment should be selected for aiding control (e.g., flashlights and radios), for common use for all patrol members (e.g., common uniform requirements), for use in the objective area and for use en route (e.g., maps and binoculars).

3.9. Planning for a Patrol. When given an order to lead a patrol, the PL begins the same troop leading procedure outlined in **Paragraph 3.6**, tailored to leading a patrol.

3.9.1. The PL issues a warning order in the following format:

3.9.1.1. Situation. Only the information needed for the patrol to make preparations is included. The complete situation is given in the patrol order.

3.9.1.2. Mission. This is a brief and clear statement of what the patrol must accomplish. It tells who, what, when, where and why.

3.9.1.3. General Instructions. General instructions are given.

3.9.1.4. Organization. General and special organizations are given.

3.9.1.5. Uniform and Equipment Common to All. Includes clothing, personal equipment, rations and water to be carried, camouflage measures to be taken and the means of identification each are to take.

3.9.1.6. Weapons, Ammunition and Equipment. Based upon METT-TC, the PL will determine required weapons, ammunition and equipment, and possibly vehicles; they will assign them to the elements and element leaders will assign them to their members. Leaders must do a PCC/PCI prior to their team's starting point (SP). In addition, leaders should check their team members to ensure all equipment made it back following a patrol (at the return point (RP)).

3.9.1.7. Chain of Command. In squad size or smaller patrols, each patrol member is given a place in the chain of command. In larger patrols, each element or team leader is assigned a place in the chain of command. Each element or team leader then establishes a chain of command within the element or team.

3.9.1.8. Time Schedule. The patrol is given a reverse time schedule for all activities that are to take place. The following is an example of a patrol time schedule:

3.9.1.8.1. Time, place, uniform and equipment for receiving the OPORD.

3.9.1.8.2. Times and places for inspections and rehearsals.

3.9.1.9. Specific Instructions. Given to element and team leaders for getting, checking and distributing weapons, ammunition, equipment, rations and water; preparing their defenders for the mission; coordinating, inspecting, rehearsing and reconnoitering; and assistance in preparing the OPORD (e.g., designated person with compass prepares primary and alternate routes).

3.9.2. The PL conducts coordination throughout the entire planning process. They coordinate with the S-2 to determine any changes in the enemy situation. They coordinate with the S-3 for changes in the friendly situation, selection of routes, other patrols in the area, departure and reentry of the tactical perimeter (if applicable), transportation requirements (in conjunction with the S-4) and communication requirements. The PL coordinates with the FDC (if available) to ensure they are aware of the mission and objective, routes to and from the objective, fire support plan to include targets en route to and from the objective, targets on and near the objective and communications requirements.

3.9.3. The PL conducts a map, ground or aerial reconnaissance prior to completing the plan. After this, they assign essential tasks to be accomplished in the objective area. The PL plans how the elements are to perform their tasks on the objective. The PL then outlines additional tasks which will help the patrol reach the objective and return, such as primary and alternate routes, security during movement and at halts, actions on enemy contact, rally points (to include the objective rally point), logistical requirements and command and signal requirements.

3.9.4. The PL completes the plan and issues it in the standard operation order format. Terrain models, rock drills, sketches and other visual aids should be used to assist in illustrating the plan.

3.10. Planning/Organizing for a Convoy. An excellent reference for planning, organizing and conducting a convoy is AFTTP (I) 3-2.58, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations* (FM 4-01.45).

Chapter 4

CONDUCTING INTEGRATED DEFENSE

4.1. General. Conducting ID is accomplished by achieving nine desired effects. Anticipate the enemy is the critical first step. Upon anticipate, the enemy must be deterred. If the threat is not deterred then SF elements need to detect the threat. After the threat has been detected, SF elements need to assess the threat. Once assessed, all friendly forces need to be warned. SF elements then need to defeat, delay and defend. Finally, recovery operations need to take place. Other tasks relating to the conduct of ID include counterattack actions, consolidation and reorganization, EPW actions and stability operations.

4.2. Anticipate. Conducted through threat analysis and IPB through the S-2/IFC.

4.3. Deter. Deter threat activity through mounted and dismounted patrolling, base boundary posting from DFPs and positive entry control and circulation.

4.4. Detection. Detecting the enemy is the most important step in conducting ID. Effective detection is accomplished through a combination of means to include:

4.4.1. Maintain a Consistent Intelligence and Liaison Network. As outlined in Chapter 2, the DFC and the S-Staff (primarily the S-2/IFC) must continuously coordinate with available agencies such as AFOSI and the battle space owner's TOC to gather as much information about the threat and its likely targets. Based upon current information, the DFC assesses their plan and adjusts accordingly. The information is disseminated to key leaders at the O-Group so all ID forces are kept abreast of the current threat, the enemy's most likely COAs and changes to the defensive scheme.

4.4.2. Site ID Force Positions to Enhance Detection. When FLs plan their defenses, emphasis should be placed on early detection as far away from critical resources as possible. Detection assets such as sensors, thermal imagers, night vision equipment, LP/OPs and MWD teams should be placed on key terrain inside and outside the base tactical boundary (within the BSZ). Areas should include high ground (hill tops), likely avenues of enemy approach (ravines, gullies), possible standoff threat positions (open areas within mortar range), aircraft approach and departure lanes and other critical areas requiring observation. Also, DFPs and barriers/obstacles should be sited to enhance the overall detection capability.

4.4.3. Patrolling. Continuous active patrolling provides another means of detection. Patrols may either be routine as indicated by the patrol state or directed by the DFC to execute a specific mission. ID forces conduct two types of patrols: reconnaissance and combat. Reconnaissance patrols are either zone (conducted to obtain information on enemy, terrain and routes within a specified zone) or area (conducted to obtain information about a specified location and the area around it). Combat patrols are either ambushes (a surprise attack from a concealed position on a moving or temporarily halted target) or raids (an attack on a position or installation followed by a planned withdrawal). ID patrols are typically fire team to squad size and primarily focus on reconnaissance and detection. **Attachment 8:** Reverse Time Schedule outlines organization, planning and other considerations for patrolling in ID operations.

4.4.4. Reporting. Once the enemy is detected, it is reported up the chain of command through the BDOC in the form of a SALUTE (Size, Activity, Location, Unit/Uniform, Time, Equipment) report as outlined in Air Force Pamphlet (AFPAM) 10-100, *Airman's Manual*. This report gives the FS, FL and DFC critical information about the threat and allows for response preparation.

4.5. Assess. Assess the enemy by using RAID cameras, PGSS, posted sentries, response forces or technologies such as those in the newly developing arenas of SUAS and TASS just to name a few. In addition, leaders should consider the use of the Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar and the backscatter system.

4.6. Warn. Warn friendly forces by utilizing mass radio notification, secure messaging and giant voice.

4.7. Defeat. An effective delaying action will give ID forces the capability to carry out the third phase of conducting ID – destruction of the threat. ID forces use available fire support and tactics to carry out this task. Delay can be achieved using a layered application of barriers, obstacles, technology, physical security measures and forces (defense-in-depth).

4.7.1. Operational Fires. Based upon the factors of METT-TC, the FL may elect to request additional fire support outside their flight capabilities to destroy the threat. Indirect fire is controlled through the unit FDC, normally collocated with the JDOC or BDOC. Requests for indirect fire support are made by the FL to the JDOC/BDOC. Procedures to call for indirect fire support need to be coordinated with the supporting service at your unit's deployed location. There are numerous AF and non-AF assets available to ID forces. Close air support assets could include the AC-130H/U, MC-130W, U.S. Army helicopter gunships and other fixed wing assets. Control of execution should be carried out only by qualified personnel. Other fire support assets may be available from the Army and Marine mortar and artillery assets. For more information on indirect fire support see [Attachment 9](#).

4.7.2. Tactical Employment. Based upon the factors of METT-TC, the FL may elect to tactically employ ID forces to defeat the threat. FL may use available flight forces or request mobile response forces. The leader accomplishes this using the principle of fire and maneuver. Fire and maneuver are conducted to close with and destroy the threat, to learn more of its strength and capabilities, and, if necessary, disengage from it. Fire and maneuver are conducted at the same time. A fire element covers the move of the maneuver element by engaging the enemy with suppression fire. A maneuver element moves to either close with the enemy or move to a better position from which to fire at the enemy. Depending upon the distance to the enemy positions and the availability of cover, the fire element and the maneuver elements switch roles as needed to keep moving. Before the maneuver element moves beyond the supporting range of the fire element, it takes a position from which it can fire at the enemy. The fire element becomes the maneuver element for the next move. While the MK-19s and M-2s may support the fire and maneuver action, most of the maneuvering forces' fire support will come from its own weapons. As the maneuver element gets in and among the enemy, the fire element shifts fire to possible escape routes. This allows the maneuver element to sweep across the enemy position and secure the area.

