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MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION C
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FROM: HQ USAF/A4
1030 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1030

SUBJECT: Air Force Guidance Memorandum to AFMAN 10-2504, *Air Force Incident Management Guidance for Major Accidents and Natural Disasters*

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force, this Air Force Guidance Memorandum immediately changes AFMAN 10-2504, *Air Force Incident Management Guidance for Major Accidents and Natural Disasters*. Compliance with this Memorandum is mandatory. To the extent its directions are inconsistent with other Air Force publications, the information herein prevails, in accordance with AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*.

Air Force guidance for Hurricane Conditions (HURCON) and Tropical Cyclone Conditions of Readiness (TCCOR) provided in AFMAN 10-2504, dated 13 March 2013, requires immediate revision to synchronize with other service's guidance and prevent confusion at joint bases in hurricane/tropical cyclone threat areas. A corrected Table 2.3 is provided at Attachment 1. These HURCON/TCCOR timelines are now consistent with PACOM and Navy policies affecting joint reporting and AF resources based at those installations.

This memorandum becomes void after one year has elapsed from the date of this memorandum, or upon release of an Air Force publication incorporating the guidance, whichever is earlier.

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Attachment:
1. Table 2.3 Replacement

Attachment

Table 2.3 Replacement

Table 2.3. Hurricane Conditions (HURCON) and Tropical Cyclone Conditions of Readiness (TCCOR).

HURCON/ TCCOR	Criteria
5	Destructive winds are possible within 96 hours (1).
4	Destructive winds are possible within 72 hours.
3	Destructive winds are possible within 48 hours.
2	Destructive winds anticipated within 24 hours.
1	Destructive winds anticipated within 12 hours.
1C	Caution: Winds of 40-57 mph/35-49 kts sustained are occurring.
1E	Emergency: Winds of 58 mph/50 kts sustained and/or gusts of 69 mph/60 kts or greater are occurring.
1R	Recovery: Destructive winds have subsided and are no longer forecast to occur; survey and work crews are permitted to determine the extent of the damage and to establish safe zones around hazards (e.g. downed power lines, unstable structures). Non-essential personnel are asked to remain indoors.
(1). Commanders may direct an installation to stay in HURCON/TCCOR 5 for an entire Tropical Cyclone or Hurricane season if desired. This is discouraged due to the potential of the base/installation population becoming complacent in a prolonged HURCON/TCCOR 5 status.	

**BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY
OF THE AIR FORCE**

AIR FORCE MANUAL 10-2504

13 MARCH 2013



Operations

**AIR FORCE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
GUIDANCE FOR MAJOR ACCIDENTS AND
NATURAL DISASTERS**

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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This manual implements Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-2501, *Air Force Emergency Management Program Planning and Operations*. It also aligns the Air Force Emergency Management Program with *Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8, National Preparedness, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5)*, the *National Incident Management System (NIMS)* and the *National Response Framework (NRF)*. This manual integrates major accident and natural disaster procedures, and standards for planning, logistical requirements, emergency response actions, emergency response organizational guidelines, exercises and evaluations, personnel training, detection, identification, warning and notification actions. It establishes responsibilities, procedures and standards for prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation resulting from major accidents or natural disasters within the continental United States (CONUS) and Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS). It prescribes the planning process to help responders achieve unity of effort, allocate, and use resources effectively. It identifies shortfalls in response capabilities concerning Major Accidents and Natural Disasters. This publication applies to Active Duty, Air Force Reserve Command and Air National Guard units. Consult cited policy directives, instructions, manuals and their supplements for specific policies, procedures and requirements. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to AFCEC/CXR, 139 Barnes Drive, Tyndall AFB, FL 32403-5319. Use AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS), Records Disposition Schedules (RDS), or any updated statement provided by the AF Records Management Office (SAF/CIO A6P).

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

Additions to this publication include: Chapter 1, a Prevention definition from the National Resource Center; Chapter 3, a Preparedness explanation; Chapter 4, introduces the DoDI 6055.17, *Installation Emergency Management Program’s* Recovery Working Group with the Recovery Operations Chief developing an Installation Recovery Plan and Chapter 5, a Mitigation Overview. Deletions include all references to Space Shuttle operations; the Initial Response Force (IRF) and Response Task Force (RTF) responsibilities based on the publishing of AFI 10-2518, *Nuclear Weapons Accident and Incident Response*; and *Air Force Be Ready* web sites; along with the Installation Notification and Warning System responsibilities, which are found in AFI 10-2501, *Air Force Emergency Management Program Planning and Operations*.

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Chapter 1

OVERVIEW AND POLICY

1.1. Purpose. This manual provides Air Force Emergency Management (AFEM) program guidance on major accident and natural disaster prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation for higher headquarters, installation commanders, unit commanders, first responders and emergency responders. It implements the Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) and complies with the intent and guidelines in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5. It also provides policy guidance to prepare installation and unit plans and checklists for major accidents and natural disasters.

1.2. Mission. The primary missions of the Air Force EM program are to save lives; minimize the loss or degradation of resources; and continue, sustain, and restore operational capability in an all-hazards physical threat environment at Air Force installations worldwide. The ancillary missions of the AFEM program are to support homeland defense and civil support operations and to provide support to civil and host nation authorities according to DoD directives and through the appropriate Combatant Command. Major accident and natural disaster physical threats are defined in [Chapter 2](#).

1.3. Policies. This manual supports the AFEM program as required by Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6055.17, *Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program* and Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-25, *Emergency Management*.

1.3.1. The President establishes national security emergency policy through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) within the Continental United States (CONUS) and through the Department of State (DOS) outside the CONUS (OCONUS). In the CONUS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) implements the policy through coordination with other federal departments, agencies and geographical combatant commands. These entities work together to prepare for emergencies, develop systems for response, protect essential resources and critical infrastructures, ensure continuity of government, and conduct training. Some emergencies are the responsibility of government agencies other than FEMA; for example, forest fire emergencies are the responsibility of either the United States (US) Department of Agriculture or the Department of the Interior (DOI). DoD assistance may be requested by a lead federal government agency regardless of the type of emergency.

1.3.2. The National Response Framework (NRF) explains that the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief & Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) authorizes the President to provide assistance to State and local governments to support response, recovery, and mitigation efforts following Presidential emergency or disaster declarations.

1.3.3. After a Presidential declaration of a catastrophic incident or emergency under the Stafford Act, he may direct any federal government agency including DoD, to provide support to state and local agencies.

1.3.4. AF Policies. The AF must respond to major accidents and natural disasters involving DoD resources or resulting from DoD activities and assist civil authorities when requested support has been approved by the installation commander or higher headquarters. AFI 10-2501, AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, AFI 91-204, *Safety Investigations and Reports*, and

AFI 10-206, *Operational Reporting* provide detailed reporting requirements for all mishaps involving AF equipment or personnel. AFI 10-2501 states that commanders at OCONUS locations will follow DOS, COCOM, and MAJCOM guidance when assisting local authorities. Commanders at US territories and US possessions will follow DoI, theater, and MAJCOM guidance when assisting local authorities. MAJCOMs will coordinate with the DoI to determine appropriate response protocols at US territory and US possession locations.

Chapter 2

PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS

2.1. Prevention and Preparedness Overview. AFIMS outlines Prevention and Preparedness as the first two phases of incident management. The prevention phase begins before a major accident or natural disaster occurs, and includes actions taken to detect, contain, and forestall events or circumstances, which could result in an accident or incident. The preparedness phase is a continuous process involving efforts at all levels to identify hazards, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required resources to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major accidents and natural disasters.

2.2. Prevention. The National Resource Center defines prevention as actions to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from occurring. Prevention involves actions to protect lives and property. It involves risk management applying intelligence and other information to a range of activities that may include such countermeasures as deterrence operations; heightened inspections; improved surveillance and security operations; investigations to determine the full nature and source of the threat; public health and agricultural surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation or quarantine; and, as appropriate, specific law enforcement operations aimed at deterring, preempting, interdicting or disrupting illegal activity and apprehending potential perpetrators and bringing them to justice. While major accident preventive actions (such as hazard analysis, fire prevention, safety programs, and implementing lessons learned) are specific in nature, natural occurring disaster preventive actions are more general as they are difficult to predict. The following major accident and natural disaster hazard explanations are provided to assist installations in defining preventive actions.

2.2.1. Major Accidents. A major accident is an accident of such a magnitude as to warrant response by the installation DRF. It differs from day-to-day emergencies and incidents that are routinely handled by base agencies without the DRF. Major accidents may occur at home station, in transit, at deployment locations, or during any phase of training, civil support, humanitarian support, or wartime operations. Major accidents can contribute to adverse public reaction. Efficient and appropriate response activities combined with quick and honest communication on the situation and planned actions will help alleviate the public's concerns. This action will aid in limiting negative reactions and facilitate returning the installation to normal operations. A major accident may involve one or more of the following:

2.2.1.1. Hazardous Substances. Hazardous Substances include radioactive materials, Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TIC)s, Toxic Industrial Materials (TIM)s, or explosives.

2.2.1.2. Class-A Mishaps - defined by AFI 91-204.

2.2.1.3. Class B Mishaps - defined by AFI 91-204 and AFI 10-206. Incidents may include facilities involved in fire or explosions, mass casualty incidents, or hazardous material (HAZMAT) responses.

2.2.1.4. Grave Risk, Injury or Death. Installations must be prepared to mitigate those accidents and/or disasters that potentially create grave risk to the populace that could result in injuries and/or death. This manual details procedures to prepare the installation

and its personnel for that threat and outlines the appropriate prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions to take in the event of an incident or natural disaster.

2.2.1.5. Major Accident Hazards. Installations must conduct an assessment of the types of major accidents that are a threat to their installation. Identifying the hazards allows installation commanders to prepare plans, checklists and train response forces to efficiently respond to these major accidents. Below are examples of major accidents:

2.2.1.6. . HAZMAT. Air Force installations store and use hazardous materials worldwide. In addition, AF Installations may be located near storage locations and transportation routes (highways, rail yards etc.) for hazardous materials that may affect installation property, resources, and personnel. Storage and use locations include aircraft maintenance facilities, logistics warehouses, medical laboratories and research facilities, wastewater treatment plants, and hazardous waste accumulation sites. AF installations must be able to respond to incidents involving the transportation, transfer, or storage of hazardous materials or hazardous waste. HAZMAT incidents include organic and inorganic air releases, hazardous liquid spills, TIC/TIM spills that pose an immediate or potential health and ecological safety hazard to personnel, the environment, or the mission. The three levels of HAZMAT response are in [Table 2.1](#) Regulations and policy regarding transport and storage of HAZMAT at both CONUS and OCONUS operating locations are intended to ensure safe operations. [Table 2.2](#) reflects typical hazardous materials on an installation that can pose a hazard to operations and personnel.

Table 2.1. HAZMAT Response Levels

Response Level	Characteristics
Level I	Confined to small area controlled by a first responder. Does not require evacuation beyond involved structure. Poses no immediate threat to life or property.
Level II	Involves greater hazard or area than Level I. May require limited protective action for surrounding area. Poses potential threat to life or property.
Level III	Involves severe hazard or larger area than Level II. May require large-scale protective action. Poses extreme threat to life or property.

Table 2.2. Typical Hazardous Materials on Air Bases

Activity	Typical HAZMAT(s).
Aircraft Maintenance	Paints (containing isocyanates, chromates), solvents (such as methyl ethyl ketone, tetrachloroethylene).
Petroleum, Oil, Lubricant Storage	Jet fuel, hydrazine, motor vehicle fuel, motor oil.
Medical Operations	Formaldehyde, gluteraldehyde, methyl alcohol, anesthetic gases, radioactive materials.
Hazardous Waste Accumulation	Hazardous wastes.
Wastewater Treatment	Chlorine.
Pest Management	Organophosphates, endothall, metaldehyde, sodium chlorate, methyl parathion
Special (Research, Medical Lab, etc.)	Osmium tetroxide, picric acid, formaldehyde, nitrogen tetroxide, methyl hydrazine, fluorine, chlorine, radioactive materials.

2.2.1.7. Aircraft Accidents. Aircraft accidents may involve DoD, coalition, and multinational or military aviation aerospace platforms and commercial airframes from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and contract flight services. An incident that requires AF response may include aircraft, aerial target drones, and UASs.

2.2.1.7.1. On Base Response. The installation must plan, equip and train to provide immediate, decisive incident response anytime an incident occurs on the installation. The installation mobilizes and deploys the installation DRF to respond to the incident. The incident commander (IC) may request recall of additional DRF resources to ensure lifesaving, rescue, suppression, and containment are accomplished at an incident.

2.2.1.7.2. Off Base Response. Coordinate with local civil authorities if areas under civil jurisdiction are affected by the incident or the incident occurred in a civil jurisdiction. Installation emergency responders should immediately respond to the incident site to assist in saving lives and controlling the incident site by integrating with local responders. If the incident is far enough away where emergency responders will not be able to assist in immediate rescue and hazard mitigation then an IC and others should wait to be notified to respond to the incident site. The arriving installation DRF will coordinate and work with local authorities on the security and recovery of DOD assets when responding to the incident. The installation DRF must coordinate incident response and recovery operations with local authorities.

2.2.1.8. Advanced Aerospace Material. Installations provide emergency response to airframes and weapons platforms containing advanced aerospace composites, such as depleted uranium, titanium and other HAZMAT materials. Composite materials present unique hazards and must be considered by the IC and emergency responders when choosing personal protective equipment (PPE) to be worn. Additionally, care in the handling and cleanup of these materials must be taken in order to prevent additional

airborne hazards. Refer to the Installation Emergency Management Plan (IEMP) 10-2; Annex A, Appendix 2, Tab C, *Advanced Aerospace Materials (Composites) Checklist* for detailed information.

2.2.1.9. Nuclear Weapons Accident/Radiological Incident information is contained in AFI 10-2518.

2.2.1.10. Accidents Involving Space Systems. Installations may be called on to respond to incidents involving space systems, including spacecraft, launch platforms, spacecraft fuel sources, satellites and other materiel. Incidents can range from accidents prior to or during launch and to downed satellites. Space systems can include radiological and chemical hazards, including TICs and TIMs. PPE selection will be determined based on the space system involved. Care in the handling and cleanup of these the materials must be taken to prevent additional hazards from being created, refer to AFI 10-2501; and AFMAN 91-222.

