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OF THE AIR FORCE**

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Operations Support



**UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
IMPLEMENTATION OF AND
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION**

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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The instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 16-6, *Arms Control Agreements*, and is consistent with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 2030.01D, *Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Implementation and Compliance Policy Guidance*. The publication codifies United States Air Force (USAF) implementation of, and compliance with, the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction* (also referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC). This publication supersedes the Air Force CWC Implementation and Compliance Plan 1997 and incorporates the Base Assistance Team (BAT) Concept of Operation (CONOPs). It applies to all USAF personnel at USAF-controlled facilities, geographically separated units, and Government Owned-Contractor Operated (GOCO) facilities where USAF equities are present. This guidance applies to personnel involved in the operation of USAF aircraft, whether or not they are at a USAF installation or GOCO facility where other USAF equities are present. This publication applies to all USAF organizations and offices, including the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and the Air National Guard (ANG). It also applies to all USAF research and development laboratories involved in research and development programs, including those involving any non-lethal agents that may be interpreted to be Riot Control Agents (RCA) as defined by the CWC.

The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier ("T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3") number following the compliance statement. See AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management, Table 1.1 for a description of the authorities associated

with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the Publication OPR for non-tiered compliance items. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS).

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This publication has been revised. This rewrite modifies AFI 16-609 by updating the office titles and symbols to reflect the October 2014 HAF reorganization. References to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans and Requirements (AF/A3/5) were changed to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (AF/A10). Similarly, references to the Strategic Plans and Policy Division (AF/A5XP) were changed to the Strategic Stability and CWMD Policy Division (AF/A10-S). The new revision also implements SAF/AA guidance resulting from the recent Compliance Statement Review.

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Chapter 1

BACKGROUND

1.1. The United States is a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and is obligated to comply with its provisions. The CWC prohibits a wide range of chemical weapons-related activities and requires States Parties to destroy their Chemical Weapons (CW) and former CW production facilities. The CWC was ratified by the United States on 25 April 1997. The Treaty entered into force (EIF) 29 April 1997. Currently, 190 nations are State Parties to this convention. The CWC includes a verification regime comprised of systematic inspections, on-site short-notice challenge inspections and investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons or riot control agents (RCAs) as a method of warfare.

1.2. The United States Air Force (USAF) is responsible for proper implementation of and compliance with the CWC, as mandated by the U. S. Congress, the President, and the Department of Defense (DOD). This plan addresses USAF responsibilities for implementing and complying with the CWC.

1.3. The USAF does not possess any CW or any declared facilities under the CWC and does not participate in the CW demilitarization process. Because of this, the USAF is excluded from the need to comply with systematic inspections to verify the destruction of U.S. CW. However, all USAF facilities and equities worldwide remain subject to the CWC's challenge inspection provisions and investigations of alleged use of CW. The CWC prohibits the use of RCAs as a "method of warfare," but does not define the term. This could lead to situations where RCAs stored or used by USAF entities, even in total compliance with U.S. Government directives, arouse CWC compliance concerns and/or trigger a challenge inspection or investigation of alleged CW use.

1.4. CWC challenge inspections and investigations of alleged use are among the most intrusive types of verification mechanisms in any arms control regime. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), based in The Hague, Netherlands, is staffed by personnel who are citizens of States Parties. The OPCW may conduct a challenge inspection or investigate the alleged use of CW at any location worldwide in response to allegations from other States Parties to the CWC. An OPCW inspection team (IT) is empowered to receive the greatest degree of access possible within the constitutional rights of the inspected State Party on site and strict treaty provisions ensure relatively prompt access to the inspection site.

1.5. Despite the intrusive and rigorous nature of the treaty obligations associated with a challenge inspection or investigation of alleged use of CW, the CWC allows an inspected State Party to protect sensitive equipment, information, and areas not related to CW through the use of a variety of techniques generally known as "managed access." Therefore, inspection site personnel need to have full understanding of these techniques to fully exercise U.S. rights to manage access to sensitive USAF equities during challenge inspections or alleged use investigations.

1.6. Properly prepared site personnel are a vital component in demonstrating compliance with the CWC and in effectively managing a CWC challenge inspection. The USAF response effort, intended to both demonstrate U.S. compliance and to protect national security equities, combines base-level planning and preparation with a timely infusion of subject matter

expertise and training to enable any USAF inspection site to successfully respond to a challenge inspection. The USAF employs a Base Assistance Team (BAT) to provide on-site treaty expertise and support for challenge inspection activities, and a Response Cell at HQ USAF to provide assistance to the site prior to the BAT arrival at the inspection site.

Chapter 2

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. U. S. Department of State (DOS): The U.S. Department of State (DOS) is the Office of the National Authority (ONA) for the CWC. Because of this designation, DOS becomes involved in the notification process for all inspections and has a role in challenge inspections and investigations of alleged use.

2.1.1. The Secretary of State:

2.1.1.1. Designated by law (the CWC Implementation Act of 1998) as the U.S. National Authority for purposes of the Convention.

2.1.1.2. Provides the interface between the OPCW, other CWC States Parties, and the U.S. government (USG).

2.2. U. S. Department of Commerce (DOC):

2.2.1. Responsible for CWC implementation at non-U.S. Government facilities, particularly commercial chemical facilities.

2.2.2. Interfaces with the private sector corporations that operate USAF GOCO facilities as necessary.

2.3. U. S. Department of Defense (DOD): The Secretary of Defense is charged by the President of the United States with ensuring that all DOD activities are compliant with U.S. arms control obligations. Within the DOD, the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (OATSD (NCB)) and the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Matters (DATSD (NCB) (C/BM)) are responsible for ensuring implementation of and compliance with the CWC.

2.3.1. **The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD):** Designated by the U.S. President to ensure U.S. compliance with all arms control obligations.

2.3.2. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD (P)):

2.3.2.1. Develops and coordinates DOD policy for DOD activities arising from the CWC.

2.3.2.2. Provides a representative to the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Working Group (CWIWG) and Compliance Review Group (CRG).

2.3.2.3. Provides support to the Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)).

2.3.2.4. Evaluates all documents related to reimbursable inspection-related costs incurred by DOD as a result of an inspection and forwards applicable costs to Department of State for reimbursement.

2.3.3. The Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)):

2.3.3.1. Oversees implementation of, and provides guidance throughout appropriate chains of command for, planning and execution through DOD to ensure that all DOD

activities fully comply with the CWC. Promulgates and updates DOD Directive 2060.1 *Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements and Planning Assumptions for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological (Treaties and Agreements for Fiscal Year 2013-2019)*.

2.3.3.2. Monitors all DOD activities for compliance with the CWC and, as necessary, conducts or directs reviews to determine if there are issues that should be brought before the CRG for deliberation/adjudication.

2.3.3.3. Convenes the CRG as required. The DOD CRG is a DOD-wide decision-making forum that conducts an executive level review of CWC compliance issues and makes determinations of U.S. compliance for the Secretary of Defense. The CRG meets on an as-needed basis to address key issues, such as a CWC challenge inspection.

2.3.3.4. Provides direction and oversight for research and development programs to ensure that they adhere to DOD guidance.

2.3.4. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (OATSD (NCB)):

2.3.4.1. Chairs the DOD CWIWG, which reviews implementation issues and may recommend courses of action to ensure compliance.

2.3.4.2. Coordinates CWC implementation issues for DOD, such as those discussed during the CWIWG. The CWIWG develops and coordinates DOD CWC implementation and compliance policy and guidance.

2.3.5. Office of the Secretary of Defense, General Counsel:

2.3.5.1. Responsible, within OSD, for legal interpretation of the provisions of the CWC.

2.3.5.2. Provides advice and assistance on CWC implementation and compliance (I&C) as required.

2.3.5.3. Provides a representative to the CWIWG and to the CRG.

2.4. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA):

2.4.1. Receives notification of inspection activities for the DOD from the U.S. National Authority and provides these notifications to the Air Force Operations Group (AFOG) for action.

2.4.2. Coordinates and executes point of entry (POE) activities in accordance with (IAW) U.S. Government (USG) and OSD policies and procedures.

2.4.3. Escorts OPCW inspection teams (IT) throughout the entire in-country period, from arrival at the POE until their departure for The Hague at the end of the inspection. Responsibilities to the IT include: escorting; providing transportation; arranging communication; and arranging meals and lodging for the duration of the inspection period.

2.4.4. Coordinates with appropriate DOD components to arrange necessary administrative and logistic support for the IT.

2.4.5. Coordinates and performs Technical Equipment Inspections (TEI) and certifications for all equipment used by the IT at U.S. facilities.

2.4.6. Documents all reimbursable inspection-related costs incurred by DOD and reports them to OUSD (P).

2.5. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JS J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy):

2.5.1. Coordinates Services' issues with OUSD (P) and OATSD (NCB).

2.5.2. Coordinates with the AF/A10-S and evaluates Air Force I&C issues.

2.5.3. Coordinates with Combatant Commands (CCMD), OSD, and other organizations to develop the necessary processes and procedures to facilitate development and implementation of Host Country Agreements (HCA).

2.5.4. Provides a representative to the CWIWG and to the CRG.

2.6. Combatant Commands (CCMD):

2.6.1. Promulgates and updates Combatant Commander (CCDR)-specific implementation and compliance plans in accordance with DODD 2060.1 and CJCSI 2030.01C, *Chemical Weapons Convention Compliance Policy Guidance*.