4.7.3. Counterattack. Counterattacks are conducted when a sector or area has been attacked by enemy force. If the posted forces determine a counterattack is warranted, it should be carried out swiftly with an overwhelming force and all available fire support. The size of the

threat will determine how large of a counterattack force is needed. In some cases, the counterattack element could be as small as a fire team; in other cases, it could be a flight. Counterattacks are normally carried out in the same manner as any tactical employment of troops – using fire and maneuver as outlined in [Paragraph 4.7.2](#)

4.7.3.1. The mobile reserve flight is normally the appropriate ID force to conduct the counterattack as it has the assets and time to rehearse these actions. The DFC may designate additional forces to reinforce the mobile reserve flight based upon METT-TC factors.

4.8. Delay. Delay adversaries using a layered application of barriers, obstacles, technology, physical security measures and forces (defense-in-depth).

4.8.1. Obstacles and Barriers. Defenders use obstacles and barriers to shape the terrain to their advantage. To be successful in the defense, the leaders must integrate obstacles into both the direct and indirect fire plans. Per AFI 31-101, a barrier is a coordinated series of obstacles designed or employed to channel, direct, restrict, delay or stop the movement of an opposing force and to impose additional losses in personnel, time and equipment affecting the opposing force(s). Defenders must understand the basics of how obstacles and barriers help provide protection from counter mobility, standoff and blast.

4.8.1.1. Counter mobility denies possibly explosive-laden vehicles proximity to resources/gathering areas far enough away to provide proper standoff.

4.8.1.2. Proper standoff distance is the best way to diminish the effects of a blast wave.

4.8.1.3. Blast mitigation is, in a general sense, the various physical measures that may be employed to lessen the damage of a blast wave on critical assets. These measures can include, but are not limited to, blast walls, blast barriers, standoff, structural hardening, retrofitting, etc.

4.8.2. Tactical Obstacles. A tactical obstacle is designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn or block the movement of the enemy. Barriers play a key role in the defense of critical assets and require deliberate planning with the IDWG/ATWG to achieve maximum utilization across the ID continuum.

4.8.2.1. Disrupting Effects. Disrupting effects focus a combination of fires and obstacles to impede the enemy's attack in several ways to include breaking up formations, interrupting tempo and causing early commitment of breaching assets. These effects are often the product of situational obstacles, such as claymore mines, and normally are used forward within engagement areas or in support of forward positions within a defensive sector. Normally, only indirect fires and long-range direct fires are planned in support of disrupting obstacles.

4.8.2.2. Fixing Effects. Fixing effects use the combination of fires and obstacles to slow or temporarily stop an attacker within a specified area, normally an engagement area. The defending unit then can focus on defeating the enemy by using indirect fires to fix the enemy in the engagement area while direct fires inflict maximum casualties and damage. If necessary, the defender can reposition forces using the additional time gained as a result of fixing the enemy. To achieve the fixing effect fully, direct and or indirect fires must be integrated with the obstacles.

4.8.2.3. Turning Effects. Turning effects use the combination of direct and indirect fires and obstacles to support the DFC's scheme of maneuver in several ways, including the following:

4.8.2.3.1. Diverting the enemy into an engagement area and exposing their flanks when they turn.

4.8.2.3.2. Diverting an enemy formation from one avenue of approach to another.

4.8.2.3.3. Denying the enemy the ability to mass their forces on a flank of the friendly force.

4.8.2.3.4. Additional references for obstacles/barriers include: FM 7-8, FM 3-21.9, *SBCI Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, and FM 90-7, *Combined Arms Obstacle Integration*.

4.8.2.3.5. For more on defense-in-depth and barriers, refer to GTA 90-01-011, *Joint Forward Operations Base (JFOB) Protection Handbook*. The JFOB Handbook can assist leaders with determining appropriate barriers for employment. It covers barrier classification, barrier selection, perimeter barriers, personnel barriers, entry control point (ECP) barriers and all other elements pertaining to this realm.

4.8.3. Firepower. As stated, a well-conceived obstacle and barrier plan will channel an enemy force into areas where ID forces can engage them with fire. Upon orders to engage, ID forces initiate fires IAW with the FL's engagement priorities (examples outlined in Chapter 2). Based upon the FL's assessment of the size and capability of the threat, he/she may request from the DFC a mobile response force as a backup measure. Mobile response forces should be incrementally committed. As ID heavy weapons teams (MK-19, 40mm grenade launchers, machine guns and M-2 .50 caliber machine guns) are typically attached to the mobile response force, they provide added firepower to ID forces in contact. To avoid unnecessary exposure to fire of the ID heavy weapons team, employ these weapons at their maximum effective range. If possible, employ these weapons in pre-designated "drive-in" positions.

4.9. Defend. Defend assets through threat analysis provided through S-2. Integrate all friendly forces into the defense plan and all personnel are trained on ROEs, Use of Force (UOF) and expeditionary skills. Perimeter defense is critical to defending the FOB.

4.10. Consolidation and Reorganization and Recovery. After the enemy withdraws or has been defeated, the FL directs actions to consolidate and reorganize. The flight reestablishes security; provides first aid and prepares wounded for medical evacuation; repairs damaged obstacles and booby traps; redistributes ammunition and supplies; relocates selected weapons to alternate positions if the FL believes the enemy may have pinpointed them during the attack and adjusts other positions to maintain mutual support; reestablishes communications; reoccupies and repairs positions; and prepares for another attack. Squad and team leaders provide appropriate logistical, casualty and situation reports (as outlined in **Tables 4.1** through **4.3**) to the FL. The FL reestablishes the flight chain of command and consolidates flight reports to forward to the DFC. The flight sergeant coordinates for resupply and supervises the execution of the casualty and EPW evacuation plan; the flight also continues to improve positions and resumes patrolling as directed. A common reporting format at the small team level is Liquids, Ammo, Casualties and

Equipment (LACE). Once the squad leader determines what they need for resupply, they report it to flight leadership and then to the S-4.

Table 4.1. S-1 and S-4 Reports.

Administrative Reports						
Type	Who	What	When	Where	How	Content
Casualty	Unit or section with casualties	Number of dead, wounded and/or sick	Upon experiencing casualties or as required by HQ	To higher headquarters	Most secure means; encoded if by unsecure radio	DA Form 1156, <i>Casualty Feeder Card</i>
Personnel Daily Summary	Submitted at flight level and higher, but input needed from squad/sector	Personnel strength accounting and status	Daily	To higher headquarters	Written on locally developed form	Personnel numbers and a detailed explanation of those missing from duty
Periodic Logistic	Submitted at flight level and higher, but input needed from squad/sector	Supported strength and status of critical supplies	As supplies become depleted or as required by OI	To higher headquarters	Most secure means; encoded if by unsecure radio	-Logistical Situation -Supply -Maintenance -Transportation -Service
Journal	Units or sections operating independent of their parent organization	Events about a unit or section during a specified period	As events occur over the given or specified period	Maintained locally; may be provided to higher headquarters upon request	Written in book	1. Item 2. Time 3. Incident, message, order 4. Action taken 5. Initials

Table 4.2. S-2 Reports.

Intelligence Reports						
Type	Who	What	When	Where	How	Content
SPOTREP	Unit/section/ individual observing the enemy; all echelons	Report enemy activity and area information of immediate value	Upon contact or as requested	To higher headquarters	Quickest means; encoded if by unsecure radio	A. Reporting unit B. Date/time of event C. Location/ grid coordinates D. Event (SALUTE) E. Original Source F. Remarks
Meacon, Intrusion, Jamming, Interference (MIJI)	Unit experiencing electronic warfare	Submit the correct MIJI report according to the type of interference	As soon as possible after the incident	Through signal channels to higher headquarters	OI defines the report and how to prepare it	-Type report -Frequency or channel affected -Victim designation and call sign -Type emission or audio characteristic -Coordinates of affected station
Patrol	Prepared by patrol leader	Pertinent information pertaining to patrol activity	Upon completion of patrol	To higher headquarters	Written	-Designation of patrol -Maps -Terrain -Enemy -Results of contact -Condition of patrol
SALUTE	Submitted by observer	Enemy activity; i.e., convoy, patrol vehicles, aircraft	Upon encountering enemy activity	To the BDOC/JDOC and higher headquarters	Most secure means; encoded if by unsecure radio	S-Size A-Activity L-Location U- Unit/Uniform T-Time E-Equipment

Table 4.3. S-3 Reports.