2.2.2. Natural Disaster Hazards. Natural disasters include: severe weather such as tornados, cyclones, floods, thunderstorms, lightning, extreme cold and heat, winter storms, hurricanes, typhoons, and tropical storms; tsunamis; earthquakes; fires; wild land fires; volcanoes; and any other natural weather phenomena specific to the installation. Because natural disasters can simultaneously impact both USAF/Joint Base installations and civil authorities' jurisdiction outside the installation, it is important to understand that there are multiple military and non-military weather organizations involved in disaster response planning.

2.2.2.1. USAF Weather organizations are responsible for comprehensive weather support inside the boundaries of all USAF and Army installations as well as joint installations in which USAF is the joint base lead agency. USAF weather organizations have sole authority and responsibility to create and disseminate the official forecast and all weather watches, advisories, and warnings for the installation.

2.2.2.1.1. The local USAF Weather Flight [normally a flight within the host-wing Operations Support Squadron (OSS)] and a geographically separated USAF Operational Weather Squadron (OWS) responsible for the region provide cooperative weather watch for the installation according to AFI 15-128, AFMAN 15-111, AFMAN 15-129 Volumes 1 & 2, AFVA 15-136, AFVA 15-137, and AFI 15-157.

2.2.2.1.2. Installation weather watch, advisory, and warning issuance is primarily the responsibility of the regional USAF OWS unless the local installation weather flight sees the immediate need for a warning and issues for the OWS in the interest of time to mitigate the threat to personnel and resources.

2.2.2.1.3. Weather support for installation-specific disaster response planning will be coordinated through the installation USAF Weather Flight and regionally responsible USAF OWS. Refer to AFVA 15-136, *Air Force Operational Weather Squadron Areas of Responsibility -- CONUS*, and AFVA 15-137, *Air Force Operational Weather Squadron Areas of Responsibility [Worldwide]* for OWS-specific regions and contact information.

2.2.2.2. Outside of DoD installations, the CONUS (or OCONUS) national meteorological service is responsible for issuing weather watches, advisories, and warnings for the civilian population. Within the CONUS, civil authorities depend upon

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Weather Service (NWS).

2.2.2.2.1. The NWS provides local and regional forecasts and information for severe storms, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, extreme heat, winter storms, fire threats, tsunamis and solar flares to the general public.

2.2.2.2.2. NOAA's Storm Prediction Center at <http://www/spc/noaa.gov> provides valuable background information for natural disaster response planning.

2.2.2.2.3. NOAA/NWS is responsible for supporting CONUS civil authorities in their disaster response planning activities.

2.2.2.3. Should weather-related conflicts arise between USAF Weather organizations and the CONUS NWS [or OCONUS national meteorological office(s)] inputs to combined military/civil disaster response planning, the installation's USAF Weather Flight will coordinate with the meteorological office supporting civil authorities as necessary to deconflict.

Table 2.3. Hurricane Conditions and Tropical Cyclone Conditions of Readiness

HURCON/ TCCOR	Criteria
5	General Hurricane Season, 1 June to 30 November
4	Indicates surface winds in excess of 58 mph (50 knots) could arrive within 96 hours.
3	Indicates surface winds in excess of 58 mph could arrive within 72 hours.
2	Indicates surface winds in excess of 58 mph could arrive within 48 hours.
1	Indicates surface winds in excess of 58 mph could arrive within 24 hours.
1E	Indicates surface winds in excess of 58 mph are occurring and other dangerous condition associated with the storm are present. All outside activity is strictly prohibited.
1R	Indicates life-threatening storm hazards have passed but damage may persist and only emergency responders and damage assessment personnel are released to move about.

2.2.2.4. Severe Weather. Installations will include severe weather plans into the IEMP 10-2 for the hazards likely to affect the installation.

2.2.2.4.1. Hurricane Conditions (HURCON) and Tropical Cyclone Conditions of Readiness (TCCOR). Specific to the AF, installations use HURCONs and TCCORs warning codes to prepare for an impending hurricane or typhoon. The information to guide installation HURCON/TCCOR codes provides arrival timelines and wind speed sheltering and evacuation decisions. Those hurricane and tropical cyclone conditions are listed in **Table 2.3**.

2.2.2.4.2. Tropical storms and hurricanes that come ashore can also generate tornadoes. Installations subject to tornadoes provide notification of watches and

warnings using the Installation Notification and Warning System (INWS). A tornado watch is issued for the installation by the regionally responsible USAF OWS (see AFVA 15-137) when weather conditions are capable of producing a tornado. A tornado warning is issued by the regionally responsible USAF OWS (or local USAF Weather flight in time-critical situations) when a tornado is confirmed by radar or sighted by spotters. Personnel in the affected area should seek shelter immediately. Tornado warnings can be issued without a tornado watch in effect.

2.3. Preparedness. Preparedness is the range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover and mitigate the effects of incidents or accidents. Preparedness is a continuous process. Preparedness involves efforts at all levels of government, between government and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required resources. Within AFIMS, preparedness is operationally focused on establishing guidelines, protocols, and standards for planning, training and exercises, personnel qualification and certification, equipment certification, and publication management.

2.3.1. Preparedness begins before a major accident or natural disaster occurs, and includes planning, training, and exercising. Developing the IEMP 10-2 with supporting checklists and establishing tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to respond to all hazard incidents is vital. Base training ensures personnel are prepared to respond to an incident. The EM Information Program provides the base populace training on major accident and natural disaster procedures and localized threats. Exercises provide a forum for the installation DRF to test emergency response plans and TTPs. Installations are also required to maintain and test appropriate response equipment and supplies in case of a major accident or natural disaster.

2.3.1.1. Planning. Accomplish a thorough review of Memorandums of Agreements, civilian agency plans, base installation support requirements, as well as any other tasking documents when developing or updating installation plans. The development of checklists and standard operating procedures must be part of this planning process to ensure the installation and response forces are able to respond to the hazards that threaten the installation. Planning prior to a major accident or natural disaster allows installations to minimize the effects of an incident. Use of the AFIMS during EM planning standardizes incident management. Installations begin the planning phase by completing a threat analysis, a vulnerability analysis, and a capabilities assessment. Information gathered in these assessments allows installations to determine what personnel, supplies, and equipment are required for prevention, detection, response, recovery, and mitigation. Using a risk-based approach, installations must consider the worst-case scenario.

2.3.1.2. The IEMP 10-2 Template. The IEMP 10-2 is template located on the Air Force Portal/Air Force/Emergency Management/Publications and Plans. It contains lists of executable tasks commanders accomplish based hazards that could threaten installations. Each AF installation is required to develop an IEMP 10-2 according to AFI 10-2501. Annexes should not repeat the main plan. When EM guidance is included in another plan, such as the Integrated Defense Plan, Expeditionary Site Plan or War and Mobilization Plan (WMP)-1, Civil Engineer (CE) Supplement, reference the other plan but do not repeat the guidance. Basic IEMP template information is explained in AFMAN 10-2502, *Air Force Incident Management System Guidance*. Units and

agencies must prepare detailed checklists to implement actions specified in this template. As previously stated, the pertinent IEMP 10-2 annexes addressed in this manual are Annex A, Major Accidents, and Annex B, Natural Disasters.

2.3.1.2.1. . IEMP 10-2 Functional Checklists. Checklists should follow the format used in the template located on the AF Portal/ Air Force/Emergency Management/Publications and Plans, and should be based on tasks and requirements in IEMP 10-2. Checklist specify who, what, when, where, and how response and recovery tasks are accomplished. Checklists are dated and coordinated with the installation Readiness and Emergency Management Flight prior to publication. Reviews must be conducted at least annually, or when significant portions of the IEMP 10-2 have changed.

2.3.1.3. Support Agreement. Commanders develop and execute Support Agreements (SAs) as directed in AFI 25-201, *Support Agreement Procedures*. All SAs are to be coordinated through the installation Legal Office before finalization and implementation. In addition, all SAs should be regularly reviewed to ensure they are current and complete. SAs are also known as "mutual assistance", "outside aid", "memorandums of understanding", "letters of agreement", "cooperative assistant agreement", or "intergovernmental compacts". An SA template can be downloaded from the Emergency Management Community of Practice under folder F: Publications and Plans/Mutual Aid Agreements.

2.3.1.4. Civilian Agency Plans. Participation in local planning should not be limited to a single appointee. All installation responders units, that anticipate involvement with their off-base counterparts, should be fully engaged in the community incident response planning process. They should ensure their parts of the IEMP 10-2 do not conflict with local plans and how the installation fits into plans for receiving and providing support.

2.3.1.5. Issues to consider for both major accident and natural disaster response planning are listed in **Table 2.5**.

Table 2.4. Considerations for Major Accident and Natural Disaster Response Planning

1.	Plans. Has the installation developed SAs with the local community to ensure safe transport and handling of injured, or ill personnel to medical treatment facilities? These plans should address the handling of contaminated casualties.
2.	Plans. Are the needs of base personnel who own house pets and other domesticated animals included in the IEMP 10-2?
3.	Plans. Ensure Emergency Action Plans are completed, trained and exercised for the safe storage or destruction of classified material and according to AFI 31-401, <i>Information Security Program Management</i> .
4.	Plans, Training, Exercises. Are the IEMP 10-2 and Integrated Defense Plans linked to consider the physical security of AF Protection Level Resources? Are security forces required to remain in place and do they have the appropriate PPE for the major accident? Are national security assets moved to secure areas on the installation or evacuated?
5.	Plans, Training, Exercises, Equipage. How is the base populace informed of evacuation information? Has Public Affairs provided/coordinated on a plan to provide emergency information to the public and base community (plan should include use of INWS via Command Post, and other previously publicized communication mediums – radio, public web sites, social media, etc)? Are privatized housing units included in mass notification processes?

2.3.1.6. IEMP 10-2 tasks must not conflict with other installation plans to ensure preservation of life, property, and the installation's mission.

2.3.2. Installation Notification and Warning System (INWS). AFI 10-2501 requires AF installation to have systems to rapidly and effectively disseminate emergency information. INWS capabilities include signals or messaging appropriate to Force Protection Condition (FPCON), watches, warnings, evacuation routes, and other alerting information to meet DoD and federal warning requirements. Installations should incorporate all available resources to provide warning, which may include cable override, reverse 911, Network Broadcast System, or (add) existing public affairs communication tools.

2.3.2.1. The IEMP 10-2 must incorporate all INWS requirements listed in AFI 10-2501 and include any unique local procedures.

2.3.2.2. The installation CP serves as the focal point for installation notification and warning operations.

2.3.2.3. Installations should advertise the existence and use these systems regularly to properly educate the base and local populace of where to seek information during times of emergency.

2.3.2.3.1. Each IEMP 10-2 will identify the notification and warning system requirements for the installation. Requirements must include: alert, warning, notification, and response. Incident notification and warning occur at all levels of the installation. See **Table 2.5**, for the types of notification systems used within the INWS.

2.3.2.4. Air Force Visual Aid 10-2510, *US Air Force Emergency Notification Signals*, provide specific incident warning signals associated with three major emergencies (natural disasters, wildfires, HAZMAT release) and attacks from hostile entities in peacetime and contingency operations. The IEMP 10-2 should identify this visual aid and include definitions for each warning notification category.

2.3.2.5. The INWS must meet standards identified in Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-021-01, MNS Standards. INWS must support the installation's AFIMS according to AFI 10-2501.

Table 2.5. Base-Wide and Targeted Notification

BASE-WIDE NOTIFICATION	TARGETED NOTIFICATION
Base Siren/Giant Voice	Primary & Secondary Crash Nets
Base Network (Audio and Visual Alert)	Radio Net
Intra-Base Radio Network	Base Network (Audio and Visual Alert)
Primary & Secondary Crash Nets	Centralized Paging System
Mobile Public Address Systems	Cell Phone / Blackberry
Commander's Access Channel	Land Line Telephone
Computer-based Notification System	Runner
Public Affairs communication tools	Local Media

2.3.3. Unit commanders, through their unit EM representatives, conduct recurring EM training for unit personnel through the Air Force EM Information Program. Supplemented training is provided by the R&EM Flight for shelter management, contamination control teams, and EOC representatives. Unit commanders schedule assigned people for EM training courses, ensure they attend, and maintain documentation of training for assigned personnel.

2.3.4. Air Force Emergency Management Information Program. This program consists of an initial orientation, as described above, and recurring education. Unit commanders and staff agency chiefs conduct recurring education throughout the year using materials provided by the installation R&EM Flight. The program emphasizes applicable hazards and protective actions. Consider the threat, mission, and assigned weapon systems when addressing the major accidents and natural disasters likely to occur at the installation. . Improve response capability by highlighting problem areas and corrective actions identified by inspections, exercises, or actual major accidents and natural disasters.

2.3.5. Assign and train specialized teams according to AFI 10-2501 to ensure response capabilities exist to mitigate local threats and hazards. Team equipment requirements are tailored for the installation based on specific mission and threat in the employment environment.

2.3.6. First and Emergency Responder Training. Training for major accident and HAZMAT incident response is conducted according to AFI 10-2501. It lists courses for the response members and directs training events and frequencies to support the IEMP 10-2 for the installation. Members complete these courses according to AFI 10-2501.

2.3.6.1. Incident Commanders (ICs). Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1910.120, *Occupational Safety and Health Standards, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response*, requires ICs to be properly certified and credentialed when responding to HAZMAT incidents. Non-CBRN/HAZMAT incidents requiring multi-agency response, the incident commanders must meet NIMS Incident Commander training requirements.

2.3.6.2. Investigation Board Members. Personnel assigned to the safety investigation board and incident investigation board must be suitably trained and equipped to enter any site where HAZMAT (including biohazards posed by blood-borne pathogens) may pose a threat to their safety.

