

BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE



14 November 2012
AIR FORCE TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
3-4.6 AS

ACTIVE SHOOTER (AS)



THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

**BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY
OF THE AIR FORCE**

**AIR FORCE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURES 3-4.6 AS**



14 November 2012

Tactical Doctrine

ACTIVE SHOOTER

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available for downloading or ordering on the e-Publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil.

RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication.

OPR: 422 JTS

Certified by: USAF EC

Supersedes: N/A

(Col Patrick Owens)

Pages: 62

PURPOSE: To provide tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare personnel for an active shooter incident and prevent the unnecessary loss of life in a deployed environment due to the insider threat of an active shooter.

APPLICATION: Although this document was drafted to address considerations in a deployed environment, it is applicable to all theaters of operation. The focus of the publication is at the tactical level but it has applicability for planners and warfighters at all levels. This publication applies to the Active Air Force, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve Command unless otherwise stated.

SCOPE: This guide describes the active shooter environment and provides guidelines for Air Force personnel to better prepare themselves mentally and physically for an active shooter incident. It focuses on individual and unit preparation, emphasizing the need for a cultural mindset shift.

RECORDS MANAGEMENT: Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with AFMAN 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at <https://www.my.af.mil/afirms/afirms/afirms/rims.cfm>. To submit changes, conflicts, suggestions, or recommendations use the AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*, and e-mail it to the OPR organizational in-box (422jts.ttp@us.af.mil).

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "William J. Bender".

WILLIAM J. BENDER, Maj Gen, USAF
Commander
USAF Expeditionary Center (AMC)
Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1—DEVELOPING THE WARRIOR MINDSET

| | |
|---|-----|
| 1.1 Overview | 1-1 |
| 1.1.1 Active Shooter | 1-1 |
| 1.2 The Mindset | 1-1 |
| 1.2.1 Warrior Mindset | 1-1 |
| 1.3 Factors Causing Unnecessary Hesitation When Reacting to a Threat | 1-1 |
| 1.3.1 Psychological Inhibitions | 1-1 |
| 1.3.2 Personal Beliefs | 1-2 |
| 1.3.3 Understanding Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and ROE | 1-2 |
| 1.3.4 Understanding the Application of Force | 1-2 |
| 1.3.5 Local Command Policies | 1-3 |
| 1.3.6 Physiological Changes | 1-3 |
| 1.3.7 Perceptual Changes from Fear | 1-4 |
| 1.3.8 Cognitive/Behavioral Changes | 1-4 |
| 1.3.9 Commander Considerations | 1-4 |
| 1.3.10 Conditioning/Training Pitfalls | 1-5 |
| 1.3.11 Appropriate Application of Training Elements | 1-6 |

CHAPTER 2—ENHANCING RESILIENCY BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER AN ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE

| | |
|---|-----|
| 2.1 Definition of Resilience | 2-1 |
| 2.2 Comprehensive Airmen Fitness | 2-1 |
| 2.2.1 Physical | 2-1 |
| 2.2.2 Mental | 2-1 |
| 2.2.3 Spiritual | 2-1 |
| 2.2.4 Social | 2-1 |
| 2.3 Strategies to Strengthen Resilience | 2-1 |
| 2.3.1 Recognition (Understanding Natural Threat Response) | 2-1 |
| 2.3.2 Performance Optimization (Thrive Under Threat) | 2-4 |
| 2.3.3 Building Protection (Bend Under Threat) | 2-4 |
| 2.3.4 Restoration (Recovering After Responding to Threat) | 2-5 |
| 2.4 Tactical Mental Toughness Skills | 2-5 |

| Paragraph | Page |
|--|------------|
| 2.4.1 Tactical Breathing..... | 2-5 |
| 2.4.2 Warrior Mindset..... | 2-5 |
| 2.4.3 Attention Management | 2-5 |
| 2.5 Lesson on Survival Response | 2-5 |
| 2.5.1 Adrenaline and Cortisol..... | 2-6 |
| 2.5.2 Heart Rate | 2-6 |
| 2.5.3 Controlling Heart Rate..... | 2-6 |
| 2.5.4 Fear and Rage Responses | 2-6 |
| 2.5.5 Controlling Thoughts..... | 2-6 |
| 2.5.6 TRT Activation | 2-7 |
| CHAPTER 3—WEAPONS PROFICIENCY | |
| 3.1 Weapons Proficiency..... | 3-1 |
| 3.2 Weapons Qualification | 3-1 |
| 3.2.1 Group A Personnel..... | 3-1 |
| 3.2.2 Group B Personnel..... | 3-1 |
| 3.3 Unit Sustainment Training Programs | 3-2 |
| 3.3.1 Live-Fire Sustainment Training..... | 3-2 |
| 3.3.2 Unit Sustainment Training (Non Live-Fire) | 3-3 |
| 3.4 Arming Standards and Configurations..... | 3-4 |
| 3.5 Small Arms and Related Equipment | 3-4 |
| 3.5.1 Commercial Weapons..... | 3-4 |
| 3.5.2 Authorized Small Arms | 3-4 |
| 3.6 Summary..... | 3-4 |
| CHAPTER 4—IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, AND DISSEMINATION | |
| 4.1 Identification, Prevention, and Dissemination | 4-1 |
| 4.2 Cultural Awareness..... | 4-1 |
| 4.2.1 Cultural Awareness Training..... | 4-1 |
| 4.2.2 Mental Preparation..... | 4-1 |
| 4.2.3 US Policy | 4-1 |
| 4.2.4 Host Nation | 4-2 |
| 4.2.5 Advanced Planning..... | 4-2 |
| 4.2.6 Observation..... | 4-2 |

| Paragraph | Page |
|---|------|
| 4.3 Preventive Efforts | 4-2 |
| 4.3.1 Recognize Potential Threat Indicators | 4-2 |
| 4.3.2 Reporting and Response | 4-2 |
| 4.4 Behavioral Threat Indicators | 4-2 |
| 4.4.1 Overt Indicators - Preparations/Activities | 4-3 |
| 4.4.2 Covert Indicators - Subversive Activities | 4-4 |
| 4.4.3 Behavioral Threat Indicators of Disaffected/Mentally Unbalanced Persons | 4-5 |
| 4.5 Dissemination | 4-7 |
| 4.6 Guiding Principles for Information Sharing | 4-7 |
| 4.6.1 Threats | 4-7 |
| 4.6.2 Activities | 4-7 |
| 4.6.3 Implementation | 4-7 |
| 4.7 Information Sources | 4-7 |
| 4.7.1 Information Sharing | 4-8 |
| 4.7.2 Information Packaging | 4-8 |
| 4.8 Information Sharing Foundations | 4-8 |
| 4.8.1 Strong Partnerships | 4-8 |
| 4.8.2 Collaboration | 4-8 |
| 4.8.3 Information Sharing Organizations | 4-8 |
| 4.9 Functional Awareness | 4-8 |
| 4.9.1 Success | 4-8 |
| 4.9.2 Organizations | 4-8 |
| 4.10 Information Sharing Culture | 4-9 |
| 4.10.1 Interconnectivity | 4-9 |
| 4.10.2 Multidisciplinary Awareness and Education | 4-9 |
| 4.10.3 Reporting Mechanisms | 4-9 |
| 4.10.4 Threat Awareness Service and Products | 4-9 |
| 4.11 Intelligent Integration, Mutual Respect | 4-9 |
| 4.11.1 Information Sharing | 4-9 |
| 4.11.2 Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) | 4-10 |
| 4.12 Outreach and Partnerships | 4-10 |
| 4.13 Conclusion | 4-10 |

CHAPTER 5—EMERGENCY ACTION PLANNING

| | |
|--|-----|
| 5.1 Overview | 5-1 |
| 5.2 Administrative Practices | 5-1 |
| 5.2.1 Planning | 5-1 |
| 5.2.2 Procedures..... | 5-1 |
| 5.2.3 Command and Control..... | 5-1 |
| 5.2.4 Entry Control | 5-1 |
| 5.3 Individual Responsibilities | 5-2 |
| 5.3.1 Facility Manager | 5-2 |
| 5.3.2 Supervisors..... | 5-2 |
| 5.3.3 Individuals | 5-2 |
| 5.4 Workplace Layout | 5-2 |
| 5.4.1 Furniture..... | 5-2 |
| 5.4.2 Observation | 5-3 |
| 5.4.3 Separation of Public and Private Areas | 5-3 |
| 5.4.4 Accessibility..... | 5-3 |
| 5.4.5 Egress..... | 5-3 |

CHAPTER 6—INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS: ESCAPE, BARRICADE, OR FIGHT

| | |
|---|-----|
| 6.1 Active Shooter Considerations | 6-1 |
| 6.2 Escape, Barricade, or Fight | 6-1 |
| 6.2.1 Escape | 6-1 |
| 6.2.2 Barricade | 6-2 |
| 6.2.3 Fight..... | 6-3 |
| 6.3 What to Expect When First Responders Arrive on the Scene | 6-5 |
| 6.4 How to React When First Responders Arrive | 6-5 |

CHAPTER 7—TRAINING BEFORE DEPLOYMENT

| | |
|---|-----|
| 7.1 Program Design | 7-1 |
| 7.2 Air Force Mandated Training | 7-1 |
| 7.3 Airmen Tasked to Deploy | 7-1 |
| 7.4 Airmen in Tier 3, Advanced Expeditionary Skills Training | 7-1 |
| 7.5 Training Prior to Deployment | 7-1 |

ATTACHMENT 1—GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING

INFORMATION

| | |
|--|------|
| A1.1 References | A1-1 |
| A1.2 Adopted Forms | A1-1 |
| A1.3 Abbreviations and Acronyms | A1-1 |
| A1.4 Additional Information Resources | A1-2 |

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1 Combat and Operational Stress Continuum..... 2-2

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

| | | |
|-----------|--|-----|
| Table 2.1 | Tactical Response Team (TRT) Zone Descriptions | 2-3 |
| Table 7.1 | Additional Training | 7-2 |

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

CHAPTER 1

DEVELOPING THE WARRIOR MINDSET

1.1 Overview. Commanders and leaders at all levels should develop their Airmen to have a warrior mindset to help them survive when faced with an active shooter threat. Realistic training will condition Airmen to fight through factors that may normally cause them to hesitate when faced with a threat. By employing realistic and practical training, we help Airmen understand the changes that occur in the body and mind and by doing so, empower the warrior mindset. This training should be part of a commander's home station responsibility and must not start or end at expeditionary training centers. To meet this responsibility, it is imperative leaders understand how to appropriately conduct training and avoid conditioning and training pitfalls to increase chances for survival. The following term is included to clarify the scope of this AFTTP.

1.1.1 Active Shooter. One or more subjects who participate in a shooting, random or systematic, with the intent to continuously harm others. The term "active shooter" will also include anyone who uses any other deadly weapon (knife, club, bow and arrow, explosive, etc.) to commit the incident.

1.2 The Mindset. The first step in enhancing an Airman's chances of survival is to actively develop and foster a warrior mindset. The need for all Airmen to possess a proper mindset is essential for their defense and the defense of their fellow Airmen.

1.2.1 Warrior Mindset. The warrior mindset is more important than polished technique. When faced with an attack, act immediately and escape. Do not let anything get in your way of survival or mission accomplishment. As Sir Winston Churchill said, "Never give in! Never give in! Never, never, never, give in except to convictions of honor and good sense." The essential components of the warrior mindset are:

1.2.1.1 Toughness. The uninhibited mental resolution to aggressively react to illegal violence with a fierce and violent defense.

1.2.1.2 Immediate Response. Respond immediately with the appropriate level of force. Stop the attack and escape or press forward with the mission. A warrior does not wait, as the advantage is the surprise of instant and direct offense.

1.2.1.3 Focus. Stay focused on your goal of survival and mission accomplishment. Be persistent and continue to respond if the first response is not effective. Commit to your goal of survival and let nothing get in your way.

1.3 Factors Causing Unnecessary Hesitation When Reacting to a Threat. There are many factors, which may cause Airmen to hesitate when faced with an active shooter threat such as psychological inhibitions, personal beliefs, misunderstanding of the rules of engagement (ROE)/use of force policy, command policies, physiological changes, and prior training (or lack thereof). Commanders and leaders should provide training to mitigate the factors which cause unnecessary hesitation when reacting to a threat. This section discusses how commanders and Airmen can identify such factors, and develop an effective way of dealing with them to enable reasonable responses in use of force incidents.

