BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

18 September 2013

AIR FORCE TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

3-4.7

CONTINGENCY RESPONSE

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AIR FORCE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES 3-4.7

18 September 2013

Tactical Doctrine

CONTINGENCY RESPONSE

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PURPOSE: The purpose of this publication is to provide tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) used to open the airbase, jointly open ports, and operate worldwide where little or no mobility operations support exists.

APPLICATION: This publication applies to the Air Force Active, Reserve, and Air National Guard personnel performing the Contingency Response Mission. TTP and TTP(I) are not directive. IAW AFI 33-360, "Complying with publications in this category is expected, but not mandatory." The tactics, techniques, and procedures in this document are still authoritative; deviations require sound judgment and careful consideration. In cases where this publication and AFIs conflict, the applicable AFI will take precedence. To submit changes, conflicts, suggestions, or recommendations use the AF IMT 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication,* and e-mail it to the OPR organizational in-box (422jts.ttp@us.af.mil). This publication may be supplemented at any level, but all direct supplements must be routed to the OPR of this publication for coordination prior to certification and approval. Request for waivers are not required for any portion of this publication. The following joint publication definitions apply:

Tactics-The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.(JP 1-02)

Techniques-Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks.(JP 1-02)

Procedures-Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks.(JP 1-02)

SCOPE: This publication will:

1. Supplement established doctrine and TTP.

2. Provide reference material to assist ground focused expeditionary combat support in planning and coordinating tactical operations.

3. Apply to all personnel planning and conducting Air Force operations including commanders, planners, ground forces, special operations forces (SOF), and aviation personnel.

4. Promote an understanding of the complexities of contingency response operations emphasizing employment of personnel and capabilities.

5. Incorporate TTP, lessons learned, information from ongoing combat operations and training exercises applicable to contingency response forces.

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

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Major General, USAF
Commander

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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW

1.1 Contingency Response Force (CRF) Doctrine, Organization and Missions. The CRF provides "first responder" contingency response (CR) forces to the joint force commander regardless of service. CRFs may be composed of a scalable contingency response group (CRG), contingency response element (CRE) and contingency response team (CRT), with two basic mission sets. These mission sets are contingency response and mobility advisory missions. Contingency response missions include the air component to the Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO), Air Base Opening (ABO), and support to the Global Air Mobility Support System (GAMSS). A CRF may also have mobility advisory roles that include air mobility division (AMD) augmentation or stand-alone capability, partner service mobility liaisons, and building partnership capacity. CRGs in the US Air Forces Europe (USAFE) and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) theaters have the contingency response missions of air base opening and support to the GAMSS, as well as security forces, construction capabilities, and support to air mobility missions. CRFs may also be tasked with defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) and noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) missions.

1.2 CRF Organizations.

1.2.1 Contingency Response Wing (CRW). The in-garrison structure of continental United States (CONUS) based CRWs include six groups split between two operating locations: Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst (JB-MDL), NJ and Travis Air Force Base, CA. Each operating location has one contingency operations support group (COSG) and two CRGs. The Wing Headquarters is physically located at JB-MDL, though many wing functions and responsibilities are split between the two or may exist at both locations. Deployable CRF units will not normally be utilized in a sustainment role and do not normally change of operational control (CHOP) without the Secretary of Defense's (SecDef) written approval.

1.2.1.1 Wing Staff. The Contingency Response Wing staff provides personnel who manage wing processes and provide support to deployable wing elements. Led by a director of staff, the wing staff can be comprised of various support elements including wing operations, plans and programs, public affairs, judge advocate (JA), manpower, safety, financial management, and standardization & evaluation as well as other functions as directed by the wing commander.

1.2.1.2 Contingency Operations Support Group. Ensures mission-ready command and control, aerial port, aircraft maintenance projection and sustainment of combat forces worldwide, and the ability to rapidly establish airbase lodgments and extend the Air Mobility Command en route support infrastructure. In addition, the group is responsible for theater employment planning for in-theater air operations usually by providing augmentation to the theater air operations center (AOC), thus providing a deployable Air Mobility Command (AMC) capability. The COSG also supplies air mobility liaison officers to seven Army and Marine Division Headquarters.

1.2.1.3 Contingency Response Group. The CRG is both an in-garrison organization and deployable unit. The in-garrison organization consists of two squadrons, a global mobility squadron (GMS) and a global mobility readiness squadron (GMRS). The GMS includes

the operational and combat support mission elements of the aerial port, command and control (C2), and quick-turn aircraft maintenance, while the GMRS includes selected mission elements of agile combat support such as security forces and other Base Operating Support and Integration (BOS-I) support roles.

1.2.1.3.1 The deployable CRG is normally tasked to open and/or operate airfields or airbases after seizure, or whenever needed to assess, open, and initially operate airbases in support of the Air Force component of the combatant command (COCOM), although operational control (OPCON) will usually not transfer. A deployed CRG consists of approximately 113 personnel. The CRG may initially represent the senior Air Force leadership and for this reason, the CRG is normally commanded by an O-6.

1.2.1.3.2 The groups consist of a standardized force module dedicated to the base opening task. This module includes a tailored selection of all forces needed after seizure, or handoff from seizure forces, to establish initial air mobility C2, and operate the flow of air mobility in and out of that airfield. CRGs may open an airfield for the Air Force, another service or even a coalition partner. To ensure continuity of operations, CRGs should coordinate planning and agreements with the theater commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR)/joint force air component commander (JFACC) staff.

1.2.2 PACAF and USAFE-Specific CRF.

1.2.2.1 PACAF Contingency Response Group. The PACAF organization is somewhat different than that of an AMC controlled CRG. The PACAF CRG has four squadrons and a theater staff to support wing type functions inside of the CRG. The four squadrons include a rapid engineers deployable heavy operations repair squadron engineers (RED HORSE), security forces, mobility readiness, and a combat communication squadron. The security forces squadron is responsible for in-theater SF training (e.g., Fly Away Security Teams, Commando Warrior, Military Working Dog) as well as containing the force protection element for the CRG. The mobility readiness squadron is similar to AMC's GMS; however, there are few aerial port and aircraft maintenance personnel directly assigned. Therefore, these positions may require augmentation from other PACAF units. The combat communication squadron provides in-theater deployable communications for all of PACAF. The RED HORSE squadron provides the theater construction capability and is associated with two Air National Guard and USAF Reserve RED HORSE units.

1.2.2.2 USAFE Contingency Response Group. The USAFE CRG is both an in-garrison organization and deployable unit. The in-garrison organization consists of three squadrons, an air mobility squadron, a security forces squadron, and a construction and training squadron. The air mobility squadron includes the operational and combat support mission elements of the aerial port, C2, and quick-turn maintenance, with the security forces squadron and construction and training squadron providing elements of agile combat support such as security forces and civil engineering beddown support. The deployable size, organization, and mission is consistent with other Air Force (AF) CRGs.

1.2.3 USAF Reserve CRF. Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) contingency response forces are organized into airlift control flights (ALCF) at larger airlift wings (Dover, Westover, Charleston, Lackland, and March). All are unit equipped and each has a number of 7E1XX

unit type codes (UTC) including 7E1AE CRF leadership packages with associated communication and base operating support (BOS) capability. Full CRG equivalent capability may be obtained by tasking other mission support elements from those wings (e.g., aerial port, maintenance, security forces). AFRC CRF units have an active affiliation and exercise program utilizing organic funding and airlift; and are available for tasking with a 36-hour response time.

1.2.4 National Guard Bureau (NGB). NGB CRFs are tasked differently according to the level of tasking authority. For Title 10 USC, *Armed Forces,* tasking, the CRF is tasked similarly to AMC controlled CRFs in coordination with the NGB. However, under Title 32 USC, *National Guard*, CRFs are tasked from the state Governor through the Adjutant General to the tasked unit.

1.2.5 Contingency Response Element. A CRE is a temporary deployed organization established at deployed locations where air mobility operational support is non-existent or insufficient. The core capability sets that define a CRE are C2, communications, aerial port, and aircraft maintenance. A CRE normally provides capability to support a working maximum of two aircraft on the ground for 24 hours. The CRT is led by an officer trained within the unit and certified by the commander. Locations range from fixed, en-route, or locations where C2 and air mobility support are required but are either inadequate or non-existent. The combination of UTC and the capability of the airfield define the deployed organization's complete capability. The maximum aircraft on ground (MOG) is determined by the most limiting factor. They provide minimum essential onload, offload, and en route aircraft mission support during deployment, employment, and redeployment operations.

1.2.6 Contingency Response Team. A CRT performs the same functions as a CRE, but on a smaller scale. The CRT is led by an enlisted supervisor (7-level or above) trained within the unit and certified by the commander. A CRT is capable of supporting a MOG of 1 for 12 hours a day, but will maintain 24-hour C2 coverage. The combination of UTCs and the capability of the airfield define the deployed organization's complete capability. The CRT chief is normally a loadmaster or boom operator as prescribed by the UTC 7E1AF mission capability statement, but any core enlisted United States Air Force specialty code (AFSC) may be trained, certified, and deployed as a CRT Chief. Contingency support elements (CSE) will augment a CRT as required.

1.2.7 Other CR Mission Sets.

1.2.7.1 Airfield Survey Team (AST). An airfield survey team accomplishes assessments to verify known information and evaluate/obtain any items that were not pre-assessed. Results are compiled and reported to higher-headquarters as directed through appropriate command channels. Airfield surveys will address areas such as: runways, ramps, taxiways, force protection, communications, and facilities; and will provide a recommendation to appropriate decision makers on the suitability of future airfield operations (fixed or rotary wing). AST personnel should meet with representatives of the airfield seizure forces/host nation (HN) and follow-on forces in order to understand the supported commander's mission for the airfield and proposed layout.

1.2.7.2 Joint Inspection (JI). JI personnel deploy worldwide to support the air movement of hazardous cargo and equipment in accordance with DTR 4500.9-R, Part III, *Mobility*,

Appendix O. JI personnel are specially-trained and experienced aerial port personnel whose inspections ensure all documentation requirements are met and that the shipment is airworthy and safe for flight.

1.2.7.3 In-Transit Visibility (ITV). ITV teams deploy worldwide to set-up and operate radio frequency identification (RFID) systems to provide real-time In-Transit Visibility to users of the AMC systems in accordance with DTR 4500.9-R, Part III, *Mobility*, Appendix I. These systems communicate with ITV servers, allowing customers to determine location and movement status of unit cargo and equipment quickly.

1.2.7.4 Affiliation. Affiliation teams deploy worldwide to provide training for all branches of military service in the planning, preparation and loading of AMC aircraft for worldwide mobility. They are responsible for managing and conducting the AMC Equipment Preparation and Air Load Planner Courses, as well as training and evaluating course instructors.

1.2.7.5 Airlift Control Flight (ALCF). An Air National Guard (ANG) Unit or an Air Force Reserve unit that provides many of the same core functions as a GMS. Some ALCFs maintain their own communications packages. There are five US Air Force Reserve (USAFR) ALCFs and six ANG ALCFs.

1.3 Contingency Response Missions.

1.3.1 Air Component to the JTF-PO.

1.3.1.1 The CRG is the element capable of serving as the air component of the JTF-PO. When coupled with the Army's Rapid Port Opening Element (RPOE), the CRG and RPOE comprise the JTF-PO. A JTF-PO is an enabling force integrating Air Force and Army resources capable of rapid deployment to establish the initial distribution network. This is accomplished by initially operating ports of debarkation, establishing a forward node (FN) and optimizing port throughput. It provides the supported combatant commander (CCDR)/joint force commander (JFC) with an expeditionary aerial port of debarkation (APOD) deployment and FN capability consistent with the single port manager concept (JP 3-17). The JTF-PO capabilities may be tailored to support varying situations within the CCDR's/JFC's area of operations.

1.3.1.1.1 JTF-PO is capable of coordinating cargo and passenger movement control activities between air and surface elements and staging cargo in the FN to optimize distribution throughput. JTF-PO reduces the historic ad hoc nature of APOD opening with a jointly trained solution, 12-hour deployment response, C2 and immediate ITV capability feeding national systems and command decisions.

1.3.1.1.2 Deploying the JTF-PO, at time of immediate need, provides quick reaction time and immediate operational effect. The JTF-PO is designed to operate for 45 to 60 days and be relieved by follow-on forces.

1.3.2 Airbase Opening (ABO).

1.3.2.1 ABO consists of Force Module 1 (Open the Airbase), plus Force Module 2 (Command & Control), plus initial portions of Force Module 3 (Establish the Airbase). Within the ABO Stage, there are three event-driven (rather than time-dependent) phases:

1.3.2.1.1 Phase I - Runway Open. Following airfield seizure operations, (usually accomplished by United States (US) Army, US Marine Corps or special operations forces), and the subsequent transition to Airbase Opening operations, Phase I is achieved when the first mobility aircraft is authorized to land. By the end of this stage, adequate runway, ramp and taxiways for the intended mission are clear and monitored. Additionally, the airfield is secure and capable of supporting airlift operations.

1.3.2.1.2 Phase II - Airfield Open/Aircraft Reception. Phase II is achieved, or the airfield is considered "open", once airbase opening forces and their equipment are prepared to receive aircraft; sufficient ramps, taxiways, and facilities are available to support the intended mission.

1.3.2.1.3 Phase III - Airbase Open/Initial Beddown. Phase III is achieved when sufficient real estate has been obtained to allow for the initial beddown and sustainment of combat and combat support forces. Phase III is complete once like forces are in place to extend, then replace the initial-airbase opening force capability. Once Phase III is complete, the airbase is considered "open" and the CRG can be redeployed back to home station or deployed as required for another mission.

1.3.2.2 Global Air Mobility Support System.

1.3.2.2.1 Air mobility support forces provide a responsive, worldwide foundation for airlift and air refueling operations. This force is divided between AMC, which controls the majority of assets in its global/functional role, and the geographic combatant commands that control sufficient assets to meet their specific regional needs. These forces, combined with the interrelated processes that move information, cargo, and passengers, make up the GAMSS. The CRW has scalable teams capable of supporting the multitude of GAMSS requirements.

1.3.2.2.2 The GAMSS structure consists of a number of CONUS and en route locations, as well as deployable forces capable of augmenting the fixed en route locations or establishing operating locations where none exists. These deployable forces are stationed both in CONUS and at select overseas bases, and are controlled by either AMC or one of the geographic combatant commands. The prepositioning of GAMSS forces, whether at fixed locations with robust infrastructure or at en route locations with little infrastructure, supporting sustained airlift or aerial refueling operations, must be accomplished ahead of any combat force (whether Air Force or sister service) deployment.

1.3.2.2.3 The core functions GAMSS provides are C2, aerial port, and maintenance. While these fixed and deployable functions are robust, the deployable assets are designed to be temporary in nature, with a planned redeployment or replacement in 30 to 45 days. En route locations normally are tasked to provide these services; however, these basic and other support functions (e.g., combat support, life support, intelligence) can augment in-place operations, creating a more robust throughput and support capability. The level of support can be tailored to match the workload requirements. Consequently, deployable GAMSS forces can provide a method for expanding capabilities at an existing location or establishing capabilities where none exists. To

ensure continuity of operations, appropriate planners should coordinate the redeployment of GAMSS forces.

1.3.2.2.3.1 GAMSS forces are drawn from active duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard components.

1.3.2.2.3.2 Collectively, these components provide the forces that make up the fixed CONUS and overseas GAMSS organizations as well as the deployable forces stationed primarily in CONUS. These components support operations throughout the range of military operations.

1.3.2.3 Mobility Advisory Missions.

1.3.2.3.1 Air Mobility Division.

1.3.2.3.1.1 Personnel assigned to the air mobility operations squadron (AMOS) form a team that deploys worldwide to establish stand-alone AMDs or expand the AMC C2 structure at locations where an AMC presence is either limited or non-existent. Regional contingencies, which include wartime or humanitarian operations, create a temporary surge that stresses the established day-to-day capability of AMC C2.

1.3.2.3.1.2 Based on these demands, AMC expands the C2 structure by deploying its forces toward and within an area of responsibility. The 618th Air Operations Center (AOC), formerly known as the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), monitors ongoing air mobility operations to determine when augmentation or expansion is required. If the AMC presence placed within a geographic region is significant, an AMD is usually established and air mobility personnel are placed within the AMD to manage theater air mobility operations and to coordinate with 618 AOC (TACC).

1.3.2.3.2 Partner Service Mobility Liaison.

1.3.2.3.2.1 Air Mobility Liaison Officers (AMLO) are rated airlift officers specifically trained to advise the supported Army/Marine Corps unit commander and staff on the optimum and safe use of air mobility assets. They support units at the corps, division, separate regiment, and selected brigade echelons, but may be aligned with echelons above corps as required. AMC AMLOs are under the OPCON of Air Force Transportation Component (AFTRANS) and administratively assigned to the CRW. PACAF and USAFE AMLOs are OPCON to AMC while deployed. Normally, AMLOs do not change OPCON.

1.3.2.3.2.2 Ground Liaison Officers (GLO) are US Army liaison representatives assigned to contingency response organizations in support of air mobility operations. GLOs provide Army expertise to Air Force organizations by analyzing and briefing the ground tactical situation to contingency response personnel both before and during operations.

1.3.3 Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

1.3.3.1 CRFs may be tasked to assist in DSCA operations. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), *Management of Domestic Incidents*, established a new

means to federal emergency management based on the practical requirement that all levels of government have a single, unified approach to managing domestic incidents. Such incidents may include, but are not limited to, the following conditions that will be discussed further in **Chapter 8**, Defense Support of Civil Authorities:

- Major Disaster
- Emergency
- Fire Management Assistance
- Catastrophic Incident
- Hazard

1.3.4 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

1.3.4.1 CRFs may also be called upon to support NEOs. NEOs are conducted to assist the Department of State (DOS) in evacuating US citizens, Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel, and designated HN and third country nationals (TCN) whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven. Although normally considered in connection with hostile action, evacuation may also be conducted in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or man-made disaster. NEOs and classifications will be discussed further in **Chapter 9**, Evacuations.

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CHAPTER 2
MISSION ANALYSIS

2.1 Introduction. This chapter provides planning guidance and considerations from initial mission tasking to after-action reporting.

2.1.1 Philosophy. Mission planning requires an intelligent application of sound tactical concepts obtained from lessons learned, operational evaluations, joint training exercises, and threat analysis. Planners at all levels are responsible to determine the best way to "right size" mission execution and provide commanders with rapid global mobility and agile combat support. The mission planning cell (MPC) is responsible for planning the mission. Involve all required functional leads from the outset, including the Army RPOE unit, humanitarian assistance rapid response team (HARRT), supported combatant command planners, and the Air Force forces (AFFOR) staff. Sharing critical information will help clarify implied tasks, assess mission risks, and develop alternative course(s) of action (COA).

2.1.2 Mission Variables. After receipt of a warning order (WARNORD) or mission, the planners should narrow their focus to six mission analysis variables. Mission variables are those aspects of the operational environment that directly affect a mission. The variables are mission, enemy, troops and support available, terrain and weather, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC). These are the categories of relevant information used for mission analysis.

2.2 Summary of METT-TC. Mission analysis based on the mission variables (METT-TC) enables leaders to synthesize operational-level information with tactical knowledge relevant to their mission and tasks in a specified area of operations (AO). See **Figure 2.1**, METT-TC.

2.2.1 Mission. A directive will be passed from higher headquarters (HHQ) in the form of mission-type orders. See **Table 2.1**, Mission Orders.

2.2.2 Enemy. Relevant information regarding the enemy may include composition, size, type, enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), and previous order of battle. Consider the worst-case and most-likely threats. The threat working group (TWG) should assess current threats using intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) methodology. Also, identify those risk factors that may affect operations and design risk mitigation strategies to limit the negative impact on planned operations.

2.2.3 Troops and Support Available. Know unit strengths and weakness. Check the status of equipment. Request available theater assets to support the unit.

2.2.4 Terrain and Weather. Terrain and weather are natural conditions that profoundly influence operations. They favor no one organization unless one is more familiar with-or better prepared to operate in-the environment of the AO.

2.2.5 Time Available. Typically, time available for detailed analysis and assessment is shorter at the tactical level during contingency response scenarios.

2.2.6 Civil Considerations. Civil considerations are the influence of man-made infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders,

populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations (FM 6-0).

Figure 2.1 METT-TC

2.3 Mission Orders. Planners should clearly understand the command authority as identified in the planning directives such as a WARNORD or standing execute order (EXORD). See **Table 2.1**, Mission Orders.

Table 2.1 Mission Orders

Types of Orders			
	Order Type	Intended Action	Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Approval Required
Warning order	WARNORD	Initiates development and evaluation of courses of action (COA) by supported commander Requests commander's estimate be submitted	No Required when WARNORD includes deployment or deployment preparation actions
Planning order	PLANORD	Begins execution planning of anticipated President or SecDef selected course of action (COA) Directs preparation of OPORDs or contingency plan	No Conveys anticipated COA selection by the President or SecDef
Alert order	ALERTORD	Begins execution planning on President or SecDef-selected COA Directs preparation of OPORD or contingency plan	Yes Conveys COA selection by the President or SecDef
Prepare to deploy order	PTDO	Increase/decrease deployability posture of units	Yes Refers to five levels of deployability posture Deployment/ redeployment order
UNCLASSIFIED			

Types of Orders			
Deployment/ redeployment order	DEPORD	Deploy/redeploy forces Establish C-day/L-hour Increase deployability Establish JTF	Yes Required for movement of unit personnel and equipment into combatant commander's AOR
Execute order	EXORD	Implement President or SecDef decision directing execution of a COA or OPORD	Yes
Operation order	OPORD	Effect coordinated execution of an operation	Specific to the OPORD
Fragmentary order	FRAGORD	Issued as needed after an OPORD to change or modify the OPROD execution	No
LEGEND: AOR - area of responsibility C-day - unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins COA - course of action JTF - joint task force		L-hour - specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence OPORD - operation order SecDef - Secretary of Defense	
UNCLASSIFIED			

2.3.1 Mission Commander. The role of the CR commander is to successfully lead a well-trained, cross-functional team in a dynamic, complex environment. Therefore, the mission commander is responsible for ensuring that pre-departure planning is complete and adequate to accomplish the mission while providing for the well-being of the deployed personnel. Each deploying commander/team chief will assemble and brief all deploying personnel prior to departure on the mission objective, operating environment, and individual preparation required for deployment. Those who cannot be personally briefed will be informed sufficiently prior to departure to accomplish any items needed for preparation. In the case of an ABO, the CRG commander (O-6) needs to adequately plan for senior airfield authority (SAA). In the case of Joint-Task Force Port Opening (JTF-PO), the CRG commander (O-6) has command responsibility for APOD operations and cargo throughput to the forward node. **Attachment 3**, Key Decision Parameter Checklist may assist the mission commander with their duties and responsibilities.

2.4 Mission Tasking. For a specific contingency, a deployment order (DEPORD) or OPORD provides specific guidance, typically including a description of the situation, commander's intent, purpose of military operations, objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints and restraints, and forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations.

2.5 Mission Analysis.

2.5.1 Desired End State. Planners can compare the current conditions of the operational environment with how the operation should look (the desired end state) and help visualize an approach to solving the problem. First, start by identifying necessary end state conditions and termination criteria early in planning, which will help the commander and mission planning cell devise an operational approach with lines of effort that link the current condition to a desired end state condition.

2.5.1.1 Force Protection and Intelligence Fusion Cell. One fundamental driving force of mission analysis is the intelligence/threat situation. As a result, the integration of the most current and accurate threat analysis must take place throughout the entire process of mission analysis. See **Attachment 4**, Force Protection and Intelligence Cell Support to Contingency Response Force Employment. See AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense [FOUO]* and AFI 14-119, *Intelligence Support to Force Protection [FP]* for further information.

2.5.1.2 Public Health. A public health representative should be integrated into the MPC to provide medical intelligence and health protection measures throughout mission analysis.

2.5.1.3 Public Affairs (PA). Early during mission analysis, the commander should determine the active or passive public affairs posture for the mission and coordinate appropriate PA support for the MPC.

2.5.1.4 Safety. Accomplishing the mission includes managing risk affecting people and resources. Attempt to analyze and anticipate as many hazards as possible before deployment. Throughout the mission planning process, the commander must apply risk management (RM) principles. See AFPD 90-8, *Environment, Safety & Occupational Health Management and Risk Management* and for additional deployment and contingency safety requirements see AFPAM 91-216, *USAF Safety Deployment and Contingency Pamphlet*.

- Accept no unnecessary risk
- Make risk decisions at the appropriate level
- Integrate RM into operations, activities, and planning
- Apply the RM process cyclically and continuously

2.5.2 Desired Effects. Plan to achieve desired effects in support of JFC objectives. For example, the geographic combatant commander (GCC) needs to "rapidly establish a distribution network with in-transit visibility." However, indirect effects often can be unintended and undesired since there will always be gaps in our understanding of the operational environment.

2.5.3 Tasks. Confirm with HHQ staff the essential, specified, and implied tasks during mission analysis before developing initial mission planning products.

2.5.3.1 Specified tasks are those that the higher commander assigns to a subordinate commander in a WARNORD, OPORD, or other planning directive. These are tasks that HHQ wants the commander to accomplish during execution of the operation, usually because they are important to the higher command's mission and/or objectives. One or more specified tasks often become essential tasks for the subordinate. For example, "Establish an APOD at International Airport of Country X" is a specified task.

2.5.3.2 Implied tasks are additional tasks the commander must accomplish, in order to accomplish the specified and essential tasks, or otherwise accomplish activities relevant to the operation. The commander can also deduce implied tasks from knowledge of the operational environment, such as the enemy situation and political conditions in the assigned AO. For example, "During APOD operations, be prepared to enforce force protection measures."

2.5.3.3 Essential tasks are those that the joint force must execute successfully to achieve the desired end state. The commander and staff determine essential tasks from the lists of both specified and implied tasks. The mission statement contains only essential tasks (e.g., "Deploy a task-organized contingency response force and establish an APOD…").

2.5.4 Capabilities. The air and space expeditionary task force (AETF) force module (FM)-1, Open the Airbase, is representative of the baseline capability set, skill set, and equipment for all CRGs. The nine CRG core capabilities:

1. Rapid Deployment
2. Ability to Operate in an Austere Environment
3. Operating Location Airfield Assessment
4. Initial Command and Control
5. Initial Force Protection
6. Initial Air Mobility Support
7. Initial Airfield Operations
8. Initial Force Health Protection
9. Initial Airbase Support

2.5.5 Operational Limitations. Consider the following CRF limitations:

- Maximum on ground (MOG): Working (1 aircraft for 12 hours or 2 aircraft for 24 hours), Parking, Contingency.
- No organic aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF).
- Limited chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) defensive and detection response.
- Limited organic force protection for airfield access control and self-defense. However, force protection (FP) for the expanded base area is dependent on additional forces.

- Communications: Depending on geographic location and crisis, world-wide access to cell phone and broadband global area network (BGAN) bandwidth may be limited due to high-demand commercial use.
- Sustained Operations: CRF are typically equipped to be self-sufficient for the first five days of deployment.

2.6 Enemy. Unit intelligence should use IPB methodology to analyze the threat throughout mission analysis. When possible, be as unpredictable as operations permit.

NOTE: Consider all other risk factors and mitigation strategies using operational risk management (ORM) methodology. See **Attachment 5**, Example ORM for CRF. (Reference: AFI 90-802, *Risk Management* and AFPAM 90-803, *Risk Management (RM) Guidelines and Tools*)

2.7 Terrain and Weather.

2.7.1 Objective Area. Each operating location (OL) presents its own unique challenges and requires detailed planning. Keep in mind operations can be executed from semi-prepared runway operations to a large international commercial air hub.

2.7.2 Existing Airfield Survey or Landing Zone (LZ). A review of the Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report (ASRR) or the LZ survey is essential. The ASRR, or Giant Report, is available on the Global Decision Support System II (GDSS2). The ASRR contains basic information on runway size, weight bearing capacity (WBC), and restrictions. In some instances, the ASRR information may not be available or the information may be outdated. In this case, the information must be obtained from 618 AOC (TACC) or another valid source. If valid WBC data is not available, load classification number (LCN), pavement classification number (PCN) or California bearing ratio (CBR) may be used to calculate suitability and maximum gross weight allowable. Airfield managers may waive WBC by up to 50 percent of the published values. Remember, the same considerations need to be applied to all taxiways and parking ramps that the aircraft intends to use during ground operations.

NOTE: AFI 13-217 governs Drop Zone and Landing Zone Operations.

NOTE: One suitability item that is often overlooked is the availability of aircraft rescue equipment and personnel. For ARFF requirements, refer to Chapter 10 "Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting," AMCI 11-208, *Tanker/Airlift Operations*, and AFPAM 32-2004, *Aircraft Fire Protection for Exercises and Contingency Response Operations*.

2.7.3 Charts, Maps and Imagery. Chart selection should provide the best possible detail and accuracy that meets requirements. It is highly recommended to print charts during mission planning for quick reference en route and during initial setup when data connectivity may be bandwidth limited.

2.7.4 Weather Analysis. A detailed weather analysis is critical to mission planning. All available resources should be used to best determine the weather conditions expected during mission execution. Set an appropriate battle rhythm to manage heat/cold-related fatigue stress. When using non-DOD sources, keep operations security (OPSEC) in mind. Other meteorological information may be obtained from host nation capabilities study. If the MPC does not have dedicated weather support, the list below shows weather agency-provided services and products available for mission analysis.

• Observations and Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAF). A TAF request includes the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) identifier, pilot reports, surface observations and TAFs are reported in alphanumeric format. The website www.aviationweather.gov is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) site for domestic aviation weather.

• Weather Agencies. If a weather forecaster is not available at the operating location, the Air Force weather agencies' geographic area of responsibility can be found in Section C of the Flight Information Handbook can provide operational weather squadron (OWS) products and services. Additionally, the Air Force Weather Agency provides an Interactive Grid Analysis and Display System at https://weather.afwa.af.mil.

• Space Weather. Space weather is observed and forecast solar activity impacting high frequency (HF) and ultrahigh frequency (UHF) communications and applications.

• Night Vision Device (NVD) Operations Weather. Moon phase and illumination should be referenced when planning NVD operations and is available through many means listed above.

2.8 Troops and Support Available. Perhaps the most important aspect of mission analysis is determining the combat potential of one's own force. Leaders know the status of their Airmen's morale, their experience and training, and the strengths and weaknesses of subordinate leaders. A self-assessment includes knowing the strength and status of their equipment. It also includes understanding the full array of theater assets in support of the CRF. (FM 5-0).

2.8.1 UTCs. A familiarity with available UTCs will aid the MPC in determining which personnel and equipment are required to complete the mission. Familiarization with the manpower and equipment force packaging (MEFPAK) tool, which includes the logistics detail (LOGDET) (equipment) and manpower force packaging system (MANFOR) (personnel), provides this sound tactical knowledge.

2.8.2 Force Protection. Force Protection is another chief concern for the mission planning team. Security may be provided by local police forces, security forces, sister service/coalition forces, host nation forces, or contingency response force personnel. For AMC-gained CRF, reference the AMC Airfield Threat Matrix on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). If the mission requires help from augmenting units (e.g., Air Force Office of Special Investigations [AFOSI]), the mission planning team must ensure they are expeditiously notified. If mission requirements dictate a flyaway security team, the Phoenix Raven program is managed by headquarters (HQ) AMC/security forces (SF) and consists of specially trained SF cadre dedicated to providing close-in force protection for AMC assets transiting high terrorist and criminal areas.

2.9 Civil Considerations and HN Relations. Based on information from higher headquarters and known planning factors, the MPC should identify civil considerations that affect their mission. Most of the time, deployed CRFs are surrounded by noncombatants. These noncombatants may include United States Government (USG) officials, residents of the AO, local officials, international governmental organizations (IGO) and non-governmental organizations (NGO). Positive HN relations are vitally important to CR operations. Dependent upon the mission, CRFs may be working hand-in-hand with HN counterparts. Even if CRFs are not working directly with HN representatives, a poor HN perception of US military abroad could create unnecessary

obstacles towards mission accomplishment. Depending upon the tasked mission and operating environment (permissive, uncertain, hostile), HN considerations require continuous attention from the MPC during mission analysis. CR mission planning teams should pay close attention to host base considerations since they will almost undoubtedly shape the mission. It is highly recommended to review, print, and comply with guidance in the foreign clearance guide (FCG) at https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/. Also note there is a classified version of the FCG on the SIPRNET. In addition to intelligence assessments and guidance from HHQ, **Attachment 6**, Host Base Checklist should provide additional situational awareness to the mission planning cell. Upon completion of the host base checklist, the MPC should have established contacts at the airfield in the AO. CR leadership and planners should try to build partnerships with civilian points of contact (POC) in the AO during mission analysis. Cooperative civilian organizations substantially enhance military operations by performing complementary civil functions that inform the population and add legitimacy to the mission (FM 5-0).

- As a technique, mission planners should contact key civilians in the AO prior to deployment so the commander can establish contact with them once deployed. If there is a language barrier that will prohibit essential communication to mission accomplishment, CR planners should begin coordination for an interpreter.
- The MPC should consider what assets the HN can provide in a permissive environment. During CR operations, CRF should incorporate commercial and/or HN provided transportation assets as required to conduct movement operations. In addition, the HN may be able to provide local contracting for services to facilitate throughput of passengers and cargo.
- **Attachment 6**, Host Base Checklist provides the MPC with a solid framework for assessing the HN airfield capabilities. As a technique, any unanswered items from the checklist should be submitted to HHQ as a request for information (RFI).

2.9.1 Joint Consideration. US Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) JTF-PO APOD mission requires detailed coordination between CR and RPOE forces. Only USTRANSCOM verified CRG forces maintain the JTF-PO capability. The JTF-PO provides a rapid-response capability to meet initial rapid APOD opening and FN requirements of the CCDR or JFC across the full range of military operations. Since the RPOEs are not collocated with a CRG, communication is critical to successful mission analysis. There are three RPOEs: 688th, 689th, and 690th and all are located at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA. While AMC CRG units are sitting alert with an RPOE, it is a good technique for CR leadership to get in touch with RPOE leadership once a week to provide an alert status update. Recommended discussion topics include personnel and equipment status, joint assessment team (JAT) issues, and any potential impediments to successful mission completion. The joint team concept should be stressed early during mission analysis to preclude service-specific rivalry during execution. Refer to **Chapter 5**, Seizure Forces/CRF Integration for further mission analysis and joint integration considerations when supporting forcible entry operations.

2.9.1.1 The MPC should note the following when planning for JTF-PO missions:

- JTF-PO is designed to deploy and operate for 45 to 60 days.
- JAT is responsible for conducting distribution network assessment.
- JTF-PO will open and establish a FN not to exceed 10 kilometers from the APOD.

- JTF-PO will provide movement control including coordination for onward movement of arriving cargo and passengers.
- Working MOG of 2 to 24 in no/low-light conditions.
- Capable of receiving, staging, and transloading 560 short tons in a 24-hour period.
- JTF-PO can receive and handle 150 passengers arriving via airlift at any point in time (process approximately 150 passengers every 6 hours).
- The mission planning team should utilize imagery and work with security forces and Intel during mission analysis to identify potential threat areas. In addition to airbase security provided during CRG operations, JTF-PO security requirements also include APOD access and egress, and routes to and from the FN and living areas.

2.9.1.2 Mission analysis for the JAT also requires close coordination between CRG and RPOE members. The purpose of the assessment is twofold: it gathers information to determine if the airfield and distribution infrastructure are capable of supporting the mission, and determines the availability of resources. At a minimum, JAT planners should know the expected air flow, type of cargo, and delivery mode to the FN.

2.9.1.3 For load planning purposes, the JAT team and equipment should be capable of air delivery to the assessment location using no more than two C-130 equivalents. Therefore, it is recommended for CRG load planners to develop “purple” load plans incorporating the RPOE's JAT equipment with CRG JAT equipment. This practice will save time in the event of a short-notice deployment. See **Table 2.2**, JTP-PO APOD Operations for some basic airlift requirement factors to consider when planning JTF-PO operations.

Table 2.2 JTF-PO APOD Operations

JTF-PO Heavy Footprint/Capability Austere airfield (bare base) Uncertain Environment, Significant Contingency 24/7, No-/Low-light operations, maximum on ground (MOG) 2xC-17s 90% pallets, 560 short tons (STONS)/day, 150 passengers (PAX)/6 hours Node 10km off aerial port of debarkation (APOD), no HN/Commercial trucks	**JTF-PO Heavy Airlift** 9 Surface Element 7 Air Element 16 C-17 equivalents (estimated)
JTF-PO Medium Footprint/Capability Established airfield Permissive Environment, Major Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Disaster Relief (DR) 24/7, Night operations, MOG 2xC-17s 90% pallets, 560 STONS/day Node 10km off APOD, host nation (HN)/commercial trucks	**JTF-PO Medium Airlift** 5 Surface Element 5 Air Element 10 C-17 equivalents (estimated)
JTF-PO Light Footprint/Capability Established airfield Permissive Environment, Moderate HA DR 12/7, Daylight only operations, MOG 1xC-17 90% pallets, 140 STONS/day Node adjacent to parking ramp	**JTF-PO Light Airlift** 3 Surface Element 3 Air Element 6 C-17 equivalents (estimated)
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2.9.1.4 Once again, “purple” load plans should be prepared for each capability category with a recommended deployment chalk sequence for air and surface element loads. As outlined in AFI 10-403, *Deployment Planning and Execution,* C-17 load plans are the preferred planning factor. This requires close coordination between the CRG and RPOE mission planners.

2.10 Time Available. Unfortunately, for CR forces, there usually is not a lot of time available for mission analysis. CR forces must be prepared to deploy with as little as 12 hours of notification, so maintaining a constant state of readiness should be a leadership focus. See **Table 2.3**, Minimum N-Hour Timeline. With CR capabilities spanning a wide spectrum of military operations from humanitarian assistance (HA)/disaster relief (DR) to expeditionary combat support, thorough mission analysis is often difficult. Prior to receipt of a DEPORD, CR leadership and the mission planning cell should focus on accomplishing deployment deliverables. CR leadership and planners should be familiar with deployment requirements from AFI 10-403, and local operating instructions (e.g., Installation Deployment Plan), in order to ensure adequate pre-deployment preparation on a compressed timeline.

Table 2.3 Minimum N-Hour Timeline

Timing (Hour)	Deliverable	Desired Outcome
N-hour	Receive deployment /redeployment order/voice command (VOCO)	Mission planning cell (MPC) recalled
No Later Than (NLT) N+4	Mission Analysis Brief	Commander selects course of action (COA)
NLT N+6	Pre-departure Brief	Entire team briefed
N+12	Personnel manifested/Equipment joint inspected	First chalk ready to load
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2.10.1 Deployment Sequence of Events. Based on mission orders, commander and/or team chiefs must evaluate the sequence of events and determine when to be in place. Here are some basic planning factors from AMCI 10-202 V4, *Expeditionary Air Mobility Support Operation* that should be addressed during mission analysis:

- CR forces should be in place no later than (NLT) 48 hours prior to arrival of the first scheduled aircraft (24 hours for offload locations).
- Large-scale operations may require positioning an advance team 3 to 10 days prior to the operation.
- During emergency or contingency operations, CR forces may be required to work mission immediately upon arrival at the operating location.
- As a minimum, all efforts must be made to put CR forces on the first arrival aircraft and/or in place at least three hours prior to the scheduled arrival of the first aircraft to be supported.

2.11 COA Development, Comparison, and Selection. A COA is a potential way and means to accomplish the assigned mission. The MPC develops COAs to provide unique choices to the commander, all oriented on accomplishing the desired end state. A good COA accomplishes the mission within the commander's guidance, provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution, and positions the force for future operations (JP 5).

2.11.1 Worst Case COA. Upon receipt of a tasking from HHQ, the CR mission planners should begin formulating ideas of how to accomplish the assigned mission. Primary considerations include ensuring the right personnel and equipment are tasked for the mission, and that the CR assets have adequate security to conduct the mission. CR planners can pare and tailor the size of their force to meet mission needs. Based on working MOG, duty day (12 or 24 hours) and HN support/AO considerations, CR mission planners can recommend a projected force requirement to complete the mission. CR mission planners should strive to "right size" the team because strategic airlift allocations are often scarce. Any gaps in required mission planning information should be submitted to HHQ via an RFI. All of these factors contribute to COA development.

2.11.2 Most Likely COA. Available planning time is always a key consideration, especially during contingency response planning on a condensed timeline. Despite time constraints, there should always be more than one way to accomplish the mission, which suggests that leadership and planners should consider the pros and cons of valid COA alternatives. As a technique, the mission planning team should develop two or three COAs (e.g., large CRT vs. small CRE) to focus their efforts and concentrate on the most likely scenarios. (JP 5)

2.11.2.1 The goal of COA comparison is to identify and recommend the COA that has the highest probability of success while mitigating unacceptable risk. Mission planners should work with Intel, AFOSI, and SF personnel to ensure they have an accurate understanding of enemy threats and capabilities.

2.11.2.2 COA comparison helps the commander answer the following questions:

- What are the differences between each COA?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages?
- What are the risks?

2.11.2.3 Once the CR commander has selected his preferred COA, mission planners continue the planning process to ensure the right personnel and equipment are tasked against the mission. CRG/CRE commander's, and team chiefs can reference **Attachment 7**, Leadership Planning Checklist for discussion on how to guide COA selection. Particular attention should be paid to steps one through seven.

2.11.2.4 CRE/operations officer (DO) and CR mission planners can reference the Mission Planning Cell Checklist included in **Attachment 8**, Mission Planning and Analysis Guide, once the commander has selected a COA to guide the rest of their mission planning and pre-deployment duties.

2.11.3 After-Action Report (AAR)/Lessons Learned (L2). A review of previous after action reports (AAR) should be included in mission analysis to complete a thorough performance review of past events. After mission execution, an AAR is an excellent tool for enabling Airmen to discover what happened, why it happened, how to sustain strengths and how to improve on weaknesses. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) database is also a robust resource for lessons learned. As a technique, mission analysis is a good time to begin gathering after-action reporting inputs to capture lessons learned. See **Figure 2.2**, 615 CRW Lessons Learned from Multi-modal Operations in Romania, for an example of a lessoned learned.

Figure 2.2 615 CRW Lessons Learned from Multi-modal Operations in Romania

615 Contingency Response Wing (CRW) lessons learned from multi-modal operations in Romania.
7/18/2011 - **MIHAIL KOGALNICEANU AIR BASE, Romania**. United States Transportation Command applies the term "multi-modal" as the movement of supplies involving several means of transporting cargo into the theater of operations; be it over land, sea or by air. For this mission, the supplies were transported to Romania from Germany via railway to a distribution center here. The cargo is transferred to the 615th CRW which loaded it onto aircraft and then sent to Afghanistan. *"This is critical not only in terms of the amount of supplies being moved, but also in terms of the timeliness with which it's being moved -- and that's why we're here,"* said Lt. Col. John Platte, 571st Global Mobility Squadron commander and deployed 615th Contingency Response Element commander. *"We've also built solid partnerships with our Romanian hosts,"* Platte added.

Capt Scott Zarbo, 570th Global Mobility Squadron logistics readiness officer, commented, *"Working joint multi-modal operations are excellent opportunities to conduct more efficient transportation operations with our sister services. However, extra detail needs to go into the initial mission analysis between the supported and supporting unit to ensure mutual understanding of who has responsibility for key operations and equipment during each phase of the mission between all units. Avoid making assumptions about the operational and logistical details of the mission. Finding out during execution that a unit didn't bring key equipment, such as 463L Tie Down/Coupler can quickly become a barrier to mission accomplishment leading to both mission delay and cost overrun."*

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2.11.4 RFIs to Tasking Authority. Submitting an RFI to HHQ is the normal procedure for filling information gaps not available through the use of organic intelligence and planning assets. CR mission planners should identify an RFI Recorder to consolidate all RFIs required for thorough mission analysis. The RFI process can greatly enhance situational awareness of the AO by tapping into HHQ or area of responsibility (AOR) sources with access to information that is not accessible to CR forces. RFIs can be submitted via e-mail or HHQ may have an RFI collection database, depending on their capability. Regardless of the submission method, RFIs should be submitted in a timely manner to enable thorough mission analysis.

2.11.5 Mission Analysis Brief. The purpose of this brief is to provide the commander with the results of the MPC analysis of the mission, offer a forum to surface issues that have been identified, and provide an opportunity for the commander to synthesize the staff's mission analysis with his initial visualization of the mission (JP 5). The commander approves or disapproves the MPC's recommended COA and provides additional guidance if required (JP 5). The mission analysis briefing may be the only time all CR leadership is present and the only opportunity to ensure that all members have a common reference point for the mission.

2.11.5.1 An excellent tool for CR mission planners to use to prepare the mission analysis brief is located in **Attachment 8**, Mission Planning and Analysis Guide. Completing checklist items one through nine will provide the mission planning team with the necessary background information to use during the mission analysis briefing. Mission analysis briefings are commonly tailored to meet the commander's intent, but a good example of a mission analysis briefing is located in **Attachment 10**, Example Mission Analysis Briefing, which is also included as a complete PowerPoint file to this TTP.

2.11.6 Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drill. A successful transition from planning to execution requires those charged with executing the order to fully understand the plan (FM 5-0). An excellent method for accomplishing this is to conduct a ROC drill. A rehearsal is a session in which the planning staff or unit practices expected actions to improve performance during execution (FM 5-0). Rehearsals allow leaders to practice synchronizing operations at times and places critical to mission accomplishment (FM 5-0). During a rehearsal, all

participants rehearse their roles in the operation. They make sure they understand how their actions support the overall operation and note any additional coordination required. After a rehearsal, all participants should have a clear understanding of the mission and know their responsibilities and priorities during execution.

2.11.6.1 The extent of rehearsals depends on available time. In cases of short-notice requirements, rehearsals may not be possible during mission analysis (FM 5-0). If this is the case, CR leadership should strive to conduct a ROC drill at the deployed location prior to the beginning of operations. Rehearsals can be robust and include all members of a unit (time permitting), or they can be table-topped with CR leadership and functional group representatives.

2.11.6.2 ROC drills become more important when operating as part of a joint team or coalition. Once again, CR leadership should push to conduct ROC drills with joint or coalition partners during mission analysis when time permits. If this is impossible, ROC drills should be completed at the deployed location prior to the beginning of operations. After the ROC drill, the commander or designated representative should lead a hot wash. The intent of the meeting is to review lessons learned and make any required modifications to the existing plan.

2.11.7 Pre-Departure Brief. The intent of the pre-departure brief is for CR leadership and mission planners to brief all deploying personnel on the mission objective, operating environment, and individual preparation required for deployment (AMCI 10-202V4). This is often the only opportunity for CR leadership to brief all deploying members prior to departure.

2.11.7.1 **Attachment 9**, Pre-Departure Briefing (see checklist 2-6, AMCI 10-202 V4 CL-1, *Expeditionary Air Mobility Support Operations Checklist*), provides a thorough pre-departure briefing as a reference (mandatory for AMC CR units) and also included is the complete PowerPoint file as an attachment to this TTP.

2.11.7.2 Other useful pre-departure brief information not included in the checklist above is:

- Chalk breakdown/chalk commanders
- Tasked Equipment UTCs
- Packing list for deployed location
- Specific functional lead input
- Known or anticipated safety hazards of the deployed

2.11.7.3 CR mission planners must remember that all personnel deploying with weapons will be briefed prior to departure on the use of force and rules of engagement. This briefing may be covered during the personnel deployment function (PDF) line depending upon the specific installation deployment plan, but mission planners need to be aware of this requirement in the event it needs to be included during the pre-departure brief.

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CHAPTER 3

DEPLOYMENT EXECUTION SYSTEMS

3.1 Deployment Systems.

3.1.1 JOPES. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the Department of Defense's primary system for translating policy decisions into operational plans. JOPES feeds information directly into the Deliberate Crisis Action Planning and Execution System (DCAPES).

3.1.2 DCAPES. DCAPES is the Air Force's war planning system and provides an Air Force feed to JOPES automated data processing (ADP). The objective of DCAPES is to enable improved and streamlined operations planning and execution processes which include associated policy and procedures, along with organizational and technology improvements. DCAPES provides standard data files, formats, application programs, and management procedures that are Air Force unique and joint guidance compliant and used primarily for force planning, sourcing equipment and personnel requirements, transportation feasibility estimation, civil engineering support, and medical planning.

3.1.2.1 DCAPES and JOPES share common business rules and ADP procedures and policies to plan and execute joint military operations. Air Force planners at all levels will use DCAPES to support the combatant commander's selected COA in a timely manner.

3.1.2.2 DCAPES supports accurate and timely sourcing which includes validation and verification. DCAPES also supports sourcing and tailoring of lower levels of detail beyond the JOPES level of detail.

3.1.3 LOGMOD. Logistics Module (LOGMOD) is a logistics-planning program that receives and maintains the cargo and personnel details for UTCs and taskings. It maintains detailed cargo records as well as personnel records (levy file positions and the personnel to fill them) and provides a command and control capability through the deployment schedule of events (DSOE) module.

3.2 Deployment Planning and Execution for 621 CRW.

3.2.1 Introduction. The deployment process has two distinct phases; planning and execution. Both phases are equally as important to a successful unit mobilization. When the planning phase is performed properly, mission execution will happen with minimum problems.

3.2.2 Planning. The planning phase involves many processes that factor into the overall plan of a mission. This phase encompasses the actions prior to execution. The focus of this section will be on the most essential tasks needed to ensure successful mission execution.

3.2.2.1 The first step of the planning phase is notification. The notification of a tasking is usually received in the wing operations center (WOC) through a classified WARNORD but frequently a phone call or “draft” WARNORD will precede official notification. The WARNORD notifies the commander that the planning process has officially begun.

3.2.2.2 The WOC makes all appropriate notifications and initiates a recall if necessary.

3.2.2.3 The deploying team lead creates a mission development brief to identify different COAs that will fulfill the capabilities required in the WARNORD.

3.2.2.4 After a COA is selected and approved by the wing commander, it is transmitted to 18th Air Force (AF) (or tasking authority).

3.2.2.5 A common procedure for team leads in AMC and AMC gained units is to start building the Manpower and Materiel (M&M) request. The M&M is the primary tool used to communicate the commander's intent into the DCAPES tasking system. An accurate M&M early in the planning process facilitates success in all phases of the deployment process. Conversely, changes to the M&M can have significant negative impacts throughout the deployment process, so careful consideration should be given prior to making updates after initial submission. This is essential to the process when time constraints are an issue. Note: PACAF and USAFE units usually use a force flow tasking worksheet that can be found on the SIPRNET.

3.2.2.6 The M&M identifies any shortfall requirements and can be used to build a personnel roster. This document will also identify any possible meals ready to eat (MRE), water, weapons, and ammo requests that need to be submitted.

3.2.2.7 After the unit has completed the M&M, they transmit it to the WOC. The Logistics Planners (AFSC 2G0XX) will create a plan identification number (PID) in LOGMOD based on the approved M&M from the tasking authority.

3.2.2.8 The log plan file is exported from LOGMOD into the integrated computerized deployment system (ICODES). Load plans will be submitted to tasking authority upon request. This ensures that all of the data is correctly loaded in LOGMOD and feeds into the applicable computer load planning system. The load planner (preferably, a non-deploying load planner will be available in the WOC) will build all of the preliminary load plans.

3.2.2.9 The team lead then verifies the load plans are built correctly. Once verified, the PID is locked in LOGMOD.

3.2.2.10 The M&M, load plans/hazardous diplomatic clearances and a JOPES export from LOGMOD are transmitted to 18 AF/A3M. This will facilitate accurate tasking as soon as the EXORD is published.

3.2.2.11 The LOGMOD export is sent to the installation deployment officer (IDO) for their awareness.

3.2.3 Execution. The execution phase includes the deployment and overall mobilization of contingency response forces to a given location. This phase is centrally managed by the IDO and is subject to local installation deployment plans (IDP). However, there are many factors in execution that are controlled by the unit. The most essential of these tasks will be critical to a successful mobilization.

3.2.3.1 Official notification and N-Hour start time is undefined. This notification should come via execution order or deployment order, however, frequently voice commands (VOCO) or other electronic means are used.

3.2.3.2 Once the tasking has flowed through DCAPES, it will be accepted by the WOC. The WOC then notifies the wing commander and the deploying unit.

3.2.3.3 The WOC imports the tasking into LOGMOD and populates the unit line numbers (ULN) into the PID in LOGMOD.

3.2.3.4 Once the ULNs are in LOGMOD, the data is imported into ICODES and is used to draft load plans. During this time, the WOC builds the draft DSOE to transmit with the load plans to the IDO.

3.2.3.5 The deploying unit continues to prepare identified personnel and equipment.

3.2.3.6 The deploying unit fills in the personnel roster, identifies shortfalls, submits a final arming roster, identifies weapons couriers and increment monitors.

3.2.3.7 The deploying unit uses LOGMOD to assign personnel to chalks and prints placards from LOGMOD.

3.2.3.8 After all of these steps have been accomplished, the unit can move cargo and passengers in accordance with AFI 10-403, IDP, and published LOGMOD Schedule or schedule of events.

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CHAPTER 4

AIRBASE AND PORT ASSESSMENT

4.1 Overview. Airfield surveys and assessments enable the employment of contingency response and joint task force-port opening forces. UTCs within the CRG are designed to provide a small team with the expertise in air mobility operations to assess a potential expeditionary air mobility support airfield or landing zone. Although similar, airfield surveys and assessments are two distinct missions. An AST provides data for the global airfield database to meet potential worldwide operations and is typically conducted in passive environments. In contrast, an airfield assessment team (AT) is specifically tied to an operation and can be conducted in permissive or uncertain environments immediately following an airfield seizure by the joint force. Additionally, an AT incorporates Air Force leadership capable of assuming the SAA. The first priority of the AT is the airfield pavement evaluation provided by the expertise of engineers and airfield managers incorporated into the team. Following determination of airfield capability to support air operations, the AT is equipped and trained to conduct initial runway and airfield opening. The following sections provide definitions of key terms, outline priorities and missions of the AT, and describe the existing UTCs for ATs.

4.2 Definitions. The following definitions are derived from multi-service doctrine.

4.2.1 Airfield. An area prepared for the accommodation (including any buildings, installations, and equipment), landing, and takeoff of aircraft. See page 11, JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Military Terms*.

4.2.2 Airbase. An area of land from which all airfield and base activities are conducted. An area where air operations are conducted, which contains the airfield plus all of the land, facilities, and infrastructure required to beddown and support the forces. See JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.

4.2.3 Airfield Survey. A physical investigation of a location, conducted to gather data to support planned or possible contingency operations. Site surveys are conducted by ASTs for any of the following purposes:

4.2.3.1 Determine the feasibility of a location for planned operations.

4.2.3.2 To validate information about equipment, terrain, host nation resources, and infrastructure such as serviceability, availability, compatibility, and so forth.

4.2.3.3 To gather critical information and facilitate planning for future operations. This data provides the foundation for CRF assessment team airfield evaluations conducted in response to an actual contingency.

4.2.4 Airfield Survey Team. Each COSG possesses an airfield survey team as part of their capability. These personnel are trained and equipped to deploy to airfields, assess the capabilities of the airfield and its supporting facilities, and relay that information to the appropriate authorities who deploy any needed augmentation or engineer forces.

4.2.5 Airfield Assessment. Includes actions taken by an AT to validate or determine the suitability of a designated airfield for a pending air mission in support of an actual contingency or other designated airfield assessment requirements by the tasking authority. An AT conducts

a physical investigation by deploying to an airfield and validating pre-assessment information and/or prior surveys (if available).

4.2.5.1 An airfield assessment should be rapidly accomplished to verify information and evaluate/obtain any items that were not pre-assessed and report back through secure, dependable, long-range communications as directed through appropriate command channels. Assessments address the runways, ramps, taxiways, force protection, communications, facilities, and will provide a recommendation to appropriate decision makers on the suitability of future airfield operations.

4.2.5.2 The AT will focus on identifying the "big picture, show stopping" items to the intended follow-on mission at the location. Airfield capabilities and limitations, airland facilities available and obstruction clearance in the departure and arrival areas must be assessed. Planners will need to consider runway characteristics as well as taxiway, parking, ramp and cargo handling areas for operational suitability, and determination of the MOG limitations. See JP 3-17, *Air Mobility Operations*.

4.2.6 Airfield Assessment Team. The AT directly supports the AETF by rapidly assessing an airfield or LZ, providing precise information back to decision makers. This assessment is critical for the proper sequencing of the first sorties of follow-on combat/combat support forces flown into a new operating location. As the lead element of the ABO, the CRF and assessment team should meet with representatives of the initial security/airfield seizure forces and follow-on forces, in order to understand the supported commander's vision for the airfield and proposed lay down prior to forward movement. Once operations have commenced, this small, highly mobile, self-sufficient team will rapidly deploy and insert with any DOD ground combat or airfield seizure force to rapidly assess the airfield. The team is equipped with dependable, secure, man-portable communications. To the extent possible, personal tactical equipment should mirror that of supporting ground forces, taking full advantage of mutual support and scheme of maneuver during infiltration. An assessment team is also the advanced echelon (ADVON) team for the CRG and follow-on forces.

4.2.6.1 AT actions have a dual focus:

4.2.6.1.1 Conducting the Airfield Assessment. Provide a Go/No-Go assessment to the tasking authority via secure, dependable, long-range communications based upon initial survey as well as airfield MOG. ATs also incorporate an O-6 to assume senior airfield authority when required to open the base. Depending on the mission, the O-6 on the AT may assume SAA responsibilities until designated otherwise by the JFC.

4.2.6.1.2 Planning/executing arrival & beddown for the CRG main body force. This would include establishing a work center/living area for the AT.

4.2.6.1.2.1 Site CRG beddown areas (working/living areas).

4.2.6.1.2.2 Prioritize CRG beddown actions.

4.2.6.1.2.3 Prepare to receive each CRG chalk and provide an initial briefing.

4.2.6.2 AT Composition. These specialties constitute the core capabilities of the assessment team.

4.2.6.2.1 Team Leader. The assessment team leader should be a rated colonel (O-6) with extensive mobility expertise. Knowledge of mobile C2 is desired. This position can be filled by a qualified O-5 with major command (MAJCOM) approval (see paragraph 1.10 of AMCI 10-202 V4). Key considerations are the size and complexity of the objective airfield, as well as the rank structure of the supporting airfield seizure forces. The team leader is the primary point of contact for the decision makers and serves as the principal liaison between the assessment team and the ground forces and/or host nation forces. The assessment team leader is the "Airman in charge of the airfield" until follow-on command and control forces arrive.

NOTE: Another key factor is determining if SAA will be established by the AT. If this is the case, then the individual must be designated as the SAA by the direction of the JFC. Additionally, if SAA will be established by the AT but then handed off to a CRE commander or other follow on O-6, SAA hand-over will need to be coordinated as well.

4.2.6.2.2 Deputy Team Leader. The deputy team leader is essentially the team's operations officer and must be a field grade officer with tactics and operational CRG experience. In the absence of the team leader, the deputy team leader will be responsible for the accomplishment of the assessment. The deputy will also perform the tactical assessment, focusing on overall threat assessment, ingress/egress routing, and so forth.

4.2.6.2.3 Force Protection. A SF specialist handles force protection matters for the assessment team. The SF team member will be an experienced officer or noncommissioned officer (NCO).