2.6.2. Supports negotiations of HCAs.

2.6.3. Plans to host/support a CWC challenge inspection in respective Area of Responsibility (AOR); synchronize plan with Joint Staff, J-5 Joint Plan.

2.6.3.1. Coordinates inspection implementation procedures with the host state and U.S. Embassy per *DOD Planning Guidance for Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)*.

2.6.3.2. Notifies the National Military Command Center (NMCC)/National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (NJOIC) immediately of any OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) request for an inspection on the territory of a host country.

2.6.3.3. Designates a flag officer or civilian equivalent to serve as the Host Team Leader, as required, for OUT-US challenge inspections.

2.6.3.4. Conducts POE activities pending the arrival of the U.S. Host Team in accordance with the Joint Plan.

2.6.3.5. Provides a representative to serve as a Host Team member for the duration of any CWC inspection at U.S. Military facilities or installations that are within the CCDR's AOR.

2.6.3.6. Coordinates with DTRA for inspection support, which includes POE support, escorting, TEI, and on-site technical support.

2.6.3.7. Coordinates transportation and logistics support and accommodations (at POE and at the inspection site) for OUT-US Host Team and U.S. escort team members, Military Department/Service assistance team, and the Army Mobile Laboratory, as required.

2.6.3.8. Coordinates, in conjunction with the facility commander/manager, the necessary administrative and logistic support.

2.7. USAF Organizational Responsibilities

2.7.1. Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF):

2.7.1.1. Ensures that the USAF is trained, organized and equipped in a manner that facilitates compliance with treaties and agreements.

2.7.1.2. Director of Public Affairs, Office of the **Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/PA)**: Coordinates public affairs (PA) policy and guidance concerning the CWC with OSD/PA and DOS/PA, as required, and prepares this guidance for all subordinate USAF commands to implement as required.

2.7.1.3. **Deputy General Counsel, Intelligence, International and Military Affairs Division (SAF/GCI)**: Provides and coordinates legal advice concerning USAF CWC-related staff actions and issues that emerge either on a day-to-day basis, during challenge inspections, or investigations of alleged use of CW. HQ USAF Operations and International Law Directorate (AF/JAO) may assist SAF/GCI in this respect where appropriate and such assistance is requested.

2.7.2. Chief of Staff, Air Force (CSAF): The Chief of Staff, USAF (CSAF) and the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) are responsible for ensuring that the USAF is compliant with the CWC, both for day-to-day operations of the existing force, and also for acquisition of new forces and/or capabilities. The CSAF has delegated oversight of these activities to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Strategic Stability & CWMD Policy Division (AF/A10-S) to execute and participate in all aspects of USAF CWC implementation and compliance activities. AF/A10-S works in close coordination with the Major Commands (MAJCOMs), other Services, and organizations to fulfill these responsibilities.

2.7.3. Headquarters, United States Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Strategic Stability & CWMD Policy Division (AF/A10-S):

2.7.3.1. Serves as the central authority for USAF implementation of and compliance with all international treaties and agreements including the CWC.

2.7.3.2. Provides the USAF Member of the DOD Host Team at the POE and at the inspection site during a challenge inspection.

2.7.3.3. Coordinates with the appropriate funding elements and exercise Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) responsibility for CWC implementation and compliance activities. Subordinate commands will identify program and budget requirements for CWC implementation and compliance within their commands and forward these to AF/A10-S for review and consolidation.

2.7.3.4. Serves as the Air Staff POC for this Instruction. Contact information is HQ USAF, Strategic Stability & CWMD Policy Division (AF/A10-S) 1488 Air Force Pentagon, Washington, DC, 20330-1480, Phone: (703) 693-7247.

2.7.4. Headquarters, United States Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Strategic Stability & CWMD Policy Division, International Treaties and Agreements Branch (AF-A10-SI):

2.7.4.1. Serves as the point of contact (POC) for USAF CWC implementation and compliance.

2.7.4.2. Coordinates USAF policy guidance and other related staff actions concerning USAF equities within the context of the CWC.

2.7.4.3. Represents the Air Force on the CWIWG.

2.7.4.4. Prepares representative or represents the USAF at CRG deliberations.

2.7.4.5. Develops and disseminates USAF CWC implementation and compliance guidance. Responsibilities include:

2.7.4.5.1. Maintaining the USAF Instruction for implementation of and compliance with the CWC and coordinating changes to the Instruction;

2.7.4.5.2. Establishing the USAF CWC Response Cell (RC) and issuing necessary operational guidance; and

2.7.4.5.3. Promulgating the CWC Inspection Support Manual (ISM); and coordinating changes to the ISM.

2.7.4.6. Ensures the proper reporting of Recovered Chemical Weapons (RCW).

2.7.4.7. Determines funding requirements associated with USAF CWC implementation and compliance for inclusion in budget submissions.

2.7.4.8. Programs all USAF CWC implementation and compliance costs.

2.7.4.9. Consolidates MAJCOM CWC implementation and compliance requirements, including costs associated with site-specific challenge inspection preparations and operations.

2.7.4.10. Forms and dispatches a BAT upon notification of a CWC challenge inspection.

2.7.4.11. Dispatches the BAT Chief to an inspection site upon notification of a CWC challenge inspection.

2.7.4.12. Ensures MAJCOMs/Components are notified of pending CWC challenge inspections.

2.7.4.13. Serves as the USAF POC for all CWC-related OSD- and JS- directed taskings.

2.7.4.14. Submits reports (e.g. RCA inventories, Scheduled chemicals, or activities relating to CWC compliance) to the Joint Staff, as required.

2.7.4.15. Certifies USAF CWC compliance to AF/A10-S, JS, and OSD, as required.

2.7.4.16. Provides training, per AFI 16-601, *Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements* and 16-603, *Education and Training Requirements for Implementation of, and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements*, to the USAF for CWC challenge inspections:

2.7.4.16.1. Conducts classroom and practical training.

2.7.4.16.2. Organizes and conducts tabletop and on-site CWC challenge inspection exercises.

2.7.4.16.3. Supports DOD-level CWC challenge inspection exercises.

2.7.5. Director, **Air Force Operations Group (AFOG):**

2.7.5.1. Develops standardized formats to relay notifications of CWC inspections from DTRA to AF/A5XP and other Air Staff or Secretary of the Air Force offices and MAJCOMs.

2.7.5.2. Supports and facilitates command, control and communications of HQ USAF staff in responding to challenge inspections of USAF equities worldwide:

2.7.5.2.1. Air Force Watch forwards initial notification information from DTRA Operations Center to the AF Response Cell, affected MAJCOM, and designated USAF inspection site operations center.

2.7.5.2.2. Interfaces with affected MAJCOM Operations Centers to relay information as requested.

2.7.5.2.3. Works with the AF Response Cell to ensure appropriate command briefings are prepared and delivered to senior AF leadership, as determined by AFOG and AF/A10-S.

2.7.6. MAJCOM and U. S. Air Forces CENTRAL COMMAND (AFCENT) Commanders:

2.7.6.1. Develop and implement MAJCOM supplements or implementation and compliance plans to ensure all USAF activities are in accordance with U.S. obligations under the CWC.

2.7.6.2. MAJCOMs/AFCENT develop individual MAJCOM/AFCENT-specific CWC supplement or implementation and compliance plans, as required, for the development of USAF facility-specific plans or challenge inspections involving Geographically Separated Units (GSU), and review all plans biennially.

2.7.6.3. AFCENT will, in coordination with United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and AF/A10-S, develop a plan for utilizing BAT qualified USAFE Treaty Compliance Officers (TCOs) to support a CWC challenge inspection involving Air Force equities in the CENTCOM AOR.

2.7.6.4. Designate a 24-hour POC/office of primary responsibility (OPR) for implementing CWC inspection responsibilities.

2.7.6.4.1. Ensure subordinate commands establish and maintain a 24-hour POC for CWC inspection notification.

2.7.6.4.2. Provide notification of intent to conduct a CWC-related challenge inspection to the TCO at the impacted base within their command.

2.7.6.5. Provide one or more BAT members (except for DRUs) to support the HQ USAF CWC BAT at inspection sites during a challenge inspection IAW Chapter 5 of this instruction.

2.7.6.6. Develop procedures for receiving CWC challenge inspection notifications and forwarding such notifications to the inspection site.

2.7.6.7. Account for CWC-related implementation and compliance expenditures and forward cost information to AF/A10-S.

2.7.6.8. Develop procedures to take possession of, account for and report any old, abandoned, or buried chemical weapons found on their subordinate installations, or in the vicinity of those locations by local law enforcement agencies and where the Air Force is the closest U.S. Government facility with an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit. Recovered munitions are to be safeguarded and disposed of in accordance with DOD Manual 6055.09-M, *DOD Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards* and Chapter 7 of this instruction. Ensure AF/A10-S and AFOG are notified in the event of the recovery of any identified or potential chemical weapons.

2.7.6.9. AF Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) will comply with paragraphs 2.7.6.1. and 2.7.6.8. (T-1).

2.7.7. USAF Installation Commanders:

2.7.7.1. Develop and maintain local inspection site support plans. (Except AFCENT bases in the CENTCOM AOR) (T-3)

2.7.7.2. Designate a unit POC to coordinate and manage inspection support requirements in event of a challenge inspection at the installation. (T-1).