1.3.1 Psychological Inhibitions. Human beings, like most animal species, do not naturally prey upon others in the same species. Humans have a natural inhibition to killing other human

beings. As members of the Armed Forces, there are those times when we may be required to take another's life. Proper conditioning, mentally rehearsing a self-defense scenario, and mental commitment to the use of deadly force prior to the event can improve the ability of Airmen to respond to acts of violence and fulfill this duty without unnecessary hesitation.

1.3.2 Personal Beliefs. Airmen must resolve personal issues within themselves such as commitment to mission, mortality, and willingness to sacrifice.

1.3.2.1 Airmen must overcome the false belief of, "This could never happen to me." The active shooter incidents in Fort Hood, Germany, and Afghanistan have proven any Airman may become the victim of an active shooter.

1.3.2.2 Another belief, which may hinder an Airman's ability to react to violence, is the false assumption others will respond on their behalf (such as Air Force Security Forces). Incidents at Fort Hood, Germany, and Afghanistan have proven these acts of violence will be well underway before emergency responders can respond to neutralize the threat and any Airman is a potential target. In most active shooter incidents, the person in the best position to stop the threat is the individual closest to the threat, to include the targeted victim.

1.3.2.3 An individual's religious preference may affect their ability to inflict aggression on others. Airmen, who believe their religion prohibits the use of force, including deadly force, should consult guidance from a chaplain to resolve these issues. Airmen may cause harm to themselves or others if they unnecessarily hesitate.

1.3.3 Understanding Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and ROE. Airmen must be clear on the right of individual defense and the defense of others. Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander, Airmen may exercise individual self-defense in the response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Understanding the right of self defense may prevent unnecessary hesitation and save their lives and the lives of their fellow Airmen. Each Airman, no matter the career field, duty position, or rank must feel confident their leadership, Air Force, and government will protect them from legal harm if they appropriately use force to protect themselves or their fellow Airmen. Commanders and leaders at all levels can overcome this hesitation by reinforcing the Airman's right to use all means necessary and appropriate for personal or unit self-defense and incorporate this information into training scenarios.

1.3.4 Understanding the Application of Force. Some Airmen may believe that deadly force is employed only as a last resort and used only when all lesser means are exhausted. Time and circumstances permitting, Airmen should attempt to deescalate use of force situations; however, the use of deadly force may be a reasonable and appropriate first option if necessary and proportionate to the threat encountered.

1.3.4.1 A domino effect occurs when reasonable use of force is not applied immediately to gain control or compliance. Circumstances of the incident become either more dangerous, out of control, or unmanageable for the personnel involved.

1.3.4.2 An Airman's ability to determine a reasonable force option quickly erodes as the complexity of the decision and assessment process increases.

1.3.4.3 When reasonable force is applied immediately and without hesitation, the application of force results in fewer injuries to both Airmen and offenders. This is due to a quick ending and establishment of control.

1.3.4.4 Airmen have no duty to retreat in an effort to avoid using force on a hostile aggressor when faced with a life-threatening act of violence. However, disengaging from a threat in order to gain a tactical advantage and put them into a position of advantage may be a reasonable response to a critical incident depending upon the totality of circumstances.

1.3.5 Local Command Policies. Commanders and local policies may unnecessarily restrict the ability of Airmen to protect themselves or place them at a tactical disadvantage. Commanders are encouraged to evaluate local risks to forces before employing policies, which restrict an Airmen's ability to protect themselves (e.g., changes in arming status, restricting types of weapons based on rank, preventing Airmen from carrying weapons). Additionally, commanders must consider factors that may place their subordinates at a tactical disadvantage (e.g., arming status other than what they are trained on, office lay out/design).

1.3.6 Physiological Changes. When faced with a threat, Airmen need to understand certain physiological changes may occur. These changes are triggered by the autonomic nervous system (ANS). The autonomic nervous system controls the parasympathetic and sympathetic nervous system, which are both involved in response to stress.

1.3.6.1 The sympathetic nervous system initiates a defense mechanism referred to as the “fight or flight” response when you are stressed with the perception of death or serious bodily harm. This response prepares the body for a survival reaction. A third response known as “freezing” could occur once the body's defense mechanism is activated. This response is important because it can affect an Airman's ability to react to the situation at hand.

1.3.6.2 Once the sympathetic nervous system is triggered, Airmen may experience negative effects in visual processing, motor skill performance, and cognitive processing. The following are physical responses to fear:

1.3.6.2.1 Pounding heart

1.3.6.2.2 Muscle tension

1.3.6.2.3 Trembling

1.3.6.2.4 Rapid, shallow breathing

1.3.6.2.5 Dizziness

1.3.6.2.6 Nausea

1.3.6.2.7 Gut wrenching knot

1.3.6.2.8 Sweating

1.3.6.2.9 Dry mouth

1.3.6.2.10 Goose bumps

1.3.6.2.11 Tingling sensation in limbs and/or face

- 1.3.6.2.12 Insensitive to pain
- 1.3.6.2.13 Jumpy, easily startled
- 1.3.6.2.14 Urge to urinate
- 1.3.6.2.15 Urge to defecate
- 1.3.6.2.16 Loss of fine motor skills
- 1.3.6.2.17 Loss of complex motor skills
- 1.3.6.2.18 Loss of depth perception
- 1.3.6.2.19 Loss of near vision
- 1.3.6.2.20 Increase in gross motor skills

1.3.7 Perceptual Changes from Fear.

1.3.7.1 Tunnel Vision. The loss of peripheral vision. Your field of vision may narrow to mere inches and you may lose depth perception and the ability to see what is behind the threat.

1.3.7.2 Heightened Visual Clarity. While experiencing tunnel vision, you may have a clear picture of details you ordinarily might not notice or remember.

1.3.7.3 Hearing Distortion. The most common hearing distortion is diminished sound, which may include a total loss of hearing to muffled and distant. You may not hear shots being fired, people yelling at you, or sirens coming your way.

1.3.7.4 Time Distortion. Things may seem to slow down (slow motion) or speed up. Airmen can experience both types of time distortion during the same incident.

1.3.8 Cognitive/Behavioral Changes.

1.3.8.1 Automatic Behavior. Most participants in a traumatic event give little or no thought to their behavior; they just instinctively do what their experience has programmed them to do. This is why service members are told “you will do what you train to do, so trust your training.”

1.3.8.2 Memory Gaps. It is normal when you are involved in a deadly force encounter to not remember parts of what happened and parts of what you did. Memories of high threat situations are often like a series of snapshots, some vivid, some blurry, and some even missing.

1.3.8.3 Intrusive Thoughts. Sometimes you may have intrusive thoughts that may not be immediately relevant to your current situation. You might think of your family, some future event, or a previous event that reminds you of the present one.

1.3.9 Commander Considerations. The Air Force currently provides commanders and leaders with a wide array of training opportunities to aid in the development of the warrior mindset. If commanders and leaders effectively execute existing training and avoid training pitfalls, these current opportunities expose Airmen to the desired conditioning needed. The training is intended to: (1) expose the member to realistic situations they may experience

operationally, and (2) condition them to respond appropriately under stress to prepare for future unknown challenges.

1.3.10 Conditioning/Training Pitfalls. The three primary ways leaders improperly condition their Airmen are: (1) unintentionally conditioning Airmen to react in an undesired manner, (2) relying on a single training event to yield desired operational capabilities, and (3) by excessive use of simulation of individual action during exercise scenarios.

1.3.10.1 Unintentional Conditioning. Base X conducted operational readiness training by placing Airmen in simulated combat scenarios during their field training exercises (FTX). All Airmen “deployed” to the FTX were issued weapons; however, only security forces were issued blank ammunition. When the opposing forces (OPFOR) attacked the base, only security forces had the means to engage the enemy. This approach was the installation's standard training structure for years. A follow-on scenario was conducted at a training event where security forces were removed from the FTX and blank ammunition was issued to the remaining Airmen. When the base was under attack during the second scenario, few Airmen engaged the OPFOR and some never even loaded their weapons. When the installation's Exercise Evaluation Team (EET) questioned the Airmen as to why they had not engaged the active shooter, some responded they “forgot” they had a weapon. So what was the failure? The standard training conditioned the non-security forces Airmen to not fight back even when attacked. In addition, Airmen were conditioned to view their weapon as a burden rather than the key to their survival. These lessons were even more important because this was not the intention of leadership.

1.3.10.2 Relying on a single training event to yield desired operational capabilities. The execution of a singular training task in most cases will not yield an operational capability. Capabilities are normally developed through a continual developmental process of interrelated activities, concepts, and principles. For example, a commander wishes to develop their Airmen's ability to engage a hostile threat with their weapon and uses Air Force weapons certification firing to meet this objective. This singular approach to training does not yield the desired capability because weapons certification provides the Airmen with the intellectual ability of how to use a weapon, but it alone does not condition them to physically (through muscle memory or stimulus response) and immediately react to a threat, nor does it cultivate the psychological mindset needed to react effectively to violence.

1.3.10.3 Excessive use of simulation of individual action during exercise scenarios. Realistic exercise scenarios may yield great benefits in conditioning the appropriate response. However, when individual actions are allowed to be simulated, the outcome is degradation in appropriate conditioning. Excessive simulation of individual actions conditions Airmen to ignore the initial warnings, hesitate in their actions (wait to hear the direction to simulate), or not act at all. An installation may have a robust training and exercise program; however, if individuals are allowed to simulate their action then the exercise does little more than meet an annual exercise requirement rather than providing the desired level of conditioning.

1.3.10.4 Allowing Airmen to “lose” during training scenarios. One of the greatest benefits of proper training is developing confidence in one's skills and abilities. Conversely,

developing training scenarios (particularly those associated with survival skills) where Airmen are allowed to lose or fail creates doubt in their skills and abilities. When training Airmen, the training must condition them to win and allow them to believe if they execute as trained they will survive/win. Leaders who train Airmen and then place them in unwinnable scenarios not only undermine the value of the training, it allows Airmen to doubt their own abilities. This creation of doubt causes unnecessary hesitation when an Airman is required to take life saving actions. Leaders teach Airmen to survive and win, not to lose and die. There is time for lessons learned after the scenario. The simple rule here is if Airmen execute as trained and conditioned, then they walk off the field after a survival or combat scenario as a winner—every time.

1.3.11 Appropriate Application of Training Elements. In order for training to be effective, it must focus less on task certification and more on conditioning the response of the Airmen. To develop a warrior mindset, training should condition the Airmen's physical, intellectual, and psychological abilities to react to violence.

