

**BY ORDER OF THE  
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

**AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 14-2RC-135,  
VOLUME 2**



**4 SEPTEMBER 2013**

***Intelligence***

***RC-135 UNIT INTELLIGENCE  
EVALUATION CRITERIA***

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**RELEASABILITY:** There are no releasability restrictions on this publication.

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OPR: ACC/A2

Certified by: AF/A2D  
(Brig Gen Donald J. Bacon)

Pages: 16

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This publication implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 14-2, *Intelligence Rules and Procedures*, and is consistent with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 14-202, Volume 1, *Intelligence Training*, AFI 14-202 Volume 2, *Intelligence Standardization/Evaluation Program*, and AFI 14-202, Volume 3, *General Intelligence Rules*. This publication establishes the minimum Air Force standards for evaluating and qualifying personnel performing intelligence duties in RC-135 units. This publication applies to all Air Force Active Duty, Reserve and Air National Guard (ANG) intelligence personnel supporting RC-135 operations. National Guard Bureau will be considered functionally as a major command (MAJCOM) for the purposes of this instruction. This publication requires the collection or maintenance of information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974. Privacy Act System of Records Notice F011 AF AFMC B, Patriot Excalibur, covers required information. The authority to maintain the records prescribed in this instruction are Title 10 U.S.C. 8013, *Secretary of the Air Force*; Air Force Instruction 36-2608, *Military Personnel Records System* and Executive Order 9397, *Numbering System for Federal Accounts Relating To Individual Persons*, as amended by Executive Order 13478, *Amendments to Executive Order 9397 Relating to Federal Agency Use of Social Security Numbers*. Ensure all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with (IAW) Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of IAW Air Force Records Information Management System Records Disposition Schedule. This publication may be supplemented, but all supplements must be coordinated with the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) prior to certification and approval. Refer recommended changes to this publication to the OPR using the AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*. Route AF Form 847s through the appropriate MAJCOM functional chain of command. Units may request waivers for tiered compliance items IAW AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*. Air Combat Command (ACC) Directorate of Intelligence

(A2) is the waiver authority for non-compliance items; these requests must be submitted through the chain-of-command to the publication OPR.

## Chapter 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1. General.

1.1.1. Scope. This volume provides intelligence evaluators (IEs) and examinees with procedures and evaluation criteria to be used during knowledge and task phases of initial and periodic evaluations. All evaluations will be conducted IAW the provisions of AFI 14-202, Volume 2, Intelligence Standardization/Evaluation Program, and this instruction.

1.1.2. References. The primary references supporting RC-135 intelligence evaluations are AFI 14-2RC-135 Volume 1, *RC-135 Unit Intelligence Training*; AFI 14-2RC-135 Volume 3, *RC-135 Unit Intelligence Procedures*; Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-1.General Planning, *General Planning and Employment Considerations*; AFTTP 3-1.Threat Guide, *Threat Reference Guide and Countertactics Manual*; AFTTP 3-1.RC-135, *Tactical Employment—RC-135*; and this instruction.

**1.2. Waivers.** MAJCOM/A2s are granted waiver authority for specific requirements outlined in this publication. MAJCOM/A2s will courtesy-copy Air Combat Command (ACC)/A2 regarding all waiver requests and responses. ACC/A2 will notify AF/A2DF of significant trends in waiver correspondence if such correspondence indicates the need to readdress existing policy and guidance.