2.4. Risk Management Process. The EM all-hazards Risk Management Process (RMP) identified in AFI 10-2501 compliments the Integrated Defense Risk Management Process (IDRMP) found in AFI 31-101, and is comprised of three assessments providing the installation commander with an objective risk management decision tool to make informed risk decisions. Refer to AFI 31-101, ch.3 for details on developing Risk Management methodology. The foundation of the RMP is comprised of three annual assessments: the Hazard Assessment, the Vulnerability Assessment, and the Capabilities Assessment which are conducted in concert with other installation working groups

2.4.1. Hazard Assessment. A Hazard Assessment identifies all natural and man-made threats to the installation. The hazard assessment identifies an installation's facilities, roadways, and other infrastructure subject to potential exposure or to the physical effects of a natural or man-made disaster. The hazard assessment considers all hazard types, the likelihood of each type of hazard occurring, and the vulnerability of the supported missions, assigned personnel, property, the environment, and the installation as a whole to these hazards. Mitigation actions are necessary for identified hazards. The hazard assessment allows installations to prioritize and plan response, recovery, and continuing mitigation efforts. Hazard assessments serve as one of the foundational components for effective emergency management. Results of the hazard assessment directly affect the planning for activities such as resource management, capability development, public education, and training and exercises.

2.4.1.1. All installations perform hazard assessments in conjunction with other programs (e.g. AT, water, CIP). Installations identify all hazards, likelihood of the hazard occurring, and how the hazard affects the installation. The steps in hazard assessment include:

2.4.1.1.1. Research and identify the natural or man-made hazards or threats to your installation.

2.4.1.1.2. Review historical weather data, plans of past natural disasters, and projected seasonal natural disasters. FEMA also has several tools to assist in identifying hazards in your area.

2.4.1.1.3. Consider the possibility of toxic industrial material facilities located off the installation and if there is any historical data concerning the facility.

2.4.1.1.4. Consider the full range of known or estimated terrorist capabilities and possibilities of non-hostile incidents.

2.4.1.1.5. Evaluate each hazard for severity and frequency by determining how often these hazards affect the installation and what actions may help reduce their severity.

2.4.1.1.6. The steps in hazard assessments are shown in **Table 2.7**.

Table 2.6. Hazard Assessment Steps

1. Identify and characterize the hazards. Identify types of natural disasters the installation is susceptible to (i.e., tornadoes, blizzards etc.) Identify types of major accidents (i.e., aircraft, munitions, fuel storage, etc.) What additional hazards do they project?
2. Evaluate/review each hazard for severity and frequency and historical data frequency. What preventive/mitigation actions may help reduce the severity of these hazards?
3. Determine operational mission implications and costs of direct and indirect effects of identified hazards.
4. Installation commander determines acceptable risks. What level of damage or mission loss can be accepted?
5. Identify risk reduction opportunities. This step takes mitigation actions to reduce the threat or impact of the hazard.

2.4.2. Vulnerability Assessment (VA). The installation VA provides a quantitative estimate of how vulnerable the installation is to each hazard identified in the Hazard Assessment. All installations identify emergency management vulnerabilities in conjunction with the AT and Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)/Critical Asset Risk Management (CARM) programs and address the broad range of hazards to the installation, mission critical assets, and its personnel using DoD Vulnerability Assessment Benchmarks, Service AT and CIP/CARM specific benchmarks, as required. All VAs are cross-functional activities requiring the involvement of several installation agencies (e.g. CE, MDG, SF, OSI, etc.). The other program VAs are analyzed with the EM Program providing clear understanding of the threat spectrum effecting the installation and reducing equipment and funding redundancies.

2.4.2.1. Identify impacts hazards will have on the installation to include: mission, personnel, equipment, damage to facilities and infrastructure, life safety, public health, and recovery concerns.

2.4.2.2. Identify appropriate courses of action to address vulnerabilities and solutions for enhanced protection of DoD personnel and resources. Apply installation commander risk management decisions to prioritize and focus mitigation efforts.

2.4.2.3. Refer to AFI 31-101, ch.3 for details on developing Risk Management methodology.

2.4.2.4. Estimate the impact of hazards and threats by identifying and quantifying missions or areas that could potentially be affected, include special events in the process.

2.4.2.5. Analyze vulnerability of the installation's critical assets, missions, and identify mitigation options to reduce or eliminate the vulnerabilities.

2.4.3. Capability Assessment. A capabilities assessment is an installation's evaluation to identify capabilities for response to a major accident or natural disaster. The capabilities assessment identifies response resources and limiting factors of mission- derived tasks with associated conditions and standards. Capability assessments serve as one of the foundations for effective EM activities and include: planning, resource management, capability development, public education, and training and exercise. Steps for a capabilities assessment are listed in **Table 2.8**

2.4.3.1. Capability Assessments measure the installation's current level of capability to prepare for the hazards identified in the Hazard Assessment, and employ mitigation practices identified in the Vulnerability Assessment. Installation Capability Assessments will consider preparedness, response, and recovery processes. Objectives of the Capability Assessment are to:

2.4.3.1.1. Identify equipment required for response to each hazard and vulnerability. List resources by type and include in the asset capability report. Identify each organizations mission essential tasks (METs) and functions assigned to each organization.

2.4.3.1.2. Identify first and emergency responders necessary for response to identified hazards. If there is a shortfall, consider if local authorities can provide those resources.

2.4.3.1.3. Review policy, guidance, and planning documents to ensure they adequately address the response to and recovery from identified hazards/threats.

2.4.3.1.4. Identify and list personnel with EM responsibilities, and categorize them as emergency responders, specialized teams, critical personnel, essential personnel, and other personnel.

2.4.3.1.5. Identify if the INWS is able to warn all personnel immediately, but no longer than 10 minutes, according to the requirements in DoDI 6055.17.

2.4.3.1.6. Assess if the command and control process is adequate to support and control resources needed for the identified hazards and threats.

2.4.3.1.7. Identify costs required to increase capabilities or mitigate identified vulnerabilities.

Table 2.7. Capabilities Assessment Steps

1.	Analyze the installation's Threat Assessment and Vulnerability Assessment.
2.	Capture information on specific hazards applicable to the installation.
3.	List installation resources.
4.	List installation personnel with a mission-essential task responsibility for EM.
5.	Identify shortfalls: equipment, resources, and personnel.
6.	Report shortfalls and develop funding requirements as necessary.

2.5. Base Support Installation (BSI) and Incident Support Bases (ISB). A BSI is a military installation within the US, its territories, or possessions controlled by any Service or agency, in or near an actual or projected domestic emergency operational area. BSIs are designated by the DoD to provide military support for DoD. ISBs are facilities that support FEMA incident

response operations and logistics, and are frequently military installations, designated after request to DOD.

2.5.1. The Secretary of Defense designates the appropriate BSI. Locations are based on previous site surveys, assessments, and mission analyses. Air Force installations are chosen for BSI by suitability.

2.5.2. Resources provided by a designated BSI may include: marshalling and lay-down areas, security forces, personnel and equipment reception/staging areas and facilities, personnel support, billeting, transportation, material handling equipment, maintenance, general supply and subsistence support, contracting support, communications support, and medical services.

2.5.3. Installation may be tasked as a BSI for incident relief efforts. The BSI serves as the main logistical hub for military support operations. Refer to IEMP 10-2, Annex B, Appendix 3 for detailed information on BSI requirements and actions.

Table 2.8. AF Installations Selected as FEMA ISB Lessons Learned

Ensure approved DoD authorization is received at the installation before receiving FEMA recovery assets.
Establish a FEMA Memorandum of Agreement with the regional FEMA office and state emergency management agency prior to incidents for smooth coordination.
Establish FEMA incident management team installation access procedures.
Conduct a site survey to ensure a large staging area is identified to support hundreds of incoming FEMA resources.
Identify installation access requirements for FEMA assets.
Determine staging area access control procedures and boundary barriers/fences.
Plan for excessive vehicle traffic; provide alternate installation access points for use.
Be aware of civilian transport personnel carrying privately owned weapons, and develop a storage procedure for those weapons when the individuals are on the installation.
Plan for fuel use for installation supporting equipment and aircraft fuel for transport planes, helicopters, and possible Civil Air Patrol aircraft.
Develop a plan to feed, bed, and provide latrine access for individuals supporting the recovery operation. Develop a plan for capturing feeding and lodging cost.
Ensure sufficient numbers of heavy equipment operators are available for each apparatus assigned to the installation.
Ensure sufficient number of special transportation vehicle operators for each type of vehicle assigned to the installation.
Plan sand bag filling and delivery processes. Deliver sand bags to areas needing them vice having personnel come to the filling area. This drives the need for a consolidated list of buildings that traditionally suffer water damage.
Develop a plan for capturing costs associated with ambulance runs to assist FEMA workers.

2.6. Shelters. Circumstances may require installations to move some or all of the base populace into shelters during a major accident or natural disaster. Potential shelters should be pre-designated based on expected events. For example, installations in hurricane/typhoon prone

areas should designate buildings that are built to withstand hurricane/typhoon force winds; installations in flood prone areas should designate buildings that sit above the flood plain, etc.

2.6.1. It is the BCE's responsibility to identify and evaluate installation facilities that may be used for shelters. Installations should not rely on one shelter; several potential shelters should be identified. On-base agencies that provide a service to the population will normally be required to provide that service to shelter occupants. Force Support Squadron (FSS) through the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Emergency Support Function (ESF) - 6 provides food and bedding; Civil Engineers (CE) through ESF 3 provides power, water, sanitary facilities and trash removal; medical will provide medical care; the owner/user of the shelter will provide security. Some of these requirements, e.g., food and bedding; may require staging in the shelter prior to the event. Others, e.g., water and power may be readily available through the normal infrastructure. If they are damaged, then bottled water and generator power may be needed. Sources for both should be located before the need arises. These shelter requirements should not be confused with shelter-in-place requirements, which are described later in this manual. The IEMP 10-2, Annex B, Appendix 4 outlines the necessary shelter-related steps to take in case of a major accident or natural disaster.

2.7. Evacuation. Evacuation is when personnel move from a hazardous area to a safe location. The decision to evacuate from the incident area is made by the IC for incidents that require an IC on the scene. The installation commander will make decisions to evacuate personnel from the installation. Major factors in evacuation decisions are shelter availability, transportation to move personnel, mission criticality of assets to be moved, and the safety of personnel evacuated. AFMAN 10-2502 outlines the steps necessary to conduct evacuation planning within the IEMP 10-2. It is also important to ensure that local evacuation procedures for both major accidents and natural disasters are briefed and disseminated through the Base Emergency Preparedness Orientation (BEPO) as described in AFI 10-2501.

2.7.1. For major accidents, an evacuation will most likely be an IC's decision based upon the information received at the incident site during initial incident site assessment. This decision will occur when it is too dangerous to have personnel shelter in place. An IC must have means to safely move, and a location to move personnel before evacuating.

2.7.2. In most natural disasters, an installation commander has time to make operational risk management decision based on weather watches and warnings. Support Agreements, with installation participation in local community emergency planning committee meetings, assists the R & EM Flight in developing a well formulated evacuation plan for the IEMP 10-2, Annex B. The R & EM flight gains valuable planning information from the local emergency planning committee meetings. The information gained is essential to the IEMP 10-2, Annex B development. The installation EOC ESFs can gather the information from the local or regional EOC to support evacuation decisions. Ensuring the base populace is prepared for an eventual evacuation is essential to the installation's mission continuation. Evacuation briefing should include the route of evacuation, available shelters off base, supplies to bring, care of pets, and notification information. When the installation commander gives the evacuation order, the EOC must coordinate evacuation procedures with the local authorities.

2.8. Education and Training. Education and Training is an integral part of the Air Force Emergency Management Program. It provides the requisite knowledge and skills for effective EM preparedness planning, operations, and recovery. Formal courses and on-the-job training develop functional expertise in primary EM personnel. Some formal training courses also provide emergency preparedness knowledge and skills for other personnel with EM program responsibilities. Installation-level training helps develop knowledge and proficiencies DRF members need to conduct emergency operations. It also provides the base populace with the knowledge and skills needed to survive and operate during major accidents and natural disasters.

2.9. Exercises. A key factor to preparedness is ensuring the installation training and equipment meet the needs of the DRF by conducting exercises. Exercises should be conducted to stress and test every facet of major accident and natural disaster response according to AFI 10-2501. However, exercises need not stress and test every facet simultaneously.

Chapter 3

RESPONSE

3.1. Response Overview. There are three phases of response for major accidents and natural disasters: notification, response, and withdrawal or evacuation. The phases of response are sequential and overlap each other. Notification is when the installation command control element receives the notification of an accident or disaster. Once the notification is received, response forces are dispatched to respond to the incident. Once responders arrive on scene, they will assess the situation and if needed, they will initiate protective actions for personnel in the affected area and for responders as outlined in AFMAN 10-2502. The response phase ends when emergency actions have been implemented and lifesaving actions have been completed. This section addresses notification, response, and withdrawal actions that should be considered during major accidents and natural disasters. The first step is notification that an incident has occurred.

3.2. Notification. The goal of rapid, informative notification is to protect personnel, critical equipment, weapons systems, and infrastructure. Notification provides time needed to disperse equipment and weapons systems, curtail non-essential operations, and shelter or evacuate personnel. Emergency response operations begin with notification. Reports of incidents come from a variety of sources (i.e., telephone call; 911, crash phone, radio transmission, weather forecast warning, watch or advisory, or eyewitness). Individuals witnessing an incident must alert others in the immediate area and report it to the Emergency Communications Center (ECC), Security Forces, Fire and Emergency Services, or the CP. Regardless of how notification is received, an emergency response is initiated. During natural disaster events response personnel will be unable to take action until immediate dangers subside. Once response is initiated, installation leadership, higher headquarters, and local civil authorities must be notified of events. Notification procedures should be included in IEMP 10-2.

3.2.1. Primary and Secondary Crash Nets. Installations use primary and secondary crash networks to notify first responders, emergency responders, airfield personnel, and other DRF elements. AFI 13-204V3, *Airfield Operations Procedures and Programs*, provides direction for organizing and utilizing primary and secondary crash networks.