2.7.7.3. Designate a 24-hour POC to receive CWC inspection notifications. (T-1).

2.7.7.4. Create installation implementation and compliance plans, as required. (T-1).

2.7.7.4.1. In preparing each plan, ensure that preparation for a challenge inspection is coordinated with all applicable agencies and tenants.

2.7.7.4.2. In each plan, use the USAF CWC ISM as the basis for planning and responding to a challenge inspection.

2.7.7.5. Create installation plan or instruction to take possession of, account for and report any old, abandoned, or buried chemical weapons found on their subordinate installations, or in the vicinity of those locations by local law enforcement agencies and where the Air Force is the closest U.S. Government facility with an EOD unit. Recovered munitions are to be safeguarded and disposed of in accordance with DOD Manual 6055.09-M and Chapter 7 of this instruction.

2.7.7.5.1. Secure recovered suspected chemical weapons.

2.7.7.5.2. Ensure installation EOD and Civil Engineers are instructed to notify the base or installation Treaty Compliance Officer of any recovered suspected chemical munitions.

2.7.7.5.3. Report suspected recovered chemical munitions to respective MAJCOM, AF/A10-S, AFOG and the U.S. Army Forces Command's 20th Support Command's (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE)) Operations Center.

2.7.7.6. During a CWC challenge inspection, the Installation Commander retains responsibility for the safety and security of all personnel to include the inspection team, and the execution of assigned operational missions.

2.7.7.7. Host CWC challenge inspection exercises and tabletops as determined by the respective MAJCOM in coordination with AF/A10-S. (T-2)

Chapter 3

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

3.1. Implementation:

3.1.1. AF/A10-S is authorized to coordinate directly with OSD, JS, HQ USAF, MAJCOMs, and other DOD agencies and organizations (e.g., DTRA) in the execution of CWC implementation and compliance actions. Coordinate with other agencies/offices outside the DOD through the JCS J-5.

3.1.2. MAJCOMs will assist AF/ in the execution of a CWC inspection support mission and ensure that MAJCOM supplements or theater-specific AF Component Command CWC Compliance plans are consistent with this Air Force Instruction.

3.2. Compliance:

3.2.1. Notifications:

3.2.1.1. MAJCOMs and units execute inspection notification responsibilities as specified.

3.2.1.2. All USAF organizations are required to report recovery of “old” or “abandoned” CW as noted in Chapter 7. (T-1). “Old” or “abandoned” CW are described in the CWC and may be discovered during remediation or excavations, and possibly even by presentation by non-DOD entities such as civilian law enforcement or hazardous material response teams. Suspected recovered CW should be handled and stored in accordance with DOD Manual 6055.09-M. Depending on the circumstances, these discoveries may need to be reported to the U.S. CWC National Authority and to the international community through the OPCW. In all cases of discovery of old or abandoned CW, regardless of source, affected units notify MAJCOM TCOs. MAJCOM TCOs notify AF/A10-S and AFOG. HQ USAF coordinates with the Department of the Army and within DOD to ensure these discoveries are reported in a timely manner.

3.2.2. Certifications:

3.2.2.1. HQ USAF certifies compliance with the CWC to the CRG annually.

3.2.2.2. All USAF organizations report activities for defensive or “protective” purposes that are permitted by the CWC to the CRG as required. Specific reporting guidance is typically disseminated annually by AF/A10-S.

Chapter 4

CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS

4.1. Purpose of a Challenge Inspection

4.1.1. The purpose of a CWC challenge inspection is to collect factual information regarding a CWC non-compliance allegation made against a State Party by another State Party.

4.1.2. Allegations against the United States will be investigated by the Inspection Division of the TS for the OPCW based in The Hague, Netherlands. It is important for U.S. personnel participating in a challenge inspection to understand that OPCW inspectors do not initiate a challenge inspection, but rather are the mechanism to collect facts and investigate the requesting State Party's allegation(s) of non-compliance. As such, it is essential to ensure that inspectors have maximum possible access to information at an inspection site that confirms U.S. CWC compliance.

4.2. Challenge Inspection Notification

4.2.1. Once the Director-General of the OPCW authorizes a challenge inspection, the OPCW sends a notification to the U.S. government. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) at the U.S. Department of State receives the notification and transmits it to the DTRA Operations Center. DTRA watch officers relay the notification to the Air Force Operations Group (AFOG) at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and other affected Services and Defense Agencies.

4.2.2. The AFOG forwards the notification through the chain of command, notifying AF/A10-S, MAJCOMs, and other pertinent organizations.

4.2.3. AF/A10-S activates the HQ USAF CWC Response Cell (RC), which begins support operations. Phone: (703) 693-7247.

4.3. Challenge Inspection Participants 4.3.1 OPCW Inspectors

4.3.1.1. The IT consists of inspectors and inspection assistants from the OPCW. The OPCW determines inspection team composition and size based on the size of the site and the anticipated complexity of the inspection. For planning purposes, the OPCW TS anticipates teams of up to 50 personnel to conduct CWC challenge inspections. The CWC prohibits inspectors from either the requesting State Party or the inspected State Party from being on the IT.

4.3.1.2. IT members are granted privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961. Immunities generally relate to the privacy of IT notes and discussions, and to the integrity of their persons and personal effects. Inspection site personnel should consult national escorts from DTRA whenever immunity issues arise.

4.3.2. Requesting State Party Observer

4.3.2.1. The State Party requesting a challenge inspection has the right to send an observer to monitor inspection activities. This observer is called the requesting State Party Observer (RSO) and his/her function is to represent the requesting State Party and

to monitor the conduct of the inspection. The RSO is not a member of the IT, but is accorded generally the same diplomatic privileges and immunities as the inspection team members themselves.

4.3.2.2. The RSO has the right to consult with and make recommendations to the Inspection Team Leader (ITL) and communicate via telephone with his/her country's embassy or, if there is no embassy, with his/her home country.

4.3.3. Department of Defense

4.3.3.1. Working within existing command structures to ensure successful completion of the inspection, the DOD forms a "Host Team" (HT) for the purpose of representing the U.S. Government, negotiating with an IT, and making major inspection management decisions during a challenge inspection. The HT meets the IT when the IT arrives at the POE and stays in contact with the IT until completion of an inspection. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy (JS-J5) or OSD assigns a Host Team Leader (HTL) to be the principal spokesperson during negotiations. HQ USAF provides a senior official as the Air Force Member of the HT. Additionally, once the HT and IT arrive at the inspection site, the Installation's Commanding Officer or a designated representative joins the HT as a full Member.

4.3.3.2. DTRA provides and leads a team of National Escorts who accompanies the OPCW inspectors and the RSO throughout their stay in-country, including POE activities, transport to and from the inspection site, and during the conduct of the inspection.

4.3.3.3. Air Force units may be tasked to provide airlift for the HT, IT, DTRA, and the U.S. Army Mobile Treaty Lab.

4.3.4. Headquarters U. S. Air Force

4.3.4.1. AF/A10-S deploys the BAT to the inspection site. The BAT's primary function is to integrate with and provide technical subject matter expertise to advise and assist the Inspection Control Group (ICG). BAT members are sourced from HQ USAF, MAJCOMs, and select Unit staffs. The BAT deploys to the inspection site as soon as possible, but NLT 12 hours after notification, when directed by the BAT Chief.

4.3.4.2. AF/A10-S activates the HQ USAF Response Cell (RC) to assist all command echelons during a CWC challenge inspection. The response cell responds to questions related to the challenge inspection process and provides guidance to the inspection site prior to arrival of the BAT. The RC also serves as a conduit for information, requests, and queries between the inspection site, the DOD Host Team prior to deployment to the inspection site, and the Air Staff.

4.3.5. Inspection Site

4.3.5.1. The Installation Commander of the host USAF unit, or a similar organization designated as "owning" the inspection site, forms the ICG as described in the Air Force CWC ISM to manage the day-to-day activities associated with a CWC challenge inspection. At some installations (e.g., Joint or overseas bases), an Air Force Wing or other unit may be a tenant or "mission partner" that does not manage the installation. In

such cases, the Air Force Wing or other unit remains prepared to support the ICG or ICG-equivalent established by the organization that “owns” the site.

4.3.5.2. The TCO serves as the Commander’s principal advisor for the duration of the challenge inspection process. (MAJCOMs/Components develop plans and policies to support GSUs without identified TCOs).

4.4. Challenge Inspection Activities

4.4.1. General Guidelines

4.4.1.1. A challenge inspection follows a defined timeline and sequence of events dictated by the CWC. The OPCW Director General will issue a challenge inspection mandate to the IT that outlines the basis for the non-compliance allegation(s) (i.e., the reason(s) for the inspection). The mandate may explicitly state how the OPCW inspectors will conduct their inspection activities to investigate concerns about compliance or it may provide only general guidance and direction to the IT.

4.4.1.2. The inspection activity primarily occurs within and adjacent to a specified and limited geographic area known as a perimeter. The perimeter is initially specified by the Requesting State Party (RSP) and later negotiated between the HT and the IT. As part of this process, the RSP initially draws and submits to the OPCW a requested perimeter (RP) that defines the area where the RSP believes evidence exists that the United States has violated the CWC. This RP can be altered if it does not meet requirements described in the CWC Verification Annex. If an RP is not acceptable to the Inspected State Party (ISP), the ISP may propose an alternative perimeter (AP), which must meet additional requirements. Negotiation between the HT and IT will produce a Final Perimeter (FP), which is the boundary where inspection activities occur.

