This Air Force Instruction (AFI) implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 16-6, *International Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements, and the DoD Foreign Clearance Program*. It applies to all Regular Air Force, Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve personnel responsible for implementing and complying with arms control agreements. This AFI may be supplemented by subordinate organizations, but all supplements must be routed to AF/A10P for coordination prior to certification and approval. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility listed above using the Air Force Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route Air Force Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate chain of command. The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3”) number following the compliance statement. See AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, Table 1.1 for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the requestor’s commander for non-tiered compliance items. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System Records Disposition Schedule.
SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This instruction has been revised in order to comply with direction from the Secretary of the Air Force to consolidate, eliminate, and reduce publications and requires a complete review. This revision modifies language to reflect current New START implementation activities; combines AFI 16-608, AFI 16-605, and AFI 16-609 into one document; modifies and updates office titles and symbols to reflect reorganization within AF/A10; and updates roles and responsibilities for each Air Force organization responsible for implementing and complying with arms control agreements. References to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans and Requirements (AF/A3/5) were updated to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (AF/A10). Similarly, references to the Strategic Plans and Policy Division (AF/A5XP) and the Strategic Stability and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Division (AF/A10S) were both updated to the Policy and Strategy Division (AF/A10P). Former references to the Strategic Stability and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Division (AF/A10S) have also been updated to Policy and Strategy Division (AF/A10P).

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Chapter 1

OVERVIEW

1.1. This AFI provides guidance on Air Force implementation of, and compliance with, the four primary treaties concerning weapons of mass destruction. These treaties are the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), the Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States (U.S.-IAEA Integrated Safeguards Agreements), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention). This publication provides guidance in accordance with Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2060.1, Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 2060.03, Application of the National Security Exclusion to the Agreements Between the USA and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the US, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI), Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation and Compliance Policy Guidance 2030.01D. This instruction is consistent with AFPD 13-5, Air Force Nuclear Enterprise and Air Force priorities for the Nuclear Enterprise. This publication incorporates the Chemical Weapons Convention Base Assistance Team (BAT) Concept of Operation (CONOPs). It applies at USAF-controlled facilities, geographically separated units, and government owned-contractor operated (GOCO) facilities. This guidance applies to personnel involved in the operation of USAF aircraft, whether or not they are at a USAF installation or GOCO facility. This AFI also applies to all Air Force research and development laboratories involved in research and development programs, including those associated with any non-lethal agents that may be interpreted to be riot control agents as defined by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Chapter 2

NEW START

Section 2A—New START Overview

2.1. Background. New START entered into force on 5 February 2011 and has a duration of ten years. It may be extended for a period of no more than five years by mutual agreement of the parties. The purpose of the treaty is to increase transparency, enhance predictability and stability, and reduce and limit the strategic offensive arms and associated warheads of both the United States and the Russian Federation. The treaty requires the parties to mutually and transparently reduce their nuclear forces over a period of seven years, but allows each party the flexibility to determine the structure of its own strategic forces within the aggregate limits of the treaty. Verification of New START is carried out using on-site inspections, national technical means, unique identifiers, data exchanges, and notifications.

2.2. Strict adherence to New START requirements and use of standard operating procedures for treaty activities is paramount.

Section 2B—New START Roles and Responsibilities

2.3. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower, Personnel and Services (AF/A1) shall ensure authorizations are properly assigned and allocated to support treaty compliance offices and activities.

2.4. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (AF/A2) shall provide intelligence information concerning foreign threats in relation to New START activities to affected MAJCOMs.

2.5. The Chief, Policy Division (AF/A10P), on behalf of the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence, and Nuclear Integration (AF/A10), shall:

   2.5.1. Ensure nuclear operations policy and guidance complies with New START.

   2.5.2. Oversee the force structure development and execution process for implementation of New START in coordination with Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), Air Mobility Command (AMC), Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC).

   2.5.3. Provide oversight toward ensuring all non-nuclear combat operations involving use of New START-accountable forces are conducted in a treaty-compliant manner.

   2.5.4. Raise questions and concerns from MAJCOMs about Air Force operations, or contemplated operations, employing New START-accountable forces to the Joint Staff Rep of the New START Compliance Review Group for compliance assessment before such operations are initiated.

   2.5.5. Provide updates on New START implementation and compliance activities to the Nuclear Oversight Board, Nuclear Issues Resolution and Integration Board, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Secretary of the Air Force, as necessary.
2.5.6. Ensure operations are accomplished in a joint manner to support the Commander, United States Strategic Command and to ensure that the number of accountable items remain within New START central limits.

2.5.7. Serve as the Treaty Implementation Manager and manage all aspects of Air Force compliance with New START.

2.5.8. Participate in and represent the Air Force at New START Implementation Working Group meetings and activities. When invited, participate as technical advisor in interagency and international meetings (e.g., Bilateral Consultative Commission).

2.5.9. Review Air Force acquisition plans and testing documents related to New START accountable forces/installations for compliance, as required.

2.5.10. Coordinate with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and MAJCOMs to schedule and conduct New START mock inspections.

2.5.11. Submit notifications required by New START to the Joint Staff J-5/Deputy Directorate for Strategic Stability/International Negotiations Division (JS DDSTS/IND) for forwarding to the Department of State for transmittal.

2.5.12. Coordinate all Air Force notifications and data submissions related to telemetric information.

2.5.13. Collaborate with the United States Navy and Joint Staff to develop the annual recommendation of launches for exchange of telemetry with the Russian Federation.

2.5.14. Submit all changes to site diagrams of Air Force facilities subject to inspection to JS DDSTS/IND.

2.5.15. Provide oversight to ensure the Air Force Central Node, functioning as an adjunct to AF/A10P, manages all aspects of Air Force New START reporting and associated requirements to include training and guidance for implementation of the New START Notification Protocol.

2.6. The Air Force Central Node shall:

2.6.1. Manage all aspects of Air Force New START reporting and associated requirements, including providing guidance and support for New START notification processing (in accordance with this instruction and the New START Reporting Handbook) during normal duty hours. After hours, the Air Force Central Node duty officer may be contacted through the Air Forces Strategic Command Joint Global Strike Operations Center (AFSTRAT J-GSOC).

2.6.2. Serve as the releasing authority for Air Force New START notifications. Notification routing occurs as directed by the Joint Staff and is incorporated into the New START software; however, in unusual situations, the Central Node duty officer or higher authority may direct a necessary deviation. AFSTRAT J-GSOC personnel, acting in support of the Air Force Central Node, are authorized to release notifications as directed by the Air Force Central Node or AF/A10P.

2.6.3. Conduct training for personnel responsible for origination or review and approval of New START notifications. Deliver the formal curriculum using one of three methods.
2.6.3.1. Provide in person training at the Air Force Central Node facility at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia if arms control temporary duty funds are available.

2.6.3.2. If extenuating circumstances exist precluding student travel, units may request approval from AF/A10P, through their major command treaty office, for on-site mass training (six or more students).

2.6.3.3. During periods of sequestration, the Air Force Central Node may conduct training on-line using web-based tools such as Defense Collaboration Services.

2.6.4. Develop, maintain, and publish the New START Reporting Handbook.

2.6.5. Validate, on a monthly basis, the Air Force data resident in the New START Database and ensure the accuracy of the semi-annual data exchanges.

2.6.6. Analyze Air Force New START notifications and collect and report accuracy and error statistical data.

2.6.7. Serve as the interface between Air Force New START reporting nodes and DTRA for Arms Control Enterprise System support issues.

2.6.8. Manage all Arms Control Enterprise System accounts for Air Force New START users, to include account creation, deletion, and locking/unlocking when required.

2.7. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection (AF/A4) shall coordinate logistical support with the MAJCOMs to ensure treaty implementation and compliance activities are fully supported.

2.8. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Plans and Requirements (AF/A5/8) shall factor New START-required force modifications and limitations into future Air Force strategic plans and incorporate New START implementation and force reduction requirements into the programming process.

2.9. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) shall:

2.9.1. Ensure appropriate acquisition and testing documents for acquisition programs involving strategic nuclear forces are submitted to AF/A10P for New START compliance review.

2.9.2. Ensure that any acquisitions, conversions or eliminations of strategic systems comply with New START, in coordination with AF/A10.

2.10. The Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Special Program Oversight and Information Protection (SAF/AAZ), in coordination with AF/A10P and Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), Office of Special Projects, shall:

2.10.1. Ensure all special access programs are in compliance with New START.

2.10.2. Ensure special access programs are protected against unnecessary or inadvertent exposure during New START verification activities.

2.10.3. Provide a treaty representative to support applicable New START inspections.

2.11. The Office of the Air Force General Counsel (SAF/GC) shall provide legal advice to Headquarters Air Force regarding New START implementation and compliance activities and coordinate this advice with the Air Force Judge Advocate General (AF/JA) as appropriate.
2.12. **The Director of Public Affairs (SAF/PA) shall** interface with the DoD Office of Public Affairs and provide requested support as necessary to DoD and Air Force public affairs and strategic communications actions relative to implementation of and compliance with New START.