4.2.6.2.4 Communications. The communications team member(s) serve two purposes. They are primarily responsible for establishing and maintaining secure communications with the decision makers and the myriad of resources available. In addition, the communications team member(s) may assess the communications equipment at the airfield, if required. The desired rank structure for this element is an experienced officer and/or NCO.

4.2.6.2.5 Airfield Operations. The airfield operations team member must be an experienced officer (13M) or NCO (1C771) capable of assessing whether or not an airfield meets minimum requirements for operations.

4.2.6.2.6 Civil Engineers. Two civil engineer team members, one officer and one NCO, will assess runway, taxiway, and parking apron pavement conditions; airfield structures (e.g., tower, hangars, airfield lighting, support facilities); and obstructions to include unexploded ordnance (UXO). At least one member will be certified in evaluating airfield pavements.

4.2.6.2.7 Air Traffic Control. An air traffic control NCO (1C171) or airfield operations officer (13M) with current landing zone safety officer or landing zone controller qualifications (in accordance with AFI 13-217) may be required to establish the minimum operating strip capabilities of the airfield to begin receiving follow-on airbase opening forces. This is a limited capability and the requirement may be fulfilled by special tactics teams (STT) already on location.

4.2.6.2.8 Assessment Team Augmentees. The assessment team augmentees are comprised of the additional specialties which may be required depending upon the objective airfield. Assessment team augmentees may consist of a tactician (if the team leader does not satisfy this requirement), logistics planner, medical/public health specialist, fuels specialists, intelligence specialist, and contracting/finance officer/technicians. Required rank and skill levels are dependent upon the size and complexity of the objective airfield and follow on mission. All augmentees must be pre-identified, highly experienced, mission ready forces prepared for deployment.

NOTE: Extra personnel will incur additional requirements for beddown, water, MREs, and transportation (limited seats in UTC vehicles). Prior planning must address beddown and transport requirements that exceed assessment team UTC capabilities. Exceeding UTC MANFOR authorizations without MAJCOM functional area manager approval is prohibited. Additional UTC sourcing will be required.

4.2.7 Senior Airfield Authority. An individual designated/appointed by the component responsible for airfield operations at the direction of the JFC. This individual is responsible for the control, operation, and maintenance of an airfield to include the runways, associated taxiways, parking ramps, land, and facilities whose proximity affect airfield operations. See page 105, AMCI 10-202 V4.

4.3 Surveys. The main survey completed by CRG forces is encompassed by the AMC Form 174, *Airfield Survey*. However, there are multiple types of surveys, some of which contingency response personnel are qualified to perform that provide for unique capabilities, have separate regulatory guidance, and require specific documentation. **Table 4.2**, Survey Types, provides an overall description of different surveys and outlines which surveys can be accomplished by CR personnel.

4.3.1 AMC Airfield Surveys (AMC Form 174). Airlift, tanker, contract carrier, and Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft operate at airfields throughout the world. These airfields must be certified as suitable for specific AMC aircraft operations. MAJCOM/A3 will determine the suitability for their aircraft and the suitability assessment of airfields is based in part on information provided by airfield surveys, when available. An AMC airfield survey is conducted to determine suitability of an airfield for operations of AMC aircraft. A two-part survey, Part 1, Airfield Suitability, provides specific information on the capability of the airfield to physically handle air mobility aircraft. Part II of the survey is a checklist designed to provide information to determine if the airfield has the facilities to support air mobility operations.

4.3.1.1 Guidance for AMC Form 174 can be found in AMCI 10-202 V4. Surveys typically are completed and reported to the tasking agency within five days of the survey completion date. However, it is important to note that pavement evaluations conducted by CR personnel require functional review and approval from the MAJCOM/A7 pavement engineer that requires an expected 30 days.

4.3.1.2 The database for airfield surveys is maintained in the GDSS2.

4.3.1.3 AMC Form 174s are valid for three years, and should be reviewed or updated every two years. If no updates are made after three years, the survey should be

re-accomplished but is maintained in the GDSS2 database. Surveys over three years old are kept for archive purposes only.

4.3.2 Contingency Pavement Evaluation. A civil engineering pavement evaluation determines the PCNs of the airfield, to include runways, taxiways, and ramps. Finalized results are incorporated into AMC Form 174. Contingency pavement evaluations are conducted at varying levels of detail depending on time frame and expected duration/intensity of the follow on mission. An airfield pavement evaluation (APE) is the terminology used to identify a contingency pavement evaluation in support of an airfield AT.

NOTE: Pavement evaluation tools organic to CRF (i.e., hand operated dynamic cone penetrometers [DCP]) are limited in their reliability compared to other evaluation methods and additional follow-on evaluation with more accurate methods may be required for air operations that exceed the data reliability pass limit. See **Table 4.1**, Applicability of Pavement Evaluation Results.

4.3.2.1 Purposes of Evaluation. Contingency pavement evaluations are classified as expedient, sustainment, or permanent in ETL 02-19, *Airfield Pavement Evaluation Standards and Procedures*. The evaluation methods used and the number of field tests performed influence the reliability of the evaluation results.

4.3.2.1.1 Expedient Evaluation. Assessment of airfield structural capability to support 100 passes (landing and takeoff) of a particular aircraft at its maximum weight or the number of passes to support the initial surge of mission aircraft.

4.3.2.1.2 Sustainment Evaluation. Assessment of airfield structural capability to support sustained aircraft operations-generally 5,000 passes of a particular aircraft at its maximum weight, or the number of passes required to support the mission aircraft throughout the anticipated operation.

4.3.2.1.3 Permanent Evaluation. Assessment of airfield structural capability to support long-term aircraft operations-generally 50,000 passes or more of a particular aircraft at its maximum weight. The results of a permanent evaluation include the same information as a sustainment or expedient evaluation but in a much greater level of detail.

4.3.2.2 Applicability of Evaluation Results. Pavement evaluations are usually incorporated into an AMC Form 174 that remains current for a maximum of three years. Pavement evaluation reports require MAJCOM/A7 engineer approval before publishing, with an expectation of 30 days, for vetting and corrections. **Table 4.1**, Applicability of Pavement Evaluation Results, describes the applicability of different types of pavement evaluation tools/methods and specifies accuracy limits, as well as which methods are capabilities of CRF ATs or ASTs. For the most part, CRF contingency pavement evaluations, in support of airfield surveys utilizing sustainment criteria, may provide an evaluation reliable enough to allow passes, not exceeding 1000, before re-evaluation is required. If additional accuracy of data is required, core drilling and testing or other additional capability may be required. See **Table 4.1**, Applicability of Pavement Evaluation Results.

4.3.2.3 Pavement evaluation capabilities and limitations for contingency airfield surveys and assessment teams. An APE, in support of an airfield assessment, is limited in scope due to the short amount of time the team has to collect data. Available pavement data, from a current survey or prior pavement evaluation, expedites the Go/No-Go determination of the pavement engineer. In this case, a surface inspection and battle damage assessment may not require additional DCPs (at the judgment of qualified pavement engineer). **Figure 4.1**, Airfield Pavement Assessment Flow-chart, describes the particulars and applicability of APE results for airfields with and without prior pavement data.

Figure 4.1 Airfield Pavement Assessment Flow-chart (data reference ETL 02-19)



4.3.2.3.1 In cases where in-the-field evaluation time is limited and judgments must be made on limited available data, the reliability of the evaluation is questionable. In accordance with ETL 02-19, *Airfield Pavement Evaluation Standards and Procedures*, contact Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) before reporting airfield capability in such situations. Contact information for AFCEC pavement authorities are also provided in ETL 02-19. See **Table 4.1**, Applicability of Pavement Evaluation Results.

Table 4.1 Applicability of Pavement Evaluation Results

Evaluation Tools	Test Locations[1]	Reliability of Results	Limitations Placed on Evaluation Results	CRG Capability
Dynamic Cone Penetrometer (DCP) Only[2]	Expedient Criteria	VERY LOW	Limit operations to those prescribed by the allowable pass table in this evaluation, **but not to exceed 100 passes**	**AT**
Drill and DCP[3]	Expedient Criteria	LOW	Limit operations to those prescribed by the allowable pass table in this evaluation, **but not to exceed 100 passes**	**AT**
	Sustainment Criteria	LOW	Limit operations to those prescribed by the allowable pass table in this evaluation, **but not to exceed 1,000 passes**	**AST**
Core Drill and DCP or Automated DCP (ADCP)[4]	Sustainment Criteria	MEDIUM	Limit operations to those prescribed by the allowable pass table in this evaluation, **but not to exceed 5,000 passes**	**Not organic to CRF**
	Permanent Criteria	MEDIUM	No limitations placed upon operations beyond those prescribed by the allowable pass table in this evaluation	**Not organic to CRF**

Table 4.1 Applicability of Pavement Evaluation Results continued

Evaluation Tools	Test Locations[1]	Reliability of Results	Limitations Placed on Evaluation Results	CRG Capability
Electronic Cone Penetrometer (ECP)[4]	Sustainment Criteria	HIGH	Limit operations to those prescribed by the allowable pass table in this evaluation, **but not to exceed 5,000 passes**	**Not organic to CRF**
	Permanent Criteria	HIGH	No limitations placed upon operations beyond those prescribed by the allowable pass table in this evaluation	**Not organic to CRF**
Heavy Weight Deflectrometer (HWD)[5] or HWD and ECP or HWD and ADCP	Permanent Criteria	VERY HIGH	No limitations placed upon operations beyond those prescribed by the allowable pass table in this evaluation	**Not organic to CRF**

LEGEND:
AT - Assessment Team
AST - Airfield Survey Team
CRF - Contingency Response Force
NOTES:
1. Test locations for each evaluation criteria are described in ETL 02-19, *Airfield Pavement Evaluation Standards and Procedures*.
2. Limited accuracy by taking soil strength readings adjacent to pavement evaluated.
3. Drilling through concrete/asphalt to determine pavement thickness and soil strength only. Modulus of concrete estimated.
4. ADCP or ECP are truck mounted automated systems. Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) owned equipment/capability. Requires coring of pavement and follow-on analysis of samples for results.
5. HWD is a non-destructive testing method. Prior knowledge of pavement thickness and layers is required.

4.3.3 Landing Zone. Surveys are normally accomplished by Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) STTs to support austere, unimproved landing strips but may include operational airfields that have unique issues, missing NAVAIDs, or insufficient lighting. The

obstacle division of the AMD tactics is the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for LZ suitability issues. PACAF LZ and drop zone (DZ) survey OPR is 353d Special Operations Group (SOG) Tactics.

4.3.3.1 CRG airfield assessment teams include AFCEC qualified personnel that can conduct surveys of prepared and semi-prepared LZs. Reference AFI 13-217, *Drop Zone and Landing Zone Operations*.

4.3.3.2 Airfield ATs gather data from the on-site survey; prepare an LZ survey package using the AF Form 3822, *Landing Zone Survey*, and recommend approval or disapproval to the appropriate agency for use. Reference AFI 13-217.

4.3.3.3 Pavement Evaluation. An LZ survey team will often incorporate the pavement evaluation team providing a 1000 pass reliability survey. See **paragraph 4.3.2**, Contingency Pavement Evaluation.

4.3.4 Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ). HLZ surveys may be documented on the AF Form 4303, *Helicopter Landing Zone Survey*. Tactical HLZ surveys may be accomplished in exercise or contingency situations if time does not permit the completion of a full HLZ survey. Reference AFI 13-217.

NOTE: In accordance with AFI 13-217, Air Force HLZ surveys will be conducted during daylight by a qualified combat control team (CCT), survey qualified rotary aircrew member, Chief Group Weapons and Tactics, or qualified civilian. The cooperation of one of the above may be needed for CRF to establish a new HLZ.

4.3.5 Drop Zone. A comprehensive site survey to certify a location to support DZ operations (i.e., paradrops) will be accomplished by a DZ survey certified individual.

4.3.5.1 Drop zone surveys are documented using the AF Form 3823, *Drop Zone Survey*. Surveys may be accomplished by the unit whose equipment or personnel are being airdropped. A safety of flight review will also be required for new DZs. Reference AFI 13-217.

4.3.5.2 Drop Zone Surveys are maintained on the AMC/A3A ZAR in accordance with AFI 13-217 and can be found at:

https://afkm.wpafb.af.mil/community/views/home.aspx?Filter=OO-OP-AM-40

4.3.6 Deployable Air Traffic Control and Landing Systems (DATCALS). The DATCALS provides deployable navigational aid (NAVAID) and airfield system support capabilities in an expeditionary environment. A comprehensive terminal instrument procedures (TERPS) procedural build is not required for a DATCALS survey. A combat flight inspection of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) flight check is normal, but a MAJCOM can approve waiver requests based on flyability checks by DOD aircrew in accordance with AFI 11-230, *Instrument Procedures*. Reference AFMAN 11-225, *United States Standard Flight Inspection Manual*. Deployment of DATCALS is a combat communications squadron function. Specific site surveys for individual systems are not primarily a CRF function and are accomplished by the teams deploying with their equipment. As required, CRF conduct site surveys for the TRN-45 Mobile Microwave Landing System and TRN-41 Tactical Air Navigation only.

4.3.7 TERPS. An aerodrome survey that is accomplished by a TERPS specialist or designated survey team, with focus on the airfield/airspace, obstructions, and instrument procedures. The survey is accomplished as needed and may be retained with no change, raise, or lower approach minimums at the aerodrome in question. The survey requires a current and accurate obstruction survey. Reference AFI 11-230.

4.3.8 Obstruction. Virtual/digital analysis and certified subject matter expert site survey to determine location, height, and impact of any object on/around an aerodrome that would be considered a hazard to air navigation and normally supports a waiver package build/submittal/validation. Often the results are published on the applicable civil engineer (CE) "E" Tab map.

4.3.9 Infrastructure Base Support and Expeditionary (BaS&E). Installation survey that looks at all facets of an installation to include: supply, logistics, maintenance, operations, infrastructure, and so forth. The survey is published in a multiple chapter document which resides within the BaS&E database, and is supposed to be updated any time content within is changed through any survey process. MAJCOM/A4 Logistics is the OPR. Reference AFTTP 3-4.4, *Contingency Airfield Operations (CAO)* and **Table 4.2**, Survey Types.

Table 4.2 Survey Types

	STT	CRF	CC	ANG	Rotational
LZ/DZ	X	X[1]			
AMC Form 174	X[2]	X		X	
Airfield					X
DATCALS		X	X	X	
ESSP		X			
TERPS				X[3]	X

LEGEND:
ANG - Air National Guard
CC - combat communications
CRF - contingency response forces
DATACALS - deployable air traffic control and landing systems
DZ - drop zone
ESSP - expeditionary site survey process
LZ - landing zone
TERPS - terminal instrument procedures
STT - special tactics team

NOTES:
1. Limited to personnel having documented differences training.
2. Limited to combat controllers certified to have completed Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) Pavement Course.
3. The unit responsible for the equipment is also responsible for the initial TERPS survey (in conjunction with their major command [MAJCOM] or as outlined in AFI 11-230, *Instrument Procedures*).

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4.4 Airfield Survey Teams. An AST conducts worldwide airfield and site surveys to assess airfield capabilities in support of air mobility operations. The survey team composition is

prescribed by UTC 7E1AP comprising of eight personnel, including all specialties required to complete an AMC Form 174. Survey teams may be organized as dictated by the mission and required expertise.

4.4.1 Equipment. The survey team requires equipment necessary for contingency pavement evaluation to include: DCPs, drills, laser ranger finders, measuring wheels, and global positioning satellite (GPS) systems.

4.4.2 Personnel. At a minimum, the team should include civil engineer and airfield management personnel to complete airfield pavement and essential airfield surface evaluation. The remainder of the team (as described by the UTC 7E1AP) should include functional area experts qualified to complete their respective portions of the AMC Form 174 checklist. Reference Chapter 7 of AMCI 10-202 V4, for additional guidance.

4.4.2.1 It is important to note that the 7E1AP UTC is personnel only and does not include evaluation equipment such as DCPs, generators, or power converters necessary to complete a full survey. Personnel and equipment from the unit's AT UTCs (e.g., 7E1AM) may be required to support the survey.

4.4.3 AST Planning Considerations.

4.4.3.1 AST Pre-mission planning. Airfield and location information on a proposed survey location/airfield will typically be researched prior to departure, to include notice to airmen (NOTAM), Giant Reports, available satellite imagery, pre-existing surveys, and open source Civil Aviation Authority publications.

4.4.3.2 AST Insertion Methods. Transport of survey teams is typically by commercial air travel but military air (MILAIR) may also be obtained when available. MILAIR travel provides for ease of transport of additional gear and allows the team to bring hazardous materials such as generators or gas powered tools. MILAIR also has fewer restrictions on total baggage and equipment. However, travel by commercial air restricts the transport of any hazardous materials and alternative equipment solutions are required. The team may choose to power electric concrete drills by either direct current (DC) or alternating current (AC) power converters that can be connected to a vehicle battery or generator. Consideration should be taken to contracting vehicles and/or generators to power equipment. Voltage capability should also be addressed, since commercially available generators may not be 110 volts/60 amperes compatible. In cases where equipment and services must be purchased on the economy at the survey location, both contracting and paying agents may be required. Access to a US Embassy or other approved bank to convert US Dollars to and from local currency will need to be addressed in the team itinerary.

4.4.3.3 Foreign Clearance Guide. Whether traveling by commercial or MILAIR, appropriate clearances must be addressed. Locations outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) may require country clearance, theatre clearance, and antiterrorism plans. Additionally, there may be airline and customs limitations on what equipment may be brought into or out of the country. If pavement evaluations incorporate additional measures such as pavement coring or soil samples, additional permits for transportation may be required and there may be restrictions on where they may be sent for testing.

Consult the Foreign Clearance Guide for specific instructions for any proposed location: https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/fcg.cfm.

4.5 Airfield Assessment. Airfield assessments are in support of theater capabilities planning for imminent contingency operations at a location. It is a process to determine airfield status and capabilities while validating airfield survey information (if available) and determine relevant support requirements. Before deployment, numerous capabilities exist to create an accurate picture of the airfield in question and associated infrastructure. A CRF provides expeditionary site plans in accordance with AFI 10-404, *Base Support and Expeditionary Site Planning*, and provides airfield information for development of the airfield suitability and restrictions report. See paragraph 2.3.2.1 of AFTTP 3-4.1, *Expeditionary Combat Support Planning*.

4.5.1 Assessment Priorities. The Go/No-Go priorities of the assessment team are dependent mission objectives as well as the condition of the airfield. The primary mission of the AT is to conduct the landing zone and airfield site surveys of austere or established airfields for imminent air operations. The AT also assesses and reports status of organic communications, facilities, fuels, pavement, force protection, ATC, and overall airfield condition/suitability; while also establishing a minimum operating strip (MOS). The following are airfield assessment priorities:

- Conduct the assessment within 24 hours of arrival.
- Captures airfield capabilities and assists in collecting/validating information to include airfield suitability.
- Airfield pavement evaluation.
- Provide the director of mobility forces (DIRMOBFOR) the "Go/No-Go" for mobility operations.
- Establish MOS.
- Complete the "Runway Open" phase of the initial ABO operations.
- Establish a provisional operations center to direct actions of the AT/CRG until CRG work centers are operational.
- Determines capability and suitability of a forward operating location to support mobility operations and sustainment of combat airpower.
- Validates current site information and captures critical information for future operations.
- CRG and overall force beddown assessment to include real estate available.
- Site the CRG beddown, receive each CRG chalk, and provide initial briefing to arriving personnel.
- Full spectrum threat assessment, to include airfield and airbase security, enemy activity/intelligence threats, terrorist threats, UXO hazards, health threats, environmental threats, and so forth.
- Priorities for the AT are flexible to the mission and highly dependent on time available. **Table 4.3**, Example Mission Task Timeline, provides a notional AT mission task timeline, illustrating the shifting priority focus as the AT mission progresses. Additionally, the priorities above shift depending on how the AT fits into the larger operation. **Figure 4.2**, Notional Assessment Team Timeline versus Senior Airfield Authority, and **Figure 4.3**, Air

Base Opening Timeline, provides notional timelines for the establishment of SAA as well as how the AT fits into the overall Air Base Opening construct.

• The critical piece of information decision makers and planners are seeking form the AT is the Go/No-Go assessment. Can the airfield accept aircraft and what are the limitations? Notionally, an initial feedback to leadership within four hours of arrival, detailing which aircraft types can be supported, should be transmitted if a viable recommendation can be made. The priorities for the airfield should be determining C-130/C-17/C-5 capability. **Figure 4.4**, Example Airfield Go/No-Go Assessment, provides an example. However, it is most likely that an initial Go/No-Go assessment may be transmitted by voice only and includes (at a minimum) the MOG for each aircraft type.

Figure 4.2 Notional Assessment Team Timeline versus Senior Airfield Authority



Figure 4.3 Air Base Opening Timeline



Figure 4.4 Airfield Go/No-Go Assessment



4.5.2 AT Insertion Methods. Dependent upon owning MAJCOM, assessment teams are able to infiltrate via airborne, air assault movement, airland, or overland employment methods. To the extent possible, equipment should mirror that of the supporting ground forces, taking full advantage of mutual support and scheme of maneuver during infiltration.

4.5.2.1 Fixed-Wing. Runway must be open/available for aircraft landing. May allow for full equipment and personnel complement to be inserted. Primary insertion method.

4.5.2.2 Helicopter. May limit team size and amount of equipment. Helicopter insertion without vehicles will reduce team mobility once they arrive on the field.

4.5.2.3 Sling-load Helicopter. Allows vehicle, equipment, and personnel to be inserted into an airfield where the runway status cannot be confirmed or is not capable of supporting aircraft without modification. AT personnel should be trained and equipped in sling load operations to be as self-sufficient as possible.

4.5.2.4 Airborne. Allows AT personnel to accompany an airborne seizure force. This is beneficial for early coordination with the seizure-force; however AT vehicles are not airdrop capable. Similar benefits/restrictions to helicopter insertion come with an increased training requirement, risk of injury, and decreased equipment capability.

4.5.2.5 Convoy. Full personnel, vehicle, and equipment complement capable of accompanying inbound convoy or ground airfield seizure force. Reliant on seizure force/parent convoy for security. Long convoy distances may be problematic if utilizing all-terrain vehicles (ATV).

4.5.2.6 Foot. If need be, minimum essential man-portable equipment and supplies (water/MREs) can be carried into target airfield. AT may accompany other ground personnel or operate independently by CR forces with appropriate force protection considerations.

4.5.2.7 Commercial Aircraft. Commercial air is considered a last resort for AT insertion. Though not completely ruled out, restrictions for hazardous cargo, baggage limitations, and so forth, must all be addressed to ensure the team will arrive. (See **paragraph 4.4.3.2**, AST Insertion Methods). Further, commercial air is prone to delays and/or cancellations during contingencies. Commercial air is not a practical contingency insertion method.

4.5.3 AT Planning Considerations.

4.5.3.1 AT Pre-Mission Planning. In addition to accumulating available airfield and location data (as in **paragraph 4.4.3.1** AST Pre-Mission Planning), overall mission objectives must be determined, while equipment and personnel are prepared for deployment. Prior preparation of equipment and standardized checklists are a good way to ensure success. Checklists should be adapted for unit specific requirements and equipment considerations. They may include topics such as overall assessment team checklists, pre-mission planning guides, airfield handoff, AT commander checklist, and AT handoff to sustainment.

4.5.3.2 Assessment personnel should meet with representatives of the airfield seizure forces/HN and follow-on forces in order to understand the supported commander's mission for the airfield and proposed layout. These meetings should occur as soon as feasible on

the AT's or follow-on force's arrival to incorporate critical airfield considerations before decisions for force/facility emplacements are made that would negatively impact airfield capability.

4.5.4 AT Task Timeline. The assessment team has a myriad of tasks to complete in a very short time period. **Table 4.3**, Example Mission Task Timeline, provides an outline of the general flow of AT activities. In addition, the assessment team should make contact with seizure forces (if applicable) and follow-on forces during the planning process and as soon as possible once on the ground to facilitate the larger ABO operation.

Table 4.3 Example Mission Task Timeline

Arrival to A + 4	Responsibilities			
	CRG Commander and AT DO	COMM	Air Operations and CE	SFS
Receive local airfield brief (if applicable)	X	X	X	X
Identify local points of contact (POC) (name, location, contact information)	X	X	X	X
Establish command and control (C2)/work center (high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles [HMMWV], tent and host nation facility)	X	X	X	X
Establish voice and data reachback communications		X		
Send on-station report and initial situation report (SITREP)	X			
Brief assessment team (AT) members the airfield rules of engagement (ROE)	X	X	X	X
Establish line of sight (LOS) communications and active land mobile radio (LMR) net		X		
Review operational plan - Checklist execution (limiting factors [LIMFAC]) - Review communications/security plan (C/S, rally point)	X	X	X	X
Arrival to A + 12	**Responsibilities**			
	CRG Commander and AT DO	**COMM**	**Air Operations and CE**	**SFS**
Complete CRG arrival checklist	X	X	X	X
Continue CRG airbase assessment checklist as directed by CRG commander	X	X	X	X
A + 12 HANDOFF or CRG ARRIVAL	**Responsibilities**			
	CRG Commander and AT DO	**COMM**	**Air Operations and CE**	**SFS**
Send go/no go report	X			
Plan and execute CRG arrival and beddown	X	X	X	X
Plan redeployment (if handing-off to follow-on forces)	X			
Complete CRG hand-off checklist (if handing-off to follow-on forces)	X	X	X	X

LEGEND:
A - Arrival Hour
AT - Assessment Team
COMM - Communications
CE - Civil Engineer
CRG - Contingency Response Group
DO - Operations Officer
X - Required Expertise for Task
SFS - Security Forces Squadron

NOTE:
1. X denotes required expertise for task and shaded sections are lead function for identified task.

4.5.5 UTC 7E1AM. An AT UTC that consists of eight personnel from a CRG representing airfield/ramp operations, civil engineering, security, and communications. Team is capable of producing a full pavement evaluation and a formal assessment report within 24 hours to assist in command-level go/no-go decisions.

4.5.5.1 Personnel. This UTC is composed of eight personnel to include an O-6 capable of assuming SAA. The remainder of the UTC includes a rated officer, airfield operations officer, civil engineers, a communications NCO, security forces NCO. The UTC may also include either an aircraft load master or ATC specialist.

4.5.5.2 Equipment. The equipment for this UTC includes two high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), two ATVs, very high frequency (VHF)/UHF capable radios, and satellite communications equipment capable of supporting the team for 120 hours.

4.5.5.3 Deployment Methods. The team may be delivered by fixed-wing, rotary-wing, sea-lift, or convoy insertion methods.

4.5.6 UTC 7E1AK. An airborne assessment team/UTC consisting of 12 personnel, capable of fixed/rotary wing airland infiltration, to include airdrop, or overland employment into a bare base location. In addition to 7E1AM personnel, 7E1AK also includes air traffic control, medical, and logistics readiness.

4.6 Joint Assessment Team. The JAT consists of eight Air Force 7E1AM personnel and Army RPOE personnel to coordinate operations and communications. See **Figure 4.5**, JTF-PO (APOD) JAT Composition. The team is specifically tasked to assess airfield capabilities in support of JTF-PO operations. The surface element for a JTF-PO is capable of supporting operations at the APOD and one FN. The JTF-PO surface element possesses the following core capabilities:

- Command, control, and communications (C3)
- Distribution network assessment
- Passenger and cargo transfer
- Movement control
- In-transit visibility (ITV) and RFID
- Node and container/pallet/equipment management

4.6.1 CRF Priorities. From the CRF perspective, the priorities for airfield assessment in a JTF-PO scenario still focused on the initial airfield Go/No-Go assessment for the DIRMOBFOR. The APOD or seaport of debarkation will be assessed by Army or Navy teams per respective service functional requirements. Once these assessments have been completed and combined, there are additional follow-on requirements that the JAT will have to assess in order to determine overall transportation and planning requirements. Reference the JTF-PO concept of operations (CONOPS) for additional guidance.

4.6.1.1 Follow-on joint planning and transportation considerations are incorporated into the Joint Assessment Team Checklist that may be found in the *Joint Task Force-Port Opening (Aerial Port of Debarkation) Concept of Operations*.

Figure 4.5 JTF-PO (APOD) JAT Composition



4.7 Security/FP Concerns. The AT will be required to provide their own security/force protection unless augmented by other CRF, sister services, host nations, or coalition forces. Transition from seizure forces to the CRG main body may create a shortfall of airfield security. Airbase security is an additional concern, as CRG may not have personnel to manage airbase as well as airfield security. Integration with seizure forces to plan the FP posture and airbase/airfield security posture is critical. AT UTCs include security forces personnel to provide expertise to assist AT leaders and CRE DO in matters of FP concerns and team security. At a minimum a rally point, the buddy system, and a defensive position should be established to ensure team security. AT SF member should provide guidance in the development of the AT escape and evasion plan as well as brief and coordinate with local Embassy personal or recovery agencies supporting the AO. SF member should also provide guidance to arming condition and rules of engagement during the AT mission in all operational environments. FP guidance should be coordinated with CE during both AT and CRF beddown location selection. Refer to **Attachment 2**, Force Protection for further TTP guidance.

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CHAPTER 5

SEIZURE FORCE/CR FORCE INTEGRATION

5.1 Introduction. Transition from seizure force to CRF initial airfield and/or airbase opening begins either with elements of the CRF imbedded or non-imbedded with the seizure force. Seizure force operations may be characterized by forcible entry such as an amphibious assault, airborne assault, or air assault operation led by joint land and/or maritime forces or a deliberate land offensive operation. Non-imbedded CRFs are those elements that are not part of the planned assault but are called upon to provide airfield and/or airbase opening capabilities following seizure by joint land and/or maritime forces.

5.2 Forcible Entry. As defined in JP 3-18, *Joint Forcible Entry*, forcible entry is a joint military operation conducted against armed opposition to gain entry into the territory of an adversary. The entry is accomplished by seizing a lodgment as rapidly as possible in order to enable the conduct of follow-on operations or conduct a singular operation. A lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations (a lodgment may be an airhead, a beachhead, or a combination thereof). Lodgment requirements depend upon the objective(s) of the overall operation or larger campaign. A lodgment may have established facilities and infrastructure.

5.2.1 Joint Operations. Forcible entry operations are joint in nature. There are many service-unique forcible entry capabilities, techniques, and procedures the Nation has developed since World War II, primarily consisting of amphibious assault, airborne assault, and air assault operations. Despite these service-oriented capabilities, techniques, and procedures, forcible entry operations are inherently joint as evidenced by the need for using resources (e.g., C2, transportation, sustainment) from all elements of DOD and often other resources (e.g., multinational, other government agencies).

5.2.2 Joint Operations Phases. Forcible entry operations are normally conducted during the "Seize the Initiative" or "Dominate" phase of a joint operation. See **Figure 5.1**, Joint Operation Phase. Within the context of these phases established by a higher-level JFC, the forcible entry operation commander may establish additional phases that fit the forcible entry CONOPS. Forcible entry operations may be planned and executed in the five phases: Phase I - Preparation and Deployment, Phase II - Assault, Phase III - Stabilization of the Lodgment, Phase IV - Introduction of Follow on Forces, Phase V - Termination of Transition Operations.

5.2.2.1 Elements of CRF may participate in all the phases depending on the scope of the CR operation; however, JP 3-18 specifically addresses CRF in Phase IV of a forcible entry operation. See **Figure 5.2**, Forcible Entry Operation Phases. For example, a CR assessment team from USAFE or PACAF may jump in during an airborne operation with the seizure force during Phase II - "Assault" or an AMC CR assessment team may airland in with additional seizure forces after an initial airborne operation. Operational art may require elements of the CRF, such as the QFEPF/Phoenix Fist, to airland during a forcible entry or convoy in during Phase III - "Stabilization of the Lodgment" prior to arrival of the CRF main body if the seizure force lacks adequate airfield security.

NOTE: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, defines operational art as "The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment-to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means."

Figure 5.1 Joint Operation Phases



Figure 5.2 Forcible Entry Operation Phases



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5.3 Joint Planning. Joint planning is conducted through a disciplined process by policies and procedures established in the JOPES and joint operation planning process (JOPP). See **Figure 5.3**, The Joint Operation Planning Process. In addition to facilitating contingency planning, these processes have additional procedures for crisis action planning and for time-sensitive development of operation orders when a forcible entry operation requirement occurs with little or no warning. See JP 3-18 for additional planning considerations.

Figure 5.3 The Joint Operation Planning Process



5.3.1 CR Planning with Operational Art. Operational art and unit specific standard operating procedures (SOP) determine which element of the seizure force seizes and/or operates the airfield. Whatever the mode of forcible entry used, it is imperative that the CRF provide a planner for the deliberate joint planning process at the earliest possible time. This will ensure that the CRF capabilities, mission-essential task list (METL), and requirements are vetted early, allowing the CRF components to be sequenced appropriately within the seizure force. During this initial planning, the SAA should be decided upon and when or if a transition will occur.

5.3.1.1 Consideration should be made regarding the rank of the CR planner attending the conference. If the seizure force and operation planning is being conducted at Brigade or higher echelon, it is recommended the CR planner is at least a field grade officer. Army planners at this echelon are often field grade or senior field grade officers; thus, a CRF field grade officer will better be able to present, negotiate, and coordinate requisite mission requirements.

5.3.1.2 If an AMLO is assigned with the seizure force, this person is an excellent source to help determine and make contact with appropriate seizure force points of contact. The AMLO may be available to facilitate formal introductions. Stipulations such as planning date, type, and size of the seizure force will determine the echelon of staff the CRF planner will integrate with. In some cases, it may be a G5 or S5 staff, other times it may be the G3 or S3 staff. The AMLO can help make this determination.

5.3.1.3 It is vital for CR planners to be part of the planning process to maximize effort in a combat situation. This reinforces the "train together-fight together" concept. For example, consider a requirement where the 7E1AM/7E1AK might need to plus up the team with added QFEPF members to ensure a safer environment to conduct the airfield assessment. Additionally, the joint planning processes ensure seizure force security augmentation for the CRF is taken into consideration based on METT-TC.

5.3.1.3.1 No matter the mode of the seizure force, planners will need to know the size and phase requirements of the CRFs. CRF planners should be prepared to discuss details regarding their requirements. Additionally, planners should be prepared to propose priorities for their chalks with regards to overall seizure force chalk priorities. A product such as a load plan is a good source for CR planners to present their force requirements, and helps to visualize chalk priority.

5.3.1.4 The CRF commander can expect to participate in all pre-operation rehearsals. Additionally, the CRF commander and planners can expect to produce deliverables, such as slides or annexes, as dictated by the operation. The specific type and scope of deliverables is largely determined by the scope of the operation and seizure force unit specific requirements.

5.3.2 Additional Planning Considerations.

5.3.2.1 Amphibious Assault. See **paragraph 5.3.1.3**.

5.3.2.2 Airborne Assault.

5.3.2.2.1 In some airborne operations, the Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB) may seize the airfield and the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) operates the airfield. Additionally, in some operations you may see elements of both seizing and operating the airfield. It is important that this determination and relationship is understood during the joint planning for the operation because the commander of the unit operating the airfield is likely the first echelon of command the assessment team (AMC's/PACAF's 7E1AM) or (USAFE 7E1AK) commander will meet first.

5.3.2.2.2 Use the sample checklist in **Attachment 12**, Sample Handoff (Seizure Force to CRG) Checklist, to assist with planning before the operation commences planning consideration should be made that the hand off may be conducted while still under direct fire of enemy forces.

5.3.2.2.3 Air Assault. See **paragraph 5.3.1.3**.

5.3.2.2.4 Conventional (Land) Assault. See **paragraph 5.3.1.3**.

5.4 CRF Imbedded with the Joint Seizure Force.

5.4.1 Assessment Team Imbedded with the Seizure Force. If the assessment team is imbedded with the seizure force, this must be planned with the seizure force well before the operation commences. This is especially important if the operation is an airborne forcible entry operation. The USAFE CRG has an airborne capability. This chalk must be sequenced or integrated into the seizure force chalks. If the 7E1AM/7E1AK is non-airborne capable, use METT-TC to consider the battlefield environment to determine which airland chalk the 7E1AM/7E1AK should be inserted. In some cases, it may be advantageous to insert the

7E1AM/7E1AK on the initial chalks. In other cases, such as non-permissive, it may be advantageous to allow the seizure force to build combat power before inserting the 7E1AM/7E1AK. Concurrence with the seizure force and operational art will ultimately decide CRF sequencing.

5.4.1.1 Initial Battlefield Actions.

5.4.1.1.1 Coordination with the AMLO and/or STTs. With some operations, an AMLO or STT will be incorporated into the joint seizure force. This person is an excellent initial source and point of contact on the battlefield for the 7E1AM/7E1AK commander. This person likely will be the first Air Force member on the battlefield the 7E1AM/7E1AK commander makes contact with. The AMLO or STT can provide a situation report (SITREP) of the battlefield to include who is the land force unit commander on the airfield and help facilitate the initial meeting between the 7E1AM/7E1AK commander, the airfield land force commander, and a follow on meeting with the Brigade commander if necessary. See AFI 13-106, *Air Mobility Liaison Officers (AMLO),* for more details regarding AMLO roles and responsibilities.

5.4.1.1.1.1 It is expected that the AMLO will make every effort to meet the assessment team commander or CRF commander on the battlefield before the CR team makes contact with the land force unit commander, or designated representative occupying the airfield. This meeting may occur immediately after a jump (if USAFE 7E1AK team) or the arrival of an airland chalk. Conditions dependent, the AMLO can have completed and compiled requisite information listed in the sample checklist in **Attachment 12**.

5.4.1.1.1.2 If STT provided initial air traffic control of the airfield or landing zone, coordination between the CRF will need to be complete before the formal battlefield hand over is complete. In some operations, STTs may be the only Air Force representative on the ground. CRF airfield operations officer and Air Traffic Controllers will be briefed by an STT before assuming control over airspace and airfield.

5.4.1.1.2 Coordination with the tactical air control party (TACP) team. TACP teams control and coordinate the Air Force close air support (CAS) requirements for the seizure force. CRF and TACP relationships should be worked out during the joint planning process. This is especially important if battlefield conditions require TACP support after the CRF assumes control of the airfield or landing zone. For example, the tactical situation changes requiring CAS to assist with the ingress of mobility aircraft into a “hot” landing zone.

5.4.1.1.3 Coordination with the Land Force Unit Commander. The first land force unit commander encountered at the airfield may be an O-5 or lower. Typically, the brigade combat team (BCT) commander, O-6, will be heavily involved in combat operations and may not be in close proximity to the airfield. Even if the 7E1AM/7E1AK commander is an O-6, the corresponding land force commander O-6 may not be available initially. The AMLO can help the 7E1AM/7E1AK commander understand who they need to meet with and help facilitate a meeting with the BCT commander when conditions on the battlefield are conducive. The 7E1AM/7E1AK commander

will want to receive a SITREP from the land force unit commander, if an AMLO is not part of the operation or was unable to compile information detailed in the sample "Handoff (Seizure Force to CRG) Checklist" before beginning their assessment. Additionally, the 7E1AM/7E1AK commander will want to summarize and discuss the scope of the 7E1AM/7E1AK mission and their requirements. This discussion should not be new since it should have been worked out during the joint planning process prior to the operation. Discussion points to consider are the threat environment, location of the enemy, condition of the airfield or landing zone, and sustainment requirements.

5.4.1.1.3.1 It is important that the command relationships between the CRF commander and seizure force commander are determined during the joint planning process. This becomes important if the tactical situation is too dangerous to grant the assessment team access to the airfield or landing zone to conduct an assessment. Operational art and METT-TC will always dictate actions on the battlefield.

5.4.2 Follow-on CRF Imbedded with the Seizure Force. In addition to the 7E1AM/7E1AK, the subsequent echelons of the CRF will need to be phased with the seizure force airland chalks, if it is an airborne operation. As with 7E1AM/7E1AK considerations discussed in **paragraph 5.4.1**, operational art will dictate the chalk order to ensure the follow on CRFs are sequenced with the seizure force.

5.4.2.1 Battlefield Actions.

5.4.2.1.1 Transition from Seizure Force to CRF. Operational art and scope of operations will dictate if the seizure force is moving forward to follow on operations, or staying at the airfield. If the seizure force is not moving forward, it is important that real estate deconfliction on the airfield is negotiated early. The AMLO can assist with this prior and/or during the operation.

5.4.2.1.2 Before the airfield can be handed off to a CRF, and the seizure force moves forward for follow on objectives or operations, a formal handoff between the land force unit commander and the CRF commander must take place. Both commanders should consider security posture and whether an element of the seizure force needs to stay behind to augment Phoenix Fist. See **Attachment 12**, Handoff (Seizure Force to CRG) Checklist.

5.4.2.1.3 If the operation is planned for an element of the seizure force to remain behind to provide or augment CRF force protection requirements, the command relationship needs to be coordinated during the planning process. Additionally, the battlespace owner will need to be coordinated during the joint planning process if a command element of the seizure force remains at airfield or landing zone. It is plausible for some operations to expect the CRF commander to carry SAA duties and responsibilities, but not "own" the battlespace.

5.5 CRF Non-Imbedded with the Joint Seizure Force.

5.5.1 Initial Battlefield Actions.

5.5.1.1 Coordination with the AMLO and/or STT. See **paragraph 5.4.1.1.1.2**.

5.5.1.2 Coordination with the TACP team. See **paragraph 5.4.1.1.2**.

5.5.1.3 Coordination with the Land Force Unit Commander. Operational art and scope of operations will dictate if the seizure force is moving forward to follow on operations, or staying at the airfield. If the seizure force is not moving forward, it is important that real estate deconfliction on the airfield is negotiated early. The AMLO can assist with this prior and/or during the operation. The difference with this type of operation is joint planning may or may not have been conducted before commencement of the operation. If joint planning was not conducted, a more thorough initial battlefield meeting will be required.

5.5.1.4 Transition from Seizure Force to CRF. See **paragraph 5.4.2.1.1** through **paragraph 5.4.2.1.2**.

5.6 CRF to Air Expeditionary Group/Air Expeditionary Wing Transition. When conditions warrant or operational art and joint planning dictate, the airfield or airbase can be handed over to follow on forces. See **Chapter 10**, Airbase Transition, Redeployment, and Reconstitution of this publication for the transition discussion and considerations.

CHAPTER 6

MISSION EXECUTION

6.1 Introduction. Opening the airbase involves CRF who provide "first-responder" forces for airfield opening to the JFC regardless of service or mission of the field being opened. Chapter 6 of AFI 10-401, *Air Force Operations Planning and Execution*, explains the AETF FM Construct for Open the Airbase. The forces within these modules are designed to build upon each other in order to bring an airbase to operational status. In Force Module 1, Open the Airbase, CRFs will likely be the first Air Force presence on an expeditionary airfield regardless of how the airfield is gained (i.e., seizure or acceptance from a host nation) or which follow-on US or multinational entity will operate the airfield. CRGs are specifically designed and created to initiate and conduct airbase opening, which is the process of turning a runway and surrounding environment into a location capable of supporting an operational mission. In this manner, CRFs bridge the gap between seizure forces and the follow-on/expeditionary combat support forces contained with Force Module 2, Command and Control, and Force Module 3, Establish the Airbase.

6.1.1 Open the Airbase Milestones. There are four major milestones during the Open the Airbase FM. See **Figure 6.1**, CRG Phases during Open the Airbase.

6.1.1.1 Seize the Airfield. Airfield seizure is conducted by the US Army, US Marines, or Special Operations Forces.

6.1.1.2 Runway Open. The runway is open when the first mobility aircraft is cleared to land and continues until runway, taxiway, and ramp for the intended mission are clear and monitored; airfield is secure and capable of supporting airlift operation.

6.1.1.3 Airfield is Open. The airfield is considered open when sufficient ramps, taxiways, and facilities are available to support the intended operational mission (e.g., CAS, offensive counterair [OCA], air refueling).

6.1.1.4 Airbase is Open. An airbase is considered "opened" when sufficient real estate has been secured to allow for the beddown of combat and combat support forces. Open the airbase is considered complete once like forces are in place to extend and then replace the initial open the airbase force capability.

Figure 6.1 CRG Phases During Open the Airbase



6.1.2 Purpose. CRFs may be called upon to execute missions ranging in scale from small teams to large joint forces, in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments, and across the spectrum of conflict. Therefore, CRFs are, by design, modular and scalable. However, sound mission execution principles apply to any CRF, regardless of size and mission set. This chapter will address mission execution with a modular and scalable approach, and focuses on the core mission sets that contribute directly to achieving the commander's desired effects and end-states. This chapter also assumes that the initial airfield surveys and assessments have been completed.

6.1.2.1 Intent. This chapter is intended to provide new CR personnel a detailed understanding of how CRFs will be employed. Specific functional "Best Practices" are located where applicable in order to illustrate past successes or lessons learned. These techniques may work in one situation but not another as CRF are expected to respond to a wide variety of missions which will require on the spot problem solving.

6.1.2.2 Scope. This chapter first covers basic techniques for any size CRF arrival and considerations that should be followed by any CRF commander or team lead. The following sections detail more specific roles, responsibilities, and considerations for different functional areas.

6.2 Planning Concepts for Commanders. In order to effectively transition from in-garrison to deployed operations, the deployed roles, and command structure should be established early and exercised often.

6.2.1 CRF Manning. Manning and mission conflicts often require "rainbowing" mission teams from various units. The unit submitting members to a roster are responsible for the basic mission readiness of members.

6.2.1.1 Assignment to battle rosters should be made as soon as possible for mission deconfliction and preparation.

6.2.1.2 Once assigned to a mission, that mission commander may assign critical tasks that take priority over garrison responsibilities. Coordination must be done to minimize adverse effects on the Airmen due to scheduling conflicts.

6.2.2 Initial Planning. The deploying commander should convene a planning cell or staff meeting to develop mission plans and synch with HHQ battle rhythm. See **Figure 6.2**, Battle Rhythm Concept. During alert or heightened postures, these meetings are usually weekly, but may be more often in crisis prep, even just once in a cold start deployment scenario.

6.2.2.1 The planning cell should produce a decision brief for the commander including mission analysis, and COAs as outlined in **Chapter 2**, Mission Analysis. In crisis modes, this may be concurrent with execution.

6.2.2.2 The planning cell should include elements remaining in garrison to continue and update planning while the force is en route and to begin planning redeployment in conjunction with HHQ and the fielded team. For small teams, this may simply be the operations officer and unit deployment manager (UDM), or an entire standing battle staff for major deployments.

6.2.3 Planning Considerations. There are numerous ways to plan most missions - CR planning is no different. Here are some general techniques for all levels of planning.

6.2.3.1 Keep some personal distance to prevent the commander from becoming another staff officer, but always brief the chain of command in a timely manner.

6.2.3.2 Set-out (or seek out) commander's intent and have critical vector checks in the planning process to stay aligned with the staff.

6.2.3.3 Develop and review RFIs as they are answered to redirect intent to the staff as required. Also, build commander's critical information requirement (CCIR) and priority intelligence requirement (PIR) lists.

6.2.3.4 Create an atmosphere where collaborative efforts are expected and respected. The staff can create and deconflict solutions more effectively than single planners.

6.2.3.5 Coordinate with local authorities (DOV, wing commander) and HHQ throughout the planning process to remove barriers, request waivers, and update orders/FRAGOs as required.

6.2.4 Establish a Battle Rhythm. See **Figure 6.2**, Battle Rhythm Concept.

Figure 6.2 Battle Rhythm Concept



6.2.4.1 Lay a foundation for battle rhythm before deploying.

6.2.4.1.1 Establish processes and SOPs that facilitate making actions routine. This frees commanders from the routine business allowing them time to analyze new info, complete other tasks, and so forth.

6.2.4.1.2 Ensure schedule, drills and briefings mesh with local battle rhythm.

6.2.4.1.3 Work toward parallel planning, not sequential planning. For instance, conduct reconnaissance of new locations while the staff is conducting initial planning and prep. Plan for adjustments in the schedule based on new info.

6.2.4.2 Nest higher and lower timelines.

6.2.4.2.1 Must be top-driven.

6.2.4.2.2 Requires constant attention and frequent updating.

6.2.4.2.3 Should be posted in a prominent location in the command center.

6.2.4.2.4 Allow for travel time to events. Traveling in daylight takes one half or less of the time to accomplish the same at night.

6.2.4.2.5 Incorporate AARs and hot wash events into timelines.

6.2.4.2.6 Designate a leader in the command post (CP) to monitor and enforce the timeline, usually the DO or A/J3. The timeline and changes must be briefed during updates and shift-change briefings.

6.2.4.3 Establish work/rest plans for leadership.

6.2.4.3.1 Establish windows for leaders to rest and sleep based the nested timeline and mission requirements.

6.2.4.3.2 Allow for overlap of leadership between rest periods.

6.2.4.3.3 Plan for the staff to update the CRF commander after rest periods. Include intelligence briefings, operations outlook, and significant events.

6.2.4.3.4 Establish criteria to wake senior leaders when their presence is required as circumstances change.

Figure 6.3 Local Battle Rhythm Depiction from a Joint Exercise



6.3 Preparing the Force. No matter the size and complexity of the deployment, the CRF commander must clearly define the essential tasks and how they want them accomplished. This can be even more critical for a smaller team, or those traveling by commercial means, because the equipment and personnel UTCs may be very tailored. If the concept of operations isn't clear, the team may find itself without mission critical parts or skill sets. This starts in the planning stage with functional leadership and is usually published to the entire force thru the pre-departure brief and commander's intent.

6.3.1 Pre-departure Brief. The pre-departure brief may in fact be several briefings or have several parts.

6.3.1.1 Administrative and Training. This part covers the orders process, cleans up any special training requirements, equipment issue, general force protection matters (e.g.,

malaria medications). This can be covered throughout an alert cycle or periodically in garrison as posture changes.

6.3.1.2 Mission and Concept of Operations. This includes overall mission overview, specific taskings, deployment methods/timing, tailoring of forces, arrival actions (e.g., infill, set-up).

6.3.1.3 When complex or critical, rehearsal of concept drills are a good way to prepare. They can happen at home station, at an en route location or even at location prior to the start of operations.

6.3.2 Commander's Intent. One way to communicate commander's intent is to develop CCIRs and PIRs.

6.3.2.1 A standing set of CCIRs/PIRs should be maintained for in-garrison mission analysis and rapid deployment missions. Review regularly. Pre-existing information requirements and action triggers can shorten the commander's decision timeline in critical situations.

6.3.2.2 CCIR and PIRs should feed the decision process of the commander and their staff. The TTP in these chapters include information usually applicable to any mission and funnel that information to the commander for decisions. They are not always applicable and the list is by no means all-inclusive.

6.3.2.3 CCIRs may be unclassified or classified, or some of each. The mission will dictate how much to share.

6.3.2.4 In humanitarian relief scenarios, letting partners know what is important to our support mission aids trust and success.

6.3.2.5 In any scenario, force protection and secondary missions may best remain in a classified environment.

6.3.2.6 PIRs usually remain classified as the perception of intelligence gathering during cooperative missions is a political misstep undermining our military and national security objectives.

6.4 Command Relationships and Authority. It is critical CRF leaders fully understand and craft their command relationships to complete the mission. The relationships can be complex and have subtle to severe impacts on the mission and CRF personnel.

6.4.1 Expected Command Relationships. USTRANSCOM CRF (AD) usually do not CHOP and remain under Air Force Transportation Component AFTRANS (AMC or 18AF) authority.

6.4.1.1 Under JTF-PO, USTC retains OPCON, tactical control (TACON) to 18AF (AFTRANS) as defined by the standing OPORD.

6.4.1.2 Total Force CRF usually remains under parent NAF or state Adjutant General/ National Guard Bureau (AG/NGB) unless formally activated.

6.4.1.3 If supporting a domestic response (i.e., DSCA), both Title 10 and Title 32 forces may CHOP to 1AF (Northern Command [NORTHCOM]). This relationship will be complex and unique, and defined by a FRAGO to the standing DSCA OPORD.

6.4.2 Command Relationship Considerations. CRF commanders may be granted authority to oversee operations and/or support of multiple locations within a particular AOR.

6.4.2.1 CRF commanders may forward deploy CR team members to facilitate mission movement, such as aerial port teams to recover pallets, nets, evaluate passenger (PAX) screening, and coordinate operations schedules. This movement is normally of short duration under TACON.

6.4.2.2 Unless assigned to a contingency response-task force (CR-TF) commander, the main body commander is responsible for force protection, support, and movement.

6.4.2.3 This commander may have TACON or specified ADCON of deployed CRF, but might simply have direct liaison authorized for mission coordination when an AMD or other CRF commander is not designated.

NOTE: Command relationships (COMREL) can be confusing and can change often. Know who the CRF works for - coordinate with everyone. See **Figure 6.4**, COMREL Chart from Unified Response for an example of complex command relationships.

Figure 6.4 COMREL Chart from Unified Response (Haiti Earthquake Relief 2010)



6.4.3 Senior Airfield Authority. The SAA is an individual designated with responsibility for the control, operation, and maintenance of an airfield to include the runways, associated

taxiways, parking ramps, land, and facilities whose proximity affect airfield operations. The CRF commander may be designated as the SAA at the deployed location (until relieved by an individual designated by the JFC). The SAA is responsible for all aspects of airfield operations:

6.4.3.1 Transition Authority. The transfer of responsibility generally occurs when the incoming force can meet or exceed the existing capability. The SAA will need to establish their position clearly in the local command structure in order to facilitate a seamless transition.

6.4.3.2 Build Command and HN relationships. These relationships are critical and may influence operations if not clearly understood. Relationships must be built with local embassies, diplomats, or other HN officials to facilitate coordination on items such as overflight and access agreements or arrangements that suit the foreseeable time frame of operations. Military command relationships are equally complex and may vary greatly depending on supporting and supported command relationships.

6.4.3.3 Establishment and Enforcement of Airfield Criteria. All airfield construction and sighting of airfield support should be coordinated with the SAA to ensure it does not encroach on runway/taxiway/apron clear zones. Certain functions (e.g., maintenance, ARFF) may need immediate flight line access for mission accomplishment while others (e.g., life support, flight operations) can operate away from the airfield.

6.4.3.4 Establish Airfield Security. Existing airfield opening forces can have some degree of organic security for airfield access control and limited self-defense. However, force protection for the expanded base area and patrols for indirect fire (IDF) stand-off are often dependent on CRF forces or more robust SF UTCs as dictated by mission.

6.4.3.5 Airfield Expansion Plans. The SAA should develop an airfield master plan that captures requirements for planned airfield expansion and beddown of potential additional missions. Airfield pavements (e.g., runways, taxiways, aprons) capable of supporting aircraft movement and parking are usually scarce and finite resources. As such, the use of airfield pavements for non-aircraft related activities (e.g., cargo storage, maintenance/support facilities) should be limited to the maximum extent possible.

6.4.4 Scalable CRF Commander Responsibilities. No matter the size of the CRF employed, the commander must assume responsibility for all aspects of the mission planning, execution and CRF support if not specifically withheld by HHQ or assumed by the supported unit.

6.4.4.1 Contingency Response Group Commander. The CRG commander may be deployed as the mission commander for CRFs at one or multiple locations within a designated AOR (TACON). They will make decisions not specifically assigned to higher authority.

6.4.4.1.1 CRG Commander Roles and Responsibilities. The CRG commander is responsible for the safety and welfare of the forces under his/her command. They must also ensure continuous security of CRG resources from home station departure until return.

6.4.4.1.2 CRG Commander Transition Force Responsibility. CRG commander ensures a smooth transition from seizure forces to CRG forces and from CRG forces to follow-on/sustainment forces. Additional actions may include initiating and guiding open the airbase operations in accordance with the COCOM's direction.

6.4.4.1.3 CRG Commander Sustainment and Re-deployment Responsibility. The CRG commander is responsible for requesting augmentation from other functional areas as the mission dictates (e.g., security forces, medical, contracting, finance, CE readiness, explosive ordnance disposal, life support, public health). They also ensure request for forces are initiated for follow-on/replacement forces if required.

6.4.4.2 Contingency Response Element Commander. The CRE commander is ultimately responsible for all aspects of air mobility operations. They serve as the focal point for air operations C2, aircraft maintenance, and aerial port at the designated airfield. A CRE commander may also assume the roles and responsibilities of a CRG commander, if trained and certified in their absence.

6.4.4.2.1 CRE Commander Force Arrival Responsibilities. The CRE commander ensures initial reach-back communications are established and facilitates the arrival of additional CR personnel during an airfield opening.

6.4.4.2.2 CRE Commander Airfield Status Responsibilities. The CRE commander reviews all pertinent information to ensure the airfield is ready for initial operating capability (IOC).

6.4.4.3 Contingency Response Element Operations Officer. The CRE/DO is primarily responsible for all aspects of air mobility operations at the designated airfield. CRE/DO may assume the roles and responsibilities of the CRE commander, if trained and certified in their absence.

6.4.4.3.1 CRE/DO Arrival Actions. The CRE/DO primarily focuses on the set-up of the applicable command center after arrival. This includes ensuring appropriate communications systems are established and Mobile C2 controllers are ready to initiate Quick Reaction Checklists if required.

6.4.4.3.2 CRE/DO Sustainment Actions. CRE/DOs must continually ensure the operations work-center is prepared for any type of contingency such as low light operations. They must also direct hardening actions as necessary and ensure potential evacuation measures are set.

6.4.4.3.3 CRE/DO Airfield Operations Actions. The CRE/DO collects all pertinent information to ensure the airfield is ready for IOC and ensures efficient and safe ramp operations throughout operations.

6.5 Command Structure. The tactical command structure should be set prior to deployment and anticipate integration with a joint or expanded HHQ structure. This scheme may be employed in garrison for mission prep. Dependent on mission and force composition, the staff factions may be combined to offer the best oversight of functional areas. See **Figure 6.5**, Example of a CRE Structure Using the A-Staff Scheme.

Figure 6.5 Example of a CRE Structure Using the A-Staff Scheme



6.5.1 Joint Organization. An Air Base Opening team is the largest CRF structure and is readily supplemented by the RPOE to form the J-staff for JTF-PO.

6.5.2 Organizational Structure Considerations. As the CRF scales in size, the more familiar staff functions must be combined into dual-hatted positions. Even in a CRT-sized team, the additional support components need to coordinate thru the core C2 leadership via an organized scheme. See **Figure 6.6**, Example of a CRE Structure.

Figure 6.6 Example of a CRE Structure



6.6 Ingress, Arrival, and Initial Actions.

6.6.1 Ingress. The CRF may deploy to the mission objective area through a number of means, the most likely of which are: military fixed or rotary wing air, commercial air, military convoy, or commercial ground vehicle. Often, the CRF will employ a combination of methods to travel to the objective area. For example, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, USAF Open the Airbase forces [air mobility operations groups (AMOG) versus CRGs] travelled to the theater via commercial and MILAIR, and then proceeded to follow on destinations through US Army rotary wing aircraft or by embedding in US Army ground convoys. The advantages and disadvantages of each method of travel are listed in **Table 6.1**, Methods of Travel.