4.4.1.3. The ISP has the right to take measures to protect sensitive equipment and prevent disclosure of sensitive information and data not related to chemical weapons. The CWC refers to this practice as “managed access.”

4.4.1.4. If the ISP uses managed access measures that provide less than full access to any object, building, structure, container or vehicle, the ISP will make every reasonable effort to demonstrate to the IT that the object, building, structure, container or vehicle is not used for purposes related to the possible non-compliance concerns raised in the inspection request.

4.4.1.5. Conflicts concerning IT-requested access that cannot be resolved on site during a challenge inspection will be expeditiously referred through the chain of command and the HT to the CRG for resolution.

4.4.1.6. Medical, public safety or critical operational emergencies will be afforded priority over ongoing inspection activities until the emergency is over.

4.4.1.6.1. In the event of a medical, public safety, or critical operational emergency at the inspection site prior to the arrival of the IT, the site shall notify the affected MAJCOM and the HQ USAF CWC RC, Phone: (703) 693-7247. Notification should include all pertinent information, including:

4.4.1.6.1.1. Specific nature of the emergency

4.4.1.6.1.2. Expected duration of the emergency

4.4.1.6.1.3. Impact of the emergency on the site's ability to support an inspection

4.4.1.6.1.4. Measures being taken to mitigate or resolve the emergency.

4.4.1.6.2. In the event of a medical, public safety, or critical operational emergency at the inspection site, the DOD HTL will notify the ITL of the situation and provide an explanation on the nature of the situation based on ensuring the safety and security of the IT, or on the requirement for non-interference in national internal affairs or operational activities.

4.4.1.6.3. The HTL will also notify the DOD CRG of the emergency situation and its impact on the inspection.

4.4.2. **Inspection Team Activities**

4.4.2.1. The inspection site should anticipate that an IT will arrive no later than 36 hours after it arrives at the POE (and no later than 48 hours after notification of the challenge inspection) and will remain in the vicinity of the inspection site for up to 180 hours after arrival.

4.4.2.2. After arrival at the vicinity of the inspection site, inspectors will begin work by monitoring the perimeter and exiting vehicular traffic. After a period of time to prepare the inspection site, and no later than 108 hours after IT arrival at the POE, the IT will have to be granted access inside the FP in order to conduct inspection activities. It is incumbent on the Inspection Site Member of the HT to determine when the site is ready for inspection and inform the HT of the site's readiness to accept inspectors. Commanders and the HT may use their discretion to allow inspection activities to begin before POE arrival +108 hours, but in no case will preparations delay IT access beyond this treaty-mandated deadline. The inspection period within the FP will normally not exceed 84 hours, unless extended by mutual agreement among the HT, the OPCW IT, and possibly the U.S. National Authority. Inspection sites should anticipate that activities will be conducted around the clock during the active inspection period and possibly also during perimeter activities prior to IT access within the FP.

4.4.2.3. While conducting a challenge inspection, the IT has multiple rights, which should be exercised in accordance with approved protocols and as negotiated between the HT and IT. These rights include:

4.4.2.3.1. Access to the inspection site, equipment and buildings/areas

4.4.2.3.2. Request that certain operations or actions be performed by site personnel

4.4.2.3.3. Review of relevant documents and records

4.4.2.3.4. Request photographs to be taken

4.4.2.3.5. Interview inspection site personnel

4.4.2.3.6. Communicate with the OPCW headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands and among inspectors on sub-teams

4.4.2.3.7. Request air, soil, and water samples

- 4.4.2.3.8. Use treaty-permitted and U.S.-approved inspection equipment
- 4.4.2.4. The inspection site should provide a cooperative atmosphere while simultaneously ensuring the protection of national security and proprietary information.
- 4.4.2.5. Prior to accommodating any request, site personnel escorting inspectors will consult accompanying National Escorts (from DTRA) and the ICG for guidance. The ICG will in turn consult with the HT for guidance and clarification if needed.
- 4.4.2.6. Before provision of any documents or records to the IT, all documents or records must be reviewed by inspection site personnel to determine if IT access to them will affect national security or other sensitivities of the inspection site, DOD, or the USG. Documents requested by the IT will only be shown to them under U.S. control. Any IT requests for copies of documents or records should be passed to the HT for consideration.
- 4.4.2.7. The U.S. Army will deploy its OPCW certified Mobile Analytical Laboratory to collect and analyze IT-requested samples at the inspection site, and provide the results of those analyses related to the inspection mandate. The HT will closely oversee collection, analysis, and sample residue management to ensure compliance with U.S. law.

4.4.3. Site Support Actions

- 4.4.3.1. Following notification, the inspection site will immediately implement several actions to meet CWC treaty deadlines and to prepare the site for inspection. The site TCO will utilize the Inspection Support Manual (ISM) throughout the inspection period and conduct the following actions prior to the arrival of the BAT.
 - 4.4.3.1.1. Prepare a situation briefing as explained in the ISM and assist the Commander in selecting the ICG leadership team.
 - 4.4.3.1.2. Activate the ICG.
- 4.4.3.2. ICG Actions include the following:
 - 4.4.3.2.1. Establish contact with the MAJCOM TCO, AF/A5XP, and the HQ USAF RC and obtain copies of the IT Mandate, the RP, and other pertinent documents, phone: (703) 693-6333.
 - 4.4.3.2.2. Identify sensitive equities and interests which may be involved at the designated inspection site.
 - 4.4.3.2.3. Review operations planned for the duration of the inspection (potentially up to 10 days following notification) that may require termination or curtailment. The unit commander is not required to cease operational activity but should work closely with HQ USAF and the parent MAJCOM to reschedule or redirect missions that might have a detrimental impact on the successful completion of the challenge inspection. Depending upon the circumstances involved in the challenge inspection request, MAJCOM should work through the appropriate chain of command, to include CCDRs and HQ USAF, to balance operational imperatives against challenge inspection requirements.
 - 4.4.3.2.4. For inspections at USAF installations outside the United States, obtain from the HQ USAF RC a copy of any pre-negotiated CWC-unique HCA, either finalized or in draft form. This agreement, along with an existing Status of Forces

Agreement (SOFA) will be used by the HT and the inspection site to coordinate activities with the Host Nation. If no HCA is available, the HT and Host Nation representatives will establish procedures and guidelines for working together to respond to the challenge inspection.

4.4.3.2.5. Develop a list of areas, facilities, and activities which may be sensitive to U.S. interests but not covered by the CWC or the OPCW challenge inspection mandate, and provide this list to the HT and/or HQ USAF as requested.

4.4.3.2.6. Shortly after the arrival of the IT at the POE, or when documents or other necessary information become available, the inspection site ICG shall initiate the following actions:

4.4.3.2.6.1. Review the RP of the inspection site as described in the ISM and provide comments and concerns to the HT along with any recommendations to correct the perimeter if it violates CWC requirements. As soon as the RP is known, forward a map of the inspection site with the RP and all identified vehicle exits from the RP shown to the HT at the POE as soon as possible. If appropriate, recommend an AP to the HT.

4.4.3.2.6.2. Prepare a site briefing for the Host Team as described in the ISM and forward it electronically no later than 4 hours prior to IT arrival at the POE. Copies of the site briefing should also be sent to the HQ USAF Response Cell in the Pentagon.

4.4.3.2.6.3. Review the inspection mandate and conduct a mandate analysis, as described in the ISM, in order to assess how the inspection may impact facilities or equities within the RP, within 50 meters outside the RP, or any AP recommended by the inspection site.

4.4.3.2.6.4. Implement self-monitoring of all vehicle exits from the RP as described in the ISM no later than 10 hours after IT arrival at the POE.

4.4.3.2.6.5. Develop a pre-inspection briefing which includes a description of the site and its activities, administrative arrangements and procedures, transportation and communication for the IT, and safety requirements. This briefing may also introduce the inspection site's recommended inspection plan.

4.4.3.2.6.6. Provide sufficient personnel, communication support, and transportation resources to support the HT, national and local escorts, and each IT member and the RSO unless directed otherwise.

4.4.3.2.7. Assemble any applicable records and reports requested by the IT through the HT. Conduct an internal base-level review and provide these records to the HT along with the results of the internal review and any recommendations for restriction of IT viewing or redaction based upon classification or other national security or proprietary concerns.

4.4.3.3. **Managed Access.** The inspection site has a right to protect national security information, equipment, or areas not related to the OPCW challenge inspection mandate through the use of managed access techniques. For example:

4.4.3.3.1. Maintain a current list of sensitive base and tenant programs

4.4.3.3.2. Develop managed access plans for all facilities that are inside the RP and may be scheduled for inspection in the agreed inspection plan. As stipulated in the CWC Verification Annex, Part X, Paragraph 48 (a-g), managed access techniques may include, but are not limited to the following:

4.4.3.3.2.1. Remove sensitive papers or items from inspectable areas

4.4.3.3.2.2. Shroud sensitive displays, storage areas and equipment

4.4.3.3.2.3. Shroud sensitive pieces of equipment, such as computer or electronic items.

4.4.3.3.2.4. Log off computer systems and turn off data displays

4.4.3.3.2.5. In exceptional cases, giving only individual inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection site.