3.2.2. Commander Notifications. The Command Post (CP) alerts the installation command structure, higher headquarters, and local civil authorities of incidents. If appropriate, the CAT will direct closure of runway(s) and issues a Notice to Airmen, advises taxiing and airborne aircraft of appropriate information, and instructs aircraft to divert or hold position as required. Additionally, the CAT implements the IEMP 10-2 and other plans depending on the situation.

3.2.3. Disaster Response Force Recall. Units will use an emergency communications network (very high frequency or ultrahigh frequency radio network, touch to talk walkie-talkie capability, pagers, or cell phones) to notify fire, medical, security forces, and other response elements. The installation commander directs notification and activates the DRF in response to incidents through the CP.

3.2.4. Installations provide weather notifications and updates, including watches, warnings, and advisories, via the INWS based upon information received from USAF weather organizations responsible for weather support to the installation.

3.2.5. The goal of quick, informative notification is to protect personnel, critical equipment, weapons systems, and infrastructure. Notification provides the time needed to disperse equipment and weapons systems, curtail non-essential operations, provide shelter, or evacuate when ordered.

3.2.6. Determine civilian government agency notification requirements in advance. Notification must be made immediately to local government agencies when an emergency has the potential to affect public health and safety. Notify local civil authorities if an incident is off-installation or is a hazard to the civilian community. Also, notify affected local federal installations and facilities. Civil authorities are responsible for evacuation within their jurisdiction. In coordination with public affairs, enlist the help of local civil agencies and radio and television stations, if necessary. A list of special notification requirements and procedures should be annotated in the IEMP 10-2.

3.2.7. Higher Headquarters. See AFI 10-206 for the Operational Report (OPREP)-3 reporting requirements. AFI 10-206 is a quick reference guide to assist users in determining the type of report to submit. The level of report is based on whether or not an accident or incident could attract nation -level interest (PINNACLE) or only be of interest to Headquarters United States Air Force (USAF) (BEELINE).

3.3. Response Actions. Initial responders must apply the initial response principles shown in **Table 3.1**. Successful application of these principles will yield protection of lives, property, and the mission. The practical application of these principles includes a multitude of response activities such as analyzing the incident, the planned response, and evaluating progress.

Table 3.1. Initial Response Governing Principles

Respond and Establish Incident Command
Lifesaving and Rescue
Suppression and Containment
Cordon
Establish Tactical Priorities
Determine and Communicate Protective Measures

3.3.1. Initial Actions. This section describes the application of general principles governing initial response actions and includes elements of Emergency Responders Missions in more detail. Initial actions include responders defining the nature and scope of the incident.

3.3.1.1. Establishing Incident Command. First responders arriving on-scene first will assume the role of IC, gain situational awareness, and establish the Incident Command System (ICS). The IC automatically assumes ownership of on-scene responsibilities until transferred to designated staff members. As the needs of the IC expand, the staff can be expanded. After initial assessment, the IC will advise the ECC of status. The IC can request support directly from units until the response is expanded and the EOC and additional Unit Control Centers (UCCs) are activated. If the EOC is activated, all requests for support and logistics will flow through the EOC rather than the ECC. The EOC will continue to develop and update the common operational picture (COP), while the IC develops an Incident Action Plan (IAP). **Attachment 2** provides a generic model for initial incident site set-up by the IC and responding forces. Each scenario may require slightly different arrangements but the basic concept doesn't change.

3.3.1.2. Lifesaving and Rescue. Specific lifesaving and rescue activities will be directed by the IC. First responders will implement immediate lifesaving and rescue operations. They will conduct fire fighting operations and perform immediate medical care at established casualty collection points. Response plans should describe how the augmentation of resources would be provided to the IC.

3.3.1.3. Suppression and Containment. Closely associated with other lifesaving activities is hazard suppression and containment. First responders suppress fires and similar incidents using a variety of strategies, including confinement, containment, and control.

3.3.1.4. Establish Cordon. The IC determines the size of the incident cordon. As the situation matures and the type and scope of the problem is identified, the cordon is redefined based upon that information. AFMAN 91-201, *Explosives Safety Standards*, 12 January 2011 and US Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Pamphlet PHH-50-ERG, *Emergency Response Guidebook*, lists initial cordon sizes for most HAZMAT. The EM Flight may advise on evacuation and cordon size based upon type and size.

3.3.1.4.1. Security Forces execute operational and tactical security procedures to ensure the safety and security of emergency response forces and populations at risk. Security Forces provide initial site and incident cordon security functions. In addition, they respond to natural disasters on the installation, establish locations for protection of classified materials, identify and secure traffic control points, direct identification of personnel entering the incident site, coordinate with local law enforcement agencies, and advise the IC on security forces issues during the establishment of a NDA at CONUS locations.

3.3.1.4.1.1. Control Site Access. Isolating the scene of the incident takes place when the emergency is discovered. If possible, the first on scene should secure the scene and control access, but no one should be placed in physical danger to perform these functions.

3.3.1.4.1.2. Only trained personnel perform advanced security measures. Access to the incident scene must be limited to persons directly involved in the response. An entry control point (ECP) must be established with along with Control Zones. Access through the ECP will only be allowed with permission of the IC or designated representative.

3.3.1.4.1.3. Entry Control Point (ECP). The ECP is where ingress and egress of all responders from an incident cordon takes place and is controlled by Security Forces or other government agencies. During an incident, the ECP is established upwind or crosswind of the incident site and at the established evacuation distance. The initial ECP location can change as new information is gathered during site assessment. During natural disasters the ECP will, in most cases, be located for ease of resource entry to the incident area or region.

3.3.1.4.2. National Defense Area. As described in AFI 31-101, NDAs are established in the CONUS and US territories when necessary to secure government property in an emergency located off installation lands not under the jurisdiction or

administration of, or in the custody of, DoD or a military department of the DoD. Establishment of a NDA temporarily places these non-federal lands under effective control of the DoD during emergencies. There must be close coordination with the commander, Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) and local authorities. The senior DOD representative at the scene will define the boundary, mark it with a physical barrier, and post warning signs. To ensure the NDA is enforceable; i.e., allowing successful prosecution of NDA trespassing violations, Title 5, U.S. Code Section 551 et seq, requires public notice. As soon as practical after NDA establishment, announcement of the NDA should be published in the Federal Register (FR). Grid coordinates, expected duration, any special instructions regarding the NDA should be published in the FR. Additionally, local public affairs offices should ensure this same information is included in local media.

3.3.1.4.2.1. Brief all personnel on the rules for use of force and apprehension and detention legalities. Military personnel are precluded from assisting civilian law enforcement pursuing or apprehending individuals outside the NDA. Request support from local civil authorities/officials in preventing unauthorized entry and in removing unauthorized personnel who enter the NDA. Ask civilian authorities to apprehend or arrest civilians who violate any security requirements at the NDA. **Note:** If local civil authorities are unavailable, or refuse to give assistance, on-scene military personnel should detain violators or trespassers. Disposition should be completed quickly following coordination with the legal officer.

3.3.1.4.2.2. Military commanders retain no specific rights or jurisdictional control of an incident in a civilian-controlled area unless a NDA is tablishe. A transfer of authority must be provided to relinquish both operational and tactical control of the incident from civil authorities to the DoD component, installation EOC, and the IC. The civil authorities will be debriefed and will forward all financial expenditures, after action reports, and lessons learned to the installation incident investigations board.

3.3.1.4.3. Hot, Warm, and Cold Zones. The IC must establish control of the site to protect first responders and restrict unauthorized personnel access. Response strategy is to establish three distinct zones where contamination is suspected: the exclusion zone (Hot Zone), the contamination reduction zone (Warm Zone), and the support zone (Cold Zone). See [Attachment 2](#) for information on a typical incident site setup. Attachment 2 depicts a incident site for a hazardous material incident. The following paragraphs describe hot, warm, and cold zones.

3.3.1.4.3.1. Hot Zone. The hot zone is defined as an area immediately surrounding a HAZMAT incident, extending far enough to prevent adverse effects from HAZMAT releases to personnel outside the zone. The hot zone is the area where the actual incident occurred and contamination may exist. Individuals entering the hot zone must wear the prescribed levels of PPE and be decontaminated before leaving. Entry and exit check points will be established at the outer boundary of the hot zone to regulate ingress from the Warm Zone and egress of personnel and equipment into the Warm Zone. The outer boundary of the hot zone is initially established by visually surveying the immediate area and determining if and where hazardous materials are located.

3.3.1.4.3.2. Warm Zone. This area is defined as the area where personnel and equipment decontamination and hot zone support take place. It includes access control points through which personnel and equipment ingress from the Cold Zone and egress from the Hot Zone, if required. The warm zone is the transitional area between hot and cold zones. Since this zone is less hazardous, personnel can wear lower levels of PPE. The outer boundary of the warm zone is initially established by visually surveying the immediate area and determining if and where hazardous materials are located.

3.3.1.4.3.3. Cold Zone. The cold zone is the outermost part of the site containing the Hot and Warm Zones and is considered non-contaminated. This is where the incident command post (ICP) and support equipment are located. Normal work clothes are acceptable in this area. The ICP should be situated upwind and upstream of the hot zone and should be easily accessible from highways or other transportation routes.

3.3.1.4.4. The size and distances between the hot zone, warm zone, cold zone and the ICP is based on incident-specific conditions, the materials involved, and the IC's judgment. The criteria in [Table 3.2](#), should be considered when establishing zone boundaries.

Table 3.2. Zone Boundary Criteria

Site physical and topographical features.
Weather conditions and wind direction.
Air contaminants field measurements.
Hazard/chemical air dispersion models.
Physical, chemical, toxicological, and other hazard characteristics present.
Cleanup activities.
Presence of adequate roads, power sources, water, and the potential for fire or explosion.

3.3.1.5. Establish Tactical Priorities. The IC takes actions to implement strategic objectives developed in previous steps. Tactical priorities address the following: rescue, responder life safety, incident stabilization, and property/ environmental conservation.

3.3.1.6. Determine and Communicate Protective Measures. The IC in conjunction with the EOC determines initial protective measures for personnel within the affected areas. The IC decides whether to evacuate personnel from the hazard area or to shelter-in-place within the cordon. Possible protective measures may also include the type and level of PPE, and type and location of contamination sensors. Evacuation or in-place sheltering augments PPE and protects personnel from hazards. If personnel evacuations are likely, temporary assembly areas must be identified and clearly marked.

3.3.1.7. Responder Protection. Emergency responders face serious hazards during the execution of their tasks. Protection can be afforded using various forms of personal protective technologies such as protective garments, respiratory protection, environmental monitoring equipment, communications equipment, and practices and protocols. Limitations in existing protective technologies as well as the continually

expanding roles of emergency responders, drives the need to improve understanding of the risks responders face and the protection needed.

3.3.1.7.1. **Determining Responder Protection.** Criteria for determining appropriate levels of responder protection include; performance of turnout gear (i.e., protective clothing); heat stress and exhaustion while working in turnout gear; necessity of respiratory protection; type of intra-responder communications needed; protection from explosive fragmentation and blast hazards; , and potential need for protection from chemical and biological hazards. Responder protection should be considered for all DRF members.

3.3.1.8. **Public Protection.** Lines of authority and communication must be established and routinely tested to ensure functionality. All AF personnel should be trained to notify the chain of command or proper authorities of a suspected incident. Typically, installations use an emergency network to notify fire, medical, and security forces response functions. Installation notification and warning system is described in AFI 10-2501. Public protection measures include notification, sheltering, and evacuation. The set of protective actions available to the IC to protect the responders and the population are: (1) withdrawal, (2) evacuation, (3) sheltering-in-place, or a combination of the three, each defined below

3.3.2. **Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) Response.** Within the US, its territories and possessions, the DHS coordinates response activities for federal agencies if the incident affects areas outside the installation boundaries. OCONUS, the DOS and COCOM will coordinate response activities. The initial response base coordinates directly with local officials until FEMA officials arrive. The applicable references are the NRF, NIMS, AFI 10-801, *Defense Support of Civilian Authorities*, and AFI 10-2501. When the effects of an incident on the installation extend to surrounding civilian communities, installation commanders provide DSCA under “imminently serious conditions”. In addition, a civilian community can request assistance for an incident that occurs off base under imminently serious conditions that include the need to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. The installation providing DSCA will report the incident to their MAJCOM as soon as possible when time does not allow the commander or installation to obtain prior approval from higher headquarters and when a civil authority requests assistance. Civil authorities’ requests must be in writing and must contain the scope and nature of the request. If a verbal request is given that requires an immediate response, the civil authorities must submit the request in writing as soon as possible. Applicable references are AFI 10-2501, AFI 10-801, the IEMP 10-2, the NRF, and NIMS.

3.4. Withdrawal or Evacuation. Withdrawal is a protective action used when responders are in imminent danger or when all response actions have been completed. Withdrawal may be immediate or planned. Persons who are in immediate danger of downwind hazards must be evacuated immediately. Move victims away from the scene and away from responders. Evacuation is a protective action to remove all personnel (military or civilian) from a threatened area to a safer location. It is typically regarded as the controlled relocation of people from an area of known danger or unacceptable risk to a safer area or to one in which the risk is considered acceptable.

3.4.1. Shelter-In-Place. Shelter-in-place is a protective action used during a major accident or natural disaster emergency condition to provide limited protection for otherwise un-protected personnel or casualties. Use in-place protection when evacuation may cause greater risk than remaining in place.

3.4.2. Decision Trees. Decision trees are useful decision support aids to implement specific major accident or natural disaster action goals. Each decision tree is supported by data from determining toxic corridor and downwind hazards. Prominent incident action goals include:

3.4.2.1. Minimize total population exposure, number of people exposed, and expected population risk. Avoid or minimize fatalities.

3.4.2.2. Reduce exposure below a threshold level (i.e., no deaths exposure) and reduce exposure to as low as reasonably achievable.

3.4.2.3. Goal Specific Decision Trees. The choice of goals is essentially an IC decision involving difficult tradeoffs. For example, the IC must decide whether it is better to: (1) minimize fatalities by having a large percentage of the population exposed to a sub-lethal but harmful level of chemical, or (2) minimize the number of people exposed by choosing to avoid exposure for most people, while allowing a few to be exposed to a potentially fatal level of the chemical. Refer to [Attachment 3](#), Protective Actions to Minimize Exposure and [Attachment 4](#), Protective Actions to Avoid Fatalities.