Table 6.1 Methods of Travel

Type	Advantages	Disadvantages
Commercial Air	Predictable schedule.	Equipment limitations, costs, may not deliver team to final destination.
Military Air	Will fit contingency response (CR) equipment, can deliver team to final destination.	CR may not have priority.
Rotary Wing	Ability to land almost anywhere.	Limited capacity to carry passengers and equipment.
Military Convoy	Limited restrictions on means of access.	Limited capacity to carry passengers and equipment.
Commercial Vehicle	Ability to travel inconspicuously.	Limited capacity to carry passengers and equipment little to no protection longer travel time.
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6.6.1.1 Ingress Coordination. CRF leads should coordinate their team's ingress and arrival with the reception party and the insertion team lead as early as feasible and update their arrival status as required. The reception party may consist of other CRFs, joint or coalition partners, USG officials (e.g., DOS), or host nation representatives. Regardless, “early and often” coordination is advantageous, as conditions at the objective area such as threat level, weather, and airfield accessibility, may change after mission planning commences, or while en route.

6.6.1.2 Tactical Ingress. Ingress actions that are constrained by threats, time, or other limiting factors, should be thoroughly pre-briefed. Assign team leads and designate rally points and initial movement direction to ensure personnel accountability. This becomes more difficult at night and in adverse terrain. Expediters may be needed to walk and guide vehicles in areas of high grass or other limited visibility. Rally and movement plan should ensure team moves away from areas that restrict aircraft movement. Positive communication with the aircrew is needed to signal the team is clear. See **Figure 6.7**, Ingress and Rally Plan of AM Proficiency Deployment to North Field.

Figure 6.7 Ingress and Rally Plan of AM Proficiency Deployment to North Field



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6.6.1.3 Overland Ingress. All overland ingress/convoy planning should be coordinated between CRF operations officer and the defense force commander (DFC)/flight chief. It is recommended that the CRF designate, and assign, staff responsibility for road movements to a "convoy leader." The joint operations center (JOC)/tactical operations center (TOC) controls and coordinates all road movements.

6.6.1.3.1 Planning Factors for Mounted Movement.

6.6.1.3.1.1 A reconnaissance of the route is conducted whenever possible. The reconnaissance team (AFOSI, maybe supported by SF completes a route report and submits it to the fusion cell (S-2).

6.6.1.3.1.2 Vehicles need to be carefully prepared prior to conducting a convoy. The number of vehicles will be based on METT-TC. Planning for convoys follows the OPORD format. Assigned AFOSI and SF personnel can advise on how to accomplish.

6.6.1.3.2 Convoy Composition.

6.6.1.3.2.1 Two to six vehicles based on mission requirements.

6.6.1.3.3 Vehicle Positions. See **Figure 6.8**, Vehicle Personnel Positions.

Figure 6.8 Vehicle Personnel Positions



6.6.1.3.4 Convoy members must be briefed on their specific roles and responsibilities. When time allows, the convoy leader should conduct rehearsals for all members that include drills for all reasonable scenarios. Primary and alternate routes will be mapped and each convoy member should be familiar with them. A copy of all routes will be kept in the TOC.

6.6.1.3.5 Any friendly force operating in the area of the convoy should be coordinated with prior to the convoy's movement. Any available quick reaction forces (QRF) should be aware of the convoy's route and time schedule with a planned means of communication.

6.6.1.3.6 Rally Points.

6.6.1.3.6.1 Establishing rally points.

- Rally points are locations that are pre-designated in the convoy or bug out plan and are used for accountability or contingency during those operations. There should be a minimum of three rally points designated in the operations order. Pre-departure, en route (maybe multiples depending on distance traveled), and objective rally points.
- Rally points will be established by the DFC or convoy commander.

6.6.1.3.6.2 Executing.

- The first person into the rally point records the time of arrival.

- The senior man in the rally point, places individuals in security positions and maintains accountability. All individuals entering the rally point are challenged.
- After a pre-determined amount of time has passed, the senior man will:
  - Continue the mission if the minimum amount of personnel and equipment is present to accomplish the mission.
  - Contact higher HQ for instructions if the minimum personnel and equipment are not present or the situation prevents completing the mission.
  - If the rally point becomes untenable, the senior man will move the unit to the next rally point back and repeat the process above.

6.6.1.3.6.3 Occupy an objective rally point (ORP).

- The ORP is a point out of sight, sound, and small arms range of the objective and is established to make final preparations for a mission and to conduct leader's recons. The ORP is tentative until the objective is located.
- It is generally located from 200 meters to 400 meters from the objective in good visibility and 100 meters to 200 meters in poor visibility.

6.6.1.4 Sling-Load Ingress.

6.6.1.4.1 Purpose. The helicopter sling load method of carrying cargo and equipment overcomes many of the obstacles that hinder other modes of movement. CRF can utilize helicopter sling load during insertion of AT and equipment and for movement of supplies and equipment over the battlefield. This method was utilized extensively during 818 CRG's deployments to Haiti and Pakistan to execute vertical replenishment of supplies. TM 4-48.09, *Multiservice Helicopter Sling Load: Basic Operations and Equipment* is the parent guidance for all sling load operations. For the purpose of this TTP, CR personnel performing sling operations will be referenced as a sling load team (SLT). TTP in this section have been compiled after performing multiple sling load operations with US Army Pathfinders and USMC helicopter support teams (HST).

6.6.1.4.2 Certification and Training. Proper training of personnel involved in sling load operations is essential in maintaining an adequate level of proficiency and knowledge, especially in the areas of safety, rigging, and sling load inspection. There are two types of instruction for sling load operations, training to be certified to inspect and sign off a sling load and the training (familiarization) to perform a sling load hook-up. Sling Load certification should not be limited to only AM/AK personnel. Aircraft maintenance and aerial port personnel are extremely advantageous as SLT members due to their extensive core training with aircraft marshalling, joint inspections (JI) and cargo preparation.

6.6.1.4.2.1 Certification. Units cannot train or certify personnel as sling load inspectors. CRF personnel can receive certification to rig, inspect, and perform sling load operations at the following schools:

6.6.1.4.2.1.1 The Air Assault Course, at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, is a ten-day course and is extremely physical. The majority of personnel fail out due to the

physical requirements. Graduates are qualified to inspect rigged helicopter sling loads.

6.6.1.4.2.1.2 Sling Load Inspector Certification Course (SLICC) at Fort Lee, Virginia. SLICC is a five-day “gentleman's” course. The academics of SLICC are very fast paced. Graduates are qualified to inspect rigged helicopter sling loads and well as low cost, low altitude resupply load aerial delivery system. Students must be in the rank of E-4 or above (No exceptions or waivers).

6.6.1.4.2.1.3 Pathfinder Course, at Fort Benning, Georgia. This course can be considered the “master's level” certification for planning and executing helicopter cargo/equipment movement and re-supply operations. The course is a 15-day gentleman's course. There is a very high washout rate for students due to academics. Graduates are qualified to inspect rigged helicopter sling loads, mark, and control HLZ and pick-up zones (PZ), conduct DZ survey operations, and assist with the mission of USAF combat control team(s).

6.6.1.4.2.2 Training. Sling load training must be conducted by sling load inspector qualified personnel. All CRF personnel involved in sling load operations must be thoroughly familiar with the following training objectives:

- Identifying inspection procedures and filling-in inspection forms.
- Determining and identifying lifting devices (for example, slings, nets, and pendants).
- Operating and maintaining slings and other lifting devices.
- Conducting rigging procedures for sling loads.
- Determining helicopter capabilities for sling load operations.
- Performing hookup procedures.
- Identifying hazards and safety procedures.
- Developing load plans for sling load operations.
- Performing ground crew tasks and responsibilities.
- Performing signalmen's duties and responsibilities.
- Performing standard hand-and-arm signals.
- Conducting proper radio procedures and communications security, as required.
- Conducting shipboard operations, as required.
- Determining and identifying safety equipment and procedures.

6.6.1.4.2.3 Planning. Coordination with the helicopter unit is essential for a smooth, safe operation. If possible, SLT lead should attend the aircrew mission/flight pre-brief for final coordination of sling load operations. During the planning phase, the entire mission should be reviewed to include aircraft limitations, landing site selection, and items to be lifted along with their weights. Consider the following planning factors:

- Equipment to be moved (for example, weight, size, quantity, and destination).
- Alternate means of movement available.
- Number of aircraft and sorties required.
- Landing site and required delivery time.
- Special lifting devices required.
- Primary and alternate radio frequencies and quantity of radios required.
- Ground crew and aircraft emergency procedures.
- Review of maps, landing site description, and local terrain features.
- Safety hazards.
- Landing site condition and security.

6.6.1.4.2.4 Risk Management for Sling Load Operations. There are numerous hazards and the potential for accidents inherent to sling load operations and procedures for conducting those operations.

6.6.1.4.2.4.1 Static discharge increases when the operating distance between the aircraft and the sling load is extremely small. As a risk-reducing control measure, the use of a reach pendant (instead of a static discharge wand) would increase the safety margin, assist in ease of hook-up (decreasing the time the aircraft and hook-up crew are close), and decrease the number of personnel required for hook-up.

6.6.1.4.2.4.2 Rotor wash is the high velocity air movement under a hovering helicopter. Large helicopters, such as the CH-47 and CH-53, can generate rotor wash in excess of 120 knots. This strong wind may cause ground crew personnel difficulty in walking or standing and its force can move unsecured material. The greatest rotor wash velocity occurs between 20 and 60 feet outside the rotor disc and will diminish once the aircraft is over the ground crew. Before conducting sling load operations, brief the ground/deck crew on the rotor wash potential of the helicopter.

6.6.1.4.2.4.3 Low Light / No Light operations make sling load missions exponentially more dangerous. Extensive training and detailed planning become increasingly important. At a minimum, the sling load team lead and marshallers should wear night vision goggles (NVG). Chemlights should be attached to the cargo to assist the aircrew in identifying the load; chemlights should be attached to the cargo hook to give visibility to the sling load team during the hookup operation. Infrared chemlights, blue-green chemlights, or flashlights with blue-green lens covers and plastic wands are effective during NVG operations.

6.6.1.4.2.4.4 Sling Load Team. SLT members are classified by their locations and duty during the sling load operation. Although each crew member has specific duties during the operation, each person should be trained to perform all duties. Examples of SLT composition/positions are included in **Figure 6.9**,

Recommended SLT Composition for Single Point Load, **Figure 6.10**, Recommended SLT Composition for Dual Point Load, **Figure 6.11**, Minimum SLT Composition for Single Point Load, and **Figure 6.12**, Minimum SLT Composition for Dual Point Load.

6.6.1.4.2.4.4.1 Team Leader. The team leader is responsible for overall team coordination, equipment, logistic support, communications, and safety. The SLT leader should:

- Coordinate with supported unit to determine type of mission, cargo, and equipment
- Establish liaison with the aviation unit to include a pre-operation briefing.
- Organize and assign duties to each ground crew member based on the mission.
- Direct and supervise the ground crew in preparing and inspecting all HST equipment.
- Ensure ground crew personnel are properly equipped with individual safety equipment
- Direct and supervise all rigging and derigging operations.
- Establish and maintain radio communications with the aircraft commander at all times throughout the operation. (Recommend a headset with microphone.)
- Organize the landing site to include avenues of approach and exit; establish staging areas (e.g., vehicles and cargo) and marshaling areas (i.e., personnel); and select landing site landing points.
- Supervise all operations within the landing site.

6.6.1.4.2.4.4.2 Outside (Far) Marshaller. The outside marshaller directs the movement of the helicopter. The outside marshaller initially identifies the load to be lifted and provides hand-and-arm signals to the pilot to position the aircraft over the load. The outside marshaller moves with the aircraft to make sure that the pilot can see the signals. The signals must be precisely given to prevent any misunderstandings between the marshaller and the pilot. The pilot uses an aircrew member for primary directions when the aircraft is over the load. The marshaller is used as an additional reference. The marshaller clears the aircraft for departure once the load is off the ground. He maintains a continuous watch for other aircraft entering the landing site area or vehicles that may affect the safety of the operation.

6.6.1.4.2.4.4.3 Inside (Close) Marshaller. The inside signalman is especially important when conditions make it difficult for the outside marshaller to see the hookup crew and load (i.e., brown out). The inside marshaller assists in properly positioning the aircraft over the load. He positions himself to best observe the aircraft cargo hook in relation to the

load and uses hand and arm signals that are relayed by the signalman to the aircraft crew.

6.6.1.4.2.4.4.4 Static Wand Person (if required). The static wand person must be thoroughly familiar with the effects of static electricity. He provides the primary protection against severe electrical shock for the hookup/manual release crew by touching the static discharge wand to the cargo hook and maintaining contact until the hookup/manual release crew clears the load. NOTE: Most CRF AM UTCs utilize a reach pendant and do not include a static wand.

6.6.1.4.2.4.4.5 Hookup Man. The hookup man positions himself on or near the load in a stable position and attaches the sling or net apex fitting to the cargo hook. If required, he performs the manual release of the cargo hook.

6.6.1.4.2.4.4.6 Sling Leg Man (if required). The sling leg man is used when there is not enough time or equipment to permit breakaway tying or the load has many obstructions which could entangle the sling legs. The sling leg personnel perform the following actions:

- Position themselves on or near the load on a stable surface.
- Hold the sling legs clear of obstructions until the aircraft has lifted enough to apply tension to the sling that will remove all slack from each leg.
- Exit the area of the load and move to the team's rendezvous point or exit direction.
- Stand by to return to the load on the team leader's signal, in case the helicopter dips down and the sling legs become entangled in the load.

Figure 6.9 Recommended SLT Composition for Single Point Load



Figure 6.10 Recommended SLT Composition for Dual Point Load



Figure 6.11 Minimum SLT Composition for Single Point Load



Figure 6.12 Minimum SLT Composition for Dual Point Load



6.7 CRF Arrival. During this time, the AT will receive and brief each arriving CRF chalk. This activity alone can consume several hours depending on the airlift schedule. During the first 24 hours on the ground, CRF's primary focus is on establishing itself as a cohesive force and achieving IOC as quickly as possible.

6.7.1 CRF Arrival Considerations. "Priorities" and "Balance" are the key words for this phase of operations. The first eight hours after a CRF arrival are typically the most difficult time. It is critical that CRF leadership strike the right balance between the competing requirements for force beddown, working the air mobility support mission and providing for force protection.

6.7.1.1 Arrival Scheme of Maneuver. Chalk leaders should ensure personnel rally immediately following aircraft deplaning in order to marshal thru PAX-processing (as required) and are ready to receive appropriate arrival briefings.

6.7.1.2 Arrival Briefing. All forces should receive an initial arrival briefing to ensure personnel have the latest information required to execute their duties safely. Some CRF may have departed from separate stations so this brief may be instrumental in providing all personnel a base level of situational awareness. Recommended items to cover include:

- CRF Commander
- CRFs & friendly forces present
- Security situation

- Current force protection condition (FPCON)/mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) level/arming & engagement rules of engagement (ROE)
- Communication plan/sign & countersign/duress words
- Local area information & restrictions
- Next brief time/event/shift change

6.7.1.3 Arrival Actions. CRF should plan to focus on beginning the mission immediately upon arrival, and will have to balance mission and support requirements to determine where to assign the weight of effort for arrival actions. Likewise, the primary concern may also be establishing living quarters as early as possible to start getting personnel on the desired work-rest cycle. Plan for arrival, and be ready to adjust the plan according to the situation at hand. **Table 6.2**, Arrival Prioritization Schedule of Events contains a table of prioritized items that each functional area should accomplish.

6.7.1.3.1 Initial FP Actions. FP will be a priority in any operation. As soon as FP forces are on-site, they should analyze the threat and establish team security; establish force protection posture, rally point, bugout and "alamo" sites; assign initial hasty defensive fighting positions (DFP) and begin work on other DFPs. FP forces will also define the security perimeter, if able, and establish perimeter defense procedures. For further information, see **Attachment 2**, Force Protection.

6.7.1.3.2 Initial Communication Actions. CR communications personnel should issue individual radios to team leads as soon as practical to expand the immediate span of control as forces disperse to conduct arrival actions. Consider programming radios before departing home station or en route.

6.7.1.3.2.1 Communications network equipment will be established in the TOC to provide C2 connectivity and internal team communications. This may include, but is not limited to: HF, UHF and VHF air-to-ground communications equipment, satellite communications equipment (Iridium and BGAN), mobile giant voice equipment, land-mobile radio net and secure and HAVEQUICK capabilities. Set antennas on a mast to provide the best line of sight communications (the higher the better) and be cognizant of obstacles that might hinder line of sight capabilities (trees, valleys, hills, and buildings). Also, remind radio users of radio etiquette: avoid use of names, rank, or obscenities, keep transmissions short, and use call signs. Accomplish communications security, crypto-operations, and authentication procedures to include setup and operation of secure terminal equipment/secure telephone unit and secure data. Communications personnel are required to set up all communication equipment including the Hardside Expandable Light Air-Mobile Shelters (HELAMS) or a tent IAW published USTRANSCOM JMETs.

NOTE: The frequency request for the Command & Control System Integration Directorate (C2SID) must be submitted at least 30 days before the mission. Obtain the communication requirements from the CRE DO (number of frequencies). To submit this request, access this website: https://tacc.scott.af.mil.default.asp?action=frequencies. A 618 AOC (TACC) website account is required to access this page. For assistance, contact tacc.xont.rad@scott.af.mil.

NOTE: When possible, the communications security (COMSEC) package should be requested from the COMSEC office at least two weeks out for proper coordination. Once the material is signed out, someone should be assigned to be responsible for physical security of COMSEC package at all times.

6.7.1.3.3 Initial C2 Actions. Establishing initial voice contact with higher-headquarters or other controlling agencies is typically the top priority for C2 personnel once CRFs have arrived on-site. C2 personnel should then be primarily concerned with establishing a provisional operations center (if not already established) followed by securing a suitable TOC/JOC location, be it a HELAMS, tent, vehicle, or existing structure.

6.7.1.3.4 Initial CRF Actions. Remaining CRF are normally tasked to assist with initial offload operations and to establish locations for work area and living areas. Team leads, who are establishing work schedules, should consider assigning some forces to camp set-up, some to begin operations, and/or some to begin their rest cycle for 24-hour operations.

6.7.2 Arrival Priorities. Prioritize arrival actions according to METT-TC analysis. CRFs should plan to focus on beginning the mission immediately upon arrival, and will have to balance mission and support requirements to determine where to assign the weight of effort for arrival actions. Plan for arrival and monitor by using periodic updates versus a planned Schedule of Events, and be ready to adjust the plan according to the situation at hand. See **Table 6.2**, Arrival Prioritization Schedule of Events.

Table 6.2 Arrival Prioritization Schedule of Events

EVENT	OPR	SCHED
Arrival Aircraft #1		A
Meet with host nation	CRG commander, Contracting	A+:15
Security conducts a sweep of area	Security Forces (SF)	A+:30
Secure immediate contingency response group (CRG) work areas	ALL	A+:30
Procure use of materials handling equipment (MHE) for aerial port	Aerial Port/ Vehicle maintenance	A+:30
Download Aircraft #1	Aerial Port	A+:30
Initial on station report	Command and Control (C2)	A+:30
Offload baggage pallet	Aerial Port	A+:45
Clear minimum operating strip/ramp for airflow	SF	A+01:00
Establish accountability and assign billets	PERSCO	A+01:00
Real world Medical Identified	Medical	A+01:00
Real world crash, fire, rescue (CFR) Identified	CE	A+01:00
Start building sandbags if applicable	Sandbag Team	A+01:30
Start Functional Arrival Actions in accordance with AMCI 10-202 V4 CL-1, *Expeditionary Air Mobility Support Operations Checklist*	Functional Leads	A+01:30
Tactical operations center (TOC)/ Hardside Expandable Light Air-Mobile Shelters (HELAMS) setup begins	C2, aerospace ground equipment (AGE)	A+01:30
Identify defensive fighting positions (DFP) and entry control points (ECP)	SF	A+01:30
Arrival of 2nd Aircraft	C2	A+02:00
Begin equipment accountability	Vehicle MX	A+02:00
Fire protection coordinated with Host nation	Airfield Management	A+02:00
Begin build bunkers/ DFPs	ALL	A+02:00
Setup medical facility	Medical	A+02:00
Form fusion cell (include Intelligence, security forces [SF], Air Force Office of Special Investigations [AFOSI], and others as required); provide initial airfield threat recommendation to air mobility division (AMD)	Intel, SF, AFOSI	A+02:00
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Table 6.2 Arrival Prioritization Schedule of Events continued

EVENT	OPR	SCHED
Download 2nd Aircraft	Aerial Port	A+02:15
Rally points identified	SF	A+02:00
Full security sweep complete and personnel briefed on threat assessment	SF	A+03:00
Man DFPs and ECPs	ALL	A+03:00
Semi-Harden fixed building structures	BOS, Operations	A+03:00
Secure use of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) Facilities	POL	A+03:00
Host nation coordination for equipment, food, billeting finalized	SUPPLY	A+03:00
Billeting assignments	PERSCO	A+04:00
TOC setup complete	Operations	A+04:00
First situation report (SITREP) due	C2	0200 Z
New deployed personnel & equipment (DP& E)	C2 and PERSCO	
MARC setup complete/ Semi-Hardened	Communications/AGE	A+04:00
Setup work areas, Facility Manager kits, Par kit placement, door guard sign in/sign out, whiteboards	ALL	A+04:00
Day shift personnel and baggage to billeting		
Arrival of 3rd Aircraft		A+04:00
Transition zones and command and control agency (CCA) established if applicable	CE	A+07:00
Achieve full accountability of equipment and chart all vehicle placements	VM	A+07:00
Contracts finalized for non-host nation equipment	Contracting	A+08:00
AMCI 10-202 V4 CL1 2-9 CRG/contingency response element (CRE) arrival actions complete	ALL	A+08:00
AMCI 10-202 V4 CL1 2-11 CRG/CRE commander arrival actions complete	CRG commander	A+08:00
AMCI 10-202 V4 CL1 2-12 Operations Officer arrival actions complete	Operations Officer	A+08:00
AMCI 10-202 V4 CL1 2-13 Operations noncommissioned officer (NCO) arrival actions complete	Operations NCO	A+08:00
AMCI 10-202 V4 CL1 2-14 Loadmaster/Boom Operator arrival actions complete	RAMPCO	A+08:00
AMCI 10-202 V4 CL1 2-15 Communications/AGE arrival actions complete	Communications/AGE	A+08:00
AMCI 10-202 V4 CL1 2-16 Maintenance arrival actions complete	MX	A+08:00
AMCI 10-202 V4 CL1 2-17 Aerial port arrival actions complete	Aerial Port	A+08:00
Second Shift Change	All	

LEGEND:
AFOSI - Air Force Office of Special Investigations
BOS - Base Operating Support
C2 - Command And Control
CE - Civil Engineering
MX - Maintenance
PERSCO - Personnel Support For Contingency Operations
RAMPCO - Ramp Coordinator
VM - Vehicle Management

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6.8 Initial Operational Actions.

6.8.1 Command and Control. Establish a TOC location, be it a HELAMS, tent, vehicle, or existing structure. CR team leads should coordinate with any existing support forces and

establish a continuous relationship. For example, if the CRF is operating only a section of an airfield and another agency or agencies are operating other sections of the airfield, synchronization and coordination with existing schedules, procedures, meetings, and so forth, will enable employment that is more effective.

6.8.1.1 An on-station, initial contact communication must be made by the fastest means (voice/data) to 18 AF/A3M within 30 minutes of arrival. Use the iridium phone w/secure sleeve when making the call to 618 AOC (TACC). Initial data copy is not required if reported to controlling agency via secure voice. When sending an on-station report in a data format, list first the initial capabilities and limiting factors (LIMFAC) description that contains working MOG and specific functional areas.

6.8.1.2 Immediately after making on-station phone call, issue out radios (LMR/equivalent) to all functional leads. The best way to track all issued radios is to prepare a sign out sheet and have each member sign next to the serial number of the radio they have.

6.8.1.3 Once all functional leads receive their radios, do a "radio check" to ensure all radios are operational and all areas receive the transmission "loud and clear."

6.8.1.4 Setup the BGAN, ensure the BGAN is operational, and verify station workload for all inbound aircraft.

6.8.1.5 Set up work location (e.g., PSC 5 terminals, laptops). Once communication has been established, connect laptop and begin working on reports (e.g., deployed personnel & equipment [DP&E], SITREP, redeployment plan). This will save time if reports are completed before due. Normally, all report formats are loaded onto laptops, but if not, they can be downloaded from an external drive under "C2 desktop download." If an external drive cannot be located, it may be found inside of the bug out kit.

6.8.1.6 Notify the AMD (or appropriate tasking authority) when full operational capability is reached.

6.8.1.7 Prepare a SITREP that reflects the activities occurring from 0001 Zulu to 2359 Zulu for the CRE/DO and CRE commander to review before sending to 618 AOC (TACC). Unless otherwise directed by 618 AOC (TACC) or controlling agency, SITREPs are sent by 0200 Zulu daily. Ensure the reports are sequentially numbered starting with 001.

6.8.1.8 The next priority is to begin work on the DP&E. The DP&E includes all personnel and equipment under the authority of CRFs. A DP&E report will be sent to 618 AOC (TACC) controlling agency and info AMD (if established) within 24 hours of arrival at the deployed location. 618 AOC (TACC) e-mail address is located in the report guide in the bug out kit.

6.8.1.9 Just like a fixed command post, if an emergency situation occurs, run a quick reaction checklist. Some emergency situations may require an operational report (OPREP).

6.8.2 Airbase Operations. Conduct initial offload operations and establish locations for work areas and living areas. When establishing work schedules, consider assigning some

forces to camp set up, some to begin operations, and/or some to begin rest cycle for 24-hour operations, depending on the expected flow of follow-on personnel and equipment.

NOTE: If maintenance is available, the ramp coordinator (RAMPCO) will perform "follow-me" duties to park inbound aircraft.

NOTE: If maintenance is not available, designate one RAMPCO to perform "follow-me" duties, while the other RAMPCO performs marshalling duties to place aircraft in final parking/engine running on/offload location.

6.8.2.1 Airfield Operations. This capability establishes visual flight rules (VFR) and/or limited instrument flight rules (IFR) capabilities as necessary to sustain operations. Personnel may also establish initial airfield operations to include supervising and managing the airfield.

6.8.2.1.1 Airfield Operations Arrival Priorities. Establish contact with any existing personnel (e.g., STS, host nation) and determine the level of support required; whether it be full replacement of personnel, augmentation of existing forces, or as a liaison. Following the determination of personnel/operations requirements, conduct an initial airfield inspection (in coordination with host airfield management, if required). At a minimum, special interest must be placed on runway and taxiway conditions, airfield lighting, weather condition reporting, emergency notification, hazardous cargo and parking areas, and airfield safety and security. Following the inspection, personnel should begin marking/lighting of the airfield (if required) in order to allow for the commencement of operations.

6.8.2.1.2 Airfield Operations Employment Considerations. The crash, fire, rescue (CFR) team lead or designated representative should get on the distribution list for the host's daily airfield inspections and should be notified when conditions change. Special consideration should also be made with regard to the governing authority and regulations of the airfield and the qualification requirements that may need to be met (i.e., specific ATC certification requirements).

6.8.2.1.3 Foreign Object Damage (FOD). If an existing FOD elimination program is not in place, a program should be established encompassing all airfield operations functions, to include maintenance and aerial port personnel. Establish FOD control points near flight line entry control points as necessary. All available personnel should assist in daily FOD walks of responsible aircraft parking areas.

6.8.2.1.4 Bird/Wildlife Aircraft Strike Hazard (BASH). If an existing BASH program is not in place, a program should be established to mitigate bird/wildlife hazards on the airfield. A response program should also be established in case of an incident.

6.8.2.1.5 Anti-hijack Planning. Coordinate the development of anti-hijack plan with airfield management, security forces, aircraft maintenance, and C2. The final plan should be considered sensitive information and shared only with personnel with anti-hijack responsibilities. Ensure all flight line personnel are aware and vigilant of hijack indicators. See **Table 6.3**, Sample Anti-Hijack Plan.

Table 6.3 Sample Anti-Hijack Plan

Prerequisites:

- Completed parking and taxi plan to include hot cargo areas
- Internal/external contingency response element (CRE) communications plan

Hijacking Indications /Signals:

- Crews facing a hijacking threat will transmit an in-the-clear notification of hijacking to air traffic control (ATC). Crews will also notify ground agencies as soon as practical and follow-up with situation reports as circumstances permit.

Plan Basics

1. Mitigation Methods: Stop it before it starts!
   - Security force (SF) presence on flight line: visible near aircraft, standard is two to three per aircraft with additional overwatch from concealed location
   - If no SF, or threat is high, maintenance marshallers work with rifles slung over back; when aircraft in position and parked, marshallers assume outward watch with rifles at ready (unslung)
   - Restricted flight line access: visible badge system, entry control points (ECP), entry authorization lists (EAL); must be coordinated with host nation (HN) and coalition forces - need system adaptable to their requirements
   - Aircraft maintenance production superintendent provides overwatch of entire ramp operations with continuous communication with command and control (C2). In the absence of a production superintendent, a ramp coordinator (RAMPCO) is then utilized.
   - All personnel stop all unauthorized personnel from flight line areas, contact SF or HN/coalition forces security details for assistance when required
2. Notification Procedures
   - Individual first observing or receiving hijack indication will immediately relay information to CRE C2
   - C2 relays information to entire CRE radio net and SF net using pre-coordinated “Hijacking” code word; acknowledgement required from all parties
   - C2 notifies HN and/or coalition forces in following order: tower/airspace controller, airfield manager, base C2 agency, security detail
   - C2 notifies other agencies in following order: theater C2, 618th Airlift Operations Center (TACC), United States Embassy/defense attaché office (DAO)
   - Consider use of Giant Voice as well as ground radio nets
   - If available, use Flag System: display pre-coordinated flag on maintenance production supervisor and any other vehicles on flight line to indicate hijacking in progress
3. Individual Responsibilities of CRE Personnel
   - C2
     a. Confirm hijacking with aircrew using table above, if able
     b. Notify all agencies in accordance with Step #2 above
     c. Execute appropriate quick reaction communications (QRC)
     d. Maintain accurate and complete log of all events
     e. Execute operational reports (OPREP) if required, track until completed
     f. Execute accountability check of all CRE personnel
     g. Clear communication lines in mobility air reporting and communications (MARC)/tactical operations center (TOC) of non-essential traffic
     h. Notify all agencies when terminated

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Table 6.3 Sample Anti-Hijack Plan continued

- CRE Operations Officer
  a. Monitor actions of C2 Controllers
  b. Initiate QRCs and OPREP as required
  c. Activate quick reaction force (QRF) if available
  d. Assist C2 controllers when required
  e. Act as advisor to on-scene commander on ramp, as required, until arrival of CRE commander
  f. Maintain position in MARC/TOC
- CRE Commander
  a. Proceed to scene and act as advisor to on-scene commander
  b. Assume on-scene commander duties if no CRG commander, HN or coalition forces authority present
  c. Base actions on ensuring protection/safety of CRE personnel, aircrew, aircraft, equipment and resources
- Maintenance production supervisor/RAMPCO/aerial port superintendent
  a. Ensure notification of all personnel on flight line
  b. Pre-coordinated individual designated on-scene commander until arrival of CRE commander, CRG commander, HN or coalition forces authority
  c. Clear area around aircraft of personnel, restrict access to area
  d. Execute accountability check of personnel; relay to C2
- SF
  a. Clear area around aircraft of personnel, restrict access to area
  b. Deploy QRF around area
  c. Advise on-scene commander
  d. Maintain vigilance at defensive fighting positions (DFP) and entry control points (ECP)
  e. Await instructions from on-scene commander

4. Aircraft Immobilization/Isolation Methods
   - Move vehicles and/or materials handling equipment (MHE) to key taxiway or ramp chock points: driver leaves vehicle
   - Move vehicles and/or MHE in front of and behind aircraft: 10 to 30 feet from aircraft is sufficient to hinder movement for majority cargo/large aircraft; driver leaves vehicle
   - Place aerospace ground equipment in front of aircraft or engines to impede progress
   - Leave chocks, intake covers, etc. in place; do not install after the fact - keep clear of aircraft
   - Drastic measures to be taken only when requested by aircrew or directed by higher authority
   - Ram aircraft with vehicle and/or MHE
   - Purposely cause foreign object damage (FOD) to engine
5. Additional Considerations
   - Responsibility for hijackings lies with HN, theater commander if no HN present
   - CRF provides initial response; more drastic measures come from direction of these higher authorities

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6.8.2.2 Safety. In the event of an aircraft mishap/emergency the maintenance officer/production superintendent is the best choice for ground safety representative since the CRF may not have any organic safety personnel. The maintenance officer or production superintendent is in the best position to assess, monitor, and coordinate the safety and security of the scene. They can direct the collection and preservation of evidence until a safety board arrives. It is highly recommended that all maintenance officers, production superintendents, and expediters, if possible, attend Aircraft Mishap Investigation Course.

EXAMPLE: During the 621 CRW 2010 Pakistan flood relief deployment, a C-17 class A mishap took place and no formal safety representative was present to take initial actions. The CRE commander assumed the role of "on-scene commander" balancing the needs for evidence preservation and resuming the mission. Rapid coordination with formal safety staff helped both efforts.

6.8.2.3 Weather Arrival Priorities. Once camp set-up is complete, weather personnel should mark observation locations that are two to three times farther away than the highest building, tent or tree line. Observation equipment should not be placed in low lying areas and should be set-up close to the TOC for easily accessible readings. Following establishment of observation capabilities, weather personnel will be integrated into the Cooperative Weather Watch Program with the regional weather squadrons and provide watches, warnings and advisories for airfield and airbase operations.

6.8.2.4 Command Centers. The exact lay down of operations varies greatly from place to place and with mission requirements. It is usually preferable to establish a stand-alone US command post or JOC, paired with a mobility C2 air-element, both manned by the CRFs. In smaller operations, these can be the same and collocated on a non-interference basis. If purely an Air Force mission, the C2 center is often called the TOC. The layout of the command operations area depends on the size of the command staff, space available, base configuration, and mission. The terms command post, JOC, and TOC are often used interchangeably in describing the command area in general. Any scheme is subject to communications cable and power support limits, as well as radio frequency (RF) hazard areas and antenna angle to the satellite. In determining spots to consider, knowing the satellite bearing and elevation can help. The antenna position can drive the tactical beddown solution in congested locations or when on a "seam" between satellites where elevations are low. See **Figure 6.13**, Notional Operations Beddown in Semi-Permissive Environment.

6.8.2.4.1 Provisional Operations Center (POC). Arriving CRFs may establish a POC (usually in the AT work-center) to direct actions until permanent work-centers are established and operational. General responsibilities of this POC include directing actions and priorities of arriving CRFs for beddown, set-up, and achieving operational capability. This center will also serve to direct airfield/air mobility support operations until the permanent C2, aerial port and aircraft maintenance work centers are established. Initial force protection, integrated base defense measures, and base support functions may also be directed from this center, prior to other work centers being established.

Figure 6.13 Notional Operations Beddown in Semi-Permissive Environment



6.8.2.4.2 Airfield Operations Center. The AOC normally serves as the focal point for airfield and air mobility support operations. Depending on the CRF posture, this center may conduct C2 actions for all CRFs. Based on METT-TC, this center may either be located near other work-centers; located as a stand-alone center; or be comprised of separate centers for C2, aerial port, and aircraft maintenance.

6.8.2.4.2.1 Use of a mobile shelter (such as a HELAMS) is a preferred solution in most cases. It combines the benefits of a tailored workspace and usually comes with basic communications and environmental gear. However, most of these UTCs also have significant support equipment with a hefty cost in terms of airlift and maintenance personnel. They are often sent on a later chalk requiring an interim C2 solution. See **Figure 6.14**, HELAMS.

Figure 6.14 HELAMS

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6.8.2.4.2.1.1 Soft-sided shelters offer a quick set-up for environmental protection and can be placed almost anywhere on the airfield. Tents are not fully secure and have limited visibility to control air operations.

6.8.2.4.2.1.2 If available, hard buildings are good solutions as it will expedite set-up, establishes the feel of a permanent presence to mission partners, and solves many force protection issues.

6.8.2.4.2.2 Operation Board Set-up. Operation boards are intended to be used to organize and communicate current status for CRF operations. Each mission may require tailorable products specific to that operation. **Figure 6.15**, Example Operations Board contains an example operations status sheet, which can be utilized to track in-bound and out-missions, airfield status, current weather and applicable NOTAM.

Figure 6.15 Example Operations Board



6.8.2.4.2.3 JOC/TOC. The TOC normally serves as the operating location for the CRF commander (or team chief) and is the focal point for all CRF operations. This center typically serves as the primary C2 node for all CR actions and, depending on CRF posture, may encompass all other CRF work centers. The TOC may be set-up in hard billets, hangar space or even empty bunkers. CRFs also possess equipment for bare-base TOC set-up that may be either a tandem axle cargo trailer (normally referred to as the horse trailer), a HELAMS, or a complete C2 soft-wall operations center.

6.8.2.4.2.3.1 The number one consideration when placing the TOC is visibility of the cargo ramp and parking apron. When feasible, the TOC and air terminal operations center (ATOC) should be collocated for effective coordination.

6.8.2.4.2.3.2 If the space for the JOC/TOC is large enough, divide the area into sections layering security from an administrative area, to an operations center with permissive but controlled access, to a command area where classified discussions are possible, and a secure, entry authorization lists (EAL) controlled section for intelligence, secure defense connect online (DCO)/Tandberg and communications center. See **Figure 6.16**, Example of Large Operations Set-up.

6.8.2.4.2.3.3 In the tent set-up, a good technique is to have the functional areas horseshoed around the sides facing out. This gives each desk a wall for posting info and the softer walls help muffle discussions. The commander fills the bend of the shoe facing inwards so he has direct line of sight dialogue with the

functions. For collaboration, reports, and briefs, all areas can face the center providing for good acoustics and sight for visual aids/displays. A screen near one corner is a good way to facilitate info sharing.

Figure 6.16 Example of Large Operations Set-up



6.8.2.4.2.3.4 Another method is to have functions pushed to the center facing each other. This works best in open bay or noisy environments, like a tent on a fighter flight line.

6.8.2.4.2.3.5 In the HELAMS or small room, only the most essential functions will have space. Control of the flight line mandate controllers, operations officers and essential personnel requiring a secure environment, such as intelligence, are top priorities.

6.8.2.4.2.3.6 In a joint operation, space may also be given to personnel from other services, provided they have clearance for any COMSEC or classified materials in use. The ATOC & RPOE could use the ramp side of the HELAMS to monitor the aerial port yard and coordinate movements. In a NEO or passenger movement operation, an embassy or other rep may be useful to aid coordination. See **Figure 6.17**, Large Camp Set-up in Haiti, UNIFIED RESPONSE (2010).

Figure 6.17 Large Camp Set-up in Haiti, UNIFIED RESPONSE (2010)

Large camp set-up in Haiti, UNIFIED RESPONSE (2010). The tan tent just to the right of the Hardside Expandable Light Air-Mobile Shelter (HELAMS) is the joint operations center (JOC) in a single long tent configuration. A high-traffic tent is separated on the back side and the antenna farm is on the either side of the JOC (large satellite dish just visible on the right). The civilian red top tent was for initial elements of the contingency response group (CRG) forward deploying from an exercise - it could make a great civil affairs meeting place or reception area.

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6.9 Threat Considerations.

6.9.1 Conventional.

6.9.1.1 Use natural terrain and cover to prevent direct observation or avenues of attack on the TOC. A hanger, small rise, vegetation, or even properly placed dumpsters can prevent easy surveillance. In hostile situations, the camouflage netting in many UTCs can be effectively employed, but is often overlooked.

6.9.1.2 Use a reception tent or other facilities to meet with non-US partners, contractors and others. This prevents intelligence gathering and “insider” attacks.

6.9.1.3 Be creative in force protection. When politically sensitive, traditional hardening may be unwise. Placing support container expresses (CONEX), trailers, even 8,000-pound pallets of bottled water on a vulnerable side of a tent hardens against shrapnel and provides standoff from attacks without looking like a bunker.

6.9.1.4 Develop an asset dispersal plan.

6.9.1.5 Radio call signs and brevity codes should be used when talking in the clear.

6.9.1.6 Accountability should be taken at shift changes and at least once per shift if warranted by conditions. A numbering system to identify members may also help with radio/phone security. Designate rally points for those on and off shift - especially if the living area is not nearby (e.g., hotel, other side of runway).

6.9.1.7 Line badges or identification cards could be displayed. Another method is to issue homemade photo cards with roster numbers, as many people do not have line badges and common access card (CAC) identification (ID) cards are often left in computers during a bug out, making accountability of casualties difficult. This is most useful during a scenario where the CRF will integrate or co-mingle with another forces.

6.9.1.8 Develop a post attack recovery (PAR) plan for UXO sweeps and other conventional ability to survive and operate (ATSO) needs. Hard assign teams on each shift and have back-ups. ROC drill as threat dictates.

6.9.2 Alternate Operations Centers. In any case, an alternate operations center should be designated and transfer/evacuation and rally plans established. This covers combat contingencies and peacetime events (e.g., storms, flooding, infrastructure problems).

6.9.2.1 Pre-stage equipment such as a BGAN, radio (PSC-5) and handheld chargers in the location.

6.9.2.2 Collocating the alternate TOC with another function such as ATOC allows use of existing equipment, provides security for controlled items, increases situational awareness of the other operations center and allow for rapid transfer of C2 at the beginning of the evacuation.

6.9.2.3 Position bags or cases in the TOC with designated high-value or classified equipment for rapid evacuation. Personnel should review evacuation actions at shift change. See **Figure 6.18**, Quick-Grab Clipboard or "Bug Out Board".

6.9.2.4 Stage an evacuation vehicle or trailer near the entrance to the C2 shelter. In higher threat situations, a vehicle can be hooked up to the trailer for rapid movement (at the expense of vehicle availability). See **Figure 6.19**, Staging a Vehicle and Trailer near a Command Center

Figure 6.18 Quick-Grab Clipboard or "Bug Out Board"

Posting operations information on a quick-grab clipboard or "bug out board" will help keep continuity of operations in many scenarios. Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drill the transfer at the start and periodically throughout the mission.

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Figure 6.19 Staging a Vehicle and Trailer Near a Command Center

Staging a vehicle and trailer near a command center speeds bug out but ties up valuable transportation assets, so you may implement based on increased threat levels/force protection conditions.

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6.9.2.5 The alternate C2 node may be mobile; working from a vehicle provides power and versatile response to a threat or rapidly changing conditions. This is essentially a basic CRT configuration.

6.9.3 CBRNE Techniques. Most CRFs have no CBRNE response UTCs or other specialists. Each Airman is trained for personal ATSO, but equipment is not normally issued unless requested. Theater supplies may not be issued if the CRF did not CHOP and "in-process". The commander should request additional forces to support the mission if the threat is credible.

6.9.3.1 Local CE readiness may be the easiest to provide "just in time" support, training or materials.

6.9.3.2 Airborne RED HORSE is a rapid response force for ATSO support called out in the JTF-PO CONOPS.

6.9.3.3 Develop and deploy CBRNE response kits such as a Z99 pallet or CONEX. CE personnel and AFPAM 10-100, *Airman's Manual* has information for set-up of expeditionary decontamination operations.

6.9.3.4 Plan for extra baggage pallets for chemical bags and re-supply items.

6.9.3.5 Bring voice emitters for gas masks so radio transmissions can be heard.

6.9.3.6 Use Giant Voice, air horn signals work well in open spaces.

6.9.3.7 Develop a sector system to return uncontaminated areas to operations as soon as possible. The usual small footprint and size of the force means two or three zones are usually sufficient.

6.10 Civil Engineer.

6.10.1 Bare-Base Beddown Setup Fundamentals. The following are some general guidelines when considering the beddown setup plan. See AFPAM 10-219 V5, *Bare Base Conceptual Planning*.

6.10.1.1 Distances to remember

- Between tents: 12 feet
- Between doors: 30 feet
- Travel/Fire lane: 60 feet
- Utility alley: 30 feet
- Distance from generators: 25 feet for billets, 50 feet for industrial
- Latrines: at least 60 feet down-wind (if possible)

6.10.1.2 Typically, a generator can support four environmental control units (ECU) running a normal load. This normally equates to four living tents or four work tents that are set up as regular office space. If a tent is going to contain an unusual amount of equipment or special power requirements, it may need a designated generator to support it. Also, if a tent is deemed mission critical, and the mission could not be performed if power was lost, it should have a backup generator to prevent power loss in the event the primary generator fails. It is important to plan for generator maintenance, fueling and repair so that there will

not be periods of unplanned power loss. If there are day/night shifts, members should be separated if space allows.

6.10.1.3 Male and female living quarters and showers need to be separated if possible. If not, plan on installing some sort of opaque barrier and rotating showering times.

6.10.1.4 Always consider terrain when selecting a beddown location. Do not locate the camp in any valleys or areas that look to be prone to flooding. Look for flat, clear areas that are free of large objects and vegetation if available. Also, consider all force protection concerns before actually setting up the camp. It is important to check that the location can be protected and is not in a vulnerable area before actually beginning to beddown.

6.10.2 Beddown. During initial arrival actions, the initial beddown setup will often occur simultaneously with initial airfield and air operations setup. CE will be the focal point of the beddown plan. CRF beddown assumes a five-day water supply will be available for personnel. The priority of beddown efforts for a CRF will typically follow the order displayed in **Table 6.4**, Beddown Priorities.

Table 6.4 Beddown Priorities

1. Working Tents
2. Mission Essential Power
3. Environmental control units (ECU)
4. Living Tents
5. Break Tents
6. Showers
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6.10.2.1 Ensure there is a camp waste disposal plan. This should cover wastewater and solid waste. The plan should be effectively communicated and followed to minimize the risk of vermin, disease, and generally unsanitary conditions. See **Figure 6.20**, Camp Layout 2 below for example camp layout.

Figure 6.20 Camp Layout 2



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6.10.2.2 For references on camp layout, refer to AFH 10-222 Volumes 1 and 3. It is vital to remember each camp layout will vary heavily based on circumstances at each location. There is no generic location layout that will work for any airfield so it is important to be flexible. See **Figure 6.21**, Sample Camp Layout 1 and **Figure 6.22**, Sample Camp Layout 2.

Figure 6.21 Sample Camp Layout 1



Figure 6.22 Sample Camp Layout 2



6.11 Sustained Operations.

6.11.1 Integration and Synchronization of CRFs. Since CRF are composed of many different AFSCs and are relatively small units, cross-functional execution is critical to mission success. Team leads should continually keep in mind those areas where the different functionals interact or overlap to ensure that "seams," or gaps between mission sections, do not occur. The small security force element available to most CRF, for example, will rely upon augmentation from some or all of the remaining CRF if the threat dictates. Likewise, the aerial port may need help onloading or offloading aircraft, from additional personnel. Therefore, CR personnel must be ready to flex from the duty at hand to a skill-set that suddenly becomes a higher priority. Team leads should mentally rehearse those critical functions that must continue to ensure mission success and identify roles and responsibilities for teams or individuals to close the seams.

6.11.2 Command and Control. C2 functions will be at the heart of most CR missions, and cover the spectrum: internal and external C2. CR units conduct internal C2 in order to ensure the smooth and seamless operations of the unit.

6.11.2.1 C2 Organization. Different techniques for organizing the CR C2 team can be utilized depending on the scope of the mission. See **Table 6.5**, Contingency Response C2 Team.

Table 6.5 Contingency Response C2 Team

Type	Advantages
Functional (e.g., aerial port, maintenance, security forces, intelligence)	• Simple. • Subject matter experts most familiar with their own work areas.
Operational (e.g., force protection [intelligence/security forces/Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI)], operations)	• Fusion between functional groups.
Joint Staff	• Common practice in joint community. • Synergy between functional groups.
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6.11.3 Airfield Operations Center. See **paragraph 6.8.2.4.2**.

6.11.4 Tanker and Airlift Control. The mobile C2 element serves as the focal point for all AMC aircraft movement, and may become the focal point for all air traffic flying into and out of the deployed location, depending on the situation. The mobile C2 element functions as the deployed command post, and is responsible for: tracking of AMC missions; running quick reaction checklists (currently found in AMCI 10-202 V4, CL-1); OPREP; and crew control.

6.11.5 Flight Line Operations. The aircraft flight line is potentially the most dangerous area of any operation. Noise hazards, exhaust hazards, propeller/engine hazards are almost always present at differing levels. Always remember the basic doctrine on safety: Expose only the

minimum number of personnel to the minimum number of hazards, for the minimum amount of time.

6.11.5.1 Engine Running On/Offload (ERO). ERO procedures expedite the flow of aircraft through airfields during airland operations where the reduction of ground time warrants a departure from normal operating procedures. ERO procedures may also be preferred in austere environments where there is minimal maintenance support as aircraft engines do not have to be shut down and restarted. This considerably lessens the chance of maintenance problems.

6.11.5.1.1 Thoroughly brief all operations and ensure that crew and ground support personnel understand the method and procedures to be used. Pre-planned visual signals (e.g., lights and hand signals) or the use of warning bells or vehicle horns can aid in ensuring safety during ERO. LMs may use NVGs during EROs and combat offloads. Ensure all the appropriate off-loading personnel are equipped as well.

6.11.5.1.2 Choosing areas for EROs is critical. Selecting the proper drop-off/pick-up point is essential. The aircraft should always be positioned and ready for an immediate departure in the event of enemy attack.

6.11.5.1.3 There must be enough room for vehicles to operate behind the aircraft, preferably with an access to off-ramp marshaling areas. To preclude damage caused by taxiing aircraft, off-load sites should be away from tents, vehicle yards, and buildings. Clear the immediate area when able, particularly at night or in limited visibility conditions.

6.11.5.1.4 Once the aircraft is stopped, the Production Superintendent or RAMPCO should coordinate with maintenance to ensure safety of all personnel/equipment being uploaded or downloaded inside the aircraft circle of safety. See **Figure 6.23**, ERO Safety Distance.

NOTE: It is highly recommended the production superintendent or RAMPCO give a safety brief and ROC drill ERO procedures with the aerial port team and MX prior to aircraft arrival.

6.11.5.1.5 Production Superintendent or RAMPCO should be positioned at least 50 feet behind the aircraft (depending on aircraft type, see below for distances of specific aircraft) and ensure that all personnel and equipment to be up/downloaded approach the aircraft from a safe position and remain clear of operating engines.

6.11.5.1.6 ERO distances for passengers and cargo

6.11.5.1.6.1 C-130. Vehicles and all personnel will proceed directly aft of the aircraft at least 50 feet before turning and/or 300 feet before stopping.

6.11.5.1.6.2 C-17. Vehicles and all personnel will proceed directly aft of the aircraft at least 25 feet before turning and/or 200 feet before stopping.

6.11.5.1.6.3 C-5. Vehicles and all personnel will proceed directly aft of the aircraft at least 150 feet before turning and/or 300 feet before stopping.

6.11.5.1.6.4 MX personnel should be positioned around the aircraft (wingtips, nose of aircraft) to prevent personnel from approaching aircraft incorrectly. See **Figure 6.23**, ERO Safety Distance, for aircraft circle of safety.

Figure 6.23 ERO Safety Distance



6.11.5.2 Combat Offload. Combat off-loads enable cargo off-loading without MHE.

6.11.5.2.1 C-130 Method A. Method A is used to off-load single, multiple, married, and ramp pallets, airdrop platforms, and CDS containers in a train-like fashion or one-by-one, as the situation dictates. This method involves aircrew taxi the aircraft forward to release cargo onto the ground. Aircrews will determine the method of combat offload to use, based on the conditions at the offload site. Generally, aircrews require at least 500 feet of taxiway/ramp space to execute this method, however, 1,000 feet is desired.

6.11.5.2.2 Use Method B to off-load married and/or oversized pallets or cargo too sensitive to off-load using Method A. It involves off-loading pallets onto 55-gallon steel drums (filled to one-third full with water for stabilization, if possible). The aircraft is slowly taxied out from underneath the load; additional barrels are placed under the pallet for support.

6.11.5.3 Passenger Combat Loading. During contingency operations, maximum troops, passengers, or patients can be combat loaded on the aircraft without the use of installed seats, seat belts, or litter stanchions. The number of personnel that fit on the cargo floor

will depend on individual size. Consider loading in groups of 12 to 16 (depending on size) to control loading operations.

6.11.6 Aircraft Maintenance. Assigned MX personnel should be trained to perform duties in a highly mobile and flexible environment and be capable of rapid deployment to augment or support air mobility operations/ contingencies. These personnel should be trained to support marshalling of various aircraft types, to include commercial aircraft. Air mobility control units will ensure deployed teams have sufficient numbers of personnel qualified to support the C-5 and the C-17 aircraft at a minimum.

NOTE: CRF MX personnel should attempt to stay qualified and proficient on the C-5 and the C-17 in order to fill CR requirements. Maintenance personnel should attempt to utilize aircraft located on home station to achieve proficiency training requirements. If mission design series (MDS) is not available at home stations, make attempts to utilize bases nearby that have the required MDS. Suggest using ANG and Air Force Reserve units if available. Recommend creating memorandum of agreement with supporting unit to document all aspects of utilizing assets for training/proficiency purposes. Recommend small percentage (10 to 20 percent) of maintenance personnel attend familiarization training on C-130s. This is due to the high number of C-130 aircraft encountered while on exercises and deployments.

6.11.6.1 Prior to home station departure ensure personnel have required items (e.g., personal protective equipment [PPE], flashlights, helmets) for anticipated mission (e.g., extreme weather, night operations, tent living). Inventory/ inspect tools and equipment to ensure serviceability and calibration are current for duration of deployment. Acquire sufficient supply of batteries, chemsticks, and other consumables to last duration of deployment. Ensure digital tech data is current and access is possible by all maintenance members. NOTE: A physical digital video disc (DVD) copy of digital tech data is HIGHLY recommended as a spare in the event Defense Travel System (DTS) computer access fails/locks out. The DVD can be accessed using a personnel computer (REF: During 621 CRW 2011 HURIVAC to Little Rock AFB, a glitch in the DTS log-on system, locked all members out of the DTS).

6.11.6.1.1 Use combination locks for air shipment of (CONEX) to allow aircrew access if needed and to prevent loss of keys if key locks were used.

6.11.6.1.2 Thorough inventory of maintenance equipment/tools should be conducted (REF: During the 2010 Bahrain deployment-MX equipment was delayed in Germany and appeared to be tampered with and was unsecured)

6.11.6.1.3 Verify fuel type and availability.

6.11.6.1.4 Observe airfield areas for available aerospace ground equipment, support equipment, and possible sources of aircraft support outlets. Attempt to locate any aircraft tow capabilities. Request capabilities through 618 AOC (TACC) if aircraft towing is anticipated.

6.11.6.1.5 Obtain contact numbers of any commercial or host nation aircraft maintenance facilities. NOTE: This information may become critical in event support equipment, hardware, parts, oils, grease, hydraulic fluids, oxygen, or gaseous nitrogen is needed. This can be used to source required maintenance items without requesting

through supply or official channels. This may be helpful in expediting aircraft/equipment repair.

6.11.6.1.6 Physically verify aircraft parking areas considering hazards, obstructions, and taxiways. Attempt to obtain hazardous cargo parking area (i.e., hot spot) and engine run areas. Mark spots using airfield marking tape (pavement tape). Chalk or construction spray paint is commonly used where tape poses a FOD hazard, especially for potential fighter aircraft locations. For example, at Nellis mobility Air Forces exercise (MAFEX), degradable paint was used to mark parking spots to eliminate FOD hazard. Consider a parking area that will be used in the event aircraft is hard broke. This area should not affect ongoing operations. Consider an area capable for jacking, engine run, and wings over pavement if maintenance is to be performed on wings or engines.

6.11.6.1.7 Parking plans can rapidly be developed using "Park-It" (Microsoft Excel with pre-scaled pictures and grid). This program is widely available, and many CRF maintenance personnel have experience with it. See screen shot in **Figure 6.24**, Park-It Screen Shot. This Excel program can also be used with imported imagery from multiple sources (such as Google Maps) to illustrate parking plans. See examples in **Figure 6.25**, Park-It with Google Maps Imagery One and **Figure 6.26**, Park-It with Google Maps Imagery Two. SAA has full ownership of airfield parking plan. Any deviation to parking plan should be approved by SAA.

Figure 6.24 Park-It Screen Shot



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Figure 6.25 Park-It with Google Maps Imagery One



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EXAMPLE: This plan was the actual working plan from 2010 Volk Field Operational Readiness Exercise. It was set up so that all spots were "pull through" with no towing required. Pull through parking is preferred. In the event an aircraft were unable to depart, no adjustments are required to the parking plan since all other spots are still accessible.

Figure 6.26 Park-It with Google Maps Imagery Two

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EXAMPLE: This is the actual parking plan from the Pakistan Flood Relief Deployment. The C-130's were required to back out of parking spots due to host nation requirements and prop blast to the area in front of their parking apron. C-5's were required to park on the taxiway due to footprint and jet blast hazard. They were required to make a left hand spot turn to minimize blast hazard to inhabited areas. C-17's were parked for easy taxi in and out for engine run on/offload requirements.

6.11.6.1.8 Establish FOD control points at flight line entry control points if necessary. All available personnel should assist in daily FOD walks of responsible aircraft parking areas. Use of the commercial "FOD*BOSS", a towable debris collector, is encouraged for extended deployments, ramps in poor condition, or large amounts of noted FOD.

6.11.7 Aerial Port Operations. The composition and size of the aerial port team will vary with each operation. An ATOC will normally be established and serve as the focal point for all aerial port activities, and an area should be established for the storage and maintenance of materials handling equipment (MHE).

6.11.7.1 Aerial Port Senior Team Lead Arrival Actions.

6.11.7.1.1 Before landing at a location, there should be time in flight to establish the work schedule for established MOG.

6.11.7.1.2 If there was not an aerial porter on the AM UTC, arrival priorities will include: establish a cargo yard, ATOC location and JI/marshalling area, as well as PAX holding area.

6.11.7.1.3 Remember the following when establishing these areas:

6.11.7.1.3.1 ATOC should be located near the TOC however, if the TOC is located in an area that does not allow for clear radio transmissions, place the ATOC in a suitable area that will still allow communication with the TOC and assigned flight line personnel.

6.11.7.1.3.2 The cargo yard should be slightly elevated, if possible, with drainage capability. It should be far enough from the sleeping tents, to not interrupt the personnel sleeping, yet close enough to the flight line that shuttling MHE back and forth is not necessary. See further guidance below when establishing a cargo yard:

- Should have established exit and entrance points
- Establish cargo grid to properly utilize storage area
- Setup ITV Integrators/Readers to read RFID tags
- Yard manager should make sure speed limit is maintained and cargo yard is well organized/free of clutter
- Establish a pallets/chains/nets/devices storage area
- Make sure yard lanes have enough maneuverability for the 10K all-terrain (AT) forklift
- Appoint a pallets and net monitor to ensure enough supplies are on hand as well as sending back overflow assets

6.11.7.1.3.3 The JI/Marshalling area should be located on the flight line, if possible, so that once cargo is positioned for upload it can remain in a semi-secure area until upload.

6.11.7.1.3.4 PAX assembly area should be far away enough from the ramp ensuring PAX will not be affected by jet wash. It should be close enough to walk to and from A/C in the event there is no vehicle transportation available.