Operational Reports						
Type	Who	What	When	Where	How	Content
Situation/ Status (SITREP/ STATREP)	Commander or leader closest to the situation	Report the tactical situation or status	Immediately after a significant event or as specified by OI/HQ	To higher headquarters	Most secure means; encoded if by unsecure radio	-Enemy -Own situation -CSS -General -CC's evalua- tion
EPW Civilian Internments	Flight/ squad/team operating collecting points	Number of EPWs collected/ evacuated	As required	To higher headquarters	Most secure means; encoded if by unsecure radio	As required by the EPW Tag
Intention of Laying a Sensor field	Flight/ squad/team leader preparing to lay the field	Tactical objective(s) and characteristics of the field	Prior to emplacing sensors	To higher headquarters	Written or secure radio	-Purpose of field -Estimated number and type -Location -Proposed start and completion times
Initiation of Laying a Sensor field	Flight/ squad/team leader of the force laying the field	Emplacement sensors	When emplacement begins	To higher headquarters (Mandatory)	Written or secure radio	-Time begun -Location and target number
Completion of Laying a Sensor field	Flight/ squad/team leader of the force laying the field	Completion of the field	Upon completion of the field	To higher headquarters	Written or secure radio	-Field is complete and functional

4.11. Types of Operating Environments. Security Forces have been and will be involved in Joint Expeditionary Taskings which encompass the range of military operations (ROMO) not always organic to SF core taskings (see JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*).

4.11.1. Stability Operations. Stability operations is an umbrella term for various military missions, tasks and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief. (See JP 3-07, *Stability Operations*)

4.11.2. Civil Support. DoD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law and order and other activities. (See JP 3-28, *Civil Support*)

4.11.3. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA). DoD activities, normally in support of the U.S. Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the U.S., its territories and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger or privation. (See JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*)

4.11.4. Personnel Recovery. An operation to search for, locate, identify, recover and return isolated personnel, human remains or items critical to national security. (See JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*)

4.11.5. Noncombatant Evacuation (NEO). An operation to evacuate noncombatants and civilians from foreign countries to refugee safe havens when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest or natural disaster. (See JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*)

4.11.6. Peace Operations (PO). PO include peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace building (PB) post-conflict actions, peacemaking (PM) processes, conflict prevention and military peace enforcement operations (PEO). (See JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*)

4.11.7. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Activities within the eight military mission areas that include WMD-related security cooperation and partner activities, offensive operations against WMD, defensive operations and managing the consequences of WMD attacks. (See JP 3-40, *Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*)

4.11.8. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Consequence Management. DoD support to U.S. Government actions that plan for, prepare for, respond to and recover from the effects of domestic and foreign CBRN incidents. (See JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Consequence Management*)

4.11.9. Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and other threats to its security. FID is an example of nation assistance. (See JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*)

4.11.10. Counterdrug Operations. Support provided by the DoD to law enforcement agencies to detect, monitor and counter the production, trafficking and use of illegal drugs. (See JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*)

4.11.11. Combating Terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (actions taken directly against terrorist networks) to oppose terrorism. (See JP 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism*, and JP 3-26, *Counterterrorism*)

4.11.12. Homeland Defense. The Protection of U.S. sovereignty, domestic population and critical defense infrastructure against internal threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. (See JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*)

4.11.13. Counterinsurgency (COIN). This is an operation that encompasses comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. (See JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*)

4.11.13.1. Mindset. Conducting successful COIN operations requires an adaptive and flexible mindset. First and foremost, the population is the key center of gravity of successful COIN. COIN can also be utilized across the ROMO.

4.11.13.2. Understanding the population is to successful COIN as understanding physical terrain is to successful conventional land operations. Understanding the population requires an intimate knowledge of the causes and ongoing grievances of the insurgency.

4.11.13.3. A second aspect of the counterinsurgent mindset is being able to think like an insurgent to stay ahead of the actual insurgents' decisions and actions.

4.11.13.4. Third, successful counterinsurgents must understand it is essential to establish an enduring presence within the population to provide continuous security and development efforts vital to assuring the population's sense of security and long-term outlook.

4.11.13.5. Finally, counterinsurgents must understand that the military instrument is only one part of a comprehensive approach for successful COIN, although the security situation may require the joint force to execute tasks that other organizations are better suited to conduct.

4.11.13.6. Popular Support. The support of the people is the most vital factor in the long-term success of any COIN effort. Gaining and maintaining the population's support can be a formidable challenge. It is imperative that the population have trust and confidence in their government and its institutions. Counterinsurgents must make every effort to reinforce the legitimacy of the HN government in the eyes of the people.

4.11.13.7. Cultural Understanding. Forces or agencies supporting or conducting COIN must understand and be aware of the local and national culture. More specifically, counterinsurgents must understand the core grievances, drivers of conflict and friction points between different groups. Only when counterinsurgents understand the relationships of these factors can their COIN efforts be effective.

4.11.13.7.1. Cultural awareness facilitates accurate anticipation of the population's perception of COIN operations. These perceptions can determine the success or failure of COIN operations. By simultaneously addressing the core grievances and drivers of conflict and taking measures against the insurgencies themselves, COIN attacks the problem both indirectly and directly, thus providing the best chance for success. Insurgency and COIN also tend to be nested in larger, complex and irregular conflicts; therefore, understanding and appreciating the strategic context and operating environment are essential to success.

4.12. Security Forces Mission Sets.

4.12.1. Common SF expeditionary mission sets are capability based. To achieve the full complement of SF mission sets, the request for forces (RFF) process must be followed.

4.12.2. Typical base security may not possess the organic capabilities found in **Table 4.4, Common SF Expeditionary Mission Sets**. These capabilities should be specifically requested via RFF and filled via unit line number (ULN) line remarks indicating the specific capability required. Standard SF unit type codes (UTC) will be used and designated to provide a specific capability.

4.13. Military Working Dog Program. The MWD program is a critical enabler to ID and the DFC's ability to defeat threats. MWD enhance Air Force and joint capabilities to secure protection level resources, enforce military laws and regulations, suppress the use of illegal

drugs, detect explosives and protect installations and resources during peacetime, war and in support of operations other than war.

4.13.1. The USAF MWD Team (MWDT) also serves a vital role in offensive and defensive operations with the other DoD components. The objective is to employ MWD assets aggressively and effectively to counter risks. AFI 31-121, *Military Working Dog Program*, provides the framework for employment and utilization to support ID in achieving the nine ID desired effects.

4.13.2. The DFC will establish local procedures for MWD utilization. These procedures must conform to all DoD and Air Force instructions and local SOFA or other HN agreements.

4.13.3. When integrating MWD assets into the defensive plan, the first consideration should place MWDs in positions where they can most effectively exploit their keen sense of smell. MWDs are most effective during nighttime hours and in areas of minimal activity. Rotate MWD teams through all appropriate posts to meet operational needs and to maintain proficiency of the MWD team.

4.13.4. Unless an MWDT is conducting explosives/narcotic detection, observation or listening post duties, or psychological deterrence duties, MWDTs will not be placed on static posts.

4.13.5. MWDs may be used to, but not limited to, conduct the following duties:

4.13.6. Law Enforcement. Controlled aggression certified MWDs seek, detect, bite and hold, and guard suspects on command during patrol. They provide a psychological deterrence and can defend their handlers during threatening situations. They can assist in crowd control and confrontation management, and search for suspects and lost personnel, indoors and outdoors.

4.13.7. No MWD will be used to validate the response of another MWD or mechanical device used to detect explosives or narcotics.

4.13.8. Drug Suppression. Drug detection dog teams are specially trained in drug detection and support the Air Force goal of a drug-free environment. Their renowned capability to detect illegal drugs deters drug use and possession, and is a valuable adjunct to a commander's other tools such as urinalysis and investigation.

4.13.9. Explosives Detection. Explosives detection dog (EDD) teams are exceptionally valuable in antiterrorism operations. They are capable of detecting unexploded ordnance, searching large areas during bomb threats quickly, and are valuable in augmenting EOD capabilities.

4.13.9.1. EDDs will not be used to search suspicious/unattended packages or assess, examine and clear items already identified as a possible IED. However, there may be times in a theater of combat when an item needs to be cleared. In these cases, only the MWD handler will determine if the search will be conducted.

4.13.10. Combat Operations. In war fighting roles, MWD teams provide enhanced patrol and detection capability to perimeter and point defense. In bare base operations, deploy MWDs as an early warning system. Given the range of potential contingencies, drug and explosives detection are also valuable added capabilities in these environments since they are patrol dogs first and detector dogs second.

4.13.11. Under no circumstances will any type of MWD be used in the interrogation or interview of EPW or detainees. Refer to AFMAN 31-219, *USAF Military Working Dog Program*, for more guidance on contingency operations.

4.13.12. Physical Security. The MWD team can augment detection roles and temporarily replace inoperative sensor systems.

Table 4.4. Common SF Expeditionary Mission Sets (examples only).

Base Security Operations	Area Security Operations
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Base Defense 2. Restricted Area Security 3. ECP/Overwatch 4. Vehicle Inspections/Overwatch 5. Base Defense Operations Center 6. S-Staff 7. Armory 8. Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM) 9. Military Working Dog 10. Mobile Fire Teams 11. Listening Post/Observation Post (LP/OP) 12. Flightline Security 13. Air Provost Activities (Law & Order) 14. Pass and ID 15. AT/FP Cell Augmentation 16. Intelligence Fusion Cell (IFC) 17. Integrated Defense Council (IDC) 18. Integrated Defense Working Group (IDWG) 19. Antiterrorism Working Group (ATWG) 20. Threat Working Group (TWG) 21. Heavy Weapons Teams 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 22. Quick Response Force (QRF) 23. RAVEN B 24. Fly Away Security (FAS) 25. Convoy Operations 26. Detainee Operations 27. Military Working Dog 28. SECFOR Operations 29. Tactical Security Element (TSE) 30. Air Provost Activities (Town Patrol) 31. Vulnerability Assessment Team 32. Building Partnership Capacity Team 33. Military Support to Civil Authorities

Chapter 5

RESILIENCE AND SURVIVAL

5.1. Resilience. The ability to respond, withstand, recover and/or grow in the face of stressors and changing demands. Resilient Defenders aim to perform at their best, build protective strategies to withstand demands placed upon them and recover and restore to return to mission ready status.