Section 2C—**New START MAJCOM Responsibilities**

2.13. **All MAJCOMs, the Air Force District of Washington (AFDW), and ANG shall:**

2.13.1. Ensure any proposed modifications to New START-accountable items are submitted to AF/A10P for treaty compliance review prior to approval and funding. (T-1)

2.13.2. Coordinate requests for New START mock inspections through AF/A10P with DTRA.

2.13.3. Submit annual requests for funding under the Arms Control Program Element Code 35145F.

2.13.4. Ensure logistical support and maintenance of all New START-accountable items is conducted in a manner compliant with New START requirements until the item is removed from accountability in accordance with the treaty or until the treaty is no longer in force.

2.13.4.1. If not the lead command for any New START-accountable items or inspectable facilities, provide support to maintain compliance with New START provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities. (T-1) Even though a MAJCOM may not own any New START-accountable assets or inspectable facilities, MAJCOM commanders may be required to develop future plans to support New START requirements and other commands, as needed, if circumstances change.

2.13.4.2. Train and educate all personnel who have responsibility for New START items of inspection.

2.13.4.3. Ensure all New START notifications are provided in accordance with the New START Reporting Handbook.

2.13.4.4. Develop local training for unit personnel supporting New START.

2.13.5. Ensure Command Post controllers have current voice formats and use proper reporting procedures to notify subordinate wings/units and tenant organizations of upcoming New START events.

2.13.6. Designate and maintain a 24-hour point of contact for New START notifications.

2.13.7. Conduct mock inspections and training visits. U.S.-only mock inspections are valuable training activities for the escort mission teams, local base personnel, and logistics support activities, as well as those personnel involved in the notification process.

2.13.8. Ensure MAJCOM TCOs:

2.13.8.1. Develop supplements, implementation, or compliance plans and procedures to execute this AFI and coordinate plans and procedures with AF/A10 (see Attachment 2). Review subordinate wing/unit compliance plans. (T-1)
2.13.8.2. Review and coordinate on higher headquarters directives and instructions, and participate in the review and coordination of arms control implementation and compliance guidance.

2.13.8.3. Coordinate with subordinate wings/units to implement DoD, higher headquarters, and MAJCOM policies on arms control treaties and agreements.

2.13.8.4. Coordinate with MAJCOM programs that may impact treaty compliance.

2.13.8.5. Coordinate and monitor contractual agreements on efforts affecting New START (building, road improvements, new weapon systems/platforms) to ensure work is completed according to treaty specifications.

2.13.8.6. Provide training and guidance for wing/unit personnel on New START implementation and compliance activities, as applicable.

2.13.8.7. Serve as the focal point for New START matters as they affect the MAJCOM.

2.13.8.8. Develop contingency plans to ensure New START inspector rights guaranteed by the treaty are executable under furlough, sequestration, or possible government shutdown periods. These plans would include alternatives to ensure transportation, billeting, dining, medical, and full access to all inspectable areas is still available.

2.13.8.9. Ensure contracts involving storage, production, movement, modification, or elimination of New START-accountable items, to include reporting requirements, are compliant with the treaty. Propose modifications for deficient contract work statements as soon as possible.

2.13.8.10. Keep AF/A10P and MAJCOM Operations Security informed of any activity at inspectable facilities that could impact New START activities (e.g., runway closures, air shows, major exercises/operations that impact operations security, ramp space, and billeting challenges).

2.13.8.11. Coordinate with their chain of command and/or AF/A10P for clarification on questions that may arise during an inspection.

2.13.8.12. Advise the wing/unit or Regional TCO with responses to communicate to the DTRA Escort Team Chief.

2.13.8.13. Ensure subordinate wing/unit or Regional TCOS and MAJCOM personnel receive appropriate New START training if directly involved in New START implementation and compliance.

2.14. Those MAJCOMs and ANG units affected by New START verification and implementation activities shall:

2.14.1. Develop and maintain a MAJCOM supplement or compliance plan. Ensure each unit and wing implementing New START provisions submits a compliance plan to their MAJCOM. MAJCOM compliance plans or supplements will also include requirements for completing and maintaining facility protection plans and vulnerability assessments for units subject to inspection. (T-1)

2.14.3. Ensure units with New START-inspectable assets or facilities remain prepared to support New START inspections.

2.14.4. Submit site diagrams of all New START inspectable facilities to AF/A10P for approval in accordance with Part Four of the *Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.*

2.15. **Headquarters, AFGSC shall:**

2.15.1. Maintain compliance with New START provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities in the command.

2.15.2. Ensure all assigned forces and installations affected by New START are operated in a treaty-compliant manner until the treaty is no longer in effect or the systems are removed from accountability in accordance with New START.

2.15.3. Operate assigned converted heavy bombers in a manner consistent with New START commitments and obligations.

2.15.4. Ensure converted heavy bomber aircraft in the command’s possession remain in their New START-compliant configuration and do not plan or apply aircraft modifications to converted New START-accountable aircraft without AF/A10 approval.

2.15.5. Serve as the first level reviewer for all Air Force-originated New START notifications. In this role:

   2.15.5.1. Ensure sufficient numbers of trained personnel are available to support New START notification processing requirements on a continual basis.

   2.15.5.2. Ensure the accuracy and timeliness of all New START notifications in accordance with the treaty and New START Reporting Handbook guidelines. Contact the Air Force Central Node, or the designated Air Force Central Node duty officer, prior to the transmission of any notification that does not pass the automated compliance checks.

   2.15.5.3. Add notification reference information, when required, and forward notifications for additional processing in accordance with the treaty and New START Reporting Handbook guidelines.

   2.15.5.4. Appoint a primary and alternate Point of Contact for local training of AFSTRAT J-GSOC personnel supporting New START notification processing. Provide a copy of the appointment letter to the Air Force Central Node via e-mail to afcn.nst@us.af.mil. These individuals will:

      2.15.5.4.1. Serve as trusted agents for the request of Arms Control Enterprise System user accounts.

      2.15.5.4.2. Oversee local procedures training in support of New START notification processing.

2.15.6. Work with AFMC and AFSPC to ensure that any new acquisitions, conversions, or eliminations of strategic nuclear delivery systems are conducted in accordance with New START procedures.
2.16. **Headquarters, AFMC shall:**

2.16.1. Maintain compliance with New START provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities in the command.

2.16.2. Work with AFGSC and AFSPC to ensure that any acquisitions, conversions, or eliminations of strategic nuclear delivery systems are conducted in accordance with New START procedures.

2.16.3. Schedule newly assigned personnel to receive local Arms Control Enterprise System training and complete the Arms Control Enterprise System-New START Initial User training course if required by their job.

2.17. **Headquarters, AFSPC shall:**

2.17.1. Maintain compliance with New START provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities in the command.

2.17.2. Ensure appropriate AFSPC representatives participate in the mission planning, as well as launch day activities and post-mission creation of required telemetry products, for all New START accountable launches subject to potential exchange of telemetric information and related materials. AFSPC shall provide recommendations to AFGSC on the advisability of exchanging these telemetry-related materials with the Russian Federation.

2.17.3. Work with AFMC and AFGSC to ensure that any new acquisitions, conversions, or eliminations of strategic nuclear delivery systems are conducted in accordance with New START procedures.

2.18. **Headquarters, AMC shall** provide airlift to support the DoD, DTRA inspectors, and escort operations as requested through United States Transportation Command.

2.19. **Headquarters, AFRC shall** operate heavy bomber aircraft that are transferred from the Regular Air Force in a manner consistent with New START commitments and obligations. The Air Force Reserve ensures converted heavy bombers in the Command’s possession remain in their New START-compliant configuration and will not seek aircraft modifications to converted New START-accountable aircraft without AF/A10 approval.

2.20. **Headquarters, ACC shall:**

2.20.1. Provide support, as required, to maintain compliance with New START provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities, if not the lead command for any New START-accountable items or inspectable facilities. Even though a MAJCOM may not own any New START-accountable assets or inspectable facilities, MAJCOM commanders may be required to develop future plans to support New START requirements and other commands, as needed, if circumstances change. Schedule newly assigned personnel to receive local Arms Control Enterprise System training and complete the Arms Control Enterprise System-New START Initial User training course if required by their job.

2.20.2. Ensure AFTAC has available properly trained and certified individuals to support all New START Treaty inspections involving potential use of radiation detection equipment.
2.21. The Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces shall:

2.21.1. Provide airlift in support of New START requirements as requested by DTRA. Ensure aircrew and logistics support personnel maintain current diplomatic passports through the DTRA representative at Yokota Air Base, Japan.

2.21.2. Ensure converted heavy bomber aircraft in the command’s possession remain in their New START Treaty-compliant configuration and will not seek aircraft modifications to converted New START Treaty-accountable aircraft without AFGSC and AF/A10 approval.

2.22. Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe shall ensure converted heavy bomber aircraft in the command’s possession remain in their New START Treaty-compliant configuration and will not seek aircraft modifications to converted New START Treaty-accountable aircraft without AFGSC and AF/A10 approval.