6.11.7.1.4 Designate section leads and ensure they are aware of responsibilities. There should be a checklist for their designated area if they unsure.

6.11.7.1.5 Coordinate with designated shift supervisors including, supported forces and arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG) to establish good communication, flow of the yard and proper safety requirements while working around MHE. Remember, the supported forces may have never been around some of this equipment and may not understand the risks.

6.11.7.1.6 Make sure assigned personnel know the importance of keeping up with the maintenance of MHE. The conditions in deployed areas are often not ideal for vehicles, so paying extra attention to this may ensure their operability for the duration of a deployment.

6.11.7.1.7 Coordinate with the 1C3XX personnel to ensure the aerial port portion of the on-station report is complete, and that all required actions have been submitted to HHQ.

6.11.7.1.8 Establish a vehicle parking plan based on the layout and needs of the area. Next generation small loaders (NGSL)/60K parking should be on the ramp area so that FOD is not an immediate concern.

6.11.7.2 Aerial Port Supervisors Arrival Actions.

6.11.7.2.1 Supervisors should coordinate download teams and briefs for each inbound chalk, upon arrival, according to arrival times (make sure load teams have proper PPE and spotting aides to work immediately upon arrival).

6.11.7.2.2 Organize a FOD walk through the cargo yard, and vehicle parking plan areas upon arrival.

6.11.7.2.2.1 Give an airfield safety brief including:

- Routes to and from A/C.
- Driving in and out of cargo yard/MHE parking area.
- Possible safety obstructions on the airfield and cargo yard that could present a hazard.
- Ensure team is briefed on airfield parking plan (if not completed before departure).

6.11.7.2.3 Designate a temporary ATOC and ATOC vehicle to retrieve cargo packages and coordinate aerial port personnel working the airfield.

6.11.7.2.4 Ensure materials handling and associated equipment is in proper operating condition and certified for operation. Ensure the AF Form 1800, *Operator's Inspection Guide and Trouble Report,* is filled out and vehicles have sufficient fuel to operate during the shift. MHE operators should fill up/top off vehicles after their shifts so that the next shift can get right to work following shift change.

6.11.7.2.5 Walk through the airfield to see what LIMFACs exist (e.g., can they support containers/pallet trains, do they have MHE to support the effort).

6.11.7.2.6 Make sure ERO specific briefs are conducted and that the team chief has available AMCI 24-101 V11, *Cargo and Mail Policy,* aircraft specific ERO checklist, and that teams have all required PPE.

6.11.7.2.7 Designate a hot cargo yard/hazardous materials (HAZMAT)/Registered Mail/refrigerated material storage areas.

6.11.7.2.8 Appoint PAX representative(s) to escort PAX to and from airfield, as well as coordinate transportation of DVs.

6.11.7.2.9 Have beddown plan and shift change over brief prepared for the next shift.

6.11.7.3 Aerial Port Arrival Actions for Load Team Chief.

6.11.7.3.1 Separate team into three to four person groups to maximize manpower and be able to work multiple aircraft simultaneously.

6.11.7.3.2 Load team chiefs should brief their teams on the following:

- Designate MHE drivers, pushers, and chockers are for each team.
- Aircraft commander specific safety concerns.
- Designated parking areas for MHE.
- Loan out load team members for tent city build-up when mission permits.
- Be sure to brief load team members, who are not aerial porters, on job related hazards. For example, never walk between MHE and the aircraft; never walk under aircraft wing; never stand in MHE operators 'blind spots'; and so forth.
- Make sure all team members are aware of their surroundings and know to watch out for other people and equipment on the flight line.

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CHAPTER 7

AIRBASE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

7.1 Introduction. This chapter will focus on BOS. This capability provides the personnel and equipment necessary to establish the initial airbase support structure for CRF and for follow-on forces at deployed locations. CRFs are only capable of providing BOS for their own personnel and equipment. At bare-base locations, the preponderance of external BOS capability will come from follow on forces arriving after CRF. BOS is normally the responsibility of the exercise/theater host and will be outlined in the exercise or contingency OPORD prior to deployment. However, CRF must be prepared to coordinate, integrate, and in some cases take the lead with current forces and organizations already present on the airfield or base, host nation and with follow on forces.

7.2 Objective. The objective of the chapter is twofold. The first objective is to give CRF leadership important issues to be aware of concerning each function that will enable them to make key decisions regarding force size, equipment to take and considerations they should be aware of. The second objective is to give each particular support function guidance on how to accomplish their mission and function concerning CRF.

7.3 Assumptions. CRF members that are in a support function are qualified 5 level or 7 level personnel. The purpose of this chapter is not to explain to a particular function how to accomplish their core function but how to integrate and employ in the CR community.

7.4 Base Operating Support - Integrator. The BOS-I oversees the development of the base infrastructure and all contingency support activities including engineering, comptroller, contracting, and services support.

7.4.1 Roles and Responsibilities. The role of BOS-I is to organize, direct, and integrate beddown and force support activities. These include allocation of airbase real estate, support resources, and consolidation of force support requirements. Specific responsibilities include:

- Draft deployed location base support plan.
- Supervise and direct airbase development in accordance with follow-on mission requirements.
- Civil engineering support including; site layout, utilities, fire protection, crash rescue, and disaster preparedness.
- Shared use of existing services support including; food service, lodging, organizational laundry, mortuary affairs, fitness support, and field exchanges (as required) or the consolidation of expected expansion of requirements.
- Facilitate common-user communications and information management discussion to avoid system disruptions caused by localized interference (e.g., carefully placed antenna fields).

7.4.2 Leadership Considerations.

7.4.2.1 Since there is no specific UTC for the BOS-I, the CRF commander will have to appoint a member to assume the role of the BOS-I. The scope of the operations will determine if there is a need to appoint a BOS-I. For large-scale operations dealing with multiple forces and issues, the appointment of a BOS-I is critical and should be given to an

experienced CR or support member. Depending on the layout of the A/J staff and focus of operations, the A/J4 or A/J7 may be dual-hatted and be appointed the BOS-I. Rank will also need to be considered if integrating with other forces (e.g., foreign military, host nation)

7.4.2.2 The BOS-I role is meant to be collaborative in nature and centralize the discussions necessary for the successful beddown and integration of similarly operating forces as part of a larger JTF. Additionally, the BOS-I is intended to offset the workload assumed by the Senior Airfield Authority during full-scale CR operations. Given the assumption of authority over all things "Air Side" by the SAA, it will be necessary to have a complementary role to assume oversight of all things "Land Side". This should in no way take the place of the existing J-Staff in direct support of the CR forces themselves, but instead seek to accomplish an optimized lay down of overlapping mission footprints and sustainment requirements.

EXAMPLE: During the earthquake relief efforts in Haiti in 2010, a mission support group commander was sent down early in the operation who integrated with the CR forces and assumed the BOS-I role and responsibility. This commander was able to coordinate with multiple forces and the host nation in allocating real estate and integrate support functions to ensure efficient and safe operations.

7.4.2.3 The BOS-I's most important tool will prove to be a gridded map of the available airbase. As additional forces, sister forces, and follow-on forces arrive, the BOS-I will be responsible for initiating conversations with representatives of each entity with an effort toward consolidating their spacing and support requirements.

7.5 Civil Engineering.

7.5.1 Roles and Responsibilities. Civil engineering personnel deploy forward as part of the assessment team. They provide site survey assessment of required structural and pavement facilities, including pavements assessment/analysis (i.e., PCN). Additionally they identify initial CBRNE defense, ARFF, and EOD requirements. Upon integration, they will:

- Obtain and print large scale unclassified imagery, maps, and charts.
- Provide engineering support for construction and sustainment of CRF facilities and infrastructure. This includes work areas, living areas, latrines/showers, power, and water source. Civil Engineers, assigned to CRF, are not specifically trained as utilities troops, and therefore may rely on supply, contracting, or host nation for water support.
- Report daily status of CRF living area, work area facilities, and infrastructure.
- Establish procedures for hazardous/waste, grey water, sewage and refuse disposal.
- Monitor and report status of airbase fire protection and EOD capability.
- Coordinate with CRF commander for ARFF waivers and/or additional support as required.
- Oversee on-site development of airbase beddown plan in accordance with follow-on mission requirements.

• Coordinate and oversee construction of airbase facilities and infrastructure in preparation for follow-on mission (as required).

• Use GEOREACH and/or other GIS geo-referenced systems to build a Common Installation Picture (CIP) reflecting current and planned/future operations for the deployed site.

• Provide GIS geo-referenced products for Intel upon request.

• Finalize PAR operations.

• Provide initial CE assessment, liaison, and coordination for follow-on/sustainment forces beddown.

7.5.2 CE Leadership Considerations.

7.5.2.1 Limitations. CE personnel assigned to CRF perform an assessment role as their primary function. They may possess knowledge of construction, EOD, CBRNE and ARFF and be able to identify shortfalls. These services are not organic functions of the CRF and additional support will be required if EOD, ARFF or CBRNE support is determined to be necessary. Additional support will be required to perform any construction or repairs and will need to be acquired through contract if in a permissible environment or through military engineering units such as RED HORSE or PRIME BEEF units located in the vicinity of operations. The CE personnel will be able to communicate requirements for support and assist commanders by interacting with these units to request the equipment and personnel. There are typically only one or two CE personnel so the primary focus will be pavement assessment and evaluation followed by infrastructure, facility and camp beddown operations and ensuring fueling equipment is compatible with the expected aircraft.

7.5.2.2 Follow on Forces Planning. The engineering career field is uniquely suited to prepare for follow on forces. Each of the engineering members on the ABO team should have a background that prepares them to give recommendations for layout, location, orientation, and coordination amongst all concerned functions and host nations. This coordination serves to eliminate long-term problems that arise from poor planning. Engineering understands the fundamentals of power grid layout, camp configuration, water drainage, essential utility locations (e.g., sewer, water, electrical), and all the other factors that will prevent catastrophic failure in the future. This is another area that should be planned to every extent possible. Having a good plan to begin with will mitigate confusion upon initial arrival and organize the initial operations into areas that have been previously considered. While a preplanned layout is ideal, any camp must be changed for existing site conditions upon arrival. Utilization of existing facilities can also be considered at this time.

7.5.3 CE Techniques and Best Practices.

7.5.3.1 Airfield Assessment. The first and most critical task to be performed by CE is the pavement evaluation. This evaluation will be done to give the go/no-go for planned operations and give the commander an idea of operations that can and cannot be conducted at a potential site without major renovation and construction. All efforts of CE personnel

should be focused on this aspect of ABO upon initial arrival. Personnel should be considered to augment engineers to expedite data collection in the early stages of ABO.

7.5.3.1.1 Determine if anyone is available to augment and help with pavement evaluation. Typically, there are personnel who are familiar with drilling operations from cross-utilization training and can speed up the evaluation process. If there are any personnel who are not busy immediately after arriving to the airfield, they can be used to assist CE personnel with airfield survey operations.

7.5.3.1.2 Airfield pavement evaluation will take approximately four hours but can vary depending on the length of the runway and consistency of the results. CE will drill holes, measure soil strength using a DCP at the critical locations, and continue to take measurements as time allows. The most critically stressed areas of pavement are any areas that look like a repair has been made, severely distressed areas (from visual inspection), touch-down braking and take-off areas, areas where the aircraft rotates (turning areas), taxiways, parking aprons and center runway areas. The DCP components can be seen in **Figure 7.1**, DCP Components and Procedures.

Figure 7.1 DCP Components and Procedures



7.5.3.1.3 The purpose of the DCP is to measure the number of blows it takes the hammer to move the cone a known distance. In the simplest terms possible, the more blows it takes to move the cone, the stronger the soil is. Once the data is captured, the CE personnel will utilize the Pavement-Transportation Computer Assisted Structural Engineering (PCASE) software to determine the number of allowable passes for various aircraft at different weights. This program should be loaded onto all laptops

that are associated with CE UTCs, but it is important to ensure CE personnel are trained and software updates are downloaded periodically.

NOTE: For detailed airfield pavement evaluation procedures, reference UFC 3-260-03, *Airfield Pavement Evaluation,* and ETL 02-19, *Airfield Pavement Evaluation Standards and Procedures*. This will give specific guidance to CE personnel on how to complete airfield pavement evaluation for paved, unpaved, and semi-prepared surfaces.

7.5.3.1.4 The engineering technicians that are assigned to the assessment teams are the best suited along with airfield management personnel and maintenance to assist in developing aircraft parking plans. This should be accomplished largely before departure during the mission planning process. Once in theater, the parking plan for aircraft should be finalized after the pavement evaluation has been accomplished. Many of the factors evaluated and considered during the pavement evaluation will determine the feasibility of the pre-departure mission planning. The parking plan will then need to be approved by CRF leadership.

7.5.3.2 Camp Laydown. Operational requirements, land allocation, host nation restrictions, METT-TC, and so forth, will all factor into camp laydown plans. No two situations are identical and operational art will determine the most efficient camp laydown. Reference **Figure 7.2**, Notional Camp Laydown and **Figure 7.3**, Notional Airfield Layout that depict notional camp and airfield layouts; and **Table 7.1**, CR Assessment Planning Dispersed Distances. The most important element to remember is not to encroach upon the airfield surfaces. UFC 3-260-01, *Airfield and Heliport Planning and Design* outlines all the requirements for airfield clear zones.

Figure 7.2 Notional Camp Laydown



Figure 7.3 Notional Airfield Layout



Table 7.1 CR Assessment Planning Dispersed Distances (feet)

Facility/ Group	Billeting	Maintenance	Fire Department	Aerial Port	Munitions	Oxygen (LOX)	Fuel (POL)	Transportation	
Facility/ Group	Billeting	Maintenance	Fire Department	Aerial Port	Munitions	Oxygen (LOX)	Fuel (POL)	Transportation	Medical
Billeting		1600	1600	1600	3160	1600	2640	900	200
Maintenance	1600		1000	-	3160	1600	2640	200	1600
Fire Department	1600	1000		200	3160	1600	2640	1600	1600
Aerial Port	1600	-	200		3160	1600	2640	1600	1600
Munitions	3160	3160	3160	3160		3160	1800	3160	3160
Oxygen (LOX)	1600	1600	1600	1600	3160		2640	1600	1600
Fuel (POL)	2640	2640	2640	2640	1800	2640		2640	2640
Transportation	900	200	1600	1600	3160	1600	2640		200
Medical	200	1600	1600	1600	3160	1600	2640	200	
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7.5.3.3 Bare Base Beddown. During initial arrival actions, the initial beddown setup will often occur simultaneously with initial airfield and air operations setup. CE will be the focal point of the beddown plan. CRF beddown assumes a five-day water supply will be available for personnel. CRF leadership will direct the priority of beddown efforts.

7.5.3.3.1 Always consider terrain when selecting a beddown location. Do not locate the camp in any valleys or areas that look to be prone to flooding. Look for flat, clear areas that are free of large objects and vegetation if available. Also, consider all force protection concerns before actually setting up the camp. It is important to check that the location can be protected and is not in a vulnerable area before actually beginning to beddown.

7.5.3.3.2 Ensure there is a camp waste disposal plan. This should cover wastewater and solid waste. The plan should be effectively communicated and followed to minimize the risk of vermin, disease, and generally unsanitary conditions.

7.5.3.3.3 Male and female living quarters and showers need to be separated if possible. If not, plan on installing some sort of opaque barrier and rotating showering times.

7.5.3.3.4 Some common distances to consider when setting up:

- Between tents: 12 feet
- Between doors: 30 feet
- Travel/Fire lane: 60 feet

- Utility alley: 30 feet
- Distance from generators: 25 feet for billets, 50 feet for industrial
- Latrines: at least 60 feet down-wind (if possible)

NOTE: For references on camp layout, refer to AFH 10-222 Volumes 1 and 3. It is vital to remember each camp layout will vary heavily based on circumstances at each location. There is no generic location layout that will work for any airfield so it is important to be flexible. For notional layouts on the 7E1BD tent package, refer to **paragraph 7.8** AGE of this chapter.

7.5.3.4 Ability to Survive and Operate.

7.5.3.4.1 CRF will prepare and plan for protection of assets and personnel by coordinating with the installation CE readiness flight upon receiving information detailing a CBRNE threat. CE readiness can provide required supplies to protect equipment and personnel as needed.

7.5.3.4.2 All personnel are issued MOPP gear through the installation logistics readiness section. If there is a CBRNE threat, personnel will transport gear to location. All personnel are also trained in CBRNE response through the CE readiness flight at the installation prior to departing. Different MOPP conditions and how to don protective gear are outlined on pages 20 through 29 of the Airman's Manual.

7.5.3.4.3 Upon arriving at a location, the commander can direct the CE personnel to establish attack procedures. The recommended CBRNE preparation actions are as follows:

- Establish post-attack reconnaissance (PAR) teams
- Establish unit control center (location and personnel)
- Establish contamination collection location and procedures
- Perform hardening (pages 57 through 60 in the *Airman's Manual*)
- Establish disposal location and procedures
- Inspect all equipment

7.5.3.4.4 There are no official PAR kits as part of any of the CRF UTCs. However, kits can be improvised from materials found in the 7E1AM and 7E1AF equipment or obtained/prepared before departure. Typical PAR kits consist of marking tape, flashlights, first-aid kits, medical litter, radios, an *Airman's Manual,* and personal/vehicle identification and de-contamination equipment (M8/9 paper, M291/295), but supplies can vary by installation and mission. PAR procedures are outlined in the *Airman's Manual* from pages 124 through 129 and will be followed to the max extent possible.

7.5.3.4.5 Pre-attack procedures are detailed in the *Airman's Manual* on pages 73 through 76. The commander can direct pre-attack procedures as appropriate based upon available intelligence.

7.5.3.4.6 Post attack response times will vary depending on the type of attack encountered. CE personnel in the CRF do not possess the tools or training required to

properly plot and analyze the chemical plumb of an attack. In addition, CE personnel in the CRF will not be able to establish split-MOPP conditions for the location either. Mission essential equipment should be prepped by covering with plastic and placing detection paper in accordance with procedures outlined in the *Airman's Manual* on pages 62 through 64.

7.5.3.4.7 De-contamination procedures are detailed in the *Airman's Manual* on pages 95-96. In the event of an attack, the CRG will follow these procedures to the max extent possible. See **Table 7.2**, Civil Engineering (CE) Checklists.

Table 7.2 Civil Engineering (CE) Checklists

Mission Planning/Deployment Checklist

1. Obtain airfield info (emphasis on imagery and existing pavement evaluation reports)
2. Inventory pavement evaluation/airfield assessment kit
3. Conduct function checks on equipment
4. Ensure equipment is loaded and ready for deployment at the prescribed time
5. Develop preliminary beddown plan and coordinate with interested parties
6. Develop aircraft parking plan in coordination with aircraft maintenance and ramp coordinator (RAMPCO) functions
7. Contact follow-on force CE representatives and establish reach-back communication
8. Determine ability to survive and operate (ATSO) requirements
9. Download road maps and all applicable topographical info within 50 miles of aerial port of debarkation (APOD)

Initial Arrival Checklist

1. Conduct pavement evaluation of airfield features and prepare airfield pavement summary (report)
2. Identify limiting factors or prerequisites for operations (e.g., airfield damage repair)
3. Select suitable beddown site (consider environmental factors and potential presence of underground utilities)
4. Locate water source(s)
5. Establish liaison with host nation or joint CE, aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF), and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel
6. Identify initial chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) defense, ARFF, and EOD requirements and relay to contingency response force (CRF) commander (CDR) as required

Main-Body Arrival Checklist

1. Survey beddown site and place survey flags to facilitate desired site development
2. Establish work priorities for main body labor pool
3. Provide oversight of tent erection and force beddown
4. Execute hardening plan
5. Collect site geodata and build/expand Common Installation Picture

Employment Checklist

1. Upload geodata as necessary to Air Mobility Command (AMC) GeoBase Data Share site
2. Provide oversight for facility and infrastructure issues
3. Provide engineering and mapping support
4. Work with contracting officer to establish service contracts for sanitation and trash disposal requirements
5. Coordinate follow-on force requirements and respond to requests for information as necessary
6. Ensure all deployed members understand nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack timeline

Redeployment Checklist

1. Inventory pavement evaluation/airfield assessment kit and prepare for shipment
2. Provide oversight for site tear-down and packing

Reconstitution Checklist

1. Reconstitute pavement evaluation/airfield assessment kit, clean and perform maintenance as required
2. Identify depleted consumable items and project for replenishment as necessary
3. Ensure final pavement evaluation reports and geodata are filed with the appropriate user or process owner

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7.6 Contracting.

7.6.1 Roles and Responsibilities. Contracting personnel are responsible for all CRF contracting activities. They act as business advisors to the deployed commander. They are the only individual who can commit government resources for the procurement of local goods and services to support deployed CRF and CRF augmenting forces. They establish initial contracting relationships and source lists for follow-on and sustainment forces. Contracting personnel will:

- Use the *Federal Acquisition Regulation* (FAR), *Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement* (DFARS) and FAR supplement for the service providing the contracting authority (*Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement* [AFFARS] for Air Force, *Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement* [AFARS] for Army, etc.) as guidance.
- Establish source lists at deployed location.
- Brief BOS-I or J4 and when appropriate the CRF commander on local contracting situations/conditions.
- Establish funding procedures with deployed Comptroller.
- Review Host Nation Support, Status of Forces and Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements.
- Coordinate all contracted deliveries/services with deployed Security Forces.

7.6.2 Leadership Considerations.

7.6.2.1 Contracting versus Command Authority. Contracting authority is the legal authority to enter into binding contracts and obligate funds for the US government. Contingency contracting officers (CCO) receive their contracting warrants from a source of contracting authority, not command authority. Pursuant to FAR, Part 1.6, *Career Development, Contracting Authority, and Responsibilities,* contracting officers are the only personnel authorized to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts and make related determinations and findings. Contracting officers may bind the government only to the extent of the authority delegated to them. Command authority does not include creating or implementing acquisition policy, guidance, procedures, directing, or authorizing deviations. CCOs receive their contracting warrants from a source of contracting authority, not command authority. Commanders at all levels must avoid improper command influence, or its appearance, on the contracting process. **Figure 7.4**, Command Authority versus Contracting Authority, from the *Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook*, illustrates the different authorities.

Figure 7.4 Command Authority versus Contracting Authority



7.6.2.2 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Commanders need to ensure they review the SOFA. The SOFA is intended to clarify the terms under which the foreign military is allowed to operate. Typically, purely military issues, such as the locations of bases and access to facilities, are covered by separate agreements. The SOFA is more concerned with the legal issues associated with military individuals and property. This may include issues like entry and exit into the country, tax liabilities, postal services, or employment terms for host-country nationals, but the most contentious issues are civil and criminal jurisdiction over the bases. For civil matters, SOFAs provide for how civil damages caused by the forces will be determined and paid. For additional guidance to interpret or apply the SOFAs or MOUs, commanders should seek advice of a judge advocate general (JAG) officer.

7.6.2.3 Employment. CRF commander should establish a clear policy to request and approve purchases in the contingency environment. This ensures proper use of resources, prevents over-burdening the commanding officer with unnecessary purchases, and ensures integrity by removing possibility of rank/supervisory influences.

7.6.2.4 Contractor Security. CCOs must be aware that many contractors live in the local area and that doing business with the US government can be dangerous for them and their families. All precautions must be taken to ensure that a contractor's personal information is protected. Prior to publicizing award notifications and other contracting information, check the local policy on what needs to be posted. CCOs and comptrollers traveling downtown or in hostile areas should utilize an AFOSI agent or security forces as escort.

7.6.3 Contracting Techniques and Best Practices.

7.6.3.1 Contingency Contracting Officer. All contracting personnel in the CRW are CCOs. The CCO warrant is obtained from the appropriate head of contracting authority (HCA), usually AMC A7, upon arrival to the CRW and is valid for the entire duration of assignment to the CRW. The HCA will determine the warrant limit based on information provided during the application process. A CCO is a person with delegated contracting authority to enter into, administer, and terminate contracts on behalf of the Government in support of a local contingency, steady-state deployments, or other contingency operations. The CCO also acts as the primary business advisor to the deployed or on-scene commander. Contracting personnel in the CRW are warranted for contingency operations. All home-station contracting issues will be handled by the host base.

7.6.3.2 Government Purchase Cards (GPC). CCOs normally do not use GPC. GPCs are tied to wing funding or Overseas Contingency Operation funds. The CRF normally does not deploy using its own funding and thus the GPC is not suited for CRF missions. Additionally, GPCs are more cumbersome and restrictive than using a contracting Standard Form 44, *Purchase Order-Invoice-Voucher (Storage Safeguard Form)*. GPC might be an option for a small team at an exercise where the CRF is using its own funding.

7.6.3.3 Host-Nation Support (HNS). It is essential to establish a link with the HNS teams and obtain cooperation from HNS authorities and personnel to enhance the contracting officer's ability to fulfill the contingency contracting obligation. It is also important to understand what can be obtained through HNS. Contact with local US authorities and higher headquarters will help determine whether HNS is available. Before deployment, coordination with legal assistance, civil affairs units, intelligence, and the US embassy will also be useful as possible sources for identifying contractor information in the area. A liaison officer should have knowledge of the HNS laws, regulations, and military command structure and be able to coordinate with the host nation to initiate site surveys. Reconnaissance visits to proposed contingency, humanitarian assistance, or peacekeeping operation sites will help identify what support can be provided by the host nation.

7.6.3.4 Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreements (ACSA). Research ACSA for deployed location. ACSAs are bilateral international agreements that allow for the provision of cooperative logistics support under the authority granted in DODD 2010.9, *Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements*. The ACSA statute was enacted to simplify exchanges of logistic support, supplies, and services between the US and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. The act was subsequently amended in 1994 to permit ACSAs with the governments of eligible non-NATO countries to require equal value exchanges, to allow ACSAs with United Nations organizations, and to authorize the loan or lease of equipment. Key elements of an ACSA include:

- Transactions may be cash reimbursement, equal value exchanges, or replacement in kind of logistic support, supplies, and services.
- The kinds of logistics support that may be exchanged are food; billeting; transportation; petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL); communications services; nonaccredited training; ammunition; emergency medical services; and base operations.

- Categories of support, which may never be exchanged, are guided missiles and kits, major end items, chemical or nuclear munitions, formal accredited course training, official uniforms, or major construction projects.

7.6.3.5 Mission Planning/Deployment. Meet with CRF leadership early on and try to identify potential requirements based on initial notification. This will enable contracting to begin researching potential contracts before departing home stations. Common examples are cell phones, port-a-johns, building space, rental vehicles, and so forth.

7.6.3.6 Employment. During this phase, the CCO will be utilizing the Standard Form 44 to make all the required purchase. Standard Form 44s are a pocketsize purchase order form designed primarily for on the spot, over-the-counter purchases of supplies and non-personal services.

7.6.3.6.1 Customs and Taxes. Many times the SOFA will address contracting support related to legal obligations (such as taxes and customs), and the process and documentation needed for exemption. If procedures have not been established, contact the customs office or US embassy for guidance.

Table 7.3 Contracting Checklists

Mission Planning/Deployment Checklist
1. Obtain and execute deployed commander designated requirements.
2. Determine if contracting requirements are identified and prioritized.
3. Establish source lists at deployed location.
4. Establish funding procedures with deployed paying agent.
5. Review Host Nation Support, Status of Forces and Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements.
6. Determine if contracting will need to be escorted based on the threat (Offices of Collateral Responsibility [OCR]: security force [SF], Air Force Office of Special Investigations [AFOSI])
7. Determine if an interpreter will be required; identify who will provide this service.
8. Maintain mission trip file to include all trip related documentation.
9. Brief CRF CDR on local contracting status.

Initial Arrival Checklist
1. First priority is basic life support requirements; billeting, food service (including potable water), transportation, and refuse and sanitation services.
2. Coordinate all contracted deliveries/services with deployed security forces.
3. Ensure payments are being made in a timely manner and vendors are being cooperative.
4. Ensure adequate prioritization and validation of contracting requirement processes.
5. Establish contact with local embassy and responsible sources.

Main-Body Arrival Checklist
1. Secure transportation and communication for mobile status.
2. Establish requirement protocol with CRF commander.

Employment Checklist
1. Meet with vendors on a regular or as-needed basis and establish productive business relationships.
2. Continuously search for new responsible sources within local area.
3. Build and update source list.
4. Brief deployed commander or designated representative on requirement and budget status.

Redeployment Checklist
1. Contract closeout.
2. Receiving reports.
3. Settle contractor claims.
4. Process final payments.
5. Dispose of purchased assets.

Reconstitution Checklist
1. Prepare after action report and restock kit.

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7.7 Comptroller (Financial Management [FM]).

7.7.1 Roles and Responsibilities. Comptroller personnel have pecuniary liability for all financial transactions. Research and ensure compliance with financial regulations and obtain local funds by currency exchange thru approved banking establishments. FM must:

- Establish AF Form 616, *Fund Cite Authorization (FCA)* (without this document it is not possible to receive funding prior to departure) prior to leaving for both emergency travel and accountable funds.
- Record/track obligations against the AF Form 616 for CRF and submit turn-in reports to the Disbursing Officer.

- Ensure all known outstanding invoices are paid prior to redeployment.
- Should establish financial procedures for follow-on/sustainment forces.
- Safeguard funds in approved General Services Administration (GSA) safe in accordance with Chapter 25 of AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense (FOUO)*.
- Ensure all authorized military personnel who request check cashing privileges consent, in writing, to immediate collection against their pay for total of check. Maintain detailed records of all instruments negotiated.
- Maintain accountability on a DD Form 2665, *Daily Agent Accountability Summary.*
- Follow Air Force Pamphlet 65-110, *Deployed Agent Operations* and DOD FMR 7000.14-R, V5 *Disbursing Policy*, and protect the collection and maintaining information by the Privacy Act of 1974.

7.7.2 Leadership Consideration.

7.7.2.1 Mission Planning/Deployment.

7.7.2.1.1 Carrying Cash. The method of travel will determine the amount of funding an agent can carry. On MILAIR flights, the agent is not limited to a specific currency, but any amount exceeding 75,000 dollars requires an armed escort. If traveling commercial the agent should not carry currency exceeding 10,000 dollars. AMC does not recommend agents carry large amounts of cash aboard commercial airlines due to the legality in paperwork and potential attention that it will draw.

7.7.2.1.2 US Embassy and banking facility availability is often key to the success of the comptroller. The agent will need time to pre-coordinate with the available government agencies. If agencies are not available, the agent may need to travel to closest supporting agencies.

7.7.2.2 Bottled Water. CRF leaders need to be aware of the guidance concerning the purchase of bottled water at deployed locations. Reference **Table 7.4**, Bottle Water Excerpt from AFI 65-601 V1, *Budget Guidance and Procedures* for an excerpt from the instruction concerning the procurement of bottle water.

Table 7.4 Bottle Water Excerpt from AFI 65-601 V1

Special Drinking Water. Air Force organizations may purchase drinking water (bottled water) with appropriated funds only when it is a necessary expense from the government's standpoint:

- The public water supply is unsafe for human consumption **as determined by competent medical/environmental authority in writing**.
- There is an emergency failure of the water source on the installation.
- A temporary facility has no drinking water available within a reasonable distance.
- There is no water fit for drinking purposes, as determined by competent medical/environmental authority in writing, available without cost or at a lower cost to the government. **The purchase of drinking water (bottled water) with appropriated funds (APF) ceases to be authorized when the problem with the drinking water has been remedied.** (See CompGen B-247871, B-147622, 3 CG 828, 5 CG 90, 17 CG 698, 18 CG 238, 24 CG 56, and 25 CG 920.)
- Bottled or Potable Water Purchases Incident to Temporary Duty (TDY). Military members and civilian travelers, directed to perform TDY, are not authorized bottled/potable water as a reimbursable expense. Bottled water is part of the subsistence portion of the per diem allowance. Reference: See Chapter 4, Part F, of JFTR V1 (for uniformed service members), *Miscellaneous Reimbursable Expenses* and Chapter 4, Part O, JTR V2 (for DOD civilian personnel), *Reimbursable Travel Expenses.*
- **Sports Beverages.** Any requirement to provide sports beverages must be established by competent medical authority. If the local medical treatment facility (MTF) commander or a medically qualified representative makes a medical determination, in writing, that consumption of such beverages during the performance of official duties is necessary to maintain the physical well-being of Air Force members, the use of organizational operation and maintenance (O&M) funds to procure the beverages is authorized. The authority to make this medical determination cannot be delegated to other installation organization commanders. This is the only circumstance under which APF is authorized to procure such beverages for consumption during the performance of official duties. This direction is not intended to and does not preclude competent medical authority from prescribing the use of sports beverages for medical reasons for individual members on or off duty.

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7.7.2.2.1 If it is determined by the Embassy that the water is non-potable, purchasing of water will be determined by the per diem entitlement. For example if a member orders state full per diem then he/she is responsible for the purchase of bottled water/sports beverage.

7.7.2.2.2 If a member is traveling and the order states all government meals are available and directed and the member is limited to $3.50 per day to the AOR then a water contract should already be in place for the member.

7.7.2.2.3 If the area is a bare base operation with no established requirement, a contract cannot be set in place until the medical officer's letter is received. This letter should be accomplished on the site survey or once the initial team arrives. Thus, a

medical specialist should travel on the assessment team or ADVON team to make the earliest determination on bottled water and sports beverages. The letter is not based on meteorological data and is based on a Medical Officer evaluation. This letter is based at the time of arrival and duration of a specific deployment.

7.7.2.3 Employment. Comptroller requires a separate office space that can be secured at the deployed location. The FM agent cannot be located with weapons or classified information. This is considered a conflict of interest.

7.7.2.4 Redeployment. The comptroller has to have hand over with the follow on comptroller. There are no exceptions to this policy. If the incoming agent is delayed, the current agent will remain in place until new agent arrives. Additionally, a comptroller cannot pre-pay invoices if their payment office is closed the day of departure.

7.7.3 Comptroller Techniques and Best Practices.

7.7.3.1 Pre-deployment. The AF Form 616 can only be accomplished prior to each mission. HQ will use an emergency and special code directed at that mission. This action cannot be accomplished ahead of time

7.7.3.2 Initial Arrival. Establish primary facility to store funding, and check with agencies on cash exchange and check cashing. Personal check cashing could be accommodated by the paying agent if deemed necessary.

7.7.3.3 Employment. The agent may be required to travel outside the wire, therefore will need an armed escort (depending on amount carried). Situation may also require AFOSI agent to travel as well.

7.7.3.4 Redeployment. The agent requires sufficient amount of time to close all existing contracts. All businesses are not open every day of the week and airlift consideration need to be made accordingly. Comptrollers are unable to pre-pay for invoices. Paying agents may need to stay behind to close out contract. For example, a payment office is only open Monday through Friday and the redeployment is on Sunday. If departing on Sunday, the paying agent will still owe for Saturday and Sunday.

7.7.3.5 Reconstitution. Paying Agent will need to close all transactions with the station where the money was acquired.

Table 7.5 Comptroller (FM) Checklists

Mission Planning/Deployment Checklist

1. Determine if a paying agent required (paying agents can be a Staff Sergeant or above with the required training from the local finance office. Having a finance specialist assigned is preferable, if applicable. There are many rules and guidelines that need to be followed. A new agent will need to take the time to research each item requested to buy or procure.)
2. Obtain funding documents
3. Obtain funds from Comptroller squadron, if necessary
4. Identify local banking establishments

a. Hours of operation?
b. What are their policies?

5. Determine how purchased items will be paid for (Government Purchase Card, check, or cash)
6. Determine local vendor requirements
7. Obtain foreign currency
8. Determine need of establishment of a limited depository account
9. Determine need to hand carry US Currency
   - Determine plan to replenish currency
   - Determine if there is adequate security for escort of funds (OCR: security force [SF]) (AFI 31-101)
   - Determine if funds may be secured on site (OCR: SF) (AFI 31-101)
10. Safeguard funds in approved General Services Administration (GSA) safe in accordance with AFI 31-101 chap 25. (This is part of the agent's logistics detail [LOGDET] kit. If the agent does not have a safe, they may be able to acquire one from local Finance Office; there is no guarantee that they will have one.) Prepare Standard Form 700, *Security Container Information Form*, and give it to the deployed commander or security officer to store the combination.
11. Use Standard Form 44, *Purchasing Order - Invoice Voucher (Storage Safeguard Form)*, as payment documents but as an attachment to a Standard Form 1034, *Public Voucher for Purchases and Services Other Than Personal*.
12. All authorized military personnel who request check cashing privileges must consent, in writing, to immediate collection against their pay for total of check. Maintain detailed records of all instruments negotiated.
13. Maintain accountability on a DD Form 2665, *Daily Agent Accountability Summary*. For detailed explanation in completing DD Form 2665, refer to DODFMR 70000.14-R V5, Dispersing Policy and Procedures.
14. Follow AFPAM 65-110, *Deployed Agent Operations* and DODMFR V5 and protect the collection and maintenance of information by the Privacy Act of 1974.
15. Coordinated with the deployed contracting representative. See **Table 7.6**, Comptroller Site Survey Checklist (to be completed on advanced echelon [ADVON] team item).

Initial Arrival Checklist

1. Set up workspace should have a facility that can be locked. The reason is for the safety of the funds and agent. A workspace should be created for the agent to work undisturbed. Security of the funding is the agent's responsibility and they are solely responsible for what is lost.
2. Exchange funds for foreign currency
3. Secure funds in approved GSA safe

Main-Body Arrival Checklist

Employment Checklist

1. Pay completed obligations
2. Balance daily
3. Prepare turn-in reports
4. Secure funds

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Table 7.5 Comptroller (FM) Checklists continued

Redeployment Checklist 1) Secure follow-on funding. 2) Turn in all local currency to bank for credit. 3) Contact Disbursing Officer with information on redeploy site. 4) Work with Contracting Officer to close and pay any outstanding contracts. 5) Coordinate with follow-on forces on any continuing contract payments. See **Table 7.7**, Comptroller Handover Checklist.
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Table 7.6 Comptroller Site Survey Checklist

(To be completed on advanced echelon (ADVON) team item)	Yes	No	Comments
1. Are quarters available on the beddown site?			
a. How many bed spaces are available?			
b. Are the available bed spaces sufficient to beddown all deploying personnel?			
c. Is there adequate air conditioning/heating?			
2. Will temporary field assignment apply?			
3. Are there adequate commercial hotels in the vicinity of the beddown location?			
a. How far away are hotels from the beddown location?			
b. How will transportation be provided between hotels and beddown site?			
• What is the estimated cost?			
c. Is there adequate air conditioning/heating?			
d. Are there adequate, passable roads between the hotels and the beddown location?			
e. Do all hotels accept for payment			
• The Government Travel Charge Card?			
• Personal credit cards?			
• US currency			
• Local currency only?			
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Table 7.7 Comptroller Handover Checklist

Complete	Item
	Receive personnel support for contingency operations (PERSCO) brief: reception, in-processing, orientation, beddown, and work area.
	Brief assigned New Paying Agent, appointment letter prepared and signed by new agent.
	Ensure safe combinations changed; prepare new Standard Form 700, *Security Container Information Form* and deliver to the installation commander to be secured in their safe.
	Reconcile limited depository account (LDA) - obtain bank statement and balance; account for all outstanding checks.
	Transfer LDA (if open) to new paying agent or close if no longer required.
	Transfer advance cash to incoming paying agent on DD Form 1081, *Statement of Agent Officer's Account,* count all currency.
	Confirm serial numbers of marked bills with new paying agent.
	Prepare all documents and vouchers for agent final turn in.
	Brief new paying agent on local customs of vendors, recurring monthly vendor payments and notify vendors of paying agent change.
	Brief new paying agent on anti-robbery procedures, code word, and security forces call sign.
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7.8 Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE).

7.8.1 Roles and Responsibilities. The range of tasks of the AGE specialist varies greatly depending on the employed equipment. AGE personnel must be very familiar with the equipment associated with the 7E1CA, 7E1BD, 7E1BC, XFB1A (BBS Bear 150 Kit). The AGE specialist will:

- Construct power grid and establish environmental control to support CRF operating and living areas.
- Perform HELAMS setup in conjunction with Communications personnel.
- Provide technical support to ensure continuous operability of power generation and environmental control systems.
- Perform daily checks and provide servicing of power generation and environmental control equipment.
- Monitor and report daily status of power generation and environmental control equipment.

7.8.2 Leadership Considerations.

7.8.2.1 7E1BD Planning Considerations. AGE is in charge of the UTC 7E1BD tent. Careful planning and consideration needs to go into the increment buildup and chalk order for the 7E1BD. It is recommended to put a tent pallet on each chalk to ensure that each chalk will be able to beddown. It is also recommended to put a generator, food and water on each tent pallet to ensure that the increment is able to be sustained on its own and not reliant on another chalk. The goal is to prevent a critical increment and/or chalk.

7.8.2.2 Fuel Considerations. AGE will need to coordinate with POL and CRF leadership on expected fuel requirements. Fuel requirements can be high if running a large scale 24 hour operations and distribution/resupply will have to be thoroughly planned for. Additionally, supporting aircraft and providing traditional AGE equipment will further increase the required fuel load.

7.8.3 AGE Techniques and Best Practices.

7.8.3.1 Generators. Reference **Table 7.8**, Generator Information. Typically, an 806 generator from the 7E1BD can support 4 ECUs running a normal load. This normally equates to four living tents or four work tents that are set up as regular office space. If a tent is deemed mission critical and the mission could not be performed if power was lost, it should have a backup generator to prevent power loss in the event the primary generator fails. It is important to plan for generator maintenance, fueling and repair so that there will not be periods of unplanned power loss. Ideally, there should be a spare generator to allow for these conditions. Refer to **Table 7.9**, Generator Start Up Operations.

Table 7.8 Generator Information

Generator	UTC	# on UTC	Fuel Burn	Oil Change
806	7E1BD	4	Approx 46 gallons/8 hrs	Every 300 hours
805	7E1CA	2	Approx 46 gallons/8 hrs	Every 300 hours
805	7E1BC	1	Approx 46 gallons/8 hrs	Every 300 hours

Table 7.9 Generator Start Up Operations

GENERATOR OPERATIONS
1. Pre-Operational Training a. Remove all jewelry and make sure hearing protection is utilized b. Check all fluid levels c. Check for frayed and loose wires d. Check belt tension (two-inch deflection off back of hand) e. If fluids are found leaking or loose/frayed wires are discovered, **REFER TO HIGHER MAINTENANCE**
2. Start-Up a. Flip MASTER CONTROL switch to ON position and wait for screen to load to Main Menu b. Hold the FAULT RESET to ON placing the ENGINE CONTROL SWITCH to START until start-up c. Let engine warm up for 5 minutes d. If problems are encountered, **REFER TO HIGHER MAINTENANCE**
3. Under-Load a. Hold the alternating current (AC) INTERRUPTER SWITCH to the CLOSED position b. Make sure that no faults appear on the screen c. If problems are encountered, **REFER TO HIGHER MAINTENANCE**
4. During-Operation a. Annotate readings for screen on AF Form 487, *Emergency Generator Operating Log (Inspection Testing)* b. Look for any leaks on or around generator c. If problems are encountered, **REFER TO HIGHER MAINTENANCE**
5. Stopping a. Remove load by placing AC CIRCUIT INTERRUPTER SWITCH to OPEN position b. Allow engine to cool down for 5 minutes c. Annotate reading at 5 minute mark at on AF Form 487 d. Stop engine by placing ENGINE CONTROL SWITCH to OFF position e. If problems are encountered, **REFER TO HIGHER MAINTENANCE**
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7.8.3.2 7E1CA (Hard-Sided Expandable Light Air-Mobile Shelter [HELAMS]).

7.8.3.2.1 Mission Planning/Deployment. Grounding the generators and HELAMS is extremely important. Ensure all necessary grounding tools are packed (e.g., slide hammers, sledge hammers, and possibly demolition hammers). Also ensure extra ground rods and extra lengths of ground wire are packed. Additionally, ensure extra ground rod couplers and ground wire clamps are on-hand. Spider ground kits are highly encouraged and are a good alternative in the case that normal grounding is not possible or forbidden due to no digging permit or host nation rules.

7.8.3.2.2 Initial Arrival/Employment. AGE personnel work with 7E1CA communications personnel to download HELAMS from aircraft or truck. Site location of the HELAMS is determined by CRF leadership. After location is determined, move HELAMS to the site, and begin set up actions. When positioning the shelter, consider which side of shelter command and control personnel will be utilizing to ensure visibility of flight line. When small portable initial communications equipment (SPICE) is being used and equipment is located in the HELAMS, one side of the shelter will be closed off due to SIPRNET and COMSEC requirements. For sustainment operations, monitor generator operation and fuel levels. Operate spare generator daily to ensure serviceability.

7.8.3.2.3 Redeployment. HELAMS close out is accomplished after UTCs 7E1AE and 7E1AB are cleared out of shelter. Some work may be accomplished, but all non-UTC 7E1CA personnel and equipment need to be out of shelter before pack up. For stateside truck shipment, a bonded motor carrier needs to be contracted due to controlled cryptographic items (CCI) being located inside shelter.

7.8.3.3 7E1BC (C2 Soft-Wall Operations Center).

7.8.3.3.1 Mission Planning/Deployment. This is the UTC setup for the Tactical / Joint Operations Center, and paring and tailoring of the UTC is usually not done. This UTC contains Alaska Extreme shelters, which are different from the main 7E1BD tents. Typically, these tents take longer time to set up due to the differences and training levels of CR personnel. Extreme shelter training prior to deployment for all personnel is highly recommended. See **Attachment 13**, Alaskan Extreme Tent Set Up to complement the instructions already contained in the UTC. It is critical to ensure that the setup instruction is with the UTC. If using a commercial off the shelf tent system in lieu of the Alaskan Extreme shelters (such as the HDT Base-X tent), refer to the specific manufacturer instructions for proper setup of the shelter.

7.8.3.3.2 Initial Arrival/Employment. Leadership determines the location for the JOC. Consider whether the site is large enough for tents (depending on configuration, end-to-end or side by side with vestibules) and somewhat level, but with some slope for drainage. Get with CE personnel for any particulars about tent sitting and standoff distances. These tents are the AK extreme so they will take some extra time. Careful attention needs to be paid to proper construction of these tents, since most personnel are not very familiar with them. Since this is the TOC/JOC, these tents need to go up as soon as possible after arrival. For sustainment, monitor generator operation and fuel

levels, and monitor tents to ensure no rips are developing in fabric and all ropes remain tight.

7.8.3.3.3 Redeployment. Proper tent deconstruction is as essential as construction. Care should be exercised to make sure no parts are broken due to failure to follow proper procedures. Also, ensure no parts are left behind and that all parts for one tent are placed in the same box. Since two tents are coming down at the same time, consider putting some distance in between the two operations, locating the empty boxes well away from each other. Any broken parts should be reported to AGE personnel as soon as possible.

7.8.3.3.4 Reconstitution. 7E1BC reconstitution is primarily aimed at tents. Tents should be washed and dried completely before they are packed away in their boxes to prevent mold and mildew growth. Tents will be inventoried in accordance with the AK extreme shelter inventory sheets.

7.8.3.4 7E1BD (Mobility Bare Base Living Quarters).

7.8.3.4.1 Mission Planning/Deployment. The full 7E1BD is 14 increments of cargo, 16 for a JTF-PO. It is the largest UTC assigned, and the most manpower intensive. At prep time, AGE personnel will need extra help from the rest of the CRF for packing the pallets, and weighing and marking all the equipment. A week should be allowed for UTC 7E1BD preparation. This UTC can be pared and tailored to suit the needs of the deployment; for example deleting shower facility and water for a short deployment (seven days or less) or deleting tent increments based on number of personnel deploying. If bringing food or water, they should be dispersed among the tent pallets. Ensure there is no critical increment or chalk that will prevent other increments or chalks from setting up.

7.8.3.4.2 Initial Arrival/Employment.

7.8.3.4.2.1 The tent city is the largest and most complex part of the laydown plan. The site for the tent city is determined by the CE personnel with input from the AGE personnel. Tent construction is accomplished by all personnel available, and supervised by CE personnel ideally, as AGE personnel will be busy with power grid design and set up. CE should be considering all aspects of sitting such as drainage areas, stand offs for generators from tents, latrine locations, chow tent locations, and so forth.

7.8.3.4.2.2 When designing and laying out the power grid, consider making a drawing beforehand to ensure proper cable length, and to assist in troubleshooting. Keep in mind a maximum of four tents can be connected to one generator.

CAUTION: Safety is a major consideration during the tent city construction. No one except AGE or civil engineering power production personnel may make any electrical connections outside of the tents, as some lines may be energized. There is the possibility that some lines may be energized. Hard hats or helmets must be worn when personnel are installing purlins over their heads.

7.8.3.4.2.3 See **Figure 7.5**, 7E1BD Notional Beddown Plan for a notional 7E1BD beddown. Note that this plan currently uses all four generators. It could be reconfigured to utilize three generators to allow for a spare generator.

Figure 7.5 7E1BD Notional Beddown Plan



7.8.3.4.2.4 See **Attachment 14**, Small Shelters (SS) for techniques to build the Alaskan Small Shelter Tent. Use in conjunction with instructions included with the tent.

7.8.3.4.3 Redeployment. A big consideration to this UTC for tear down is not to get in a rush. In the past, tent parts have been broken due to personnel being in a hurry to get the tent city down and packed away. Tent deconstruction should be done in an organized manner; all parts for one tent should go in the same box. The tent city area can be a chaotic scene as tents come down and AGE personnel are busy removing and packing the power grid. Attention needs to be paid to verifying safety of personnel.

CAUTION: No one except AGE or civil engineering power production personnel may disconnect any electrical items outside of the tents. There is the possibility that some lines may still be energized. Hard hats or helmets must be worn during tent deconstruction when personnel are removing purlins over their heads.

7.8.3.4.4 Reconstitution. Tents are the biggest consideration in the 7E1BD recon. Tents should be washed and completely dried before repacking to prevent mold/mildew growth. All available personnel are needed for tent recon as AGE personnel will be busy reconstituting other 7E1BD equipment and equipment from

other UTCs. For tent inventories, personnel should be broken into teams with a team leader assigned. The team leader will ensure all parts of the tent are accounted for in the box. This person will be signing the inventory sheet, assuming responsibility for the inventory and assuring that the tent is ready for future deployment.

Table 7.10 AGE Checklists

Mission Planning/Deployment Checklist

1. Coordinate with contingency response force (CRF) civil engineer (CE) personnel for bare base layout.
2. Coordinate with CRF supply personnel to procure meals, ready to eat (MRE)/water for joint field office (JOC)/living quarters.
3. Ensure qualified personnel accompany Hardside Expandable Light Air-Mobile Shelters (HELAMS) for offloading at deployed location.

7E1CA

1. Prepare MEP-805 generators and corresponding Hazardous Cargo Declarations for deployment.
2. Prepare air expeditionary group (AGE) war readiness spares kit (WRSK)/7E1CA equipment pallet/internal storage units (ISU) with all required items for deployment.
3. Coordinate with communications personnel for equipment packing and planning.
4. Prepare fuel pallet and corresponding Hazardous Cargo Declarations for deployment (if required).
5. Ensure equipment/pallets are properly weighed and marked.
6. Coordinate with load planners to make sure 7E1CA equipment is on same chalk as HELAMS. Also, all 7E1CA personnel need to be on the same chalk as HELAMS and support equipment.

7E1BC

1. Sign for 7E1BC from unit type code (UTC) management section.
2. Inventory pallets using 7E1BC checklists and make sure all required equipment is available and serviceable.
3. Prep generator for shipment, along with hazardous cargo declarations.
4. Ensure equipment/pallets are properly weighed and marked

7E1BD

1. Sign for 7E1BD from UTC management section.
2. Prepare generators and corresponding hazardous cargo declarations for deployment.
3. Prepare fuel pallets and corresponding hazardous cargo declarations for deployment.
4. Coordinate with contingency response group (CRG) supply personnel for MRE procurement.
5. Coordinate with 7E1BD UTC manager for drinking water procurement.
6. Request all available help from CRG for UTC preparation.
7. Ensure war readiness spares kit (WRSK) is packed in ISU90 for generator/environmental control unit (ECU) servicing & field maintenance.
8. Ensure water bladders are filled and the pallets prepared for shipment (if required).
9. Ensure equipment/pallets are properly weighed and marked.

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Table 7.10 Mission Planning/Deployment Checklist continued

Initial Arrival Checklist/Employment/Sustainment

7E1CA

1. Complete HELAMS offload
2. Complete site survey for HELAMS, equipment and camp
3. Assist communications personnel in HELAMS setup
4. Ensure HELAMS grounding is accomplished
5. Set up, ground, attach generators to external fuel supply if applicable
6. Connect power cable from generator to distribution box to HELAMS
7. Verify all circuit breakers turned off in HELAMS panel.
8. Apply power to HELAMS through distribution box and power up HELAMS at internal circuit breaker panel.
9. Verify proper operation of all HELAMS systems and ECUs.

7E1BC

1. Determine location and set up and ground generator and lay out power distribution boxes and cables
2. Construct Alaska Extreme shelters, to include interior electrical items
3. Minimum of seven personnel required for set up of tent.
4. Attach ECUs to tents and prepare units for operation
5. Attach power distribution cables, boxes, and so forth, to tents and air conditioners and apply power from generator
6. Verify proper operation of electrical systems and ECUs.

7E1BD

1. Work with CE and leadership for tent city location and layout, depending on real estate available.
2. While tent construction is progressing, design and set up power grid and locate generators accordingly.
3. Set up and ground generators and lay out power distribution boxes and cables; attach to external fuel supply if applicable
4. Attach ECUs to tents and prepare for operation
5. Attach power distribution cables, boxes, and so forth, to tents, air conditioners, and shower tent/accessories and apply power from generator
6. Install shower tent plumbing and connect pumps and water heater to water supply
7. Ensure latrine tents are constructed
8. Construct lighting around tent city if required

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Table 7.10 Mission Planning/Deployment Checklist continued

Redeployment Checklist

7E1CA

1. Ensure hazardous declaration documents are complete and installed; ensure equipment and pallets are properly weighed & marked
2. Disconnect power from HELAMS and prepare generators for shipment
3. Assist communications in packing up and folding up HELAMS for shipment
4. Ensure fuel bladders/generators/jerry cans are empty and fuel bladder pallet is built up for redeployment

7E1BC

1. Disconnect generator power and prep generator for shipment
2. Disconnect power distribution boxes and cables
3. Disconnect ECUs from tents, stow ducts, and panel unit for shipment
4. Build 7E1BC pallets for return shipment

7E1BD

1. Disconnect generators and prepare pallets for shipment
2. Disconnect and stow all power distribution boxes and cables
3. Disconnect ECUs from tents, stow ducts, and panel unit for shipment
4. Ensure tent/environmental control unit (ECU) pallets are built for return shipment
5. Disconnect and repackage all shower tent plumbing (e.g., pumps, heater)
6. Drain, rinse and repack reusable gray water bladder
7. Tear down and repackage latrine tents
8. Repackage shower pallet for return shipment
9. Ensure fuel bladders are empty and build fuel bladder pallet for redeployment

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Table 7.10 Mission Planning/Deployment Checklist continued

Reconstitution Checklist

7E1CA

1. Load-bank generators to burn off excess carbon in engine and exhaust and perform all due or delayed maintenance actions; return generators to designated parking location; annotate/fix discrepancies
2. Inventory fuel bladder pallet; return pallet to designated storage location; annotate/fix discrepancies
3. Assist communications personnel with HELAMS and ISU90 inventory; annotate/fix discrepancies
4. Ensure any AGE related discrepancies are turned in when communications returns HELAMS inventories and discrepancy reports to UTC management

7E1BC

1. Tents need to be washed and dried completely before repacking.
2. After drying, tents need to be inventoried as they are repacked in their boxes.
3. Load bank generator and perform any required maintenance or inspections.
4. ECUs need to be cleaned and operationally checked before being placed back in storage.
5. After tents, generators and ECUs are completed, repack pallets in accordance with 7E1BC recon checklists.
6. Turn in both 7E1BC pallets to UTC management and report any known discrepancies

7E1BD

1. Ensure that previously deployed personnel unpack, inspect, clean, inventory, and make any necessary repairs to the tents they used; ensure tents are properly repacked so items will fit properly; annotate any unresolved discrepancies
2. Ensure 7E1BD ISU90 receives 100 percent inventory and that all consumed items are replaced; annotate unresolved discrepancies
3. If generators ran at less than 50 percent rated load for the deployment, they must be load-banked to burn off excessive carbon; perform all maintenance, delayed maintenance, and preventative maintenance required; return generator to designated storage location; annotate any unresolved discrepancies
4. Inventory fuel bladder pallet; ensure pallet is returned to designated storage area; annotate any discrepancies
5. Turn in inventory/discrepancy list with binder to UTC management

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7.9 Logistics Readiness Officer (LRO).

7.9.1 Roles and Responsibilities. The LRO role is to serve as the primary authority for the CRG's aerial port function as well as all logistics related issues. These can include, but are not limited to, supply management, fuels management, transportation management, air transportation management, UTC management, deployment/mobilization management, and vehicle fleet operations and maintenance. LROs offer broad-spectrum knowledge and

understanding of this diverse list of disciplines and should be positioned as the leadership focal point for the associated AFSCs operating within and supporting the aforementioned capabilities.

7.9.2 Leadership Considerations:

7.9.2.1 Mission Planning/Deployment.

7.9.2.1.1 An LRO should be a component of any CRF commander's initial planning team. During early discussions, issues related to deployment phasing, initial beddown sequence and sustainment should be directed to the LRO. In each case, the discussion items concerning logistics items will span several disciplines and will require the collaboration and consensus of a number of subject matter experts (SME). By employing an LRO in planning discussions, mission commanders can consolidate the size of their planning team, but retain the required diversity of input.

7.9.2.1.2 The UTC 9LRCG constitutes one LRO and is a personnel-only UTC. This UTC is designed to accompany the UFBBS aerial port UTC. Per the MEFPAK, the 9LRCG is obligatory if more than one UFBBS is tasked. Including an LRO in a force package that contains only one UFBBS, however, still represents an advantageous use of capability. The UFBBS contains only one senior noncommissioned officer (SNCO), but has mission capability to support two-shift operations. By incorporating an LRO with the UFBBS, the LRO and SNCO can split the aerial port leadership requirement and ensure sufficient management expertise over both shifts.

EXAMPLE: In Haiti, an LRO was assigned to the aerial port function and assumed the role of shift-lead. Within days, this shift-lead position became integral to the synchronization of air and surface cargo and was re-coined 'Yard Boss'.

7.9.2.1.3 For deployment movements to supported or semi-supported locations, placing an LRO on a first arriving chalk can substantially improve the reception/beddown process for follow-on chalks. Whether integrating with an existing Air Force unit or sister-service reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (); the LRO possesses the capacity to facilitate transitional movement with these host forces.

7.9.2.2 Initial Arrival.

7.9.2.2.1 The LRO's first obligation is to the establishment of the aerial port operation. This includes establishing shift schedules, building the cargo grid yard, standing up the ATOC, and readying the MHE fleet. Often there is very little, if any, time between the arrival of CR forces and the arrival of follow-on airlift. Aerial port operations may need to commence immediately upon arrival. Priority should be given to MHE set-up as few aircraft are able/configured to download cargo without external assistance. ATOC and the cargo yard can follow sequentially.