#### 1.3. Procedures.

1.3.1. Conduct and document evaluations IAW AFI 14-202, Volume 2. Prior to any formal evaluation conducted by a qualified IE, the examinee must have successfully completed all duty position required Mission Qualification Training (MQT) or Specialized Training (ST) requirements outlined in AFI 14-2RC-135, Volume 1. (T-2)

1.3.2. Evaluations should be accomplished in a realistic training environment and in conjunction with local events (e.g., actual deployment briefing or post-mission debrief) to the maximum extent possible. When it is impossible to conduct evaluations in a realistic environment, use an alternate method (e.g., simulated, staged, or verbal examination). Document the reasons for and type of alternate method used in the comments section of the AF Form 4350, *Certificate of Intelligence Qualification*. (T-3)

1.3.3. Intelligence evaluators will use the evaluation criteria contained in Chapter 3 for conducting intelligence evaluations. To ensure standard and objective evaluations, IEs will be thoroughly familiar with the prescribed evaluation criteria. (T-2)

1.3.4. Prior to beginning an evaluation, the IE will brief the examinee on the conduct, purpose, requirements and applicable criteria of the evaluation. The examinee will accomplish required planning IAW the task being evaluated. (T-3)

1.3.5. The IE will compare examinee performance for each area accomplished during the evaluation with the evaluation criteria provided in this volume and assign an appropriate evaluation grade for the area. Based on a composite of these individual area/sub-area grades, the IEs will determine the overall qualification level. (T-3)

1.3.6. The IE will use the AF Form 4381, *Intelligence Gradesheet*, to assist in grading the individual areas during the evaluation. The form used by the evaluator will be a blank AF Form 4381, not the one completed by the trainer during MQT/ST. The gradesheet elements specific to RC-135 intelligence tasks are found in attachments 3 and 4 of AFI 14-2RC-135 Volume 1. (T-3)

1.3.7. In addition to the guidance provided by this publication, IEs will be expected to use their personal experience and knowledge in the assessment of examinee performance. (T-3)

1.3.8. The IE will thoroughly debrief all aspects of the evaluation. This debrief will include the examinee's overall rating, specific deviations, grades assigned (if other than qualified) and any required additional training. (T-3)

**1.4. Additional Training.** IEs are responsible for recommending additional training as necessary. Document any additional training and completion IAW AFI 14-202, Volume 2. (T-3)

**1.5. Unsatisfactory Performance.** Examinees receiving an overall qualification level 3 ("Q-3") will be placed in supervised status until recommended additional training is completed and/or a reevaluation is successfully accomplished. If an examinee receives a "Q-3" on an evaluation (initial mission qualification evaluation (INIT MSN) or mission qualification evaluation (MSN)), they will not perform mission duties unsupervised until remedial actions are accomplished. (T-2)

## Chapter 2

## EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS

**2.1. General.** The intelligence evaluation must include all areas listed in this chapter as they relate to the examinee's duty position and as depicted in Tables 2.1, Intelligence Evaluations.

**Table 2.1. Intelligence Evaluations.**

SUBJECT	INIT MSN	MSN	EIT	IE
<b>Knowledge Evaluations</b>				
RC-135 Weapons Systems Academics	R	R	---	---
Threat Knowledge	R	R	---	---
Friendly and Neutral Weapons Systems	R	R	---	---
Visual Recognition (VR)	R	R	---	---
Personnel Recovery (PR)	R	R	---	---
Force Protection Intelligence (FPI)	R	R	---	---
<b>Performance Task Evaluations</b>				
Threat Briefing	R	---	---	---
Situation Displays	R	R	---	---
Manual Order of Battle (OB)	R	R	---	---
Automated OB	R	R	---	---
Initial Situation Briefing	R	R	---	---
Situation Briefing	R	R	---	---
Changeover Briefing	R	R	---	---
Deployment Briefing	R	R	---	---
Air Tasking Order (ATO)/Airspace Control Order (ACO)/Special Instructions (SPINS)/Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Annex/ Collection Emphasis Message and other tasking documents	R	R	---	---
Intelligence Support to Mission Planning	R	R	---	---
Mission Package Construction	R	R		
Mission Briefing	R	R	---	---
Step Briefing	R	R	---	---
Mission Tracking	R	R	---	---
Debriefing	R	R	---	---
Intelligence Reports	R	R	---	---
<b>Specialized Task Evaluations</b>				
COBRA BALL Intel Support	R	R	---	---
Instructional Ability	---	---	R	---
Evaluator Ability	---	---	---	R
<b>Note:</b> Gradesheet templates for each area are included in AFI14-2RC-135, Volume 1. Passing criteria for any knowledge evaluation is 85% of answers correct.				