1.3.11.1 Physical Elements of Training. The physical elements of training achieve two objectives: (1) conditioning the Airmen to be physically capable to execute the task (physical fitness), and (2) the ability to react to the threat without hesitation during periods of high stress (muscle memory). It is important to note that just because a training class is physical in nature does not mean it meets the physical elements of training (physical fitness or muscle memory). Courses that are physical in nature, but merely introduce or familiarize a task (e.g., annual weapons qualification, annual chemical warfare training) meet the intellectual elements of training. Examples of activities, which develop physical element, are:

- 1.3.11.1.1 Proficiency drills (stimulus response)
- 1.3.11.1.2 Quick reactionary weapons drills
- 1.3.11.1.3 Physical fitness
- 1.3.11.1.4 Weapons proficiency (not merely qualification)
- 1.3.11.1.5 Combatives type training (must be routinely trained)

1.3.11.2 The intellectual elements of training are to inform, familiarize, clarify, or introduce subject matter required for a task. Examples of activities that develop intellectual element are:

- 1.3.11.2.1 Understanding policies and procedures
- 1.3.11.2.2 Understanding individual responsibilities
- 1.3.11.2.3 Understanding of threat indicators
- 1.3.11.2.4 Understanding LOAC and ROE
- 1.3.11.2.5 Annual weapons qualification
- 1.3.11.2.6 Annual chemical warfare training
- 1.3.11.2.7 Training which overcomes learned behaviors or inappropriate personal beliefs (the “this could never happen to me” mentality)

1.3.11.3 Psychological Element of Training. The psychological elements of training condition Airmen in three main areas to: (1) overcome physiological inhibitions, (2) foster the development of a desired mindset, and (3) overcome the physical, cognitive, and behavioral responses of fear and stress. Some training designed to condition Airmen physically can also yield psychological benefits. For example, using a virtual weapons training simulator achieves the physical element of weapons proficiency while the interface with humanlike targets helps overcome the physiological inhibitions of engaging another human. Additionally, physical training such as combatives helps develop the mindset and will to fight while allowing Airmen to overcome fear of personal injury. Psychological training can help inoculate Airmen to the stress and fear of combat so they can function during high stress situations by introducing them to the visual, audio, and situational stimuli prior to an actual event. Lastly, preparing Airmen psychologically yields benefits beyond effectively reacting to enemy contact. This element of training can strengthen Airmen resiliency and enhances survival after the fight. Examples of activities, which develop psychological elements, are:

1.3.11.3.1 Combatives training

1.3.11.3.2 Reality based training (dynamic and interactive)

1.3.11.3.3 Continuous positive visualization

1.3.11.3.4 Virtual simulation

1.3.11.3.5 Live exercise (with realistic sounds, smells, sights, and scenarios)

1.3.11.3.6 Stress Inoculation. Under high-stress conditions, over-learned behaviors (i.e., those previously experienced and repeatedly trained where limited decision-making is required) will be those easiest to use when it really matters, especially under challenging or adrenaline-inducing circumstances.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

CHAPTER 2

ENHANCING RESILIENCY BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER AN ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE

2.1 Definition of Resilience. Resilience is the ability to respond, withstand, recover, and/or grow in the face of stressors and changing demands. Resilience does not mean an absence of stress or fear. Resilience during an active shooter incident is about a process of performing under stress, resisting the effects it may have, and then recovering and restoring as needed. Practical applications and how to build resilience in preparation for, in response to, and after an active shooter incident are both straightforward and complex. The following chapter highlights opportunities for leaders to enhance these areas as well as address issues specific to active shooter response. This list is not meant to be exhaustive and commanders should adapt the information, as they deem appropriate.

2.2 Comprehensive Airmen Fitness. The foundations of resilience are physical, mental, social, and spiritual fitness, which is covered under Comprehensive Airmen Fitness. According to research, these domains include a number of areas in which there is an increase in the chance for an adaptive or resilient minded response during a stressful incident. The following list highlights factors under each of the areas that leaders must help strengthen equally to be optimally effective. Strengthening actions should focus on teams, units, families, and individual Airmen to be effective.

2.2.1 Physical. Includes physical fitness and wellness; as well as the physical strength, endurance, and physical skills to accomplish tasks.

2.2.2 Mental. Familiarity with specific threat situations, necessary mental skills including mental toughness, self-confidence and self-knowledge, overall psychological wellness, willpower, and fortitude.

2.2.3 Spiritual. Resources outside oneself to build fortitude, sense of purpose and rightness of mission and actions, as well as general spiritual fitness.

2.2.4 Social. Trust in peers, family, organizations, leadership, desire to help others, and effective utilization of support resources.

2.3 Strategies to Strengthen Resilience.

2.3.1 Recognition (Understanding Natural Threat Response). There will be a variety of reactions during and after an active shooter incident particularly from those directly involved in engaging the active shooter. It is important to normalize these reactions while making sure there are no particular issues of concern to be addressed. One way to look at a range of responses to the stressors of an active shooter incident is the continuum outlined below. See [Figure 2.1](#), Combat and Operational Stress Continuum. Most individuals will respond in the green and yellow zone where some stress is expected due the natural survival response system being engaged.

2.3.1.1 This continuum was modified from a United States (US) Navy/US Marine model. The only significant difference between the model below and the US Navy/US Marine model is that the US Navy has “Ready” as the “Green” category while “Responding” is emphasized in this model. Though readiness is implied in the model, in terms of reacting

to stress it is important to emphasize that during stress one need not just react but also respond optimally because stress can enhance performance. The continuum is only meant as a gauge as it could be likely someone may be somewhere in between responding and reacting or reacting and a stress injury and the descriptions particularly in the green through yellow can vary by individual. **Table 2.1**, Tactical Response Team (TRT) Zone Descriptions, demonstrates how the TRT physiological stress response system (adrenaline and cortisol) and the mental controls work together to initiate a survival response.

Figure 2.1 Combat and Operational Stress Continuum




Table 2.1 Tactical Response Team (TRT) Zone Descriptions

| Zone | Description |
|--------------------|---|
| Responding (Green) | Stress can help increase performance. Tactical, mental and physical skills are working in sync to optimize the Tactical Response Team (TRT) response to a threat such as an active shooter. There may be some fine motor skill deterioration, which is why effective training and practice is necessary to overcome this. Performance is at its peak when responding and the experience has been described as “Flow” or “Being in the Zone”. |
| Reacting (Yellow) | Depending on length or intensity of the stressor and preparation, optimal response to a threat will begin to decline at some point. Heart rate may be increasing beyond optimal levels and complex motor skills begin to deteriorate. Communication may begin to break down and the likelihood of mistakes will increase. An individual may actually feel the physiological effects of stress and might notice some decline in performance. For the better trained and more fit, the decline in performance may be delayed, but this varies by individual and depends on the situation. Whether responding or reacting to stress, some recovery may be needed. |
| Injury (Orange) | Stress injuries are different from stress reactions because although they are less common, anyone, even the most fit individual, can be at risk. Stress injury means there has been some damage because of the stress. The individual may no longer feel like him/herself. Stress injuries can heal but they can also leave scars because of the intensity of a stressor, but remember resilience does not mean an absence of scars. They can occur due to life threatening situations or where one has witnessed mass devastation, general fatigue from the wear and tear of mission grind, or because of the loss of someone or something, or shattered assumptions that affect ones values (e.g., having to shoot at children who are being used as combatants). It is possible to experience daily stress, be involved in a firefight, and witness the death of an innocent and have no ongoing problems or stress injury. It is normal to react to these events, and it is also possible for someone to experience a stress injury. A stress injury can be recovered from, but this can take days, weeks, or months. |
| Illness (Red) | Results from an unhealed stress injury can be treated to facilitate recovery but will likely require assistance from a professional such as a psychologist. It is likely to significantly impact one or more areas of performance, and it is important for individuals, team members, and leaders to recognize where team members may fall along the continuum and take appropriate action. |

2.3.2 Performance Optimization (Thrive Under Threat).

2.3.2.1 Training Overview. Optimal performance under challenging conditions requires the collaboration of technical, physical, and mental skill. Training plays an essential role in developing these skills and increases the likelihood they will be in sync when needed.

2.3.2.1.1 Three basic principles for training include:

2.3.2.1.1.1 Making training as realistic as possible to minimize surprises when engaging an active shooter. Varied scenarios and repeated practice are one way to accomplish this. Intense surprises can be detrimental to psychological health.

2.3.2.1.1.2 Training should be tough enough to push unit members to develop new skills but not so difficult they will fail to master the challenges or cause them to experience stress injuries during training.

2.3.2.1.1.3 Promoting communication peer to peer as well as leader to subordinates through shared hardships as well as success is also important.

2.3.2.2 Training Suggestions.

2.3.2.2.1 Training should entail an understanding of what happens physiologically and psychologically under such situations (i.e., the natural survival response and what that feels and looks like). This is important to normalize any reactions but also make aware the impact of this natural reaction can be managed.

2.3.2.2.2 Before active shooter scenarios, mental toughness skills should also be taught as these are tools that can be used to manage threat response with the aim to build a warrior mindset.

2.3.2.2.3 Events after an active shooter incident can be just as stressful as the incident itself; therefore, a scenario should include realistic debriefing by individuals role-playing Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) or commanders so they can be exposed to what the event will entail. It can take some time to regulate down the stress chemicals in the body, so having to practice responding to the aftermath of an active shooter incident is critical.

2.3.3 Building Protection (Bend Under Threat).

2.3.3.1 Training helps to optimize performance and may build some protection against the stress of responding to an active shooter. As stated previously, good preparation increases confidence and helps an individual manage their response system. Training is also one way for teams to practice working together and supporting each other during and after an intense situation. If a scenario would include a range of expected reactions after an active shooter incident (e.g., someone who is struggling because they may have had to take a life, or someone not having difficulties except for the stress of the inquiry afterwards) this would allow for individuals and teams to practice how they would respond and support that individual.

2.3.3.2 Unit cohesion and social support are key factors in promoting resilience. It can be developed through communication, trust, respect, loyalty, and familiarity. The more opportunities to face challenges successfully through training and other shared activities,

the more likely cohesion can be built. After action reports (AAR) after an incident may also be an opportunity to facilitate social support.

2.3.4 Restoration (Recovering After Responding to Threat).

2.3.4.1 There may be a variety of responses after an active shooter incident from no reaction, to an excitement because of adrenaline or fatigue, and confusion. Any one of these is normal, but because physical and mental energy is expended, recovery is needed even if no injury is sustained. This could be as simple as rest and sleep, good food, and an opportunity to socialize. If a stress reaction continues (yellow) or a stress injury has occurred/developed, ensuring that individual gets the proper support needed is essential. Getting a stress injury attended to should be no different from having a physical injury managed and leadership should promote a culture where this care is acceptable and expected for continued mission success and individual performance.

2.4 Tactical Mental Toughness Skills. These skills are designed to optimize performance and enhance resilience. Mental toughness focuses on two primary aspects: composure and concentration. During an active shooter incident, this translates into: does an individual pay attention to what matters and can they do what is necessary without allowing emotions to control their actions? Below are some mental toughness skills that may be utilized to enhance resilience and performance under intense stress such as active shooter response.

2.4.1 Tactical Breathing. Tactical breathing is a technique employed to consciously control breathing to overcome or prevent the physical effects of stress. To execute tactical breathing, you inhale through your nose to the count of four seconds, hold your breath for four seconds, exhale through your mouth slowly for four seconds, and hold your breath for four seconds.

2.4.2 Warrior Mindset. Strong sense of purpose, clear values that drive action, commitment to appropriate action to achieve goals, not giving up.

2.4.3 Attention Management. Internal and external awareness, ability to reduce unhelpful mental static.

2.5 Lesson on Survival Response. First, it is important to understand how the body reacts when it faces any kind of real or perceived threat so one can anticipate those expected effects and recognize when natural physiological reactions are either increasing or hindering an optimal response. Early recognition allows for adjustment to enhance the possibility of an optimal response and outcome. When a threat is perceived, the brain (primarily the amygdala responsible for fear response) sends signals to structures in the brain that secrete stress response chemicals—adrenaline and cortisol. This physiological response is an essential part of a TRT we have built into our system to respond to threats. “You may see a muzzle flash, as if in stop action, or even see a bullet in the air or you may have a vivid image of the gun, or even a ring on the suspect's hand, but not remember his face” (Artwohl & Christensen, 1997, p.40). This quote is describing the experience of tunnel vision, which can result naturally as the body's natural defense system kicks in. The tunnel vision we experience in dangerous situations, and the physical changes going along with it, are all natural processes designed to help keep us alive. Although this survival mechanism is extremely important and useful, if left unchecked it can actually cause a decline in performance and lead to health-related problems. Learning to manage your TRT system can therefore be a life-saving skill.

2.5.1 Adrenaline and Cortisol. Adrenaline and cortisol increase blood sugar, blood pressure, and heart rate amongst other physiological responses in an effort to initiate our fight or flight response. Examples of how this can help include stories of people being able to suddenly lift heavy objects, running faster, etc. There can also be negative effects if the TRT is always responding or responding incorrectly, which can hurt long-term sustained performance. It is possible for the TRT to get overloaded or overrun quickly and without warning particularly under extreme conditions. This can be helped by proper training and preparation including mental preparation.

2.5.2 Heart Rate. The stress response chemical, adrenaline, affects heart rate making it a good but not a perfect gauge of the stress response. When at rest, our heart rate is typically between 60 to 80 beats per minute (BPM). At around 115 BPM, we start to lose control of fine motor skills. At around 145 BPM, our complex motor skills deteriorate. This includes hand-eye coordination and multitasking. Above 175 BPM, our brain stops processing information and we start to feel the physical effects of tunnel vision. Above 175 BPM is where we see undesirable combat behaviors, including submission and/or flight when doing so is inappropriate.