5.1.1. As Airmen, we will face both physical and psychological dangers which may create a great deal of physical and psychological stress. Demands, those of Defenders and their families, must be managed so as not to distract from the task at hand and help us perform optimally. This creates a delicate balancing act for leaders, their personnel and organizations to learn, understand and apply the skills necessary to become resilient and teach others these skills.

5.1.2. Just as combat skills and training can prepare Defenders for the physical dangers common in war, resiliency training is the best protection from, and preparation for, dealing with psychological dangers. Below is a recommended guideline for leaders.

5.1.3. Overview. Commander and leaders at all levels can assist their Airmen in developing the survival and winning mindset and overcome unnecessary hesitation in use of force applications. This is achieved through a continual developmental process of interrelated training activities, concepts, principles and conditioning. This continual process does not start or end at expeditionary training centers; it is part of a commander's home station responsibility and requires leaders to champion cultural shifts which foster the development of the survival and winning mindset. In order to meet this responsibility, it is imperative leaders understand how to foster a survival and winning mindset, avoid conditioning/training pit falls and appropriately apply training elements.

5.1.4. The Mindset. The first step in enhancing Airmen survival is to actively develop and foster a survival and winning mindset. The need for all Airmen to possess a proper mindset is essential for their defense and the defense of their fellow Airmen. In all kinds of situations, from combat to being lost in extreme climates, survivors share some common characteristics in their battles to survive, overcome and win. Survivors maintain a strong situational awareness. They are sensitive to cues of danger and their "personal radar" scans for any relevant information they can use. Survivors stay in the "here and now;" they accept and work with given conditions. They set small manageable goals leading to overall survival and winning. The bedrock of the survival and winning mindset is the expectation that something can be done and that there is something worth the struggle to survive, fight and win. Survivors never give up. Thoughts are focused on maintaining survival, on the goal of getting home and back to what one cares about and on ways to make that happen.

5.1.5. The survival and winning mindset is more important than polished technique. When faced with attack, act immediately and take necessary actions to avoid injury. Do not let anything get in your way of survival. As Sir Winston Churchill said: "*Never give in! Never give in! Never, never, never give in except to convictions of honor and good sense.*" The essential components of the survival and winning mindset are:

5.1.5.1. Toughness: The uninhibited mental resolution to aggressively react to illegal violence with a fierce and violent defense.

5.1.5.2. Immediate Response: Respond immediately with the appropriate level of force, stop the attack and secure the area. A warrior does not wait as the advantage is the surprise of instant and direct offense.

5.1.5.3. Focus: Stay focused and single-minded on your goal of survival. Commit to your goal of survival and let nothing stand in your way.

5.1.5.4. The above characteristics that enable survival can be trained which in turn increases the likelihood of survival. In addition, training speeds up an individual's Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop which also increases the odds of survival. Noncommissioned Officers need to train the personnel they are charged to lead as it could save their life. Training helps to reduce the time it takes for an individual to go through their OODA loop, and this could possibly save their life.

5.2. Factors Which Cause Unnecessary Hesitation When Reacting to a Threat. In addition to developing a survival and winning mindset, commanders should understand and leverage training to mitigate the factors which cause hesitation when reacting to a threat. In many cases, individuals have misconceptions of use of force based upon life experiences, media presentation of use of force incidents, prior training (or lack thereof) and other factors. This section discusses how commanders and Airmen can identify such factors and develop an effective way of dealing with them to enable reasonable responses in use of force incidents.

5.2.1. Psychological Inhibitions - resistance to taking another's life. As a member of the Armed Forces, there are those times when we may be required to take another's life; proper training can improve the ability of each Airman to respond to acts of violence and fulfill this duty without unnecessary hesitation. Having to use lethal force or other levels of violence may result in usually temporary psychological effects ranging from exhilaration to guilt. Though these effects may resolve on their own, leadership and mentoring can provide a context for the incident to facilitate the natural recovery process.

5.2.1.1. Psychological inhibitions can be mitigated through the proper application of training as identified in [Paragraph 5.3.2.3](#)

5.2.2. Personal beliefs. Airmen must resolve personal issues within themselves such as commitment to mission, mortality and willingness to sacrifice.

5.2.2.1. Airmen must overcome the false belief, "This could never happen to me." Past active shooter incidents in Germany and Afghanistan have proven that any Airmen could become the victim of close-range aggression.

5.2.2.2. Another belief which may hinder an Airman's ability to react to violence is the false assumption others will respond on their behalf (such as Air Force Security Forces). The active shooter incidents at Fort Hood, and in Germany and Afghanistan have proven these acts of violence will be well underway (possibly over) before emergency forces can respond to neutralize the threat. In most active shooter situations, the person in the best position to stop the threat is the individual closest to the threat to include the targeted victim.

5.2.2.3. An individual's religious preference may affect their ability to inflict aggression on others. Airmen who believe their religion prohibits the use of force, including deadly force, should consult guidance from a spiritual leader to resolve these issues. Airmen may cause harm to themselves or others if they unnecessarily hesitate based upon their religious beliefs.

5.2.3. Understanding Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and ROE. Airmen must be clear on the inherent right of personal or unit self-defense. This understanding may prevent unnecessary hesitation and save their lives and the lives of their fellow Airmen. Each Airman, no matter the career field, duty position or rank, must feel confident that their leadership, Air Force and Government will protect them from legal harm if they discharge force to protect themselves or their fellow Airmen. Commanders and leaders at all levels can overcome this hesitation by reinforcing the Airman's inherent right to use all means necessary and appropriate for personal or unit self-defense and incorporate this information into training scenarios.

5.2.4. Understanding the application of force. Some Airmen may believe that deadly force is employed only as a last resort and used only when all lesser means have been exhausted. The legal standards do not require Airmen to select the least intrusive alternative, only a reasonable one.

5.2.4.1. A cascading effect occurs when reasonable use of force is not applied immediately to gain control or compliance. Circumstances of the incident become either more dangerous, out of control or unmanageable for the personnel involved.

5.2.4.2. The Airman's ability to determine a reasonable force option quickly and efficiently erodes as the complexity of the decision and assessment increases.

5.2.4.3. When reasonable force is applied immediately and without hesitation, that force application results in fewer injuries to both the Airmen and offenders. This is due to a quick ending and establishment of control.

5.2.4.4. According to AFTTP 3-4.6, *Active Shooter*, when faced with a life threatening act of violence, Airmen have no duty to retreat in an effort to avoid using force on a hostile aggressor. However, Airmen must remember (based upon the totality of circumstances), that disengaging from a threat in order to gain a tactical advantage and put them into a position of advantage may be a reasonable response to a dangerous situation.

5.2.5. Commanders are encouraged to evaluate local risks to assigned forces before employing policies which restrict an Airman's ability to protect themselves (e.g., changes in arming status, restricting weapons based upon rank, preventing Airmen from carrying weapons, etc). In addition, commanders must consider factors which place their subordinates at a tactical disadvantage (e.g., arming status other than what they are trained on, office layout/design, etc).

5.2.6. Learned Behavior. No two Airmen have exactly the same background (e.g., morals, ethics, values, etc). Some may have combat experience, some may be college graduates and all were raised with different value systems by their parents. Individuals entering military service must recognize that some of the behaviors they have learned throughout their life may cause hesitation in the use of force. Example: Most boys growing up are taught from a

very young age that it is wrong to hit a girl. This does not require conscious thought, but a male Airman faced with a situation where he is required to use force on a female may hesitate momentarily due to the learned behavior of never hitting a girl.

5.2.6.1. Airmen must understand that there is no universal description of a person who will commit an act of violence. They come in every shape, size, race, creed and color. Airmen must overcome some of their learned behavior in order to reduce hesitation in a use of force incident.

5.2.7. Physiological changes. When faced with a threat, Airmen need to understand that certain physiological changes occur. These changes are triggered by the sympathetic nervous system which is something we are all wired with from birth.