3.5. Command and Control (C2). C2 during major accidents or natural disasters starts at the incident command level and migrates to one of the installation operation centers as the situation matures. Dissemination of critical information is accomplished by a single integrated command structure within the DRF. Each C2 level is assigned responsibilities to ensure overall success of unit and installation mission priorities and management of emergency response and recovery operations. Each level also performs organization and installation support functions to enable safe management of incidents that threaten the primary mission of the installation. Actions are prompted from standard operating instructions, checklists and other written procedures.

3.5.1. Communications Principles. Installations must ensure effective communications systems exist to support incident management activities. Installations will comply with national interoperable communications standards. Such standards appropriate for the NIMS community are designated by the NIMS Integration Center. Air Force incident communications follow standards called for under the AFIMS.

3.5.1.1. An incident command manages communications at an incident using a common communications plan and an incident-based communications center established solely for use by the command, tactical, and support resources assigned to the incident. All entities involved in managing the incident should communicate using common terminology.

3.5.1.2. Effective communications, information management, and information and intelligence sharing are critical aspects of domestic incident management. Establishing and maintaining a COP and ensuring accessibility and interoperability are principal goals of communications and information management. A COP and systems interoperability provides the framework necessary to:

3.5.1.2.1. Formulate and disseminate indications and warnings.

3.5.1.2.2. Formulate, execute, and communicate operational decisions at an incident site as well as between incident management entities across jurisdictions and functional agencies.

3.5.1.2.3. Prepare for potential requirements and requests supporting incident management activities.

3.5.1.2.4. Develop and maintain overall awareness and understanding of an incident within and across jurisdictions.

3.5.2. Incident Commander (IC). The IC is responsible for all incident activities, including the development of strategies and tactics and the ordering and releasing of resources. The IC has overall authority and responsibility for conducting incident operations and is responsible for the management of all incident operations at the incident site. The IC must be fully qualified to manage the response. The IC recommends EOC activation based on the need for additional resources at the incident site. The IC is equivalent to the on-scene IC as defined in Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 1910.120(8), *Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response*.

3.5.3. Incident Command Post. The ICP is the field location where the primary tactical level, on-scene incident command functions are performed. It is where the IC develops objectives, communicates with subordinates, and coordinates activities between various agencies and organizations.

3.5.4. Disaster Response Force. The DRF includes the CP, CAT, EOC, ECC, IC, First Responders, Emergency Responders, UCCs, and specialized teams. DRF responsibilities are outlined in AFI 10-2501, including C2, contamination control, and shelter management.

3.5.4.1. Senior Military Representative. The installation commander can dispatch to, or the incident commander can request a senior military representative (SMR) at the incident site. The SMRs' primary purpose is to liaison with media and outside agencies during high visibility incidents or to support the incident commander. A SMR is not required at a vast majority of incidents. On scene, unless a transfer of Incident Command authority occurs, the existing IC maintains tactical control.

3.5.4.2. Crisis Action Team. The CAT directs strategic actions supporting the installation's mission via the CP. The CAT's primary focus during and after emergencies is mission continuation. Upon recommendation of the IC, the CAT directs activation of the EOC and recall of DRF elements/members when necessary. The CAT, through the CP sends and receives information and requests pertinent to emergencies.

3.5.4.2.1. The CAT oversees operation of the CP, EOC and some UCCs dedicated to the strategic decision actions (e.g. Maintenance Operations Center). The installation commander serves as the senior leader of the CAT. The CAT is an organization capable of devoting full-time attention to a crisis and is composed of pre-designated personnel, with possible representation from outside agencies as needed. The CAT is scalable and tailorable at the discretion of the commander based on the situation. It is intended to provide intense management of "limited" crises and works collaboratively with the EOC. Additional staff members or senior officers representing major tenant units or host-nation forces may also be present to support CAT operations. The CAT's primary functions are listed in **Table 3.3**.

3.5.4.2.2. The CP is the essential C2 node of the CAT. The CP provides communications with higher headquarters and civilian agencies, and is the focal point for installation-wide warning and notification operations. It is responsible for submitting request for forces (RFF) process outlined in AFMAN 10-2502.

Table 3.3. Crisis Action Team Primary Functions

Maintain the primary operational and support mission capabilities of the installation within the parameters of the incident.
Provide support to the CAT and EOC Director during EM operations.
Receive advice from the SJA regarding NDAs at off-base incidents.
Oversee CP, EOC, and UCCs.
Disseminate and collect information from the EOC.
Coordinate RFFs through the appropriate MAJCOM.
Coordinate required requests for external specialized teams such as State National Guard Civil Support Teams (CST), Hammer Adaptive Communications Element (ACE), Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), Army's Technical Escort Unit (TEU), and Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT) required for response through their respective MAJCOM or component commander.
Receive and disseminate orders and missions to ensure continuity of operational requirements.

3.5.4.3. Emergency Operations Center. The installation commander activates the EOC and designates the EOC Director to manage incident response resources. The installation commander provides guidance to the EOC Director on mission priorities. The installation commander approves, directs, and ensures IC or EOC requests for assistance from external specialized teams are forwarded through MAJCOM or DoD component commanders. During a major accident or natural disaster the EOC Director must consider initial response actions listed below:

3.5.4.3.1. Convene the EOC. Based on the magnitude of the incident, the EOC Director decides to recall the full EOC or to tailor the recall to include only those staff members and ESFs required to handle the incident. When there is doubt, it is easier to recall the full EOC staff and subsequently dismiss those members not required.

3.5.4.3.2. Establish Situational Awareness. The EOC Director must establish and maintain situational awareness. As the EOC staff convenes, it is the EOC Director's responsibility to ensure the entire staff is populating current incident information through the installation's COP.

3.5.4.3.3. Coordination of Information and Resources Supporting an Incident. Once the EOC is operational, the EOC Director ensures the EOC staff is responsive in coordinating information and resources the IC needs to facilitate effective response.

3.5.4.3.4. Keeping the Installation Commander Informed. The EOC Director must keep the installation commander fully informed on the incident response efforts throughout the operation through the installation's COP.

3.5.4.3.5. Executing checklists. The EOC must effectively communicate information and decisions. Communications may include checklists to activate required

resources, provide direction to evacuate or take cover, and accomplish specific emergency actions.

3.5.4.3.6. Maintaining information flow. Information flows from the individual and continues via the UCC to the EOC. The EOC also communicates with MAJCOM, area of responsibility (AOR) or Host Nation, through the installation commander to report any critical issues or incidents affecting the mission. Additionally, information flows from the EOC to UCCs to inform of any changes in the threat.

3.5.4.3.7. Ensuring the EOC staff develops messages, coordinates and consolidates communication inputs, and eliminates duplicate or contradictory information. During responses, the EOC receives reports from several sources. EOC processing of these reports includes organizing the reports; developing messages; and status updates relative to their source.

3.5.4.3.8. Directing unit commanders to activate their UCCs and initiate unit personnel accountability. The EOC Director determines which UCCs remain activated.

3.5.4.3.9. Determining specialized teams requirements. The IC can request any specialized team support needed for response operations. Upon request, the EOC will coordinate and activate the installation specialized teams. If the IC requires a specialized team not available locally, the request will go to the CAT. The CAT coordinates requests for external specialized teams using the RFF process through their respective MAJCOM. Examples of external specialized teams include: (1) State National Guard CST, (2) Hammer ACE, (3) US Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, (4) NEST, (5) Army's TEU, and (6) AFRAT.

3.5.4.3.10. Providing initial situation briefings. Upon initial recall, EOC personnel will report to the designated EOC and receive a situation briefing. The regarding the following topics should be considered for presentation: (1) description of the incident, (2) forces on-scene, (3), casualty estimate, (4), cordon size and location description, (5) protective measures being taken, and (6) tactical priorities, (7) weather considerations.

3.5.4.4. Emergency Communication Center. During an emergency, the ECC receives and processes emergency calls and dispatches sufficient emergency response forces, (e.g., fire emergency services, Security Forces, and Medical) to mitigate incidents as requested by the IC or the EOC once activated. The ECC supports the IC and emergency responders until the incident is completed. It also coordinates with CP, CAT, EOC, Base Defense Operations Center, and other UCC's when necessary.

3.5.4.4.1. The ECC supports the IC as the single dispatch point for initial emergency response. The ECC may dispatch other emergency responders until the EOC is activated.

3.5.4.4.2. The ECC is the gathering point for initial emergency response information and populates the tactical level COP. Upon activation of the EOC, the ECC will share installation COP information with the ESFs 4, *Fire Fighting*; 5, *Emergency Management*; and 13, *Public Safety and Security*. The ECC will continue to manage

routine, non-emergency operations for security forces and fire emergency services and in many cases will act as a UCC.

3.5.4.5. Unit Control Centers. UCCs provide support to the IC through the EOC (when activated) and to the installation commander as directed by the EOC. UCCs are the essential focal point within an organization during emergencies to maintain unit C2, relay information to and from unit personnel, provide expertise to the EOC or IC, and leverage unit resources to respond to and mitigate an incident. UCCs relay emergency information within the chain of command regarding major accidents and natural disasters. The UCCs also direct, monitor, report mitigation and preparedness activities, and maintain unit continuity for C2. UCCs are responsible for coordinating activities in preparation for, response to, and recovery from incidents. This includes gathering and disseminating information, accounting for personnel and resources, and performing initial damage assessment for their functional areas of responsibility.

3.5.4.5.1. UCCs are responsible for coordinating activities for incident response with the respective EOC members identified in AFMAN 10-2502. UCCs are responsible for personnel accountability, emergency notification, accomplishing unit-level preparation, resource management, recovery actions and providing any support required by the EOC or IC. Effective accountability during major accidents and natural disasters is essential to maintaining safety and continuing search and rescue efforts. All responders report according to procedures established by the IC to receive mission assignments.

3.5.4.5.2. To ensure efficient accountability of responders and personnel affected by the incident, tactical operations must be accomplished as outlined in the IAP. Additional UCC responsibilities are listed in **Table 3.4**.

Table 3.4. Unit Control Center Responsibilities

UCCs support the IC, EOC Director, unit commander and the installation commander.
UCCs serve as a communications conduit to unit personnel and provide a single point of contact at unit level for resources requested from the EOC/IC.
UCCs maintain an activities log utilizing ICS Form 214, status of unit activities, and a base map identifying unit areas of responsibility, structures, and shelters.
During major accidents and natural disasters, UCCs provide essential notification and dissemination of pertinent information to all personnel and support the execution of preparedness.
UCCs conduct prevention and mitigation activities at unit level to support the IEMP 10-2.
UCCs provide personnel, resources, supplies, and technical expertise to the DRF structure to conduct EM operations.

3.5.4.6. Local and State Government and Emergency Managers. Determine government agencies' notification requirements in advance. Notification must be made immediately to local government agencies when an emergency has the potential to affect public health and safety. Notify local civil authorities if the incident is off-installation or is a hazard to the civilian community. Also, notify affected local federal installations and facilities. Civil authorities are responsible for evacuation within their jurisdiction.

Chapter 4

RECOVERY

4.1. Recovery Overview. Recovering from a major accident or natural disaster often extends past the incident itself. The recovery phase may require days, weeks, or even years before an installation resumes normal operations. Responders develop a recovery plan for short-term and long-term goals for restoration of functions, services, resources, facilities, programs, and infrastructures. Responders analyze damage assessment reports and identify priorities to restore the installation's mission primary capabilities. During recovery, installations must also conduct and maintain installation security, provide support and assistance to personnel (to include fatality management and mortuary affairs), evaluate the incident, and identify lessons learned.

4.2. Recovery Operations. The recovery phase begins when emergency responders have completed the emergency response and lifesaving actions. The EOC, using the IEMP 10-2 and appropriate checklists, develops the installation recovery plan. The EOC Director, with approval from the installation commander, activates a Recovery Working Group and identifies a Recovery Operations Chief. The main goal of recovery is to re-establish installation mission and return to normal operations. There may be critical missions that must continue before or during the recovery phase. Installations must plan for those operations and develop procedures to remove or minimize the hazards in an area or at a facility in order to continue the critical mission.

4.2.1. Recovery Working Group (RWG). According to DoDI 6055.17, a RWG will be established early in the recovery phase. In most incidents, the RWG will be members of the EOC already activated and working response issues.

4.2.1.1. The RWG will support ESF 14's OPR and provide the EOC Director with an analysis of the damage, approximate number of personnel effected, short and long term shelter needs, resources that will be needed, and identify recovery funding availability.

4.2.1.1.1. The RWG will provide an analysis of short term impacts to the installation and provide recommended priorities. They will also analyze long-term recovery impacts to housing, installation operations, base employment issues, infrastructure, along with environmental and health impacts. They will also provide information where installation personnel can receive local recovery assistance through ESF 15.

4.2.1.1.2. The RWG should not duplicate on-going efforts within the CAT, EOC, federal/Non-Governmental Agencies or Host Nation. However, the RWG may determine the installation will require state or federal agency support. If needed, the RWG will advise the EOC Director and recommend CAT request external support.

4.2.1.1.3. Working with the ESF 14 OPR and the Recovery Operation Chief (ROC), develop an installation recovery plan that has a logical way ahead and coincides with the local and state/Host Nation recovery plans ensuring installation needs, jurisdictional responsibilities, and financial means are met. The plan will identify:

4.2.1.1.3.1. Health needs and fatality management.

4.2.1.1.3.2. Quick fix projects relating to mission continuation.

4.2.1.1.3.3. Critical facilities impacted by the incident.

- 4.2.1.1.3.4. Hazard mitigation processes.
- 4.2.1.1.3.5. Specialized team needs, if any.
- 4.2.1.1.3.6. Short and long term shelter, food, water, and transportation needs.
- 4.2.1.1.3.7. Short and long term resource needs (e.g. fuel, generators, heavy machinery, mobile lighting systems, traffic direction barriers)
- 4.2.1.1.3.8. Weather predictions effecting recovery operations
- 4.2.1.1.3.9. Long Term recovery options.
- 4.2.1.1.3.10. Financial planning considerations.