4.4.4. USAF Support Requirements. Air Force will provide support to the IT, HT, National Escorts and RSO as requested by the U.S. National Authority or DTRA national escorts, to include:

4.4.4.1. Provide a Base Assistance Team to support on-site activities. Specific activities, responsibilities and training requirements for the BAT are outlined in Chapter 5 of this instruction.

4.4.4.2. Provide a HQ USAF challenge inspection Response Cell to support site activities, relay information to HQ USAF Host Team Member, and to monitor deployment of the BAT.

4.4.4.3. Transportation to and from the site for the HT, IT, RSO, and National Escorts.

4.4.4.4. On-site physical security for the IT and RSO.

4.4.4.5. Emergency medical support.

4.4.4.6. Appropriate communication means for the HT, IT, RSO, and National Escorts.

4.4.4.7. Lodging for up to 150 personnel for up to 8 days. IT and RSO lodging costs are borne by the DTRA National Escort team; lodging expenses for others are borne by individuals as official travel expenses. Inspection sites should work closely with the DTRA advance team and seek to lodge the HT on base, but seek to initially lodge the IT off-base outside the RP.

4.4.4.8. Office space and support for the HT, IT and RSO. IT and RSO office spaces should initially be located outside the RP but may be provided on base once the inspection begins inside the FP. Pre-inspection office space and support may be located inside the RP if it is to the benefit of the USAF and/or the DOD. HT office space may be provided in close proximity to that of the IT/RSO.

4.4.4.9. Meals on a 24-hour basis during the inspection activities. HT and national escorts and other USG personnel pay for all costs individually. IT and RSO costs are borne by the DTRA National Escort team.

To

4.5. Challenge Inspection Completion

4.5.1. Within 24 hours after the completion of the inspection, the IT meets with U.S. representatives to review the preliminary findings of the inspection. The IT may provide preliminary findings in a report, to include a list of written information, data and materials collected during the inspection. The HT and IT agree as to what documentation can be taken off site. The inspection site works closely with the HT to document any disagreements with the IT concerning events during the course of the inspection, to include data to refute any ambiguities and/or allegations of lack of cooperation by the United States.

4.5.2. The inspectors and RSO are expected to depart the site 24 hours after the end of the inspection.

4.5.3. Upon departure of the IT, the BAT and inspection site draft an after-action report to document inspection management activities and any lessons learned. The report must be provided through the MAJCOM to HQ USAF no later than 10 days after the completion of the inspection.

4.5.4. The IT drafts a preliminary report within 72 hours after their return to The Hague. The IT assigns an overall classification to the report based on OPCW classification guidelines and ISP recommendations. The report is classified using one of the following OPCW categories: Highly Protected, Protected, or Restricted. Although these classifications closely parallel those of Secret, Confidential and For Official Use Only (FOUO) respectively, U.S. personnel will only use applicable U.S. classifications or other restrictions to govern their distribution or release.

4.5.5. A copy of the preliminary inspection report will be provided to the United States for review NLT 20 days after completion of the challenge inspection. The final report must be submitted to the OPCW Director-General no later than 30 days after completion of the challenge inspection.

Chapter 5

BASE ASSISTANCE TEAM (BAT) OPERATIONS

5.1. Purpose: This chapter addresses the BAT's composition, specific roles and responsibilities, and operations. AF/A10-S established the BAT and this Air Force Instruction (AFI 16-609) authorizes its operations and addresses its general roles and responsibilities.

5.2. Background

5.2.1. The CWC EIF occurred on 29 April 1997. Since the United States is a State Party to the Convention, USAF facilities, equities, and assets are subject to short-notice, intrusive challenge inspections worldwide.

5.2.2. The primary tool to support challenge inspection management involving Air Force equities is the USAF CWC ISM, which is published by AF/A10-S.

5.2.3. CJCSI 2030.01C requires that the Services provide Service Assistance Teams (SATs) capable of preparing Service installations, public vessels, State aircraft, and geographically separate units to receive CWC challenge inspections. AF/A10-S meets this requirement through the establishment of the BAT. The BAT provides expertise in utilizing the ISM and preparing required briefings, implementing checklists, and presenting educational materials to the inspection site. The BAT also integrates and advises the inspection site's Inspection Control Group (ICG)—the organization responsible for challenge inspection management—on preparation of deliverables and responses to taskings.

5.3. BAT Composition

5.3.1. For a challenge inspection where the USAF is the Lead Service, the BAT includes members from the following organizations:

5.3.2. HQ USAF:

5.3.2.1. Strategic Plans and Policy Division (AF/A10-S); a representative leads the BAT and designates a BAT member to serve as the Deputy BAT Chief.

5.3.2.2. Directorate of Security & Special Program Oversight (SAF/AAZ)

5.3.2.3. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Office of Special Projects (AFOSI/PJ)

5.3.2.4. HQ USAF-sponsored civilian contractors

5.3.3. USAF components:

5.3.3.1. Major Command (MAJCOM/Component) TCOs; and

5.3.3.2. BAT Augmentees (as defined in Section 5.5.6.)

5.3.4. DTRA liaison

5.3.5. Other organizations as necessary.

5.4. USAF Tenant/Geographically Separated Unit Inspections: For an inspection site where the USAF is not the lead service and for AF GSUs, the BAT Chief determines the composition of the BAT necessary to fulfill assistance obligations.

5.5. Roles and Responsibilities: BAT members advise and assist the inspection site on CWC-related matters. However, directing and implementing inspection preparation and support activities is the responsibility of the inspection site. The BAT advisory role includes—but is not limited to—providing CWC implementation and compliance expertise and knowledge to the ICG and inspection site commander in areas such as inspection management, local escort and facility manager requirements, site pre-inspection preparation actions, transportation, and logistics. MAJCOM BAT members may be assigned specific areas of challenge inspection expertise (e.g., Perimeter, Self Monitoring, etc.) by AF/A10-S; however, all BAT members should be knowledgeable in all ISM functional areas. Due to time and distance considerations and the phasing of expertise, BAT members perform the most time-critical tasks as identified in Paragraph 5.6.1 as soon as they arrive at the inspection site.

5.5.1. HQ USAF A10-S Member

- 5.5.1.1. Serves as the BAT Chief and is responsible for overall team management (including the designation of the BAT member from the impacted MAJCOM to serve as Deputy BAT Chief);
- 5.5.1.2. Determines general and mission-specific BAT support and deployment requirements;
- 5.5.1.3. Confirms that the owning MAJCOM/Component and inspection site received inspection notifications;
- 5.5.1.4. Ensures that the inspection site receives the BAT Introductory Briefing;
- 5.5.1.5. Provides advice to the ICG Chief and site commander/manager;
- 5.5.1.6. Maintains an updated list of all BAT members' contact information to alert BAT members of initial notification of a challenge inspection;
- 5.5.1.7. Directs the activities of BAT members;
- 5.5.1.8. Ensures that facility- and inspection site-specific post-inspection security and counterintelligence assessments are conducted; and
- 5.5.1.9. Meets specific on-the-ground situations by adapting, as necessary, existing guidance.

5.5.2. MAJCOM/Component Treaty Office BAT Member Responsible for the Inspection Site

- 5.5.2.1. Normally serves as the Deputy BAT Chief; and
- 5.5.2.2. Provides regular updates to MAJCOM/Component leadership.

5.5.3. SAF/AZ

- 5.5.3.1. Advise and/or assist the inspection site concerning security and counterintelligence issues as requested or required by the commander;
- 5.5.3.2. Advise the inspection site regarding pre-inspection facility preparation activities (For these purposes, the term “facility” means any building, activity, area, and/or program);
- 5.5.3.3. Advise and/or assist with facility inspections as necessary; and

5.5.3.4. Advise and/or assist with facility-specific and inspection site post-inspection security and counterintelligence assessments.

5.5.4. **BAT Members**

5.5.4.1. Assume prioritized functional area responsibilities upon arrival or as assigned by the BAT Chief or Deputy BAT Chief;

5.5.4.2. Coordinate directly with appropriate ICG personnel to determine the status of preparations in their functional areas;

5.5.4.3. Assist the ICG Chief in implementing ISM actions and checklists;

5.5.4.4. Provide advice concerning other inspection-related requirements.

5.5.5. **BAT Augmentees**

5.5.5.1. BAT augmentees are selected based upon meeting qualifications (defined in Paragraph 5.8 of this chapter) and are available to deploy in support of a specific challenge inspection. BAT augmentees may be necessary to support activities at the inspection site.

5.5.5.2. MAJCOMs may identify base-level TCOs or other personnel to serve as BAT augmentees. AF/A10-S approves all augmentees. All augmentees can be deployed worldwide to satisfy requirements. Deployment of BAT augmentees outside their MAJCOM or Component Area of Responsibility (AOR) requires approval of AF/A10-S.

5.5.6. **DTRA BAT Liaisons**

5.5.6.1. Provide advice to the BAT and ICG on National Escort Team duties, functions, and security/countermeasures responsibilities;

5.5.6.2. Serve as liaison between the BAT and ICG and the DTRA Advance Team and National Escort Team;

5.5.6.3. Coordinate on IT-related transportation, communications, and logistics through the DTRA Advance Team;

5.5.6.4. Coordinate escort duties between the inspection site's local escorts and National Escorts, including training assistance; and

5.5.6.5. Provide training to site personnel on building preparation, route planning, and managed access procedures, as requested.