R = Required area of evaluation  
QUAL = Qualification (Evaluation)  
INIT MSN = Initial Mission Qualification Evaluation  
MSN = Mission Qualification Evaluation  
EIT = External Intelligence Trainer Qualification Evaluation  
IE = Intelligence Evaluator Qualification Evaluation

## **2.2. Intelligence Mission Qualification Evaluation.**

2.2.1. Knowledge Evaluation. Knowledge evaluations will be conducted as part of the initial and periodic mission qualification evaluations to test the examinee's understanding of RC-135 weapons systems and capabilities, threat knowledge, friendly and neutral weapons systems, basic radar theory, infrared (IR) theory, VR, PR and FPI. Examinees will complete a test from the unit's master question file (MQF) for knowledge evaluation areas. Examinees will take a separate VR test. Research, analysis and dissemination (RAD) and intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) involve knowledge intelligence personnel should be applying throughout all areas of the evaluation and will be evaluated as subsets of each applicable performance task. (T-2)

2.2.2. Performance Evaluation. Use MAJCOM/A2 and/or unit-developed evaluation materials based off of current intelligence, unit tasking and area of responsibility (AOR) scenarios. Units must apply operational risk management principles to evaluations conducted during exercises or deployments. The following guidelines are provided to assist the IE conducting performance evaluations (T-2):

2.2.2.1. Situation displays. Evaluate the examinee's ability to use intelligence systems to construct, post, update, and maintain quality situation displays based on unit mission and Operations Plan (OPLAN)/Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) tasking. Determine the examinee's decision-making abilities to choose the best medium to use to create the display. Include a large variety of items from AFI 14-2RC-135, Volume 3 that challenges the examinee to conduct research and analysis to determine the relevance of the data to the situation. The number of items to plot should be of sufficient volume to be challenging, yet not so overwhelming that the time taken is beyond that necessary to determine proficiency. The scenario may include erroneous information to mirror the "fog of war" by including intentionally incorrect coordinates or types of threats for the particular AOR, thereby allowing the IE to assess the examinee's ability to identify errors and question the validity of information. The examinee should use Military-Standard (MIL-STD) 2525C, Common Warfighting Symbology and US Army Field Manual (FM) 1-02/US Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-12A, *Operational Terms and Graphics*.

2.2.2.1.1. Manual OB. Evaluate the examinee's ability to maintain OB on situation displays without intelligence systems based on unit mission and OPLAN/CONPLAN tasking. The examinee must identify OB production sources for the AOR and research and analyze OB data. The examinee must be able to identify critical elements of the table of organization and equipment for the OB being used. The number of OB items in the plotting exercise will be of sufficient volume to have a variety of threats to plot to ensure correct symbology is used.