Section 2D—New START Guidance and Procedures

2.23. Notifications.

2.23.1. MAJCOMs shall provide notifications to the Air Force Central Node via the Arms Control Enterprise System in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol and the Annex on Notifications of New START.

2.23.2. New START contains provisions for the parties to address situations where there are no pre-established notifications. Should such situations arise during the course of an inspection on an installation, whether initiated by the Russian inspectors or at the behest of the unit, address it through established command channels and escalation processes.

2.23.3. Newly-assigned personnel shall receive local New START notification processing and Arms Control Enterprise System procedures training if required by their job. After the initial local Arms Control Enterprise System instruction, newly assigned personnel can request a training account but will not process actual notifications without supervision (by an individual who has completed formal training) until completing the formal New START Notification Training Course. Managers should make every effort to have this training completed as part of a controller's initial training program, prior to certification.

2.24. Database Reporting.

2.24.1. New START establishes a database of information concerning items of accountability that the parties exchange twice annually in March and September, based on data effective the first day of March and September. MAJCOMs will process New START notifications through the Arms Control Enterprise System reporting network. (T-0)

2.24.2. MAJCOMs who have responsibility for Minuteman III first stages will ensure a physical inventory is conducted on all non-deployed Minuteman III first stages stored at their facility within 15 days of the semi-annual data exchange. (T-1) Note: Inventories will verify the unique identifier against the New START Database.

2.24.3. MAJCOM will ensure all inventories are verified against the unit’s New START database and then forwarded to the Air Force Central Node, either directly or per MAJCOM-directed process, for a final check before the semi-annual New START data exchange.
2.24.4. Some New START notifications require concurrent reporting through separate channels to support distinct but complementary databases. United States Strategic Command’s Force Status/Readiness database is one such system. If applicable, the Treaty Compliance Officer and local Force Status/Readiness representative will coordinate to ensure that New START force status changes for their unit are reflected in the same manner in both the Arms Control Enterprise System and the Force Status/Readiness New START module, consistent with established reporting procedures.

2.24.5. MAJCOMs shall ensure TCOs, for installations with deployed assets, establish force status/readiness accounts. These officers will use their accounts to verify the accuracy of New START module data for their unit within 24 hours of a reportable movement/event that changes the status of a strategic delivery vehicle. If this movement/event is outside normal duty hours, the TCO will conduct the check the next duty day. If mismatches are noted, they will immediately coordinate with the Force Status/Readiness representative to determine if corrective actions are needed.

2.25. TCO Reports.

2.25.1. MAJCOMs shall ensure post-inspection reports by the unit Treaty Compliance Officer are prepared within seven days following an inspection, exhibition, or demonstration.

2.25.2. Installation TCOs forward post-inspection reports through the MAJCOM TCO. MAJCOMs will review and forward to AF/A10P, who will distribute as necessary.


2.26.1. OPSEC is an information-related capability that preserves friendly essential secrecy by using a process to identify, control, and protect critical information and indicators that, if compromised, would allow adversaries or potential adversaries to identify and exploit friendly vulnerabilities leading to increased risk or potential mission, function, program, or activity failure or the loss of life. OPSEC's desired effect is to influence the adversary's behavior and actions by reducing the adversary's ability to collect and exploit critical information and indicators about friendly activities. (see AFI 10-701, Operations Security).

2.26.2. MAJCOMs shall ensure Wing Operations Security Program Managers and unit Operations Security Coordinators will annually accomplish risk and vulnerability assessments of facilities subject to New START inspections.

2.26.3. MAJCOMs shall ensure facility personnel should guard against the possibility that someone may attempt to gather information on our abilities, capabilities, operations, intentions, personnel, and organizations. It is incumbent on facility personnel to be observant and diligent in protecting information that might be used to compromise our security, while at the same time being courteous and pleasant.

2.26.4. MAJCOMs shall ensure that if inquiries or actions of a Russian inspection team member raise suspicions, the host-unit’s escort shall notify the TCO, who in turn notifies the DTRA Escort Team Chief. Base security force representatives and AFOSI are notified of any suspicious situations. The Wing Operations Security Program Manager is also notified.
Chapter 3

UNITED STATES-INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Section 3A—U.S.-IAEA Integrated Safeguards Agreements Overview

3.1. Background. This chapter provides instruction on Air Force implementation of, and compliance with, the U.S.-IAEA integrated safeguards under the Agreement Between the United States of America and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the United States and the Additional Protocol in accordance with United States law and policy, as specified in DoDD 2060.1 and DoDI 2060.03.

3.2. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970 established a safeguards system directed by the IAEA. While not obligated to do so under the treaty, the United States voluntarily concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which entered into force on 9 December 1980.

3.3. Under this agreement, the United States has provided and annually reviews a list of facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards, also known as the Eligible Facilities List. This list includes Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed facilities, activities, and programs. The agreement excludes any current or former DoD-owned or -leased locations, sites, and facilities, or associated information or activities, of direct national security significance, under what is known as the national security exclusion.

3.4. The United States also voluntarily concluded an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, which entered into force on 6 January 2009. For the purposes of this instruction, the safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol are collectively referred to as “integrated safeguards.” The Additional Protocol expands IAEA authorities for verification by requiring declaration of additional facilities and complementary access allowing inspection of undeclared locations with short notice, among other requirements.

3.5. The United States also applies the national security exclusion to exclude IAEA access to activities or information of direct national security significance under the Additional Protocol. In addition, the United States has the right under the Additional Protocol to employ managed access to protect activities or information during IAEA inspections. Each location develops its own managed access measures with guidance from appropriate security personnel and AF/A10P. Managed access may include, but is not limited to:

3.5.1. Removing sensitive papers from office spaces.

3.5.2. Shrouding sensitive displays and equipment.

3.5.3. Logging off from computers and turning off data indication devices.

3.5.4. Dismissing non-essential personnel during the inspection period.

3.6. Managed access should always be used to prevent access to equities of direct national security significance during a complementary access visit or inspection.
3.7. Per DoDI 2060.03, paragraph 4.d., the national security exclusion does not apply to U.S. government assets outside of the United States. Any exclusion of U.S. government assets outside of the United States should be addressed with the host country through the applicable host country agreements.

Section 3B—Roles and Responsibilities for U.S.-IAEA Integrated Safeguards Agreements

3.8. The Chief, AF/A10P, on behalf of AF/A10, shall:

3.8.1. Act as the Treaty Implementation Manager for all aspects of the Air Force arms control process, including monitoring the implementation of the integrated safeguards, and serve as the point of contact concerning issues of implementation and compliance with the integrated safeguards agreements.

3.8.2. Coordinate with Offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff concerning all matters associated with the integrated safeguards, working closely with Offices of the Secretary of the Air Force to include: Special Programs (SAF/AQL), SAF/AAZ, and SAF/GC.

3.8.3. Act as the Air Force interface with DTRA.

3.8.4. Ensure timely and adequate support for IAEA visits to the United States, as requested by DoD host team representatives participating in the inspection management.

3.8.5. Coordinate with the DoD Treaty Manager in the vetting process of all IAEA inspectors and technicians, if requested.

3.8.6. Participate in DoD-level meetings and discussions regarding guidance for integrated safeguard implementation and compliance.

3.8.7. Represent the Air Force in all Office of the Secretary of Defense-sponsored Additional Protocol exercises and/or mock inspections. MAJCOM and select treaty compliance points of contact and program managers may also participate in such activities on request.

3.8.8. Conduct outreach/liaison within the DoD and with the Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure Air Force equities are incorporated into integrated safeguards planning.

3.8.9. Oversee all MAJCOMs, relevant Numbered Air Forces (NAF) and equivalent units, AFDW, and ANG implementation plans and activities.

3.8.10. Lead Air Force efforts in identifying facilities, programs, activities, and other equities located at or near declared facilities.

3.8.11. In coordination with the MAJCOMs, develop and lead processes for actions to identify and protect equities of national security significance that may be at risk of exposure under the integrated safeguards.

3.8.12. Provide integrated safeguards awareness and managed access training and subject matter expertise for Air Force personnel, activities, and programs affected by the agreements so informed decisions can be made regarding implementation and compliance with the integrated safeguards, while protecting sensitive or national security information.
3.8.13. Ensure required security and counterintelligence training concerning the integrated safeguards and their impact on Air Force programs and activities is developed by the appropriate organizations and provided to affected organizations and commands, as necessary.

3.8.14. Provide assistance to MAJCOMs and program managers in the development and implementation of compliance plans, security vulnerability assessments, managed access, or any other integrated safeguards-related issues, when requested.

3.8.15. Provide assistance to project managers and contractors subject to Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement Clause 252.204-7010 in developing program protection plans in accordance with AFI 63-101, Integrated Life Cycle Management.

3.9. SAF/AQ shall:

3.9.1. Ensure program managers of Air Force equities that could be affected by integrated safeguards are aware of the integrated safeguards’ provisions, the United States’ obligations under the agreements, the rights of the United States to protect national security information during inspections, and the DoD and Air Force policies concerning the application of the national security exclusion to DoD activities and equities.