4.2.2. Recovery Operations Chief (ROC). Once the emergency response phase of the incident is completed and recovery operations begin, control of the incident site must be officially transferred from the IC to the ROC. The ROC is not referred to as an IC, but called the Recovery Operations Chief within the AF. The ROC must be a subject matter expert in the hazards or activities within the incident site. If it is a HAZMAT incident, the organization or individual that assumes control of the site must be knowledgeable of the hazards and recovery procedures. The person in charge of initiating actions to contain the hazard and clean up the site to restore the area to its condition before the incident should have an environmental engineering background and be familiar with HAZMAT clean-up requirements. If it is an aircraft incident, the ROC should be familiar with that aircraft or be a member of the interim aircraft mishap investigation team. The ROC:

- 4.2.2.1. Is selected by the EOC Director and approved by the installation commander.
- 4.2.2.2. Directs and coordinates recovery inspections and reports damage to the EOC Director by using “quick looks” and detailed assessments.
- 4.2.2.3. Decisions should focus installation resources on safety, preventing the further loss of combat power, maintaining or restoring installation integrity and security, restoring C2 over forces, restoring the primary mission, and supporting other forces.
- 4.2.2.4. Determines capabilities required to restore the force, units, facilities, and equipment to near-normal operating conditions major accident or natural disaster. These measures include decontamination operations and effective supply and sustainment of all response assets.
- 4.2.2.5. Reports actions necessary or in progress that must be included in the recovery plan. Actions must include: estimates of repair costs, and how repairs will be accomplished (in-house or contract); estimated date and time for completion of recovery efforts; confirmation of support teams required (e.g. Prime BEEF and RED HORSE teams; and an assessment of impacts to combat readiness on installation mobility forces.

4.2.3. Reporting. The EOC has requirements to communicate simultaneously certain information and decisions. Communications may include checklists to activate resources needed and accomplishment of specific actions associated with mission continuation.

- 4.2.3.1. AFI 10-2501 requires all EOC real world incident activations or events to be reported via email to AF/A7CXR using an ICS Form 213, *General Message* and through ACE-FD. The EOC Manager will provide the date, time frame (activated-deactivated),

reason with a short summary and email it to their MAJCOM Emergency Management Functional Manager and courtesy copy aflexr.workflow@pentagon.af.mil and afcesa.cex3333@tyndall.af.mil.

4.2.3.2. Information flow starts with individuals and continues upward to the UCC and finally to the EOC. The EOC must communicate with the MAJCOM through the installation commander to report critical shortages or incidents affecting the installation's mission capability.

4.2.3.3. Information flow from the EOC downward informs UCCs of the situation as it changes. This includes alert stages, natural disaster threats, or major accident information.

4.2.3.4. The EOC staff must coordinate and consolidate inputs to eliminate duplication of information.

4.2.3.5. The EOC receives reports from several sources during responses. Organized reports, messages, and status updates usually originate from base personnel or designated teams to include the CAT, ECC, UCCs, and first and emergency responders. The reports are funneled to UCCs and passed to the EOC.

4.2.4. Document Report Information. The EOC Director and EOC ESFs will maintain the necessary maps and status boards to show the key operations status in their areas of responsibility. In addition, they will maintain a permanent log of actions. This log of actions provides continuity between shift changes and assists in the preparation of daily situation reports (SITREP). A well-maintained and thorough log of actions provides the alternate EOC with periodic updates to enable a rapid resumption of operations if the primary EOC is damaged or destroyed; therefore, the log must be regularly copied and given to the alternate EOC. Detailed documentation is also required for continuity during the event, and for identifying lessons learned, reviewing planning documents, and updating execution checklists after an event. The EOC or CAT assimilates airbase information and forwards essential elements to joint force, theater, and MAJCOM command centers. The process is reversed for downward information flow.

4.2.4.1. Expense Accounting. The finance/administrative section is an essential part of the ICS. In addition to monitoring multiple sources of funds, the section chief tracks and reports to the IC the financial "burn rate" (the rate at which resources are being consumed) as the incident response progresses. This enables the IC to forecast the need for additional funds before operations are adversely affected. This is important if significant operational assets are contracted to the private sector. The section chief may also need to monitor cost expenditures to ensure statutory rules are met. Close coordination with the planning and logistics sections are also essential to ensure operational records are reconciled in a timely manner with financial documents. The Finance/Administrative section track incident response costs, procurements, time costs, compensation and claims. The finance/administrative section chief may organize the different incident response costs into specialized units.

4.2.4.2. Activity Logs. Activity logs detail unit and resource activity. These logs provide the basic reference from which to extract information for after-action reporting.

An activity log is initiated and maintained by each UCC, the EOC, CAT and the ECC. Completed logs are submitted for after-action reporting when directed.

4.2.4.2.1. UCCs, EOC, CAT and other reporting activities can use ICS Form 214, *Activity Log*, computer generated or installation approved activity logs. Additional ICS forms can be downloaded from the FEMA website: http://training.fema.gov/EMIweb/IS/ICSResource/ICSResCntr_forms.htm.

4.2.4.3. According to AFI 90-1601, *Air Force Lessons Learned Program*, the primary method for submitting observations and AFAARs is via AF-Joint Lessons Learned Information System (AF-JLLIS). Organizations or individuals should use this method whenever possible to submit individual lessons or AFAARs to their appropriate lessons learned office (normally the A9L for that MAJCOM or Numbered Air Force, or direct to HAF/A9L where appropriate. After actions report summary template is available on the AF-JLLIS website. When submitted via AF-JLLIS, AFAARs go to AF/A9L who in turn forwards them to the appropriate Numbered Air Force or MAJCOM for action. The intent is for inputs to be validated at the appropriate level of the submitting organization's chain of command—the lessons learned process is not intended to be used to bypass the chain of command when submitting lessons.

4.2.4.4. Conduct Damage Assessments. Damage assessment may include aircraft and support equipment, munitions and other real property. When necessary based on circumstances a claims processing location may be required. Damage assessments are completed in two phases. The first phase is a rapid field assessment of the area affected. The second phase is a detailed damage assessment of facilities and infrastructure. This section will only discuss the rapid field assessment during recovery actions.

4.2.4.4.1. Rapid Field Damage Assessment. A reliable rapid field damage assessment will increase the likelihood that recovery funds and other resources are properly prioritized and targeted. Damage assessment also provides policymakers with guidance for planning and implementing mitigation measures. The field-based assessment acts as ground-truth for larger more comprehensive assessments such as satellite-based assessments. The objective of rapid field damage assessments is to get a quick reliable overview of damage-related issues shown in **Table 4.2**.

Table 4.1. Rapid Field Damage Assessment Impact Issues

What facilities have been damaged?
Is there damage to the environment?
What is the damage to utilities and other supportive infrastructure?
Are there impacts to livelihood because of the damage?
What role, if any, did pre-incident mitigation measures play in reducing the impact of the incident, and under what circumstances and to what extent did this occur?

4.2.5. Mishap Response Plan. The Installation Safety Office and the EM Flight work together according to AFI 91-202, *The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program*, AFI 91-204, and AFI 10-2501 to implement the Mishap Response Plan. The Mishap Response Plan complements the IEMP 10-2 and provides guidance for rapid response to all flight, weapons, and ground mishaps occurring within the installation's area of responsibility. It is implemented at the conclusion of emergency response operations on-site as recovery actions

take place. This plan ensures timely assembly of the interim safety board to preserve evidence, compile data, and protect “privileged” and “for official use only” information for the Air Force Safety Investigation and subsequent safety report.

4.2.6. Maintaining site or installation security after a natural disaster may be very difficult, depending on the extent of damage to facilities and resources. Maintain Site Security. During the recovery phase following major accident or natural disaster, site security may be enforced by installation Security Forces (SFs) the owner-user of the resources affected by the incident or, in many cases, a combination of both. AFI 10-2501 identifies the roles and responsibilities of these agencies. AFI 31-101, identifies the policies and guidance in protecting installation resources. The IEMP 10-2 must identify any manpower and equipment shortfalls that would preclude installation personnel from adequately maintaining site security. Preparation before a natural disaster is the key to success. Those responsible for sit security and those responsible for developing the IEMP 10-2 and Integrated Defense Plan must work together to ensure mission success.

4.2.7. Provide Assistance to Personnel. Providing assistance to military members, civilian employees, and their families is extremely important. Airmen will be better able to concentrate on mission recovery if they know their families’ needs (medical, housing, legal, counseling, food, and clothing) are being met. The primary method of providing assistance is to activate an Emergency Family Assistance Control Center (EFACC). The EFACC will serve as the focal point for family assistance services. IEMP 10-2, Tab C, Appendix 7, Annex A, Family Assistance Checklist, provides guidelines for EFACC operations. The EFACC should operate in conjunction with the installation’s EOC and appropriate ESFs.

4.3. Mission Continuation. The installation commander will use operational risk management tools to decide which critical missions to continue.

4.4. DSCA in Recovery Operations. If a CAT receives a request for DSCA, then the notification of higher headquarters is completed as activities permit. Reporting will be accomplished in real time for all DSCA situations and will include OPREP-3, SITREP and narrative statement, as directed in AFI 10-801 and AFI 10-206. Additionally, installation commanders will notify the Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness office of immediate response requests according to DoDD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*. All requests for USAF resources must be validated by the lead federal agency first to be reimbursed for DSCA operations. In addition, the requests must comply with the legal and accounting requirements for loan, grant, or consumption of USAF resources for DSCA to ensure reimbursement under the Stafford Act. Military responders, who are called off-base for a response, must observe the jurisdictional rights of civilian authorities and private citizens.

4.5. Joint Task Force (JTF) Support. Per Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, “A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a CCDR, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing command JTF (CJTF) to accomplish missions with specific, limited objectives and which do not require overall centralized control of logistics. However, there may be situations where a CJTF may require directive authority for common support capabilities delegated by the CCDR. Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, identifies further support that may be required. The AF role in support will be directed from the Combatant Commander through the Air Component of that geographic combatant commander.

4.5.1. CONUS installations will also find further support requirements in USNORTHCOM Contingency Plans (CONPLAN) located on the NORAD-USNORTHCOM SIPRNET Portal: CONPLAN 3500-08, *CBRNE Consequence Management Operations*; CONPLAN 3501-08, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*; and CONPLAN 3505, *USNORTHCOM Nuclear Incident Response Plan*. When directed by the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense, USNORTHCOM will respond quickly and effectively to the requests of civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage. These plans provide military support according to applicable DoD directives and policy in line with national strategic policy.

4.5.1.1. Established USNORTHCOM Instruction 10-222, *USNORTHCOM Force Protection (FP) Mission and Antiterrorism (AT) Program*, 17 Feb 10.

4.5.1.1.1. Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR).

4.5.1.1.2. Joint Task Force North (JTF-N).

4.5.1.1.3. Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS).

4.5.1.2. JTF support requests will be handled through the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) assigned to the Joint Field Office (JFO). Possible support areas identified in the NRF for DoD that could include Air Force support are intelligence sharing, air operations, search and rescue and BSI.

4.5.1.2.1. An installation requiring additional DoD support, including Air Force support, will use the RFF process as outlined in AFMAN 10-2502. Installations will not arbitrarily send supporting forces unless the assisting installation falls within the authoritative jurisdiction for an Immediate Response. Lessons learned from 11 September 2001 and the Gulf of Mexico 2005 hurricane season enforced the need for all DSCA, civilian requests for assistance, and federal RFFs to be handled at the JTF, Defense Coordinating Officer, and Joint Field Office levels.

4.6. Restoration. Restoration of Lifelines is the capability to initiate and sustain restoration activities. Restoration of Lifelines addresses the immediate restoration of critical infrastructure. This includes facilitating the repair/replacement of infrastructure for oil, gas, electric, telecommunications, drinking water, wastewater, and transportation services. The restoration, in concert with mission continuation tasks, officially begins when the IC advises the EOC Director that the incident has been sufficiently controlled or terminated and the security of the situation is sufficient to begin restoration activity. Consequently, the EOC directs and coordinates recovery inspections and reports damage by using “quick looks” and detailed assessments.

4.6.1. Restoration decisions should focus installation resources on safety, preventing the further loss of combat power, maintaining or restoring installation integrity and security, restoring C2 over forces, restoring the primary mission, and supporting other forces.

4.6.2. Restoration capabilities include measures required to restore the force, units, facilities, and equipment to near-normal operating conditions after a major accident or natural disaster. These measures include decontamination operations, and the effective supply and sustainment of all response assets.

4.6.3. All restoration actions, in progress or intended, must be recorded and, be part of the recovery plan. From this record, several actions are enabled. Those actions include

estimating repair costs and determining whether the repairs will be accomplished in-house or by contract; estimating recovery date and time; ascertaining assistance required (for example, Prime Base Engineer Emergency Forces (BEEF) and Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineer (RED HORSE)squadrons; and assessing the impact on the combat readiness status of installation mobility forces.

Chapter 5

MITIGATION

5.1. Mitigation Overview. Mitigation includes activities designed to reduce or eliminate risks to persons or property or to lessen the actual or potential effects or consequences of an incident. Mitigation measures may be implemented prior to, during or after an incident. Mitigation measures are often developed according to lessons learned from prior incidents. These actions include: documenting information; accounting of expenses; tracking of events; after-action reporting; analyzing damage; implementing the recovery plan; documenting contamination; accounting for classified and hazardous materials; maintaining installation or site security; assisting personnel; providing response personnel stress debriefing; providing legal assistance for claims, witnesses, and victims; base populace actions; and issuing notifications and communications.

5.2. Preparing and Exercising Plans. Mitigation includes preparing and exercising critical elements of responses to major accidents and natural disasters. Exercises must include realistic scenarios to ensure installations are prepared for real-world responses. Exercises allow installations to develop procedures for personnel notification, recall and accountability, as well as resource protection and injury or damage reporting. Plans, such as the IEMP 10-2 and applicable checklists are validated through preparation and execution of exercises.