7.9.2.2.2 Grid yard operations must ensure adequate space for MHE and transportation vehicle spacing. A densely filled cargo yard can prove prohibitive to movement of equipment and can result in slowed operations. Wide aisle-ways and turn-arounds may seem like a misuse of space early in an operation, but as cargo

begins to accumulate, this accommodation will pay invaluable dividends. Be sure to mark of the grid yard with a visible boundary (e.g., cones, yellow rope, surveyor tape).

NOTE: When establishing space for anticipated cargo, mark off an area geared toward 150 percent of the expected through-put. Then, double that. Running out of room for cargo once an operation has begun can prove disastrous. Unused real estate can always be given back to the BOS-I, but it will be difficult to negotiate extra once the operation in underway.

7.9.2.2.3 Additionally, given the CRW's limited foot-print, another of the LRO's overarching concerns, upon arrival, should be sustainment. While camp build and force beddown are the primary considerations after arrival, the five-day supply of food, water and fuel will rapidly deteriorate.

7.9.2.2.4 The LRO should collaborate with the fuels specialist and assess the anticipated requirements for sustainment of CRF. For example, the 806-series generators consume 120 gallons of diesel every 24 hours. With four generators operating continuously, the camp's power production alone will consume one 500-gallon blivet every day. Based on the AOR, fuels requirements may need to be coordinated with the respective Joint Petroleum Office to ensure seamless operation. Otherwise, AMC/A4 is primary contact for fuel provisions (DSN 312-779-2774). Furthermore, on-hand fuel quantity will need to be reported to the CRE/DO daily for inclusion in the SITREP.

7.9.2.3 Employment.

7.9.2.3.1 In any deployment, the LRO's primary responsibility is the management of the Aerial Port operation. This includes oversight of the MHE fleet, cargo yard, ITV, ATOC and load planning cell. Additionally, various missions may require the coordination of Joint Inspections or passenger movements.

7.9.2.3.2 CR forces face a unique supply predicament when deployed at bare base operations without some Air Force infrastructure. LROs will find themselves without the benefit of a stock record account number (SRAN) or Department Of Defense activity address code (DODACC). Historically, resupply challenge has proven extremely difficult. LROs should reach out to AMC/A4 and theatre COCOM J/4s as soon as possible to establish resupply request channels

7.9.2.4 Redeployment.

7.9.2.4.1 The LRO can assist the CRF commander with the preparation of the redeployment plan as early as arrival. For time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) movements, the LRO should consult with the theatre logistics planning cell to ensure that all of the CR force's ULNs are rolled to a re-deployment PID. This not only ensures adequate ITV of re-deploying forces, but is instrumental to the allocation of airlift.

7.9.2.4.2 Additionally, the LRO should oversee the phased scale-down of Aerial Port forces as part of any roll-up plan. Careful consideration must be given to the re-deployment of MHE if there are no follow-on, MHE-capable forces in place. In this instance, the CR forces will have to facilitate their own outbound cargo upload and the

final load plan must allow the MHE aboard, but still permit either self-upload or hand-upload of remaining cargo increments.

7.9.2.5 Reconstitution.

7.9.2.5.1 During reconstitution, any deployment discrepancies (e.g., JI frustration items, LOGMOD data mismatches) should be addressed with the CRW Log Planners and UTC managers for rectification.

7.9.3 LRO Techniques and Best Practices.

7.9.3.1 Training Requirements.

7.9.3.1.1 As a CRW LRO, one can expect to utilize expertise from across the entire gamut of LRO qualifications. A broad background is essential for success in the CR arena. Those LROs who have stove-piped themselves around one core function (i.e. POL/Supply only) will find themselves ill-suited to the challenge ahead. LROs entering a CR unit should have experience in both a logistics readiness squadron (LRS) and an aerial port squadron (APS)/air mobility squadron (AMS). Duty experience should include Plans & Integration, Supply, POL, Vehicle Management, Traffic Management and Aerial Port.

7.9.3.1.2 There are formal training schools that will prove essential to an LRO's success. At a minimum, LROs should attend the Contingency War Planners Course, the IDO course, LOGMOD training, and UDM training.

7.9.3.1.3 Mission Planning/Deployment. It is strongly advised that the LRO bring a government lap-top computer with CD writing capability for his/her dedicated use, an ample supply of CD-Rs and an external floppy disk drive, if not built into the lap-top, to ensure utility with all available media. The redeployment letter and all updates must be sent to AMC/A4 via SIPR; therefore unless the letter can be saved on a secure computer to which the LRO has uninterrupted access for updates, the LRO will need to transfer the file from a non-secure computer to a secure one for transmission. The transferring medium is itself then classified to the security level of the system used and cannot be reused in an unclassified computer.

7.9.3.2 Employment.

7.9.3.2.1 ATOC radios (land mobile radios [LMR] or PSC-5) should be set to scan the CRG “Work Net”, the C2 net (command post to aircraft) and the ATC ground frequency. This combination of information will ensure situational awareness at the aerial port control level and will serve to minimize duplicate transmissions of info.

7.9.3.2.2 MREs are accountable items. Someone (typically the supply rep) will need to serve as the responsible officer for the quantity of MREs, thereby necessitating the establishment of a “point of sale/issue.” Although a mass issue (“Here's a week's worth of MRE”) may seem like an efficient way to minimize work for the supply rep, it leads to open storage of food within living quarters that can easily result in the degradation of hygienic conditions. Instead, the supply rep should operate a twice-daily 'store front' and sell/issue MREs for the day's consumption by personnel.

7.9.3.2.3 Water is a precious commodity in a deployed environment, yet the need to keep the force hydrated means that rationing of water is undesirable. Instead, deployed leaders must stress the minimization of waste. Partially consumed bottles of water should be discouraged. Additionally, if the only water available comes in larger containers (e.g., box quarts, gallon jugs); personnel should be encouraged/required to use these larger containers of water strictly for the refilling of water bottles and canteens to ensure total consumption.

7.9.3.2.4 The LRO should also consult with the supply specialist to establish a daily inventory schedule of MREs, water, and other consumables. This information will be required for each day's SITREP. Resupply sources will vary, but a basic rule of thumb is to work through the theater headquarters (i.e., JTF-J4 or AFCENT/A4).

7.9.3.3 Fuel Considerations.

7.9.3.3.1 CRW operations are based on a single-fuel concept. All vehicles and equipment are capable of operating primarily on DS-2 (diesel) and secondarily on JP-8 (jet fuel).

7.9.3.3.2 The 621st CRW has established an account code with Defense Logistics Agency-Energy (DLA-E) which has enabled the issuance of an Aviation Into-Plane Reimbursement™ (AIR) card for the purchase of fuel from fixed based operators (FBO) across the world. Where the AIR card is accepted, CR forces can use the card to purchase both aviation grade fuels (JP-8, Jet A, aviation gasoline [AvGas]) and ground fuels (e.g., motor gasoline [MOGAS], diesel). Defense Energy Support Center contact phone number: 866-308-3811.

NOTE: Using an AIR card for the purchase of fuel for ground equipment is extremely rare; it is not uncommon for FBOs and fuel vendors to balk at authorizing the release of fuel into ground equipment. It may be necessary to point out that the tail number on the AIR card is, in fact, INTOTRUCK. This is by design and is indicative of this card's unique authorization.

7.9.3.4 Vehicles.

7.9.3.4.1 When preparing Aerial Port MHE for deployment, consider the following:

- Rollerized tines are essential for speed of loading operations
- Bare-tine operations are slower (and unauthorized unless there is no other MHE present)
- Tine mounted pintle hook attachments are essential for the upload/download of non-winchable rolling stock

7.9.3.4.2 Aerial Port MOG is directly affected by the size of the MHE fleet.

- The CRF MOG of 2/24 is dependent on the 2 x NGSL, 3 x 10K AT forklift configuration
- Careful consideration must be given to any kind of tailoring of this package

EXAMPLE: In Haiti, the rate of aircraft arrival during the early phases of the operation far exceeded the CRG's MHE capacity. Additional MHE had to be airlifted onto the field to balance

the capability against the requirement. During most contingencies, the greatest demand for MHE will be at the onset of operations where airflow is greatest and MOG-sensitive spacing is not a planning consideration.

7.9.3.5 Resupply. In the case of a reach-back requirement (where required items are only found at home station), coordinating with in-garrison contacts can facilitate procurement of needed items, but airlift (or transportation) will need to be coordinated separately. LROs may need to request assistance from 618 AOC (TACC) planners to divert airlift to (or schedule origination from) home station.

7.9.3.6 Mobilization.

7.9.3.6.1 During any unit's preparation for alert, or mobilization, the LRO should expect to lead the effort. Although this preparation is the culmination of a combined series of individual efforts, it will require a consolidated leadership to see it through to a successful completion. The alert preparation of CRF cargo consists of three primary phases.

7.9.3.6.1.1 Inventory/Prep.

- UTC leads inventory and prepare their cargo in accordance with the UTC's LOGDET
- UTC leads also ensure that hazardous shipper's declarations are prepared for all hazardous cargo components
- UTC leads then weigh and mark the cargo

7.9.3.6.1.2 Airworthiness.

- Aerial port personnel will review UTC increments with the respective UTC leads to ensure the cargo is suitable for air transportation
- Inspection will include pallet build-up, markings, center of balances, weight verification, hazardous placarding, and so forth.

7.9.3.6.1.3 Data Integrity.

- UTC leads will ensure that level-6 data in LOGMOD accurately matches the contents of the prepared cargo increments

7.9.3.6.2 During wing mobilizations, non-deploying LROs should be assigned to positions in the IDO's deployment control center as a liaison officer (LNO) and/or the unit deployment control center (UDCC) as an advisor to the UDCC/Director immediately upon receipt of a WARNORD, prepare to deploy order (PTDO), DEPORD or EXORD LROs should ask whether or not ULNs have rolled in DCAPES.

7.9.3.6.3 While the CRW trains to a N+12 deployment requirement, the concept of “N” (notification) remains undefined. If one considers executable or actionable notification, then “N” constitutes the arrival of ULNs in DCAPES at the installation level. The IDO (and associated cargo deployment function and personnel deployment function processes) cannot activate without actionable data in the IDS architecture.

7.9.3.7 Line haul.

7.9.3.7.1 CRW forces often transport equipment via Surface Deployment and Distribution Command line haul. This is frequently in conjunction with a CONUS exercise, but has also occurred as part of a TPFDD'd deployment movement where the aerial port of embarkation was another CONUS location.

7.9.3.7.2 Line haul requests are coordinated through the transportation management office (TMO) office. Line haul requests should be submitted on an AF1149. All AF1149s require a line of accounting (provided by resource advisor).

7.9.3.7.3 There are three types of flat bed commercial truck that can be used

- Standard flat bed is 40 feet long, deck height is 48 inches, and can carry 5 x 463L pallets. Reference **Figure 7.6**, Flat bed.
- Step deck has an 8 feet forward section at 48 inches height, 32 feet aft section at 40 inches deck height, and is ideal for most rolling stock when equipped with detachable ramps. The forward deck is suitable for one x 463L pallet. Reference **Figure 7.7**, Step Deck.
- Removable goose neck (RGN) has a deck height as low as 20 inches, deck-well length of 29 feet, forward goose neck detaches for roll-on, roll-off capability - ideally suited to transport of 10K AT forklift, HELAMS, and NGSL (due to improved vertical clearance and roll-on, roll-off); some RGNs can carry 1 x 463L pallet on the position over the rear axles. Reference **Figure 7.8**, Removable Goose Neck.

Figure 7.6 Flat Bed

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Figure 7.7 Stepdeck



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Figure 7.8 Removable Goose Neck



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7.9.3.7.4 When transporting the 7E1CA, 7E1AE, 7E1AF, or 7E1AB, there are CCI in each UTC's communication suite that require special handling. CCIs from these UTCs must be transported via bonded courier. This is commonly missed by members utilizing line haul. AF1149s for these increments are routed through TMO Special Handling. It is recommended that all CCI components be consolidated into one increment to minimize the number of bonded couriers required.

7.9.4 LRO Checklists. Due to the large span of control that an LRO will have and the various scenarios that could present itself, there are no checklists for the LRO that would be adequate to cover all their duties.

7.10 Supply.

7.10.1 Roles and Responsibilities. Supply personnel serve to maintain equipment accountability and a mission readiness spares package (MRSP) for deployed CRG and CRG augmenting forces. Primary responsibilities are to:

- Centrally manage MREs and bottled/potable water.
- Determine, coordinate, and publish issue time and location for items.
- Ensure that personnel receive three MREs and five liters of water per day in austere locations
- Collect unused portions of MRE packages for re-issue as needed.
- Track and account for all classes of expendable supplies and report daily to the Airbase Support Director.
- Coordinate with finance and contracting to locally procure re-supply.
- Coordinate LRO and/or BOS-I for organic re-supply.
- Ensure deployed equipment custodians and equipment monitors are regularly inventorying, maintaining, and reporting status as needed for equipment in their control. Assist deployed equipment custodians with re-supply issues as needed.

• Integrate the RPOE surface force logistics and supply section into the J-4 when conducting JTF-PO operations

7.10.2 Leadership Considerations.

7.10.2.1 CR forces face a unique supply predicament when deployed at bare base operations without some Air Force infrastructure. Supply will find themselves without the benefit of a SRAN or DODACC. DODACC is normally not established for CRF due to the short nature of operations but could be potentially setup if there are follow on forces.

7.10.2.2 Historically, resupply challenge has proven extremely difficult. Supply and LROs should reach out to AMC/A4 and theatre COCOM J/4s as soon as possible to establish resupply request channels. CRF leadership must be aware that acquiring items through supply can often be a difficult and time-consuming process.

7.10.2.3 If the CRF is staging or working military aircraft, the CRF will not be expected to procure parts for aircraft. Aircrews will work through their chain of command to receive mission capable (MICAP).

7.10.2.4 Supply must be kept in the loop during mission planning and afforded enough time for acquiring the correct number of MREs and water supply from services. Additionally, it is recommended to have supply personnel on an early chalk if MREs and water are on early chalks. MREs are accountable items. If supply personnel are not on initial chalks, there must be a plan to account and secure the MREs and water.

7.10.3 Supply Techniques and Best Practices.

7.10.3.1 DODAAC. Supply establishes the groundwork to create DODAAC for follow on forces and create one for CRF if expected to deploy more than 45 days. Requests for new accounts, changes, and deletions are submitted through MAJCOM DODAAC monitor to the Air Force Service Point HQ Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Logistics Support Office [LSO]/LOTC) as soon as possible after a requirement is known. On-line interrogations of DODAACs can be made at any location with a personal computer and a modem or Defense Data Network connection. Contact with the Service Point can be made by either telephone: Commercial (513) 257-7136, DSN 312- 787-7136, FAX 312-787-7680, or Mail (HQ AFMC LSO/LOTC, 4375 Chidlaw Road, Suite 6, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-5006.

7.10.3.2 Resupply. Coordinating for resupply will be an important and challenging task.

7.10.3.2.1 Coordinate with the contracting officer to determine what types of equipment might be available in the local area (e.g., vehicle tires, general-purpose vehicle parts, other consumables). Local purchases will often be the easiest and quickest method to procure items.

7.10.3.2.2 There will be situations where the CRF will have to reach back to home station for parts or equipment that are unique to the CRF. Coordinate with AMC and 618 AOC (TACC) for transportation of the equipment. However, there are many times where AMC and 618 AOC (TACC) will not be able to task aircraft to pick up the equipment. Depending on the equipment, creative solutions might be needed to get critical pieces of equipment to the deployed CRF.

7.10.3.2.3 Supply in conjunction with the LRO should immediately begin coordinating with AMC/A4 and theatre J4s as soon as possible to establish resupply request channels and procedures. There are no set resupply procedures for CRF and every attempt should be made to lay the groundwork for a resupply chain.

7.10.3.3 MREs and Water.

7.10.3.3.1 Mission Planning/Deployment. Supply must be kept in the loop for acquiring the correct number of MREs and water supply from services. It is recommended to keep an up to date file of individuals on meal card to make the transition with services faster.

7.10.3.3.2 Initial Arrival. Upon arrival, be sure that all MREs and water are accounted for prior to issuing them out. Annotate the count on a status board. Ensure there will be enough work space to hand out the MREs and water. Additionally, ensure all the necessary paperwork and forms are present.

7.10.3.4 Employment.

7.10.3.4.1 Set up a schedule for issuing out MREs. Recommend at the start of each shift to issue out three MREs to each individual. This is found to be the most efficient distribution method. Once all MREs are issued for that day, they need to be counted and stored in a secure location, preferably indoors to keep the animals from getting into them. Annotate the number of MREs left on the status board.

7.10.3.4.2 Supply will need to do water checks more frequently. Supply should check water status two times a day. After each inventory of water, annotate status on the status board.

7.10.3.5 Redeployment. Ensure all MREs are accounted for and all extra or unused MRES and water are assembled for redeployment. Supply should ensure that some MREs and water are on the last chalk in case the aircraft delays or breaks.

Table 7.11 Supply Checklists

Mission Planning/Deployment Checklist

1. Establish Logistics support for bare base operations
2. Obtain logistics readiness officer (LRO) intent on food/water requirements and obtain food/water resources for shipment if needed
3. Determine any additional items specific to the mission that unit will require prior to departing and obtain/issue to unit
4. Contact supporting regional supply squadron prior to deploying to establish initial lines of contact, create a Department of Defense (DOD) activity address code and reporting organization file
5. Check out unit type code (UTC) equipment (operationally check equipment)

Initial Arrival Checklist

1. Determine location for warehouse/covered storage area if deemed necessary for the following types of items:
    a. Subsistence (food/water): unitized group rations (UGR) or meals, ready to eat (MRE)
    b. Due in from maintenance/consumable items that were mission capable (MICAP) requisitioned needed for repair on major end items or items that will impact a mission's capabilities.

Employment Checklist

1. Ensure real-time tracking of supply and provide updates to the LRO at a minimum of twice daily
2. Use the base operating support (BOS) reporting tool to keep track of supplies.

Reconstitution Checklist

1. Ensure real-time tracking of supply and provide updates to the LRO at a minimum of twice daily
2. Log and submit an after action report to identify deficiencies or short falls while deployed.

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7.11 Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants.

7.11.1 Roles and Responsibilities. POL personnel serve as the POC for all CRF fuel requirements and will work with follow-on/sustainment forces to determine future fuel requirements. The CRW POL function is to provide a Military Service Station for CRF ground support operation and run limited fuel quality analysis. The CRW POL function currently has NO aircraft servicing capability. POL personnel will:

- Provide initial fuel testing (if required)
- Coordinate/establish refuel capability/procedures for CRF ground support operations
- Coordinate and oversee construction/maintenance of aviation fuel storage areas/facilities as required

- Coordinate bulk fuel delivery and notify Security Forces of delivery schedule
- Supervise liquid oxygen (LOX)/liquid nitrogen (LIN) aviation and ground fuel receipt, storage and issue
- Track daily fuel usage, account for all fuel on-hand, and report daily status to LRO

7.11.2 Leadership Considerations.

7.11.2.1 No Aircraft Servicing Capability. The most important consideration is that POL has no aircraft servicing capability. POL only has a fuel blivet UTC and a fuels field laboratory UTC with limited analysis ability. While POL is qualified to fuel aircraft, all aircraft servicing capability (fuel and equipment) will have to come from sources outside the CRF structure. If there is a requirement to refuel aircraft, it is imperative that it is determined where the fuel and equipment come from. It also must be ensured that the fueling equipment is compatible with the expected aircraft.

7.11.2.2 Quality Assurance Representative (QAR). If there is fuel available at the deployed location for use, it must be determined if there is a QAR that represents the deployed location and can confirm that the fuel meets military specifications. If there is no QAR, there is no guarantee that the fuel at the deployed location will meet military specifications. POL will be able to conduct fuel samples to help determine if it meets military specifications. If the fuel does not, POL does not have the ability to bring it into compliance. POL will have to work and coordinate with the DLA-E to correct the fuel or find another source of fuel.

7.11.2.3 Paying for Fuel. If not coordinated ahead of time, paying for fuel can become an issue. Aircraft will be able to purchase fuel if using host nation support with their AIR card. The common complication is the purchase of fuel for CRF ground equipment. Determine if there is already a fuel contract in place and procedures setup to purchase fuel. If there is no agreement or fuel contract in place, the POL function must work through DLA-E. A fuel contract is not like the normal AF contract, and is not handled through the contracting officer. The 621st CRW has an AIR card that is approved to purchase fuel for ground use. If the CRF does not have an AIR card that is approved for this, POL will have to coordinate with DLA-E to set up a contract.

7.11.3 POL Techniques and Best Practices.

7.11.3.1 The 621st CRW has established an account code with DLA-E that has enabled the issuance of an AIR card for the purchase of fuel from FBOs across the world. This is highly recommended to aid in the ease of procuring fuel for CRF ground vehicle. POL can coordinate this through DLA-E.

- Where the AIR card is accepted, CR forces can use the card to purchase both aviation grade fuels (e.g., JP-8, Jet A, AvGas) and ground fuels (e.g., MOGAS, Diesel)
- Using an AIR card for the purchase of fuel for ground equipment is extremely rare; it is not uncommon for FBOs and fuel vendors to balk at authorizing the release of fuel into ground equipment. It may be necessary to point out that the tail number on the AIR card is, in fact, INTOTRUCK. This is by design and is indicative of this card's unique authorization.

7.11.3.2 Mission Planning/Deployment. POL Personnel must be involved in mission planning from the beginning. It is imperative that the POL personnel know the exact type of fuel mission and requirement imposed on POL, site layout, and if there is a plan for follow on forces. Additionally, attempt to determine the fuel requirement, ensure that the appropriate equipment is in place and the method of fuel resupply (e.g., contract in place, trucked in).

7.11.3.3 Initial Arrival.

7.11.3.3.1 Traditionally, emphasis is placed on camp build-up. Following the initial camp construction POL priority of work should be to locate a suitable location for the fuel blivets, military service station, and fuel storage area. The scope of operations will determine the size, location and if they are even needed. They could all be centrally located or geographically displaced depending on camp layout and operational requirements. When selecting a suitable location for the fuel storage area, use the following recommendations:

- Flat area with no more than a three-degree slope, good drainage, clear entrance and exit for heavy equipment.
- Secondary containment if possible (if not possible use portable dikes).
- 100 feet from inhabited buildings (i.e., living quarters).
- Ensure blivets are located at a higher point than issue point to aid in fuel flow. Blivets work by gravity feed.

7.11.3.3.2 POL should make contact with host nation for use of their equipment and locate an area for a possible bulk storage area if needed.

7.11.3.3.3 If required, POL will take fuel samples and determine if the fuel meets military specifications.

7.11.3.4 Employment.

7.11.3.4.1 POL's first priority is to provide fuel support to aircraft. If refueling aircraft, the following factors need to be considered

- Does POL have the required equipment and correct connections (e.g., R-11s, pantographs, fuels operational readiness capability equipment)?
- What will the Daily Demand Rate be for the aircraft?
- Method of fuel resupply.
- Will POL need additional manpower for refueling aircraft?

7.11.3.4.2 Ground Refueling Plan. POL will need to coordinate with the other functions, especially AGE, to determine the fuel requirement to develop a detailed refueling plan for ground equipment. If the fuel resupply rate is large, using jerricans to refuel AGE equipment will be a very labor-intensive task for POL and AGE. One technique is to load fuel drums in a back of a vehicle to make refueling generators more efficient.

7.11.3.4.3 When not accomplishing primary duties, POL is free to assist any function requiring assistance. Traditionally, this is the aerial port, SF, or AGE. This cross utilization must be done in such a way that allows POL personnel to respond rapidly to perform their primary duties.

7.11.3.5 Redeployment. As with any roll-up plan, fuel usage should be maximized to allow the shipment of empty blivets. This is not required, but aids in the redeployment plan. Depending on the mission, POL personnel are normally on the last chalk to provide fuel support to any remaining forces.

7.11.4 POL Checklists. All of the POL tasks from running lab samples, to issuing fuel, to transferring fuel from one location to another are checklist driven. In accordance with AFI 23-201, *Fuels Management,* fuels will have local operational checklists developed. See **Attachment 11**, Fuel Checklists for examples of ones used by the 621st CRW.

7.12 Vehicle Management (VM).

7.12.1 Roles and Responsibilities. Vehicle management role is to serve as the single POC for all vehicle related issues. They offer limited vehicle and MHE maintenance capability. They maintain full vehicle accountability for deployed CRF and CRF augmenting forces, per AFI 34-302, *Vehicle Management*. VM personnel will:

- Determine CRF vehicle requirements with the help of functional leads prior to deployment
- Assists contracting officer in procurement of lease vehicles.
- Manages vehicle lease program and CRF temporary mission support kits (TMSK)/MSRPs.
- Establish vehicle control procedures
- Establish a vehicle dispersal plan, coordinated though civil engineer, security forces and airfield manager. Post vehicle parking plan in the TOC/JOC.
- Provide servicing/maintenance for all CRF and attached vehicles and MHE.
- Provide daily vehicle/MHE status reports to A/J-4
- Coordinate with the LRO and/or contracting to procure spare parts as needed.
- Assists in developing over-land cargo movement procedures for JTF-PO (if required)
- Integrate the RPOE Army Surface unit maintenance staff into the J-4 vehicle management section during JTF-PO

7.12.2 Leadership Considerations.

7.12.2.1 Mission Planning/Deployment.

7.12.2.1.1 VM Personnel must be involved in mission planning from the beginning. In addition, a decision must be made early as possible on amount of vehicles to bring. Depending on the CRF in garrison structure, vehicles may be on alert status and will not be used for a non-alert tasking or may not be owned by the actual CRF. If the CRF forces do not own their vehicles or have enough vehicles, sufficient time must be given

to allow vehicle control officer (VCO) and VM personnel the ability to identify, inspect, and prep vehicles for shipment in accordance with AFI 24-302 from other organizations such as an LRS. This leadtime will also affect the ability of other UTCs to receive their vehicles and prep for shipment.

7.12.2.1.2 VM personnel usually are not considered mission essential and sent on later Chalks. It is recommended to send one mechanic on main body Chalk 1 with a hand carry toolbox to support initial operations. The second mechanic should follow on a later chalk with the mission support CONNEX (PFCRG) preferably NLT Chalk 3.

7.12.2.2 Employment. VM personnel's first priority is to maintain deployed vehicles. When not accomplishing primary duties they are free to assist any function requiring assistance. Traditionally, this is the aerial port, SF, or AGE. This cross utilization must be done in such a way that allows VM personnel to respond rapidly to perform their primary duties.

7.12.3 VM Techniques and Best Practices.

7.12.3.1 Mission Planning/Deployment.

7.12.3.1.1 As a CRF mechanic, remaining plugged in to the mission planning is essential. The key things to notice are the numbers and types of vehicles that functions are asking for. When alert vehicles are being used, it is an easy task as they will already be inspected and prepped for shipment and very little coordination needs to take place. On the other hand, if alert vehicles aren't being used or don't have alert vehicles, try to give VCO a heads up on number and types of vehicles so they can start pulling needed assets.

7.12.3.1.2 GSA vehicles. If GSA vehicles are deploying with CRF, then VM will need to receive approval from GSA to perform maintenance on the vehicles. VM will also need to notify POL so they can coordinate fuel for GSA vehicles.

7.12.3.2 Initial Arrival.

7.12.3.2.1 Traditionally, emphasis is placed on camp build-up without consideration to VM initial arrival requirements. VM priority of work should be account for vehicles, secure TMSKs, assist with camp laydown, and assist AGE with power distribution. VM must advocate their priority but mission necessity will dictate the setup priority.

7.12.3.2.2 VM needs to establish a vehicle parking plan with the assistance of SF and CE. This is to ensure that the multiple vehicles are not parked together in case of an attack. Also, vehicles should not be parked by likely targets for the enemy. See **Figure 7.9**, Vehicle Dispersal Plan Example.

Figure 7.9 Vehicle Dispersal Plan Example



7.12.3.2.3 VM should establish a vehicle control noncommissioned officer (VCNCO) program, establish a functional lead for each function, and let the functional lead disperse the keys to their function, if they have multiple vehicles. This allows the functional lead of each UTC to have more control of the vehicles and reduces the span of control for the VM. See **Attachment 15**, Master Vehicle Sign Out and Status, for an example of product to use in vehicle management.

7.12.3.3 Employment.

7.12.3.3.1 Basic Maintenance. Military vehicles are different from civilian vehicles and can be more dangerous to perform maintenance on. Basic maintenance like changing a tire on a HMMWV can result is serious injury if not done properly. See **Figure 7.10**, HMMWV Tire Change Procedure on the following pages that show the excerpts from the technical manual for this procedure.

Figure 7.10 HMMWV Tire Change Procedure

TM 9-2320-280-20-2

8-3. WHEEL REPLACEMENT

This task covers:

a. Removal

b. Installation

INITIAL SETUP:

Tools

General mechanic's tool kit:
automotive (Appendix B, item 1)

Manual References

TM 9-2320-280-24P

General Safety Instructions

- Always apply parking brake and chock opposite wheel before removing wheel.
- Remove only the inner group of nuts when removing a wheel from the vehicle.
- Never mix radial tires and bias ply tires.

WARNING

- Always apply parking brake and chock opposite wheel before removing wheel. Avoid removing wheel when vehicle is on sloping terrain. Injury to personnel or damage to equipment may result.
- Remove only the inner group of nuts when removing a wheel from the vehicle. Removing the outer nuts which hold the rim together while the assembly is inflated could result in serious injury or death.
- Radial and Bias ply tires should not be mixed on the same vehicle. Injury to personnel or damage to equipment may result .

NOTE

Check tire size designator on sidewall for tire construction identification:
36 X 12.50-16 .5 LT-Bias ply
37 X 12.50R16.5LT-Radial

a. Removal

1. Lumen eight lug nuts (2), but do not remove.
2. Raise and support corner of vehicle (para. 8-2).
3. Remove eight lug nuts (2) securing wheel (1) to geared hub (3) and remove wheel (1).

b. Installation

NOTE

- Install lug nuts with fingers to full engagement. If nuts resist finger tightening, discard nuts. Examine studs for damage and replace if damaged (para. 6-14) .
- The radial tire is nondirectional and can be used in either position.

1. Install wheel (1) on geared hub (3) with eight lug nuts (2).
2. Remove support and lower corner of vehicle (para. 8-2).
3. Tighten eight lug nuts (2) to 90-110 lb-ft. (122-149 N•m) in tightening sequence shown.

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Figure 7.10 HMMWV Tire Change Procedure continued

TM 9-2320-280-20-2

8-3. WHEEL REPLACEMENT (Cont'd)



TIGHTENING SEQUENCE



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7.12.3.3.2 Dead Batteries. Most of the tactical vehicles are equipped with a NATO slave cable receptacle. Vehicles should have a NATO slave cable somewhere on the vehicle. This is a very easy way to jump-start vehicles, simply plug one end of the cable into a vehicle with a good battery and the other end of the cable in to the receptacle of the dead vehicle. Next, start the good vehicle and then turn the dead ignition over. Also the MEP 805, MEP 806 models A and B, and the MEP 831A have the receptacle on them. See **Figure 7.11**, NATO Slave Cable Pictures.

Figure 7.11 NATO Slave Cable Pictures


NATO Slave Cable used for jump starting


NATO Slave Cable receptacle on M1008


NATO Slave Cable connected to receptacle

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7.12.3.3.3 Due to often-long theater resupply lead times, tires and other essential parts not in a TMSK should be ordered in advance so there is no downtime for mission critical equipment. For example, 10K AT forklift tires wear very fast in the middle of the tire when driven regularly on pavement.

7.12.3.3.4 War reserve materiel (WRM) MHE always breaks. Vehicles are often older models being phased out and acquiring parts can be difficult. Work immediately to determine how to get parts if needed.

7.12.3.3.5 Transmission fluid is not included in TMSK kits, will have to coordinate purchasing through contracting.

7.12.3.3.6 Host Nation/Leased Vehicles. If using host nation or leased vehicles that are not standard military vehicles while deployed, VM can perform minor maintenance on them. For any larger maintenance issues, the vehicle will have to be fixed by the

host nation or leasing company. VM is not authorized to do major maintenance on these vehicles.

7.12.3.4 Redeployment.

7.12.3.4.1 As with any roll-up plan, vehicle usage should be minimized as operations slow to allow VM personnel to inspect and prepare the vehicles to return to home station. This draw down should coincide with the re-deployment chalks. VM personnel should redeploy in the reverse order of arrival.

Table 7.12 VM Checklists

Mission Planning/Deployment Checklist
1. Brief vehicle increment monitors on vehicle pre-deployment inspection requirements
2. Check out toolkit and perform inventory
3. Brief contingency response forces (CRF) members about use of AF Form 1800, *Operator's Inspection Guide and Trouble Report* before and after use inspections, and waiver requirements.
4. Obtain vehicle serial numbers for all deploying vehicles.
5. Refer to Vehicle listing by unit type code (UTC)
6. Complete a virtual vehicle dispersal plan and chart on airfield map created by civil engineering (CE)
7. Forecast petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) requirements for all vehicles in coordination with POL personnel

Initial Arrival Checklist/Employment Checklist
1. Account for vehicles coming off plane by registration number, type and user, Augment UTCs or swap UTC equipment as needed per local mission requirements
2. Establish vehicle parking plan with security forces (SF)
3. Recover/Secure toolkit
4. Establish vehicle control noncommissioned officer (VCNCO) program with vehicle maintenance personnel as primary and alternate representatives
5. Ensure AF Form 1800 is correct and current for each vehicle
6. Recover/secure all vehicle temporary mission support kits (TMSK)
7. Receive and approve/deny all additional vehicle authorization requests and coordinate with contracting officer and local vendors to arrange acceptance of approved vehicles/parts ordered

Main-Body Arrival Checklist
1. Allocate vehicles
2. Identify vehicle noncommissioned officers (NCO) within each functional area
3. Conduct/direct daily vehicle inspections
4. Forecast POL requirements for all vehicles in coordination with POL personnel
5. Coordinate vehicle parking plan (on and off the flight line/ramp).
6. Ensure users wash vehicles regularly (or when required); if vehicles are shared between multiple users, establish a rotating schedule between users
7. Conduct vehicle maintenance
8. Assist with driver assignments and briefings
9. Assist/direct vehicle preparation and distribution
10. Coordinate with airfield management for host nation permission to operate vehicles on the flight line/ramp
11. Other tasks as determined by the CRF combatant commander

Employment Checklist
1. Maintain tracking of status for all vehicles and report data to joint operations center (JOC)
2. Manage vehicle utilization plan
3. Conduct additional vehicle inspections as required
4. Monitor and/or implement vehicle dispersal plan when directed

Reconstitution Checklist
1. Inventory toolkit and turn in
2. Ensure all vehicles are returned by increment monitors
3. Brief home station VCNCO/vehicle control officer (VCO) of vehicle discrepancies/vehicles left behind and if necessary assist in vehicle turn in procedures to base maintenance
4. Return and joint inspect TMSKs as necessary

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7.13 Public Affairs.

7.13.1 Roles and Responsibilities. Public Affairs personnel are responsible for all CRF PA activities to include command information, external communication, community engagement, and information operations. They act as primary advisor to the deployed/Joint Task Force commander on all matters concerning PA. They execute initial PA guidance directed by requesting combat command commander and the in-country embassy public information officer until follow-on and sustainment forces arrive. When activated for joint operations, 621 CRW/PA staff deploys with the 621 CRW and reports to the Joint Task Force commander once on station. The 621 CRW/PA staff documents and accessions Air Force wartime, contingency response, humanitarian assistance/disaster response operations, building partner capacity, historical and newsworthy events, IAW AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs*, AFI 35-109, *Visual Information*, and all supporting series. Public Affairs personnel include public affairs journalists (3N0X1), photojournalists (3N0X5), and broadcasters (3N0X2). PA personnel will:

- Coordinate all public affairs activities and release of information.
- Review/implement HHQ Public Affairs Guidance (PAG).
- Establish communications plan.
- Provide pre-deployment training to deploying forces.
- Research local media policies/procedures.
- Serves as primary external media interface and provides responses to external media.
- Engage host nation counterparts, civic leaders, and key stakeholders if applicable.
- Coordinate all external and internal communication (photography, videography, and written products) through proper channels.
    - External: Stories, features, commentaries, releases
    - Internal: Communications plans, messaging planning, responses to query, crisis planning and response, media training guides, media content and location analysis, speeches.
- Conduct/facilitate on-the-ground interviews with mission personnel.
- Provide live/real-time satellite video transmissions via Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS).

7.13.2 Leadership Considerations.

7.13.2.1 Mission Planning/Deployment. The CRF commander will determine the need for PA on deployment, if not initially requested. Notify PA staff as soon as possible of deployment to allow time for PA operational planning. If PA is unavailable for deployment, source support forces from local installation.

7.13.2.2 Employment. PA forces' first priority is to deploy in support of CRF's public affairs functions. If they are not deploying with the outgoing unit, they will continue to support the team with PA assistance before, during, and after the deployment.

7.13.3 PA Techniques and Best Practices.

7.13.3.1 Mission Planning/Deployment. PA personnel must be involved in mission planning from the beginning. In addition, a decision must be made early as possible on amount of personnel to bring. PA personnel are normally only assigned to wings. The CRW PA shop houses one public affairs officer, one photographer, one videographer, and one writer. The determined capacity for support should be worked between the commander and the public affairs officer.

7.13.3.2 Initial Arrival.

7.13.3.2.1 Public Affairs Operating Center (PAOC)/Joint Information Center. Depending on infrastructure setup, PA will need a designated area of operations, a public affairs operating center or joint information center. This may be located where information flow is most easily accessed, in the tactical operations center or command cell.

7.13.3.2.2 The PAOC should be located separately from a designated media center and/or a sanitized visitor section.

7.13.3.2.3 An initial PA mission brief should be conducted for all Airmen present to make sure the overall purpose of the mission is clear and the messaging is used correctly.

7.13.3.3 Employment.

7.13.3.3.1 PA should consider setting aside a designated time for downloading and uploading video as to not interrupt internet connectivity for the rest of the encampment. A separate Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) internet connection, Digital Video and Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS), and so forth, would be most beneficial.

7.13.3.3.2 PA should provide continuous imagery for release to HHQ, public audiences and the media.

7.13.3.3.3 A business card with information portal links on it should be distributed for the mass audience.

7.13.3.3.4 Combat camera, if present, will clear all imagery through the lead public affairs officer for release.

7.13.3.3.5 PA will conduct a smart Division of labor, especially if there is excessive number of PA members from different units. PA will also consider setting up a sustainable operations tempo. PA will also need access to the daily meetings for releasable information.

7.13.3.3.6 PA metrics will be sent regularly for Airmen recognition, commander visibility, and HHQ reporting. The numbers will also help determine the proper use of PA and planning efforts in future engagements.

7.13.3.3.7 Media and community relations efforts will be conducted in coordination with the lead PA agency, the embassy, civil affairs, and security forces.

7.13.3.4 Redeployment.

7.13.3.4.1 Depending on commander's intent, PA may be the first to leave while escorting media, or may be the last to document the return. PA will coordinate with representatives back home to cover the homecoming.

Table 7.13 PA Checklists

Mission Planning/Deployment Checklist

1) Respond to Battle Staff/Be present for all major decisions
    a) Read Warning Order/Operations Order in wing operations center (WOC)
        i. Determine mission objectives and goals
        ii. Read Annex F to Operations order to determine proposed public affairs guidance (PPAG)
2) Develop Proposed Public Affairs Guidance if not provided
    a) Message Development Plan
    b) Proposed Public Affairs Posture (Response to Query/Active)
3) Contact
    a) Supported Combatant Commander Public Affairs
        i. Determine release authority/public affairs guidance (PAG)
    b) AMC Public Affairs (PA)
        i. Determine need for embed media
    c) Host Nation PA if applicable
    d) Defense attaché (DATT)/Embassy Public Information Office
    e) Joint public affairs support element (JPASE) if Joint Task Force
    f) Joint service PA counterpart
4) Determine PA Support Package
    a) Public Affairs Officer
    b) Photographer
    c) Combat Correspondent
    d) Public Affairs Specialist
    e) Coordinate additional support through AMC
5) Verify Equipment Package
    a) LOGDET Checklist
    b) Operations Check
    c) Deploy assets in AIM2
6) Prepare/Execute Public Affairs Briefing
    a) General Brief
        i. Social Media Guidelines
        ii. Country Media Analysis
        iii. Media Engagement Procedures
        iv. Hometown News Release
        v. Troop Cards
    b) Commander/Subject Mater Expert Preparation
        i. Questions and Answers/Effective Responses
        ii. Military Deception Plan/PPAG
7) Determine Force Protection Objectives
    a) Contact
        i. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI)
        ii. security forces squadron (SFS)
        iii. Intelligence
    b) Establish IO PA posture
        i. AFOSI

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Table 7.13 PA Checklists continued

Initial Arrival Checklist

1) Travel
   a) Document
      i. Processing Line
      ii. Departure of forces
      iii. En-route travel
   b) Continue SME commander Prep
2) Arrival
   a) Establish Joint Information Bureau/Media Operations Center
      i. Coordinate Media
      ii. Press Conference if needed
      iii. Disperse media pool as soon as practical
   b) Gain authority to photograph/video on flight line from host nation if necessary
   c) Inspect equipment upon arrival
      i. Document damage and report to CRG/CRE leadership/AMC
   d) Community Engagement
      i. Prepare commander and supervise host nation counterpart interactions
      ii. Determine community influencers and attempt to engage
   e) Document
      i. Arrival
      ii. Aircraft Off-load operations
      iii. Camp/Equipment Set Up
      iv. Operations
   f) Contact
      i. Defense attaché (DATT)/Embassy Public Information Officer
      ii. AMC
      iii. Supported Combatant Commander Public Affairs
      iv. Host Nation PA if applicable
      v. JPASE-Joint Public Affairs Support Element if Joint Task Force
      vi. Joint service PA counterpart
   g) Arrival Press Release
      i. Clear release and photos through established release channel
      ii. Keep OPSEC in mind
         · Locations
         · Number of personnel
         · Capability
         · Country sensitivities
         · Focus on Joint Operation not just CRW operations
      iii. Deliver as soon as possible after communications/internet established
      iv. Accession Imagery to:
         · The Air Force Public Affairs Agency's Air Force Media Center
         · The Defense Imagery Management Operations Center
      i. Digital Video and Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS)

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Table 7.13 PA Checklists continued

Main-Body Arrival Checklist

1) Establish contact with local embassy and responsible sources
2) Secure transportation and communication for mobile status

Employment Checklist

1) Attend changeover briefing and daily commanders meetings
2) Public Information
   a) Keep international/national/local media informed through press releases
      § Notify any major development with release/photos/video
   b) Continue to develop messages as operation matures
3) Imagery
   a) Accession regularly
   b) Follow shooting script to ensure event/incident coverage
4) Community Engagement
   a) Keep lines of communication open with
      - Airport director/AMC airport coordinator
      - Local community leaders
      - Develop crisis response/protest response actions
      - Determine local notification authority for incidents affecting community
5) Command Information
   a) Hometown news release
   b) Social Media Web Sites
   c) Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst (JB MD) web
   d) Internal news story – consider features
6) Force Protection
   a) Provide support to AFOSI/SFS/Intel
   b) Alert services for accidents/incidents
   c) Air Base Defense support
7) Basic Shooting Script.
   a) Preparation
   b) Departure
   c) En-route travel
   d) Arrival
   e) Set-up
   f) Local officials
   g) Damaged equipment
   h) First aircraft arrival
   i) Off-load operations
   j) On-load operations
   k) Last aircraft departure
   l) Distinguished visitors
   m) Daily operations
   n) Night operations
   o) International/joint interaction

Table 7.13 PA Checklists continued

a) Security support to Air base Defense
b) Alert documentation for incidents/accidents

Redeployment Checklist

1) Deliver cleared/released imagery to involved members
2) Coordinate Media return with AMC if needed
3) Keep equipment available for documentation
4) Out brief joint task force (JTF) command leadership
5) Develop re-deployment press release
   - Include cargo moved, etc.
   - Remember OPSEC

Reconstitution Checklist

1) Operations check equipment
2) After Action Report
3) Lessons Learned
4) Adjust this guide if needed!
5) Add press releases, documents, and lessons learned to this document!

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CHAPTER 8

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

8.1 Introduction. This chapter addresses the legal framework for military involvement in domestic disaster response missions, properly known as defense support to civil authorities (DSCA). The HSPD-5, *Management of Domestic Incidents*, established a new means to federal emergency management based on the practical requirement that all levels of government have a single, unified approach to managing domestic incidents.

8.1.1 The Stafford Act. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act signed into law on November 23, 1988 amending the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Title 42 United States Code Section 5121-5207), provides for assistance by the federal government to the states in the event of natural and other disasters and emergencies. The Stafford Act is the primary legal (and fiscal) authority for federal emergency and disaster assistance to state and local governments. Congress' intent in passing the Stafford Act was to provide for an "orderly and continuing means of assistance by the federal government to state and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result from such disasters." The Stafford Act sought, among other things, to broaden the scope of disaster relief programs; encourage the development of comprehensive disaster preparedness and assistance plans, programs, and capabilities of state and local governments; and provide federal assistance programs for both public and private losses sustained in disasters.

8.1.1.1 Stafford Act Declarations. The Stafford Act (Title 42 USC § 5121-5207) commits federal resources to responding to damaging, life-threatening disasters when state and local efforts cannot handle them. With a few exceptions, states must take the initiative in requesting declarations.

8.1.1.1.1 Each affected state has a separate declaration, even when more than one state is impacted by the same disaster, emergency, or fire.

8.1.1.1.2 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assigns a sequential number to each major disaster or emergency, followed by the initials DR for disaster relief or EM for emergency management.

8.1.1.1.3 A small portion of declared emergencies escalate, requiring a subsequent major disaster declaration (in the case of Hurricane Katrina, for example).

8.1.2 National Response Framework (NRF)/National Incident Management System (NIMS). Pursuant to Public Law 107-296, *Homeland Security Act of 2002*, the secretary of Homeland Security was charged to develop and administer a National Response Framework that would integrate federal government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan. It also tasked the secretary of homeland security to develop and administer a National Incident Management System that would unify federal, state, and local government capabilities to work together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic events regardless of cause, size, or complexity. The intent of the NRF and NIMS is to provide the structure and mechanisms for establishing national-level policy and operational direction regarding federal support to state and local incident managers.

8.1.3 Emergencies, Disasters, Hazards, and Incidents. These terms derive from two sources, one dating from before 9/11, and the other after 9/11. The older and more familiar terms are from the Stafford Act (42 USC § 5121): major disaster, natural disaster, and domestic disaster. The newer terms are from the NRF: incident or catastrophic incident. The newer NRF terms stem from the need to also address manmade events such as terrorist activities.

8.1.3.1 Major Disaster. A major disaster (presidential declaration) is defined by Title 42 USC Section 5122, as any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought) or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance. A major disaster is declared by the president in response to a request from the governor of a State or a federally recongnized tribal government and opens the way to a large federal commitment of resources, including the potential deployment of DOD personnel and resources.

8.1.3.2 Emergency. An emergency (presidential declaration) is defined by 42 USC § 5122 as, any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.

8.1.3.3 Fire Management Assistance Declaration. At the request of a governor, authorizes the use of federal funds to mitigate, manage, and control fires burning on publicly or privately owned forests or grasslands.

8.1.3.4 Incident. An incident is defined by JP 3-28, *Civil Support*, as an occurrence, caused by either human action or natural phenomena that requires action to prevent or minimize loss of life or damage to property and/or natural resources.

8.1.3.4.1 Catastrophic incidents are comparable to presidentially declared major disasters. The terms suggest natural and man-made events that do significant harm and overwhelm the response capabilities of local and state governments. The definition of a catastrophic incident differs from that of a major disaster only in that it fits more neatly within the framework of the war against terrorism.

8.1.3.4.2 So long as the Stafford Act remains the principal source of federal disaster response funding, the alternative terms (incident or catastrophic incident) are of lesser importance. The NRF has not replaced the term major disaster. Incidents number in the tens of thousands each year; most are handled solely by local first responders. Small portions are of sufficient magnitude to require federal assistance, including events of great magnitude: catastrophic incidents and incidents of national significance.

8.1.3.4.3 Facts about catastrophic incidents. The NRF includes a Catastrophic Incident Annex. Only the secretary of Homeland Security or their designee can implement this annex. Incidents covered under the annex are any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties,

damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.

8.1.3.5 Hazard. Hazard is defined by the NRF as something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an unwanted outcome. A disaster has already occurred and caused significant damage while a hazard has the potential of causing damage.

8.1.4 Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).

8.1.4.1 The federal courts have enunciated three tests to determine whether the use of military personnel violates the Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18 United State Code Section 1385). If any one of these three tests is met, the assistance may be considered a violation of the PCA.

8.1.4.1.1 Were the actions of military personnel "active" or "passive"? Only the direct, active use of military personnel to enforce the laws is a violation of the PCA.

8.1.4.1.2 Did the use of military personnel pervade the activities of civilian law enforcement officials? Under this test, military personnel must fully subsume the role of civilian law enforcement officials.

8.1.4.1.3 Did the military personnel subject citizens to the exercise of military power that was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature? A power "regulatory in nature" is one that controls or directs. A power "proscriptive in nature" is one that prohibits or condemns. A power "compulsory in nature" is one that exerts some coercive force.

8.1.4.2 Direct assistance and participation by military personnel in the execution and enforcement of the law is the heart of the prohibition of the PCA. Impermissible direct assistance by military personnel in civilian law enforcement activities directed as DOD policy by DODI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement*. Prohibited direct assistance by military personnel includes:

8.1.4.2.1 Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity.

8.1.4.2.2 A search or seizure.

8.1.4.2.3 An arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity.

8.1.4.2.4 Use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.

8.1.4.3 There are several forms of direct assistance by military personnel that are permitted under the PCA.

8.1.4.3.1 Direct assistance is permitted if the action is taken for the primary purpose of furthering a military or foreign affairs function of the United States. This category is often referred to as the "Military Purpose Doctrine" and covers actions the primary purpose of which is to further a military interest. While civilian agencies can receive an incidental benefit, this section should be construed narrowly and cannot be used as a subterfuge for getting around the PCA. For example, the scheduling of a military exercise for the sole purpose of benefiting a civilian law enforcement agency is contrary to the intent of the military purpose doctrine.

8.1.4.3.2 Direct assistance may be permitted if the action falls under the emergency authority of the United States. These actions are taken pursuant to the inherent authority of the federal government under the Constitution. Actions permitted in accordance with this authority are those necessary to preserve public order and to carry out governmental operations within US territorial limits, or otherwise in accordance with applicable law. In such circumstances, force may be used if necessary. Emergency authority is reserved for extremely unusual circumstances. Further, it will only be used under the guidance of DODI 3025.12, *Defense Support of Civilain Law Enforcement Agencies*.

8.1.4.3.3 Direct assistance by military forces to civilian law enforcement is action taken pursuant to DOD responsibilities under the Insurrection Act, Title 10 USC Sections 331-335. These statutes contain express exceptions to the PCA and they relate to the use of military forces with respect to insurgency, domestic violence, or conspiracy that hinders the execution of state or federal law in specified circumstances. Actions under this authority are governed by DODD 3025.12.

8.2 Organizations.

8.2.1 FEMA. FEMA was established in 1979 by executive order as an independent agency and became part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003.

8.2.1.1 FEMA serves as the executive agent of DHS for emergency management and is responsible for responding to, planning for, recovering from, and mitigating against disasters. FEMA is organized into ten regions see **Figure 8.1**, FEMA Regions. Each region serves as the focal point for organizing and coordinating state and federal emergency management for incidents within the region. There is one defense coordinating officer (DCO) assigned to each FEMA region, with the exception of Region IX where there are an additional three DCOs (US Pacific Command [USPACOM], commander, Naval Forces Marianas [COMNAVMAR], and US Army Pacific [USARPAC]).

8.2.1.2 Each of FEMA's regional offices maintains a regional response coordination center (RRCC) that expands to become an interagency facility in anticipation of a serious incident in the region or immediately following an incident. RRCCs coordinate federal regional response efforts and maintain connectivity with state emergency operations center (EOC) and other state offices and agencies.

Figure 8.1 FEMA Regions



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8.2.2 NIMS. NIMS distinguishes between command authority and coordination authority. Command authority is vested in the incident commander (IC) for a single incident or an area commander for multiple incidents or jurisdictions. Coordination authority is vested in various coordinating officers who have the authority to make decisions within their respective jurisdictions.

8.2.3 Incident Command Structure (ICS). ICS is a widely applicable management system designed to enable effective, efficient incident management. ICS addresses incident command in terms of single incident command, area command, and unified command. It provides a flexible core mechanism for coordinated and collaborative incident management. When a single incident covers a large geographical area, multiple local emergency management and incident response agencies may be required. Effective cross-jurisdictional coordination using processes and systems is absolutely critical in this situation. See **Figure 8.2**, ICS Command Structure.

Figure 8.2 Incident Command Structure



8.2.4 Single Incident Command. The IC, usually an official of local police, fire or other municipal service, has the direct tactical and operational responsibility for conducting all incident management activities. He or she is specifically responsible for ensuring incident safety, providing information services regarding the incident and establishing and maintaining liaison with other agencies participating in the incident. He or she also has overall responsibility for managing the incident by defining objectives, planning strategies, and implementing tactics. To discharge these responsibilities, the IC may appoint one or more deputies from either the same or different agencies. The IC generally is supported by a command staff and a general staff, with functions as depicted in **Figure 8.2**, ICS Command Structure. The incident command post (ICP) is intended to provide a modular and standardized on-scene emergency management organization to support the IC. Regardless of how large, complex, or multi-jurisdictional the incident becomes, there is only one ICP per incident.

8.2.5 Area Command. An area command, as depicted in **Figure 8.3**, Area Command Structure, is intended to oversee multiple single incidents, either geographically dispersed or located in near proximity. Area commands are most effective for multiple incidents (e.g., two hazardous material spills or several wildland fires) that will most likely be competing for the same resources and capabilities. When incidents are of different types or do not have similar resource or capabilities requirements, they will generally be handled as separate incidents.

Figure 8.3 Area Command Structure



8.2.6 Unified Command. A unified command (UC) is intended to allow multiple agencies to work together efficiently without affecting the authority, accountability, or responsibility of individual agencies. In a UC, agencies work together at a single ICP location to establish a common set of objectives and strategies and develop a single incident action plan. Agency ICs exercise authority over the personnel of their respective agencies and represent their function or subject matter in the ICP organization.

8.2.7 Joint Field Office (JFO). The JFO is an interagency coordination center established to provide a central location for the coordination of local, tribal, state, federal, non-governmental, and private sector organizations with responsibilities for incident response. The JFO does not manage operations; rather, it provides support to on-scene efforts and conducts broad support operations. A coordinating officer and staff will assist each political level of jurisdiction (state, federal, and defense) in a typical incident.

8.2.7.1 The federal coordinating officer (FCO) is appointed to manage federal response support activities for Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The FCO also plays a significant role in managing the financial aspects of DSCA.

8.2.7.2 The state coordinating officer (SCO) is appointed by the governor to coordinate state response and recovery operations with the federal government.

8.2.7.3 The DCO is the Title 10 officer who serves as the DOD point of contact at the JFO.

8.2.7.4 Civilian LNOs serve as representatives and points of contact for other governmental agencies, NGOs, and private sector entities. Military LNOs serve as representatives of their commander.

8.2.7.5 Joint information centers (JIC) are facilities established to coordinate all public information activities related to incidents. They are often co-located with local, state, or federal EOCs. JICs provide a location where the organizations participating in incident management can work together to ensure that timely, accurate, understandable, and consistent information is disseminated to the public. The JIC has representatives from each organization involved in management of an incident. ICs and interagency coordinating entities are responsible for establishing and overseeing JICs, including processes for coordinating and clearing public communications.

8.2.7.6 Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO). An EPLO is a senior reserve officer who is the representative of the Service Planning Agent, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and a designated Defense Coordinating Officer.

8.3 Operations.

8.3.1 Incident Response Process. See **Figure 8.4**, Incident Response Process.

Figure 8.4 Incident Response Process



8.3.2 Emergency Support Functions & Planning Considerations. The emergency support functions (ESF) provide structure for coordinating federal interagency support in a federal response to an incident. They are mechanisms for grouping functions frequently used to provide federal support to states and federal-to-federal support, for both declared disasters and

emergencies under the Stafford Act and for non-Stafford Act incidents. A complete discussion of ESFs can be found in the NRF ESF tables.

8.3.2.1 Transportation (ESF-1). See **Table 8.1**, Transportation (ESF-1). Transportation provides support to the DHS by assisting federal, state, tribal, and local governmental entities, voluntary organizations, NGOs, and the private sector in management of transportation systems and infrastructure during domestic threats or in response to incidents. ESF #1 also participates in prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities. ESF #1 carries out Department of Transportation (DOT) statutory responsibilities, including regulation of transportation, management of the nation's airspace, and ensuring the safety and security of the national transportation system. ESF #1 is not responsible for movement of goods, equipment, animals, or people.

Table 8.1 Transportation (ESF-1)

ESF coordinator: Department of Transportation (DOT)	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: DOT **Supporting federal agencies:** US Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of the Interior (DOI), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of State (DOS), General Services Administration (GSA), US Postal Service (USPS)	
Scope: • Aviation/airspace management and control • Transportation safety • Restoration/recovery of transportation infrastructure • Movement of restrictions • Damage and impact assessment	
DOD responsibilities: • Provides military transportation capacity for US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) or other organizations to move essential resources • USTRANSCOM also provides staff to the headquarters ESF #1 function and the regional ESF #1 when requested and upon approval by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) • Provides assets to complement temporarily degraded or disrupted DOT/Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air navigation services capabilities as requested by DOT/FAA and ESF #1	
CRF considerations: • SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland • Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD • Assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)	
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8.3.2.2 Communications (ESF-2). See **Table 8.2**, Communications (ESF-2). Communications supports the restoration of the communications infrastructure, facilitates the recovery of systems and applications from cyber attacks, and coordinates federal communications support to response efforts during incidents requiring a coordinated federal response. This ESF implements the provisions of the Office of Science and

Technology Policy National Plan for Telecommunications Support in Non-Wartime Emergencies. ESF #2 also provides communications support to federal, state, tribal, and local governments. It provides support to first responders when their systems have been impacted, and provides communications and information technology support to the JFO and JFO field teams.

Table 8.2 Communications (ESF-2)

ESF coordinator: DHS/National Communications System	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) **Supporting federal agencies:** USDA, DOC, DOD, DHS, DOI, Federal Communications Commission, GSA	
Scope: • Coordination with the telecommunications and information technology industries • Restoration/repair of telecommunications infrastructure • Protection, restoration, and sustainment of national cyber technologies and information technology resources • Oversight of communications within the federal incident management and response structures	
DOD responsibilities: • Promptly notifies the communications branch director of all communications requirements, assets available, and assets deployed to the incident area • Provides resources and capabilities to relief operations after other federal resources and capabilities are exhausted • The SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) • The joint director of military support serves as the DOD action agent for DSCA • The defense coordination office/defense coordinating element serves as the DOD interface to FEMA and the federal coordinating officer at JFO and the single point of contact for requesting DOD assistance	
CRF considerations: • SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland • Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD • Assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)	
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8.3.2.3 Public Works and Engineering (ESF #3). See **Table 8.3**, Public Works and Engineering (ESF-3). Public works and engineering assists DHS by coordinating and organizing the capabilities and resources of the federal government to facilitate the delivery of services, technical assistance, engineering expertise, construction management, and other support to prepare for, respond to, and recover from a disaster or an incident requiring a coordinated federal response.