3.9.2. Inform AF/A10P of any national security concerns or other sensitive requirements regarding implementation of the integrated safeguards by other U.S. government departments or organizations as they impact Air Force acquisitions.

3.9.3. Inform AF/A10P of any requests by the IAEA for a complementary access visit or inspection to Air Force activities, equities, programs, or facilities related to acquisition of capabilities, to include subcontractor activities. This information will support the DoD representative on the U.S. government host team in determining whether to seek a national security exclusion or permit managed access to the location.

3.10. SAF/AAZ shall:

3.10.1. Conduct a separate analysis of declarations provided by the Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission to determine security implications of any complementary access visits or inspections upon any Air Force acquisitions programs, operations at logistics centers, or special programs.

3.10.2. Notify AF/A10P and seek assistance in determining whether to seek a national security exclusion or permit managed access prior to IAEA visits to these locations.

3.10.3. Take separate actions, through appropriate channels, to seek application of a national security exclusion or managed access should it determine Air Force equities, activities, or interests are at risk.

3.11. SAF/GC shall provide legal support to the Air Force’s implementation of the U.S.-IAEA integrated safeguards agreements.

3.12. AFOSI shall:

3.12.1. Provide counterintelligence support, to include counterintelligence training to Air Force offices upon request.
3.12.2. Provide direct support to AF/A10P, as necessary, during any vetting of inspectors requested by the DoD.

3.12.3. Provide direct support to AF/A10P and SAF/AAZ concerning counterintelligence matters as requested for IAEA complementary access visits or inspections to the United States.

3.13. MAJCOMs, relevant NAFs and equivalent units, AFDW, and ANG shall:

3.13.1. Assess the impact of integrated safeguards upon their commands and/or programs, when requested, or when they determine that environmental changes necessitate an assessment. This assessment is conducted regardless of whether the activity is nuclear or non-nuclear in nature and regardless of the physical proximity to declared locations. (T-1)

3.13.2. Ensure the proper application of the national security exclusion in accordance with DoDI 2060.03 and act proactively to ensure personnel know and understand the DoD policy to exempt national security activities from any complementary access visits or inspections. If commands believe their activities and/or programs may be included in a declaration by the United States, they should raise the issue to AF/A10P for consideration. (T-0)

3.13.3. Ensure timely notification if any declared activities by the Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission create security vulnerabilities for Air Force operations or activities located at or near (located within ten miles of the declared location or having a business relationship, regardless of physical proximity) declared locations.

3.13.4. Determine the level of exposure to command assets at or near declared facilities eligible for IAEA inspections and ensure adequate plans are in place to mitigate the risk. MAJCOMs will develop managed access plans in coordination with the lead government agency for the declared site, should the command and/or program determine it is at some level of risk. MAJCOMs will also predetermine, as accurately as possible, when the national security exclusion should be sought during inspections.

3.13.5. Coordinate with Air Force program managers to ensure that plans, programs, and budgets are implemented in compliance with integrated safeguards, while safeguarding sensitive national security information. If there are activities being conducted under contract with a commercial entity, the program manager for that equity needs to know when to insist on preventing access or implementing managed access. Review program protection plans as requested.

3.13.6. Develop notional plans, if applicable, outlining when to recommend invoking the national security exclusion during unplanned/unknown requests for complementary access to locations that are not exclusively on the declarations of eligible facilities for inspection.

3.13.7. Inform AF/A10P of a point of contact responsible for integrated safeguards matters and ensure AF/A10P is notified of changes in points of contact within 30 days.
Section 3C—Guidance and Procedures for U.S.-IAEA Integrated Safeguards Agreements Implementation Activities


3.14.1. As directed by the DoD and the Joint Staff, AF/A10P facilitates data calls to review and assess proposed declarations lists generated by other U.S. government agencies, including any updates to the Eligible Facilities List, and determines potential impacts of routine and complementary access visits or inspections on Air Force equities. Data calls entail dissemination of declarations proposed by the Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the appropriate MAJCOMs and organizations.

3.14.2. AF/A10P makes a determination regarding any sites, facilities, or activities that should be excluded or removed from the declaration list or be subject to a national security exclusion. AF/A10P ensures compliance with DoDI 2060.03 and coordinates the gathering of data and supporting information necessary to seek a national security exclusion. AF/A10P reports the final determination to the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Treaty Manager.


3.15.1. Air Force equity stakeholders will conduct the necessary security vulnerability assessments of sites, facilities, or activities identified in a data call as vulnerable to exposure during Additional Protocol visits. This assessment may be performed by the stakeholder unit’s leadership in coordination with security personnel. Conducting a security vulnerability assessment involves identifying equities that could be compromised during international inspections and rating the threat level to each equity.

3.15.2. Program managers comply with AFI 63-101 to ensure all activities within the acquisition life cycle are compliant with all U.S. government arms control obligations and prepare program protection plans to ensure programs are protected, if necessary.

3.15.3. If local units and/or program managers believe they need additional security vulnerability assessment support beyond the scope of what is available at their level, they are encouraged to request it from AF/A10P through intermediate headquarters. AF/A10 seeks assistance from policy, treaty, and security experts from SAF/AAZ, Directorate of Special Investigations (SAF/IGX), AFOSI, and other subject matter experts as needed.

3.16. Air Force Integrated Safeguards Equity Database.

3.16.1. AF/A10P maintains an internal electronic database of equities based on input from the MAJCOMs and Headquarters Air Force.

3.16.2. The database contains information gathered during initial, annual, and other data calls. The database contains a description of the program or activity, its geographic location, contact information (i.e., program manager or commander), and results of security vulnerability assessments.
3.17. Inspections and Complementary Access Visits.

3.17.1. The IAEA is provided access to inspect declared locations. In accordance with the integrated safeguards, IAEA inspectors will also have the right to request complementary access to undeclared locations either at or near the declared location.

3.17.2. In the event of a complementary access request to an undeclared location, Air Force equities and activities of national security significance may be inadvertently exposed to IAEA inspectors. These types of visits may be requested with short notice, from two to 24 hours depending upon the specific circumstances of the request. In exceptional circumstances, the IAEA may provide less than two hours’ notice. This provision in the Additional Protocol is designed to permit inspectors to “follow the trail” of nuclear material diversion from legitimate activities to possibly illegitimate activities. Because of the short notice, ordinary security provisions for DoD equities and activities may not be adequate to protect national security information.

3.17.3. The U.S. government employs an interagency host team process to monitor and manage the risks associated with IAEA inspections, whether these are pre-notified or short-notice requests for complementary access to undeclared locations. The Air Force supports the DoD representative on the U.S. government host team with technical advice concerning Air Force equities and activities at or near the visited site derived from the Integrated Safeguards Equity Database.


3.18.1. The Air Force operations cell, situated within the National Military Command Center, will serve as the 24-hour point of contact for receiving formal notifications from the DoD. The Air Force operations cell relays notifications to AF/A10P via email to usaf.pentagon.af-a10.mbx.af-a10-p-workflow@mail.mil.

3.18.2. As the Air Force’s central office to receive notifications of IAEA visits, AF/A10P ensures notifications are passed to affected units and organizations.

3.18.3. AF/A10P disseminates notifications and other messages associated with the integrated safeguards via email to designated points of contact with follow-up voice notification.

3.19. Funding for Implementation Activities. AF/A10P provides funding for integrated safeguards implementation and compliance. MAJCOMs will budget accordingly for the integrated safeguards within the annual plans they provide to AF/A10P.
Chapter 4

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Section 4A—Overview of the Chemical Weapons Convention

4.1. Background. The United States is a state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and is obligated to comply with its provisions. The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits a wide range of chemical weapons-related activities, including the use of riot control agents as a “method of warfare,” and requires states parties to destroy their chemical weapons and former chemical weapons production facilities. The Chemical Weapons Convention includes a verification regime comprised of systematic inspections, short-notice challenge inspections, and investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons or recovered chemical weapons as a method of warfare.

4.2. The Air Force is responsible for ensuring proper implementation of and compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention on United States Air Force owned and/or operated facilities and equipment worldwide.

4.3. The Air Force does not possess any chemical weapons. It also does not manage or operate any declared facilities under the Chemical Weapons Convention, and does not participate in the chemical weapon demilitarization process. Because of this, the Air Force is not subject to systematic inspections. However, all Air Force facilities and equities worldwide remain subject to the Chemical Weapons Convention’s challenge inspection provisions, investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons, and obligations to secure and report recovered chemical weapons.

4.4. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), based in The Hague, Netherlands, was established to ensure implementation of and compliance with the treaty. The Technical Secretariat of the OPCW is responsible for conducting all verification activities associated with the treaty. Each state party has the right to request that the Organization conduct a challenge inspection or investigation of alleged use, solely for the purpose of gathering factual information and clarifying compliance concerns. States parties being inspected are expected to facilitate the inspection and to provide the greatest degree of access to an inspection site and pertinent information, but may protect information and materials not related to chemical weapons.