- 2.2.2.1.2. Automated OB. Evaluate the examinee's ability to maintain OB on situation displays with intelligence systems based on unit mission and OPLAN/CONPLAN tasking. The examinee must identify OB production sources for the AOR from which to pull data; research and analyze that data; and question the information's accuracy. Evaluate the examinee's ability to post and maintain OB; update and purge data to ensure quality control of the displayed. Evaluate the examinee's ability to use intelligence software applications to convert between coordinate systems.
- 2.2.2.2. Intelligence Briefings. Evaluate the examinee's ability to prepare and present briefings. Briefings should be assembled from information provided by the evaluator; message traffic, intelligence reports, and other intelligence materials. Other sources used to evaluate other mission areas may also be used. Evaluate the research and analysis skills related to briefing preparation. Evaluated briefings include threat, initial situation, situation, changeover, deployment, mission, and step.
- 2.2.2.3. ATO/ACO//SPINS , RSTA Annex/Collection Emphasis Message and other tasking documents. Objective: Evaluate the examinee's ability to obtain, identify, and extract applicable elements of tasking documents. Use scenario, actual contingency or exercise materials. Provide enough information that the examinee's unit is not the sole unit in the tasking mechanism. The IE will determine the examinee's ability to identify and extract unit tasking, airspace control, PR SPINS and intelligence related information from tasking documents with and without the assistance of automated tools.
- 2.2.2.4. Intelligence Support to Mission Planning. Evaluate the examinee's ability to provide intelligence support to mission planners. Use scenario or actual contingency/exercise materials. Evaluate the examinee's knowledge of unit mission planning process. Provide enough information to evaluate the examinee's ability to analyze the ATO/ACO/SPINS breakout, plot unit tasking, and derive specified and implied intelligence requirements (including mission materials). The IE will determine the examinee's ability to analyze operating area threats and terrain. Specific pieces of information should be purposefully omitted to evaluate the examinee's ability to identify intelligence gaps and any assessments of likely answers to the gaps.
- 2.2.2.5. Mission Package Construction. Evaluate the examinee's ability to construct mission folders. Use scenario or actual contingency/exercise materials. The IE will determine the examinee's ability to identify and obtain geospatial information and services (GI&S) products to build mission materials and the use of mission planning software to construct mission folders.
- 2.2.2.6. Mission Tracking. Evaluate the examinee's ability to monitor mission execution and communicate with other agencies and coordination centers. Use scenario, exercise or actual contingency communication tools and agency contact information to allow examinee to follow mission execution. The IE will evaluate the examinee's ability to maintain situational awareness of ongoing missions and upcoming debriefs.
- 2.2.2.7. Debriefing. Evaluate the examinee's ability to plan, coordinate and conduct a post-mission debriefing. Conduct debriefing evaluations following actual flying missions whenever possible. The IE will construct inject cards or coordinate with crews to identify a particular threat scenario for the debriefings. Ensure there is enough activity to

represent the typical level of detail for a threat scenario commensurate with unit AOR tasking. Evaluate the examinee's ability to prepare appropriate sections of the debrief form/checklist; identify time-sensitive information and disseminate it appropriately and expediently. The IE will determine the examinee's ability consult appropriate post flight products; control the flow and pace of the debriefing as needed to ensure thorough and accurate information collection; and identify key points and develop intelligence by asking amplifying questions relevant to the mission. The examinee will be able to prioritize questions to focus on priority intelligence requirements and control environmental factors that distract the crew or impede the debriefing process.

2.2.2.8. Intelligence Reports. Evaluate the examinee's ability to develop and transmit mission reports (MISREP) and other intelligence reports. Evaluate the examinee's knowledge of theater reporting directives. The IE will determine the examinee's ability to analyze and extract information of intelligence value from in-flight reports (INFLTREP) and other aircrew-submitted formats; Generate intelligence reports using computer and/or manual information systems; and validate accuracy and completeness of reports. Reports should be completed IAW MAJCOM/theater/Combatant Command (COCOM) intelligence reporting directives.

**2.3. Specialized Qualification Evaluations.** Individuals that successfully completed initial qualification training (IQT)/MQT and are chosen by the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) can provide specialized intelligence support to the COBRA BALL mission area after completing the training and evaluation described below. (T-3)

2.3.1. COBRA BALL Intelligence Support Evaluation. Evaluate the examinee's ability to prepare a pre-mission briefing tailored to the intelligence needs of the COBRA BALL aircrew. The IE will determine the examinee's ability to construct and transmit a MISREP IAW local checklists using information provided from aircrew debriefings and mission logs. (T-3)

2.3.2. External Intelligence Training (EIT) Trainer Evaluation. Evaluate the examinee's ability to apply instructional concepts and methods and provide training IAW minimum standards to fulfill EIT requirements. Use MAJCOM/A2 and/or unit-developed evaluation materials based on current intelligence, unit tasking, and AOR scenarios. Base EIT trainer evaluations on the EIT Trainer training profiles in AFI 14-2RC-135, Volume 1. The IE will determine the examinee's knowledge and ability to present training in each applicable profile. (T-3)