5.6. **BAT Operations**

5.6.1. **Initial Operations.** Because BAT members arrive at the inspection site at various times, the first BAT member to arrive assumes BAT Chief responsibilities until relieved, and presents the BAT Introduction Briefing to the ICG and Commander. This briefing may also be provided by the HQ USAF Response Cell if there is a significant delay in the arrival of the first BAT member. Due to time-sensitive requirements, arriving BAT members need to fulfill, in order, the functions listed below:

5.6.1.1. Perimeter Team responsibilities, specifically focusing on definition and analysis of the requested perimeter;

5.6.1.2. Self Monitoring Team responsibilities, specifically focusing on developing the Self Monitoring Plan; and

5.6.1.3. Mandate Team responsibilities, specifically focusing on preparing and forwarding the base briefing to the Host Team, conducting the mandate analysis, and creating the initial draft of the pre-inspection briefing.

5.6.2. **Sustained Operations.** As appropriate, the BAT Chief adjusts BAT member assignments. The BAT Chief ensures staffing for 24-hour operations for a period of up to 10 days.

5.7. Deployment

5.7.1. Upon notification of a challenge inspection, all BAT members deploy to the inspection site as soon as possible, but NLT 12 hours from notification. Each BAT member notifies the AF/A10-S CWC Response Cell Phone: (703) 693-7247 of his/her travel plans and anticipated arrival time at the inspection site.

5.7.2. If augmentees are activated, they provide travel plans and anticipated arrival times at the inspection site to the AF/A10-S CWC Response Cell.

5.7.3. For an inspection site where the USAF is not the Lead Service, the BAT Chief determines BAT deployment requirements and notify selected personnel.

5.8. Qualifications

5.8.1. BAT Members

5.8.1.1. To ensure a high level of BAT member competence, each individual, prior to assignment as a BAT member, is assigned as a MAJCOM TCO, directly supports a MAJCOM TCO, or directly supports HQ USAF for CWC implementation and compliance.

5.8.1.2. BAT members must successfully complete initial USAF CWC BAT member training as soon as possible after assignment, including:

5.8.1.2.1. Air Force TCO Training Course;

5.8.1.2.2. DTRA CWC Orientation Course or CWC Challenge Inspection Course (recommended, not required);

5.8.1.2.3. Participation in one Air Force challenge inspection tabletop exercise (CWC 201), Air Force challenge inspection exercise (CWC 301) or DOD CWC challenge inspection exercise (CWC 401); and

5.8.1.2.4. Complete the CWC Computer Based Training (CBT) and comprehensive examination.

5.8.1.3. BAT members will be responsible for maintaining their proficiency and knowledge. To ensure proficiency, each BAT member will complete the following recurring requirements:

5.8.1.3.1. Attend a USAF-sponsored BAT Workshop annually

5.8.1.3.2. Participate in a USAF CWC 201 training exercise at least once every two years;

- 5.8.1.3.3. Participate in one USAF or DOD challenge inspection exercise (CWC 301/401) at least every two years; and
 - 5.8.1.3.4. Complete the CWC CBT and comprehensive examination annually.
- 5.8.2. **BAT Augmentees.** MAJCOMs will nominate and AF/A10-S will approve BAT augmentees.
- 5.8.2.1. Upon approval, each nominee will complete the following:
 - 5.8.2.1.1. USAF TCO Training Course;
 - 5.8.2.1.2. Participation in one USAF or DOD challenge inspection exercise (CWC 201/301/401); and
 - 5.8.2.1.3. Complete the CWC CBT and comprehensive examination.
 - 5.8.2.2. On a recurring basis, each BAT augmentee will be required to:
 - 5.8.2.2.1. Attend a USAF- or DOD-sponsored CWC training activity (CWC 201/301/401), at least once every two years, and
 - 5.8.2.2.2. Complete CWC CBT and comprehensive exam annually.
- 5.8.3. AF/A10-S will send certification letters to all certified BAT members and augmentees through their respective chains of command by the end of each calendar year. AF/A10-S and the parent MAJCOM have the authority to decertify members.

Chapter 6

INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS OR RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AS A METHOD OF WARFARE

6.1. Purpose of Investigations

6.1.1. To investigate alleged use of CW or RCAs as a method of warfare.

6.1.2. The USAF could either be subjected to use of CW or RCAs, or be accused of using them against another State or non-State actor.

6.2. Notification

6.2.1. If the United States requests an investigation of alleged use, it must provide certain information to the OPCW. Air Force units that receive or witness CW use or witness RCAs being used as methods of warfare should collect the following data and forward it through the chain of command to AF/A10-S as soon as possible:

6.2.1.1. The State Party on whose territory the use of CW or RCAs is alleged to have taken place

6.2.1.2. Extent and nature of alleged use

6.2.1.3. GPS or map coordinates where CW or RCAs are alleged to have been used

6.2.1.4. CW or RCA characteristics, if known, and their effects on humans, animals, and vegetation

6.2.1.5. Date and time (local or Zulu) when CW or RCA is alleged to have been used

6.2.1.6. Any suggested safe routes of access into the area of alleged use

6.2.2. Any USAF-initiated requests for investigations should be elevated through the chain of command, either through the theater CCMD or the Joint Staff to OSD. The OSD contacts the National Authority and requests that organization to initiate an investigation. The National Authority provides the U.S. request to the OPCW.

6.2.3. If a U.S. Air Force base or equity is accused of employing CW (or of using RCAs as a method of warfare), AF/A10-S will cooperate with the appropriate USG agencies in gathering information concerning allegations of non-compliance.

6.3. Conduct of Investigations

6.3.1. Regardless of whether the United States is accused of or is the victim of an alleged use of CW or of RCAs as a method of warfare, the OPCW dispatches an IT as soon as practical to the scene or to any other relevant locations to conduct its fact-finding investigation.

6.3.2. Should the OPCW decide it needs to investigate on U.S. territory the IT has the right to be briefed by the United States upon arrival at the U.S. POE. The IT may request additional briefings and or information as its investigations progress. USAF commands support those government agencies gathering data to provide these briefings as requested.

6.3.3. The IT has the right of access to any and all areas which could be affected by the alleged use of CW or RCAs. For such access, the IT consults with the investigated State Party.

6.3.4. Samples.

6.3.4.1. The IT collects samples of types and in quantities it considers necessary to conduct its investigation. If requested, the investigated State Party assists in the collection of samples under the supervision of inspectors or inspection assistants. The investigated State Party also permits and cooperates in the collection of appropriate control samples within the boundary of the investigated State Party as requested by the IT.

6.3.4.2. Samples of importance in the investigation of alleged use include toxic chemicals, munitions and devices, remnants of munitions and devices, environmental samples (air, soil, vegetation, water, snow, etc.), and biomedical samples from human or animal sources (blood, urine, excreta, tissue, etc.).

6.3.4.3. If duplicate samples cannot be taken, and if the IT requests analysis be performed at off-site laboratories, the U.S. will negotiate a sample analysis process that will ensure samples are managed appropriately within the terms of the U.S. CWC Implementation Act of 1998.

6.3.5. Investigation Duration. The CWC does not specify the duration of an investigation of alleged use. However, the OPCW will direct its IT to travel as expeditiously as possible and conduct as thorough an investigation as needed to collect evidence. An assumption is that an IT could arrive in a specified area within 48 to 72 hours of an allegation, but the exact timing and duration of an investigation, once begun, can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. If the IT deems that safe access to a specific area relevant to the investigation is not possible, the RSP shall be informed immediately. If necessary, the investigation will be suspended until safe access can be provided and the IT is able to resume its activities and conclude its investigation.

6.3.6. Interviews. The IT will have the right to conduct interviews and take biomedical samples from human or animal sources that may have been affected by the alleged use of CW or RCAs. It will also have the right to interview eyewitnesses, medical personnel, and other persons who have treated or have come into contact with persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of CW or RCAs. The IT may be provided access to medical histories, if available, and permitted to participate in autopsies, as appropriate, of persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of CW or RCAs.

6.3.7. Reports. Throughout the investigation, the IT will send periodic progress reports to the OPCW Executive Council. The investigated State Party, or any other State Party, will not be provided access to these preliminary reports. No later than 30 days after returning to The Hague, Netherlands, the IT will provide its final report to the OPCW Executive Council and all State Parties.

6.4. USAF Support Requirements

6.4.1. Depending upon circumstances at the investigation site, USAF commands will provide support to the IT as requested by appropriate command authorities, to include:

6.4.1.1. Transportation to and from the site of the alleged use

6.4.1.2. Physical security for the IT at the investigation site if USAF Security Forces are best-positioned to provide such security

6.4.1.3. Logistical support

6.4.1.4. Access to victims of the alleged chemical use

6.4.1.5. Access to witnesses to the alleged chemical use

6.4.1.6. Additional information related to the alleged chemical use

6.4.1.7. Emergency medical support

6.4.2. If the alleged use investigation takes place involving a USAF equity/interest located on the territory of another State Party to the CWC, the Air Force will provide support as mandated by competent command authority in accordance with any applicable HCAs, SOFAs, or as requested by the U.S. National Authority through the appropriate command channels.