4.5. The Chemical Weapons Convention allows an inspected state party to protect sensitive equipment, information, and areas not relevant to the purpose of the inspection through the use of managed access techniques. Inspection site personnel must have a full understanding of these techniques to fully exercise and protect United States’ rights during these inspections, in accordance with the treaty.
4.6. The Air Force response, which combines base-level planning and preparation with timely deployment of subject matter experts, is intended to demonstrate U.S. government compliance while protecting our national security equities. The Air Force Base Assistance Team (BAT) deploys to the Air Force site involved in the challenge inspection to provide on-site treaty expertise and support for challenge inspection activities. In addition, Headquarters Air Force assembles a response cell in the Pentagon to provide initial site support, prior to BAT arrival at the inspection site, and guidance throughout the inspection process.

Section 4B—Roles and Responsibilities under the Chemical Weapons Convention

4.7. SAF/GC shall coordinate and provide legal advice concerning emerging Chemical Weapons Convention related staff actions and issues.

4.8. The Chief, AF/A10P, on behalf of AF/A10, shall:


4.8.3. Provide the Air Force member and support staff of the DoD host team during a challenge inspection.

4.8.4. Coordinate with the appropriate funding elements.

4.8.5. Exercise Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System responsibilities for Chemical Weapons Convention implementation and compliance activities.

4.9. Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Policy Division, International Treaties and Agreements Branch (AF/A10PI) shall:

4.9.1. Serve as the point of contact for Air Force Chemical Weapons Convention implementation and compliance.

4.9.2. Coordinate Chemical Weapons Convention policy, guidance, and other related staff actions concerning Air Force equities.

4.9.3. Represent the Air Force on the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Working Group. When invited, participate as technical advisor in interagency and international meetings (i.e., OPCW meetings, Conference of States Parties, etc.).

4.9.4. Represent or appoint a representative of the Air Force at Compliance Review Group deliberations.

4.9.5. Develop and disseminate Chemical Weapons Convention implementation and compliance guidance to include:

4.9.5.1. Establishing and issuing operational guidance to the Air Force Chemical Weapons Convention Response Cell.

4.9.5.2. Promulgating, maintaining, and coordinating changes to the Chemical Weapons Convention ISM.
4.9.6. Determine Chemical Weapons Convention implementation and compliance funding requirements for inclusion in budget submissions.

4.9.7. Program all Chemical Weapons Convention implementation and compliance costs.

4.9.8. Consolidate MAJCOM Chemical Weapons Convention implementation and compliance requirements, including costs associated with site-specific challenge inspection preparations and operations.

4.9.9. Appoint BAT Chief.

4.9.10. Certify BAT members and augmentees on an annual basis through transmission of a certification letter. AF/A10P, A10PI, and the parent MAJCOM reserve the right to decertify members/augmentees at any time.

4.9.11. Direct dispatch of the BAT members as soon as possible, but no later than 12 hours after notification of a Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection.


4.9.13. Provide support to the inspection team, host team, national escorts, and requesting state party observer as requested by the United States National Authority or the DTRA national escorts.


4.9.15. Submit reports (e.g., Riot Control Agent inventories, Scheduled Chemicals or activities relating to Chemical Weapons Convention compliance) to the Joint Staff, as required.


4.9.17. Provide Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection training, per AFI 16-601, Implementation of, and Compliance with, International Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements, to include:

4.9.17.1. Conduct classroom training and Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection practical exercises. At a minimum, AF/A10PI will plan one tabletop exercise and one field training exercise to take place in the continental United States annually. Additionally, AF/A10PI will plan one tabletop exercise outside the continental United States and at one of the GOCO facilities biennially. More exercises may be conducted to facilitate required BAT training as deemed necessary by the BAT Chief in accordance with paragraph 4.16.1.10.


4.9.17.3. Observe/Support sister Services’ Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection exercises, as appropriate and feasible.
**4.10. Director, Air Force Operations Group shall:**

4.10.1. Develop standardized message formats to relay Chemical Weapons Convention inspection notifications from DTRA to AF/A10P to other Air Staff entities, to include Secretary of the Air Force offices, and MAJCOMs.

4.10.2. Support and facilitate command, control, and communications of Headquarters Air Force staff responding to challenge inspections of equities worldwide. Specifically the Air Force Operations Group:

4.10.2.1. Forwards initial notification information from the DTRA Operations Center to the Air Force Response Cell, the affected MAJCOM, and the inspection site operations center.

4.10.2.2. Interfaces with affected MAJCOM Operations Centers to relay information, as requested.

4.10.2.3. Coordinates with the Air Force Response Cell to prepare and deliver command briefings to senior leadership, as deemed appropriate by Air Force Operations Group and AF/A10P.

**4.11. MAJCOMs, relevant NAFs and equivalent units, and ANG shall:**

4.11.1. Develop and implement applicable supplements or implementation and compliance plans, as appropriate, to ensure Air Force activities are in accordance with U.S. obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, as required. (T-1)

4.11.2. Develop facility-specific installation site support plans for challenge inspections involving Geographically Separated Units to include GOCOs, and review all plans biennially. (T-1)

4.11.3. Identify program and budget requirements for Chemical Weapons Convention implementation and compliance within their command and forward them to AF/A10P for review, coordination, and consolidation.

4.11.4. Account for Chemical Weapon Convention related implementation and compliance expenditures and forward cost information to AF/A10P.

4.11.5. Designate a 24-hour point of contact/office of primary responsibility for implementing Chemical Weapons Convention inspection responsibilities and direct subordinate commands to establish and maintain a 24-hour point of contact for Chemical Weapons Convention inspection notification in accordance with Secretary of the Air Force Memorandum, *Reducing Additional Duties*, 18 August 2016.

4.11.6. Provide notification of intent to conduct a Chemical Weapons Convention-related challenge inspection to the TCO or point of contact at the impacted base or GOCO within their command.

4.11.7. Provide one or more members (except for Direct Reporting Units) to support the Headquarters Air Force Chemical Weapons Convention BAT in accordance with section 3.15 of this instruction.

4.11.8. Develop procedures for receiving Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection notifications and forwarding such notifications to the inspection site.
4.11.9. Upon notification of a Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection, direct the inspection site to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention ISM and Inspection Site Support Plan or equivalent.

4.11.10. Develop procedures to take possession of, account for, and report any old, abandoned, or buried chemical weapons found within their area of responsibility. This includes any chemical weapons found in or near the vicinity of those locations by local law enforcement agencies and where the Air Force is the closest U.S. government facility with an explosive ordnance disposal unit in accordance with DoD Manual 6055.09-M, Volume 1, Department of Defense Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards: General Explosives Safety Information and Requirements.

4.11.11. Notify AF/A10P and the Air Force Operations Group of the recovery of any identified or potential chemical weapons.

4.11.12. MAJCOMs will ensure their subordinate units possess and are familiar with the ISM.

4.11.13. MAJCOMs will ensure their subordinate units have a Logistic Support Plan.

4.12. AFOSI, Office of Special Projects, shall:

4.12.1. In coordination with SAF/AAZ, provide treaty representatives, as required, to applicable Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection exercises.

4.12.2. In coordination with SAF/AAZ, provide treaty representatives to act as subject matter experts on actual Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspections.

Section 4C—Guidance and Procedures for Challenge Inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention


4.13.1. BAT. Under the direction of the BAT Chief, the BAT deploys to the inspection site in support of the ICG, as soon as possible, but no later than 12 hours after notification.

4.13.2. Response Cell. AF/A10P activates the Headquarters Air Force Response Cell upon official notification of a Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection, in order to assist all command echelons during the inspection and to serve as a single point of contact while the BAT is in transit to the inspection site.

4.13.3. ICG. The Installation Commander of the host unit, or a similar organization designated as operating the inspection site, to include site leadership located on a GOCO, forms the ICG as described in the Air Force Chemical Weapons Convention ISM to facilitate the day-to-day activities associated with Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection preparation and execution. (T-1)


4.14.1. Inspection Team Activities.

4.14.1.1. The OPCW inspection team will arrive in the vicinity of the installation no later than 36 hours after it arrives at the point of entry, and will remain in the inspection area for up to 180 hours (7.5 days).
4.14.1.2. Upon arrival, inspection team members will begin exit monitoring at the perimeter. Within no later than 108 hours (4.5 days) after inspection team arrival at the point of entry, the inspection team must be granted access inside the final perimeter in order to conduct inspection activities (e.g., taking air, water, soil, swipe samples and photographs, reviewing documents, and interviewing personnel). The inspection period within the final perimeter will not exceed 84 hours (3.5 days), unless extended by mutual agreement between the host team and the inspection team.


4.14.2.1. Following notification, under direction of the parent MAJCOM, the site TCO will implement the ISM and the Inspection Site Support Plan to meet Chemical Weapons Convention treaty timelines and prepare the site for inspection.

4.14.2.2. The inspected state party has a right under the Chemical Weapons Convention to protect national security information, equipment, or areas not related to chemical weapons through the use of managed access techniques.


4.14.3.1. Provide support to the inspection team, host team, national escorts, and requesting state party observer as requested by the United States National Authority or DTRA national escorts.

4.14.3.2. Provide a capable and certified BAT to support on-site activities. Specific activities, responsibilities, and training requirements for the BAT are outlined in paragraph 3.19.