2.3.3. Intelligence Evaluator Evaluation. Evaluate the examinee's ability to perform intelligence evaluations. Use MAJCOM/A2 and/or unit-developed evaluation materials. Record the completion and results of evaluations on the AF Form 4350. The IE will determine the examinee's ability to describe evaluation criteria, grading procedures, and form preparation for an evaluation based on the IE training profiles in AFI 14-2RC-135, Volume 1. Provide scenarios for intelligence evaluations, objectivity issues, and techniques for conducting evaluations. (T-2)

## Chapter 3

### EVALUATION CRITERIA

**3.1. General Evaluation Standards.** The evaluation criteria in this chapter are divided into two sections: MQT and ST evaluation Criteria. Use all sections of criteria applicable to the events performed on the evaluation. (T-2)

**3.2. Mission Qualification Evaluation Criteria.** The following evaluation criteria (Table 3.1.) apply to tasks associated with the duty positions or work centers in which personnel maintain mission qualifications.

**Table 3.1. Mission Qualification Training Evaluation Criteria.**

KNOWLEDGE EVALUATION	
Q	Correctly answers at least 85% of questions in test based on MQF.
Q-	Not applicable for knowledge evaluations
U	Failed to answer at least 85% of the questions correctly.
VISUAL RECOGNITION	
Q	Correctly identifies 85% of all items in VR test.
Q-	Not applicable.
U	Fails to identify correctly at least 85% of all items in VR test.
SITUATION DISPLAYS (Includes Manual and Automated OB)	
Q	Used checklists and followed local procedures. Correctly determined the proper medium, including type and scale, for creating the best situation display. Researched and analyzed data for accuracy, inconsistencies, and relevance to the situation. Used manual and automated processes to accurately plot all threats/items within 0.5nm of center point of coordinates. Consistently used correct symbology IAW MIL-STD-2525C and FM 1-02/MCRP 5-12A. Correctly extracted proper coordinates. Plotted to appropriate level of detail with respect to unit requirements. Successfully downloaded, printed, exported and displayed data. Able to manipulate data, display appropriate threat rings and perform terrain masking analysis. Demonstrated ability to convert various coordinate formats. Accurately maintained situation display to unit specifications, including classification and currency. Correct classification and security markings on all products.
Q-	Did not select the absolute best medium for creating the situation display. Did not fully research and analyze data resulting in some minor irrelevant items to be included. Plotted 95% of the data within 0.5nm of center point of coordinates, the remaining 5% within 1nm. Minor inconsistencies in symbology, corrected with little prompting. Needed little assistance with coordinate conversions.
U	Failed to use checklist and follow local procedures. Errors would have significantly impacted mission success. Unable to identify errors or inconsistencies in data. Unable to complete tasks without significant supervision or intervention. Incorrect classification.
SITUATION BRIEFINGS	
Q	Used checklists and followed local procedures. Briefing well organized and professionally presented in a logical sequence. Appropriate level of detail and