2.5.3 Controlling Heart Rate. During an active shooter incident, it is important to be able to control your heart rate between 115 to 145 BPM where mental processes are sharpest. Because this optimal zone is also at the level where we experience fine motor skill deterioration, these skill should be practiced over and over again to make sure these physical problems can be overcome. These mental effects occur only as a result of adrenaline-induced heart rate increases. Elevating your heart rate during exercise, for example, will not cause tunnel vision. It is important to note that physiological response system does not distinguish between daily and operational stressors or real threats (active shooter) versus perceived threats (“I might look bad if I don't respond well”).

2.5.4 Fear and Rage Responses. There is another part of the brain (the limbic system) involved in memory, learning, and emotional ties, particularly to the fear response. Fear and rage to some degree are part of the survival response. However, the system within our brain for this is fairly primitive and these emotions can be quite raw, overpowering, and negatively impact performance if not regulated. This can lead to impaired decision making and reduces the ability to utilize fine motor skills. Fear and rage are natural emotions, part of our survival system, and efforts should not be to eliminate or suppress them but rather to regulate them for an optimal response.

2.5.5 Controlling Thoughts. The thinking part of the TRT is primarily in the frontal lobes and can help optimize our response by leveraging the body's natural survival response system. This part of the team is responsible for higher order function like decision-making, impulse control, and the regulation of emotions. Instead of reacting, it allows the TRT to ACT (ACT= adrenaline + cortisol + thought) purposefully and sets us apart from animals who also have an ingrained flight or fight response. It is important to note that our thoughts can also have a negative impact on our ability to respond optimally. For instance if we feel unprepared or doubt our ability, we essentially create “mental static” distracting us from the task at hand and reduces our ability to perform optimally.

2.5.6 TRT Activation. If your TRT is not activated when you need it, you will tend to feel fatigued, exhausted, and not perform very well. It is almost as though you are asleep at the wheel. As the TRT engages to meet the challenge, you will perform better. However if your TRT is too high, your performance will be degraded due to agitation, sleep problems, and distractibility. Over the long term, if a TRT remains in overdrive for too long, it can have a negative impact on your health. In fact, your body can forget how to turn it off, and you can start experiencing physical and mental health problems that interfere with your daily performance.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

CHAPTER 3

WEAPONS PROFICIENCY

3.1 Weapons Proficiency. Over the past couple of decades, United States Air Force (USAF) ground combat missions have changed dramatically. Our operations are no longer confined to the air base or limited to primarily defensive operations. We are involved in many outside the wire missions, as well as embedded with sister Services and performing more direct combat functions than ever. Additionally, active shooter incidents like those in Germany and Afghanistan serve as grim reminders that all Airmen are susceptible to attack. These factors direct a fundamental change in the way our Airmen view their need to maintain proficiency with small arms/light weapons and the way leadership emphasizes the criticality of these skills. Commanders, supervisors, and trainers must ensure weapon training extends beyond qualification training provided by combat arms. They should implement unit level weapons proficiency and sustainment programs to facilitate improved weapons handling skills, tactical movement, weapons retention, and performing assigned duties while bearing arms. Commanders have many options, ranging from live-fire weapons qualification to knowledge level training using existing Air Force policies and resources. Three key publications guiding Air Force weapons training and handling policies are AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*, AFI 36-2226, *Combat Arms Program*, and AFMAN 31-229, *USAF Weapons Handling Manual*.

3.2 Weapons Qualification. Air Force personnel with an in-garrison arming requirement or are deploying to a contingency operation must complete qualification training conducted by Air Force Combat Arms on the weapon(s) and equipment they will use while armed. As an example, all Airmen are required to conduct rifle/carbine qualification training with individual combat equipment and using any authorized accessories they will use when armed. During handgun qualification training, Airmen must use the authorized type of holster in the configuration they will use while carrying the weapon. The Air Force small arms training infrastructure (ranges and classroom training facilities) cannot support live-fire qualification and proficiency training for all Airmen. Therefore, the Air Force has developed qualification-training policies focusing on those Airmen with the greatest need to maintain weapons proficiency. The Air Force classifies individuals into one of two arming groups based on their need to be armed or potential for armed conflict, Group A and Group B.

3.2.1 Group A Personnel. Group A personnel are those individuals who are serving in an Air Force specialty code (AFSC) that specifies qualification to bear firearms as a mandatory requirement, those who are armed in-garrison, and those with a higher potential for armed conflict. Examples of Group A personnel are security forces, AFOSI agents, battlefield Airmen specialties, and security force augmentees.

3.2.1.1 These individuals must complete qualification training annually on all weapons with which they are or will be armed.

3.2.1.2 Additionally, security forces and battlefield Airmen specialties must complete unit level live-fire sustainment training five to seven months after completing qualification training each year.

3.2.2 Group B Personnel. Group B personnel are those individuals other than Group A who are required to be armed as designated by deployment orders to meet Air Force War and

Mobilization Plan or Air Expeditionary Force unit type code (UTC) deployment requirements and have no in-garrison or peacetime arming requirement.

3.2.2.1 Group B individuals complete qualification training only when they are actually tasked to deploy to a contingency operation.

3.2.2.2 Commanders may designate up to 10 percent of Group B personnel assigned to a UTC with a designed operational capability (DOC) statement requiring a 72 hour or less response time, or units with a Joint Mission Tasking/Charter, to complete annual pre-deployment qualification training. This allows these individuals to maintain readiness when short-notice qualification training is not feasible.

3.2.2.3 Although requiring all Airmen to complete some form of weapons training on a recurring basis is desirable, live fire training is not feasible for most units. Therefore, commanders and supervisors must develop creative solutions to address weapons skills needed for their Airmen relevant to the duties they are expected to perform.

3.3 Unit Sustainment Training Programs. Commanders have several options for implementing unit sustainment training programs. Some Group A personnel are required to conduct live fire proficiency with their assigned weapons at recurring times. Other units are authorized proficiency munitions to hone their skills. Units that do not have assigned weapons or munitions authorizations have resources available they can use to increase weapons handling and proficiency.

3.3.1 Live-Fire Sustainment Training. AFI 36-2226 allows users with authorized proficiency ammunition to create a weapons training program more in-line with their operational needs. This effort does not replace periodic Air Force weapons qualification requirements but is additional training to maintain perishable skills by affording personnel more live-fire time. Individuals must be currently qualified on the weapon prior to participating in the live-fire proficiency/ sustainment program. Only combat arms personnel are authorized to conduct weapons qualification training, but anyone certified as a range official by the combat arms noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), as outlined in AFI 36-2226, can conduct live-fire proficiency or sustainment training.

3.3.1.1 Units with authorized proficiency munitions may use Air Force small arms ranges to conduct their proficiency/sustainment training on an as available basis. The combat arms NCOIC will establish procedures for scheduling and use of the firing range. Individuals who will use the range must meet all range safety official training requirement outlined in AFI 36-2226.

3.3.1.2 Before conducting live fire training, combat arms must approve courses/type of fire for each weapon used to ensure the proposed course of fire does not exceed the safety limits of the range.

3.3.1.3 The unit training section can establish a unit level proficiency weapons training program at the discretion of the unit commander in accordance with AFI 36-2226. This program should focus training on advanced weapons tactics, techniques, and procedures. This program should also be progressive in nature to encourage a continual improvement in weapons handling skills and tactics proficiency.

3.3.1.4 Another option for units with access to weapons may be developing unit training programs utilizing close combat mission capability kits (CCMCK). The CCMCK is a temporary modification to the M9 and/or M16/M4 that allows firing of dye-marking rounds and prevents chambering or firing of live rounds. These non-lethal rounds allow force-on-force training and can be used for limited marksmanship training. There are training and certification requirements for individuals who conduct training with CCMCKs and safety provisions for performing the training. These requirements are included in the Headquarters Air Force Security Forces Center (HQ AFSFC) CCMCK Training Concept of Operations (CONOPS).

3.3.2 Unit Sustainment Training (Non Live-Fire). Unit commanders may institute a weapons training program that does not include live-fire. This training will help personnel maintain perishable skills by affording individuals increased weapons training. When units use operational weapons for this type training, unit trainers must be qualified on the weapon(s) prior to conducting training. Individuals are not required to be qualified in order to participate in non-live-fire small arms training. For this initiative to be effective, unit commanders, supervisors, and trainers must be open-minded and creative without sacrificing safety.

3.3.2.1 If weapons are available, units can conduct mechanical weapons training. This type of training is a highly effective way to increase weapons familiarity and should be accomplished at unit level by noncommissioned officers (NCO) qualified on the weapon. Skills such as loading, clearing, and immediate action can be instructed and practiced with dummy rounds or empty magazines. Training can also include disassembly, assembly and care/cleaning procedures. AFPAM 10-100, *Airman's Manual*, is a readily available reference and contains a weapon skills section that unit NCOs can use to provide unit level training on the M9 pistol and the M16/M4 rifle/carbine.

3.3.2.2 Virtual Training Systems (VTS). This type of training is an efficient and time/cost effective tool that provides real world training at the unit level in marksmanship, use of force, theater or command specific ROE, and tactical and judgmental scenarios. VTS are very good for initial through advanced marksmanship and remedial training. Personnel are encouraged to utilize VTS to practice marksmanship fundamentals prior to qualification training. Approved courseware is authorized for Air Force use and encouraged for training at the unit level.

3.3.2.3 Computer Based Training (CBT). Modules for the M16 rifle and M9 pistol are available on the Air Education and Training Command (AETC) Advanced Distributed Learning System website and individuals are encouraged to complete these courses prior to attending combat arms qualification training. Additionally, commanders and unit training personnel may use this training to augment qualification training and as part of unit sustainment training programs.

3.3.2.4 Units can purchase and incorporate firearms replicas (plastic guns) into local exercises and train on weapons handling and movement techniques, as well as individual/group security procedures for protecting weapons. Replica weapons must be of a color that is easily identifiable as not being a real weapon, such as red or blue. Units must secure and account for these training devices when not in use.

3.3.2.5 Another easily implemented training option is mandated self-study or group training on the weapon skills section of AFPAM 10-100. This can help to keep individuals' weapons knowledge at a more proficient level. Additional training references include HQ AFSFC rifle/carbine and handgun instructor guides (available on the US Air Force Combat Arms Community of Practice [CoP]) and US Army Field Manuals, which individuals may obtain from the Army Knowledge Online site. These publications are readily available and provide excellent sources for unit training programs.

3.4 Arming Standards and Configurations. AFI 31-117 contains guidance on Air Force arming standards, requirements, and suitability standards. Commanders should use this publication as a reference for questions on these topics. AFMAN 31-229 includes the Air Force approved loading and clearing procedures for all standard Air Force weapons. This is the sole reference for approved weapons handling procedures and is a valuable reference for unit training.

3.5 Small Arms and Related Equipment. The HQ AFSFC is the lead for US Air Force small arms/light weapons and related equipment requirements for all Air Force users.

3.5.1 Commercial Weapons. Units are not authorized to procure commercial weapons parts, accessories (e.g., grips, slings, holsters, lights) or use/attach/install any items on an Air Force weapon not approved by HQ AFSFC and the Air Force Small Arms Program Office. The base combat arms section is the focal point for all authorized weapon parts procurement and replacement. Additionally, the base combat arms section is the only organization authorized to perform any maintenance above operator level as indicated in the applicable weapon technical order.

3.5.2 Authorized Small Arms. HQ AFSFC/SFXW maintains a listing of authorized Air Force small arms and light weapons accessories on their CoP site or through installation CATM section. Commanders must ensure that individuals do not install any unapproved items on Air Force weapons. The use of non-military specification parts/accessories or items that have not been adequately tested may interfere with the proper operation of the weapon or the weapon may fail during use placing the user at risk. Additionally, HQ AFSFC develops all qualification training for these approved items. Allowing individuals to use items without proper training may also place them at risk.

3.6 Summary. This chapter provides Air Force leaders with a general background on Air Force weapons qualification training policies and current options for providing increased weapons training at unit level. If leaders embrace the concept that weapons proficiency is a core Air Force skill and implement some of these options, Airmen will receive increased and enhanced training on weapons, thus improving their combat capability and survivability.