4.14.3.3. Provide a Headquarters Air Force challenge inspection response cell to support site activities, relay information to the Headquarters Air Force host team member, and monitor deployment of the BAT.

Section 4D—Guidance and Procedures for BAT under the Chemical Weapons Convention

4.15. Composition.

4.15.1. For a challenge inspection where the Air Force is the lead Service, the BAT will include members from the following organizations and individuals:

   4.15.1.1.1. AF/A10P.
   4.15.1.1.2. SAF/AAZ.
   4.15.1.1.3. AFOSI, Office of Special Projects.
   4.15.1.1.4. Headquarters Air Force-sponsored contractors.

4.15.1.2. Air Force components.
   4.15.1.2.1. MAJCOM TCOs.
   4.15.1.2.2. Selected base-level TCOs to serve as BAT Augmentees.

4.15.1.3. DTRA.
4.15.1.4. Other organizations as necessary.

4.15.2. For an inspection site where the Air Force is not the lead Service and for Air Force geographically-separated units, the BAT Chief determines the composition of the BAT necessary to fulfill assistance obligations.

4.16. Functions. BAT members advise and assist the site inspection management personnel on Chemical Weapons Convention-related matters; appropriate inspection site personnel directs and implements inspection preparation and support activities. The BAT advisory role includes, but is not limited to, providing implementation and compliance expertise, and “just-in-time” training in areas such as inspection management, local escort and facility manager requirements, site pre-inspection actions, transportation, and logistics. MAJCOM BAT members may be assigned specific areas of challenge inspection expertise (e.g., perimeter, self-monitoring) by AF/A10P; however, all BAT members should be knowledgeable in all Inspection Support Manual functional areas. Due to time and geographical considerations, and the phasing of expertise, BAT members perform the most time-sensitive tasks immediately upon arrival at the inspection site. The following lists the different BAT members and their functions.

4.16.1. BAT Chief (AF/A10PI).

4.16.1.1. Responsible for overall team management, including designation of a BAT member from the impacted MAJCOM to serve as deputy team chief.

4.16.1.2. Determines general and mission-specific BAT support and deployment requirements.

4.16.1.3. Confirms that the owning MAJCOM/component and inspection site received inspection notifications.

4.16.1.4. Ensures that the inspection site receives the BAT introductory briefing.

4.16.1.5. Provides advice to the ICG chief and site commander/manager.

4.16.1.6. Maintains an updated list of all BAT members’ contact information to alert them of initial notification of a challenge inspection.

4.16.1.7. Directs the activities of BAT members.

4.16.1.8. Ensures conduct of facility inspections specific to the inspection location, post-inspection security, and counterintelligence assessments.

4.16.1.9. Meets specific on-the-ground situations by adapting existing guidance, as necessary.

4.16.1.10. Organizes and conducts training exercises and educational events in order to establish and maintain a BAT capable of preparing Air Force installations, vessels, aircraft, GOCOs, and geographically separated units to receive Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspections. Frequency and type of exercises necessary to achieve a level of readiness sufficient to certify the BAT as capable shall be determined by the BAT Chief.

4.16.2. MAJCOM/Component Treaty Office BAT Member Responsible for the Inspection Site.

4.16.2.1. Typically serve as the deputy team chief.
4.16.2.2. Provides regular updates to MAJCOM/Component leadership.

4.16.3. Office of Special Program Oversight and Information Protection.

4.16.3.1. Advises and/or assists inspection site personnel concerning security and counterintelligence issues as requested or required by the commander.

4.16.3.2. Advises inspection site personnel regarding pre-inspection facility activities. **Note:** For these purposes, the term “facility” refers to any building, activity, area, and/or program.

4.16.3.3. Advises and/or assists with facility inspections, as necessary.

4.16.3.4. Advises and/or assists with inspection-related security and counterintelligence assessments.

4.16.4. BAT Member.

4.16.4.1. Assume prioritized functional area responsibilities upon arrival or as assigned by the BAT Chief or their deputy.

4.16.4.2. Coordinate directly with appropriate ICG personnel to determine the status of preparations in their respective functional areas.

4.16.4.3. Assist the ICG Chief in Inspection Support Manual implementation.

4.16.4.4. Provide inspection-related advice to the ICG.

4.16.5. BAT Augmentee.

4.16.5.1. Selected based upon meeting specific requirements (defined in Paragraph 3.18.2).

4.16.5.2. MAJCOMs may identify base-level TCOs or other personnel to serve as BAT augmentees. AF/A10P is the approving official for all augmentees. Augmentees must be worldwide deployable in order to satisfy any Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection requirements. Deployment of BAT augmentees outside their MAJCOM or Component area of responsibility requires AF/A10P direction.

4.16.6. DTRA BAT Liaisons.

4.16.6.1. Provide advice to the BAT and ICG on National Escort Team duties, functions, and security/countermeasures responsibilities.

4.16.6.2. Serve as liaison between the BAT and ICG and the DTRA Advance Team and National Escort Team.

4.16.6.3. Coordinate on inspection team-related transportation, communications, and logistics through the DTRA Advance Team.

4.16.6.4. Coordinate escort duties between the inspection site’s local escorts and national escorts, including training assistance.

4.16.6.5. Provide training to site personnel on building preparation, route planning, and managed access procedures, as requested.
4.17. BAT Operations.

4.17.1. Initial Operations - The first BAT member to arrive at the inspection site becomes the acting BAT Chief until relieved of duties by the actual BAT Chief. In this role, he/she makes sure that the site Commander and ICG receive the orientation briefing. In the event there is a significant delay in the BAT’s arrival to the inspection site, the orientation briefing may be provided by the Headquarters Air Force Response Cell. Due to time-sensitive requirements, arriving BAT members need to fulfill the functions listed below as the priority:

4.17.1.1. *Perimeter Team* - initial focus on definition and analysis of the requested perimeter.

4.17.1.2. *Self-Monitoring Team* - initial focus on developing the Self-Monitoring Plan.

4.17.1.3. *Mandate Team* - initial focus on preparing and forwarding the base briefing to the host team, conducting the mandate analysis, and creating the initial draft of the pre-inspection briefing.

4.17.1.4. *Sustained Operations* - the BAT Chief makes preparations for 24-hour operations for up to ten days, as required.

4.17.2. Deployment.

4.17.2.1. Upon official notification of a challenge inspection, all BAT members, including identified augmentees, deploy to the inspection site as soon as possible, but no later than 12 hours from notification. Each BAT member notifies the AF/A10P Chemical Weapons Convention Response Cell telephone: (703) 693-7247 of his/her travel plans and anticipated arrival time at the inspection site.

4.17.2.2. For non-United States Air Force-led inspection sites, the BAT Chief determines BAT deployment requirements and notifies the required personnel.

4.18. BAT Qualifications.

4.18.1. BAT Members shall meet the following qualifications to successfully fulfill their role:

4.18.1.1. Be either an active MAJCOM TCO, directly support a MAJCOM TCO, or currently support Headquarters Air Force for Chemical Weapons Convention implementation and compliance.

4.18.1.2. Successfully complete initial Air Force Chemical Weapons Convention BAT member training and attain official AF/A10P certification as soon as possible after assignment. To meet AF/A10P certification members shall:

4.18.1.2.1. Attend the annual Air Force TCO Training Course.

4.18.1.2.2. Complete the DTRA Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection course (Chemical Weapons Convention Orientation Course is recommended, but not required).

4.18.1.2.3. Participate in one challenge inspection tabletop exercise (201/TTX) and one field training exercise (301/FTX).
4.18.1.2.4. Complete the AF/A10P Chemical Weapons Convention BAT computer-based training and passing the associated comprehensive examination.

4.18.1.3. Maintain certification and proficiency through completion of the following recurring training:

4.18.1.3.1. Attend an Air Force-sponsored BAT Workshop annually.

4.18.1.3.2. Participate in a Chemical Weapons Convention tabletop exercise (at least once every two years).

4.18.1.3.3. Participate in one Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection field training exercise (at least every two years).

4.18.1.3.4. Pass the AF/A10P Chemical Weapons Convention BAT computer-based annual certification examination (annually).

4.18.2. BAT Augmentees shall meet the following qualifications to successfully fulfill their role:

4.18.2.1. Attend the Air Force TCO Training Course.

4.18.2.2. Participate in one Air Force or DoD Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection exercise (TTX or FTX).

4.18.2.3. Complete the computer-based training and pass the associated comprehensive examination.

4.18.2.4. On a recurring basis, each BAT augmentee is required to:

4.18.2.5. Participate in a Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection exercise (TTX or FTX) at least once every two years.