5.2.7.1. The sympathetic nervous system initiates a defense mechanism referred to as the “fight, flight or freeze” response when you are stressed with the perception of death or serious bodily harm. This response prepares the body for a survival reaction. A third response known as “freezing” could occur once the body’s defense mechanism is activated. This response is important because it can affect the Airman’s ability to react to the situation at hand. Though these responses can occur very quickly, they can also be mitigated or recovered from more quickly through training and preparation as outlined in [Paragraph 5.3.2.3](#) and [5.4](#)

5.2.7.2. Once the sympathetic nervous system is triggered, the Airman experiences effects in visual processing, motor skill performance and cognitive processing. These effects can be mild or severe depending upon the situation and level of stress experienced by the individual. Some of those effects can be positive (i.e., more blood flow to carry more oxygen through the body, less sensitivity to pain, etc) to help the individual respond optimally. However, when the sympathetic nervous system is overwhelmed, the impact can be negative. According to research conducted by Dr. Alexis Artwohl and Bruce Siddle, the following are physical responses to fear:

- 5.2.7.2.1. Pounding heart
- 5.2.7.2.2. Muscle tension
- 5.2.7.2.3. Trembling
- 5.2.7.2.4. Rapid, shallow breathing
- 5.2.7.2.5. Dizziness
- 5.2.7.2.6. Nausea
- 5.2.7.2.7. Gut wrenching knot
- 5.2.7.2.8. Sweating
- 5.2.7.2.9. Dry Mouth
- 5.2.7.2.10. Goose bumps
- 5.2.7.2.11. Tingling sensation in limbs and/or face
- 5.2.7.2.12. Insensitive to pain
- 5.2.7.2.13. Jumpy, easily startled

- 5.2.7.2.14. Urge to urinate
- 5.2.7.2.15. Urge to defecate
- 5.2.7.2.16. Loss of fine motor skills
- 5.2.7.2.17. Loss of complex motor skills
- 5.2.7.2.18. Loss of depth perception
- 5.2.7.2.19. Loss of near vision
- 5.2.7.2.20. Increase in gross motor skills

5.2.8. Perceptual changes from fear:

5.2.8.1. Tunnel vision - The loss of peripheral vision. Your field of vision may narrow to mere inches and you may lose depth perception and the ability to see what is behind the threat.

5.2.8.2. Heightened visual clarity - While experiencing tunnel vision, you may have a clear picture of details you ordinarily might not notice or remember.

5.2.8.3. Hearing distortions - The most common hearing distortion is diminished sound, which may include a total loss of hearing, to muffled and distant. You may not hear shots being fired, people yelling at you or sirens coming your way.

5.2.8.4. Time distortion - Things may seem to slow down (slow motion) or speed up. Airmen can experience both types of time distortion during the same incident.

5.2.9. Cognitive/behavioral changes:

5.2.9.1. Automatic behavior - Most participants in a traumatic event give little or no thought to their behavior; they just instinctively do what their experience has programmed them to do. This is why police officers and service members are told “you will do what you train to do, so trust your training.”

5.2.9.2. Memory gaps - It is normal when you are involved in a deadly force encounter to not remember parts of what happened and parts of what you did. Memories of high threat situations are often like a series of snapshots: some vivid, some blurry and some even missing.

5.2.9.3. Intrusive thoughts - Sometimes you may have intrusive thoughts that may not be immediately relevant to your current situation. You might think of your family, some future event or a previous event that reminds you of the present one.

5.3. Commander Considerations. The Air Force currently provides commanders with a wide array of training opportunities, which if properly employed, can aid in development of the survival and winning mindset and mitigating factors affecting the ability to react to threats. The intent of this chapter is not to infer Air Force commanders must develop new training venues to achieve these objectives. Rather, it is intended to provide leaders with a philosophical understanding of how to leverage existing training opportunities to achieve the desired conditioning. Therefore, it is imperative leaders are able to identify conditioning/training pitfalls and understand the appropriate application of training elements.

5.3.1. Conditioning/Training Pitfalls. The four primary ways leaders can improperly condition their Airmen is by: unintentionally conditioning Airmen to react in an undesired manner; the faulty belief task completion of a singular training venue alone will yield desired operational capabilities; excessive use of simulation of individual action during exercise scenarios; and allowing Airmen to “lose” during training scenarios. Below are some examples of how leaders with the best of intentions may allow their programs to employ improper conditioning/training pitfalls.

5.3.1.1. Unintentional Conditioning. Base X conducted operational readiness training by placing Airmen in simulated combat scenarios during their field training exercises (FTX). All Airmen “deployed” to the FTX were issued weapons; however, only Security Forces were issued blank ammunition. When the opposing forces (OPFOR) attacked the base, only Security Forces had the means to engage the enemy. This approach was the installation’s standard training structure for years. During one year’s event, a follow on scenario was conducted where Security Forces were removed from the FTX and blank ammunition was issued to the rest of the Airmen. When the base was under attack during the second scenario, few Airmen engaged the OPFOR and some never even loaded their weapons. When the Installation’s Exercise Evaluation Team (EET) questioned the Airmen why they had not engaged, some responded they “forgot” they had a weapon. So what was the failure? What this training did was condition the Airmen not to fight back even when attacked. In addition, Airmen were conditioned to view their weapon as a burden rather than the key to their survival, even though this was not the intention of leadership.

5.3.1.2. The execution of a singular training task in most cases will not yield an operational capability. Capabilities are normally developed through a continual developmental process of interrelated activities, concepts and principles. For example, a commander wishes to develop their Airmen’s ability to engage a hostile threat with their weapon and uses Air Force weapons certification firing to meet this objective. This singular approach to training does not yield the desired capability because weapons certification provides the Airman with the intellectual ability of how to use a weapon, but it alone does not condition them to physically (through muscle memory or stimulus response) and immediately react to a threat, nor does it cultivate the psychological mindset needed to react effectively to violence.

5.3.1.3. Excessive Use of Simulation of Individual Action During Exercise Scenarios. Realistic exercise scenarios yield great benefits in conditioning the appropriate response. However, when scenarios are run and individual actions are allowed to be excessively simulated (intended to minimize work disruption), the actual outcome is degradation in appropriate conditioning. Excessive simulation of individual actions conditions Airmen to ignore the initial warnings, hesitate in their actions (wait to hear the direction to simulate) or not act at all. An installation may have a robust training and exercise program; however, if individuals are allowed to simulate their action, then the exercise does little more than meet an annual exercise requirement rather than provide the desired level of conditioning. Simulation should be very limited. Defenders need to train the way they fight without constant simulation.

5.3.2. The Appropriate Application of Training Elements. In order for training to be effective, it needs to focus less on task certification and more on conditioning the response of

the Airman. To develop survival and winning mindset, training should condition the Airman's physical, intellectual and psychological abilities to react to violence.

5.3.2.1. Physical Elements of Training. The physical elements of training achieve two objectives: condition the Airmen to be physically capable to execute the task (physical fitness) and be able to responsively react to the task without hesitation during periods of high stress (muscle memory). It is important to note just because a training class is physical in nature, that does not mean it meets the physical elements of training (physical fitness or muscle memory). Courses that are physical in nature but merely introduce or familiarize a task (e.g., annual weapons qualification, annual chemical warfare training) meet the intellectual elements of training. Examples of activities which develop Physical Element are:

- 5.3.2.1.1. Proficiency Drills (stimulus response)
- 5.3.2.1.2. Quick Reactionary Weapons Drills
- 5.3.2.1.3. Physical Fitness
- 5.3.2.1.4. Weapons Proficiency (not merely qualification)
- 5.3.2.1.5. Combatives type training (must be routinely trained)

5.3.2.2. Intellectual Elements of Training. The intellectual elements of training are to inform, familiarize, clarify or introduce subject matter required for a task. Examples of activities which develop the intellectual element are:

- 5.3.2.2.1. Understanding Policies and Procedures
- 5.3.2.2.2. Understanding Individual Responsibilities
- 5.3.2.2.3. Understanding Threat Indicators
- 5.3.2.2.4. Understanding Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and Rules of Engagement (ROEs)
- 5.3.2.2.5. Annual Weapons Qualification
- 5.3.2.2.6. Annual Chemical Warfare Training
- 5.3.2.2.7. Training which overcomes learned behaviors or inappropriate personal beliefs (the "this could never happen to me" mentality)

5.3.2.3. Psychological Elements of Training. The psychological elements of training condition Airmen in three main areas to: overcome physiological inhibitions, foster the development of a desired mindset and overcome the physical, cognitive and behavioral responses to fear and stress. Some training designed to condition Airmen physically can also yield psychological benefits. For example, using a virtual weapons training simulator achieves the physical element of weapons proficiency while the interface with humanlike targets helps overcome the physiological inhibitions of engaging another human. Additionally, physical training venues such as combatives helps develop the mindset and will to fight, while allowing Airmen to overcome fear of personal injury. Psychological training can help inoculate Airmen to the stress and fear of combat by building confidence in their ability to handle similar high stress situations and developing mental toughness so they can function during high stress situations by introducing them to the

visual, audio and situational stimuli prior to an actual event. Lastly, preparing Airmen psychologically yields benefits beyond effectively reacting to enemy contact. This element of training can strengthen Airmen resiliency and enhances survival after the fight. This is done by introducing them to the visual, audio and situational stimuli prior to an actual event so they can adapt to the situation, experience and overcome stress with learned strategies and learn how to effectively respond. Examples of activities which develop the Psychological Element are:

- 5.3.2.3.1. Combatives Training
- 5.3.2.3.2. Reality Based Training (Dynamic and Interactive)
- 5.3.2.3.3. Continuous Positive Visualization
- 5.3.2.3.4. Virtual Simulation
- 5.3.2.3.5. Live Exercise (with realistic sounds, smells, sights and scenarios)
- 5.3.2.3.6. Mental Toughness Training

5.4. Resiliency and the Individual.

5.4.1. It is the individual's responsibility to understand and apply fundamental resilience skills to stressful events in their lives, regardless of the location and situation in which they find themselves. Each Air Force member must seek to prepare themselves for these events prior to being deployed.