6.4.3. If the alleged use investigation takes place involving a USAF equity/interest located on the territory of a State *not* a Party to the CWC, the Air Force will make every effort to provide requested support as mandated by appropriate command authority and in accordance with SOFAs.

CHAPTER 7

RECOVERED CHEMICAL WEAPONS

7.1. Background

7.1.1. Prior to CWC entry into force, burial in landfills was an accepted and widely used method for “eliminating” unwanted or outdated chemical weapons, bulk agents, and munitions. In addition to burial on land, dumping at sea was an acceptable practice as recently as 1970, when the practice was halted. Recent information indicates that in some instances, dumping at sea may not have occurred as far offshore as suggested at the time. In many cases, record keeping for such activities was either not required, the locations were not well-documented, or records have been lost.

7.1.2. In most instances, USG policy is to avoid deliberate actions to disturb or unearth known or suspected burial sites, whether on land or at sea. However, from time to time, because these locations and contents of these sites are not well-documented, there are inadvertent recoveries that may involve USAF installations. Additionally, an Air Force base may be requested to take custody of suspected old chemical munitions that are inadvertently recovered by the general public.

7.2. DOD Policy and Procedures

7.2.1. Per DODD 2060.1; CJCSI 2030.01C; and *Planning Assumptions for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological (NCB) Treaties and Agreements for Fiscal Year 2013-2019*, the U.S. Army is DOD’s Executive Agent for the elimination of all U.S. CW.

7.2.2. When a munition with an unknown liquid fill, or CWM is encountered on a DOD installation (e.g., during a munitions response) or in the public domain, the EOD unit responding to a request for support of an explosives or munitions emergency will take those actions needed to ensure the protection of human health and the environment (see 2.2.d (5)).

7.2.2.1. The responding EOD unit will (a) ensure such munitions are properly secured in place, if armed, or over packed and secured, either at the location of discovery or at the closest military installation; and (b) request support from the U.S. Army Forces Command’s 20th Support Command’s (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE)) Operations Center at (410) 436-6200.

7.2.2.2. The 20th Support Command (CBRNE) will dispatch a team from its CBRNE Analytical Remediation Activity (CARA) on behalf of the Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) to assess the munition (or material of interest) non-intrusively. (Note: 20th Support Command response is funded by U.S. Army Material Command’s (USAMC) CMA as part of its overall mission in support of the Army’s Recovered Chemical Warfare Material Response Program.)

7.2.2.3. CARA will provide the assessment results through CMA to the Army’s Material Assessments Review Board (MARB) for determination of the most likely fill.

7.2.2.3.1. For munitions determined to be RCWM, the Army will schedule demilitarization, normally at the storage location, using Army assets (e.g., Army’s Explosives Destruction System).

7.2.2.3.2. Munitions determined not to be RCWM will be released for local disposition.

7.2.3. USAMC's CMA, as the National Inventory Control Point (NICP) for CWM, will establish and maintain accountability for any liquid-filled munition and any liquid in other than a munitions configuration that the MARB determines most likely contains a chemical agent fill. CMA will establish and maintain this accountability regardless of the circumstance (i.e., an explosives or munitions emergency; a planned CWM response; other activities, such as range clearance activities) under which recovered.

7.3. Air Force Procedure

7.3.1. Actions to be taken upon recovery of suspected chemical munitions on an installation, or upon delivery of suspected chemical munitions from a non-DOD source to a base are covered in EOD joint service technical orders (AEODPS) and AFI 32-3001, *AF EOD Program*. All responses to suspected chemical munitions are Level 1 explosives and munitions emergency responses and conducted per the DOD Policy to implement the EPA Military Munitions Rule.

7.3.1.1. In all cases of suspected CW or BW items, the safety of USAF personnel and the local population will be a primary concern.

7.3.1.2. Due to potential CWC treaty implications associated with recovery of CW, installation command post personnel will notify their MAJCOM Treaty Compliance Office within 8 hours of their notification. MAJCOM TCOs will notify AF/A10-S within 24 hours of receipt of information concerning discovery, recovery, or delivery of any CW or BW munitions or related equipment (i.e. spray tanks, bulk storage containers, etc.).

7.3.1.3. Installation command posts will send situation reports in accordance with *Air Force Instruction 10-206 Operational Reporting*, **Chapter 4**, 6 September 2011.

7.3.1.4. AF/A10-S shall report identified and destroyed chemical munitions to the OSD CWC Treaty Manager for appropriate reporting to the National Authority and the OPCW.

JACK WEINSTEIN, Lt Gen, USAF
DCS, Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

AFI 10-206, *Operational Reporting*, 11 Jun 2014.

AFI 16-601, *Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements*, 18 February 2011.

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CJCSI 2030.01D, *Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation and Compliance Policy Guidance*, 4 Sep 2015.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 13 January 1993.

CWC Implementation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-277, as amended, codified at Title 22, United States Code Chapter 75).

DOD Directive 2060.1, *Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements*, 9 January 2001.

DOD Manual 6055.09-M, *DOD Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards*, 29 February 2008.

DOD Planning Guidance for Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 28 May 2009.

Planning Assumptions for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological (NCB) Treaties and Agreements for Fiscal Year 2013-2019, 21 December 2010.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AF — United States Air Force

AF/A10 — Headquarters, United States Air Force, Deputy Chief of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration

AF/A10-S — Headquarters, United States Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Strategic Security and CWMD Policy Division

AF/A10-SI — Headquarters, United States Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Strategic Security and CWMD Policy Division, International Treaties and Agreements Branch

AFCENT — U.S. Air Forces Central Command

AFMAN — Air Force Manual

AFOG — Air Force Operations Group

AFOSI/PJ — Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Office of Special Projects

AP — Alternative Perimeter

AFPD — **Air Force Policy Document**

AFRIMS — **Air Force Records Information System**

BAT — Base Assistance Team

BW — Biological Weapons

CARA — CBRNE Analytical Remediation Activity

CBRN — Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

CBRNE - Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High -Yield Explosive

CBT — Computer Based Training

CCDR — Combatant Commander

CCMD — Combatant Command

CE — Civil Engineer(s)

CJCSI — Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CMA — Chemical Materiel Agency (USA)

COCOM — Combatant Command

CRG — Compliance Review Group

CSAF — Chief of Staff of the Air Force

CW — Chemical Weapon(s)

CWC — Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention)

CWIWG — Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Working Group (within DOD)

CWM — Chemical warfare material

DATSD (NCB) (C/BM) — Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Matters

DOC — Department of Commerce

DOD — Department of Defense

DOS — Department of State

DTRA — Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EIF — Entry into Force

EOD — Explosive Ordnance Disposal

FP — Final Perimeter

GOCO — Government Owned Contractor Operated (facility)

HCA — Host Country Agreement

HT — Host Team

HTL — Host Team Leader

I&C — Implementation and Compliance

ICG — Inspection Control Group

ISM — Inspection Support Manual

ISP — Inspected State Party

IT — Inspection Team

ITL — Inspection Team Leader

JS-J5 — Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy

MAJCOM — Major Command

MARB — Material Assessments Review Board

NICP — National Inventory Control Point

NJOIC — National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center

NMCC — National Military Command Center

NRRC — Nuclear Risk Reduction Center

ONA — Office of National Authority

OPCW — Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

OPR — Office of Primary Responsibility

OSD — Office of the Secretary of Defense

OATSD (NCB) — Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs

OUSD (AT&L) — Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

OUSD (P) — Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

PA — Public Affairs

POE — Point of Entry and Exit (of an inspection team)

PPBES — Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System

RC — Response Cell

RCA — Riot Control Agent

RCW — Recovered chemical weapon(s)

RCWM — Recovered chemical warfare material

RDS — Records Disposition Schedule

RP — Requested Perimeter

RSO — Requesting State Party Observer

RSP — Requesting State Party

SAF — Secretary of the Air Force

SAF/GCI — Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence, International and Military Affairs

SAF/AQL — Secretary of the Air Force Special Programs

SAF/AAZ — Secretary of the Air Force Security and Special Program Oversight

SAF/PA — Director of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force

SOFA — Status of Forces Agreement

TCO — Treaty Compliance Officer

TEI — Technical Equipment Inspection

TEU — Technical Escort Unit

TS — Technical Secretariat (of the OPCW)

USG — United States Government

WMD — Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction

Terms

Abandoned CW—CW, including old CW, abandoned by a State after 1 January 1925 on the territory of another State without consent of the latter. (CWC, Art. II, para. 6)

Alternative (Inspection) Perimeter (AP)—A perimeter specified by the ISP to a challenge inspection after reviewing the RP. An AP must include all of the area within the RP (i.e. an AP may not be smaller than a requested perimeter), as well as meet several other requirements specified in Part X of the CWC Verification Annex. An AP is subject to negotiation between the Host Team and the Inspection Team before the determination of a FP. (See also Requested Perimeter, Final Perimeter.)

Base Assistance Team (BAT)—A team deployed by AF/A10-S and the MAJCOMs to assist an Air Force installation in preparing for and managing a challenge inspection.

Challenge Inspection—A short-notice inspection of a specific facility or location on the territory of or under the jurisdiction and control of a State Party that is requested by another State Party. A challenge inspection is conducted by the OPCW TS. States Parties may request challenge inspections within other States Parties to clarify and resolve any questions concerning possible non-compliance with CWC provisions. Challenge inspection procedures are covered under Article IX of the CWC and Part X of the CWC Verification Annex.