CHAPTER 4

IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, AND DISSEMINATION

4.1 Identification, Prevention, and Dissemination. Active shooter incidents are incredibly dangerous and difficult because there is no criminal objective (e.g., robbery, hostage taking) involved other than violence. Often, the shooter has no regard for their life, and may be planning to die. These factors leave responding forces little recourse but to locate and stop the shooter as quickly as possible. As a result, installation commanders are encouraged to not only focus on their readiness to respond to these types of incidents, but to also focus planning efforts on mitigating the threat through awareness training. This training should be geared toward detecting behaviors indicative of an individual's propensity for violence and ensure sufficient dissemination of this information. This chapter focuses on mitigating threats through awareness training for behavioral indicators of violence, preventive efforts to mitigate the active shooter threat in a deployed environment, and dissemination/information sharing.

4.2 Cultural Awareness. A red team study of mutual perceptions of Afghan National Security Force personnel and US Army Soldiers titled “*A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility*” (author Jeffrey Bordin, 12 May 2011) indicated a pervasive and progressive insider threat that must be addressed. The author of the study came to a series of conclusions and recommendations to be considered as universally applicable regardless of the deployment area of responsibility (AOR).

4.2.1 Cultural Awareness Training. Increase the emphasis on cultural awareness training. While cultural awareness training is provided at many of our pre-deployment training venues, it seemingly falls short based on the findings of this study. Specifically, the training must not only focus on awareness of the host nation (HN) culture, but on what our forces should avoid doing that may be perceived as offensive to the HN. An effective way of imparting this training at pre-deployment training venues is through scenario based conflict resolution training. Scenarios should be as realistic as possible and, when available, should use actors thoroughly familiar with the HN cultural differences and spoken language.

4.2.2 Mental Preparation. Mentally prepare our forces for the extreme cultural and societal differences they can expect to encounter. Many cultural or societal norms, such as animal mistreatment or subservient treatment of females and children, are morally offensive to our forces and often result in significant animosity between US and HN forces working in close proximity. This training should not focus on attempting to rationalize these types of behaviors; rather it should focus on conditioning our forces to react professionally versus emotionally in their response. Our forces must understand reacting with aggression or anger could precipitate a violent response, prompting unprofessional responses at a minimum and at worst an unnecessary liability to our forces. Reinforce the need for our forces to “police” themselves and correct anyone demonstrating actions or attitudes that may result in a liability to friendly forces (e.g., profanity, disrespect, lack of professionalism).

4.2.3 US Policy. Leaders must be continually aware of US policy changes and how HN forces may perceive those changes. For example, a US policy addressing fiscal constraints such as decreasing funding to HN training programs may be perceived by HN forces as a lack of trust

or loss of confidence in their abilities. Leaders must make every effort to communicate policy or procedural changes, to the extent possible, with HN forces to mitigate those perceptions.

4.2.4 Host Nation. Leaders must be familiar with and have a conduit for feedback on the organizational climate of HN units and the local HN culture and patterns of daily living. This awareness can help spotlight areas of concern prior to escalation into an act of violence. Particular attention should be paid to HN units and local HN patterns of living after a significant event such as media reported civilian casualties. Often these events can be the catalyst for violent responses.

4.2.5 Advanced Planning. Advance planning is necessary to eliminate or mediate those actions that HN forces may find offensive. Examples include conducting combined US/HN awareness training aimed at explaining cultural differences and behaviors to head off any potential conflict. The intent of this combined training should be to facilitate communication and afford both sides the opportunity to air grievances.

4.2.6 Observation. Train US Forces to be observant of behavioral indicators that may be indicative of a HN forces potential for violence or fratricide.

4.3 Preventive Efforts. Prevention starts with the ability to detect potential threats. Numerous documented case studies exist to indicate trends of behavior demonstrated prior to violent actions taken by an active shooter or other insider threats. **Paragraph 4.4** below standardizes these indicators and facilitates training, detection, and reporting. These indicators are specific actions, behaviors, or activities correlating to the fourteen categories of suspicious activity and may indicate an individual's propensity for violence. It is imperative for leaders to educate their personnel on these indicators through systematic awareness briefings and recurring training. Specific awareness training should be developed locally and contain a brief historical review of past incidents, but primarily focus on what actions our forces should take if they observe unusual behavior by an individual that may indicate a propensity for violence.

4.3.1 Recognize Potential Threat Indicators. The people most likely to recognize potential threat indicators are those working in close proximity with the individual. Leaders are charged with educating the force and enabling our forces to report individuals exhibiting behavioral indicators indicative of violence, terrorist, or criminal activity. Educating our personnel to refer these individuals for additional law enforcement intervention or assistance enhances the overall integrated defense posture of an installation.

4.3.2 Reporting and Response. All reporting and response actions will be based on specific observed behaviors and other indicators of possible threats. The indicators contained within **paragraph 4.4** are not all inclusive and may not be independently actionable; commanders are encouraged to localize these lists based on permissive environments, non-permissive environments, and cultural variations as dictated by the operating environment.

4.4 Behavioral Threat Indicators. This list is a compilation of behavioral threat indicators derived from credible open source documents from various Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ), state, and university studies or directives. This list is not all inclusive, but provides the foundation for indicator detection and reporting. If an individual demonstrates one or multiple indicators, this information should be

shared up the chain of command. If the individual is demonstrating an immediate threat of violence, contact the appropriate law enforcement agencies.

NOTE: Not all indicators are independently actionable, but when put to together or demonstrated in conjunction with one another, they could indicate a threat. Leaders must consider cultural norms as part of their evaluation of reported indicators.

4.4.1 Overt Indicators - Preparations/Activities.

4.4.1.1 Statements/actions indicating discontent with how US Forces perform their mission (e.g., not asking HN permission prior to taking actions, shaming the HN forces through disarming/search/seizure of cell phones at entry control points [ECP], indiscriminate weapons employment).

4.4.1.2 Statements/actions indicating real/perceived cultural disrespect by US Forces (e.g., passing gas in public, excessive profanity, searching elders, sitting with legs open, bullying by US Forces, wearing sunglasses when meeting with elders, disrespecting females, public urination, causing shame to HN forces).

4.4.1.3 Statements/actions concerning a perceived lack of accountability of US Forces believed to have committed injustices to HN civilians or HN forces.

4.4.1.4 Statements/actions indicating a perceived lack of mutual respect in combat engagements (e.g., retreating and leaving HN forces behind, no air support for HN forces acting alone).

4.4.1.5 Statements/actions indicating HN perception that US Forces fail to deliver on promises (e.g., village developments, supplies).

4.4.1.6 Suspicious absence of senior leaders during routine meetings or gatherings they would normally attend (studies indicate this may be indicative of potential violence about to occur).

4.4.1.7 Suspicious actions or behavior that represent a clear departure from norms (e.g., individual is clean shaven and hygienic when typically has facial hair and lacks hygiene).

4.4.1.8 Talk knowingly about a future terrorist event, as though the person has inside information about what is going to happen.

4.4.1.9 Statement of intent to commit or threatening to commit a terrorist act, whether serious or supposedly as a “joke,” and regardless of whether or not you think the person intends to carry out the action.

4.4.1.10 Deliberate probing of security responses, such as deliberately causing a false alarm, faked accidental entry to an unauthorized area, or other suspicious activity designed to test security responses without prior authorization.

4.4.1.11 Statements of support for suicide bombers who have attacked the United States or US personnel or interests abroad.

4.4.1.12 Expressing sympathy for violence promoting organizations.

4.4.1.13 Advocating violence, the threat of violence, or use of force to achieve goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature.

- 4.4.1.14 Advocating support for international terrorist organizations or objectives.
- 4.4.1.15 A threat to DOD personnel or threatened damage to or compromise of a DOD facility or infrastructure.
- 4.4.1.16 Statements that the US Government (USG) is trying to destroy or suppress people of a particular race, religion, or ethnicity (for example, statements that the USG is engaging in a crusade against a faith or destroying the purity of a culture or race).
- 4.4.1.17 Distribution of extremist publications or posting information on the Internet, including e-mail and on-line discussions, which supports or encourages violence or other illegal activity. Frequent viewing of web sites that promote extremist or violent activity (unless this is part of one's job or academic study).
- 4.4.1.18 Advocating or participating in violence against any individual based on their race, creed, color, sexual orientation, religion, or national origin.
- 4.4.1.19 Statements of support for violence against US military forces either at home or deployed abroad.
- 4.4.1.20 Expressing outrage against US military operations.
- 4.4.1.21 Seeking spiritual sanctioning for unlawful violence.
- 4.4.1.22 Providing financial or other material support to a terrorist organization or to someone suspected of being a terrorist.
- 4.4.1.23 Family ties to known or suspected international terrorist or terrorist supporters.
- 4.4.1.24 Statements about having a bomb or biological or chemical weapon, about having or getting the materials to make such a device, or about learning how to make or use any such device-when this is unrelated to the person's job duties.
- 4.4.1.25 For US military personnel only: Any action that advises, counsels, urges, or in any manner causes or attempts to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the armed forces of the US.

4.4.2 Covert Indicators - Subversive Activities.

- 4.4.2.1 Suspicious questioning of personnel by any means about particular DOD structures, functions, personnel, or procedures at the facility or infrastructure.
- 4.4.2.2 Monitoring the activity of DOD personnel, facilities, processes, or systems, including showing unusual interest in a facility, infrastructure, or personnel (e.g., observation through binoculars, taking notes, drawing maps or diagrams of a facility, and taking pictures or video of a facility, infrastructure, personnel, or the surrounding environment) under circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to perceive a threat to DOD personnel, facilities, or forces in transit.
- 4.4.2.3 Collection of unclassified information that might be useful to someone planning a terrorist attack, (e.g., pipeline locations, airport control procedures, building plans) when this is unrelated to the person's job or other known interests.
- 4.4.2.4 Inappropriate, unusual, or excessive interest in classified information (outside current assignment or without the "need to know").

4.4.2.5 Mishandling of classified information to include revelations to unauthorized personnel, leaks to media, unauthorized contact with media, unauthorized removals, collecting or storing outside of approved facilities, or lax security protocols.

4.4.2.6 Misuse of computers/technology to include accessing databases without authorization, unauthorized searching or browsing through computer libraries, or unauthorized destruction of information or agency computer files (i.e., deleting data).

4.4.2.7 Unexplained or excessive copying of files-particularly things such as blueprints of buildings or systems such as security and fire suppression.

4.4.2.8 Unjustified attempts to obtain or conduct specialized training in security concepts, military weapons or tactics, or other unusual capabilities such as specialized transport or handling capabilities.

4.4.2.9 Acquisition of unusual quantities of precursor material (e.g., cell phones, pagers, fuel, and timers); unauthorized or unlicensed individual or group attempts to obtain precursor chemicals, agents, or toxic materials; and/or rental of storage units for the purpose of storing precursor material, chemicals, or apparatuses for mixing chemicals.

4.4.2.10 Recruiting or building operations teams and contacts, personnel data, banking data, or travel data under circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to perceive a threat to DOD personnel, facilities, or forces in transit.

4.4.2.11 Theft or loss associated with a DOD facility or infrastructure (e.g., badges, uniforms to include ballistic armor or other protective gear, identification cards, emergency vehicles, technology, or documents, whether classified or unclassified) that are proprietary to the facility, and/or a diversion of attention from a DOD facility or infrastructure that is related to a theft or loss associated with that facility.

4.4.2.12 Handling, storing, or tracking hazardous materials in a manner that puts these materials at risk.

4.4.2.13 Misusing or presenting false insignia, documents, or identification or engaging in any other activity to misrepresent one's affiliation.

4.4.2.14 Ominous, specific threats.

4.4.2.15 Association with any of the following criminal precursors to terrorist activities: front businesses and charities, counterfeit money, counterfeit goods, narcotics, smuggling & import/export violations, robbery/theft, fraud (e.g., credit card, benefits, food stamps), phone scams, bribery, immigration & identity crimes, or incitement to commit terrorist acts.

4.4.2.16 Unreported contact with foreign intelligence services, governments, organizations, or unreported contact with unauthorized foreign personnel seeking classified information.