Table 8.3 Public Works and Engineering (ESF-3)

ESF coordinator: DOD/US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: DOD/USACE, DHS/FEMA **Supporting federal agencies:** USDA, DOC, DOD, DOE, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), DHS, DOI, Department of Labor (DOL), DOS, DOT, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), GSA, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), American Red Cross (ARC), Corporation for National and Community Service.	
Scope: • Infrastructure protection and emergency repair • Infrastructure restoration • Engineering services and construction management • Emergency contracting support for lifesaving and life-sustaining services	
DOD responsibilities: • Provides expertise and conducts/supports specialized salvage/wreck removal operations as part of a coordinated response and restoration strategy • Exercises and manages regional standing emergency salvage contracts to quickly draw upon the required resources of the commercial salvage industry • Accesses and coordinates the US Navy's hydrographic survey assets and capabilities • Coordinates salvage and wreck removal operations when requested	
CRF considerations: • SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland • Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD • Assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)	
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8.3.2.4 Firefighting (ESF #4). See **Table 8.4**, Firefighting (ESF-4). Firefighting provides federal support for the detection and suppression of wild-land, rural, and urban fires resulting from, or occurring coincidentally with, an incident requiring a coordinated federal response for assistance.

Table 8.4 Firefighting (ESF-4)

ESF coordinator: USDA/Forest Service	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: USDA/Forest Service **Supporting federal agencies:** DOC, DOD, DHS, DOI, DOS, EPA	
Scope: • Incident management and response effort coordination • Issuance of mission assignments • Resource and human capital administration • Incident action planning • Financial management	
DOD responsibilities: • Assumes full responsibility for firefighting activities on DOD installations • Supports firefighting operations on nonmilitary lands with personnel, equipment, and supplies under the terms of the current interagency agreement between DOD, USDA, and DOI, including the arrangement of liaisons as required • USACE: Provides contracting services through ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering to urban and rural firefighting forces to obtain heavy equipment and/or demolition services as needed to suppress incident-related fires	
CRF considerations: • SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland • Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD • Assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)	
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8.3.2.5 Emergency Management (ESF#5). See **Table 8.5**, Emergency Management (ESF-5). Responsible for supporting overall activities of the federal government for domestic incident management. ESF #5 provides the core management and administrative functions in support of national response coordination center, regional response coordination center, and JFO operations.

Table 8.5 Emergency Management (ESF-5)

ESF coordinator: DHS/FEMA	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: DHS/FEMA **Supporting federal agencies:** USDA, DOC, DOD, Department of Education, DOE, HHS, DHS, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), DOI, DOJ, DOL, DOS, DOT, Department of the Treasury, VA, EPA, Federal Communications Commission, GSA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), NRC, Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Small Business Administration (SBA), TVA, USPS, ARC	
Scope: • Incident management and response effort coordination • Issuance of mission assignments • Resource and human capital administration • Incident action planning • Financial management	
DOD responsibilities: • National security; dam security (USACE); and hydrology, stream flows, and water-level data (USACE)	
CRF considerations: • SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland • Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD • Assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)	
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8.3.2.6 Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services (ESF#6) coordinates the delivery of federal mass care, emergency assistance, housing, and human services when local, tribal, and state response and recovery needs exceed their capabilities. See **Table 8.6**, Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services (ESF-6).

Table 8.6 Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services (ESF-6)

ESF coordinator: DHS/FEMA	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: DHS/FEMA **Supporting federal agencies:** USDA, DOD, HHS, DHS, HUD, DOI, DOJ, DOL, DOT, Department of Treasury, VA, GSA, SBA, Social Security Administration, USPS, ARC, Corporation for National and Community Service, National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD), Other voluntary agency and nongovernmental support organizations	
Scope: • Mass care • Emergency assistance • Disaster housing • Human services	
DOD responsibilities: • Fulfills mass care requirements for ice and water in coordination with ESF #6 • Provides assistance by inspecting mass care shelter sites to ensure suitability and accessibility of facilities to safely shelter victims • Provides assistance in constructing temporary shelter facilities, including accessible shelters, in the affected area, as required • Provides temporary housing support, such as temporary structures and expedited repair of damaged homes (to include temporary roofing or other repairs that facilitate reoccupation of minimally damaged structures), as necessary	
CRF considerations: • SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland • Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD • Assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)	
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8.3.2.7 Logistics Management and Resource Support (ESF-7). See **Table 8.7**, Logistics Management and Resource Support (ESF-7). DHS/FEMA logistics provide a comprehensive, national disaster logistics planning, management, and sustainment capability that harnesses the resources of federal logistics partners, key public and private stakeholders, and NGOs to meet the needs of disaster victims and responders. The GSA supports federal agencies and state, tribal, and local governments in need of resource support prior to, during, and/or after incidents requiring a coordinated federal response.

Table 8.7 Logistics Management and Resource Support (ESF-7)

ESF coordinator: GSA, DHS/FEMA	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: GSA, DHS/FEMA **Supporting federal agencies:** USDA, DOC, DOD, DOE, HHS, DOI, DOL, DOT, VA, NASA, OPM	
Scope: • Comprehensive, national disaster logistics planning, management and sustainment capability that harnesses the resources of federal logistics partners, key public and private stakeholders, and NGOs to meet the needs of disaster victims and responders • Resource support (facility space, office equipment and supplies, contracting services, etc.)	
DOD responsibilities: • When requested by FEMA and approved by DOD, DOD provides subsistence, administrative supplies, petroleum products, engineering and construction materials, personal demand items (water and ice), major end items (mobile units), medical materiel, telecommunications management, and transportation management	
CRF considerations: • SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland • Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD • Assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)	
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8.3.2.8 Public Health and Medical Services (ESF#8). See **Table 8.8**, Public Health and Medical Service (ESF -8). Public health and medical services provide the mechanisms for coordinated federal assistance to supplement state, tribal, and local resources in response to a public health and medical disaster, potential or actual incidents requiring a coordinated federal response, and support during the development of a potential health and medical emergency. Public health and medical services include responding to medical needs associated with mental health, behavioral health, and substance abuse considerations of incident victims and response workers. Services also cover the medical needs of members of "at-risk" or "special-needs" populations described in the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act and in the NRF glossary. Members of at-risk and special-needs populations, may have medical and other functional needs before, during, and after an incident. Public health and medical services include behavioral health needs consisting of both mental health and substance abuse considerations for incident victims and response workers and, as appropriate, medical needs groups defined in the core document as individuals in need of additional medical response assistance and veterinary and/or animal health issues.

Table 8.8 Public Health and Medical Service (ESF-8)

ESF coordinator: HHS	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: HHS **Supporting federal agencies:** USDA, DOC, DOD, DOE, DHS, DOI, DOJ, DOL, DOS, DOT, VA, EPA, US Agency for International Development (USAID), GSA, USPS, ARC	
Scope: • Public health • Medical • Mental health services • Mass fatality management	
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ESF coordinator: HHS	**CRF POC:**

DOD responsibilities:

- Alerts DOD National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) federal coordinating centers (FCC) for the Army, Navy, and Air Force and provide specific reporting/regulating instructions to support incident relief efforts
- Alerts DOD NDMS FCCs to activate NDMS patient reception plans in a phased, regional approach and, when appropriate, in a national approach.
- At the request of HHS, provides support for the evacuation of patients and medical needs populations to locations where hospital care or outpatient services are available
- Using available DOD transportation resources in coordination with the NDMS Medical Interagency Coordination Group, evacuates and manages victims/patients from the patient collection point in or near the incident site to NDM patient reception areas
- Provides available logistical support to public health/medical response operations
- Provides available medical personnel for casualty clearing/staging and other missions as needed including aero-medical evacuation and medical treatment
- Mobilizes and deploys available reserve and National Guard medical units, when authorized and necessary to provide support
- Coordinates patient reception, tracking, and management to nearby NDMS hospitals, VA hospitals, and DOD military treatment facilities that are available and can provide appropriate care
- Provides available military medical personnel to assist ESF #8 personnel with protecting public health through the management of food, water, wastewater, solid waste disposal, vectors, hygiene, and other environmental conditions
- Provides available veterinary military personnel to assist ESF #8 personnel with the medical treatment of animals
- Provides available DOD medical supplies for distribution to mass care centers and medical care locations for incident victims. Reimbursement is made to DOD
- Provides available emergency medical support to assist state, tribal, or local officials within the disaster area and in the surrounding area. Such services may include triage, medical treatment, mental health support, and the use of surviving DOD medical facilities within or near the incident area
- Provides assistance, as available, in managing human remains, including victim identification, mortuary affairs, and temporary internment of the dead
- Provides evaluation and risk management support through use of defense coordinating officers, emergency preparedness liaison officers, and joint regional medical planners
- Provides available blood products in coordination with HHS
- Provides medical surveillance, laboratory diagnostics, and confirmatory testing in coordination with HHS
- USACE: Through ESF #3, public works and engineering, USACE provides technical assistance, equipment, and supplies as required in support of HHS to accomplish temporary restoration of damaged public utilities affecting public health and medical facilities. In the event of a catastrophic mass fatality incident, USACE assists with the temporary interment of the dead

CRF considerations:

- SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland
- Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD
- Assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)

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8.3.2.9 Search and Rescue (SAR) (ESF#9). See **Table 8.9**, Search and Rescue (ESF-9). SAR rapidly deploys components of the Federal SAR Response System to provide specialized lifesaving assistance to state, tribal, and local authorities when activated for incidents or potential incidents requiring a coordinated federal response.

Table 8.9 Search and Rescue (ESF-9)

ESF coordinator: DHS/FEMA	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: DHS/FEMA/US Coast Guard (USCG), DOI/National Park Service, DOD/(USAF) **Supporting federal agencies:** USDA, DOC, DOD, HHS, DHS, DOJ, DOL, NASA, USAID	
Scope: • Lifesaving assistance and search and rescue (SAR) operations (urban, waterborne, inland/wilderness, and aeronautical)	
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ESF coordinator: DHS/FEMA	**CRF POC:**

DOD responsibilities:

- DOD/Air Force rescue coordination center (AFRCC) serves as the primary agency for ESF #9 during SAR operations for aviation-related incidents requiring a coordinated federal response both in open and wilderness areas and in the vicinity of airports and urban areas requiring the coordinated deployment of rescue personnel and equipment. US SAR coordinators are as follows:
  - DOD/USAF/AFRCC is the SAR coordinator for the US aeronautical search and rescue region corresponding to the contiguous United States
  - DOD/US Pacific Command is the SAR coordinator for the US aeronautical SAR corresponding to Alaska, Hawaii, and the US possessions and territories in the Pacific
  - DOD maintains active, National Guard, and reserve components, facilities, and other resources that are used to support their own operations across the contiguous United States, Alaska, and Hawaii
  - For incidents in which it is the primary agency, DOD/USAF/AFRCC: Serves as headquarters-level ESF #9 coordinator during aeronautical SAR operations
- Provides incident reports, assessments, and situation reports
- Provides SAR command and control experts to augment a joint task force/joint personnel recovery center in support of incidents requiring a coordinated federal response
- Facilitates resolution of any conflicting demands for aeronautical distress response resources and ensures coordination between DHS/ USCG and other federal, state, tribal, and local emergency response activities, as appropriate
- Coordinates and manages the timely tasking, acquisition, analysis, and delivery of satellite imagery or imagery-derived products as directed by the primary agency. Activities and sources may involve non-DOD/NGA facilities or resources
- Provides expert analysis of imagery to determine damage levels and other elements of essential information as needed. Additionally, DOD/National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), as requested, will provide technical expertise/analysis from other imagery sources if such expertise resides within DOD/NGA
- Provides mobile geospatial intelligence to support SAR field teams or other DHS/FEMA field teams as directed by the primary agency. This support includes technical experts (specifically, imagery analysts and geospatial analysts) and robust communications that can assist in more focused, directed searches and eliminate duplicate search efforts
- Provides imagery-derived and geospatial intelligence analysis in preparation for potential disasters or emergencies
- Coordinates for the release and dissemination of DOD/NGA products and data in accordance with applicable security classifications, licensing, copyright agreements, and limited distribution restrictions
- Provides pre-incident training for DHS/FEMA task force/incident support team (IST) structures specialists, as well as for DOD/USACE structures specialists. At the request of DHS, deploys trained structures specialists and technical search specialist teams to supplement urban search and rescue (US&R) task forces and ISTs
- Assists IST engineering cells and task forces with US&R efforts
- Provides structural engineering analysis, recommends hazard mitigation, recommends shoring, ascertains structural integrity and assesses whether buildings are safe to enter, and provides building stability monitoring

CRF considerations:

- SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland
- Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD
- Assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)

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8.3.2.10 Oil and Hazardous Materials Response (ESF#10). See **Table 8.10**, Oil and Hazardous Materials Response (ESF-10). Hazardous materials response provides federal support in response to an actual or potential discharge and/or uncontrolled release of oil or hazardous materials when activated.

Table 8.10 Oil and Hazardous Materials Response (ESF-10)

ESF coordinator: EPA	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: EPA, DHS **Supporting federal agencies:** USDA, DOC, DOD, DOE, HHS, DHS, DOI, DOJ, DOL, DOS, DOT, GSA, NRC	
Scope: • Oil and hazardous materials (chemical, biological, radiological, etc.) response and environmental short- and long-term cleanup	
DOD responsibilities: • Provides on-scene coordinators and directs response actions for releases of hazardous materials from DOD vessels, facilities, vehicles, munitions, and weapons • Provides defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) in response to requests for assistance during domestic incidents. With the exception of support provided under immediate response authority, DOD resources must obtain the approval of the SecDef before responding to requests for assistance. Details regarding DSCA and immediate response authority are provided in the NRF core document • USACE provides response and recovery assistance to incidents involving contaminated debris, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear contamination. The scope of actions may include waste sampling, classification, packaging, transportation, treatment, demolition, and disposal • The Navy supervisor of salvage, following appropriate statutory authorities, provides technical, operational, and emergency support in the ocean-engineering disciplines of marine salvage, pollution abatement, and diving services	
CRF considerations: • SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland • Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD • Assets in DSCA	
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8.3.2.11 Agriculture and Natural Resources (ESF#11). See **Table 8.11**, Agriculture and Natural Resources (ESF-11). Agriculture and natural resources officials support state, tribal, and local authorities and other federal agency efforts to provide nutrition assistance. They also control and eradicate, as appropriate, any outbreak of a highly contagious or economically devastating animal/zoonotic (transmitted between animals and people) disease, or any outbreak of an economically devastating plant-based pest or disease. Additionally, these officials can ensure the safety and security of the commercial food supply; protect natural and cultural resources and historic properties resources; and provide for the safety and well-being of household pets during an emergency response or evacuation situation.

Table 8.11 Agriculture and Natural Resources (ESF-11)

ESF coordinator: USDA	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: USDA, DOI **Supporting federal agencies:** USDA, DOC, DOD, DOE, HHS, DHS, DOI, DOJ, DOL, DOS, DOT, EPA, GSA, National Archives and Records Administration, USPS, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, ARC, Heritage Emergency National Task Force	
Scope: • Nutrition assistance • Animal and plant disease and pest response • Food safety and security • Natural and cultural resources and historic properties protection and restoration • Safety and well-being of household pet	
DOD responsibilities: • Provides on-scene coordinators and directs response actions for releases of hazardous materials from DOD vessels, facilities, vehicles, munitions, and weapons • Provides defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) in response to requests for assistance during domestic incidents. With the exception of support provided under immediate response authority, DOD resources must obtain the approval of the SecDef before responding to requests for assistance. Details regarding DSCA and immediate response authority are provided in the NRF core document • USACE provides response and recovery assistance to incidents involving contaminated debris, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear contamination. The scope of actions may include waste sampling, classification, packaging, transportation, treatment, demolition, and disposal • The Navy supervisor of salvage, following appropriate statutory authorities, provides technical, operational, and emergency support in the ocean-engineering disciplines of marine salvage, pollution abatement, and diving services	
CRF considerations: • SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland • Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD • Assets in DSCA	
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8.3.2.12 Energy (ESF#12). See **Table 8.12**, Energy (ESF-12). ESF #12, when activated by the secretary of homeland security for incidents requiring coordinated federal responses, is intended to facilitate the restoration of damaged energy systems and components. Under DOE leadership, ESF #12 is an integral part of the larger DOE responsibility of maintaining continuous and reliable energy supplies for the United States through preventive measures and restoration and recovery actions.

Table 8.12 Energy (ESF-12)

ESF coordinator: DOE	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: DOE **Supporting federal agencies:** USDA, DOC, DOD, DHS, DOI, DOL, DOS, DOT, EPA, NRC, TVA	
Scope: • Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and restoration • Energy industry utilities coordination • Energy forecast	
DOD responsibilities: • Coordinates emergency power team missions with power-system restoration activities to establish priorities for emergency generator installation	
CRF considerations: • SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland • Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD • Assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)	
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8.3.2.13 Public Safety and Security (ESF#13). See **Table 8.13**, Public Safety and Security (ESF-13). ESF #13 integrates federal public safety and security capabilities and resources to support the full range of incident management activities associated with potential or actual incidents requiring a coordinated federal response.

Table 8.13 Public Safety and Security (ESF-13)

ESF coordinator: DOJ	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: DOJ **Supporting federal agencies:** All federal departments and agencies possessing a public safety and security capability	
Scope: • Facility and resource security • Security planning and technical and resource assistance • Public safety and security support • Support to access, traffic, and crowd control	
DOD responsibilities: • Provides physical and electronic security systems assistance and expertise	
CRF considerations: • SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland • Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD • Assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)	
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8.3.2.14 Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation (ESF#14). See **Table 8.14**, Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation (ESF-14). ESF #14 provides a mechanism for coordinating federal support to state, tribal, regional, and local governments; NGOs; and the private sector to enable community recovery from the long-term consequences of extraordinary disasters. ESF#14 accomplishes this by identifying and facilitating availability and use of sources of recovery funding, and providing technical assistance (such as impact analyses) for community recovery and recovery planning support.

Table 8.14 Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation (ESF-14)

ESF coordinator: DHS/FEMA	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: USDA, DHS, HUD, SBA **Supporting federal agencies:** DOC, DOD, DOE, HHS, DOI, DOL, DOT, Department of the Treasury, EPA	
Scope: • Social and economic community impact assessment. • Long-term community recovery assistance to states, local governments, and the private sector. • Analysis and review of mitigation program implementation.	
DOD responsibilities: • Provides technical assistance in community planning and expertise in civil engineering and natural hazard risk assessment. • Supports the development of national strategies and plans related to permanent and accessible housing, debris management, and the restoration of public facilities and infrastructure.	
CRF considerations: • SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland • Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD • Assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)	
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8.3.2.15 External Affairs (ESF#15). See **Table 8.15**, External Affairs (ESF-15). ESF #15 ensures that federal assets deployed to the field during incidents requiring a coordinated federal response are sufficient to provide accurate, coordinated, timely, and accessible information to affected audiences, including government, media, the private sector, and the local populace, including the special needs population. ESF#15 provides the resource support and mechanisms to implement the NRF incident communications emergency policy and procedures described in the Public Affairs Support Annex. Additional information about external affairs can be found in the ESF#15 standing operating procedure, located on the DHS/FEMA website.

Table 8.15 External Affairs (ESF-15)

ESF coordinator: DHS	**CRF POC:**
Primary agencies: DHS/FEMA **Supporting federal agencies:** All	
Scope: • Emergency public information and protective action guidance. • Media and community relation. • Congressional and international affairs. • Tribal and insular affairs	
DOD responsibilities: • Depending on the nature and scope of the incident, all federal departments and agencies support the NRF and are responsible for providing appropriate support for ESF #15 as required	
CRF considerations: • SecDef and assistant SecDef for homeland • Defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD • Assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)	
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CHAPTER 9
EVACUATIONS

9.1 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). NEOs are conducted to assist the DOS in evacuating US citizens, DOD civilian personnel, and designated HN and TCNs whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven. Although normally considered in connection with hostile action, evacuation may also be conducted in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or man-made disaster. For further information, see JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.

9.2 Contingency Response Force. When the CRF is tasked to support a NEO their primary mission will be to support and get full utilization of DOD aircraft and CRF missions. It is very important to have aerial porters that are well versed in passenger operations, Global Air Transportation Execution Systems (GATES), joint inspection, ITV, and load planning to ensure mission success. The DOS is responsible for the transportation selection and method of travel for evacuees. When DOD aircraft is utilized, the DOS will provide the CRF with an Exportable Manifest (XMAN) to import evacuees' information into GATES. The XMAN will be imported into GATES in a timely manner to ensure ITV for concerned agencies in the repatriation/safe zone such as customs. US customs officials currently have access to GATES generated manifests while NEO tracking system (NTS) visibility is nonexistent for them at this time. When tasked for NEO operations in a hostile or uncertain environment, ensure there will be enough defenders to safeguard assets. AFOSI is also highly encouraged. Inquire with the DOS, Embassy, or JTF commander of the AOR about the security that will be provided.

9.3 NEO Tracking System. NTS is an automated data processing hardware and software package designed to assist combatant commanders and JTF commanders by providing them visibility of noncombatant personnel, allowing them to focus assets needed to support the NEO.

9.3.1 Purpose. The primary purpose of the NTS is to provide individual accountability of the noncombatant evacuee (NCE) by creating and maintaining a database of noncombatants assembled during an evacuation operation and subsequently tracking the noncombatant's movement through the evacuation process.

9.3.2 Data Elements. NTS data elements have been designed using standard DOD attribute naming conventions with the goal of operating in a shared data environment with other DOD systems. NTS transfers data to the Global Transportation Network, and currently exports an XMAN for the exchange of information with the GATES. GATES is the backbone of aerial port operations and ITV capabilities.

9.3.3 Local Area Network (LAN). The NTS establishes a local wireless LAN at each site that enables free-flow of information between all laptops on the network. Each registration station captures an NCE's information from their Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS)/Real Time Automated Personnel Identification System (RAPIDS) ID card, common access card, or civilian passport and the personal data information are assigned to a bar coded bracelet and then automatically sent to the mini-server when the data is saved.

9.3.4 Bar Coded Bracelets. NCE's bar coded bracelets are scanned in and out at each site during the evacuation process. Each evacuation control center (ECC) fabricates manifests with

NCE's information and sends the manifests to the server that sends them to the destination location. This provides the destination ECC with the information from the incoming manifest before the NCEs reach that location. Each NCE can be tracked via the server or the website by name or NEO ID number.

9.3.5 Other Humanitarian Missions. The main difference between a NEO and other humanitarian missions is the level of involvement of the DOS. Standard DOD assisted humanitarian missions are different based on the chain of command and procedures utilized. JCS or JTF commanders are authorized to implement NEO procedures such as the use of the NTS system. It is common for leaders to pick and choose sections from JP 3-68 to tailor evacuation procedures to fit the current mission. Example: Following an earthquake and tsunami off Japan's east coast, a nuclear emergency was declared at the power plants at Fukushima Daiichi. DOD began planning efforts for voluntary departure of DOD eligible family members. During the execution of the evacuation, NTS was directed as the primary tracking tool by the JCS.

9.4 Points of Contact.

9.4.1 DOS. Contact Overseas Citizens Services

- From within the US 1-888-407-4747
- From outside the US 1-202-501-4444

9.4.2 NTS .

- Chief, Operations Support Division, Defense Manpower Data Center (831) 583-2400 x5237
- NTS Program Manager, Defense Manpower Data Center (831) 583-4019

9.4.3 Additional Information.

9.4.3.1 US Army (as DOD Executive Agent for repatriation and planning for all services)

- www.armyg1.army.mil/MilitaryPersonnel/neo.asp
- www.armyg1.army.mil/MilitaryPersonnel/neo/jointPlan.html
- www.armyg1.army.mil/sitemap.asp#neo

9.4.3.2 US Department of State. Emergency Assistance and crisis preparedness:

- http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/emergencies/emergencies_1212.html

9.4.3.3 Web Site for Nearest US Embassy:

- www.usembassy.gov

9.4.3.4 US military-affiliated noncombatants living in:

9.4.3.4.1 Europe

9.4.3.4.1.1 NSE Larissa:

- http://www.cnic.navy.mil/content/dam/cnic/cnreurafswa/pdfs/USNSE_Larissa/ForceProtection.pdf

9.4.3.4.1.2 NSA Naples:

- http://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnreurafswa/installations/nsa_naples/om/emergency_management/neo-kit.html

9.4.3.4.2 Japan:

9.4.3.4.2.1 Commander Fleet Activities, Sasebo:

- http://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnrj/installations/cfa_sasebo/om/emergency_management/noncombatant_evacuation_operations.html

9.4.3.4.2.2 Naval Air Facility Atsugi:

- http://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnrj/installations/naf_atsugi/om/emergency_management.html

9.4.3.4.2.3 Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka:

- http://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnrj/installations/cfa_yokosuka/om/emergency_management.html

9.4.3.4.3 The Republic of Korea:

- http://www.usfk.mil/usfk/Uploads/120/NEO101.pdf?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1

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CHAPTER 10

AIRBASE TRANSITION, REDEPLOYMENT, AND RECONSTITUTION

10.1 Introduction. A significant but often overlooked process in the operations life cycle is transition to follow-on forces and subsequent roll-up plan.

10.2 Transition. Consideration should be given to the long-term use of the airfield. Transitioning the airfield to follow-on forces or the HN is a deliberate process that should be considered and resourced in the planning phase of the operation. Some key considerations for the transition to an airfield are as follows (See **Attachment 16**, CRF to AEW/AEG Transition for functional area transition items):

10.2.1 Assign Transition POC. Liaisons are instrumental in ensuring a smooth transition. Normally a single person within the deployed unit, with experience and a broad understanding of the mission, should be assigned as the transition POC.

10.2.1.1 Assign Functional Area POCs. Functional transitions occur as follow-on forces arrive on-station. Functional area POCs/SMEs help facilitate a detailed and deliberate transfer of airfield and airbase responsibilities.

10.2.1.2 CRF leadership Go/No Go functional area items.

10.2.1.2.1 Aerial Port.

10.2.1.2.1.1 ATOC.

- Follow-on forces established Deployable Global Air Transportation Execution System (DGATES)/ITV-RFID connectivity
- Ramp MOG/parking spot locations/restrictions briefed
- Host Nation customs/agriculture requirements briefed

10.2.1.2.1.2 Passenger Processing.

- Passenger terminal/baggage holding area locations and capacities briefed
- Personnel support for contingency operations (PERSCO) operations area briefed

10.2.1.2.2 Cargo Handling.

- Identify marshaling yard/hazardous cargo area location, layout and capacities
- Follow-on forces arrive with MHE and vehicle maintenance personnel available
- Joint Inspection kit/personnel and portable scales available

10.2.1.2.3 Maintenance.

- Aircraft: Brief average daily flying schedule/aircraft types; pass-on aircraft bug-out plan for emergency. Discuss aircraft ground support equipment dispersal plan; discuss vehicles/AGE hardening plan.

• Vehicle: List all available vehicles by type quantity and condition/serviceability. List parts, supplies, equipment, and facility. Inform road/terrain considerations/conditions and local driving laws.

• AGE: Ensure bare base packing timeline is created and generators are de-fueled. Damaged/broken equipment should be identified at this time.

10.2.1.2.4 Airfield Operations.

10.2.1.2.4.1 Weather.

• Air expeditionary wing (AEW)/air expeditionary group (AEG) weather equipment is full mission-capable (FMC).

• AEW/AEG weather personnel have been given an AOR orientation (e.g., local geography, rules of thumb, lessons learned).

• AEW/AEG weather personnel have been given customer support requirements

10.2.1.2.4.2 Air Traffic Control.

• Ensure proper level of manning to continue mission

• Does a CR controller need to be tasked to stay behind

• CR equipment accounted for

• Does CR equipment need to stay behind

• ATC procedures properly explained to follow-on forces

10.2.1.2.5 Command and Control.

• NIPRNET, SIPRNET and Global Decision Support System 2 accounts should be established

• Ensure communications between follow-on C2 and all using agencies (aircrew and all base agencies)

10.2.1.2.6 Communications.

10.2.1.2.6.1 Ground Radio.

• All radio frequency user requirements must be duplicated before the transition can begin

• Small Package Initial Communications Equipment

• Parallel communications capabilities must be established before transition can begin

10.2.1.2.7 PERSCO. See **Attachment 16**, CRF to AEW/AEG Transition.

10.2.1.2.8 Logistics.

10.2.1.2.8.1 POL. Pass on POC from Headquarters, transfer reporting emergency petroleum, oils, and lubricants (REPOL) responsibility procedures. Discuss proposed fuel storage/forward area and refueling point (FARP)/refueling maintenance (RFM)/Hot or Cold pit locations. Pass on different fuel grade requirements and contact for fuel contract/source. Transfer JFDES kit/equipment

items if applicable; train personnel on HAZMAT requirement/storage/disposal points. Tour testing analysis location/sign over LMRs to the TOC on demand.

10.2.1.2.8.2 Supply. Supply personnel having deployment commitments are required to have local operating procedures to support contingencies. A deployment checklist is designed to be a quick reference/reminder of necessary actions to accomplish during the deployment. This checklist is designed to give deployed supply personnel a basic outline of supply activities to consider for combat supply functions upon arrival at a forward operating location, bare, or austere base. See **Attachment 16**, CRF to AEW/AEG Transition for checklist.

10.2.1.2.9 Intelligence. See **Attachment 16**, CRF to AEW/AEG Transition.

10.2.1.2.10 Medical. UTC FFGRL members should provide key information collected at the deployed location to follow-on medical elements including:

- The Occupational, Environmental, Health Site Assessment
- Field inspection checklists for continued environmental health surveillance
- Applicable theater medical information program data
- Relative components to emergency planning procedures
- Logistics resupply chain

10.2.1.2.11 Contracting.

- Ensure Warranted Contracting Officer is brought with follow-on forces.
- Establish procurement priorities. If everything is a priority, then nothing is.

10.2.1.2.12 Finance. See **Attachment 16**, CRF to AEW/AEG Transition.

10.2.2 Establish Timeline. Timelines provide a template and execution order to facilitate a smooth transition of equipment and airbase operations from CRFs to follow-on forces. Timelines should focus on the possible turnover of capabilities.

10.2.3 Equipment Transitions. Functional SMEs should determine the order of equipment teardown for their individual area of operations to ensure mission continuation. All borrowed or joint-use equipment must be returned in a clean, serviceable condition. Transfer of equipment to theater or follow-on forces should only be done in extreme circumstances.

10.2.4 Personnel Transition. SMEs should link up with follow-on counterpart to pass appropriate airfield/airbase operations information.

10.3 Roll up Plan. Roll up should be done whether returning to home station or forward deploying. CRTs, aerial porters, and logistics personnel make good leads for the roll up plan. Plans should be based on the advice from each functional SME. This facilitates a smooth transition and ensures coverage of all areas of concern in airfield and airbase operations. See **Attachment 17**, Roll up for Return to Base for roll up items.

10.3.1 Return to Base. Most roll up plans revolve around returning to home station. Consideration should be given to preparing equipment as best as possible BEFORE returning to home station to make reconstitution quick and easy. Wash tents, clean vehicles; pack up gear correctly, not quickly.

10.3.1.1 Assign functional area POCs. Functional transitions occur as follow-on forces arrive on-station. Functional area POCs/SMEs help facilitate a detailed and deliberate transfer of airfield and airbase responsibilities.

10.3.1.2 CRF leadership Go/No Go functional area items.

10.3.1.2.1 Aerial Port.

10.3.1.2.2 ATOC.

- Coordinate with TOC on support airlift requirements
- Provide TOC with manifests/load plans for outbound missions

10.3.1.2.3 Passenger Processing.

- Process all personnel as required to meet outbound mission timing
- Provide baggage collection area for outbound PAX

10.3.1.3 Cargo Handling.

- Inspect redeploying equipment for shipment readiness
- Ensure equipment load/packing list and hazardous declarations are correct

10.3.1.4 Maintenance.

10.3.1.4.1 Aircraft. Brief average daily flying schedule/aircraft types; pass-on aircraft bug-out/dispersal plan for emergency. Discuss aircraft ground support equipment dispersal plan; discuss vehicles/AGE equipment hardening plan. Transfer all vehicles/AGE/LMRs/equipment.

10.3.1.4.2 Vehicle. Each 10K AT forklift requires 4+ hours to remove cab, weights and preparation for C-130 airlift (RORO in full operations configuration for C-17/C-5; 15 minute prep, each). Each 25K NGSL requires 20 to 30 minutes to configure for airlift (all airframes), no shoring needed. Defuel all vehicles to half tank as needed.

10.3.1.4.3 Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE). Ensure bare base packing timeline is created. Identify damaged/broken equipment and order. Generators will be prepared for air travel.

10.3.1.5 Airfield Operations.

10.3.1.5.1 Weather.

- CRF weather equipment has been disassembled and prepared for redeployment.
- CRF weather personnel have briefed AEW/AEG weather personnel on AOR familiarization and customer support requirements.

10.3.1.5.2 Air Traffic Control.

- One assigned controller to maintain positive control of aircraft/airspace until last aircraft departs (as required)
- All CR equipment accounted for

10.3.1.5.3 Airfield Management. See **Attachment 17**, Roll Up for Return to Base.

10.3.1.6 Command and Control.

10.3.1.6.1 Ensure all COMSEC is secured and proceed with packing up all equipment.

10.3.1.7 Communications.

10.3.1.7.1 Ground Radio.

10.3.1.7.1.1 Must maintain positive control of COMSEC

10.3.1.7.2 Small Package Initial Communications Equipment

10.3.1.7.2.1 Nothing significant to prevent roll-up

10.3.1.8 PERSCO.

10.3.1.8.1 Maintain accountability of all personnel until last aircraft departs

10.3.1.9 Logistics.

10.3.1.9.1 POL. Pass on POC from Headquarters, transfer REPOL responsibility procedures. Discuss proposed fuel storage/FARP/RFM/Hot or Cold pit locations. Pass on different fuel grade requirements and contact for fuel contract/source. Transfer JFDES kit/equipment items if applicable; train personnel on HAZMAT requirement/storage/disposal points. Tour testing analysis location/sign over LMRs to the TOC on demand.

10.3.1.9.2 Supply. Specific combat supply functions must take place before forward deploying or returning to home base. Transfer/close supply accounts and ensure accountability of all equipment.

10.3.1.9.3 Logistics Plans. Execution of redeployment TPFDD. Ensure, through communication with a deployed liaison, that all cargo is accounted for and listed on the redeployment TPFDD. The deployment and redeployment TPFDD should be worked prior to the deployment in collaboration with both the 86th Installation Deployment Readiness Cell (IDRC) and the JOPES personnel from the NAF. Communication is vital and highly recommended to facilitate the process.

10.3.1.10 Intelligence. See **Attachment 17**, Roll Up for Return to Base.

10.3.1.11 Civil Engineering. See **Attachment 17**, Roll Up for Return to Base.

10.3.1.12 Medical.

10.3.1.12.1 Team members will inventory and re-pack all UTC FFGR1 medical equipment assets.

10.3.1.12.2 Provide supplies as able for shortfalls in follow-on medical element supplies before departure.

10.3.1.12.3 Any hazardous items will require appropriate documentation. Secure all controlled medications and medical records.

10.3.1.12.4 Maintain emergency medical supplies available during deployment process.

10.3.1.12.5 Return accountable items such as weapons or communication equipment.

10.3.1.12.6 All personal gear will be packed in personal bags only and should not be packed in UTC FFGR1 asset containers.

10.3.1.13 Contracting.

10.3.1.13.0.1 Ensure that all contracts have been completed, and paid if cash is the payment method, prior to departure.

10.3.1.14 Finance. See **Attachment 17**, Roll Up for Return to Base.

10.3.2 Forward Deployment. It is important that the unit arrives at the forward deployed location with a full gear load out and ready for the next mission. Forward deployment can be difficult to do in a timely manner. Resupplying used stock can take time; begin inventory and resupply ordering as soon as possible when forward deployment is imminent. See **Attachment 18**, Roll Up to Forward Deploy for roll up items.

10.3.2.1 Assign functional area POCs. Functional transitions occur as follow-on forces arrive on-station. Functional area POCs/SMEs help facilitate a detailed and deliberate transfer of airfield and airbase responsibilities.

10.3.2.2 CRF leadership Go/No Go functional area items.

10.3.2.2.1 Aerial Port.

10.3.2.2.1.1 ATOC.

- Coordinate with TOC on support airlift requirements.
- Provide TOC with manifests/load plans for outbound missions.

10.3.2.3 Passenger Processing.

10.3.2.3.1 Process all personnel as required to meet outbound mission timing.

10.3.2.3.2 Provide baggage collection area for outbound personnel.

10.3.2.4 Cargo Handling.

10.3.2.4.1 Inspect redeploying equipment for shipment readiness.

10.3.2.4.2 Ensure equipment load/packing list and hazardous declarations are correct.

10.3.2.5 Maintenance.

10.3.2.5.1 Aircraft: N/A

10.3.2.5.2 Vehicle. Each 10K AT F/L requires 4+ hours to remove cab, weights and prep for C-130 airlift (RORO in full operations configuration for C-17/C-5; 15 minutes prep, each). Each 25K NGSL requires 20-30 minutes to configure for airlift (all airframes), no shoring needed. Defuel all vehicles to half tank as needed.

10.3.2.6 Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE). N/A

10.3.2.7 Airfield Operations.

10.3.2.7.1 Weather.

- Identify weather equipment critical to completion of mission from forward deployed location. Ensure consideration of support required at original deployed location.
- Prepare critically identified weather equipment for forward deployment.

10.3.2.7.2 Air Traffic Control.

- Number of controllers needed at forward location.
- Number of controllers needed at current location.
- Equipment needed at current and forward location.
- Procedural concerns.

10.3.2.8 Command and Control.

10.3.2.8.1 Ensure all COMSEC is secured and proceed with packing all equipment.

10.3.2.8.2 Ensure enough administrative supplies are procured to maintain operations at follow-on location.

10.3.2.9 Communications.

10.3.2.9.1 Ground Radio. See **Attachment 18**, Roll up to Forward Deploy.

10.3.2.9.2 Small Package Initial Communications Equipment.

- Must have new Satellite Access Authorization/Gateway Access Authorization (SAA/GAA) for new location.
- New COMSEC may be required.

10.3.2.10 PERSCO. See **Attachment 18**, Roll up to Forward Deploy.

10.3.2.11 Logistics.

10.3.2.11.1 POL. N/A.

10.3.2.11.2 Supply. Specific contingency operational plans must be reviewed prior to departure to ensure Supply personnel fully understand mission objectives interfaces with supported organizations, and details required of Supply at the deployed location.

10.3.2.11.3 Logistics Plans. Work with deployed liaison to add resupply or additional cargo. Dates and UTC information are required. All additional cargo and personnel will need to be added to both a deployment and redeployment TPFDD. This will be accomplished with coordination through the NAF and the 86th LRS/IDRC. After the ULNs have been validated, it must be communicated to the deployed liaison.

10.3.2.12 Intelligence. See **Attachment 18**, Roll up to Forward Deploy.

10.3.2.13 Civil Engineering. See **Attachment 18**, Roll up to Forward Deploy.

10.3.2.14 Medical.

10.3.2.14.1 UTC FFGRL team members will reconstitute any shortage prior to deployment to new site as able.

10.3.2.14.2 UTC FFGRL team chief will relay all potentially mission-impacting shortfall information and recommendations on resolving shortfalls to deployed commander before forward deployment.

10.3.2.14.3 Team members will inventory and re-pack all UTC FFGR1 medical equipment assets.

10.3.2.14.4 Secure all controlled medications and medical records.

10.3.2.14.5 Maintain emergency medical supplies available during deployment process.

10.3.2.14.6 Secure accountable items such as weapons or communication equipment.

10.3.2.14.7 All personal gear will be packed in personal bags only and should not be packed in UTC FFGR1 asset containers.

10.3.2.15 Contracting.

10.3.2.15.1 Ensure that all contracts have been completed, and paid if cash is the payment method, or turned over to the non-forward deploying contracting officer prior to departure.

10.3.2.15.2 Provide listing of immediately required procurement items as soon as possible after notification of forward deployment.

10.4 Reconstitute. Key considerations should be made to provide support for returning forces allowing transition back to the normal environment and reconstitution for future deployments. This process entails planning that will return units back to their full combat capability in a short time. While there is no one set way to conduct reconstitution, considerations must be given to prioritizing and restoring levels of consumables expended during the mission/tasking, and the recovery of lost training. Every base/unit will have to assess their own situation based on variables such as the magnitude, duration, and intensity of a mission/tasking, consumption rates, and the operational location (e.g., fixed vs. austere base). See **Attachment 19**, Reconstitution for reconstitution checklists.

CHAPTER 11

CLOSE THE AIRBASE

11.1 Introduction. The unique capabilities, personnel, and equipment that make up contingency response forces allow them to expedite the mission drawdown and site close of expeditionary air force bases. With proper notification, planning, and support, CRFs can allow for the reduction of base personnel, equipment, and BOS resources as the base's mission aircraft draw down. Upon cessation of base mission aircraft operations, CRFs are capable of supporting base closure logistics functions including the air transport of remaining personnel and equipment, personnel support, command and control, airfield operations, and air mobility operations. Finally, lean and organic CR capabilities allow it to execute final operations, ranging from airfield handoff to a host nation to withdrawal in a medium-risk environment.

11.1.1 Purpose. This chapter provides basic considerations relevant to planning, deploying, supporting, and using CRFs in support of air base closing operations. This includes CRGs, CREs, CRTs, CSEs, and other special purpose teams to provide support for closing operating locations (COL) operations.

11.1.2 Mission. CRFs provide the following capabilities that support the "Close the Base" force module:

- Provide CRFs to the Air Force's Close the Airbase force module in accordance with the CRG and airbase closing directives.
- Deploy and establish mobile C2 operations at closing fields to bridge the gap between fixed C2 capabilities that are drawing down.
- Provide communications support and BOS for base closing operations.

11.1.3 Capabilities/Employment. CRFs are extremely capable and can support varying levels of base closure operations. The deployed CRF mix would be right-sized to meet operational requirements, and be tailored to meet mission size, security threats, and desired capabilities. Conceivably, the deployed force structure could be as small as a 3-person team or as large as 113-person "Close the Airbase" force module capability in order to meet the specific requirements of each mission.

11.1.3.1 Airbase Closing. CRFs can serve as the final Air Force presence on an expeditionary airbase and are capable of transferring responsibility to host nation or, if not available, abandon the airfield. When the need for CRFs to support the closure of an airbase is identified, CRFs would coordinate actions with theater command elements (e.g., JFC, J/A-4) to ensure responsibilities, such as force protection, BOS, CE, C2 and communications, meet the requirements and can support the desired end state. Command relationships of CRF units to closing host bases will be situation dependent (e.g., CRF will TOA or simply support closure actions) but follow normal guidance for OPCON, TACON, and administrative control.

11.1.3.2 This can be especially important when base closure timelines are shortened due to a variety of reasons (e.g., increased threat, emerging need for redeploying forces elsewhere, host nation desires). CRF are able to pare down personnel and equipment as base closure operations evolve, greatly reducing the airbase footprint.

11.1.3.3 Final command and control (C2). This capability provides the personnel and equipment necessary to conduct initial C2 operations at closing expeditionary locations.

11.1.3.4 Final BOS-I. Depending on the threat and organic capabilities of the airfield, CRF "Close the Airbase" forces may require additional augmentation (e.g., US Air Force or joint) to reinforce and round out their capabilities. The need for these additional forces may be identified early on in the planning process by the air component or recognized later in the closure process. CRFs may initially require mutual BOS/installation services from the supported service with the preponderance of personnel and assets at the location but will eventually become the BOS-I provider as base personnel and resources are drawn down. Under hostile conditions, the CRF will require additional augmentation-especially with the reduction of host-base security forces.

11.1.3.5 Additional guidance for employing CRFs during COL operations is available from AF/A9, Center for Army Lessons Learned, and other sources.

11.1.4 Operational Scenarios. The following scenarios demonstrate the possible employment of CRFs in a base-closure role:

11.1.4.1 Example 1. Hostile Environment. An airbase, seized during initial combat operations, is set to close during phase IV operations. The base, operational for a short period of time, consisted of base expeditionary airfield resources (BEAR) shelters and existing buildings and facilities. The base is subject to insurgent and terrorist attacks. The CRG, augmented with security from joint/coalition forces, takes control of the airbase (including SAA) to expedite the removal of personnel and equipment and the reduction of base footprint. CRG conducts phased redeployment operations with support from joint/coalition forces for final withdrawal and base closure.

11.1.4.2 Example 2. Uncertain Environment. A HN with known anti-American terrorist groups and limited security functions directs a US airbase to cease operations and remove all personnel in 120 days. The CRG takes control of the airfield (SAA) and provides BOS for final closure activities (-45 days). Phased redeployment of CRG assets occurs as base personnel and equipment depart the base and C2, BOS and communications requirements are pared down.

11.1.4.3 Example 3. Permissive Environment. A base is set to close with hand over to the host nation. CRF provide C2, limited BOS, logistics and communications support. Tailored CRF assist in the final movement of personnel and equipment while base and host-nation leadership complete base closure and transfer. In this case, SAA would remain with closing base leadership; CRF would merely assist with final closure actions.

11.1.5 Planning. Closure planning should be a coordinated interagency effort that addresses all joint, USG, and HN issues and concerns. In a joint operations area (JOA), the joint staff in the AOR should provide overarching closure policies and procedures for all services, from which AF can derive its internal planning process. The CCDR's staff will typically lead in negotiating HN agreements. The termination of military operations ends with a transition to civilian control. The result will be a timely, efficient, and effective closure that leaves a positive message with the HN and properly marshals our forces and equipment for future employment.

11.1.5.1 The Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) or AEG commander normally reports to COMAFFOR and is responsible for planning and executing the closure mission at the OL under his/her command. An AEW normally is composed of the wing command element and subordinate expeditionary groups and squadrons. An AEG is normally assigned to a smaller OL and is composed of subordinate expeditionary squadrons.

11.1.6 Phases, Assumptions and Risks.

11.1.6.1 Phases.

- Phase 1 - Assessment and plan development: Inventory and determine equipment and personnel to be redeployed. Assess actions, forces, and equipment required to accomplish closure/transition. Produce time-phased plan that encompasses all COL activities. Communicate plan as needed.
- Phase 2 - Execution of closure plan: Redeploy non-closure related personnel and equipment. Manage disposition of infrastructure.
- Phase 3 - Final closure actions: Relinquish control of OL and complete redeployment of personnel and equipment.

11.1.6.2 Assumptions.

- AEW/AEG/USG closes standing contracts and agreements with HN authorities.
- Single service, joint or combined environment.
- Closure forces are properly trained, organized, and equipped.
- Closure requirements have been finalized by AFFOR and all environmental cleanup and repair/reconstruction efforts beyond CRG capabilities will be completed by COL date.
- Legal requirements are managed by AEW/AEG legal team at OL.
- Limited storage at location for closure cargo and/or equipment.
- COL is a variation to the AETF Force Modules and is contained in operational capability packages (OCP).
- OL will completely close, and all joint forces will depart.
- Harsh climate and rugged terrain.
- US Air Force is identified as the BOS-I and/or SAA.

11.1.6.3 Risks.

- Increased ground threat due to localized/standoff attack, sabotage, and civil unrest.
- Increased threat of weapons of mass destruction/directed energy weapons.
- Operational requirements change during closure.
- Accelerated timeline to close.
- Contractors default due to closure.

11.1.7 Closing Limitations. OL closure requires the integration of in-place forces and may include a minimal amount of closure specific forces and equipment to execute closure processes. Closing installations must develop comprehensive local plans and dedicate

sufficient personnel and transportation assets for closure functions. Most military equipment will redeploy with units or be retrograded to support reset programs. In some cases, AFFOR may only return a portion of a location to the HN authority. In these instances, AFFOR would consider the location "partially returned," and it will remain usable as an operational platform. This may or may not involve turning over responsibility to the HN authority for base operating support (BOS) in accordance with proper international agreements.

11.2 Scope.

11.2.1 Phase I--Assessment and Plan Development.

11.2.1.1 The AEW or AEG commander is responsible for executing the closure mission at the deployed OL. As an OL transitions from sustained military operations, OL senior leaders should discontinue non-mission essential functions and services as the focus shifts to performing closure operations. OL senior leaders, in conjunction with CRG commander, must also decide when to redeploy personnel and equipment not required for closure operations or sustained contingency operations.

11.2.1.2 CRF should conduct a thorough assessment of the closing base. This will enable deployed organizations to effectively plan closure operations and allow for the smooth transition to CRF control and ultimate closure. Detailed assessments of airfield operations, C2, FP, logistics, and mission support are required to determine the scope and timelines associated with planned closure activities. Deployed Air Force OL senior leaders must coordinate with CRF leadership as early as possible for execution to go smoothly. In addition, it is vital that closure activities be fully coordinated and integrated with JOA JS, where one exists, because they will likely coordinate base closure efforts in a JOA.

11.2.1.3 The closure plan should be site specific; however, it should reflect lessons learned from previous OL closures. When developing the plan, consideration must be given to BOS-I and SAA, as other services may be responsible for one or both. Early identification of a closure date and a plan for disposition of forces (e.g., redeployment to home station or forward deployment in-theater) for CRFs to seamlessly facilitate the closure mission. Closure forces will consist primarily of in-place personnel and equipment specifically identified to execute location closure and mission relocation. BOS will gradually phase out as OL approaches its closure date. However, appropriate levels of essential services, most importantly FP and personnel accountability, must continue until all personnel have departed.

11.2.1.4 The AEW/AEG commander is responsible for coordination with AFFOR for removal of USG property from facilities in accordance with procedures and agreements between the USG and HN before CRG assumption of responsibility. AFFOR will return real property to HN authority in an agreed upon condition as determined through USG agreements with HN (e.g., as-is, demolished, or pre-seizure condition). AEG/AEW is responsible for pre-closure environmental surveys and actions including cleanup, UXO removal, prior hand over restoration actions, and other activities. Other resources to return may include airspace and air transportation infrastructure. After stabilization, CCDR will normally implement processes to transition airspace control back to government authority. AFFOR should help re-establish a civil aviation authority to facilitate this transition. CRF

will not be tasked to negotiate OL hand over with HN or the conduct of environmental assessment, cleanup, or rebuilding efforts.

11.2.2 Phases II-III-Closure Plan Execution and Completion.

11.2.2.1 Direct and frequent communication between AEG/AEW leaders and CRG leadership will significantly benefit closure operations. Once AEW/AEG transfer a location to the CRG, the CRG will have control and authority over the property. At any given OL, there may be forces assigned from two or more branches of the US military, USG agencies, or partner nations. Consequently, CCDRs may direct an OL to close where AF units are collocated with units of the US Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or other USG agencies or coalition forces. In these circumstances, AFFOR will work with the other services/allies in accomplishing OL closure activities.

11.2.2.2 AFFOR will identify requirements needed to develop the redeployment time-phased force deployment data. Detailed planning ensures sequencing of all personnel and assets for departure, movement, and recovery. AF leaders may be required to make tradeoffs in operational capability and accept some risk as pre-closure mission operations draw down and personnel/equipment redeployment begins.

11.3 Functional Area Considerations.

11.3.1 Force Protection.

- Establish contact with AEW/AEG SF.
- Review airfield security assessment/established defense plan/SOPs.
- Review HN/joint/coalition security support agreements.
- Establish timeline for hand-over of security responsibility.
- Determine phased reduction of security capabilities and plan for contraction of base defense line (e.g., established wire/CRG footprint/ramp/aircraft).

11.3.2 Intelligence/AFOSI.

- Establish contact with AEG/AEW intelligence and AFOSI, obtain pertinent threat data, assessments, and intelligence.
- Obtain local contacts and charts.
- Ensure AEG/AEW has planned to remove/destroy all COMSEC and classified material before handoff to CRG.
- Determine intelligence requirements once CRG takes control.

11.3.3 Civil Engineering.

- Establish contact with AEW/AEG CES.
- Obtain airfield pavement and airfield evaluation.
- Obtain status of environmental assessment and cleanup efforts, status and location of facilities, location of hardened facilities (bunkers and bug out).
- Determine HN support capabilities including power/water/sanitation/CBRNE protection and detection/environmental protection /dig permit requirements (if applicable).

- Obtain current BOS plan.
- Ensure AEW/AEG redeployment plans include retaining EOD/CFR personnel and assets once CRG takes control (as required by mission).

11.3.4 PERSCO.

- Establish contact with AEW/AEG and obtain plan for host PERSCO team to scale down out processing, checkout, and work area pack up.
- Obtain AEW/AEG inbound/outbound personnel procedures.
- Obtain AEW/AEG personnel redeployment plan to determine workload and requirements, AF Form 245s, *Employment Locator and Processing Checklist* and contingency, exercise, deployment orders.
- Develop battle rhythm for CRG PERSCO team.

11.3.5 Services/BOS.

- Establish contact SVS leadership and determine AEW/AEG personnel support requirements following CRG TOA.
- Obtain HN support (billeting/food/water) contacts and contract information (if applicable).
- Determine AEW/AEG supplies (water/food/supplemental) that can be transferred to CRG.

11.3.6 POL.

- Make contact with AEW/AEG fuels leadership.
- Obtain current fuels operational readiness capability equipment (FORCE)/fuels mobility support equipment layout, resupply capabilities and fuel contract contacts.
- Contact A4 for POL shutoff and contingency supply plan and requirements.

11.3.7 Finance.

- Obtain paying agent appointment letter.
- Obtain handoff from AEW/AEG finance.

11.3.8 Contracting.

- Establish contact with AEW/AEG contracting.
- Ensure long-term/major contracts will be closed out prior to CRG TOA.

11.3.9 Medical.

- Establish contact with AEW/AEG medical leadership.
- Determine medical requirements beyond CRF (remaining AEW/AEG personnel, Joint/coalition/civilian) in order to identify augmentation beyond UTC FFGRL.
- Obtain equipment/supplies that can/will be transferred from EMDG to CRG.
- Obtain medical-specific site intelligence.
- Obtain host-nation medical capabilities, contacts, and procedures (if applicable).

11.3.10 Airfield Operations.

- Establish contact with airfield manager (civilian and/or military).
- Obtain AMC Form 174, giant report and other resources to determine status of field, location of special areas (hot cargo/hot brake), CFR capabilities, approach capability, frequencies, and so forth.
- Determine how AEW/AEG drawdown will affect airfield/ATC capabilities and if CRG will be able to maintain level of service/support. Request augmentation if required and/or ensure CRG leadership is aware of airfield/ATC degradation due to CRG limitations.

11.3.11 Aerial Port/LRO.

- Establish contact with AEW/AEG LRS and APS (if applicable), A/4, base/site closure officer.
- Ensure AEW/AEG has plan to redeploy all required personnel and equipment.
- Obtain host-nation customs/agriculture contacts and requirements.
- Establish contact with A/DACG and other joint/coalition/civilian air cargo entities on airfield.
- Obtain AEW/AEG's vehicle redeployment and disposition plan.
- Determine location for CRG facilities (e.g., cargo yard, ramp) on airfield.
- Determine ATOC, ITV, and MHE requirements.
- Determine any other logistics/aerial port needs.

11.3.12 Maintenance.

- Establish contact with AEW/AEG MX leadership.
- Determine refueling and servicing plan.
- Determine flying schedule and identify limitations due to CRG capabilities.
- Ensure handoff from AEW/AEG maintenance commander/maintenance superintendent on airfield status and parking operations.

11.3.13 Command and Control.

- Establish contact with CRG MAJCOM, base MAJCOM/NAF/AFFOR and AEW/AEG leadership to determine C2 requirements during base closure.
- Obtain AEW/AEG’s command post SOPs, checklists and contacts.
- Determine date/time for stand down of AEW/AEG command post and transfer of responsibility to CRG C2 personnel/equipment.
- Obtain copy of OPORD, PPLAN and other documents.

11.3.14 Communications.

- Establish contact with CRW/CRG Communications leadership.
- Obtain C2 combat identification (CID) and ensure frequencies are approved through date of closure.
- Ensure A6, AEW/AEG and CRG leadership are aware of capabilities/limitations of CRG communications.

11.3.15 CRG Commander.

- Obtain copy of OPORD, PPLAN.
- Establish contact with MAJOM, AEW/AEG's NAF/AFFOR and AEW/AEG leadership.
- Verify handoff and closure plan, and determine date/time for airbase/airfield handoff.
- Review status of CRG's essential supplies.
- Determine CRG's capabilities and limitations in operating and closing airfield.
- Review status of airfield with outgoing AEW/AEG commander.
- Obtain airfield and local area orientation from outgoing commander. Establish.
- Contact with HN, joint/coalition/civilian partners.
- Notify AMD when SAA is transferred from AEW/AEG to SAA.

ATTACHMENT 1

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A1.3 Abbreviations and Acronyms.