Chemical Weapons (CW)—CW means the following, together or separately:

a—: Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes;

b-:—Munitions and devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices;

c—: Any equipment specifically designed for use directly, meaning “solely”, in connection with the employment of munitions or devices specified in subparagraph (b).

Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Working Group (CWIWG)—A DOD forum for: coordinating DOD planning and preparations; coordinating and defending DOD implementation programs, budget and resource creation and allocation; and fielding and coordinating resolution of issues impacting implementation.

Compliance—Compliance assures that existing and future Air Force programs and activities legally and technically comply with the terms of the CWC. Compliance includes executing responsibilities described in this Instruction; destroying the CW stockpile and former CW production facilities; changing doctrine as required; reporting information for inclusion in CWC-required data declarations; and making CWC-required notifications. Compliance also includes not doing what the CWC forbids, including using CW, developing or producing CW, stockpiling CW, and training for the employment of CW.

Compliance Review Group (CRG)—A DOD-wide working group, chaired by Chief, CW Treaty Management within OATSD (NCB), that monitors DOD compliance with the CWC, resolves compliance issues within DOD, and makes CWC compliance determinations for DOD.

Declared Facility—An installation, factory, or plant that was declared by the USG IAW the requirements of the CWC. Declared facilities must comply with specific verification activities, like systematic inspections, and may include on-site continuous monitoring. Requirements will be defined in a facility agreement. Facilities are declared based on a range of criteria, including production, storage, or a history of CW or precursor chemical research, development, or testing. The USAF has no declared facilities.

DOD Components—Collectively refers to OSD, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and JS, the Combatant Commands, the DOD Inspector General, Defense Agencies, and DOD Field Activities.

Entry into Force (EIF)—The specific date when the provisions of the CWC go into effect for a country that has ratified or acceded to the CWC.

Final (Inspection) Perimeter (FP)—The inspection site perimeter as agreed in CWC challenge inspection negotiations between the IT and the inspected State Party. (See also Requested Perimeter, Alternative Perimeter.)

Host State—A State on whose territory lie facilities or areas of another State Party to the CWC and which are subject to inspection under the Convention.

Host Team (HT)—The group of USG representatives responsible for negotiating with an IT during an inspection and for making major inspection management decisions. For inspections where DOD is the Lead Agency, the HT will include Members from OSD, JS, DTRA, affected Service(s), and the inspection site. A flag rank officer or civilian equivalent from OSD or JS will normally be designated as Host Team Leader for challenge inspections. For Out-US inspections, the responsible Combatant Command will also have a Member of the HT and that Member may be designated as Host Team Leader.

Implementation— All tasks and actions taken by the Air Force to prepare for and undertake compliance obligations under the CWC. Among other things, this includes preparing Air Force and contractor facilities for a CWC challenge inspection, investigation of alleged use, or inspection and destruction of recovered chemical weapons.

Implementation and Compliance Planning— Implementation and compliance planning includes all tasks and actions taken to refine resource allocation planning as CWC requirements are identified, to prepare implementation and compliance, destruction, notification, education and training plans, and to alert inspectable U.S. Air Force and contractor facilities.

Interagency Working Group (IWG)—The existing CW arms control policy IWG is the national decision-making body on CWC implementation, composed of one or more representatives of the following departments or agencies: the National Security Council, Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other executive departments or agencies as the President may direct.

In-Country Escorts—Individuals specified by the inspected State Party and, if appropriate, by the Host State, if they so wish, to accompany and assist the IT during the in-country period (also referred to as National Escorts).

Inspected State Party—The State Party on whose territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control an inspection pursuant to the CWC takes place, or the State Party whose facility or area on the territory of a Host State is subject to such an inspection.

Inspection Mandate—The instruction issued by the Director-General of the OPCW to the IT for the conduct of a particular inspection.

Inspection Team (IT)—The group of inspectors and inspection assistants assigned by the Director-General of the OPCW to conduct a particular inspection.

Inspector—An individual designated by the OPCW to carry out an inspection or investigation visit IAW the CWC.

Lead Agency—The USG department or agency that is the owner or sponsor of a particular facility being declared or inspected under the CWC. DOD is the Lead Agency for all facilities owned by or leased to DOD, including facilities that are contractor-operated and overseas facilities used by DOD under agreement with foreign governments.

Managed Access—A method of protecting sensitive information while facilitating inspector access to information or to an area of a facility that has overriding national security or proprietary concerns not related to CW. Such measures may include, but are not limited to: removal of sensitive papers from office spaces; shrouding of sensitive pieces of equipment, displays or dials on such equipment; logging off of computer systems and turning off data-indicating devices; providing access to a certain percentage of buildings or rooms within a building; or providing access to only selected members of an IT.

National Authority— The designated national focal point for effective liaison with the OPCW and other States Parties. The Department of State is the U.S. National Authority.

Office of the National Authority (ONA)—The ONA is the executive secretariat of the U.S. National Authority. The ONA coordinates and facilitates communication, administrative, and

logistical matters related to CWC implementation. For the United States, the ONA is established within the Department of State.

Old CW—CW produced before 1925, or those produced between 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to such an extent that they can no longer be used as CW.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)—The international organization established under Article VIII of the CWC to ensure the implementation of CWC provisions, including those for international compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties. All CWC States Parties are members of the OPCW.

OUT-US—Outside the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories.

Perimeter—In the case of a challenge inspection, the external boundary of the inspection site, defined by either geographic coordinates or markings on a map or picture.

Perimeter Activities—Activities conducted by the IT at the perimeter of an inspected site. In the case of a challenge inspection, these activities occur upon the IT's arrival at the alternative or final perimeter, whichever occurs first, and may continue for the duration of the inspection.

Point of Entry/Exit (POE)—The location(s) designated for the in-country arrival of ITs and for their departure after completion of each inspection mission. Dulles International Airport, Washington, DC, is the only U.S. POE for CWC challenge inspections. San Francisco International Airport may be used for inspections in the western United States only when an IT conducting continuous monitoring at a CW destruction site is not bringing inspection equipment into the country.

Pre-Inspection Activities—The activities conducted near the inspection site prior to commencement of the period of inspection, including among other things welcome, orientation, safety, medical, and informational briefings, negotiations, office and lodging assignments, perimeter monitoring, and development of the inspection plan.

Purposes Not Prohibited under the Convention—These include:

- a**—: Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, or other peaceful purposes.
- b**—: Protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and CW.
- c**—: Military purposes not connected with the use of CW and not dependent upon the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare.
- d**—: Law enforcement, including domestic riot control.

Requested Perimeter (RP)—The inspection perimeter specified by the requesting State Party and presented by the IT upon its arrival at the POE to conduct a challenge inspection. The RP must conform to the following:

- a**—: Run at least ten meters outside any buildings or other structures.
- b**—: Not cut through any existing security enclosures.
- c**—: Run at least ten meters outside any existing security enclosures that the requesting State Party intends to include within the requested perimeter.

Requesting State Party (RSP)—A State Party to the CWC which has requested a challenge inspection.

Requesting State Party Observer (RSO)—A representative of a RSP designated to observe a CWC challenge inspection. An observer may be a citizen of the RSP or of another State Party as designated by the RSP.

Riot Control Agent—Any chemical not listed in a Schedule of chemicals, which can rapidly result in human sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.

Routine Inspections—Synonymous with the term Systematic Inspections as defined below.

Schedules of Chemicals—Collectively refers to the three lists of toxic chemicals and precursor chemicals that are specifically subject to verification under the CWC. The three lists are contained in the CWC's Annex on Chemicals and are referred to individually as Schedule 1, Schedule 2, and Schedule 3.

Site Diagram—A diagram or map of a facility which includes the geographic coordinates, boundaries, road/rail entrances/exits, scale of the diagram, network of roads/rails, arrow indicating orientation relative to geographic (true) north, locations of all buildings and other structures, and a description of symbols used in the diagram.

State Party—Any nation that has deposited its instrument of ratification of or accession to the CWC.

Systematic Inspections—Recurring on-site inspections conducted by the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) as part of systematic verification activities for declared facilities.

Technical Escort Unit (TEU)—The United States Army 22nd Chemical Battalion Technical Escort Unit, provides the Department of Defense and other federal agencies with a unique, immediate response capability for chemical and biological warfare material. The Tech Escort missions include worldwide response for escorting, rendering-safe, disposing, sampling verification, mitigating hazards and identifying weaponized and non-weaponized chemical, biological and hazardous material.

Technical Secretariat (TS)—The organizational body of the OPCW responsible for carrying out the verification measures and functions provided for by the CWC, as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council.

Toxic Chemical—Any chemical which, through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans and animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin, method of production, or whether they are produced in facilities, munitions, or elsewhere. (For the purpose of implementing the CWC, known toxic chemicals which have been specifically identified for the application of verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the CWC Annex on Chemicals.)

Verification—The determination that a State Party is complying with the provisions of the CWC.

Verification Measures—Those activities and actions taken by the TS to determine a State Party's compliance with the CWC. Verification includes review and analysis of States Parties' data declarations and active measures. The two principal categories of active verification

measures are on-site inspections and continuous monitoring either by inspector presence or by instruments and systems installed at declared facilities.