	covered all applicable items. Effective use of visual aids. Concise yet thorough delivery. Demonstrated ability to identify gaps in information that had potential impact on the mission. Demonstrated knowledge of research methods, information sources, and IPOE concepts. Showed ability to discriminate irrelevant information. Provided detailed information tailored to the audience. Demonstrated knowledge of capabilities and limitations of unit assets when conducting analysis. Fielded questions correctly. Correct classification and security markings on all products.
Q-	Minor omissions, recovered when prompted with no significant impact on mission. Needs improvement in organization or delivery. Briefing hard to follow, somewhat redundant.
U	Failed to use checklist and follow local procedures. Content poorly organized, confusing, and key areas omitted. Significant lack of analytical ability. Unable to conduct basic research. Poor knowledge of IPOE concepts. Missed significant information or failed to disseminate information to proper audience. Poor knowledge of capabilities/limitations of unit assets and/or the impact information may have. Negative impact on the mission. Fabricated information. Unable to accurately field questions. Incorrect classification.
<b>ATO/ACO/SPINS/RSTA ANNEX/ COLLECTION EMPHASIS MESSAGE AND OTHER TASKING DOCUMENTS</b>	
Q	Used checklists and followed local procedures. Accessed correct tasking documents and any changes. Correctly determined unit tasking, airspace control, RC-135 information and intelligence related information. Able to breakout unit tasking from tasking documents using manual and automated techniques and tools. Correct classification and security markings on all products.
Q-	Some errors or delays in extracting information that did not jeopardize or impact mission planning timeline. Accomplished tasks but needed minimal assistance.
U	Failed to use checklists and follow local procedures. Errors, omissions or delays in extracting information that could have affected mission planning. Unable to accomplish tasks without significant intervention. Incorrect classification.
<b>INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO MISSION PLANNING</b>	
Q	Used checklists and followed local procedures. Knowledgeable on RC-135 mission planning processes. Used appropriate research and analysis techniques in reviewing the ATO/ACO/SPINS and derive specified and implied intelligence requirements. Correctly identified and plotted unit tasking. Effectively analyzed operating area threats and terrain; and coordinate with operations to recommend mission routes. Recognized information gaps and assessed likely answers to the gaps. Mission planning situation briefing was effectively organized and professionally presented. Correct classification and security markings on all products produced.
Q-	Required some assistance, but no impact on mission planning functions. Some difficulty with use of mission materials. Minor omission of information or errors that did not seriously impact mission planning. Mission planning situation briefing could be better prepared or organized. Able to recover with minor prompting.
U	Failed to use checklists or follow local procedures. Poorly organized or unprepared to support mission planning. Made errors or omissions that could have prevented an effective mission. Displayed faulty or limited knowledge of factors relevant to the mission. Improper use of mission planning tools or materials. Significant lack of

	analytical ability. Unable to conduct basic research. Poor knowledge of capabilities or limitations of unit assets may have negative impact on the mission. Poor organization or lack of preparation seriously affected audience understanding of the mission planning situation briefing. Fabricated information. Incorrect classification.
<b>MISSION PACKAGE CONSTRUCTION</b>	
Q	Used checklists and followed local procedures. Demonstrated knowledge and proper use of mission planning materials. Accurate portrayal of objective threats and hazards, ingress and egress factors to consider. Tailored mission materials to type of mission being planned and target/objective area. Provided all mission materials in correct quantities and of sufficient detail. Materials neat and well organized. Considered all factors that could impact successful mission accomplishment. Correct classification and security markings on all products produced.
Q-	Errors or minor omissions in mission materials which would not preclude mission accomplishment. Minor problems in organizing mission materials. Corrected when prompted.
U	Failed to use checklists and follow local procedures. Major omissions or errors which would have affected mission. Poor knowledge of mission requirements or sources for mission materials. Chose incorrect scales or views in mission materials for target/objective area. Incorrectly plotted objective area threats. Did not know how to request information or target materials. Incorrect classification.
<b>MISSION TRACKING</b>	
Q	Used checklists and followed local procedures. Effectively monitored and used communication systems to maintain situational awareness of ongoing missions. Effectively communicated with other RC-135 agencies and coordination centers and provided support to missions as necessary. Correctly logged communication with theater and national participants. Accurately tracked mission debriefings and appropriate reports. Aware of all cancelled or diverted missions. Correct classification and security markings on all products produced.
Q-	Did not utilize resources well. Some errors or delays in communicating with other RC-135 agencies and coordination centers. Made updates to tracking mechanism with prompting, not proactive. All personnel could not quickly derive mission status. Debriefs not completely tracked. Accomplished tasks but needed minimal assistance.
U	Failed to use checklists and follow local procedures. Errors, omissions or delays in communicating with other RC-135 agencies and coordination centers. No mechanism for effectively updating status of missions. Completely missed an update or passed on erroneous information. Demonstrated lack of knowledge of RC-135 mission capabilities. Unable to accomplish tasks without significant intervention. Incorrect classification.
<b>DEBRIEFING</b>	
Q	Used checklists and followed local procedures. Thoroughly prepared and was able to extract pertinent mission results in timely manner. Prepared appropriate sections of the debrief form/checklist prior to debrief. Assembled and brought requisite materials for use to the debriefing. Quickly identified perishable information and ensured prompt dissemination as applicable. Controlled the debriefing, asked amplifying questions, and recognized irrelevant information. Collected all significant intelligence with sufficient detail to accomplish reporting requirements. Correct