5.3. Protection of Critical Facilities. An installation-specific critical facility is any facility that is of such extraordinary mission importance that if damaged or destroyed would have serious debilitating effects on the ability of the installation to function as opposed to only facilities that are identified as critical infrastructure on the CI program list. Critical facility protection is focused on assessing the risks, reducing the loss, and ensuring the survival of identified critical facilities. Effective protection of critical facilities on an installation starts with the identification of those critical facilities. Identification of critical facilities is completed using the using the risk management process that is approved by the installation commander. Critical facilities protection criteria are identified in [Table 5.1](#)

5.3.1. Once critical facilities are identified, protective actions will be undertaken to remediate or mitigate the mission impact resulting from a major accident or natural disaster. Protective actions are threat-specific and could include: changes in TTPs, adding redundancy, selection of another facility, isolation, hardening, and guarding.

5.3.2. Threat-specific physical protection is provided through passive defense and hardening mitigation. Permanent and expedient hardening methods increase physical protection for personnel, critical facilities, and infrastructure. The combination of physical protection measures and threat-specific TTPs enables commanders to minimize mission degradation and provide the most effective response and recovery following a major accident or natural disaster incident.

5.3.3. Effective protection of critical facilities on an installation starts with the identification of those critical facilities. Identification of critical facilities is completed using the risk management process that is approved by the installation commander. Critical facilities protection criteria are identified in [Table 5.1](#)

Table 5.1. Critical Facilities Protection Criteria

What missions are supported by the installation/wing/unit?
Which of these missions are considered critical?
Are there home station or deployed missions?
Have both primary and secondary missions and taskings been considered?
What are the installation's strengths, capabilities, and shortfalls? Make separate lists and carefully note the limitations and shortfalls.
What supporting forces or outside agencies are available and what resources do they have?
Are support agreements in place outlining responsibilities between agencies?
How long before supporting forces or outside agencies can be on-scene?
What are the most probable incidents and their worst possible impact?
What are the installation's priorities for protecting its resources?
What resources are protected, where are they, and who controls them?
What resources require additional levels of protection?
Have personnel, critical facilities (communications/transportation nodes), and asset vulnerabilities (munitions, fuels, etc.) been considered?

Burton M. Fields, Lt Gen, USAF
DCS/Operations, Plans and Requirements

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AF—Air Force

AFAARS—Air Force After Actions Report System

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFIMS—Air Force Incident Management System

AFMAN—Air Force Manual

AFOSH—Air Force Occupational Safety and Health

AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive

AFRAT—Air Force Radiation Assessment Team

AFRIMS—Air Force Record Information Management System

AFSPC—Air Force Space Command

ARG—Accident Response Group

AT—Antiterrorism

BCE—Base Civil Engineer

BE—Bioenvironmental Engineer

BEEF—Base Engineer Emergency Force

BEPO—Base Emergency Preparedness Orientation

BSI—Base Support Installation

C2—Command and Control

CAT—Crisis Action Team

CBRN—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

CBRNE—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives

CCDR—Combatant Commander

CE—Civil Engineer

CFR—Code of Federal Regulations

CJTF—Combined Joint Task Force

CONUS—Continental United States

COP—Common Operational Picture

CP—Command Post

CRSP—Critical Render Safe Procedures

CST—Civil Support Team

DCO—Defense Coordinating Officer
DCS—Deputy Chief of Staff
DHS—Department of Homeland Security
DoD—Department of Defense
DOE—Department of Energy
DOI—Department of the Interior
DOJ—Department of Justice
DOS—Department of State
DRF—Disaster Response Force
DRU—Direct Reporting Unit
DSCA—Defense Support of Civil Authorities
DSF—Defense Support Force
DTRA—Defense Threat Reduction Agency
ECC—Emergency Communications Center
ECP—Entry Control Point
EFACC—Emergency Family Assistance Control Center
EM—Emergency Management
EMS—Emergency Medical Services
EOC—Emergency Operations Center
EOD—Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPA—Environmental Protection Agency
ESF—Emergency Support Function
FCO—Federal Coordinating Officer
FEMA—Federal Emergency Management Agency
FES—Fire Emergency Services
FOA—Field Operating Agency
Hammer ACE—Hammer Adaptive Communications Element
HAZMAT—Hazardous Materials
HN—Host Nation
HQ—Headquarters
HSPD—Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HURCON—Hurricane Condition

IAP—Incident Action Plans
IC—Incident Commander
ICP—Incident Command Post
ICS—Incident Command System
IEMP—Installation Emergency Management Plan
INWS—Installation Notification and Warning System
IPE—Individual Protective Equipment
ISB—Incident Support Bases
JFO—Joint Field Office
JP—Joint Publication
JTF—Joint Task Force
JTF—CS —Joint Task Force – Civil Support
MAA—Mutual Aid Agreement
MAJCOM—Major Command
MNS—Mass Notification System
MPH—Miles Per Hour
N/A—Not Applicable
NARP—Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures Manual
NASA—National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NDA—National Defense Area
NEST—Nuclear Emergency Search Team
NFPA—National Fire Protection Association
NIMS—National Incident Management System
NMCC—National Military Command Center
NNSA—National Nuclear Security Administration
NRF—National Response Framework
NWS—National Weather Service
OCONUS—Outside the Continental United States
OPREP—Operational Report
OSHA—Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OWS—Operational Weather Squadron
PA—Public Affairs

PHEO—Public Health Emergency Officer
PPE—Personal Protective Equipment
RED HORSE—Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineer
RFF—Request for Forces
ROC—Recovery Operations Chief
RSP—Render Safe Procedures
RTF—Response Task Force
SF—Security Forces
SITREP—Situation Report
SJA—Staff Judge Advocate
SMR—Senior Military Representative
SOFA—Status-of-Forces Agreement
TCCOR—Tropical Cyclone Conditions of Readiness
TEU—Technical Escort Unit
TIC—Toxic Industrial Chemical
TIM—Toxic Industrial Material
TTP—Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UCC—Unit Control Center
US—United States
USAF—United States Air Force
USC—United States Code
USNORTHCOM—United States Northern Command

Terms

Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program—The single, integrated Air Force program to coordinate and organize efforts to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from and mitigate the direct and indirect consequences of an emergency or attack. The primary missions of the Air Force EM program are to (1) save lives, (2) minimize the loss or degradation of resources and (3) continue, sustain and restore combat and combat support operational capability in an all-hazards physical threat environment at Air Force installations worldwide. The ancillary missions of the Air Force EM program are to support homeland security operations and to provide support to civil and host nation authorities according to DoD directives and through the appropriate Combatant Command. The Air Force EM program is managed by the Office of The Civil Engineer, Headquarters Air Force A7C

Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS)—A methodology designed to incorporate the requirements of HSPD-5, the NIMS, the NRF, and Office Secretary of Defense guidance

while preserving the unique military requirements of the expeditionary Air Force. AFIMS provides the Air Force with an incident management system that is consistent with the single, comprehensive approach to incident management. AFIMS provides the Air Force with the coordinating structures, processes, and protocols required to integrate its specific authorities into the collective framework of Federal departments and agencies for action to include mitigation, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities. It includes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident command system, EOCs, incident command, training, identification and management of resources, qualification and certification, and the collection, tracking and reporting of incident information and incident resources. The AFIMS methodology is incorporated into current operating practices through revised instructions and manuals, training products, and exercise and evaluation tools.

Area of Responsibility—The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations.

Base Support Installation (BSI)—A Department of Defense Service or agency installation within the United States and its possessions and territories tasked to serve as a base for military forces engaged in either homeland defense or civil support operations. Also called BSI. (JP 3-28)

Broken Arrow—Flag word for a nuclear weapons accident. See entry for Nuclear Weapons Accident.

Civil Disturbance—Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and order.

Cold Zone—This area contains hot and warm zones, the incident command post, and such other support functions as are deemed necessary to control the incident. The zone encompassing the warm zone, used to carry out all other support functions of the incident. Workers in the cold zone are not required to wear personal protective clothing because the zone is considered safe. The incident command post and IC staging area and the triage or treatment area are located within the cold zone.

Command and Control (C2)—The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.

Command Post (CP)—A unit's or sub-unit's headquarters where the commander and the staff perform their activities.

Common Operating Picture (COP)—A broad view of the overall situation as reflected by situation reports, aerial photography and other information or intelligence.

Continuity of Operations—The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of functions, tasks or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in carrying out the national military strategy. It includes the functions and duties of the commander, as well as the supporting functions and duties performed by the staff and others acting under the authority and direction of the commander.

Control Zones—As defined in the Emergency Response Guidebook 2008, control zones are designated areas at dangerous goods incidents, based on safety and the degree of hazard. Many terms are used to describe control zones; however, in the Emergency Response Guidebook, these

zones are defined as (1) Hot/exclusion (Red) restricted zone, (2) Warm contamination reduction (Yellow) limited access zone, and (3) Cold support (Green) clean zone. (EPA Standard Operating Safety Guidelines, OSHA 29 CFR 1910.120, NFPA 472)

Crisis Action Team—A staff formed by the commander to plan, direct, and coordinate forces in response to contingencies, crises, natural/manmade disasters, or wartime situations. The CAT develops courses of action and executes the commander's and higher headquarters directives. The composition and function of the CAT is largely mission or situation driven and therefore a MAJCOM or unit commander prerogative.

Critical Infrastructures—Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, national public health or safety or any combination of those matters.

Decontamination—The physical or chemical process of reducing and preventing the spread of contaminants from persons and equipment used at HAZMAT incident.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)—Refers to DoD support, including Federal military forces, DoD civilians and DoD contractor personnel and DoD agencies and components, for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities.

Demobilization—The orderly, safe, and efficient withdrawal of incident resources.

Disaster Response Force (DRF)—The USAF base level organization that responds to disasters or accidents, establishing C2 and supporting incident operations.

Dispersal—Relocation of forces for the purpose of increasing survivability.

DoD Resources—Military and civilian personnel, including National Guard members and Reservists of the Military Services, and facilities, equipment, supplies and services owned by, controlled by or under the jurisdiction of a DoD component.

Domestic Emergencies—Emergencies affecting the public welfare and occurring within the 50 States, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US possessions and territories or any political subdivision thereof, as a result of enemy attack, insurrection, civil disturbance, earthquake, fire, flood or other public disasters or equivalent emergencies that endanger life and property or disrupt the usual process of government. The term domestic emergency includes any or all the emergency conditions defined below:

- a. Civil defense emergency. A domestic emergency incident situation resulting from devastation created by an enemy attack and requiring emergency operations during and following that attack. It may be proclaimed by appropriate authority in anticipation of an attack.
- b. Civil disturbances. Riots, acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages or other disorders prejudicial to public law and order. The term civil disturbance includes all domestic conditions requiring or likely to require the use of Federal Armed Forces pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 15 of Title 10, USC.
- c. Major incident. Any flood, fire, hurricane, tornado, earthquake or other catastrophe which, in the determination of the President, is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant incident assistance by the Federal Government under Public Law 606, 91st Congress (42 USC 58) to supplement the efforts and available resources of State and local governments in alleviating the damage, hardship or suffering caused thereby.

d. Natural Disaster. All domestic emergencies except those created as a result of enemy attack or civil disturbance.

Emergency Operations Center (EOC)—The physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to support attack response and incident management activities normally takes place. An EOC may be a temporary facility or may be located in a more central or permanently established facility, perhaps at a higher level of organization within a jurisdiction. EOCs may be organized by major functional disciplines such as fire, security forces and medical services, by jurisdiction such as Federal, State, regional, county, city, tribal or a combination thereof.

Emergency Responders—The response elements of a DRF that deploy to the incident scene after the first responders to expand C2 and perform support functions. Emergency Responders include follow-on elements such as firefighters, security forces and emergency medical technicians, as well as Emergency Management personnel, EOD personnel, physicians, nurses, medical treatment providers at medical treatment facilities, public health officers, bioenvironmental engineering and mortuary affairs personnel. Not all emergency responders are first responders, but all first responders are emergency responders. Emergency responders are not assigned as augmentees or to additional duties that will conflict with their emergency duties.

Emergency Support Function (ESF)—ESFs are groupings of capabilities into an organizational structure that provides the support, resources, program implementation and services that are most likely to be needed during an incident. ESFs also serve as the primary operational-level mechanism that provides support during an incident.

Evacuation—Organized, phased and supervised withdrawal, dispersal or removal of persons from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas, and their reception and care in safe areas.

Facility—A real property entity consisting of one or more of the following: a building, a structure, a utility system, pavement and underlying land.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—The Federal agency tasked to establish Federal policies for and coordinate civil defense and civil emergency planning, management, mitigation and assistance functions of Executive agencies.

First Responders—First Responders, as defined by AFIMS, are members of the DRF elements that deploy immediately to the disaster scene to provide initial C2, to save lives, and to suppress and control hazards. Firefighters, law enforcement and security personnel, key emergency medical personnel, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) during Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and nuclear accident response operations provide the initial, immediate response to major accidents, natural disasters, and CBRN incidents. All First Responders are Emergency Responders, but not all Emergency Responders are First Responder. First Responder duties have priority over other assigned duties.

Hammer Adaptive Communications Element (Hammer ACE)—Air Force Hammer ACE consists of a rapid deployment team of technicians equipped with advanced technology communications equipment. This team can deploy within 3 hours of notification and can establish communications within 1 hour of arrival on-site. Current capabilities include a secure satellite system for voice communications, air-to-ground communications and a privacy feature hand-held radio network with repeater/base station for local communications. The secure satellite link can interface with defense switched network, commercial telephone systems

through Robins ARB, GA. All Hammer ACE equipment is capable of being battery operated and enough batteries are deployed to sustain a 72-hour operation. A follow-on deployment (generators or additional batteries) is required to sustain operation beyond 72 hours.

Hazardous Material (HAZMAT)—Any material that is flammable, corrosive, an oxidizing agent, explosive, toxic, poisonous, etiological, radioactive, nuclear, unduly magnetic, a chemical agent, biological research material, compressed gases or any other material that, because of its quantity, properties or packaging, may endanger life or property.

High—Yield Explosive—Any conventional weapon or device that is capable of a high order of destruction or disruption or of being used to kill or injure large numbers of people.