A/DACG .....arrival/departure airfield control group
ABD .....air base defense
ABO .....Air Base Opening
AC .....alternating current
ACSA .....acquisition and cross-servicing agreements
ADCP .....automated DCP
ADP .....automated data processing
ADVON .....advanced echelon
AEG .....air expeditionary group
AETF .....air and space expeditionary task force
AEW .....air expeditionary wing
AF .....Air Force
AFCEC .....Air Force Civil Engineer Center
AFARS .....Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
AFFARS .....Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
AFFOR .....Air Force forces
AFKN .....Air Force Knowledge Now
AFMC .....Air Force Materiel Command
AFOSI .....Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFRC .....Air Force Reserve Command
AFRCC .....Air Force rescue coordination center
AFSC .....United States Air Force specialty code
AFSOC .....Air Force Special Operations Command
AFTRANS .....Air Force Transportation Component
AG/NGB .....Adjutant General/National Guard Bureau
AGE .....aerospace ground equipment
AIM2 .....Automotive Information Module
AIR .....Aviation Into-Plane Reimbursement

ALCF .....airlift control flight
ALERTORD .....alert order
AMC .....Air Mobility Command
AMD .....air mobility division
AMLO.....air mobility liaison officer
AMOS.....air mobility operations squadron
AMS.....air mobility squadron
ANG.....Air National Guard
AO.....area of operations
AOC .....air operations center
AOR.....area of responsibility
APE.....unexploded ordnance
APF .....appropriated funds
APOD.....aerial port of debarkation
APS .....aerial port squadron
ARC .....American Red Cross
ARFF .....aircraft rescue and firefighting
ASRR.....Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report
AST.....airfield survey team
AT.....all-terrain; assessment team
ATOC .....air terminal operations center
ATSO .....ability to survive and operate
ATV.....all-terrain vehicles
AvGas.....aviation gasoline
BaS&E .....Base Support and Expeditionary
BASH.....Bird/Wildlife Aircraft Strike Hazard
BCT.....brigade combat team
BEAR.....base expeditionary airfield resources
BETSS .....base expeditionary targeting and surveillance system - combined
BGAN .....broadband global area network
BHO .....battlefield handover
BOS.....base operating support
BOS-I .....base operating support-integrator
BSB.....Brigade Support Battalion
BSP .....base support plan
BSTB .....Brigade Special Troops Battalion
C2.....command and control
C3.....command, control, and communications
C2SID .....Command & Control System Integration Directorate
CA/CRL.....custodian authorization custody receipt listing
CAC .....common access card
CAS.....close air support
CBR .....California bearing ratio
CBRN.....chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE .....chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives

CCA .....Command and Control Agency
CCDR.....combatant commander
CCI.....Controlled Cryptographic Item
CCIR .....commander's critical information requirement
CCO .....contingency contracting officer
CCT.....combat control team
CE .....civil engineer
CFR.....crash, fire, rescue
CHOP.....change of operational control
CID.....combat identification
COA .....course of action
COL .....closing operating location
COMAFFOR .....commander, Air Force forces
COMNAVMAR .....commander, Naval Forces Marianas
COMREL.....command relationships
COMSEC .....communications security
CONUS.....continental United States
CoP.....Community of Practice
COSG.....contingency operations support group
CP.....command post
CPE .....close precision engagement
CR .....contingency response
CRE.....contingency response element
CRF.....contingency response force
CRG .....contingency response group
CRT .....contingency response team
CR-TF .....contingency response-task force
CRW.....contingency response wing
CSE .....contingency support element
CTO.....compensatory time off
DATCALS .....Deployable Air Traffic Control and Landing Systems
DCAPES .....Deliberate Crisis Action Planning and Execution System
DCO .....Defense Connect Online; defense coordinating officer
DCP.....dynamic cone penetrometer
DEERS.....Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System
DEPORD .....deployment/redeployment order
DF .....direct fire
DFARS.....Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DFC.....deputy force commander
DFP .....defensive fighting positions
DHS .....Department of Homeland Security
DIRMOBFOR.....director of mobility forces
DLA-E .....Defense Logistics Agency-Energy
DO.....operations officer
DOC .....Department of Commerce

DOD.....Department of Defense
DODACC.....Department Of Defense activity address code
DOE .....Department of Energy
DOI .....Department of the Interior
DOJ .....Department of Justice
DOL .....Department of Labor
DOS .....Department of State
DOT .....Department of Transportation
DP&E.....deployed personnel & equipment
DR.....disaster relief
DRMD .....Deployments requirements manning document
DSCA.....defense support of civil authorities
DSOE.....deployment schedule of events
DTS.....Defense Travel System
DVD.....digital video disc
DVIDS .....Digital Video and Imagery Distribution System
DZ.....drop zone
E&E .....evasion and escape
EAL.....entry authorization list
ECC.....evacuation control center
ECP .....electronic cone penetrometer; entry control points
ECU .....environmental control unit
EM .....emergency management
EMDG.....expeditionary medical dental group
EOC .....emergency operations center
EPA .....Environmental Protection Agency
EPLO .....emergency preparedness liaison officers
ESF.....emergency support functions
ESSP .....expeditionary site survey process
ETIC.....estimated time in commission
EXORD.....execute order
FAA.....Federal Aviation Administration
FAR.....Federal Acquisition Regulation
FARP.....forward area and refueling point
FBO.....fixed based operator
FCC.....federal coordinating center
FCG.....foreign clearance guide
FCO.....federal coordinating officer
FEMA .....Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLIP .....flight information publication
FM.....financial management; force module
FMC.....full mission-capable
FN .....forward node
FOD .....foreign object damage
FORCE.....fuels operational readiness capability equipment

FP .....force protection
FPCON.....force protection condition
FPD .....force protection detachment
FRAGORD .....fragmentary order
GAA.....Gateway Access Authorization
GAMSS.....Global Air Mobility Support System
GATES .....Global Air Transportation Execution Systems
GCC .....geographic combatant commander
GDSS2 .....Global Decision Support System II
GLO .....ground liaison officer
GMRS .....global mobility readiness squadron
GMS.....global mobility squadron
GPC.....government purchase card
GPS .....global positioning satellite
GSA .....General Services Administration
HA.....humanitarian assistance
HARRT .....humanitarian assistance rapid response team
HCA .....head of contracting authority
HELAMS .....Hardside Expandable Light Air-Mobile Shelters
HF .....high frequency
HHQ.....higher headquarters
HHS .....Department of Health and Human Services
HLZ.....helicopter landing zone
HMMWV.....high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HN.....host nation
HNS .....host-nation support
HSPD-5.....Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5
HST.....helicopter support team
HUD.....Department of Housing and Urban Development
HVAC.....heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
HWD.....heavy weight deflectrometer
IC .....incident commander
ICAO.....International Civil Aviation Organization
ICODES .....integrated computerized deployment system
ICP .....Incident Command Post
ICS .....incident command structure
ID .....identification
IDF .....indirect fire
IDO .....installation deployment officer
IDP .....installation deployment plan
IDRC.....installation deployment readiness cell
IFR .....instrument flight rules
IGO .....international governmental organization
IPB .....intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR .....infrared

ISOPREP .....isolated personnel reports
IST .....incident support team
ISU .....internal storage unit
ITV.....In-Transit Visibility
JA .....judge advocate
JAG .....judge advocate general
JAT .....joint assessment team
JB-MDL .....Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst
JFACC.....joint force air component commander
JFC .....joint force commander
JFO.....joint field office
JI.....joint inspection
JIC.....joint information center
JLLIS .....Joint Lessons Learned Information System
JOA .....joint operations area
JOC .....joint operations center
JOPP.....joint operation planning process
JPASE.....joint public affairs support element
JTF-PO.....Joint Task Force-Port Opening
L2 .....Lessons Learned
LCN .....load classification number
LDA .....limited depository account
LIMFACS .....limiting factors
LIN.....liquid nitrogen
LMR.....land mobile radio
LNO .....liaison officer
LOGDET .....logistics detail
LOGMOD.....logistics module
LOS.....line of sight
LOX .....liquid oxygen
LRO .....logistics readiness officer
LRS .....logistics readiness squadron
LSO.....Logistics Support Office
LZ.....Landing Zone
M&M .....Manpower and Materiel
MAFEX .....mobility Air Forces exercise
MAJCOM .....major command
MANFOR .....manpower force packaging system
MANPAD.....man-portable air defense system
MARC.....mobility air reporting and communications
MDS.....mission design series
MEFPAK.....manpower and equipment force packaging
METL.....mission-essential task list
METT-TC.....mission, enemy, troops and support available, terrain and weather, time available and civil considerations

MHE.....materials handling equipment
MILAIR .....military air
MOG .....maximum aircraft on ground
MOGAS .....motor gasoline
MOPP.....mission-oriented protective posture
MOS.....minimum operating strip
MPC .....mission planning cell
MRE.....meal, ready to eat
MRSP.....mission readiness spares package
MTF .....medical treatment facility
MX .....maintenance
NASA.....National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO.....North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC .....nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCE .....noncombatant evacuee
NCO .....noncommissioned officer
NDMS.....National Disaster Medical System
NEO .....noncombatant evacuation operation
NGA.....National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGB .....National Guard Bureau
NGO.....non-governmental organization
NGSL .....next generation small loader
NIMA.....National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NIMS .....National Incident Management System
NIPRNET.....Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network
NLT .....no later than
NMC .....non-mission capable
NOAA.....National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NORTHCOM.....Northern Command
NOTAM .....notice to airmen
NRC .....Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRF.....National Response Framework
NTS.....NEO tracking system
NVD.....night vision device
NVG.....night vision goggle
NVOAD.....National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
O&M.....operation and maintenance
OCA .....offensive counterair
OCONUS .....outside the continental United States
OCP.....operational capability package
OCR .....Office of Collateral Responsibility
OIC.....officer in charge
OL .....operating location
OPCON .....operational control
OPM.....Office of Personnel Management

OPORD.....operations order
OPR.....office of primary responsibility
OPREP.....operational report
OPSEC.....operations security
ORM.....operational risk management
ORP.....objective rally point
OWS.....operational weather squadron
PACAF.....Pacific Air Forces
PAOC.....public affairs operating center
PAR.....post attack recovery
PAX.....passengers
PCA.....Posse Comitatus Act
PCASE.....Pavement-Transportation Computer Assisted Structural Engineering
PCN.....pavement classification number
PDF.....personnel deployment function
PERSCO.....personnel support for contingency operations
PID.....plan identification number
PIR.....priority intelligence requirement
PLANORD.....planning order
POC.....point of contact; Provisional Operations Center
POL.....petroleum, oil, and lubricants
PPAG.....proposed public affairs guidance
PPE.....personal protective equipment
PRF.....personnel resources file
PTDO.....prepare to deploy order
PZ.....pick-up zones
QAR.....quality assurance representative
QRF.....quick reaction force
RAMPCO.....ramp coordinator
RAPIDS.....Real Time Automated Personnel Identification System
RED HORSE.....rapid engineers deployable heavy operations repair squadron engineers
REPOL.....reporting emergency petroleum, oils, and lubricants
RF.....radio frequency; response force
RFI.....request for information
RFID.....radio frequency identification
RFM.....refueling maintenance
RGN.....removable goose neck
RM.....risk management
ROC.....rehearsal of concept
ROE.....rules of engagement
RPOE.....Rapid Port Opening Element
RRCC.....regional response coordination center
RSO.....regional security officer
RSOI.....reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RSP.....readiness spare package

SAA .....senior airfield authority
SAFIRE.....surface to air fire
SAR.....search and rescue
SATCOM .....satellite communications
SBA.....Small Business Administration
SCO.....state coordinating officer
SecDef.....Secretary of Defense
SF .....security force(s)
SFS.....security forces squadron
SIPRNET .....SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SIR .....serious incident report
SITREP .....situation report
SLICC .....Sling Load Inspector Certification Course
SLT.....sling load team
SME .....subject matter expert
SNCO.....senior noncommissioned officer
SOFA.....status of forces agreement
SOG .....special operations group
SOI.....signal operating instructions
SOP .....standard operating procedure
SPICE.....small portable initial communications equipment
SRAN.....stock record account number
SS .....small shelters
STONS.....short tons
STT .....special tactics team
TACC .....618th Tanker Airlift Control Center
TACON .....tactical control
TACP.....tactical air control party
TAF .....Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts
TC .....team chief
TCN .....third country national
TDY .....temporary duty
TERPS .....terminal instrument procedures
TMO.....transportation management office
TMSK .....temporary mission support kit
TOC.....tactical operations center
TPFDD.....time-phased force and deployment data
TTP .....tactics, techniques, and procedures
TVA.....Tennessee Valley Authority
TWG .....threat working group
UC.....unified command
UDCC .....unit deployment control center
UDM .....Unit Deployment Manager
UGR.....unitized group rations
UHF .....ultrahigh frequency

ULN .....unit line number
UOF .....use of force
US&R.....urban search and rescue
US .....United States
USACE .....US Army Corps of Engineers
USAFE.....US Air Forces Europe
USAFR.....US Air Force Reserve
USAID .....US Agency for International Development
USARPAC .....US Army Pacific
USCG.....US Coast Guard
USDA.....US Department of Agriculture
USG .....United States Government
USPACOM.....US Pacific Command
USPS.....US Postal Service
UTC .....unit type code
USTRANSCOM .....US Transportation Command
UXO.....unexploded ordnance
VA .....Department of Veterans Affairs
VCNCO .....vehicle control noncommissioned officer
VCO.....vehicle control officer
VDP .....vehicles deadlined for parts
VFR.....visual flight rules
VHF .....very high frequency
VM.....vehicle management
VOCO .....voice command
WARNORD .....warning order
WBC .....weight bearing capacity
WOC .....wing operations center
WRM .....war reserve material
WRSK.....war readiness spares kit
XMAN .....Exportable Manifest
ZAR .....zone availability report

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ATTACHMENT 2

FORCE PROTECTION

A2.1 Purpose. Provide FP TTP for executing CR missions. Provide a generalized TTP "play book" for CR FP tasks during airfield opening/transition/closing operations, fusion of Intel, AFOSI and security forces, partnering with sister service/coalition/host nation forces and countering direct fire (DF), indirect fire (IDF), surface to air fire (SAFIRE) and man-portable air defense system (MANPADS).

A2.1.1 Scope. Includes TTP used to fulfill FP measures and responsibilities required to execute the CR mission. Relies on the input of subject matter experts from the medical, civil engineer, chemical biological radiological nuclear environmental (CBRNE is not intrinsic to CRFs), intelligence, Office of Special Investigation, and information technology. FP specific TTP apply to all stages of the CR mission; including the mission analysis, airfield assessment, airfield opening, air base opening, transition, air base closing, roll-up, and reconstitution.

A2.1.2 Assumptions. All CRF personnel should be trained and have a level of small unit tactics proficiency. Initial infill FP TTP will be largely determined by method of infill (airborne, air-land, air-assault, or over-land). FP will primarily be executed by the UTC Phoenix Fist (QFEPF) and this UTC will be paired and tailored according to METT-TC. Special consideration will be needed if it is determined that the UTC QFEPF will not be attached to the airfield assessment team. The following TTP incorporate a squad of security forces personnel during the airfield assessment and airfield opening phases.

A2.2 Airfield Assessment FP TTP.

A2.2.1 FP objectives.

A2.2.1.1 Secure initial assembly area to allow for marshalling of equipment, communication function check and conduct initial personnel accountability. This assembly area is normally located on or immediately adjacent to a ramp area or offset at least 100 feet from the departure end of the LZ. See **Figure A2.1**, Assembly Area for an example of an assembly area utilized for an air-land infill.

Figure A2.1 Assembly Area



NOTE: Southern elements of both alpha and bravo fire teams will remain on north (safe) side of runway-hold-line until in-fill aircraft has departed.

A2.2.1.2 Provide security for initial actions on the objective which would include gathering and placing into operations necessary equipment (ATVs, HMMWV), link-up with friendly force (sister service, local/coalition forces), mounted and dismounted movement from assembly area to the ORP/establishment of ORP if different from assembly area.

A2.2.1.3 Create a "bubble" that allows freedom of movement for the airfield assessment team. See **Figure A2.2**, Observation Posts/Dismounted Fire Team Placement for a graphic example of team placement during airfield assessment phase. Operations are designed to expand out or collapse in to better facilitate FP for the assessment process.

Figure A2.2 Observation Posts/Dismounted Fire Team Placement



A2.2.2 Security Force Leader Responsibilities. Responsible for command and control of security forces and all attached personnel specifically assigned FP responsibilities (exception being medical personnel responsible for medical force protection).

- Contact with sister service, host nation (military or civilian) and/or coalition partner.
- Terrain analysis (Intel/AFOSI).
- Develop and publish CR integrated defense plan (IDP).
- Initiate priorities of work/routines in defense.
- Post checks on "bubble" operations.
- Take initial steps in setting up base defense operations center (BDOC) operations (range card production).
- Confirm pre-established evasion and escape (E&E) plan; inspect "Alamo" location, viability and transportation.

A2.2.3 Security/Observation Team Responsibilities. Team should be comprised of a two-person, close precision engagement (CPE) element. This team should be located on a terrain feature or built-up structure that allows the best elevated, 360-degree observation of the airfield environment. This team will be controlled by very specific ROE directed by senior leadership personnel that fully understand the capability of the team, its weapons, and equipment. Finally, a CPE team does not have a stand-alone capability and requires support during emergency E&E. Specific tasks assigned to the team:

- Establish hide.
- Establish redundant communication with assessment team leadership.
- Serve as eyes (early warning) for assessment team; key intelligence collection.
- Provide long-range direct fire (up to 1000 meters), personnel threat engagement capability.
- Serve as relay for line-of-sight communication between dispersed members of the assessment team (Because of elevated position).
- Provide over-watch to assessment team movements and security operations.

A2.3 Airfield Opening FP TTP.

A2.3.1 Security Priorities (Emphasizing Austere LZ Environment). Concurrent with runway activation and the initiation of airfield operations, the following security priorities should be established.

A2.3.1.1 C2 Capability (ATC capability)-Assigned Tasks.

A2.3.1.1.1 Provide 24 hour physical security to C2 capability.

A2.3.1.1.2 Two armed guards for entry control of C2 facility.

A2.3.1.1.3 100 percent ID and entry authority verification.

A2.3.1.1.4 Final layer in joint "Defense in Depth" base defense plan.

A2.3.1.1.4.1 Coordinate with applicable Army personnel to ensure unity of effort for interior base security.

A2.3.1.2 Aircraft off-load area (ramp physical security and traffic de-confliction).

A2.3.1.2.1 Provide 24 hour physical security to aircraft off-load/on-load area.

A2.3.1.2.1.1 Two armed guards for entry control of ramp.

A2.3.1.2.1.2 Enforce single point of entry and exit for all personnel and vehicles onto ramp.

A2.3.1.2.1.3 Prevent aircraft versus terrestrial vehicle/personnel conflict.

A2.3.1.3 Prevent/Respond to Active Runway Incursion.

A2.3.1.3.1 Provide 24-hour mobile response to prevent and/or challenge and remove incursions (enemy/friendly/neutral) onto the active runway.

A2.3.1.3.1.1 Two armed personnel will actively conduct a mounted patrol adjacent to runway. Post limits subject to METT-TC.

A2.3.1.3.1.2 Enforce all terrestrial traffic to use pre-established track-plans (SOP: around ends of the runway). Track plan needs to be integrated with sister service/host nation/coalition forces.

A2.3.1.3.2 Integrate in joint "Defense in Depth" base defense plan (can act as on call response force).

A2.3.1.3.2.1 Coordinate with applicable Army personnel to ensure unity of effort for interior base security.

A2.3.1.4 Mitigate Enemy SAFIRE & IDF

A2.3.1.4.1 Conduct a terrain analysis.

A2.3.1.4.1.1 In conjunction with Intel/AFOSI, generate specific numbered areas of interest in approach and departure corridors and IDF footprint. Share with sister service and coalition forces; caution passing this info to local national forces.

A2.3.1.4.1.2 Determine most-likely enemy avenues of approach.

A2.3.1.4.2 Integrate in joint "Defense in Depth" base defense patrol plan.

A2.3.1.4.2.1 Initiate a tight joint S-2/S-3 operations loop. Targeted patrols/intelligence collection.

A2.3.1.4.2.2 Champion "air-minded" by attaching Air Force personnel to Army patrol operations.

A2.3.1.4.2.3 Initiate counterinsurgency centric lines of operation.

A2.3.1.4.3 Employ electronic detection equipment.

A2.3.1.4.4 Emplace CPE teams and crew-served weapons.

A2.3.1.4.5 Additional TTP can be found in AFTTP 3-4.3, *Counter Surface to Air Fire.*

A2.3.2 Force Protection Augmentee Program. CRFs have limited security forces personnel to execute the core capability of initial FP. As a result, it is mission essential to have personnel trained to augment security forces and perform FP duties like entry control point operations, man defensive fighting positions and effectively utilize use of force procedures and employ less-than-lethal engagement options. This will then allow security forces to initiate and maintain a more aggressive defensive posture. **Table 2.1**, CRF Security Forces Augmentee Training depicts an example matrix for augmentee training.

Table A2.1 CRF Security Forces Augmentee Training

Training Item	Training Hours
Security force (SF) concepts and operations	0.5
Counter blood-borne pathogens	0.5
Use/enforce weapons safety	1.0
Apply use of force in accordance with current use of force (UOF) model	2.0
Explain Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) rules of engagement	0.5
Submit reports (e.g., situation report [SITREP], size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment [SALUTE], spot report, analysis and control element)	1.5
Perform individual and small team tactics (mounted/dismounted)	4.0
Employ communication devices (PRC 152/117)	1.5
Apply handcuffs on individual	1.0
Conduct individual, area, vehicle searches	4.0
Challenge suspect (foot/vehicle, law enforcement [LE]/air base defense [ABD])	1.0
Armament Systems and Procedures baton certification	8.0
UNCLASSIFIED	

NOTE: Additionally, individuals need to be rifle qualified (M-16 or M-4) and should be M9 qualified as well (range time for M9 may be a limiting factor).

A2.3.3 Priorities of Work. Leaders must ensure that Airmen assigned to FP duties prepare for the defense quickly and efficiently. Work must be done in order of priority to accomplish the most in the least amount of time while maintaining security and the ability to respond to enemy action. Below are basic considerations for priorities of work.

- Emplace security (Phoenix Fist leader or security forces member of the AM/AK).
- Position and assign sectors of fire for each observation post (OP).
- Position and assign sectors of fire for M240B and/or M249 weapons teams.
- Establish command post and wire communications.
- Designate final protective lines (FPLs) and final protective fire (FPF).
- Clear fields of fire and prepare range cards.
- Prepare sector sketches.
- Dig fighting positions.
- Establish communication and coordination with the sister service, local national and/or coalition security forces.

- Emplace wire and other obstacles.
- Improve primary fighting positions and add overhead cover (sand bags and/or any available hardening material).
- Prepare supplementary and then alternate positions (same procedure as the primary position).
- Establish sleep and rest plans.
- Distribute and stockpile ammunition, food, and water.
- Continue to improve positions: construct revetments, replace camouflage, and add to overhead cover.

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ATTACHMENT 3
KEY DECISION PARAMETER CHECKLIST

1) Mission description
2) Classification
3) Mission purpose
4) Intel
    a. Threat analysis
5) Duration
    a. In place date
    b. Mission completion date
    c. Redeployment/roll-up "Trigger"
        i. TPFDD ULNs closed
        ii. Date
6) Commander/Team Chief/ POC:
    a. Team Chief/POC info
7) Organizations/Wing/GROUP filling the tasking
8) Command relations for this deployment
9) Deployed/TDY location
    a. Deployed/TDY location contact
    b. Embassy/defense attaché office (DAO) POC
10) Personal Requirements
    a. Visas/passports
    b. Uniforms/civilian attire
    c. Weapons
    d. Body armor
    e. NVGs
11) Expected working MOG
    a. 1 aircraft for 12 hour(s), 2 aircraft for 24 hours, etc.
12) Review airfield suitability
13) Review Airfield Survey/Giant Report
    a. Last survey date
    b. Airfield operating hours

c. Ramp lighting

d. Approaches available

e. RWY/ramp conditions

14) Review foreign clearance guide

15) Review theater reporting instructions

16) User/customer requirements

a. User/customer contact info

17) Type support requested

a. Operations command and control

b. Airfield survey/assessment

c. Aerial port/ITV/load team/JI/MHE operators

d. Maintenance/quick turn/MHE/AGE

e. Security forces

f. Civil engineering

g. Communications

h. Other

18) Functional area manager RFI requirements.

a. C2 (A3)

i. Facilities/workspace needed/available

ii. Power needed/available

iii. Fuel needed/available

iv. Communications needed/available

v. Contact, name, numbers, e-mail

b. MX (A4)

i. MX equipment needed/available

ii. Contact, name, numbers, e-mail

c. APS (A4)

i. Cargo handling equipment needed/available

ii. Ramps, high-lines

iii. ITV needed/available

iv. Load planning/preparation needed/available

v. Joint inspection needed/available

vi. Load team needed/available

vii. Contact, name, numbers, e-mail

d. Transportation

i. Vehicles needed/available

1. Lodging to airfield

2. Rentals

3. Security forces

4. AFOSI

ii. Contact, name, numbers, e-mail

e. Lodging

i. Quarters needed/available

1. Government

2. Contract

3. Field Conditions

f. Tents/generators/ECUs

I. Swift BEAR

g. Showers

h. Fuel

i. Contact, name, numbers, e-mail

i. Messing

i. Dining facilities

ii. MREs

iii. Contact, name, numbers, e-mail

j. Communications

i. Secure communications

ii. Communications phones/DSN/internet

iii. Contact, name, numbers, e-mail

k. Weather

i. Contact, name, numbers, e-mail

l. Aircraft Rescue Fire Fighting (ARFF) old CRF

i. Equipment needed/available

ii. Contact, name, numbers, e-mail

j. Security

i. Base/perimeter

ii. Ramp

iii. Lodging

k. Others

i. Finance

ii. Contracting

iii. POL

iv. Medical

v. Safety

vi. Supply

vii. CE

viii. PA

ix. JA

Contact, name, numbers, e-mail for all above.

ATTACHMENT 4

FORCE PROTECTION AND INTELLIGENCE CELL SUPPORT TO CONTINGENCY RESPONSE FORCES

A4.1 Intelligence. Intel personnel serve the commander directly by providing intelligence preparation of the battlefield focusing on potential impact to both ground and aviation assets within the operating area. Consider terrorist, criminal, medical, military, and foreign intelligence threats. Intelligence personnel will:

- Prior to deployment, establish communications with rear supporting intelligence agencies for RFI submittal/support.
- Provide mapping, imagery, and document support for CRF operations.
- Maintain isolated personnel reports (ISOPREPs) and assist ISOPREP review upon deployment tasking.
- Request threat assessment, general intelligence overview (e.g., political, military, economic), airfield summary, classified maps, and analysis of friendly forces from intelligence flight (AFOSI, Intel).
- Provide SIPRNET capability via Global Rapid Response Intelligence Package (GRRIP) and secure voice communications via Iridium, within 4 hours of arrival at deployed site.
- Provide intelligence updates to leaders during CRF commander updates and shift changes.
- Provide intelligence updates to SF personnel during guard mounts/shift changes.
- Provide intelligence support for planning off-base patrols, CPE operations, overland cargo or personnel movement or other CRF operations outside the airbase perimeter.
- Provide limited aircrew support to include MISREP generation and step brief.
- Identify potential threats to CRF personnel, equipment, aircraft and resources.
- Report relevant intelligence matters to CRF commander and HHQ through daily intelligence reports.
- Forward any time sensitive intelligence immediately to the CRF commander.
- Keep an updated threat tracking display containing all major incidents and the current threat picture in the local area.
- Coordinate with SF, AFOSI, medical (as needed), and CE (as needed) to form a fusion cell.

A4.2 Security Forces. CRF security force personnel provide initial force protection and physical security for Air Force resources supporting CRF operations and 24-hour security for an aircraft parking area up to a Level II threat. These forces may need augmentation in uncertain threat environments. They provide armed close defense of Air Force assets: by flight line detection and response teams; facilitate seamless reception of follow-on security forces; establish security forces link between CRF, host nation, coalition forces, and sister services; and coordinate for the patrol of the “ramp and camp” as well as protect aircraft transiting the airbase. General responsibilities include the following:

- Contact HHQ SF, AFOSI, CRF AFOSI, CRF Intel, CRF commander, RSO, deployed location FP representative prior to deployment to gather information and coordinate initial FP requirements.
- Oversee generation of an initial force protection plan OPORD to formalize initial integrated defense planning and execution requirements. The officer in charge (OIC) will normally prepare the initial FP Plan prior to CRF arrival at the deployed location and then update it as required after the airbase assessment.
- Coordinate FP requirements with the gaining joint force commander(s) and facilitate reception of follow-on forces.
- Establish field armory to accept and account for weapons and ammunition from CRF and attached personnel (as required).
- Establish DFPs and determine manning requirements.
- Establish communications with all joint/coalition security forces.
- Establish procedures for entry control and vehicle search.
- Provide firepower for area suppression and runway denial.
- Provide 24-hour rapid response capability for any emergency situation.
- Assist Intelligence personnel in updating base map and threat tracking board.

A4.3 Air Force Office of Special Investigations. AFOSI personnel provide a fast, flexible global response force protection capability, consisting of antiterrorism, counterintelligence collections, and investigative service equipment, to support USAF and/or DOD force protection operations. AFOSI personnel will:

- Identify and mitigate potential threats (criminal, terrorist, foreign intelligence and security services, and MANPADS) to CRF personnel, equipment, and resources.
- Perform assessments of airfield(s), hotels, routes of travel, and surrounding areas to identify potential vulnerabilities and threats.
- Conduct human source operations to identify and mitigate potential threats.
- Conduct liaison with US counterparts and host nation police, military, and intelligence officials.
- Conduct protective service operations for visiting dignitaries.
- Report all intelligence matters to CRF commander and national intelligence community through the appropriate reporting channels.
- Act as primary liaison with RSO as required.

A4.4 Intelligence Fusion Cell (IFC). The IFC provides the base defense force with analyzed or vetted all-source information that drives effective force protection decisions and operations. The IFC is inherently multi-disciplined but does not need to possess all capabilities locally. Many of these capabilities can be obtained through theater and strategic reachback. Manning of this cell should minimally consist of SF, intelligence, and OSI specialists. The fusion cell will:

- Collect and analyze pertinent information to support force protection missions.

- Facilitate threat working group (TWG) meetings as required to evaluate all threats to the base, personnel and/or CRF assets. TWG members will normally include representatives from intelligence, security forces, Office of Special Investigations, medical, GLO, civil engineering (when required), communications (when required). The TWG will:
  - Convene as needed or immediately when intelligence indicates potential increased threat to base.
  - Compile, compare, and evaluate all threat-related intelligence and information; and present recommended force protection measures to the commander.

PRELIMINARY FORCE PROTECTION QUESTIONNAIRE:

1. Have the deploying members received a FP/Intel Brief with current threat and country-specific information? **YES/NO**

2. Has the deploying team chief spoken with the Embassy Force Protection Contact for the trip-specific country information? **YES/NO**

Embassy Force Protection Contact (force protection detachment [FPD], DAO, regional security officer [RSO]):_____

Embassy Force Protection Contact (FPD, DAO, RSO): Phone: _____

Embassy Force Protection Contact (FPD, DAO, RSO): E-mail: _____

---OR---

Have the deploying members and team chief been briefed by the CRF AFOSI for the above info? **YES/NO**

AFOSI agent name contacted: _____
Phone: _____
E-mail: _____

3. Do deploying members have adequate civilian clothes if uniforms become or are a force protection issue? **YES/NO**

4. Do deploying members have NON MILITARY ID credentials and a convincing civilian equivalent title to use in a dangerous situation requiring subtlety? **YES/NO**

5. According to the Embassy Force Protection Contact/AFOSI, is the personnel threat large enough to necessitate weapons? **YES/NO** (Contact CRW SF immediately if Yes)

6. According to the Embassy Force Protection Contact/AFOSI, is there a significant personnel threat to necessitate bulletproof vests? **YES/NO** (Contact CRW SF if Yes)

7. Is transportation being coordinated through the Embassy Country Team? **YES/NO**

8. Is there a scheduled in-brief with the Embassy Country Team to confirm/adjust safe havens, transportation, and personal protection? **YES/NO**

Prior to Deployment, ensure all members have current force protection publications and have the appropriate personal protection equipment.

ATTACHMENT 5

EXAMPLE ORM FOR CRF

OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT (ORM)

The CRG mission and our daily routines involve risk. All operations, both on and off-duty, require decisions that include risk assessment as well as risk management. Each commander, DO, team chief and supervisor, along with every individual, is responsible for identifying potential risks and adjusting or compensating appropriately. Risk decisions must be made at a level of responsibility that corresponds to the degree of risk, taking into consideration the significance of the mission and the timeliness of the required decision. Risk should be identified using the same disciplined, organized, and logical thought processes that govern all other aspects of military endeavors. Our aim is to increase mission success while reducing the risk to personnel and resources to the lowest practical level in both on- and off-duty environments.

NOTE: The ORM process may not be used to violate directives or other regulatory guidance. Normal waiver or variance procedures must be followed in all cases. When conditions/time/manpower/equipment constraints exist that preclude following regulatory guidance, the ORM process should be used as an interim measure to mitigate the hazards to the best level possible for accomplishing the mission, while following the guidance as closely as permissible.

PRINCIPALS OF OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT (ORM)

Four principles govern all actions associated with risk management. These continuously employed principles are applicable before, during, and after all tasks and operations.

1. Accept No Unnecessary Risk. Unnecessary risk comes without a commensurate return in terms of real benefits or available opportunities. All CRG missions and our daily routines involve risk.

2. Make Risk Decisions at the Appropriate Level. Making risk decisions at the appropriate level establishes clear accountability. Those accountable for the success or failure of the mission must be included in the risk decision process. Anyone can make a risk decision; however, the appropriate level for risk decisions is the one that can allocate the resources to reduce the risk or eliminate the hazard and implement controls.

3. Accept Risk When Benefits Outweigh the Costs. All identified benefits should be compared to all identified costs. The process of weighing risks against opportunities and benefits helps to maximize unit capability.

4. Integrate ORM into Air Force Doctrine and Planning at All Levels. To apply risk management effectively, CRG personnel must dedicate time and resources to incorporate risk management principles into the planning processes. Risks are more easily accessed and managed in the planning stages of an operation.

RISK MANAGEMENT GOALS

The ultimate objective of a CRG is to maximize operational capabilities. The fundamental goal of risk management is to enhance mission effectiveness at all levels while preserving assets and safeguarding the health and welfare of all personnel. Beyond reducing loss, risk management also provides a logical process to identify/exploit opportunities that provide the greatest return on investment of time, dollars, and personnel. The hierarchy below illustrates the crucial framework for defining risk management.

SIX-STEP PROCESS OF OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT

1. Identify the Hazard.

A hazard can be defined as any real or potential condition that can cause mission degradation, injury, illness, death to personnel or damage to or loss of equipment or property. Experience, common sense, and specific risk management tools help identify real or potential hazards.

1.1 Identify hazards associated with these three categories:

a. Mission Degradation

b. Personal Injury or Death

c. Property Damage

2. Assess the Risk.

Risk is the probability and severity of loss from exposure to the hazard. The assessment step is the application of quantitative or qualitative measures to determine the level of risk associated with a specific hazard. This process defines the probability and severity of a mishap that could result from the hazard based upon the exposure of personnel or assets to that hazard.

2.1 Identify levels of probability of loss within these five categories:

a. Frequent
b. Likely
c. Occasional
d. Seldom
e. Unlikely

2.2 Identify the level of severity of mission impact according to these four categories:

a. Catastrophic
b. Critical
c. Moderate
d. Negligible

3. Analyze Risk Control Measures.

Investigate specific strategies and tools that reduce, mitigate, or eliminate the risk. Effective control measures reduce or eliminate one or more of the three components (i.e., probability, severity, or exposure) of risk.

4. Make Control Decisions.

Decision makers at the appropriate level choose the best control or combination of controls based on the analysis of overall costs and benefits. For each identified hazard, select those risk controls that will reduce the risk to an acceptable level. **The best controls will be consistent with mission objectives and optimum use of available resources (e.g., manpower, material, equipment, money, and time).**

5. Implement Risk Controls.

Once control strategies have been selected, an implementation strategy needs to be developed and then applied by management and the work force. Implementation requires commitment of time and resources.

6. Supervise and Review.

Risk management (RM) is a process that continues throughout the life cycle of the system, mission, or activity. Leaders at every level must fulfill their respective roles in assuring controls are sustained over time. Once controls are in place, the process must be periodically reevaluated to ensure their effectiveness. Look to see what effect the control measures has had on mission performance the control measure was designed to improve.

CRG ORM PROCESS

Each engagement, tasking, or event will be assessed using the CRG approved ORM assessment worksheet. The ORM assessment worksheet should be used throughout the planning, deployment, and roll-up process by the team chief. Additional high-risk elements identified by the deployment team throughout the deployment should be recorded on the blank risk chart and assessed accordingly. The benefit of this process is to aid in the identification of high-risk factors and to implement control measures. It will also be used to elevate high-risk deployments to a higher level of command visibility.

Note: The approval authority for the various levels of risk required is indicated below the ORM ORM assessment worksheet. The intent is to gain an objective review of the ORM *separate* from the planner/team chief for that deployment.

Certain sections of the ORM assessment worksheet may be pre-assessed by the DO, DOT, DOO, and DOV flights. Mission commanders, team leads, or designated representative, will ensure completion and retains final concurrence before departing home station. Mission commanders and team leads will brief ORM principles and mitigation efforts before departing home station during the pre- departure commander's brief, and during the team predeparture brief. Mission commanders and team leads will monitor and continuously implement ORM during mission execution. If ORM elements not currently on the ORM assessment worksheet are identified during mission execution, they will be annotated on the back of the worksheet.

The original copy of the ORM assessment worksheet will be kept with the squadron RM monitor for archiving in the squadron RM program continuity binder. DOO will make copies for themselves and the Mission Folder.

CRG ORM ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

MISSION NAME:			TYPE:		DATES:		
LOCATION:			PLANNER:				
ITEM	**LOW RISK**	**Pts**	**Medium Risk**	**Pts**	**High Risk**	**Pts**	**Total**
Deployment Location	US Military/Civilian Base	1	Foreign Military/Civilian Base	3	Bare Base/Other	5	
Material Handling Equipment	Fully Meets Tasking	1	Adequate	3	Inadequate	5	
Scheduled Duty Day	< 10 Hours	1	10 to 12 Hours	3	>12 Hours	5	
Crash, Fire, Rescue	100% of Req'd	1	< 100% > 50% Req'd	3	<50% Req'd	5	
Airfield/Flight Operations	Controlled Airfield	1	Uncontrolled Airfield	3	Dirt Strip	5	
Airfield Security	100% of Req'd	1	<100% > 50% Req'd	3	< 50% Req'd	5	
Airfield Survey	< 2 years	1	> 2 years	3	No Survey	5	
Lodging	Military	1	Contract	3	Bare Base	5	
CRG Team Chief Experience	High Extensive barebase and contingency experience	1	Moderate Some barebase and contingency experience	3	Low No barebase and contingency experience	5	
Operations Officer Experience	High Extensive barebase and contingency experience	1	Moderate Some barebase and contingency experience	3	Low No barebase and contingency experience	5	
Operations Non-commissioned Officer Experience	High Extensive barebase and contingency experience	1	Moderate Some barebase and contingency experience	3	Low No barebase and contingency experience	5	
Load Master/ Ramp Coordinator Experience	High Extensive barebase and contingency experience	1	Moderate Some barebase and contingency experience	3	Low No barebase and contingency experience	5	
Maintenance Experience	High Extensive barebase and contingency experience	1	Moderate Some barebase and contingency experience	3	Low No barebase and contingency experience	5	
COMM/NAV/AGE Experience	High Extensive barebase and contingency experience	1	Moderate Some barebase and contingency experience	3	Low No barebase and contingency experience	5	
Aerial Port Experience	High Extensive barebase and contingency experience	1	Moderate Some barebase and contingency experience	3	Low No barebase and contingency experience	5	
Last Unit Deployment	< 6 months	1	> 6 months < 1 year	3	> 1 year	5	
Personnel in Training per Unit Type Codes	10% or less	1	11% to 25%	3	> 25%	5	
Deployment Type	Training	1	Exercise	3	Contingency	5	
Unusual Conditions*	None	1	Location/other	3	Location/mission	5	
Type Operations	Daylight only	1	Day/Night < 24 Hours	3	24 hours	5	
Threat Assessment	Low	1	Medium	3	High	5	
					TOTALS		
					APPROVAL INITIALS		

*Engine running on/offloads, night vision goggles, weather, host nation considerations, etc.

Score	**Risk Level**	**Approval Level**
21-48	**Low**- Use normal caution	Deployed Team Chief
49-77	**Caution**- Increased vigilance needed, consult higher authority for mission approval guidance	CRG/CC, or GSS/CC as applicable
78-105	**High**- Safety at risk; consult higher authority for mission approval/guidance	CRW/CC

LEGEND:
CRG - contingency response group
CRW - contingency response wing
GSS - global support squadron

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ATTACHMENT 6

HOST BASE CHECKLIST

1. Location:

   A. Arrival contact_____ Phone Number_____

   B. Airfield Survey (18 AF/A3M, GDSS, National Imagery and Mapping Agency [NIMA]): YES / NO

   C. Airfield Suitability/Summary of Airfield Restrictions: YES / NO

   D. Concept of Operations: YES / NO

   E. Foreign Clearance Guide; https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/fcg YES / NO

2. Facilities:

   A. Contact Name_____ Phone Number_____

   B. Buildings Available:

      1. Number of buildings available_____

      2. Rooms available_____

      3. Location on airfield_____

      C. Is there a secure area to brief inbound personnel: YES / NO

   D. Is there a place to store classified material (w/24 hr coverage): YES / NO

   E. Place to store weapons (w/24 hr coverage): YES / NO

3. Aircraft Support:

   A. Contact Name_____ Phone Number_____

      1. Airfield Operating Hours_____, and who authorizes deviations from operating hours?_____

      2. Weight Bearing Capacity (lowest in usable areas)_____ and who may grant WBC waivers?_____

      3. Parking Max on Ground (MOG):

      C-5_____ C-130_____ C-17_____

      KC-10_____ KC-135_____

      Other _____

   B. Spots marked: YES / NO

      For what type aircraft_____

   C. Grounding points available: YES / NO

   D. Ramp lighting available: YES / NO

E. Specific taxi routes for AMC aircraft: YES / NO

Specific taxi information_____

F. Hazardous cargo parking available: YES / NO

Limitations_____

G. Last airfield survey_____

H. Fuel:

1. Contact name_____ Phone number_____

2. Type of fuel available: ____JP4 ____JP5 ____JP8__JET A ____ Other

3. Storage capacity and resupply capability_____

4. Number of trucks/pumping rate_____

5. Turn time (plane to tanks back to plane)_____

6. Number of Pits/Transfer rate_____

7. Number of fuels personnel_____

8. Method of payment (e.g., identaplate, AF Form 15, *United States Air Force Invoice*, cash)_____

I. Maintenance equipment available:

____ -86 ____ -95 ____ -60 ____ MC-1A ____ MC-2A

____ NF-2 ____ TF-1 ____ B1 ____ B2 ____ B4 ____ B5

____ LOX ____ Heater ____ Fire Bottles ____ MA-1A

____ Snow Removal (plows) ____ Deicers ____ Amount of fluid available_____

Other _____

4. Cargo Handling:

A. MHE Available:

1. Forklifts:____10K standard ____10K AT forklift_____Other

2. Rollerized Tines YES/NO

3. K-Loaders: ___25K ___40K ___60K

4. Wide-Body: ___ Cochran ___Wilson ___Atlas

5. Wide-Body Air Stairs: YES / NO

6. Highline roller system: YES / NO

7. Truck loading dock: YES / NO

8. Dunnage available: YES / NO

9. 463L pallets available: YES / NO

10. Nets available: YES / NO

11. Scales: YES / NO

12. Flatbed trailer/tractor: YES / NO

5. User Information:

A. Contact Name_____ Phone Number_____

B. Type of Loads:

1. Download. Rolling Stock _____ Pallets_____ PAX_____

2. Upload. Rolling Stock _____ Pallets _____ PAX_____

3. Special requirements_____

C. A/DACG Contact_____ Phone Number_____

6. Transportation:

A. Contact name_____ Phone number_____

B. Vehicles available:

1. Buses: 29 PAX____ 44 PAX____ Drivers/Shift_____/___ Metro___ Sedan____ Station Wagons ____ Other_____

2. Rentals available: YES / NO

3. AF Form 9, *Request for Purchase*/AF Form 616 allowed: YES / NO

4. MOGAS available: YES / NO

5. Diesel available: YES / NO

7. Billeting:

A. Contact name_____ Phone number_____

B. Government quarters available: YES / NO Singles_____ Doubles_____

C. Contract/commercial quarters available: YES / NO Singles_____ Doubles_____ Distance from base_____

D. Field conditions: YES / NO Tents provided by_____

E. Is augmentation required: YES / NO

F. Cost/method of payment_____

8. Messing:

A. Contact name_____ Phone number_____

B. Dining Hall: YES / NO

C. Clubs: Officers _____ Enlisted_____ Hours_____ Will extend hours YES/NO

9. Communications:

A. Contact name_____ Phone number_____

B. Class A/C phones available: YES / NO

C. DSN available: YES / NO

D. Extra lines available: YES / NO

E. Base Frequency Manager_____ Phone number_____

F. Message address_____

G. Cell phones available: YES / NO

10. Base Support:

A. Contact name_____ Phone number_____

B. Weather support: YES / NO Hours_____ Verify availability with 618 ACO (TACC) weather: _____

C. Crash, Fire, Rescue: YES / NO Hours_____ Equipment: P4____ P19_____ P13/20_____ Other_____

11. Manpower and Material: Number Equipment

A. CADRE _____ _____

B. APS _____ _____

C. MX _____ _____

D. Finance Contractor _____ _____

E. Intelligence/AFOSI _____ _____

F. Weather _____ _____

G. Fuels _____ _____

H. Medical _____ _____

I. Safety _____ _____

J. Supply _____ _____

K. CE _____ _____

L. Crash, Fire, Rescue _____ _____

M. Communications _____ _____

N. Security Forces _____ _____

O. Misc. _____ _____ _____

_____ _____ _____ _____

Notes:

ATTACHMENT 7

EXAMPLE TEAM CHIEF MISSION PLANNING CHECKLIST

1. Appoint lead mission planner/team chief (TC) and functional leaders.
2. Review AMT and validate mission requirements.
3. Perform cursory mission analysis:
   - What is the in place date? Duration?
   - Review the supported combatant commander's reporting instructions.
   - Review WARNORD, EXORD, DEPORD.
   - Who will be exercising OPCON and TACON of the deployed unit?
   - Request threat assessment, general intelligence overview (e.g., political, military, economic), airfield summary, satellite imagery, maps, and analysis of friendly forces from intelligence flight. (AFOSI, Intel, SF, CE)
   - What type of attack, major accident, incident, or disaster potential exists? (AFOSI, Intel, SF)
   - Contact base legal to receive SOFA for deployed location.
   - Determine general in place support.
4. Establish CRG commander intent.
5. What UTCs should be tasked (full CRG, CRE); review CRG construct by UTC.
6. Provide direction for Lead Mission Planner.
   - Establish general timeline.
   - Establish next meeting time?
7. Ensure mission planning meeting is conducted by mission planner.
8. Receive mission analysis brief.
9. Approve M&M.
10. Consider sending a ADVON team (if time permits) to:
    - Get ADVON team's cell, iridium or other contact numbers.
11. Determine command and control relationships and ensure entire CRG is informed.
12. Are there any PA considerations/ROE? (OPR: PA)
    - Embedded media.
    - Does PA member need to be included in FM1? If so, inform mission planner.
13. Consider additional force protection issues:
    - If able, establish threat working group prior to departure.
    - What is the ROE for use of deadly force?
14. Ensure beddown issues have been identified by the BOS-I. What issues need to be elevated?
15. Ensure communications plan has been developed by the BOS-I. Conduct review and

authorize plan.

16. Conduct status update meeting to ensure requested manpower and material has been tasked.
17. Establish anticipated work priorities on arrival.
18. Establish predicted work rest cycles and shift change procedures.
19. Review load plans to ensure correct arrival sequencing/spacing of personnel and equipment.
20. Have any LIMFACS been identified by the mission planning team?
21. Ensure safety personnel have been appointed and can cover full working period.
22. Receive EXORD.
23. Complete and sign ORM checklist.
24. Conduct EXORD brief to wing commander or delegate responsibility.
25. Conduct pre-departure brief.

ATTACHMENT 8

MISSION PLANNING AND ANALYSIS GUIDE

MISSION PLANNING CELL CHECKLIST

1) Coordinate equipment UTCs with owning unit

2) Focal point for completion of Host Base Checklist

3) Develop hard crew list

a) Identify shortfalls/augmentees

4) Determine personnel/equipment transportation mode/itinerary (Commercial Air, MILAIR, line haul)

5) Develop personnel/equipment priority, bump plan, chalks

a) Identify troop commanders

6) Determine/schedule deployment processing requirements in conjunction with plans and programs

a) Folders scrubbed?

b) DSOE published/validated?

c) Deployments requirements manning document (DRMD) scrubbed?

7) Ensure equipment marshaled in accordance with DSOE

8) Forward team chief (TC)-approved Manpower and Material Package to 618 AOC (TACC)

9) Review foreign clearance guide and/or theater reporting instructions and ensure compliance

10) Request/confirm airlift (if required)

11) Review load plans and submit for TC approval

12) Review personnel/team deployment eligibility, submit waiver letters as required (Reference: AFI 10-403; see item 30 in MISSION PLANNER CHECKLIST/MISSION ANALYSIS GUIDE)

13) Assist TC prepare and set up pre-departure brief

14) Ensure personnel deploy with training folders/material

MISSION PLANNER CHECKLIST/MISSION ANALYSIS GUIDE

1) Roll Call

2) Review mission planning process

3) Identify administrative assistant

a) Builds mission analysis brief

b) Collect RFIs

c) Assists MPC Chief

4) Intelligence brief

5) Review tasking

6) Initial assessment

a) Do the tasked UTCs meet mission requirements?

7) Data Collection-tasked area bring multiple copies (review host base checklist)

a) Airfield data-Airfield Manager/Operations

- Airfield survey
- Giant Report
- AMC Form 174
- NOTAMs
- Applicable flight information publication (FLIP)
- CFR

b) Base support-CE, supply, POL, finance, contracting

- Fuel
- Water
- Food
- Existing base support plans (BSP)
- HN support
- Ice
- Body bags
- Waste removal
- Dining

c) Foreign clearance guide/Theater reporting instructions

- Country and theater clearance

d) Review State Department web site

e) Imagery-Intel/CE

- Continent

- Country
- City
- Airfield

f) Intel/AFOSI

- NGOs
- Cultural issues (religion/race/historical)
- Political issues
- Local and national leadership profiles
- Review country handbooks
- FPCON considerations (Criminal/Terrorist threat)

g) Medical

- Immunization requirements
- Diseases
- HN medical support

h) SOFA/ROE-

i) Climatology-

j) Equipment status-Operations Officer

- Shortfalls
- Equipment documentation
- Specialized equipment

k) Data Collection Review-MPC Chief

- LIMFACS
- RFIs
- Additional capabilities required (MHE, CFR, riot gear, NBC)

8) Finalize mission analysis brief

9) Perform mission analysis brief (then return to this checklist for additional details)

10) Confirm communications requirements

11) Submit frequency request-(communications)

12) Confirm C2SID received

13) Complete M&M

14) Initiate equipment preparation/operational checks-(All)

15) Communications plan-(CP, communications, ATC, SF)

a) Call signs

b) Communications card/chatter marks (CRG chatter marks, code words)

c) LMR distribution: Allocate radios to functional teams

d) Notify communications about deployed e-mail requirements

16) COMSEC requirements identified and material picked up-(communications, operations NCO)

17) Determine weapons, munitions, and cleaning supplies requirements-(SF)

a) Identify weapons couriers

b) Bulk ship/individual issue

c) M9 vs. M16 (both)

d) Armory/storage (consider en route stops/prior coordination w/en routes)

18) Determine equipment transportation requirements

19) Personnel travel arrangements

20) Develop load plans for the planned airlift. Determine HAZMAT, passengers, and pallet restrictions (aisle ways and height)-(aerial port)

21) Review load plans for proper prioritized equipment and personnel for load-plan sequencing

a) Are security forces on the first chalks?

b) Are security forces and their equipment deployed on the same chalks?

c) Has bump plans been developed?

d) Has a proper mix of capabilities on initial chalks been developed to mitigate maintenance/weather diverts?

e) Does the ADVON have any recommendations for aircraft chalk sequence (personnel and equipment) based on existing situation and conditions?

22) Prepare shipper's declarations and hazardous cargo paperwork-(aerial port)

23) Build pallets and marshal equipment-(aerial port, Operations O)

24) Request/confirm airlift

25) Review lodging plan (consider en route stops)-(PERSCO)

26) Review beddown plan options for expected field conditions-(CE)

27) Review CE plan for operating location layout-(CE)

28) Vehicle plan (VCO)-(LRO)

29) Finalize load plans, shipper's declarations, and hazardous cargo certification-(aerial port, Operations O)

30) Review personnel/team deployment eligibility-(Operations O, PERSCO) Reference: AFI 10-403

a) Review ancillary training currency (e.g., small arms marksmanship training, chemical warfare training)

b) Medical (e.g., physicals, dental appointments, eye wear)

c) DAV codes (e.g., permanent change of station/permanent change of assignment, retirement/separation)

d) Impending status changes (promotion, reenlistment)

e) Testing (Weighted Airman Promotion System, Fitness Assessment)

f) Shortfalls/substitutions/specialized personnel

g) Mobility Folder/PDF Checklist

31) Determine/schedule deployment processing requirements

a) Personnel resources files (PRF) scrubbed?

b) DSOE published/validated?

c) DRMD scrubbed?

32) Mobility bag requirements-tailor document to meet deployment requirements

33) Have personnel fill-out pre-deployment health assessment (DD Form 2795, *Pre-Deployment Health Assessment*)?

34) Set up and coordinate pre-departure briefing-(Operations O)

35) Prepare PA statement for distribution; work with Wing PA to establish

36) Complete and sign ORM checklist-(TC)

37) Conduct pre-departure brief-(TC)

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ATTACHMENT 9
PRE-DEPARTURE BRIEFING

Figure A9.1 Pre-Departure Briefing Example

These slides are included within the AFTTP 3-4.7 Contingency Response book as a file attachment. See PowerPoint file attachment "Pre-Departure Briefing Slides."

1. Establish a date, time and place for the CRG/CRE pre-departure briefing. As a minimum, representatives from the following functional areas should attend:
   - AMS
   - User
   - SFS
   - Base Operating Support (e.g., Prime RIBS, BEEF, transportation, services)
   - Aerial Port
   - Contracting
   - AFOSI/Intel
   - Maintenance
2. Introduction of staff.
   - Mission commander

- CRG/CRE commander
- Operations Officers
- CRT Chief
- Operations NCO
- Maintenance Supervisors
- Aerial Port Supervisors
- First Sergeant
- Safety
- Security Coordinator
- Flight Surgeon
- Medical Team Chief
- Host Base Commander
- Host Base Security Officer

3. Explanation of what a CRG/CRE is.
   - Mission
   - All elements now make up the CRG/CRE (one team)
4. Purpose of the deployment.
   - Exercise/Operation name
   - Review applicable ROE
   - Classification
   - Background information
   - Participating units
5. Location.
   - Type base
   - Geographic location
   - Weather
   - Working condition/shifts
6. Timing.
   - Deployment of support forces
     a. Mission number
     b. Type aircraft
     c. Date/time of departure
     d. Show time/location
   - Expected return date

7. Flow schedule.
   - Missions per day
   - MOG
   - Type loads
     a. Onload/Offload/EROs
     b. Personnel/Equipment
     c. Airdrop

8. Personal equipment (ensure compliance with any AOR reporting instructions as provided by Personnel Readiness Unit on orders).
   - Uniform
   - Civilian clothes and specific wear requirements
   - Tool boxes
   - Other pro gear
   - Documents
     a. ID card
     b. Line badge
     c. Shot records
     d. Dog tags
     e. Passports/Visas
     f. Military and International Driver's License
     g. Training record
     h. Medical records
     i. Small Arms Qualification card
     j. Protective equipment
     k. A/B/C/E Bags
     l. Weapons
   - Protective Equipment
     a. Goggles
     b. Gloves
     c. Hearing protections
     d. Reflective gear
     e. Flak vests

9. Equipment.

- Unit deployed
  - a. AGE
  - b. MHE
  - c. WRSK
  - d. Vehicles
  - e. Communications
- Host base provided
- Contracted

10. Billeting/Messing.
    - On/Off base
    - Type
    - Method of payment
11. Professional conduct.
    - Uniform
    - Haircuts
    - Respect for officers (foreign included)
    - Saluting
    - DVs
    - Personal conduct
      - a. Foreign Clearance Guide
      - b. Uniform restrictions
      - c. Customs requirements
      - e. Drinking, drugs and consequences
    - Financial responsibility
    - Chain of command
12. Finance.
    - Advance Per Diem
    - Personal Government Charge Card
    - Check cashing/ exchange
      - a. Cash
      - b. Traveler's Checks
      - c. Authorized Exchange
    - Travel voucher
13. Orders.

- Accuracy, codes (additional crew members, mission essential ground personnel)
- Cell phone, variations authorized, rental car authorized
- Commercial meals/quarters authorized, bottled water, etc.
- Emergency and special coded

14. Safety.
    - Paramount
    - Flight line
    - Off duty
    - Heat Index/Wind Chill
    - Unique circumstances
15. Security.
    - Threat assessment
    - Forces available
    - Procedures
    - Hardening/Dispersal plan
    - Alarm signals/MOPP levels/FPCONs
    - Anti-terrorism procedures
16. Processing line.
    - Time/Place
    - Requirements

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ATTACHMENT 10
EXAMPLE MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEF

Figure A10.1 Example Mission Analysis Brief

These slides are included within the AFTTP 3-4.7 Contingency Response book as a file attachment. See PowerPoint file attachment “Mission Analysis Briefing Slides.”

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ATTACHMENT 11
FUEL CHECKLISTS

Table A11.1 621 CRW POL Checklist 1 Fuel Spill

621 Contingency Response Wing (CRW) FUEL SPILL Checklist 621 CRW/POL CL-01	OPR		Date
Item	**Yes**	**No**	**N/A**
I. An area less than two feet in any plane dimension (direction).			
II. An area no over 10 feet in any plane dimension, or not over 50 square feet and not of a continuing nature.			
III. An area over 10 feet in any plane dimension or over 50 square feet in total area or of a continuing nature.			
1. Record date/time: _____/_____ 2. Record time of discovery: _____			
3. Name/origin of caller_____			
4. Spill Class: _____ Amount spilled _____ gallons/pounds			
5. Location/movement of spill_____			
6. Cause of spill_____ _____			
7. Call:			
7a. Fire department (x2451/2628)			
7b. Tower			
8. Class I or II spills, notify the following:			
8a. In-Garrison - Fuels control center (x2771/4780/24 HRS)			
8b. Deployed - Notify Tactical/Joint Operation Control Center (TOC/JOC), AFPET, and MAJCOM NOTE: Escalation of response will be made by Fire Chief. For Class III spill, Fire Dept will call it out over the Primary Crash Net.			
9. Class III, notify the following:			
9a. In-Garrison - Fuels control center (x2771/4780/24 hours)			
9b. Deployed - Notify Tactical/Joint Operations Control Center (TOC/JOC), AFPET, and applicable major command (MAJCOM)			
10. Confirm checklist complete.			
11. Printed name:_____ Completion:_____(Day)/_____(Month)/_____(Time)			
12. 621 CRW/Fuels Personnel (2F) will report all fuel spills/leaks to HQ AMC/A4RP by verbal notification same day of spill/leak with follow-on e-mail message, providing details of spill/leak prior to placing spill report in AFPET Mishap Reporter. Additionally, deployed Fuels personnel will send advisory message or e-mail to MAJCOM/LGRP within 30 days on outcome of investigation/lessons learned. AFPET MISHAP REPORTER WEBSITE ADDRESS: https://afpet.ft-belvoir.af.mil/mishapreporter2/Login.aspx?ref=/mishapreporter2/Default.aspx			

Table A11.2 621 CRW POL Checklist 2 Fuels Predeparture

621 Contingency Response Wing Fuels PRE-DEPLOYMENT Checklist 621 CRW/POL CL-02	**OPR**		**Date**
Item	Yes	No	N/A
Tasked UTC: JFA7M Tasked Equipment: JFASD, JFDGF			
1. N+0			
Alert Notification and pre-departure briefing.			
Pack personal bags. Determine if civilian clothes are required/allowed by deployed commander.			
2. N+1			
Determine fuel requirements for mission.			
Review information on deployed location. Determine in-place fuel capabilities.			
3. N+2			
Verify fuels equipment unit type codes (UTC) are prepared for shipment.			
Contact 87th Logistics Readiness Squadron (LRS/LGRM) (609-754-2678) to have equipment items placed in deployed status.			
4. N+3			
Get mobility folder from Readiness shop prior to processing time.			
Withdraw required bags from Supply Warehouse as specified in mission brief.			
Deliver bags to designated pallet assembly area.			
Ensure continuity book(s) and disk (w/AFIs and Forms) is on your person. (pre-positioned in office.)			
Notify unit leadership on status of equipment.			