4.18.2.6. Pass the AF/A10P BAT computer-based annual certification examination annually.

Section 4E—Guidance and Procedures for Investigations of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons or Riot Control Agents as a Method of Warfare under the Chemical Weapons Convention

4.19. In order to request an investigation of alleged use, the United States must provide certain information to the OPCW. Units that are impacted by or witness to chemical weapons use or riot control agent use as methods of warfare should collect the following data and forward it to AF/A10P, as soon as possible:

4.19.1. The state party on whose territory the use of chemical weapons or riot control agents allegedly occurred.

4.19.2. Extent and nature of alleged use.

4.19.3. Global positioning system or map coordinates where chemical weapons or riot control agents were allegedly used.

4.19.4. Chemical weapons’ or riot control agents’ characteristics, if known, and observed effects on humans, animals, and vegetation.
4.19.5. Date and time the chemical weapon or riot control agent was allegedly utilized.

4.19.6. Suggested safe routes of access into the area(s) of alleged use.

4.20. **Air Force-initiated requests for investigations should be** elevated through the chain of command, through the theater combatant command or the Joint Staff to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Office of the Secretary of Defense contacts the National Authority to make the request for investigation to the OPCW.

4.21. **If a base or equity is accused of employing chemical weapons** (or of using riot control agents as a method of warfare), AF/A10P will cooperate with the appropriate U.S. government agencies to gather information related to the allegation.

4.22. **The investigated state party also permits and cooperates** in the collection of appropriate control samples within the boundary of the investigated state party, as requested by the inspection team. The inspection team collects samples necessary to conduct its investigation and, if requested, the investigated state party assists in the collection of samples under the supervision of inspectors.

4.23. **Samples of importance to the investigation include toxic chemicals**, munitions and devices, remnants of munitions and devices, environmental samples (e.g., air, soil, vegetation, water, snow), and biomedical samples (e.g., blood, urine, excreta, tissue) from humans and animals thought to be affected by alleged use of chemical weapons and riot control agents.

4.24. **If duplicate samples cannot be taken**, and if the inspection team requests analysis be performed at off-site laboratories, the United States will negotiate a sample analysis process to ensure samples are managed appropriately within the terms of the United States Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998.

4.25. **The inspection team has the right to conduct interviews with** eyewitnesses, medical personnel, and other persons who have treated or have come into contact with persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of chemical weapons or riot control agents. The inspection team may be provided access to medical histories, if available, and permitted to participate in autopsies, as appropriate, of persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of chemical weapons or riot control agents.

4.26. **The Chemical Weapons Convention does not specify the duration of** an investigation of alleged use. However, the OPCW will direct the inspection team to travel as expeditiously as possible and conduct as thorough an investigation as needed. An assumption is that an inspection team could arrive in a specified area within 48 to 72 hours of an allegation, but the exact timing and duration of an investigation, once begun, can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. If the inspection team deems that safe access to a specific area relevant to the investigation is not possible, the requesting state party shall be informed immediately. If necessary, the investigation will be suspended until safe access can be provided.

4.27. **Throughout the investigation, the inspection team sends periodic progress reports to** the OPCW Executive Council. The investigated state party, or any other state party, will not have access to these reports. No later than 30 days after returning to The Hague, Netherlands, the inspection team provides its final report to the OPCW Executive Council and all state parties.
4.28. **Depending upon circumstances at the investigation site**, Air Force commands provide support to the inspection team as requested by appropriate command authorities, to include:

- 4.28.1. Transportation to and from the inspection site.
- 4.28.2. Physical security at the investigation site, provided Air Force Security Forces are best-positioned to provide such security.
- 4.28.3. Logistics and medical support.
- 4.28.4. Access to victims and witnesses of the alleged chemical use.
- 4.28.5. Additional information related to the alleged chemical use.

4.29. **If the alleged use investigation involves an Air Force equity/interest located on** the territory of another state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Air Force will provide support as mandated by competent command authority in accordance with any applicable host country agreements, status of forces agreements or as requested by the United States National Authority.

4.30. **If the alleged use investigation involves an Air Force equity/interest located on** the territory of a state not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, every effort will be made to provide requested support as mandated by appropriate command authority and in accordance with status of forces agreements.

**Section 4F—Guidance and Procedures for Recovered Chemical Weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention**

4.31. AFI 32-3001, *Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Program*, provides the appropriate response to be taken upon recovery of suspected chemical munitions. This process applies to suspect munitions recovered on a military installation, or delivered to a base from a non-DoD source. All requests for responses to suspected chemical munitions are considered to be Level 1 emergencies, as defined in DoD Manual 4715.26, *DoD Military Munitions Rule (MR) Implementation Procedures*, paragraph 3.9. Such responses are conducted per DoD policy to implement the Environmental Protection Agency Military Munitions Rule.

4.32. **In all cases of suspected chemical weapon or biological weapon items**, the safety of United States Air Force personnel and the local population will be a primary concern.

4.33. **Installation command post personnel will** notify the appropriate installation treaty compliance point of contact, and their MAJCOM treaty compliance office when receiving information concerning discovery, recovery, or delivery of any chemical or biological weapons munitions or related equipment. (T-2) Due to potential Chemical Weapons Convention treaty implications, this notification should/must occur within eight hours. In turn, the MAJCOM command post will notify the MAJCOM treaty compliance office, within eight hours of receiving notification from the field. The MAJCOM treaty compliance office is responsible for notifying AF/A10P within 24 hours.

4.34. **Proper MAJCOM and installation reporting of recovered chemical weapons to** Headquarters Air Force will include, at a minimum, the following information:

- 4.34.1. Description of what was recovered (actual or suspected chemical weapon or material).
4.34.2. Type of chemical agent (if known).
4.34.3. Number of munitions/rounds.
4.34.4. Location of discovery.
4.34.5. Time of discovery.
4.34.6. Actions taken (i.e., United States Army Technical Escort notified).
4.34.7. Location of weapon(s) storage.
4.34.8. Installation TCO contact information.

4.35. **Installation command posts will** send situation reports in accordance with Chapter 4 of AFI 10-206, *Operational Reporting*.

4.36. **AF/A10P shall** report identified and destroyed chemical munitions to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty Manager for appropriate reporting to the National Authority and the OPCW.
Chapter 5

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Section 5A—Biological Weapons Convention Overview

5.1. **Background.** The *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction* was negotiated to eliminate the threat of the use of biological weapons. The Convention was signed in Moscow, London, and Washington on 10 April 1972, and entered into force on 26 March 1975. To date, 181 states have ratified the Convention.

5.2. **The treaty does not ban the use of biological weapons**, which is covered by the 1928 Geneva Protocol. Neither the treaty nor the *Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989* (the United States Implementing Legislation) restricts or restrains peaceful research or development. The treaty does not include any reporting requirements or verification regime.

5.3. **The United States, as a state party to the treaty**, participates in a voluntary exchange of data regarding defensive research and development in the biological arena. The DoD voluntarily compiles and submits data through the Department of State on its defensive biological research and development programs based on a regime established during the Second Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in 1986 and revised during the Third Review Conference in 1991.

5.4. **The Air Force meets its Biological Weapons Convention** implementation requirements by annually providing data regarding its biological defense research and development activities.

Section 5B—Roles and Responsibilities under the Biological Weapons Convention

5.5. **The Chief, AF/A10P, on behalf of AF/A10, shall:**

   5.5.1. Initiate annual requests for MAJCOMs to provide information on their biological defense programs.
   5.5.2. Receive and compile MAJCOM responses.
   5.5.3. Provide compiled report to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat Reduction and Arms Control.

5.6. **MAJCOMs, relevant NAFs and equivalent units, AFDW, and ANG shall:**

   5.6.1. Initiate annual requests for wings and installations to provide information on their biological defense programs, including negative responses.
   5.6.2. Receive and compile wing responses and provide compiled data to AF/A10P.
5.7. **MAJCOMs, Air Force Wings, Direct Reporting Units, and Agencies shall** provide information on their biological defense programs, including negative responses to their respective MAJCOMs. (T-1)

JACK WEINSTEIN, Lt Gen, United States Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration
Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

AFPD 16-6, International Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and the DoD Foreign Clearance Program, 27 March 2018


DoDD 2060.1, Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements, 9 January 2001 (certified current as of 24 November 2003)

DoDI 2060.03, Application of the National Security Exclusion to the Agreements Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, 13 November 2008

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 13 January 1993

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CJCSI 2030.01D, Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation and Compliance Policy Guidance, 4 September 2015

AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management, 1 December 2015

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New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Reporting Handbook, 13 February 2013

Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

AFI 10-701, Operations Security (OPSEC), 8 June 2011


AFI 16-601, Implementation of, and Compliance with, International Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements, 18 February 2011

Secretary of the Air Force Memorandum, SUBJECT: Reducing Additional Duties, 18 August 2016


AFI 10-206, *Operational Reporting*, 11 June 2014


**Adopted Forms**

Air Force Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

**Abbreviations and Acronyms**

AF—United States Air Force

AF/A10—Headquarters, United States Air Force, Deputy Chief of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration

AF/A10P—Headquarters, United States Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Policy and Strategy Division

AF/A10PI—Headquarters, United States AF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Policy and Strategy Division, International Treaties and Agreements Branch

AFDW—Air Force District of Washington

AFI—AF Instruction

AFMAN—AF Manual

AFOSI—AF Office of Special Investigations
AFPD—AF Policy Document
AFRC—Air Force Reserve Command
AFRIMS—AF Records Information System
AFSTRAT J-GSOC—Air Forces Strategic Command Joint Global Strike Operations Center
ANG—Air National Guard
BAT—Base Assistance Team
CJCSI—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CRG—Compliance Review Group
CW—Chemical weapon(s)
CWMD—Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
DoD—Department of Defense
DTRA—Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EOD—Explosive ordnance disposal
GOCO—Government owned-contractor operated (facility)
IAEA—International Atomic Energy Agency
ICG—Inspection Control Group
ISM—Inspection Support Manual
ISP—Inspected State Party
MAJCOM—Major Command
NAF—Numbered Air Force
OPCW—Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility
OSD—Office of the Secretary of Defense
SAF/GCI—Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence, International and Military Affairs
SAF/AQL—Secretary of the Air Force Special Programs
SAF/AAZ—Secretary of the Air Force Security and Special Program Oversight
SAF/PA—Director of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
TCO—Treaty Compliance Officer

Terms

For a full list of New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty terms and their definitions —Refer to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Protocol, Part 1.
Activities of direct national security significance — Any current or former DoD Component activity associated with military, national security, or homeland defense capability or intent including but not limited to: operations and training; intelligence; materiel production, maintenance, and supply; research, development, test, and evaluation; and infrastructure support, manning, or readiness.