Homeland Security—Active and passive measures taken to protect the area, population and infrastructure of the United States, its possessions and territories by deterring, defending against and mitigating the effects of threats, disasters and attacks; supporting civil authorities in incident management; and helping to ensure the availability, integrity, survivability and adequacy of critical national assets.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive—5 (HSPD-5)—A Presidential directive issued on February 28, 2003 and intended to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive NIMS.

Host Nation (HN)—A nation that receives the forces or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners or North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces to be located on, to operate in or to transit through its territory

Hot Zone—The area immediately surrounding a HAZMAT incident, extending far enough to prevent adverse effects from HAZMAT releases to personnel outside the zone.

Identification—The determination of which CBRNE material or pathogen is present.

Incident—An occurrence or event, natural or human caused, that requires an emergency response to protect life or property. Incidents can, for example, include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, wildland and urban fires, floods, HAZMAT spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, war-related disasters, public health and medical emergencies and other occurrences requiring an emergency response.

Incident Action Plan (IAP)—An oral or written plan containing general objectives reflecting the overall strategy for managing an incident. It may include the identification of operational resources and assignments. It may also include attachments that provide direction and important information for management of the incident during one or more operational periods.

Incident Command Post (ICP)—The field location at which the primary tactical-level, on-scene incident command functions are performed. The ICP may be collocated with the incident base or other incident facilities and is normally identified by a green rotating or flashing light.

Incident Commander (IC)—The command function is directed by the IC, who is the person in charge at the incident and who must be fully qualified to manage the response. Major responsibilities for the IC include: performing command activities, such as establishing command; protecting life and property; controlling personnel and equipment resources; maintaining accountability for responder and public safety, as well as for task accomplishment;

establishing and maintaining an effective liaison with outside agencies and organizations, including the EOC, when it is activated.

Incident Command System (ICS)—ICS is the model tool for command, control and coordination of a response and provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual agencies as they work toward the common goal of stabilizing the incident and protecting life, property and the environment. ICS uses principles that have been proven to improve efficiency and effectiveness in a business setting and applies the principles to emergency response.

Incident Support Base (ISB)—A Department of Defense Service or agency installation within the United States and its possessions and territories tasked to serve as a support base for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) incident response, upon SECDEF approval

Individual Protective Equipment (IPE)— In chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear warfare, the personal clothing and equipment required to protect an individual from chemical, biological and radiological hazards and some nuclear.

Initial Detection—Procedures performed by emergency responders to determine the presence of HAZMAT. Initial detection is a field test using detection equipment to provide a reasonable basis for acceptance of the presence of hazards.

Initial Response—Resources initially committed to an incident.

Installation Commander—The individual responsible for all operations performed by an installation.

Joint Force—A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander

Limiting Factor—A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment. Illustrative examples are transportation network deficiencies, lack of in-place facilities, malpositioned forces or material, extreme climatic conditions, distance, transit or overflight rights or political conditions.

Local Emergency Planning Committee—A committee established by the State commission for each emergency planning district to plan and coordinate local emergency response actions

Major Accident—An incident involving DoD materiel or DoD activities that is serious enough to warrant response by the installation DRF. It differs from the minor day-to-day emergencies and incidents that installation agencies typically handle.

Major Disaster—The Stafford Act defines any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm or drought) or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major incident assistance under this act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments and incident relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship or suffering caused thereby.

Mitigation—Activities designed to reduce or eliminate risks to persons or property or to lessen the actual or potential effects or consequences of an incident. Mitigation measures may be implemented prior to, during or after an incident. Mitigation measures are often developed according to lessons learned from prior incidents. Mitigation involves ongoing actions to reduce

exposure to, probability of, or potential loss from hazards. Measures may include zoning and building codes, floodplain buyouts and analysis of hazard-related data to determine where it is safe to build or locate temporary facilities. Mitigation can include efforts to educate governments, businesses and the public on measures they can take to reduce loss and injury

Mutual Aid Agreement (MAA)—Written agreement between agencies, organizations or jurisdictions that they will assist one another on request by furnishing personnel, equipment or expertise in a specified manner. Reciprocal assistance by local government and an installation for emergency services under a prearranged plan. Mutual aid is synonymous with "mutual assistance", "outside aid", "memorandums of understanding", "memorandums of agreement", "letters of agreement", "cooperative assistant agreement", "intergovernmental compacts", or other similar agreements, written or verbal, that constitute an agreed reciprocal assistance plan for emergency services for sharing purposes. MAAs between entities are an effective means to obtain resources and should be developed whenever possible. MAAs should be in writing, be reviewed by legal counsel and be signed by a responsible official.

National Defense Area (NDA)—An area established on non-Federal lands located within the United States or its possessions or territories for the purpose of safeguarding classified defense information or protecting DoD equipment or material. Establishment of a national defense area temporarily places such non-Federal lands under the effective control of the DoD and results only from an emergency event. The senior DoD representative at the scene will define the boundary, mark it with a physical barrier and post warning signs. The landowner's consent and cooperation will be obtained whenever possible; however, military necessity will dictate the final decision regarding location, shape and size of the national defense area.

National Incident Management System (NIMS)—A system mandated by HSPD-5 that provides a consistent, nationwide approach for Federal, State, local and tribal governments; the private sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size or complexity. To provide for interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, local and tribal capabilities, the NIMS includes a core set of concepts, principles and terminology. HSPD-5 identifies these as the ICS; multiagency coordination systems; training; identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualification and certification; and the collection, tracking and reporting of incident information and incident resources.

Natural Disaster—An emergency posing significant danger to life and property that results from a natural cause.

Nuclear Weapon Accident—(code term is BROKEN ARROW) An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons or nuclear components that results in any of the following:

- a. **Accidental or unauthorized launching, firing or use by US forces or US**—supported Allied forces of a nuclear-capable weapons system.
- b. An accidental, unauthorized or unexplained nuclear detonation.
- c. **Non**—nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.
- d. Radioactive contamination.
- e. Jettisoning of a nuclear weapon or nuclear component.

f. Public hazard, actual or perceived.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)—Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is equipment designed to protect individuals exposed to hazards from injury or illness in non-military unique occupational environments where OSHA or applicable AFOSH standards apply, including emergency response to CBRNE incidents in the United States.

Preparedness—The range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. Preparedness is a continuous process. Preparedness involves efforts at all levels of government and between government and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required resources. Within AFIMS, preparedness is operationally focused on establishing guidelines, protocols, and standards for planning, training and exercises, personnel qualification and certification, equipment certification, and publication management.

Prevention—Actions to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from occurring. Prevention involves actions to protect lives and property. It involves applying intelligence and other information to a range of activities that may include such countermeasures as deterrence operations; heightened inspections; improved surveillance and security operations; investigations to determine the full nature and source of the threat; public health and agricultural surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation or quarantine; and, as appropriate, specific law enforcement operations aimed at deterring, preempting, interdicting or disrupting illegal activity and apprehending potential perpetrators and bringing them to justice.

Protective Clothing—Clothing especially designed, fabricated, or treated to protect personnel against hazards caused by extreme changes in physical environment, dangerous working conditions, or enemy action.

Public Health Emergency Officer (PHEO)—The PHEO will be a Medical Corps officer with experience in preventive medicine or emergency response such as the assigned Chief of Aerospace Medicine or Chief of Medical Services. Every Installation Commander will designate, in writing, the installation PHEO and an alternate PHEO to provide EM recommendations (to include medical or public health recommendations) in response to public health emergencies.

Public Health Emergency Officer (PHEO)—The PHEO will be a Medical Corps officer with experience in preventive medicine or emergency response such as the assigned Chief of Aerospace Medicine or Chief of Medical Services. Every Installation Commander will designate, in writing, the installation PHEO and an alternate PHEO to provide EM recommendations (to include medical or public health recommendations) in response to public health emergencies.

Radiation—Alpha particles, beta particles, gamma rays, x-rays, neutrons, high-speed electrons, high-speed protons, and other ionizing particles.

Radioactive Material—Material whose nuclei, because of their unstable nature, decay by emission of ionizing radiation. The radiation emitted may be alpha or beta particles, gamma or X-rays, or neutrons

Recovery—The development, coordination and execution of service- and site-restoration plans for impacted communities and the reconstitution of government operations and services through individual, private-sector, nongovernmental and public assistance programs that: identify needs and define resources; provide housing and promote restoration; address long-term care and treatment of affected persons; implement additional measures for community restoration; incorporate mitigation measures and techniques, as feasible; evaluate the incident to identify lessons learned; and develop initiatives to mitigate the effects of future incidents.

Recovery Operations Chief—The Recovery Operations Chief must be a subject matter expert in the hazards or activities within the incident site. If it is a HAZMAT incident, the organization or individual that assumes control of the site must be knowledgeable of the hazards and recovery procedures. The person in charge of that work should have an environmental engineering background and be familiar with HAZMAT clean-up requirements. If it is an aircraft incident, the recovery operations chief should be familiar with that aircraft or be a member of the interim aircraft mishap investigation team. The EOC Director should select the individual that will be in charge of the site

Recovery Working Group—A task-organized team of personnel established early in the recovery phase for every emergency where, in the judgment of the Commander, recovery operations require coordination. If applicable, the RWG coordinates with local and regional authorities on the restoration of infrastructure. The working group is focused on the evaluation, prioritization, and coordination of recovery requirements

Response—Activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident. Response includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property and meet basic human needs. Response also includes the execution of emergency operations plans and of incident mitigation activities designed to limit the loss of life, personal injury, property damage and other unfavorable outcomes. As indicated by the situation, response activities include: applying intelligence and other information to lessen the effects or consequences of an incident; increased security operations; continuing investigations into the nature and source of the threat; ongoing public health and agricultural surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation or quarantine; and specific law enforcement operations aimed at preempting, interdicting or disrupting illegal activity and apprehending actual perpetrators and bringing them to justice.

Response Task Force (RTF)—A DoD response force appropriately staffed, trained and equipped to coordinate actions necessary to control and recover from a radiological incident. The specific purpose of the RTF is to recover weapons and provide radiological incident assistance. RTFs are not structured to respond to terrorist use of CBRNE or radiological dirty bombs

Severe weather—Any weather phenomena that pose a hazard to life or property and necessitates issuance of a special weather statement, weather watch, and/or weather warning to designated installation agencies from an Air Force Weather unit (i.e., regionally responsible OWS or installation Weather Flight).

Special Weather Statement—A weather product that provides long-range, advanced notice of widespread hazardous weather conditions offering potential to affect military installation(s) in a specified geographic area. Special Weather Statements are provided for USAF installations by USAF OWSs to improve situational awareness and facilitate risk management activities by military decision makers.

Senior Military Representative—The installation commander can dispatch to, or the incident commander can request a senior military representative (SMR) at the incident site. The SMRs' primary purpose is to liaise with media and outside agencies during high visibility incidents or to support the incident commander. A SMR is not required at a vast majority of incidents. On scene, unless a transfer of Incident Command authority occurs, the existing IC maintains tactical control.

Status—of-Forces Agreement (SOFA)—An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. Also called SOFA. See also civil affairs agreement.

Technical Decontamination—The physical or chemical process of deliberate decontamination to achieve a thorough cleansing and removal of contaminants from personnel and equipment. Also known as thorough or nine-step process decontamination. **Note:** Unlike gross or mass decontamination, EPA does require runoff control for this type of process.

Threat.—An indication of possible violence, harm or danger.

Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TIC)—Any chemicals manufactured, used, transported, or stored by industrial, medical, or commercial processes. For example: pesticides, petrochemicals, fertilizers, corrosives, or poisons.

Toxic Industrial Materials (TIM)—All toxic industrial materials (TIMs) manufactured, stored, transported, used in industrial or commercial processes. It includes toxic industrial chemicals, toxic industrial radiologicals, and toxic industrial biologicals. TIMs produce toxic impacts to personnel, materials, and infrastructure.

Vulnerability—A vulnerability may be defined as any of the following:

1. The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action by any means through which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to fight diminished.
2. The characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite degradation (incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (manmade) hostile environment.
3. In information operations, a weakness in information system security design, procedures, implementation or internal controls that could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to information systems.

Vulnerability Assessment— A DOD, command or unit-level evaluation (assessment) to determine the vulnerability of terrorist attack to an installation, unit, exercise, port, ship, residence, facility or other site.


Warm Zone—The area where personnel, equipment decontamination, and hot zone support takes place. It includes control points for the access corridor and thus assists in reducing the spread of contamination.

Weather Warning—a short-range, installation-specific weather product/notice alerting designated agencies to the imminent or actual occurrence of weather conditions of such intensity as to pose a hazard to life or property for which the agency must take immediate protective actions. Weather Warnings are issued for a USAF installation by a regionally responsible USAF OWS or the installation USAF Weather Flight. The National Weather Service (NWS) issues weather warnings for the surrounding civilian populace outside of the installation.

Weather Watch—a medium-range, installation-specific weather product that provides advanced notice to designated installation agencies of potential for weather conditions of such intensity as to pose a hazard to life or property. The weather watch can be thought of as a "heads up", at which time agencies should begin to consider implementing required protective actions should a subsequent weather warning be issued. Weather Watches are issued for a USAF installation by a USAF OWS or the installation USAF Weather Flight. The National Weather Service (NWS) issues weather watches for the surrounding civilian populace outside of the installation.

Attachment 2
TYPICAL INCIDENT SITE SETUP

Figure A2.1. Typical Incident Site Setup with Hazardous Material




NOTES:		
ECP - Entry Control Point	ARSA - Additional Resources Staging Area	▣ - Incident Command Post
TCP - Traffic Control Point		Ⓢ - Staging Area

This graphic depicts the typical incident site setup and is not to scale. During actual hazardous materials response the Hot, Warm, and Cold Zone distance parameters are determined based upon the hazard.

Attachment 3

PROTECTIVE ACTIONS TO MINIMIZE EXPOSURE


Figure A3.1. Protective Actions to Minimize Exposure



Attachment 4

PROTECTIVE ACTIONS TO AVOID FATALITIES

Figure A4.1. Protective Actions to Avoid Fatalities



Attachment 5

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT ON-SCENE SETUP

Figure A5.1. Nuclear Weapons Accident On-Scene Setup