Table A11.3 621 CRW POL Checklist 3 Fuels Arrival

621 Contingency Response Wing Fuels ARRIVAL Checklist 621 CRW/POL CL-03	OPR		Date
Item	**Yes**	**No**	**N/A**
Tasked UTCs: JFA7M, JFASD (500 gallon fuel blivet), JFDGF (Fuels laboratory kit)			
1. Establish suitable location to place JFASD pallet. Ensure enough space is available to allow approach/departure of heavy equipment. Place a safe distance from living quarters.			
2. Contact local fuel suppliers. Make arrangements for fuel re-supply. Determine capability of local suppliers to deliver jet fuel.			
3. Determine, in consultation with civil engineering (CE), a suitable location for follow-on fuel equipment and storage facility, if applicable. Ensure location has easy access to flight line location.			
4. Determine if jet fuel supply is available at location. Perform initial quality assessment of on-hand fuel to ensure supply is within specifications.			
5. Compile and send reporting emergency petroleum, oils, and lubricants (REPOL) IAW AMC Fuels Policy Letter dated 19 Nov 2010 SIPR E-mail Addresses: AMC: amc.a4rp@amc.af.smil.mil ACC: acc/a4lbattlestaff@langley.af.smil.mil CENTAF: A4.pol@auab.aorcentaf.af.smil.mil AFPET: ff9pet1@gccs.af.pentagon.smil.mil USTRANSCOM: tchankls@transcom.smil.mil EUCOM: ECJ4-LS-JPO.PG@EUCOM.SMIL.MIL SOUTHCOM: sandert@hq.southcom.smil.mil Joint Forces Command: j4314@hq.jfcom.smil.mil			
6. Establish working hours, location, and duties to be performed with deployed commander.			
7. Contact A4 representative for region to relay pertinent information.			
8. Assist other functions when necessary.			

Table A11.4 621 CRW POL Checklist 4 JFASD Dispensing

621 Contingency Response Wing Fuels JFASD DISPENSING Checklist 621 CRW/POL CL-04	OPR		Date
Item	**Yes**	**No**	**N/A**
1.Prior to dispensing from JFASD, perform operator inspection.			
2. Ensure spill containment system is in-place and functional. NOTE: Ensure no smoking allowed within 50 feet of servicing area.			
3. Assemble connectors and hoses in desired configuration. Attach 3 strands of safety wire to all camlock stems to secure hose connections.			
4. Attach coupler valve assembly to fabridrum faucet valve. Attach 3 strands of safety wire to camlock stems to secure valve.			
5. Attach hose assembly to coupler valve assembly. Attach 3 strands of safety wire to camlock stems to secure hose connection.			
6. Open coupler valve assembly stem valve to issue fuel.			
7. Operate gas station nozzle. NOTE: Push down on the end of the fabridrum to remove maximum amount of product possible.			
8. When issue is complete, close coupler valve assembly stem valve.			
9. Stow issue hose inside spill containment system to prevent accidental fuel spill.			

Table A11.5 621 CRW POL Checklist 5 Fuels Return

621 Contingency Response Wing Fuels Support RETURN Checklist 621 CRW/POL CL-05	OPR		Date
Item	**Yes**	**No**	**N/A**
Tasked UTCs: JFA7M, JFASD (500 gallon fuel blivet), JFDGF (Fuels laboratory kit)			
1. Ensure all pertinent information is given to follow-on POL troops.			
2. Inventory, clean JFASD and JFDGF kits to ensure all parts are accounted for.			
3. If forward deploying, refill blivet. If returning home, remove as much fuel as possible.			

Table A11.6 621 CRW POL Checklist 6 JFASD Filling

621 Contingency Response Wing Fuels Support RETURN Checklist 621 CRW/POL CL-05	OPR		Date
Item	**Yes**	**No**	**N/A**
1. Prior to dispensing from JFASD, perform operator inspection.			
2. Ensure spill containment system is in-place and functional. NOTE: Ensure no smoking allowed within 50 feet of servicing area.			
3. Remove dust plug from female coupling on pressure control and connect hose to pressure control.			
4. Remove dust cap from male coupling on pressure control and connect hose assembly to pressure control.			
5. Remove dust plugs from coupler valve assembly and close valve by turning handwheel clockwise.			
6. Install 2 inch female side of coupler valve assembly on check valve assembly adapter.			
7. Install main coupler of hose assembly on 2 inch female coupler valve assembly adapter.			
8. Fill fabridrum. NOTE: Ensure fabridrum is secured to pallet to prevent rolling during filling operation. Leave enough slack in straps for expansion.			
8a. Disconnect coupler valve assembly from check valve assembly adapter.			
8b. Turn handwheel counterclockwise two turns to slightly open valve			
8c. Open valve assembly at source of product supply.			
8d. Start product flow.			
8e. Hold coupler assembly over suitable container to catch product.			
8f. Depress and hold pressure control FILL button, until product is dispensed from coupler assembly, indicating all air is purged from system.			
8g. Turn handwheel clockwise until flow of product from coupler valve assembly is stopped. NOTE: Pressure control will close when flow of product is stopped at coupler valve assembly.			
8h. Connect 2 inch female end of coupler valve assembly on check valve assembly adapter.			
8i. Turn handwheel counterclockwise to open valve.			
8j. Push FILL button on pressure control and allow fabridrum to fill.			
8k. When fabridrum is full, close coupler valve assembly by turning handwheel clockwise.			
8l. Disconnect coupler valve assembly from check valve assembly adapter.			
8m. Install dust cap over check valve assembly.			
9. Complete necessary documentation.			
10. Cap and stow all hoses and couplers.			

Table A11.7 621 CRW POL Checklist 7 Fuels Reconstitution

621 Contingency Response Wing Fuels RECONSTITUTION Checklist 621 CRW/POL CL-07	OPR		Date
Item	**Yes**	**No**	**N/A**
Tasked UTCs: JFA7M, JFASD (500 gal fuel blivet), JFDGF (Fuels laboratory kit).			
1. Ensure all pertinent information is given to fellow POL troops.			
2. Inventory, clean JFASD and JFDGF kits to ensure all parts are accounted for. Refill blivet (if needed). Contact 87 LRS/LGRM (609-754-2678) to place equipment items back at home station.			
3. If forward deploying, refill blivet. If returning home, remove as much fuel as possible.			
4. Determine if jet fuel supply is available at location.			
5. Perform initial quality assessment of on-hand fuel to ensure supply is within specifications.			

Table A11.8 621 CRW POL Checklist 8 POL Handoff

621 Contingency Response Wing Fuels Support HANDOFF Checklist 621 CRW/POL CL-08	OPR		Date
Item	**Yes**	**No**	**N/A**
Tasked UTCs: JFA7M, JFASD (500 gal fuel blivet), JFDGF (Fuels laboratory kit).			
1. Receive personnel support for contingency operations (PERSCO) brief: reception, inprocessing, orientation, beddown, and work area.			
2. Pass on aviation and ground fuel resupply points.			
3. Ensure liquid oxygen (LOX)/liquid nitrogen (LIN) availability and procurement.			
4. Brief site layout.			
5. Brief Host Nation Fuels Rep and Support Capabilities on changeover and introduce to new team.			
6. Review reports to On-Scene Commander & higher headquarters (HHQ).			
7. Brief local civil engineering (CE) point of contact on changeover, (e.g., site development, berms) and introduce to new team.			
8. Brief contracting point of contact (POC)- (Cryo procurement, berm construction if CE can’t support).			
9. Review aircraft maintenance procedures, POCs.			
10. Review on-hand fuel supply, storage capacity, resupply method, rate, and status.			
11. Pass on initial fuel quality assessment results (if applicable).			

Table A11.9 621 CRW POL Checklist 9 Blivet Inspection 1 of 2

621 Contingency Response Wing Fuels Support RETURN Checklist 621 CRW/POL CL-05	OPR		Date
Item	**Yes**	**No**	**N/A**
1. [EXTERIOR] Inspect front plate for cracks and evidence of leaks around valve assembly adapter threads.			
2. Inspect rear plate for cracks.			
3. Inspect drum causing for cuts, deterioration, and evidence of leaks.			
4. Inspect shackles for cracks and damaged or missing screws.			
5. Inspect D-rings for distortion or damage.			
6. Inspect swivel plate for cracks and mechanical binding.			
7. Inspect closure ring and bearing plate for cracks and loose or missing cap screws.			
8. Inspect check valve assembly adapter for a broken chain, cracked or missing dust cap, worn check valve assembly body, damaged or missing gasket and ring(s) and evidence of leaking around threads and around check valve assembly.			
9. Inspect pressure control for cracked, loose or missing parts.			
10. Inspect hose assembly for the following: a. Cut, cracked or deteriorated hose. b. Cracked, broken or missing dust cap and dust plug. c. Missing or worn gaskets. d. Broken or missing chains. e. Broken or missing key rings.			
11. Inspect drum fabric for cuts, deterioration, and evidence of leaks. NOTE: Complete wear of rubber coating from fabric does not, in itself, render the drum unserviceable.			
12. Inspect front and rear bearing plates to determine if they are cracked/have loose or missing capscrews.			
13. Inspect front broken or missing evidence of binding.			
14. Inspect front and rear swivel plates for shackles or D-rings and rear closure rings to determine if they are cracked or have any loose or missing cap screws.			
15. Inspect front closure plate for missing pipe plug or stripped threads.			
16. Inspect check valve assembly adapter for stripped threads, broken chain, loose or missing dust cap gasket, and corroded parts.			
17. Inspect coupler valve assembly for loose/missing gaskets, corroded/stuck valve, and cracked/missing parts.			
18. [PRESSURE CONTROL] Inspect pressure control for broken or missing dust plug and dust cap.			
19. Inspect pressure control for cracked body and loose or missing capscrews and nuts.			
20. Inspect pressure control for cracked body and loose or missing capscrews and nuts.			
21. Inspect machine screws and guide shaft to determine if they are bent, cracked, broken, burred or have stripped threads.			

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22. Inspect nut for stripped threads and a burred surface.			
23. Inspect diaphragm and disk to determine if they are cut or deteriorated.			
24. Inspect spring to determine if it is broken or collapsed.			
25. Inspect poppet, spacer, and washers to determine if they are cracked or burred.			
26. Inspect ring, valve body, washer, cycling valve stem, and button to determine if they are chipped or burred. Be certain thread on setscrews, in the button and cycling valve stem are not stripped.			
27. Inspect spring to determine if it is broken or collapsed.			
28. Inspect cover to determine if it is cut or deteriorated.			
29. [PILOT VALVE] Inspect bellow assembly for cracks or breaks.			
30. Inspect burred valve stem or damaged valve stem threads.			
31. [VENTURI] Inspect venturi to determine if it is cracked, burred, or worn.			
32. [MALE/FEMALE COUPLING] inspect male coupling to determine if it is cracked, burred, or leaking.			
33. Inspect male coupling half for damaged or missing dust cap, gasket, chain, or key rings.			
34. Inspect female coupling for damaged or missing dust plug, gasket, chain, or key rings.			

Table A11.10 Fuel Blivet: Initial Fuel Location Checklist

1. Emergency Shutdown Procedures
    a. Press stop button on "Pressure Control Valve"/shut down all pumps
    b. Close all previously opened valves
    c. Notify personnel of emergency
    d. Evacuate unnecessary personnel
    e. Notify local command and fire prevention Stay near site to direct emergency response personnel
    f. Do not resume operation until reason for emergency has been corrected
2. Find suitable site for blivet(s)
    a. 100 feet from inhabited structure
    b. Ensure space is available to allow the approach/departure of heavy equipment
    c. Appropriate site
        - Site should be level
        - Firm
        - Away from low points
3. Ensure serviceable fire extinguisher is present
4. Connect discharge hose to the pressure control regulator
5. Connect the pressure control regulator to the hose assembly
6. Ensure the valve on the coupler valve assembly is closed
7. Install the 2 inch female coupler of the coupler valve assembly on the check valve assembly adapter
8. Install the main coupler of the hose assembly to the 1.5 inch female coupler valve assembly

NOTE: All exposed hose ends or adapters should be covered to prevent contamination.

Table A11.11 Fuel Blivet: Filling Checklist

NOTE: Two person policy required when filling or dispensing fuel with the blivet.

1. Prior to filling JFASD, perform operator inspection
2. Ensure spill containment system is in-place and functional

NOTE: Ensure no smoking allowed within 50 feet of servicing area. Ensure equipment has been inspected prior to operation.

NOTE: Ensure fabridrum is secured to pallet to prevent rolling during filling operation. Leave enough slack in straps for expansion.

3. Connect the coupler valve assembly to the front closure plate
4. Connect hose to the coupler valve assembly
5. Connect hose valve assembly to the pressure control valve
6. Connect adapter to pressure control valve
7. Position refueling unit
8. Bond blivet to fuel source
9. Connect servicing hose to adapter connected to the pressure control valve
10. Turn handwheel counterclockwise two turns to slightly open valve
11. Start product flow. Hold coupler assembly over suitable container to catch product. Press the fill button on the pressure control valve until product is dispensed from coupler assembly, indicating all air is purged from system.

NOTE: Blivet is designed to be filled a very low pressure. Pressure control valve will stop flow when back pressure exceeds 4 to 5 pounds per square inch.

12. Open valve completely, start fuel flow (discharge pressure of refueler will not exceed five pounds per square inch)
13. Cease fuel flow when pressure control shuts off or 350 gallons have been transferred
14. Disconnect from fuel source from adapter
15. Disconnect adapter from pressure control valve
16. Complete any necessary paperwork
17. Ensure fuel source safely leave the area
18. Setup blivet for next operation

Table A11.12 Fuel Blivet: Servicing Checklist

NOTE: Two person policy required when filling or dispensing fuel with the blivet.

1. Assemble connectors and hoses in desired configuration. Attach 3 strands of safety wire to all camlock stems to secure hose connections. Open coupler valve by turning the hand wheel counterclockwise
2. If using pump, start the pump assembly
3. Proceed to dispense product
4. Once complete, turn off pump (if utilized) and close coupler valve
5. Stow issue hose inside spill containment system to prevent accidental fuel spill

WARNING: If dispensing gasoline remove waterproof/all-purpose environmental clothing jacket/pants.

ATTACHMENT 12

SAMPLE HANDOFF (SEIZURE FORCE TO CRG) CHECKLIST

A12.1 Initial Contacts. Establish contact with the land force commander. If following an Army BCT, the assessment team commander or CRF commander will want to make contact with the land force unit commander occupying the airfield for a SITREP. This person may be the BCT commander, BSB commander, BSTB commander, or some other task organized unit's commander.

A12.2 Initial SITREP. The following may be discussed during the initial SITREP, but must be complete prior to the formal battlefield hand over (BHO) between the BCT commander (if possible, or designated rep such as the S3 or XO) and CRF commander.

NOTE: This checklist is intended to be a guide and not meant to be run to completion for all situations. Be mindful of battlefield conditions and use judgment to determine what must be discussed. Make every effort to contact an AMLO first, if one is part of the operation. If the seizure force is still engaged in the fight, do not expect the BCT commander (if Army seizure force) to initially meet CRG commander at the airfield. Expect the commander of seizure force unit occupying airfield to provide initial SITREP. Discussion topics are prioritized to aid with brevity depending on battlefield conditions.

A. Priority 1

1. SITREP (e.g., threat environment, location of the enemy, condition of the airfield or landing zone, sustainment requirements).
   - If yes, do you need additional support to complete the mission?
2. Location of friendly forces.
   - What are fields of fire?
3. Status of the runway/landing zone.
   - Has the airfield been damaged by the operation?
4. Established BDOC or Joint Operations Center (JOC)?
5. Sensors.
   - Ask if not part of the seizure force.
   - Base expeditionary targeting and surveillance system - combined (BETSS-C).
   - Aerostat
6. Configuration/location of seizure force airfield security forces.
   - What are the fields of fire?
7. How can we best integrate with your forces?
8. Signal operating instructions (SOI). Ask if not part of the seizure force. If part of the joint planning process, these would be known. Only if OPSEC is breached would they require a change.
   - Challenge/password
   - Near/far recognition

- Running password
- Number combination

9. Location of casualty collection/evacuation point.
10. Ground communication status.
    - Conduct a communications check on frequency modulation (FM) nets (As required, if not part of the seizure force. Should be completed prior to operation commencement if part of the seizure force).
11. Team notification of threats to the airfield (e.g., while conducting assessment).
12. Deconflict Army Airspace Command and Control of airspace over airfield/LZ.
    - Where/what are the capabilities of artillery and mortars in the airfield environment?
    - What are their SOPs for firing?
    - What is the command net frequency?
    - How do we deconflict fires with inbound/outbound aircraft?
    - Who is the fire direction officer?
    - Who is the fire support officer?

B. Priority 2

1. ROE changes (if any).
2. Seizure force logistical support requirements.
3. Established traffic control points.
    - If no, establish traffic control points
4. Vehicle parking plan (airfield).
5. Environmental concerns.
    - If yes, determine locations

C. Priority 3

1. Type and number of stay-behind forces.
    - Commander
    - NCO in charge
    - Follow-on forces
    - Time allotted on the objective?
    - Command relationship (Army/Air Force)
2. Additional SITREP points of contact.
    - Force protection
    - Civil engineering
    - EOD

- Communications
- Airfield operations (STS)

3. Additional information

NOTE: After the coordination is complete; if the BCT commander was not present, ask that he (or designated rep such as the S3 or XO) be notified, when prudent and conditions on the battlefield are appropriate, of the CRF or assessment team operations.

A12.3 CRF Post Airfield Assessment Actions/Guidelines for BHO.

1. Establish CRF TOC.
2. Verify communications connectivity between CRF TOC and seizure force JOC/TOC.
3. Are necessary repairs complete?
4. Determine seizure force augmentee requirements:
   - Is an additional security detachment required to augment Phoenix Fist?
   - Are additional seizure force augmentees required to service/onload-offload organic service aircraft?
5. CRF assumes airfield management/SAA authority over airfield/LZ.
6. Conduct BHO of airfield internal security from seizure force to CRF Security Forces.
7. Establish ATC/STS hand over.

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ATTACHMENT 13

ALASKA EXTREME TENT SET UP

This guide is intended to be used in conjunction with the instruction manual accompanying the tent. Ensure there are a minimum of six members available to build the tent and that everyone has the appropriate safety gear.

Priorities/Lay-out Considerations

1. Unpack and organize parts and fabrics…(keep set-up area clear, liner and cover on side with two doors)

2. Assemble base perimeter frame…(green corners opposite)

3. Install floor

4. Stake frame (not done during training)

5. Install partition base frame

6. Assemble arches and lay-out on floor (single door side bottom arch on ground)

7. Set arches on floor frame with single door side on the ground, inserting purlins one arch at a time…(red purlin 1st/yellow last)

8. Install side door arches

9. Place upright inserts and hard door uprights on ends & partition walls

10. Install center partition wall fabric…(tie corner)

11. Install soft door end…(tie corner)

12. Install hard door end…(tie corner)

13. Install plenum

14. Install liner…(affix hook and loop on ceiling arches only between purlins)

15. Secure cover ropes on base frame cleats, throw white ropes and pull top fabric cover over tent (secure cover straps with end clips)

16. Raise tent with six personnel, one on each arch and set bottom arch in place on frame.

17. Install door uprights and align hard door pin on frame

18. Tighten and tie ends and partition walls, then cover fabric

19. Install guy ropes…(D-ring stakes 36 inch offset/tilt away in clay soil and tilt toward in sand) Ropes securing tent are designed to withstand winds greater than 40mph

20. Install distribution box, string electrical outlets and hook and loop into arch

21. Install lights and level

22. Review plenum connection for ECU and duct assembly

23. Only power pro or AGE will connect power to the distribution box and outside the tent

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ATTACHMENT 14

SMALL SHELTERS (SS)

A14.1 Objectives. The objectives are to work as a team to unpack and erect a SS, disassemble, inventory, and prepare the system for shipment.

A14.2 Introduction. The SS includes a 32.5 feet by 20 feet by 10 feet free-span structure, ECU, quick connect wiring harness, and a 463L pallet compatible transport container. The SS is primarily used for billeting. Information on this unit will be presented under the following main topics:

- Small shelter set-up
- Small shelter disassembly, inventory and preparation for shipment

A14.3 Completed Small Shelter. When setting-up the 32.5 feet by 20 feet by 10 feet SS, reference TO 35E5-6-11 for complete set-up instructions. The shelter is a lightweight structural aluminum frame system that tensions into a high strength aluminum base. See slide 1 of the Small Shelter Slides attached PowerPoint for an illustration of a completed SS. The shelter is modular, supported by the aluminum frame and covered with military spec vinyl fabric. The shelter can be used in all types of weather such as snow, rain, hail, and wind. It is designed to be set-up by a trained crew of four people. Choose a site location at least 30 feet by 40 feet. Ensure the area is free of any debris and smooth and level as possible. The electrical accessories, shelter cover and end panels will be removed first, with aluminum arches, purlins and base pieces unloaded last. As items are removed from the container, inspect items for damaged or missing parts. When items and accessories are removed from the container, reinstall container top for storage. Container should be stored in this manner until needed again.

A14.3.1 AK-SS Base Assembly. Assemble the base sections in sequence as shown in slide 7 of the Small Shelter Slides attached PowerPoint. Place all base pieces with hooks on the outside of the shelter facing down. Square the base with a rope or tape measure. With a tape measure, you should measure 38 feet 3 inches from outside corner to outside corner. Secure the base assembly by driving 18 inch, double-headed spikes, through the spike holes in the base frame. Unfold the non-slip floor, and with the black side facing the ground, slip the floor cutouts over the base stubs.

A14.3.2 Arch Assembly. Assemble arches as shown in slide 8 of the Small Shelter Slides attached PowerPoint. As each arch is assembled, set one end on base stub. Holding the arch firmly, spring the other end onto its base stub. Repeat procedure until all the arches are assembled onto the base. All bottom arches without stubs (colored red) should be on the same side of shelter. Install three rows of purlins that connect between arches (see slide 9 of the Small Shelter Slides attached PowerPoint). Start with red colored purlins on one end and work toward the other end where yellow colored purlins are used. To install the end wall uprights, insert the upright insert, with hook end, into the bottom end upright section. Lift the upright up and from outside of shelter slip the insert hook end over the arch and place the upright onto its base stub. Plumb end wall upright and ensure the insert bolt is toward the inside of the shelter.

A14.3.3 Purlin Installation. Install the zipped end panel next. Start by spreading the panel white side up next to end of shelter. Attach base rope to the yellow tie off cleat on base frame.

Then, remove the purlins from the end arch only, and lift the end panel up to work the contoured edge up and over the end arch. Starting at the top purlin, slip the end cover rope under the purlins and reattach purlins to end arch. Keeping the end panel centered, tension the contour rope to the green tie off cleat. Repeat steps to install end panel with hard door on other end. Ensure door is installed with white side facing inside. Place doorframe so the stub on bottom of doorframe slides into spike hole in base frame. From inside shelter, connect door header to top of doorframe and pin header to uprights. Remove door brackets to open door, install doorknob, and adjust strike mechanism if needed.

A14.3.4 End Wall Installation. Next, install the main cover by laying the cover next to the shelter, so that when pulled over the black side will be to the inside of shelter. Tie off one end of cover base rope to the Silver tie off cleat. Stretch and secure the other end of cover base rope to the silver tie off cleat. Throw four pullover ropes over the shelter and attach to black loops at base of cover. Four people pull the ropes in unison to pull the cover up and over the frame. Secure base rope on other side in the same manner as the first and ensure the exposed portions of base rope align with hooks on base frame. Work cover over ends of shelter until cover is over lapped by four inches to five inches. Ensure overlap is same on both ends and guy rings are located directly over arches. Attach contour rope to red tie off cleat and tension contour rope. Repeat steps to tension contour rope on other side of shelter. Once cover is tensioned, securely use hook tools to attach base rope to base hooks along each side of shelter. Attach floor to cover and end panel by pressing hook-and-loop fasteners together. For wind conditions over 40 miles per hour, install guy ropes by driving 18 inch guy anchors approximately 36 inches out from side of shelter.

A14.3.5 Main Cover. There are five liners used in the set up. For installation of original interior liner panels part #AK-ILP, line up the base of liner with the bottom of the first two arches. Feed the liner over the side purlins and attach the liner to arch beam over the center purlin. Attach the liner to the arch by only covering half the width of the arch. Continue attaching liners down and over side purlin on opposite side. When completed, only the side purlins will be exposed. Upper portion of liner, adjacent to end walls, is attached to the flap from the end wall. To install new liner panels part #AK-MLP01, AK-SLP01 and AK-ELP01 use the following steps:

A14.3.5.1 Mid Liner (AK-MLP01)

- Step 1: Lay mid liner on ground, with silver side up, in the center bay of shelter.
- Step 2: Feed each end of liner over the side purlins.
- Step 3: Line up purlin cutouts on liner with each of the side purlins.
- Step 4: Attach the two center hook and loop straps around the arch, one on each side of center purlin.
- Step 5: Attach remaining hook and loop straps on arch.
- Step 6: Repeat strap attachment to other arch for other edge of liner.

A14.3.5.2 Side Liner Installation (AK-SLP01)

- Step 1: Lay side liner, with silver side up, next to mid liner in shelter.
- Step 2: Repeat step 2 from mid liner installation.

- Step 3: Repeat step 3 from mid liner installation.
- Step 4: Attach other edge of side liner to face of mid liner.
- Step 5: Repeat steps 1-4 above for other side liner.

A14.3.5.3 End Liner Installation (AK-ELP01)

- Step 1: Lay end liner, silver side up and edge with hook and loop straps facing end arch, next to side liner.
- Step 2: Feed liner over side purlins and line up purlin cutouts on liner with wide purlins.
- Step 3: Attach hook and loop straps on end liner to the end arch. Begin by attaching the straps around each bottom arch section of the end arch, starting at the side purlin and working down to the floor.
- Step 4: Attach other edge of liner to the face of side liner starting from the center purlin and working towards the floor.
- Step 5: Attach hook fastener on silver side of liner to loop fastener flap on end panel above doorway, then attach next two straps above the side purlins.

A14.3.5.4 Next install the electrical system in the Alaskan Small Shelter System. Start with installing the distribution box 4 feet high on the upright pole, adjacent to the air conditioner return inlet. The three cables, with female connectors, are for the string lights and receptacles. The one cable, with a male connector, is for incoming power. The 39-foot string of 4 receptacles is placed along the left side of the shelter (facing the distribution box) and attached to the arches. The 50-foot string of receptacles is strung over the door and attached to the arch on right side of the shelter. To install the lights, start from the distribution box and string the first 3 light to the purlins, on the left side of the shelter, about 10 feet apart. Then, run the cable over the fifth arch, to the right side purlins and attach the next 3 lights about 10 feet apart.

A14.4 Small Shelter Disassembly and Preparation for Shipment. Perform shelter disassembly in reverse order of setup procedures. Start by disconnecting electrical system from power source. Failure to disconnect the electrical system before any other step may result in serious injury or even death! When removing parts from the SS, place like items together to speed up the repack of the shelter. The following guidelines apply when disassembling a SS:

1. Pullover ropes are not needed when removing main cover.
2. Do not force pins.
3. Do not throw or drop items from great heights.
4. Use spike puller and dunnage directly under spike heads to remove spikes from frame.
5. Do not pack cover or end panels wet (air dry when possible).

A14.4.1 Pack. Pack the shelter back into its shipping container in the following order:

1. Guy ropes, throw ropes, hook tool, spare parts bag, spikes, concrete anchors and doorknob.
2. Purlins, uprights, and spike puller.

3. Arches, base pieces and door header.

4. Packing liner.

5. Zipper end panel, main cover, nonslip floor, liners and end panel with hard door.

6. Second packing liner.

7. The rest of shelter items are placed into the shelter container.

8. Attach lid to container and secure the butterfly latches.

NOTE: Shelter is now ready for shipment. The container is compatible with the 463L pallet. Four shelter containers will fit on one 463L pallet.

A14.5 Quick Assembly Instructions.

A14.5.1 Unpack. Unpack all containers and bags.

A14.5.2 Shelter Assembly Set-up. Perform the following in order:

1. Lay out and assemble base

2. Anchor base

3. Attach non-slip floor to base

4. Assemble and raise arches

5. Install purlins

6. Install uprights

7. Install end panels

8. Install cover

9. Install internal liners

10. Install electrical system

11. Install plenum

NOTE: For wind conditions over 40 miles per hour, install guy ropes. Do not pack cover or end panels wet. Let them air dry when possible.

Figure A14.1 Shelter Tent Setup PowerPoint

Alaskan Small Shelter Set-up/Teardown

These slides are included within the AFTTP 3-4.7 Contingency Response book as a file attachment. See PowerPoint file attachment “Small Shelter Slides.”

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ATTACHMENT 15
MASTER VEHICLE SIGN OUT AND STATUS

Table A15.1 Master Vehicle Sign Out and Status Example

Deployed Vehicle Control Board

Reg No.	Vehicle Type	User	Use	Maintenance/ Battle Damage	Location	Key Holder	Status
00K00039	M1008	Mac					FMC
98L437	HMMWV	COM					FMC
06L0042	HMMWV	Aerial Port					FMC
00K00043	M1008	Aerial Port					FMC
91E596	10K AT	Aerial Port					FMC
92E00044	10K AT	Aerial Port					FMC

Vehicle In Commission Rate	
Total Vehicles	6
FMC	6
NMC	0
Rate	100.00%

Field Work Order Tracker		
Reg No.	Part Status	ETIC

LEGEND:
AT - all-terrain
COM - communications
ETIC - estimated time in commission
FMC - full mission capable
NMC - non-mission capable

UNCLASSIFIED

NOTE: The table above is an example of the master vehicle sign out and status control board. A working spreadsheet of this control board is included within the AFTTP 3-4.7 Contingency Response PDF file as an attachment. See file attachment "Master Vehicle Spreadsheet."

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ATTACHMENT 16

CRF TO AEW/AEG TRANSITION

Functional Area	Checklist Item	Go	No Go
1. Aerial Port			
1.1. ATOC:	1. Did you brief location of air terminal operations center (ATOC) and in-transit visibility (ITV)/response force (RF) identification tracking tags setup?		
	2. Did you provide flight line grid map with locations and base maps for cargo handling crews and porters?		
	3. Did you identify any hazardous work areas (e.g., construction, contamination, poor lighting)?		
	4. Is the follow-on force aware of vehicle traffic flow plan and vehicle disbursement locations?		
	5. Did you show where vehicles are refueled?		
	6. Did you brief on who and/or where vehicle maintenance will be performed?		
	7. Did you provide information on cargo yard/airfield driving restrictions?		
	8. Is there an on-site arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG)? Have POCs for the A/DACG been briefed?		
	9. Did you physically show location of A/DACG operations/personnel?		
	10. Did you explain procedures of host nation customs and agriculture requirements?		
1.2. Passenger Processing:	1. What is the established location for the passenger baggage holding area?		
	2. Where is the established passenger terminal and what is its capacity?		
1.3. Cargo Handling:	1. Did you verify if the follow-on force has their own equipment and what materials handling equipment (MHE) will they additionally require?		
	2. Did you identify location and layout of marshaling yard and hazardous cargo area?		

	3. Where is the established location? What is the cargo yard capacity? Evaluate cargo yard lighting requirement.		
2. Maintenance			
2.1. Aircraft:	1. Brief foreign object damage (FOD) walk area of responsibility.		
	2. Brief average daily flying schedule and aircraft types encountered.		
	3. Discuss aircraft bug-out/dispersal plan for emergency.		
	4. Discuss aircraft ground support equipment dispersal plan.		
	5. Discuss vehicles/AGE equipment hardening plan.		
2.2. Vehicle:	1. List all vehicles available by type; # operational, # vehicles deadlined for parts (VDP).		
	2. Temporary mission support kit (TMSK)/parts & supplies/equipment on-hand.		
	3. Facility (work/storage areas) & vehicle locations.		
2.3. Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE):	1. Inform incoming civil engineer (CE) forces of power distribution.		
	2. Provide tent layout to CE.		
3. Airfield Operations			
3.1. Weather:	1. Provide air expeditionary wing (AEW)/air expeditionary group (AEG) weather personnel area of responsibility (AOR) briefing (e.g., local geography, rules of thumb, lessons learned).		
	2. Provide AEW/AEG weather personnel with customer support requirements.		
	3. Take final CRF weather observation as close to last aircraft operation as possible. Immediately transition to use of AEW/AEG equipment.		

	4. Disassemble/pack CRF weather equipment. Make note of any damage or needed repairs at this time.		
	5. Provide equipment to marshalling/passenger processing area.		
	6. Inspect redeploying equipment for shipment readiness.		
3.2. Air Traffic Control:	1. What are the current hot brake procedures?		
	2. Where are the pad locations for hot cargo/munitions up/download?		
	3. Is there an identified crew bail-out procedure and location?		
	4. Is there an approved location for emergency aircraft fuel dump procedures?		
	5. Is there an airfield brochure/airfield- specific information packet that is provided to aircrews?		
	6. Current status of navigation aid (NAVAID)?		
	7. Current status of instrument approaches?		
	8. Has a current flight check been performed in the past XXX days for each instrument approach available?		
	9. Is there a list provided of all the base operations, air traffic control, and ground advisory frequencies and call signs?		
	10. Is there a severe weather notification plan?		
	11. Did you provide any agreements with base/host nation (HN) authorities (e.g., memoranda of understanding, letters of agreement)?		
	12. Did you provide the follow-on force with an air operations center and air mobility division POC?		
	13. Did you review anti-hijacking plans?		
	14. Did you review taxi routes and aircraft specific restrictions?		
	15. Did you review crash fire rescue plans?		

	16. Did you provide crash fire rescue POC/phone numbers?		
	17. Did you provide the air traffic control tower POC/phone number?		
3.3. Airfield Management:	1. Has a walk through and brief to follow-on forces been completed for ramps and physical layout?		
	2. Has the obstruction layout been completed recently? Is the obstruction layout current and valid?		
	3. Did you provide airfield managers name and contact information?		
	4. Did you provide base operations and weather service POC/phone number?		
	5. Did you review approved parking plans (emphasize restrictions/limitations)? Have you updated the parking plan for inbound aviation forces?		
	6. What is the current parking and working maximum aircraft on ground (MOG) plan?		
	7. Are there any ramp snow removal procedures?		
	8. Is there any established controlled movement areas or access restrictions (badging)?		
	9. Did you provide pertinent airfield imagery/diagrams?		
	10. Is there an established flight line driving certification program?		
	11. Is there a wildlife control program?		
	12. Has the AMC Form 174, *Airfield Survey* been updated and submitted to AMC?		
	13. Did you review low/no light ramp operations? Is the lighting system in place a covert system (e.g., infrared [IR])?		
	14. Ramp operations hand over Date_____ Time_____ Rep_____		

3.4. Miscellaneous	1. Has a flight safety officer been identified? Has their contact information been updated or is it available? Has a ground safety officer been identified and has their contact information been updated?		
	2. Are there any fuel spill kits (locations)? What are the ramp fuel spill procedures?		
	3. Is there a hazardous materials storage and disposal plan? Is there a hazardous materials POC?		
	4. Are there severe weather recovery and hangaring plans for resident aircraft? What are the immediate action steps directly following a severe weather event?		
	5. Is there any de-icing capability for aircraft?		
	6. Does the follow-on force have means to receive airflow information (Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network [NIPRNET], SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET], Global Decision Support System [GDSS], Single Mobility System [SMS])?		
	7. Are there severe weather recovery and hangaring plans for resident aircraft? What are the immediate action steps directly following a severe weather event?		
4. Command and Control			
	1. NIPRNET account .		
	2. SIPRNET account.		
	3. GDSS2 account.		
	4. What is the procedure to review and distribute ATO/airflow information? Does the follow-on force have means to receive and publish: notices to airmen (NOTAM), special instructions (SPINS), air tasking order (ATO), and air space control order (ACO)?		
	5. Are there brevity codes in use?		

	6. Is there an established situation report (SITREP)/ operational report (OPREP)/ serious incident report (SIR) distribution list? Is there tenant headquarters commander's critical information requirement (CCIR)?		
	7. Have you ensured secure/unsecure communication capability between aircrews and base operations?		
	8. Have you introduced incoming leadership to HN or ground force commander, local dignitaries, and so forth?		
	9. Have you passed out hot cargo procedures and area (electronic and hard copy)?		
	10. Command and control procedures status briefed Date_____ Time_____ Rep_____		
5. Communications			
	1. Have you established contact with the theatre frequency management personnel?		
	2. If equipment is left behind as part of the turnover, have steps been taken to ensure replacements are available to the contingency response group (CRG)?		
	3. Are there multiple communication nets, frequencies, call signs? Is there an established base phone directory and dialing system for external dialing?		
	4. Have you provided gaining forces with communication checks to ensure their systems are operational?		
	5. Is there an established communications security (COMSEC) storage area and COMSEC changeover schedule?		
	6. Is the air traffic control tower equipped with blue force tracking systems?		
	7. Are there any specific transmitter areas that require identification and avoidance to protect against adverse health effects from exposure to RF radiation?		

	8. Is there an emergency broadcast system for base notification?		
	9. Communication briefed. Date_____ Time_____ Rep_____		
5.1. Ground Radio	1. Have you established contact with the theatre frequency management personnel?		
	2. Are there multiple communication nets, frequencies, call signs?		
	3. If equipment is left behind as part of the turnover, have steps been taken to ensure replacements are available to the CRG?		
5.2. Small Package Initial Communications Equipment	1. Establish a POC with the follow-on communications unit to ensure parallel services are available.		
6. PERSCO			
	1. Have you developed a plan for the personnel/administrative team reception, in processing, orientation, bed down, and work area set up?		
	2. Have reception procedures and arrival briefings been established for incoming personnel?		
	3. Have you explained daily battle rhythm to the personnel/administrative team?		
	4. Have you provided a report with current personnel strength, status of personnel, and casualties?		
	5. Have you familiarized the team with inbound and outbound personnel procedures?		
	6. Have established a personnel/administrative operations center?		
	7. Have you handed over relative administrative orders?		
	8. Personnel/Administrative hand over Date_____ Time_____ Rep_____		

7. Logistics			
7.1. Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL):	1. POC Headquarters.		
	2. Proposed fuel storage/forward area and refueling point (FARP)/refueling maintenance (RFM)/Hot or Cold pit locations.		
	3. Fuel grade and contact for fuel contract/source.		
	4. Testing analysis location.		
	5. Is there a hazardous materials storage and disposal plan? Is there a hazardous materials POC.		
7.2. Supply:	1. Headquarters supply/logistics POC.		
	2. Discuss the supply account /Department of Defense activity address code (DODDAC).		
	3. Discuss supply facility/storage areas.		
	4. Ensure all classified materials are handled in accordance with applicable regulations.		
	5. Review communications-OUT procedures, including necessary work arounds with communications personnel.		
	6. Obtain letters of authorization for classified/COMSEC equipment.		
	7. Discuss where radio nets and telephones are located.		
	8. Introduce contracting officer.		
	9. Assume control over supply war reserve materiel (WRM)/readiness spare(s) package (RSP).		
	10. Discuss transport of property.		
	11. Ensure equipment is in deployment status.		
UNCLASSIFIED			

7.3. Logistics Plans:	1. Work with CRG Unit Deployment Manager (UDM), wing installation deployment readiness cell (IDRC), and higher headquarters (HHQ)/numbered air force (NAF) Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) personnel to build both a deployment and redeployment time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Unit type code (UTC) information is needed in advance, a month or two in advance would be optimum to prevent mission delays.		
	2. Identify deployed liaison and establish lines of communication.		
	3. Load plans are needed for airlift. This task will be accomplished by exporting the Integrated Computerized Deployment System (ICODES) logistics module (LOGMOD) file and sending the file to the CRG load planners.		
	4. If resupply is needed, unit line numbers (ULN) will need to be built in coordination with the JOPES personnel. Communication with a deployed liaison is vital to the reception of the requested cargo and/or personnel.		
8. Intelligence			
	1. Have you liaised with follow-on intelligence personnel and passed all pertinent threat data, assessments, and intelligence?		
	2. Have you ensured handover of all local contacts and necessary imagery, charts, and data reference systems?		
	3. Have you ensured all classified material and COMSEC is secure at all times?		
	4. Have you ensured the establishment of a secure working environment to include controlled entry access lists and classified connectivity?		
	5. Have you established Intel personnel roles and reporting requirements once handoff complete?		
	6. Intelligence hand over complete Date_____ Time_____ AEG Rep_____		

9. Civil Engineering			
	1. Contact follow-on forces for initial handoff coordination/meeting.		
	2. Have you passed off the airfield pavement evaluation?		
	3. Have you identified hardened facilities/bunkers? Do these facilities need construction or repair/enhancement?		
	4. Have you provided an events log to emergency management?		
	5. Have you identified portable latrines on-hand with host nation (Office of Collateral Responsibility [OCR]: Contracting)?		
	6. Have you briefed about the refuse/waste water disposal coordination with host nation (OCR: Contracting)?		
	7. Do we have contaminated waste that needs disposed of? If so, identify location and amount.		
	8. Have you ensured potable water point coordination with incoming team (OCR: Public Health/ Bioenvironmental Engineering)?		
	9. Have you briefed status of local environmental laws and procedures?		
	10. Have you briefed incoming team on status of digging permissions?		
	11. Have you briefed about host nation commercial power availability?		
	12. Have you ensured incoming team has a fuel source for generators (OCR: POL)?		
	13. Have you briefed host nation chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities?		
	14. Have you briefed host nation explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capabilities?		
UNCLASSIFIED			

	15. Have you briefed local crash, fire, and rescue capabilities?		
	16. Civil Engineering hand over complete. Date_____ Time_____ AEG Rep_____		
10. Medical			
	1. Debrief follow-on medical team on common disease, non-battle injuries, and severe injuries encountered.		
	2. Debrief public health and bioenvironmental engineering personnel on current conditions and work requirements at the airfield. • Provide inspection and sampling information. • Provide plans for corrective measures as needed.		
	3. Pass on all medical specific site intelligence.		
	4. Debrief host nation medical support capabilities, location, and air evacuation transportation.		
	5. Brief incoming medical teams on casualty collection points for the base facilities.		
	6. Provide medical team with the base approved mass casualty event plan.		
	7. Provide medical team orientation to medical evacuation and casualty evacuation locations.		
	8. Provide medical team the logistic resupply chain.		
	9. Complete a controlled medication inventory.		
	10. Medical hand over. Date_____ Time_____ Rep_____		
11. Contracting			
	1. Provide as much information as possible about upcoming deployment (e.g., location, requirements, funding).		
UNCLASSIFIED			

	2. Set up a requirements validation board (usually squadron commander or above) to eliminate potential waste and procurement of unneeded items.		
	3. Did you provide a status and update/familiarize incoming contracting personnel with obligated contractual documents?		
	4. Are contracting personnel familiar with any blanket purchase agreements?		
	5. Have you familiarized contracting personnel with petty cash accounts?		
	6. Are there any pending purchase/delivery orders?		
	7. Are there any pending or open contracts?		
	8. Did you review all obligated/contracted funds requests?		
	9. Did you review and turnover procurement registers/logs?		
	10. Did you review pending claims/request for equitable adjustments as part of contract modifications?		
	11. Is there a list of contracts requiring closeout?		
	12. Did you familiarize incoming contracting officer with facility locations?		
	13. Did you brief contracting officers on contractor access to base camp procedures, if applicable?		
	14. Have you accomplished a review of force protection measures for petty cash and portable funds?		
	15. Did you turn over vendor list and 24-hour emergency vendor source list?		
	16. Contracting hand over. Date_____ Time_____ Rep_____		
12. Finance	1. Have you received cash from outgoing pay agent on DD Form 1081, *Statement of Agent Officer's Account* and count all currency?		

	2. Have you confirmed serial numbers of marked bills with outgoing pay agent?		
	3. Has the outgoing pay agent turned in all documents and vouchers for agent final turn in?		
	4. Have you been briefed by outgoing paying agent on local customs of vendors and recurring monthly vendor payments?		
	5. Have you been briefed by outgoing paying agent on anti-robbery procedures, code word, and security forces call sign?		
	6. Pay agent hand over. Date_____ Time_____ Rep_____		
UNCLASSIFIED			

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ATTACHMENT 17

ROLL UP FOR RETURN TO BASE

Functional Area	Checklist Item	Go	NoGo
1. Aerial Port			
1.1. ATOC:	1. Provide tactical operations center (TOC) with manifests for outbound missions. 2. Coordinate with TOC on support airlift requirements. 3. Provide all load plans for out bound missions.		
1.2. Passenger Processing:	1. Process all personnel as required to meet outbound mission timing. 2. Turn in land mobile radios (LMR) to the TOC on demand. 3. Provide baggage collection area for outbound passenger.		
1.3. Cargo Handling:	1. Provide equipment marshaling processing area. 2. Turn in LMRs to the TOC on demand. 3. Inspect redeploying equipment for shipment readiness.		
2. Maintenance			
2.1. Aircraft:	1. Brief foreign object damage (FOD) walk area of responsibility. 2. Brief average daily flying schedule and aircraft types encountered. 3. Discuss aircraft bug-out/dispersal plan for emergency. 4. Discuss aircraft ground support equipment dispersal plan. 5. Prepare all on-load equipment/vehicles for turn-in to host nation (HN). 6. Prepare all associated maintenance equipment for shipment and deliver to marshalling yard on schedule.		
UNCLASSIFIED			

	7. Identify personnel to perform block out duties for last aircraft 8. Ensure maintenance work area is cleaned 9. Turn-in LMRs to the TOC on demand 10. Ensure maintenance personnel process personnel support for contingency operations (PERSCO) and passenger terminal prior to redeploying. 11. Maintenance hand over. Date_____ Time_____ Rep_____ 12. Turn in LMRs to the TOC on demand. 13. Ensure maintenance personnel process PERSCO and passenger terminal prior to redeploying.		
2.2. Vehicle:	1. Configure 25K; 20 to 30 minutes each & defuel as needed. 2. Configure 10K AT forklift; cab removal 4 to 5 hours each, remove weights 20 to 30 minutes/AT (C-130) [C-17 no reconfiguration needed] & defuel as needed.		
2.3. Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE):	1. Discuss bare base tear down timeline. 2. Discuss AGE equipment hardening plan. 3. AGE hand over. Date_____ Time_____ Rep_____ 4. Prepare all associated AGE equipment for shipment and deliver to marshalling yard on schedule. 4.1 Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) units packed. 4.2 Generators de-fueled. 4.3 Damaged equipment flagged.		
3. Airfield Operations			
3.1. Weather:	1. Take final weather observation as close to last aircraft operation as possible. 2. Disassemble/pack weather equipment. Make note of any damage or needed repairs at this time.		
	3. Provide equipment to marshalling/passenger processing area. 4. Inspect redeploying equipment for shipment readiness.		

3.2. Air Traffic Control:	1. Prepare all publications and equipment. 2. Identify personnel to perform final air traffic control duties, as required. 3. Maintain communications with aircraft until last personnel has boarded aircraft and aircraft is ready to depart.		
3.3. Airfield Management:	1. Prepare final flight plans/maintain connectivity to submit. 2. Coordinate with security forces (SF)/ensure controlled movement area is secure until exfiltration. 3. Prepare all equipment for redeployment.		
4. Command and Control			
	1. Ensure communications security (COMSEC) is secured. 2. Maintain Global Decision Support System (GDSS) access as directed until latest possible time. 3. Prepare and send final situation report (SITREP)/reports as required.		
5. Communications			
5.1. Ground Radio	1. Have you established contact with the theatre frequency management personnel? 2. Ensure the contingency response group (CRG) leader has a fallback communications capability as required (broadband global area network ([BGAN]/Global Rapid Response Intelligence Package [GRRIP]).		
5.2. Small Package Initial Communications Equipment	1. Notify satellite controller of de-access. 2. Hazardous declarations created. 3. Create packing lists. 4. Maintain positive control of COMSEC.		
6. PERSCO			
	1. Maintain personnel accountability through last chalks departure. 2. Use paper products for final reports and accountability.		
UNCLASSIFIED			

7. Logistics			
7.1. Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL):	1.Transfer JFDES kit if applicable. 2. Headquarters point of contact (POC). 3. Proposed fuel storage/forward area and refueling point (FARP)/refueling maintenance (RFM)/hot or cold pit locations. 4. Fuel grade and contact for fuel contract/source. 5. Testing analysis location. 6. Train hazardous materials (HAZMAT) storage and disposal personnel. 7. POL hand over. Date_____ Time_____ Rep_____ 8. Turn in LMRs to the tactical operations center (TOC) on demand. 9. Ensure POL personnel process personnel support for contingency operations (PERSCO) and passenger terminal prior to redeploying.		
7.2. Supply:	1. Contact major command (MAJCOM)/close supply account. 2. Verify all equipment ordered has been received and cancelled. 3. Inventory/turn in/order equipment. 4. Contact logistics readiness squadron (LRS) to remove deployment flag to return equipment back to the base.		
8. Intelligence			
	1. Secure/destroy all classified material. 2. Coordinate with SF and AFOSI for intelligence support until departure.		
9. Civil Engineering			
	1. Prepare all on loan equipment/vehicles for turn in to host nation.		
10. Medical			
UNCLASSIFIED			

	1. Inventory and re-pack all unit type code (UTC) FFGR1 medical equipment assets according to the pack-out list. 2. Provide medical supplies to follow-on medical team as may be needed, prior to departure. 3. Any hazardous items will require appropriate documentation. 4. Complete a controlled medication inventory. 5. Secure controlled medications. 6. Secure medical records. 7. Return signed-out equipment (e.g., communications, weapons/ammunition). 8. All personal gear will be packed in personal bags only. (DO NOT pack personal items in UTC FFGR1 asset containers). 9. Maintain medical/trauma response kit for emergency during redeployment process.		
11. Contracting			
	1. Ensure contracts have been completed, paid, and closed out prior to redeployment.		
12. Finance	1. Have you transferred advance cash to incoming paying agent on DD Form 1081, *Statement of Agent Officer's Account* and counted all currency? 2. Have you confirmed serial numbers of marked bills with new pay agent? 3. Have you prepared all documents and vouchers for agent final turn in? 4. Have you briefed new paying agent on local customs of vendors, recurring monthly vendor payments and notify vendors of paying agent change? 5. Have you briefed new paying agent on anti-robbery procedures, code word, and security forces call sign? 6. Pay agent hand over. Date_____ Time_____ Rep_____		

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ATTACHMENT 18

ROLL UP TO FORWARD DEPLOY

Functional Area	Checklist Item	Go	No Go
1. Aerial Port			
1.1. ATOC:	1. Provide tactical operations center (TOC) with manifests for outbound missions. 2. Coordinate with TOC on support airlift requirements. 3. Provide all load plans for out bound missions.		
1.2. Passenger Processing:	1. Process all personnel as required to meet outbound mission timing. 2. Turn in land mobile radios (LMR) to the TOC on demand. 3. Provide baggage collection area for outbound passenger.		
1.3. Cargo Handling:	1. Provide equipment marshaling processing area. 2. Turn in LMRs to the TOC on demand. 3. Inspect redeploying equipment for shipment readiness.		
2. Maintenance			
2.1. Aircraft:	1. Brief foreign object damage (FOD) walk area of responsibility. 2. Brief average daily flying schedule and aircraft types encountered. 3. Discuss aircraft bug-out/dispersal plan for emergency. 4. Discuss aircraft ground support equipment dispersal plan. 5. Discuss vehicles/aerospace ground equipment (AGE) equipment hardening plan. 6. Maintenance hand over. Date_____ Time_____ Rep_____ 7. Turn-in LMRs to the TOC on demand. 8. Ensure maintenance personnel process personnel support for contingency operations (PERSCO) and passenger terminal prior to redeploying.		

2.2. Vehicle:	1. Configure 25K; 20-30 minutes each & defuel as needed. 2. Configure 10K AT forklift; cab removal 4 to 5 hours each, remove weights 20 to 30 minutes/AT (C-130) [C-17 no reconfiguration needed] & defuel as needed.		
2.3. Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE):	1. Identify/correct broken tents. 1.1. Replace any broken equipment (e.g., cots, Stakes, carbon dioxide testers). 1.2. Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) units inspected. 1.3. Generators inspected.		
3. Airfield Operations			
3.1. Weather:	1. Disassemble/pack critical weather equipment. 2. Provide equipment to marshalling/passenger processing area. 3. Inspect redeploying equipment for shipment readiness.		
3.2. Air Traffic Control:	1. Acquire most current airfield products for follow on base. 2. Determine equipment required for air traffic control to include airfield marking and lighting. 3. Resupply batteries, chemical lights and other consumables. 4. Determine manning requirements at follow on base.		
3.3. Airfield Management:	1. Acquire most current airfield products for follow on base. 2. Determine manning requirements on follow on base. 3. Resupply batteries and other consumables.		
4. Command and Control			
	1. Ensure communications security (COMSEC) is secured.		

5. Communications			
5.1. Ground Radio	1. Have you established contact with the theatre frequency management personnel? 2. Have changes in frequencies, COMSEC, and call signs, if any, been relayed to higher headquarters (HHQ)?		
5.2. Small Package Initial Communications Equipment	1. Notify satellite controller of de-access . 2. Hazardous declarations created. 3. Create packing lists. 4. Maintain positive control of COMSEC. 5. Obtain Satellite Access Authorization/Gateway Access Authorization (SAA/GAA) for new location. 6. Acquire new COMSEC as required. 7. Restock consumable items as required. 8. Ensure new location is suitable for satellite communications (SATCOM).		
6. PERSCO			
	1. Ensure accountability of personnel forward deploying and those that return to base. 2. Based on work rest cycles, develop and brief tent assignments before departing for follow on base.		
7. Logistics			
7.1. Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL):	1.Transfer JFDES kit if applicable. 2. Headquarters point of contact (POC). 3. Proposed fuel storage/forward area and refueling point (FARP)/refueling maintenance (RFM)/hot or cold pit locations. 4. Fuel grade and contact for fuel contract/source. 5. Testing analysis location. 6. Is there a hazardous materials (HAZMAT) storage and disposal plan? Is there a HAZMAT point of contact? 7. POL hand over. Date_____ Time_____ Rep_____		

	8. Turn-in LMRs to the TOC on demand. 9. Ensure personnel process PERSCO and passenger terminal prior to redeploying.		
7.2. Supply:	1. Headquarters supply/logistics POC. 2. Discuss the supply account /Department of Defense activity address code (DODDAC). 3. Discuss supply facility/storage areas. 4. Ensure all classified materials are handled in accordance with applicable regulations. 5. Review communications-OUT procedures, including necessary work arounds with communications personnel. 6. Obtain letters of authorization for classified/COMSEC equipment. 7. Discuss where radio nets and telephones are located. 8. Assume control over supply war reserve materiel (WRM)/readiness spare(s) package (RSP). 9. Discuss transport of property. 10. What is the average resupply time from USAF depots? Lateral support from other USAF bases?		
8. Intelligence			
	1. Ensure remaining forces have available intelligence.		
9. Civil Engineering			
	1. Acquire most current airfield products for follow on base. 2. Determine equipment required to assess follow on base. 3. Resupply batteries, caulkin,g and other consumables.		
10. Medical			
	1. Inventory and re-pack all UTC FFGR1 medical equipment assets according to the pack-out list. 2. Reconstitute any shortage prior to deployment to new site. (Either from resupply chain or from follow-on medical team.)		

	3. Relay all potential mission-impacting shortfall information and recommendations on resolving shortfalls to deployed commander before forward deployment. 4. Any hazardous items will require appropriate documentation. 5. Complete a controlled medication inventory. 6. Secure controlled medications. 7. Secure medical records. 8. Secure accountable equipment (e.g., communications, weapons/ammo). 9. All personal gear will be packed in personal bags only. (DO NOT pack personal items in UTC FFGR1 asset containers.) 10. Maintain medical/trauma response kit for emergency during deployment process.		
11. Contracting			
	1. Provide as much information as possible about upcoming deployment (e.g., location, requirements, funding). 2. Set up a requirements validation board (usually squadron commander or above) to eliminate potential waste and procurement of unneeded items.		
12. Finance			
	1. Have you received cash from disbursing officer on DD Form 1081, *Statement of Agent Officer's Account* and counted all currency? 2. Have you determined marked bills and wrote down serial numbers of the marked bills? 3. Have you been briefed by disbursing officer on anti-robbery procedures, created a code word, and got with security forces for call sign?		

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ATTACHMENT 19
RECONSTITUTION

A19.1 Commander Responsibilities. CRG/CRE or CRT chiefs are responsible for ensuring reconstitution of personnel and equipment is accomplished. Build a schedule based on aircraft/truck return time. To the max extent, personnel and equipment should be returned to a deployable state within 72 hours of return to home station. Sometimes this may not be possible due to phased redeployment or extended travel times of equipment. Process should include:

A19.1.1 Equipment.

A19.1.1.1 Coordinating for weapon cleaning supplies and UTC replenishment.

A19.1.1.2 Coordinating for any MHE required to position equipment.

A19.1.1.3 Ensure all functionals are aware of their equipment reconstitution requirements.

A19.1.1.4 Ensure all vehicles/MHE are returned to the sub-motor pool for cleaning and turn-in.

A19.1.1.5 Ensuring all equipment is reconstituted to the satisfaction of the UTC equipment owner.

A19.1.1.6 Verify completed destruction or turn-in of all COMSEC materials and/or classified equipment.

A19.1.1.7 Ensure all custodian authorization/custody receipt listing (CA/CRL) items are signed back into the base.

A19.1.1.8 MRE custodian will return any unused MREs and present a copy of orders for the returning deployment or present cash for purchased meals.

A19.1.1.9 All equipment is reconstituted in a condition suitable for immediate redeployment prior to starting compensatory time off (CTO).

A19.1.2 Personnel.

A19.1.2.1 Ensure participation of all available personnel from deployment.

A19.1.2.2 For any reports/forms generated (e.g., after actions report, AMC Form 68, *Aerial Port Movement Log*, airfield survey, pavement evaluation) ensure paperwork is completed and filed.

A19.1.2.3 Turn in all special issue equipment (e.g., bullet proof vests, chemical warfare canisters).

A19.1.2.4 Ensure all post-deployment actions are accomplished to include but not limited to:

A19.1.2.4.1 Turn in mobility records and training records.

A19.1.2.4.2 Inventory, replenish, and store mobility bags.

A19.1.2.4.3 Post-Deployment Health Assessment.

A19.1.2.4.4 In-process with Installation Personnel Readiness and UDM as required.

A19.1.2.4.5 Any additional Post Deployment Checklists.

A19.1.2.4.6 All Travel Vouchers are completed within five business days and filed prior to starting CTO.

A19.1.2.4.7 Identify any equipment damage, missing parts, or items that preclude the UTC to immediately re-deploy to UTC manager/owner.

A19.1.2.4.8 Ensure all ADPE equipment is turned into appropriate agency (e.g., computers, iridium, international cellphones).

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AFTTP 3-4.7 CONTINGENCY RESPONSE