4.4.2.17 Unreported personal foreign travel.

4.4.3 Behavioral Threat Indicators of Disaffected/Mentally Unbalanced Persons. This list is a compilation of indicators derived from multiple sources that may indicate a higher risk for violence. If an individual demonstrates one or multiple cues, this information should be

shared up the chain of command and the individual should be referred to the appropriate helping agencies on base for further screening and evaluation by medical authorities. If the individual is demonstrating an immediate threat of violence, contact the appropriate law enforcement agencies. This list is not all inclusive, but provides the foundation for indicator detection and reporting.

- 4.4.3.1 Past conflicts (especially if violence was involved) with coworkers
- 4.4.3.2 Tendency to blame others for problems
- 4.4.3.3 Defensive or hostile attitude, increasing belligerence, or outbursts of anger
- 4.4.3.4 A history of frequent job changes
- 4.4.3.5 Hypersensitivity to criticism
- 4.4.3.6 Recent acquisition/fascination with weapons and/or destructive devices
- 4.4.3.7 Apparent obsession with a supervisor or coworker or employee grievance
- 4.4.3.8 Preoccupation with violent themes
- 4.4.3.9 Interest in recently publicized violent events
- 4.4.3.10 Extreme disorganization
- 4.4.3.11 Increased use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs
- 4.4.3.12 Noticeable decrease in attention to appearance and hygiene
- 4.4.3.13 Resistance and overreaction to changes in policy and procedures
- 4.4.3.14 Repeated violations of policies
- 4.4.3.15 Increased severe mood swings
- 4.4.3.16 Noticeably unstable, emotional responses
- 4.4.3.17 Explosive outbursts of anger or rage without provocation
- 4.4.3.18 Suicidal; comments about “putting things in order”
- 4.4.3.19 Paranoid comments and behavior (“everybody is against me”)
- 4.4.3.20 Increasingly talks of problems at home
- 4.4.3.21 Escalation/introduction of domestic problems into the workplace; talk of severe financial problems
- 4.4.3.22 Talk of previous incidents of violence
- 4.4.3.23 Empathy with individuals committing violence
- 4.4.3.24 Increase in unsolicited comments about firearms, dangerous weapons, or violent crimes
- 4.4.3.25 Patterns of inaccurate statements or making excuses for irregular behaviors

- 4.4.3.26 Excessive tardiness or absences - beyond simply missing work, an employee may also reduce his or her workday by leaving early, departing the work site without authorization, or presenting numerous excuses for otherwise shortening the workday
- 4.4.3.27 Increased need for supervision; reduced productivity; inconsistent work patterns
- 4.4.3.28 Blames others for problems in life or work; suspicious, holds grudges
- 4.4.3.29 Unwelcome obsessive romantic attention
- 4.4.3.30 Unshakable depression as exhibited by low energy, little enthusiasm, or despair
- 4.4.3.31 Recently has withdrawn from normal activities, family, friends, co-workers; becomes isolated or a loner
- 4.4.3.32 Feels wronged, humiliated, degraded; wants revenge
- 4.4.3.33 Morally superior, self-righteous/feels entitled to special rights and that rules don't apply to him/her
- 4.4.3.34 Demonstrating desperation over professional or personal problems
- 4.4.3.35 Believes to have no choices or options for action except violence
- 4.4.3.36 A history of drug or alcohol abuse
- 4.4.3.37 Past convictions for violent crime

4.5 Dissemination. The need to develop and share information and intelligence has significantly changed in recent years. Experience both good and bad has reinforced the premise that preventing future attacks depends upon our ability to gather, analyze, and share information and intelligence regarding those who want to attack us, the tactics that they use, and the targets that they intend to attack. Whether the attacker is a trained operative from an international terrorist organization, a self-radicalized lone wolf intent on executing an attack from the inside, or a disgruntled employee committed to revenge, prevention is contingent on an information-sharing environment that facilitates the continual and rapid exchange of information.

4.6 Guiding Principles for Information Sharing. Entities responsible for combating and responding to terrorism events and/or violent activity must have access to timely and accurate information regarding potential threat actors. That information guides combined efforts to:

4.6.1 Threats. Rapidly identify both immediate and long-term threats.

4.6.2 Activities. Identify persons involved in threat-related activities.

4.6.3 Implementation. Implement information-driven and risk-based detection, prevention, deterrence, response, protection, and emergency management efforts.

4.7 Information Sources. Criminal and terrorism-related intelligence is best derived by collecting, blending, analyzing, and evaluating relevant information from a broad array of sources on a continual basis. There is no single source for threat-related information. It can come through the efforts of the US or HN intelligence community; various level US and HN law enforcement authorities; US Forces; other government agencies; the private sector (contractors); and the general public (US or HN civilians).

4.7.1 Information Sharing. Historically, the focus of information sharing pertains to terrorism; however, the need for collaboration extends beyond terrorism-related issues to encompass all information relevant to force protection. Additionally, the need to share information transcends operational locations; sharing information in a deployed environment is just as critical as sharing information in the continental United States (CONUS).

4.7.2 Information Packaging. Information does not typically come neatly packaged and labeled to indicate its subject matter or domain of interest. Information from one domain may prove valuable in another, often at a different time and in another form. Information that initially surfaces in the public health domain may later be determined to have implications for counter threat operations, and vice versa.

4.8 Information Sharing Foundations. The following core principles and understandings, adopted from the National Information Sharing Strategy, serve as a foundation for implementing an effective information-sharing program:

4.8.1 Strong Partnerships. Effective information sharing comes through strong partnerships among key principals (e.g., US Forces, other government agencies, foreign partners and allies, HN, public).

4.8.2 Collaboration. To maximize intelligence sharing, key principals with force protection responsibilities must communicate and collaborate. The objective is to leverage resources and expertise while improving the ability to detect, prevent, and apprehend threat actors. Fostering a collaborative environment builds trust among participating entities, strengthens partnerships, and provides individual as well as a collective ownership in the overall force protection mission. The purpose of collaboration is to increase capacity, communication, and continuity of service while decreasing duplication. Collaboration also provides key principals access to bodies of information not normally accessible within their purview, permitting a comprehensive view of threat data.

4.8.3 Information Sharing Organizations. Several recognized forums within the Air Force exist to facilitate multifunctional collaboration and information sharing. These organizations serve at multiple levels and include the Community Action Information Board (CAIB), the High Risk for Violence Response Team (HRVRT), the Threat Working Group (TWG), and the Intelligence Fusion Cell (IFC). Successful collaboration is realized when these entities work together to share information in a timely manner.

4.9 Functional Awareness. Information acquired for one purpose, or under one set of authorities, might provide unique insights when combined, in accordance with applicable law, with topically similar or even seemingly unrelated information from other sources. Successful information sharing relationships endure because key principles remain aware of each other's requirements and challenges, background, and worldview.

4.9.1 Success. Success is contingent on fostering a culture of awareness in which key representatives at all levels of the organization remain cognizant of the functions and needs of others and use knowledge and information from all sources to bolster situational awareness.

4.9.2 Organizations. Organizations formed for the expressed purpose of cross-functional collaboration greatly enhance functional awareness and information sharing; this is especially true with regard to the IFC. The IFC's multifunctional composition epitomizes functional

awareness, but it requires a strong understanding of the capabilities, limitations, organizational culture, and priorities of each principal to ensure success.

4.10 Information Sharing Culture. Information sharing must be woven into all aspects of counterterrorism activity, including preventive and protective actions, actionable responses, criminal and counterterrorism investigative activities, incident preparedness, and response to and recovery from catastrophic incidents.

4.10.1 Interconnectivity. Key force protection principals must communicate effectively. The ultimate goal is to eliminate barriers to communications and intelligence development and exchange. Communication barriers come in a number of forms (e.g., incompatible or disparate computer systems, lack of trust, lack of interoperability, lack of a common terminology, and lack of funding). Organizations should establish formal protocols (policies and procedures) and standards to enhance communications, as well as create effective and efficient vehicles for exchanging information. Personnel and leadership should communicate frequently and be responsive to the needs, concerns, and ideas of both internal and external partners.

4.10.2 Multidisciplinary Awareness and Education. All personnel must be equipped to identify suspicious activities or threats and provide information to appropriate personnel. Specific training should pertain to the identification and reporting of suspicious activities or behavioral indicators that may be indicative of potential criminal or terrorist activity. Commanders are essential to this process, due to the inherent responsibilities of command as well as their proximity to both their Airmen and the outside agencies that can offer assistance.

4.10.3 Reporting Mechanisms. Personnel must be familiar with local reporting requirements and utilize any existing resources to exchange information. Reporting mechanisms such as 911 systems, installation Eagle Eyes program, Crime Stop lines, and routine numbers for on and off-installation law enforcement agencies may not exist in an expeditionary environment. Examples of expeditionary reporting mechanisms are: base defense operations center (BDOC), tactical operations center (TOC), and joint operations center (JOC). The SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment) format is a simple reporting framework that helps ensure relevant information is reported.

4.10.4 Threat Awareness Service and Products. Threat awareness and/or intelligence products are the reports and delivery mechanisms that convey information to the end user. Ideally, an intelligence unit or fusion cell should establish a menu of products to meet the specific needs of its various consumers. The products should have a consistent format and appearance to aid consumers in selecting the products most applicable to their responsibilities; however, the absence of a specific or official format should not impede the information sharing process. These products will also balance data and analytical accuracy with reporting timeliness.

4.11 Intelligent Integration, Mutual Respect. The procedures, processes, and systems that support information sharing must draw upon and integrate existing technical capabilities and must respect established authorities and responsibilities. This is especially true with regard to the formation of TWGs, IFCs, and other information sharing organizations.

4.11.1 Information Sharing. To the greatest extent possible, agencies participating in information sharing endeavors should leverage existing information and intelligence sharing

initiatives. Leveraging the databases and systems already available and in use via participating entities will help maximize information sharing and eliminate redundancy.

4.11.2 Memorandums of Understanding (MOU). MOUs between participating agencies are necessary to define the terms, responsibilities, relationships, intentions, and commitments of each participating entity. The agreements also provide an outline of the who, what, where, when, why, and how of the organization. Partners should commit to the program policies by signing the MOU.

4.12 Outreach and Partnerships. Higher Headquarter (combatant command, major command [MAJCOM], numbered air force [NAF]) information sharing organizations and agencies represent a valuable information sharing resource and should be incorporated into local information sharing frameworks. Information sharing resulting from official liaison relationships with HN intelligence or law enforcement agencies should be established at the appropriate levels and in accordance with guidance if they are not already in existence.

4.13 Conclusion. Effective and timely information sharing combined with analysis and contextualization of shared data provides the highest level of situational awareness available. Key principals with force protection responsibilities must communicate, collaborate, and be thoroughly familiar with each other's abilities and requirements. Shared information must be combined into a usable format, balancing accuracy and timeliness, and provided to the appropriate recipients.

CHAPTER 5

EMERGENCY ACTION PLANNING

5.1 Overview. An active shooter situation is similar to many other crisis situations in that preparation has a direct impact on the severity and outcome of the incident. Failure to mentally and physically prepare can lead to inaction or inappropriate actions. The same mental and physical preparation should be applied to an emergency action plan. In the context of force protection or more specifically an active shooter situation, an emergency action plan (EAP) should consider administrative practices and address the roles and responsibilities of facility managers, supervisors, and/or individuals in the work center, and workplace layout.

5.2 Administrative Practices.

5.2.1 Planning. To best prepare your staff for an active shooter situation, create an EAP, and conduct training exercises. Together, the EAP and training exercises will prepare members to effectively respond and help minimize loss of life. When creating the EAP, ensure input is sought from all stakeholders. An effective EAP includes evacuation policy and procedures such as when to attempt escape and when to confront the attacker as well as emergency escape routes/procedures and offices/areas that can be effectively locked down from potential attackers. EAPs should also include contact information of emergency responders and measures for emergency notification within a facility (intercom and mass warning/notification procedures).