	classification and security markings on all products produced.
Q-	Debriefing took too long. Somewhat redundant in questions or failed to ask some amplifying questions that would have enhanced detail of information gathered. Slow in dealing with time-sensitive information. Some minor mistakes and some difficulty following the aircrew terminology through the debriefing.
U	Failed to use checklists and follow local procedures. Not prepared, did not have materials for debrief. Disjointed flow. Failed to identify perishable information. Completely missed a debriefing. Lost control of the debriefing. Not enough detail to accomplish reporting requirements. Incorrect classification. Errors in the reconstruction would have significantly impacted the MISREP.
<b>INTELLIGENCE REPORTS</b>	
Q	Used checklists and followed local/theater procedures. Knowledgeable of theater reporting directives. Summarized all pertinent information available and included an initial level of tactical analysis with minimal to no extraneous info. Properly formatted. Met reporting timelines. Correct classification and security markings on all products.
Q-	Missed timeline but still delivered quality intelligence report. Delay due to extenuating circumstances. Minor problems with clarity, organization or formatting, but pertinent information was included.
U	Failed to use checklists and follow local/theater procedures. Did not complete report within prescribed timelines. Report was not in format required by theater reporting directive. Incomplete or inaccurate report. Writing skills confused meaning of information or omitted critical information. Incorrect dissemination. Incorrect classification.

**3.3. Specialized Training Evaluation Criteria.** The following grading criteria (Table 3.2.) applies to duty positions in which personnel maintain specialized qualifications (COBRA BALL Intelligence Support, External Intelligence Trainer, and IE).

**Table 3.2. COBRA BALL Intelligence Evaluation Criteria.**

<b>COBRA BALL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT</b>	
Q	Clearly written report with target audience in mind. Summarized all pertinent information available with minimal to no extraneous info. Properly formatted reports. Met reporting timelines. Produced report IAW checklists and theater directives. Identified significant events. Corrected classification and security markings on all products produced.
Q-	Missed timeline but still delivered quality intelligence report; delays due to extenuating circumstances. Minor problems with clarity, organization or formatting, but pertinent information is included.
U	Did not complete reports within prescribed timelines. Failed to use checklist. Incomplete or inaccurate report. Writing skill complicated meaning of information or omitted critical information. Incorrect dissemination (e.g., not sent to the correct users through appropriate channels). Incorrect classification.

**Table 3.3. External Intelligence Training Trainer Evaluation Criteria.**

<b>INSTRUCTIONAL ABILITY</b>
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Q	Demonstrated ability to instruct effectively. Planned training efficiently and made timely decisions, incorporated and met all objectives. Tailored training to the unit's weapons systems, mission specific requirements and appropriate audience (e.g., rescue crews, security forces). Effectively fielded and accurately answered questions from audience. Demonstrated subject matter knowledge. Able to quickly retrieve answers/amplifying data from reference materials. Correct classification and security markings on all products produced.
Q-	Deficiencies in depth of knowledge, comprehension of unit procedures, requirements, mission or threats. Minor problems in communicating or organization of instruction. Did not adversely affect training.
U	Inability to effectively communicate instruction to the audience. Did not plan training efficiently. Made poor decisions that adversely affected training. Unfamiliar with procedures, requirements, mission or threats. Lack of knowledge in certain areas seriously detracted from instructor effectiveness. Incorrect classification.