5.4.2. Resilience is the Warrior's inner strength to face the realities of the environment with courage, composure and confidence. This includes training, operations, combat and transitioning home. Resilient warriors take care of themselves, their buddies and those they lead.

5.4.3. Strategies to Improve Individual Mental Fitness:

5.4.3.1. When you are faced with a stressful situation, there are four initial reactions: thoughts (what you think), behavior (what you do), physical reactions (how your body responds), and emotions (how you feel). You have a powerful brain and have made it through stressful situations before. Accept the realities of the situation. Change what you can. The following are examples of how to adjust your initial reactions to stress and improve your mental fitness:

5.4.3.2. Self-regulation. Use strategies to manage your physiological and emotional response to maximize an optimal response.

5.4.3.3. Defender mindset (warrior ethos). Identify your personal values or what is important to you in life. Recognize that adversity and pain is unavoidable, but can be managed by keeping your values in mind when making decisions.

5.4.3.4. Mental tactics. Be your own personal coach by encouraging yourself, even in tough or challenging situations. When in a stressful situation, remember to make decisions that will help you live up to your warrior ethos, even if it is not easy to do so.

5.4.3.5. Internal situational awareness. Notice your initial reactions to situations and adjust your behavioral responses to maximize your success and maintain optimal performance levels.

5.4.3.6. Teamwork. Maintain strong relationships with your buddies, cadre and family. Contact your Chaplains, mental health professionals and medical providers for additional assistance.

5.4.3.7. Adrenaline management and attention control.

5.4.3.8. Controlled breathing helps you slow your breathing and heart rate to bring you into the optimal range of performance.

5.4.3.9. Attention conditioning helps you to control your concentration and focus to maintain situational awareness and improve decision-making.

5.4.3.10. STEP-UP (Self-Talk for Enhanced Performance Under Pressure – Asken, 2005). Think about the actions you have to do when things are not going in the direction you want. People that are less resilient have mental static (“I cannot do this, this is too difficult”, etc) that prevent them from an optimal response. Positive self-talk helps you to think instead of the actions you need to take to achieve your goal.

5.4.4. Resiliency and the Team:

5.4.4.1. Team members are the individual’s closest ally to strengthen resilience. They share the same experiences, may better understand what the individual is going through and how to better deal with the aftermath. Through these shared experiences, team members develop relationships that put them in the best position to support one another as they build resilience into the team environment. As a team member, you are most likely to see behavior changes in your fellow team members. When behavior changes become apparent, don’t hesitate to approach the individual and talk about what may be troubling them.

5.4.4.2. Team members can help one another recognize there are many contributing factors when bad things happen. They can offer additional perspectives individuals may not cognitively recognize in the aftermath of a significant emotional event. Team members must understand the limitations they have in dealing with behavioral health problems within the team. Some situations may only require listening to your buddy and helping them deal with a one-time issue. Other situations may require escalation of support from professionals such as Chaplains and mental health professionals. You have a responsibility to take care of your teammates...even if it means your wingman may get angry with you for doing it.

5.4.5. Resiliency and the Leader.

5.4.5.1. It is the leader’s responsibility to understand and apply fundamental resiliency skills to stressful events in their lives and the lives of their personnel, regardless of the location and situation in which they find themselves.

5.4.5.2. The following is situational dependent and not always possible. That being understood, in order to strengthen individual and unit resiliency, leaders should make the effort to stabilize shift work and understand the central importance of a predictable sleep cycle for their personnel. By understanding how this affects people, the health of the individuals can significantly improve. Additionally, emphasis must be placed on physical fitness and personal health issues. Typically, units that conduct physical training sessions

together experience higher levels of cohesiveness and a physically and psychologically healthier force.

5.4.5.3. Leaders should develop plans on how to deal with situations that arise which could place undue stress on their personnel. Resiliency and stress management will always be concerns to leaders whether in peacetime or wartime. The Air Force has supported numerous studies and programs concerning resiliency and stress management for leaders to access for support information and guidance. A common element throughout these briefings is the imperative of preparedness. Leaders at all levels must be attuned to signs of stress and have a plan to deal with resiliency issues at the individual and unit level.

5.4.5.4. As a leader and direct supervisor, you are more likely to see some of these behaviors than more senior unit leaders, but need to recognize that these behavioral reactions may take time to develop and become apparent. Listen to your Defenders...let them know you are not simply going to “let this drop.” Listening helps to have a good understanding of the extent of the problem, ensures your Defenders understand their leaders care about them and enforces the fact they are not dealing with their problems alone.

5.4.5.5. It is important to understand the likelihood of some problems getting worse over time and the benefit to Defenders when a leader demonstrates they actively track individual problems and care about their Defenders. However, leaders must realize they are not equipped to handle every situation on their own. As a leader you must know your limitations in dealing with those situations.

5.4.5.6. Knowing your limitations. Leaders should encourage mental health professional involvement as needed and as early as applicable to the situation. This kind of referral does not mean the leader stops being involved; it means that other assets and resources are called in to support the individual. Leaders should have plans in place and develop working relationships with key support personnel (i.e., chaplains, mental health professionals, etc) which enable them to have the applicable resources at their fingertips. Lastly, leaders must know when to seek help for themselves, not only for their subordinates. Self-care is a huge factor in mission sustainment for all Airmen.

5.4.5.7. Demonstrating resilience through leadership. One concept leaders can use to help their personnel develop resilience is “thinking skills.” Some examples of resilient thinking are seeing things more positively, accepting military demands and professional identity, keeping a sense of humor, avoiding blaming or criticizing self and having confidence in managing the stress reactions of yourself and your wingmen.

5.4.5.8. Practicing an optimistic attitude builds positive emotion and gratitude. It also serves to counteract the “negativity bias” (paying more attention to the bad than the good). Optimists view adversity as a challenge and setbacks as temporary. Pessimists view adversity as permanent and out of their control. Leaders can also develop resilience by highlighting and building a sense of purpose in the job that you do regardless of that duty and, where possible, giving unit members and/or teams a sense of control in what they do. It is important to help your personnel make the best out of a bad situation. If one of them is having a bad day, you and other leaders can help them have the best bad day possible.

5.4.5.9. Lastly, leaders should understand that morale and resilience have a direct correlation. If unit personnel's morale is high, they will be more resilient. If unit personnel's morale is low, they will be less resilient. Thus, leaders should seek to obtain high morale within their units.

5.4.5.10. Bottom line – Resiliency will help you bounce and bend, and keep you from breaking.

5.5. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) arises as a delayed and/or protracted response to a stressful event or situation (either short- or long-lasting) of an exceptionally threatening or catastrophic nature, which is likely to cause pervasive distress in almost anyone (e.g., natural or man-made disaster, combat, serious accident, witnessing the violent death of others or being the victim of torture, terrorism, rape or other crime).

5.5.1. Typical symptoms of PTSD include episodes of repeated reliving of the trauma in intrusive memories ("flashbacks") or dreams, occurring against the persistent background of a sense of "numbness" and emotional blunting, detachment from other people, unresponsiveness to surroundings, inability to experience pleasure and avoidance of activities and situations reminiscent of the trauma. Commonly there is fear and avoidance of cues that remind the sufferer of the original trauma. Rarely, there may be dramatic, acute bursts of fear, panic or aggression, triggered by stimuli arousing a sudden recollection and/or re-enactment of the trauma or of the original reaction to it.

5.5.2. The onset follows the trauma with a latency period which may range from a few weeks to months (but rarely exceeds 6 months). The course is fluctuating but recovery can be expected in the majority of cases. In a small proportion of patients, the condition may show a chronic course over many years and a transition to an enduring personality change. Psychological and pharmacological treatments are available to all Airmen and research has shown that earlier interventions are more effective.