5.2.2 Procedures. In order to produce a realistic and executable EAP, facility managers and work center supervisors should conduct a security assessment to determine the facility's vulnerability to an active shooter attack. During this assessment, all evacuation routes should be identified from each work center as well as procedures for all work center employees. The security assessment should also identify possible lockdown locations for personnel who cannot evacuate. Shelter locations should have thick walls, solid doors, minimal interior windows, first-aid kits, communications devices, and duress alarms. Following the security assessment, all personnel should be trained on active shooter response procedures specific to their work center and facility and evacuation routes should be posted in conspicuous locations throughout the building. Finally, the EAP should designate a point-of-contact with knowledge of the facility's security procedures and floor plan to liaise with police and other emergency agencies in the event of an attack. Once the EAP has been completed, active shooter drills should be incorporated into the organization's emergency preparedness exercises.

5.2.3 Command and Control. All facilities should designate a command and control function and location within the building. Whatever location is identified, it can include communications infrastructure, which would allow for facility-wide, real-time messaging throughout the facility as well as external communication capable of notifying first responders of an incident in progress.

5.2.4 Entry Control. The first line of defense to detect and defend against an active shooter is to establish site specific entry control procedures. Some procedures may be more applicable to work centers that provide services such as finance offices or law enforcement desks where there is a clear separation between public and private (i.e., work areas) areas. In these cases, entry control procedures should be established to monitor entrances and physically control

access to interior areas of the work center. In other situations, such as open work centers, procedures should be developed to limit public access to specific entrances and to entrances where a threat can be detected in time to sound the alarm and alert the rest of the work center. Entry control within a work center does little to prevent/deter an active shooter if access control to the facility is lacking. To establish effective access control for a facility, minimize the number of accessible entrances to a building without limiting emergency egress. Facilities should employ credential-based access control system such as coded cards, keys to control access, or simple identification verification techniques (posted entry controller) on a day-to-day or random basis.

5.3 Individual Responsibilities.

5.3.1 Facility Manager. Facility managers play a key role in preventing or effectively mitigating an active shooter situation. Facility managers should coordinate with all organizations within a facility to institute access control measures (e.g., keys, security-system pass codes). Facility managers should also keep strict control of keys and alarm system pass codes to ensure they do not fall into the hands of unauthorized personnel. Facility managers are also responsible for maintaining floor plans, personnel lists and telephone numbers to be used in the event of an emergency. The facility manager should be a key point of contact (POC) for Antiterrorism and Emergency Management personnel as well as a key player in scheduling/conducting exercises within a building. Facility managers should include first responders as often as possible when conducting these exercises.

5.3.2 Supervisors. Supervisors should keep themselves and their subordinates trained, qualified, and ready to operate during austere/emergency situations. Supervisors should ensure all subordinates are aware of emergency procedures, and their individual responsibilities during emergencies.

5.3.3 Individuals. Individual members are responsible for knowing what to do during an emergency. Members are responsible for knowing escape routes, emergency procedures, and applicable code words for different emergencies. Additionally, members should know important contact information for first responders (e.g., fire department, security forces).

5.4 Workplace Layout. The positioning of furniture, cubicles, appliances and other items within the work center impact the effectiveness of someone moving through an area engaging targets and can reduce or enhance the ability of an active shooter to achieve target acquisition. Large open workspaces provide a target rich environment by exposing large groups to the direct line of sight of an active shooter. Conversely, office areas where workspaces are separated by dividers or screening can hinder a gunman's ability to engage multiple targets by restricting their ability to achieve target acquisition. In addition, this type of office design mitigates the tactical advantage of surprise by placing Airmen in a better position to react or escape.

5.4.1 Furniture. Furniture should be used to create cover and concealment for work center personnel while not limiting egress from the work center or creating safety hazards. Cover is an object that can protect against weapons fire, while concealment only provides against visual detection from the enemy. Weapons racks should be stored in a location that is not easily accessible by passersby (adjacent to doors and other access points). Placing weapons racks away from access points gives personnel within the room or building a chance to identify and monitor the person(s) entering the workspace, which may result in detecting hostile intent

before it begins. It would be most advantageous for workers to store weapons at/or near their desks or in the case of side arms, on their person. This would prevent hostile personnel from using those weapons against US military personnel and would give them an effective means of defending themselves.

5.4.2 Observation. Ideally, furniture within the workspace should be arranged to prevent all personnel within a work center from being visible upon entering a room or area. Wide-open work centers provide a shooter an unhindered line-of-sight to all personnel while limiting cover, concealment, and hidden escape routes for possible targets. Workplace managers should position the furniture in the room or workplace to conceal workers from entry points. The use of cubicles for individual work centers is particularly effective for this purpose. Additionally, workers should be spread out through an area to provide them increased distance from hostile personnel. Finally, work center managers should position personnel to face toward entry points, rather than away from them in order to increase detection and assessment of hostile actors.

5.4.3 Separation of Public and Private Areas. Separation of public and private areas can provide a certain level of detection as it helps workers identify who should be in a work center and who should not. Separate public/service areas from the rest of the work center through the use of pass-through windows, bulletproof glass, counters, etc. Waiting rooms and cipher lock doors also provide a certain amount of protection as it clearly delineates where the public is allowed access to versus work centers that are limited to certain personnel.

5.4.4 Accessibility. The use of cipher lock doors, identification badges, and screening measures creates an additional layer of security for work centers by helping identify who is authorized in a work center and who is not. The use of cipher locks not only limits the entry of unauthorized personnel into a work center, it also provides an additional barrier to hostile personnel and enhances lockdown capability in the event a work center has only one entrance/exit.

5.4.5 Egress. All potential avenues of egress should be left clear in the event an active shooter or other emergency situation (e.g., fire, hazardous materials emergency) arises. All furniture and other items should be kept clear of emergency exits in order to prevent members from being cornered in their offices. Inspection testing and maintenance (ITM) should be conducted on all emergency exit lights in accordance with published directives to ensure all work center employees can easily identify an escape route. Finally, evacuation routes should be posted in every work center and be exercised as often as practical.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

CHAPTER 6

INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS: ESCAPE, BARRICADE, OR FIGHT

6.1 Active Shooter Considerations. Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Because active shooter situations are often over before first responders arrive on scene individual action is the key to survival. It is critical all Airmen are mentally, physically, and psychologically prepared to effectively react to the active shooter threat. To do this, Airmen must be prepared to employ their weapons if armed or seek other means of self-defense if unarmed. All Airmen must know and understand the rules of engagement to include understanding the inherent right to self-defense and the defense of others. To enhance an Airman's capability to meet these challenges, leaders should conduct frequent battle drills to reinforce skills and develop muscle memory to execute the individual responses outlined in this chapter and throughout this AFTTP.

6.2 Escape, Barricade, or Fight. During an active shooter situation, you have three options: escape, barricade, or fight. These choices are not in any particular order and there are no requirements to progress through one option before selecting another. Each option selected should be done because it provides you the greatest chance of survival. The decision whether to escape, barricade, or fight must be based on two factors: (1) your proximity to the shooter and (2) the accessibility of egress routes. Although not a hard and fast rule, the information below provides a general synopsis of factors to consider when selecting to escape, barricade, or fight.

6.2.1 Escape. Escape is a viable option if you are not directly confronted with the shooter(s), your egress route is unobstructed, or your egress route is not under the observation of the shooter(s). The following considerations can enhance your chances of survival while employing escape:

- 6.2.1.1 Consider all points of egress as potential escape routes (e.g., windows, doors).
- 6.2.1.2 Pre-identify multiple workstation escape routes.
- 6.2.1.3 Escape regardless of whether or not others agree to follow.
- 6.2.1.4 Be aware of other possible threats.
- 6.2.1.5 Be prepared to "fight" and if not armed carry an improvised weapon (e.g., scissors, something to strike someone with, or something to throw).
- 6.2.1.6 Do not waste time gathering belongings (e.g., jacket, backpack). The only exception to this is YOUR WEAPON.
- 6.2.1.7 Notify others to escape.
- 6.2.1.8 If armed, do not pursue the threat with the exception of security forces who are armed and will move toward the threat.
- 6.2.1.9 Use individual tactics to move tactically through doorways and windows, around corners and through hallways to minimize exposure.
- 6.2.1.10 If armed, cover the general location of the shooter(s) with your weapon. With a round in the chamber, place the weapon on fire keeping the weapon in the ready position to avoid fatal delays in target engagement if you have to transition to fight.

6.2.1.11 Weigh the removal of wounded with the probability of escape (This should be further addressed in local policy).

6.2.1.12 If evacuating wounded, do not treat the wounded in the danger area. Only treat wounded at a safe location once free of the threat.

6.2.1.13 Do not hinder escape by recovering the dead.

6.2.1.14 Continually identify locations to fall back and barricade if your escape route is compromised.

6.2.1.15 Avoid fratricide. It is extremely important to identify the target as hostile before using deadly force. Remember you may come in contact with non-hostile armed individuals such as first responders and other armed escapees (in a deployed environment) who are executing the same escape tactics as you. Practicing simulation drills and shoot don't shoot scenarios ahead of time will help avoid fratricide and condition Airmen to engage hostile targets.

6.2.1.16 Proceed to a safe location. Move away from the vicinity of the shooter(s) to an area providing protection from hostile fire and observation (could be another facility).

NOTE: The use of previously identified rally points can pose an additional danger to personnel because the active shooter(s) could be an insider threat and may exploit prior knowledge of these locations to obtain a target rich environment (e.g., additional shooters, pre-placed explosives).

6.2.1.17 Once in a safe area, notify first responders via any means available to you (e.g., landline, radio, runner). When notifying first responders, provide the following information:

6.2.1.17.1 Location of the active shooter(s).

6.2.1.17.2 Number of shooters, if more than one.

6.2.1.17.3 Physical description of shooter(s).

6.2.1.17.4 Number and type of weapons held by the shooter(s).

6.2.1.17.5 Number of potential victims at the location.

6.2.2 Barricade. Barricading is not merely hiding. It is the active effort to hinder the shooter's ability to enter the room or facility. Barricade is a viable option if: (1) it is likely you are not directly confronted with the shooter(s); or (2) it is likely your egress route is obstructed and/or under the observation of the shooter(s). If barricade is employed, the senior ranking person will take command of the "sector." The following are considerations to enhance survival while employing barricade:

6.2.2.1 Close and lock door(s).

6.2.2.2 Be prepared to fight. If not armed, secure an improvised weapon.

6.2.2.3 If armed, cover the point of entry into your area with your weapon while others build the barricade.

- 6.2.2.3.1 With a round in the chamber, place weapon on fire and keep it pointed at point of entry. You should take up a position, which provides you cover and protects you from weapons fire.
- 6.2.2.4 Move heavy objects to barricade the door.
- 6.2.2.5 If barricading the door with objects in the room is not possible, use objects in the room as obstacles to slow down, fix, turn, or obscure the vision of the shooter. Even though an obstacle will not prevent a shooter from entering your area (i.e., sector), it will help you achieve a tactical advantage to “Defend Your Sector.”
 - 6.2.2.5.1 The phrase “Defend Your Sector” simply implies the actions taken during the fight to protect yourself and others in the area where you have barricaded.
- 6.2.2.6 Turn off the lights.
- 6.2.2.7 Remain quiet and observe noise discipline (e.g., limit movement, talking, whispering, and yelling).
 - 6.2.2.7.1 Silence your cell phone and/or pager.
 - 6.2.2.7.2 Turn off any source of noise (e.g., radios, televisions).
- 6.2.2.8 Develop a strategy to “Defend Your Sector” using fight in case you cannot prevent the threat from entering the room.
- 6.2.2.9 Hide in a place that reduces observation from the shooter, but allows you to react if you must defend your sector.
 - 6.2.2.9.1 These positions should provide cover and/or concealment. Cover is an object which protects you from weapons fire. Concealment protects you from enemy observation. If you are armed, choose a position that provides you cover so you can effectively engage the shooter(s) with your weapon while being protected from weapons fire.
- 6.2.2.10 Once, first responders make contact with you, communicate with response forces as necessary.
- 6.2.2.11 If your barriers are breached, you must “Defend Your Sector.”