**Table 3.4. Intelligence Evaluator Evaluation Criteria.**

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATOR SPECIALIZED TRAINING	
Q	Demonstrated ability to evaluate effectively. Planned evaluation efficiently and made timely decisions, incorporated all objectives. Displayed thorough knowledge of evaluation criteria, grading procedures and evaluation documentation preparation. Completed appropriate evaluation records accurately. Adequately assessed and recorded performance. Comments were clear and pertinent. Correct classification and security markings on all products produced.
Q-	Deficiencies in depth of knowledge, comprehension of unit procedures, requirements, mission or threats. Minor problems in communicating or organization of evaluation. Did not adversely affect the evaluation. Minor errors or omissions in evaluation records. Comments were incomplete or slightly unclear.
U	Inability to effectively communicate evaluation procedures to the examinee. Did not plan evaluation efficiently and/or made poor decisions that adversely affected the evaluation process. Unfamiliar with evaluation criteria, grading procedures and evaluation documentation preparation. Lack of knowledge in certain areas seriously detracted from evaluator effectiveness. Did not complete required forms or records. Comments were invalid, unclear, or did not accurately document performance. Incorrect classification.

Robert P. Otto, Lieutenant General, USAF  
Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence,  
Surveillance and Reconnaissance

**Attachment 1****GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

AFPD 14-2, *Intelligence Rules and Procedures*, 29 November 2007

AFI 14-202, *Volume 1, Intelligence Training*, 10 March 2008

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***Adopted Forms***

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*, 22 September 2009

AF Form 4349, *Record of Intelligence Evaluation*, 10 March 2008

AF Form 4350, *Certificate of Intelligence Qualification*, 10 March 2008

AF Form 4381, *Intelligence Gradesheet*, 10 March 2008

***Abbreviations and Acronyms***

**ACC**—Air Combat Command

**ACO**—Airspace Control Order

**AF**—Air Force

**AFI**—Air Force Instruction

**AFMAN**—Air Force Manual

**AFPAM**—Air Force Pamphlet

**AFPD**—Air Force Policy Directive

**AFTTP**—Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

**AOR**—Area of Responsibility

**ATO**—Air Tasking Order

**EIT**—External Intelligence Trainer/Training  
**FPI**—Force Protection Intelligence  
**IAW**—In Accordance With  
**IE**—Intelligence Evaluator  
**INFLTREP**—In-flight Report  
**INIT MSN**—Initial Mission Qualification Evaluation  
**IPOE**—Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment  
**IQT**—Initial Qualification Training  
**IR**—Infrared  
**MAJCOM**—Major Command  
**MISREP**—Mission Report  
**MQF**—Master Question File  
**MQT**—Mission Qualification Training  
**MSN**—Mission Qualification (Evaluation)  
**OB**—Order of Battle  
**OPLAN**—Operations Plan  
**OPR**—Office of Primary Responsibility  
**PR**—Personnel Recovery  
**RAD**—Research, Analysis and Dissemination  
**RDS**—Records Disposition Schedule  
**RSTA**—Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition  
**QUAL**—Qualification (Evaluation)  
**SIO**—Senior Intelligence Officer  
**SPINS**—Special Instructions  
**ST**—Specialized Training  
**T-2**—Tier 2  
**T-3**—Tier 3  
**VR**—Visual Recognition

### *Terms*

**Tier 2 (T-2)** —Non-compliance has the potential to create moderate risk of mission or program degradation or failure, injury, legal jeopardy or unacceptable fraud, waste or abuse. Waivers may be granted at the MAJCOM/CC level, but may not be delegated lower than MAJCOM Director.

**Tier 3 (T-3)** —Non-compliance has a relatively remote potential to create risk of mission or program degradation or failure, injury, legal jeopardy or unacceptable fraud, waste or abuse. Waivers may be granted at the Wing/DRU/FOA/CC level.