JUDITH A. FEDDER, Lieutenant General, USAF
DCS/Logistics, Installations and Mission Support

Attachment 1

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Prescribed and Adopted Forms

Prescribed Forms:

None

Adopted Forms:

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

DA Form 1156, *Casualty Feeder Card*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFDD—Air Force Doctrine Document

AFH—Air Force Handbook

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFMAN—Air Force Manual

AFOSI—Air Force Office of Special Investigation

AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive

AFTTP—Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

AO—Area of Operation

APL—Assistant Patrol Leader

ATWG—Antiterrorism Working Group

BB—Base Boundary

BCT—Brigade Combat Team

BDOC—Base Defense Operations Center

BSZ—Base Security Zone

C4ISR—Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

CBRN—Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

CCIR—Commander's Critical Intelligence Requirements

CI—Counterintelligence

COA—Course of Action

COMSEC—Communication Security

CSS—Combat Service Support

DFC—Defense Force Commander

DFP—Defensive Fighting Position

ECP—Entry Control Point

ECM—Electronic Counter Measure

EPW—Enemy Prisoner of War

ESRT—External Security Response Team

FL—Flight Leader

FDC—Fire Direction Center

FHA—Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

FM—Field Manual

FOB—Forward Operating Base

FPI—Force Protection Intelligence

FPL—Final Protective Line

FTL—Fire Team Leader

GCI—Ground Combat Information

GTA—Graphic Training Aid
HHQ—Higher Headquarters
HN—Host Nation
HQ—Headquarters
ID—Integrated Defense
IDRMP—Integrated Defense Risk Management Process
IDWG—Integrated Defense Working Group
IFC—Intelligence Fusion Cell
IPB—Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace
ISR—Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
JFOB—Joint Forward Operating Base
JP—Joint Publication
LOAC—Law of Armed Conflict
LOGDET—Logistics Detail
LP—Listening Post
METT—TC—Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain, Troops Available and Civil Considerations
NCOIC—Noncommissioned Officer-in-Charge
OCONUS—Outside the Continental United States
OACOK—Observation and Fields of Fire, Avenues of Approach, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles and Key Terrain
OP—Observation Post
OPCON—Operational Control
OPORD—Operations Order
OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility
PB—Peace Building
PCC—Pre-Combat Check
PCI—Pre-Combat Inspection
PEO—Peace Enforcement Operation
PIR—Priority Intelligence Request
PKO—Peacekeeping Operation
PL—Patrol Leader
PMCS—Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services
PO—Peace Operation

RFF—Request For Forces

ROE—Rules of Engagement

RTO—Radio Telephone Operator

SF—Security Forces

SITREP—Situation Report

SL—Squad Leader

SOFA—Status of Forces Agreement

SOI—Signal Operating Instruction

SOP—Standard Operating Procedure

SUAS—Small Unmanned Aircraft System

TACON—Tactical Control

TLP—Troop Leading Procedure

TRP—Target Reference Point

UDM—Unit Deployment Manager

ULN—Unit Line Number

UTC—Unit Type Code

Attachment 2

S-1 BRANCH DUTIES

Task	S-1	S-2	S-3	S-4
<p>1. Maintenance of Unit Strength</p> <p>a. Loss Estimates</p> <p>b. Personnel Reports and Records</p> <p>c. Replacements</p>	<p>Maintains continuous loss estimate, balanced against forecasted replacements.</p> <p>Supervises system of records and reports on personnel status including strength reports, casualty reports and personnel requisitions.</p> <p>Determines requirements; supervises requisitions; recommends allocations; establishes policies for processing plans and movements.</p>		<p>Considers impact of anticipated losses on courses of action.</p> <p>Considers personnel strengths in formulating plans and determining vulnerabilities.</p> <p>Recommends priority of assignment when replacements are critical.</p>	<p>Considers personnel strengths in planning requirements for logistical operations.</p> <p>Recommends priority of assignment to units when strength is critical; provides logistical support of replacement system.</p>
2. Personnel Management	Classifies and assigns personnel.			
<p>3. Development and Maintenance of Morale</p> <p>a. Decorations and Awards</p> <p>b. Graves Registration</p>	<p>Responsible for postal, financial, religious, exchange, welfare, legal services, rest and leave.</p> <p>Recommends policies for decorations and awards. Ensures award recommendations are made promptly.</p> <p>Responsible for planning and</p>			<p>Procures decorations as directed.</p> <p>Coordinates transportation.</p>

	supervising all graves registration activities.			
4. Health Services	Develops estimate of injury, sick and wounded rate for future operations.		Provides plans for operations and presents dispositions for planning for evacuation and hospitalization. Request Army aviation for evacuation requirements.	Provides additional transportation as required.
5. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order	Exercises staff responsibility for matters of discipline, law and order; arranges for courts-martial according to commander's jurisdiction and desires.	Monitors matters of discipline, law and order for impact on security clearances.	Includes corrective measures in training programs, as directed.	Furnishes statistics on trends of loss or damage to equipment because of carelessness.
6. Headquarters Management	Provides for movement, internal arrangement, organization and operation of the operations center; allocates shelter for staff and troops.	Assists S-1, S-3 and DFC in planning for security measures for movement, location and operation of the operations center.	Coordinates the general location, time and conditions of movement of the operations center and overall defense of the operations center area with the DFC.	Coordinates logistic support, including shelter, repair, construction and maintenance for the operations center.
7. Message Center Operations	Coordinates the internal distribution of incoming messages and use of messengers.			

Attachment 3

S-2 BRANCH DUTIES

Task	S-1	S-2	S-3	S-4
<p>1. Collection of Information</p> <p>a. Gain intelligence for ID force operations.</p> <p>b. Predict Effects of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) attacks.</p> <p>c. Weather Information</p>	<p>Analyzes weather information for effect on health of personnel.</p>	<p>Coordinates with USAF intelligence, AFOSI, U.S. Army Joint Rear Tactical Operations Center and allied operations centers. AFOSI will coordinate with embassies and/or consulate intelligence offices to obtain GCI required by the DFC and staff for ID operations.</p> <p>Estimates effects of the predicted fallout or affected zone on the area of operations and on enemy capabilities. Receives information from subordinate, adjacent and higher headquarters on ground zero, height of burst, yield of nuclear weapons or type of agent/vector employed.</p> <p>Requests weather information from source and disseminates to staff and affected units.</p>	<p>Evaluates vulnerability of units to the predicted fallout/agent. Prepares recommendation for revised task organization and alternate courses of action, if required.</p> <p>Analyzes weather information for effect on operations and training.</p>	<p>Estimates the effect predicted fallout/agent will have on logistics support and initiates planning to minimize effects. Estimates vulnerability of areas to predicted effects and initiates tentative planning as appropriate.</p> <p>Analyzes weather information for effect on logistical activities.</p>
<p>2. Planning the Distribution of Maps and Map</p>		<p>Prescribes allowances, scale and type in</p>	<p>Recommends type, scale and distribution.</p>	<p>Provides materials for the fabrication of map substitutes.</p>

Substitutes		coordination with the S-3 and S-4.		Requests, receives, stores and issues maps.
3. Special Security Requirements		<p>Serves as security manager and oversees the establishment of personnel and physical security procedures.</p> <p>Formulates emergency destruction and evacuation plans for operations center sensitive compartmented information.</p> <p>Ensures that special intelligence (SI) management and handling, production and dissemination are consistent with USAF policy.</p> <p>Directs employment of security support provided to other rear area military police organizations to guard and secure SI secure areas at various operations centers.</p>		

Attachment 4

S-3 BRANCH DUTIES

Task	S-1	S-2	S-3	S-4
1. General Operations	Advises DFC and/or S-3 of personnel ability to support operations.	Advises DFC and staff on personnel and physical security requirements.	Advises DFC on ground combat matters, ID force organization and training.	Advises DFC and/or S-3 of ability to logistically support operations.
2. Training	In conjunction with the S-3, responsible for supervising training of ID forces in respective areas of interest. Provides S-3 with recommendations concerning training. Submits requirements for training aids and areas to S-2. Analyzes weather information for effect on health of personnel.		Prepares and supervises execution of training programs, directives and orders; supervises the planning and conduct of field exercises. Determines requirements for, procures and distributes or assigns training aides and facilities. Plans, conducts and coordinates training inspections and tests.	In conjunction with the S-3, responsible for training ID forces in respective areas of interest. Provides S-3 with recommendations concerning training. Submits requirements for training aids and areas to S-3.
3. Operations		Provides S-3 with estimate of physical security requirements.	Based upon the DFC's planning and guidance, as well as information received from other staff officers, prepares operations estimates which culminate in a recommended course of action.	Informs S-3 of logistical limitations and the capability to support ID mission.
a. Operations Estimate				
b. Tactical Plans	Exercises staff supervision over traffic regulation and traffic control. Submits requirements to the	Advises the S-3 concerning OPSEC aspects. Provides information on weather, terrain and enemy	Conducts tactical planning to include supervision and coordination of supporting plans.	Advises the S-3 of limitations in logistical support which may affect the ID plan; develops plans to provide required