6.2.3 Fight. Hopefully by now leaders have effectively leveraged the recommendations outlined in this AFTTP to properly condition their Airmen to react to a hostile threat. To clarify, fight is not a last option. As with each tactic previously discussed, fight is employed when it offers you the best chance for survival. Fight may be your first and only option. You would choose to fight if: (1) you are directly confronted with the shooter(s) or (2) the shooter(s) breaches your barricade and you need to defend your sector. In this situation, escape and barricade (or the hide portion of barricade) may actually decrease your chances of survival. In short, if you are directly engaged with a hostile force or engagement is imminent; your best chance for survival is to counter the threat with fight. As already stated, even if you select escape and barricade you must always be prepared to transition to fight if the tactical situation changes. It is important to note, pursuit of an active shooter(s) is discouraged with the exception being armed security forces. However, violent and fierce fight for survival is advocated when the tactical situation dictates. Your ability to fight will greatly be affected by

your weapon status (i.e., armed or unarmed) and your ability to engage with surprise, speed, and violence of action. The following are considerations that enhance your chances of survival when employing fight:

6.2.3.1 (Unarmed) Secure an improvised weapon (e.g., something to strike or throw).

6.2.3.2 (Unarmed) Throw objects aiming at the individual's head (surprise); followed by an immediate (speed) committed counter attack (violence of action).

6.2.3.3 (Unarmed) Attempt to disarm or direct the weapons away from you and others.

6.2.3.4 (Unarmed) Commit to the fight. There is no move that is "off limits." Use whatever is necessary to survive and incapacitate the shooter(s). Hit the shooter with an object or fist, eye gouge, bite, groin strike, pull hair, stomp on feet, head butt, punch individual in the throat (violence of action). Whatever it takes, become more violent than the shooter and do not stop until the threat is subdued or terminated.

6.2.3.5 (Unarmed) Focus attacks on weak points in the shooter's defense: eyes, nose, groin, throat (violence of action). Hit hard, hit fast, and hit often.

6.2.3.6 (Unarmed) Seize the initiative. If you are directly in the vicinity of the shooter(s) and your fellow Airman attacks, join the fight and overwhelm the shooter(s). Do not stop your attack until the shooter has been rendered incapable of continuing their act of violence. Evident by the actions of United Airlines Flight 93 a small number of unarmed individuals can overrun an armed individual in a singular united effort if they exploit surprise, speed, and violence of action.

6.2.3.7 (Armed) If you are engaged, immediately return fire while moving to cover (protection from weapons fire).

6.2.3.8 (Armed) If you are not immediately engaged but the shooter(s) is approaching your area (example breaching your barricade or following you on your escape route), seek and take cover (protection from weapons fire). If cover is not available, seek and take a position of concealment (concealed from shooter's observation). Seize the tactical advantage through surprise, speed, and violence action and engage the threat.

6.2.3.9 (Armed) Suppress, neutralize, and/or destroy target(s) while minimizing threat to friendly forces and limiting collateral damage to civilians. Do not pursue the threat (Exception: armed security forces). Armed personnel should cover the escape of others and attempt to evacuate.

6.2.3.10 (Armed) Avoid fratricide. It is extremely important to identify the target as hostile before using deadly force. Remember you may encounter non-hostile armed individuals such as responding forces and other escapees (in a deployed environment), who are executing the same escape tactics as you.

6.2.3.11 If the shooter(s) is subdued, secure the weapon. Be aware there may be more shooters and only responding forces can declare a scene safe. If the immediate threat has been terminated, reevaluate escape, barricade, and fight based on the presence of another shooter. If there are no other known shooters, cover the threat (armed) or physically restrain the threat (unarmed), maintain visual of the threat, wait for first responders, and evacuate all personnel not detaining the shooter (leave an over-watch).

6.2.3.12 Fight through pain or injury. It is also important to understand you can fight even when injured. Boxers finish fights with broken hands and win. Leaders can condition their Airmen to fight through pain by implementing combatives training as part of a physical training program and having Airmen fight beyond initial onset of exhaustion in a controlled environment.

6.3 What to Expect When First Responders Arrive on the Scene. Although not universally true for all responding elements, most United States (US) first responders generally utilize the following common procedures and it is important to know what to expect. The following is a basic synopsis of actions to expect from first responders:

- May arrive in small teams.
- May proceed directly to the area where the last shots were heard.
- May wear a variety of uniforms (e.g., local law enforcement, host nation). and tactical equipment (e.g., bulletproof vests, helmets).
- May be armed with rifles, shotguns, and/or pistols.
- May use pepper spray, tear gas, or flash bangs to control the situation.
- May shout commands and push individuals to the ground for their safety.
- Most likely will not stop to help injured personnel.
- Expect rescue teams comprised of additional first responders and emergency medical personnel to follow the initial responders. These rescue teams will treat and remove any injured persons.
- May instruct able-bodied individuals to assist in providing self-aid buddy care and removing the wounded.

6.4 How to React When First Responders Arrive. Individual actions do not end immediately after the threat is neutralized. Every individual must strictly adhere to local procedures regarding individual actions once first responders are on scene. These procedures are established for your safety and the safety of the first responders. In the absence of local procedures, the following individual actions apply:

- First responders are only subject to the orders of their operational and tactical command during a response. Individuals not formally assigned or attached in operational or tactical control (OPCON or TACON) of first responders should not give orders to first responders regardless of rank, position, or affiliation. Violating this procedure hinders the tactical effectiveness of first responders, may result in an increased risk to personnel still in harm's way, and may constitute a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
- Upon contact with first responders, remain calm, empty your hands, spread your fingers, and raise your hands keeping them visible. Follow the instructions of any first responders.
- Avoid making quick movements toward first responders such as reaching for something or holding onto first responders for safety.
- Do not stop to ask first responders for help or directions when evacuating.
- Proceed in the direction from which first responders are entering the premises.
- Provide first responders with the following information:

1. Location of the active shooter(s).
 2. Number of shooters, if more than one.
 3. Physical description of shooter(s).
 4. Number and type of weapons held by the shooter(s).
 5. Number of potential victims at the location.
- If you have escaped to a safe location or an assembly point, you will likely be held in that area by first responders until the situation is under control and all witnesses have been identified and questioned. Be patient, cooperate fully, and do not leave until first responders instruct you to do so.

CHAPTER 7

TRAINING BEFORE DEPLOYMENT

7.1 Program Design. In order to prepare Airmen for the active shooter threat they may face while deployed, the US Air Force provides active shooter training within its Tiered-training construct. This training is designed to meet the physical, intellectual, and psychological elements necessary to develop a foundation for conditioning Airmen to react and survive in the event of an active shooter. The active shooter training program spans CBT to force-on-force simulation training.

7.2 Air Force Mandated Training. All Airmen will complete active shooter training during their review of the Antiterrorism Level I CBT included in the Total Force Awareness Training (TFAT).

7.3 Airmen Tasked to Deploy. Airmen with air expeditionary force deployment orders should receive active shooter training prior to deployment. This training provides Airmen an intellectual understanding of threat indicators, how to develop a warrior mindset, environmental factors affecting survival during an active shooter attack, reacting to an active shooter, actions to take upon escape from an active shooter scene and actions to take when first responders arrive on-scene. In addition to the intellectual training, all Airmen tasked to deploy should complete practical application providing a physical training event to aid proper conditioning.

7.4 Airmen in Tier 3, Advanced Expeditionary Skills Training. Airmen attending Combat Airmen Skills, Air Advisor, Joint Expeditionary Tasking (JET), and any other Tier 3 certified training should receive hands-on training building upon previously learned skills that continue to condition Airmen to react to an active shooter situation while armed or unarmed.

7.5 Training Prior to Deployment. The training identified in this AFTTP is designed to provide additional training opportunities to prepare Airmen for the threats they may face. This training is not a substitute for recurring commander or leader led training. [Table 7.1](#), Additional Training, offers additional training resources for Air Force leaders.

Table 7.1 Additional Training

The following training modules can be found at the AF Security Forces “SMARTNet” web site:

<https://afsfmil.lackland.af.mil/sfot-eTTPGs.html>

Ambush Tactics

Challenge Individuals (includes video)

Combat Stress Recovery

Contact and Approach Techniques

Employ Physical Apprehension and Restraint Techniques (includes video)

Mental Preparation for Combat

Practice Enforce Weapons Safety- M9 (includes video)

Practice Enforce Weapons Safety - M4/M16 (includes video)

React to Weapons Fire

Reaction Drills

Rifle Fighting Techniques (includes video)

Rules of Engagement

SALUTE Report

Terrorism & Antiterrorism Module 1

Terrorism & Antiterrorism Module 2

Use of Force

Weapons Retention & Disarming (includes video)

UNCLASSIFIED

ATTACHMENT 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

A1.1 References.

Air Force Publications

1. AFI 10-2501, *Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations*, 24 Jan 2007
2. AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*, 29 Jun 2012
3. AFI 36-2226, *Combat Arms Program*, 24 Feb 2009
4. AFMAN 31-201V4, *High-Risk Response*, 17 Nov 2011
5. AFMAN 31-229, *USAF Weapons Handling Manual*, 12 May 2004
6. AFMAN 33-363, *Management of Records*, 1 Mar 2008
7. AFPAM 10-100, *Airman's Manual*, 1 Mar 2009

Additional References

1. Artwohl, Alexis, and Loren W. Christensen, *Deadly Force Encounters*, Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1997
2. Bordin, Jeffrey, *A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility*, 12 May 2011
3. Doss, Wess, *Train to Win*, Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse, 2003

A1.2 Adopted Forms.

1. AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*, 22 Sep 2009

A1.3 Abbreviations and Acronyms.

| | | |
|--------|-------|--|
| AAR | | after action report |
| ACT | | adrenaline + cortisol + thought |
| AETC | | Air Education and Training Command |
| AFOSI | | Air Force Office of Special Investigations |
| AFSC | | Air Force specialty code |
| ANS | | autonomic nervous system |
| AOR | | area of responsibility |
| BDOC | | base defense operations center |
| BPM | | beats per minute |
| CAIB | | Community Action Information Board |
| CBT | | computer based training |
| CCMCK | | close combat mission capability kit |
| CONOPS | | concept of operations |
| CONUS | | continental United States |
| CoP | | Community of Practice |
| DOC | | designed operational capability |
| DOD | | Department of Defense |

| | |
|----------------|---|
| DOJ | Department of Justice |
| DOS | Department of State |
| EAP | emergency action plan |
| ECP | entry control point |
| EET | Exercise Evaluation Team |
| FTX..... | field training exercise |
| HN..... | host nation |
| HQ AFSFC | Headquarters Air Force Security Forces Center |
| HRVRT | High Risk for Violence Response Team |
| IFC | Intelligence Fusion Cell |
| ITM..... | inspection testing and maintenance |
| JET | Joint Expeditionary Tasking |
| JOC | joint operations center |
| LOAC..... | law of armed conflict |
| MAJCOM | major command |
| MOU | memorandum of understanding |
| NAF | numbered air force |
| NCO | noncommissioned officers |
| NCOIC | noncommissioned officer in charge |
| OPCON..... | operational control |
| OPFOR..... | opposing force |
| POC..... | point of contact |
| ROE | rules of engagement |
| SALUTE | size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment |
| TACON | tactical control |
| TFAT | Total Force Awareness Training |
| TOC..... | tactical operations center |
| TRT | Tactical Response Team |
| TWG | Threat Working Group |
| US | United States |
| USAF | United States Air Force |
| USG | US Government |
| UTC | unit type code |
| VTS..... | virtual training system |

A1.4 Additional Information Resources.

1. AFI 44-153, *Traumatic Stress Response*, 29 Aug 2011
2. HQ Air Combat Command (ACC), *Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Countering the Insider Threat, Internal Threat of Violence, and the Active Shooter*, 25 Jan 2011, (UNCLASSIFIED, FOUO)
3. No. 12-07, *Inside the Wire Threats-Afghanistan Green on Blue Handbook, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)*, Feb 2012, (UNCLASSIFIED, FOUO)
4. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Report of the DOD Independent Review, Protecting the*

Force: Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood, Jan 2010

5. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, *Air Force Follow-on Review, Protecting the Force: Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood*

6. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, *Final Recommendations of the Ft. Hood Follow-on Review*, 18 Aug 2010

7. US Department of Homeland Security, *Active Shooter; How to Respond*, Washington, DC, Oct 2008

8. USAF Central Command (USAFCENT), *Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Countering the Insider Threat, Internal Threat of Violence, and the Active Shooter*, 29 Jun 2012, (UNCLASSIFIED, FOUO)

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

AFTTP 3-4.6 Active Shooter