<p>c. Tactical Troop Movement</p> <p>d. Miscellaneous Activities</p> <p>(1) Signal Communications</p> <p>(2) General Location of BDOC</p> <p>e. Execution</p>	<p>S-3 for signal communications.</p> <p>Advises, supervises and supports within specific areas of interest.</p>	<p>situation.</p> <p>Advises, supervises and supports within specific areas of interest.</p>	<p>Prepares alternate operations plans as required.</p> <p>Recommends allocation and priorities for personnel, supplies and equipment.</p> <p>Establishes fighting loads for units.</p> <p>Plans and supervises tactical troop movement with the S-4.</p> <p>Establishes communications priorities. Receives SOI for ID operations.</p> <p>With the DFC and S-2, selects the general location of the primary and alternate BDOC.</p> <p>Supervises, coordinates and integrates operations, making adjustments as required within authority delegated by the DFC.</p>	<p>support.</p> <p>Plans and supervises tactical troop movement with the S-3.</p> <p>Submits signal communications requirements to S-3.</p>
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Attachment 5

S-4 BRANCH DUTIES

Task	S-1	S-2	S-3	S-4
1. Supply	Provides unit strength and loss estimate to S-4 as a basis for a logistical support forecast.	Provides S-4 with information on enemy capabilities for interfering with logistical support and characteristics of the area of operations which may affect logistical support.	Recommends allocation and priorities for equipment and supplies having an impact on training or the ID mission.	Determines supply requirements and procures by requisition from the supply base of support.
	Provides the S-4 with estimated number of personnel replacements for determination of equipment and supply.	Recommends prescribed loads for equipment and supplies pertaining to training or ID mission.		Ensures proper receipt, storage and distribution of supplies and equipment.
				Determines method of distribution; ensures distribution schedules are effective; ensures availability of transportation for distribution; and selects supply routes.
2. Transportation	Provides S-4 with requirements for transport of replacements.	Provides information on the area of operations as it affects the use of transportation.	Provides S-4 with requirements for transportation for training or tactical purposes.	Determines transportation requirements.
		Keeps the S-4 informed of enemy capabilities that may interrupt routes.	Coordinates use of routes with the S-4.	Coordinates required transportation from assigned and attached transportation assets or from those received from higher headquarters.

				Consults with the S-3 to determine allocations and priorities.
				Responsible for administrative movement, to include selection of routes.
3. Services a. Priorities for Employment	Submits requirements for support to the S-4.		Provides requirements for support to the S-4. May recommend priority of maintenance effort.	Prepares general plan for support to include: selection and allocation of support assets (in coordination with the S-3); plans for recovery and evacuation of vehicles and equipment; collection and disposition of excess property.
				Recommends evacuation and repair policies. Recommends amount and type of maintenance training.
				Provides the DFC and staff with evaluation of maintenance conditions and estimate of impact on planned operations.
				Selects general location of support area; designates route of movement; coordinates with supporting activities.
b. Movement and General Location of Support Facilities.	Coordinates with the S-4 on general location and time of movement	Provides information concerning enemy threat to rear area		Supervises maintenance program.

	concerning administrative activities.	activities.		
c. Maintenance		Coordinates COMSEC evacuation and external support requirements.	Coordinates with the S-4 for inclusion of maintenance training and supply economy in training program.	Coordinates back-up support for maintenance beyond the capability of assigned or attached maintenance assets.
d. Utilities for Facilities				Coordinates activities pertaining to maintenance and repair of utilities for facilities.
e. Collection and Disposition of Excess Property				May recommend use, allocation and priority of issue of excess property.

Attachment 6

S-5 BRANCH DUTIES

Task	S-1	S-2	S-3	S-4
1. BDOC Future Operations Cell	Provides unit strength and loss estimate to S-5 to ensure manning for future ops.	Provides S-5 with information on anticipated enemy capabilities.	S-3 provides operational guidance for the S-5 to properly devise future plans.	Coordinates and distributes supplies needed for future ops.
2. Plans and Programs	Provides unit strength and loss estimate to S-5 to ensure capability to execute published plans.	Provides S-5 with information on current and anticipated enemy capabilities.	Ensures the S-5 is aware of all operational procedures which must be provided for, including such areas as: Pass and ID, reports and analysis, Physical security, etc.	Ensures all required equipment is supplied to perform all functions controlled by the S-5.

Attachment 7

EXAMPLE OF PRE-COMBAT INSPECTION CHECKLIST

ID Cards	Water
Ammunition	MREs
Weapons	Fuel/Oil
Gas Masks/MOPP Gear	Tow Bars/Tow Ropes
Flash Lights	Slave Cables
Radios (crypto loaded)	Concertina Wire and Gloves
Maps and Overlays	IR Lights
Pen and Paper	Glint Tape
Spare Barrels/Spare Barrel Gloves	Chemical Lights
Eye Protection (Sun/Wind/Dust Goggles)	Ear Plugs
Body Armor w/ All Accouterments	First Aid/Combat Life Saver Kits
Helmets	Hot/Cold Weather Gear
Load Plan Complete/All Gear Tied Down	Signal Operating Instructions
Vehicles Topped Off	Fire Extinguishers
Blood Chits	Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) Performed
Compasses	Weapon Cleaning Kits
Head Space and Timing Set (M2)	Function Checks Completed
Test Fire w/ Permission	Machine Guns Mounted
NVGs	Binoculars
Spare Radio Batteries	ECMs Updated By Electronic Warfare Officer
Headsets For Radios	Antennas For Radios
Loadbearing Equipment (LBE)	Signal Panel Marker VS-17/GVX

Attachment 8
REVERSE TIME SCHEDULE

Patrol Time Schedule	
0200	- Return to Friendly Area
2330 – 0200	- Movement En Route
2300 – 2330	- Accomplish Mission, Reorganize
2230 – 2300	- Leader's Reconnaissance
2000 – 2230	- Movement En Route
2000 -	- Depart Friendly Area
1945 – 2000	- Movement to Departure Area
1930 – 1945	- Final Inspection
1845 – 1930	- Night Rehearsals
1800 – 1845	- Day Rehearsals
1745 – 1800	- Inspection
1700 – 1745	- Supper Meal
1515 – 1700	- Subunit Planning and Preparation
1445 – 1515	- Issue Operations Order
1400 – 1445	- Complete Detailed Plans
1315 – 1400	- Conduct Reconnaissance
1300 – 1315	- Issue Warning Order

Attachment 9

PROCEDURES TO REQUEST INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT

<p>A call for fire is a message prepared by an observer. It has all the information needed to deliver indirect fire on a specific target. Though normally requested through the FL, any member of the flight may request fire support by use of the call for fire. Calls for fire are broken down into three parts with a break and a read back between each part. The information below is the minimum necessary, and is by no means all inclusive. Personnel should be aware of theater specific requirements as necessary. Finally, personnel should review AFTTP (I) 3-2.6, <i>J-Fire Multi-Service Procedures for The Joint Application of Firepower</i>.</p>		
<p>PART 1: Identification of Observer. This is the observer’s call sign.</p>		
<p>Warning Order. This is sent to achieve communication priority and alert the DFC of the fire mission. May be: adjust fire, fire for effect, suppress or immediate suppression.</p>		
<p>PART 2: Location of Target. Informs the FDC of the location of the target. Normally, a six digit grid or an existing planned target is used. Observers may also shift from a known point.</p>		
<p>PART 3: Description of the Target. Provides the FDC a brief description of the target. Use acronym “SNAP” to describe the target: Size/shape, Nature/nomenclature, Activity and Protection/posture.</p>		
<p>Shift From a Known Point: “A78, this is A67, adjust fire, shift BC 4312, over.” “A67, this is A78, adjust fire, shift BC 4312, out.” “Direction 230 degrees, left 170, drop 500, over.” “Direction 230 degrees, left 170, drop 500, out.” “Insurgent emplacing IED, danger close, over.” “Insurgent emplacing IED (describe the target: Size/shape, Nature/nomenclature, Activity and Protection/posture).” A call for fire may also include the following information:</p>		
<p>Method of Engagement. Includes type of adjustments danger close trajectory ammunition and distribution.</p>		
<p>Method of Fire and Control. Includes outlining a method of fire and control such as “at my Command” “cannot observe” “time on target” and “continuous illumination.” The following are examples of call for fire.</p>		
<p><u>REQUEST</u></p> <p>Grid: “A78, this is B49, adjust fire, over.” “Grid 907453, over.”</p> <p>“Squad size element in trench line cannot observe, over.”</p>	<p>➔</p>	<p><u>FDC RESPONSE</u></p> <p>“B49, this is A78, adjust fire, out.” “Grid 907453, out.”</p> <p>“Squad size element in trench line cannot observe, out.”</p>

Shift from a Known Point: →	<u>FDC RESPONSE</u>
“A78, this is A67, adjust fire, shift BC 4312, over.”	“A67, this is A78, adjust fire, shift BC 4312, out.”
“Direction 230 degrees, left 170, drop 500, over.”	“Direction 230 degrees, left 170, drop 500, out.”
“Mortar team on top of building, danger close, over.”	“Mortar team on top of building, danger close, out.”
<p>NOTE: For shifting from a known point, the observer must determine the grid direction to the target, the lateral shift to the target from the known point and the range shift from the known point to the target. FDC must have the known point and target number.</p>	