Air Force Central Node — Functions as an adjunct to HAF/A10P, providing training, procedures, and guidance to AF organizations for implementation of the New START Treaty Notification Protocol. Additionally, the Air Force Central Node provides day-to-day oversight of the reporting process and assists with development of reporting policies.

Air Force equities — Refers to all nuclear and non-nuclear Air Force facilities, sites, programs, and activities conducted by the Air Force or contracted by the Air Force.

Alternative (Inspection) Perimeter — A perimeter specified by the inspected state party to a challenge inspection after reviewing the requested perimeter. An alternative perimeter must include all of the area within the requested perimeter (for example, an alternative perimeter may not be smaller than a requested perimeter), as well as meet several other requirements specified in Part X of the Chemical Weapons Convention Verification Annex. An alternative perimeter is subject to negotiation between the host team and the inspection team before the determination of a Final Perimeter. (See also Requested Perimeter, Final Perimeter.)

Arms Control Enterprise System — An information management system that supports U.S. Government compliance with the notification and information exchange obligations of arms control treaties and agreements.

At or near — Treaty term that refers to the proximity (or relative position, space, or time) of DoD locations, sites, or facilities, or associated information or activities of direct national security significance, to an eligible or potentially eligible facility under the U.S.—IAEA safeguards agreement; or a declared or potentially declarable activity under the Additional Protocol. The terms are not defined in the agreement or Additional Protocol. The Air Force has defined the term “at” as equities physically located at the declared location. The Air Force has defined “near” to mean equities within ten miles of the declared location or having a business relationship (regardless of physical proximity) with the declared location.

Base Assistance Team — A team deployed by AF/A10P and the MAJCOMs to assist an Air Force installation in preparing for and managing a challenge inspection.

Bilateral Consultative Commission — The Bilateral Consultative Commission, which convenes at least twice per year, promotes the implementation of the provisions of New START by resolving questions relating to compliance. For additional information, refer to the New START Protocol, Part 6.
**Challenge Inspection** — A short-notice inspection of a specific facility or location on the territory of or under the jurisdiction and control of a state party that is requested by another state party. A challenge inspection is conducted by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. States parties may request challenge inspections within other states parties to clarify and resolve any questions concerning possible non-compliance with Chemical Weapons Convention provisions. Challenge inspection procedures are covered under Article IX of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Part X of the Chemical Weapons Convention Verification Annex.

**Chemical Weapons** — Chemical weapons means the following, together or separately:

a:— Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes;

b:— Munitions and devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices;

c:— Any equipment specifically designed for use directly, meaning “solely,” in connection with the employment of munitions or devices specified in subparagraph (b).

**Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Working Group** — A Department of Defense forum for: coordinating Department of Defense planning and preparations; coordinating and defending Department of Defense implementation programs, budget and resource creation and allocation; and fielding and coordinating resolution of issues impacting implementation.

**Chemical Weapons Compliance Review Group** — A Department of Defense-wide working group, chaired by Chief, Chemical Weapons Treaty Management within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, that monitors Department of Defense compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, resolves compliance issues within Department of Defense, and makes Chemical Weapons Convention compliance determinations for Department of Defense.

**Declared Facility** — An installation, factory, or plant that was declared by the United States Government in accordance with the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Declared facilities must comply with specific verification activities, like systematic inspections, and may include on-site continuous monitoring. Requirements will be defined in a facility agreement. Facilities are declared based on a range of criteria, including production, storage, or a history of Chemical Weapons or precursor chemical research, development, or testing. The United States Air Force has no such declared facilities.

**Department of Defense Components** — Collectively refers to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Department of Defense Inspector General, Defense Agencies, and Department of Defense Field Activities.

**Entry into Force** — The specific date when the provisions of a treaty go into effect for a country that has ratified or acceded to it.

**Facility** — For safeguards, a reactor, critical facility, conversion plant, fuel fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, isotope separation plant, separate storage installation, or any location capable of making more than one kilogram of nuclear materiel suitable for a nuclear device.
Final (Inspection) Perimeter — The inspection site perimeter as agreed in Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection negotiations between the inspection team and the inspected state party. (See also Requested Perimeter, Alternative Perimeter.)

Host State — A State on whose territory lie facilities or areas of another state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and which are subject to inspection under the Convention.

Host Team — The group of United States Government representatives responsible for negotiating with an inspection team during an inspection and for making major inspection management decisions. For inspections where Department of Defense is the Lead Agency, the Host Team will include members from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, affected Service(s), and the inspection site. A flag rank officer or civilian equivalent from the Office of the Secretary of Defense or Joint Staff will normally be designated as Host Team Leader for challenge inspections. For outside United States inspections, the responsible Combatant Command will also have a member of the Host Team and that member may be designated as Host Team Leader.

Implementation and Compliance Planning — Implementation and compliance planning includes all tasks and actions taken to refine resource allocation planning as Chemical Weapons Convention requirements are identified, to prepare implementation and compliance, destruction, notification, education and training plans, and to alert inspectable United States Air Force and contractor facilities.

Inspection Support Manual — A chronologically and functionally organized document providing a thorough, actionable reference for Air Force (AF) personnel responsible for responding to a challenge inspection (CI) conducted under the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. AF installations are directed to use the ISM, in order to manage a CI throughout the inspection process. This document includes applicable DoD guidance, and is consistent with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 2030.01, Defense Response to a Chemical Weapons Convention Challenge Inspection, 5 July 2016. In combination with this AFI, the ISM constitutes both the AF Chemical Weapons Convention implementation and compliance and challenge inspection plans required by CJCSI 2030.01D, Chemical Weapons Implementation and Compliance Policy Guidance (4 September 2015).

Inspected State Party — The state party on whose territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control an inspection pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention takes place, or the state party whose facility or area on the territory of a Host State is subject to such an inspection.

Inspection Team — The group of inspectors and inspection assistants assigned by the Director-General of the OPCW to conduct a particular inspection.

Inspector — An individual designated to carry out an inspection or investigation visit in accordance with the provisions of a treaty.

International Atomic Energy Agency complementary access visit or inspection — Access provided by the United States to IAEA inspectors in accordance with the provisions of the U.S. Additional Protocol. Access can be requested on short notice, within two to 24 hours of the requested visit. The IAEA shall have complementary access for three purposes: to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at sites, mines, concentration plants, and other locations where nuclear material has been declared; to resolve a question on the correctness
or completeness of the information provided by the United States pursuant Article 2 of the Additional Protocol, or to resolve an inconsistency relating to that information; and to confirm, for safeguard purposes, the declaration of the decommissioned status of a facility or a location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used.

**Information Circular** — The primary means whereby the IAEA publishes documents, including agreement texts.

**Integrated Safeguards** — A regime describing entry into force of the U.S.—IAEA voluntary offer safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol. The provisions of the Additional Protocol are applied in conjunction with those of the safeguards agreement. The IAEA refers to the integrated safeguards as the combination of all safeguards measures available to the IAEA under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting its safeguards obligations within available resources.

**International Atomic Energy Agency** — The IAEA is the world's center of cooperation in the nuclear field. It was established as the world's “Atoms for Peace” organization in 1957 within the United Nations family. The Agency works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies, and to enforce nuclear safeguards agreements.

**Locations, sites, or facilities associated with information or activities of direct national security significance** — Pertains to any current or former DoD-owned, -leased, -funded, or -used space, structure, facility, installation, or land occupied by, or associated with, national security or homeland defense, including but not limited to: military operations or training; intelligence; materiel production, maintenance, or supply; research, development, test, or evaluation; infrastructure or personnel.

**Location outside facilities** — Any installation or location, which is not a facility, where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less.

**Managed access** — Measures that restrict inspector access to certain spaces or activities to avoid compromise of national security, proprietary or other sensitive information, or safety requirements while facilitating access to activities, locations, or information relevant to demonstrating U.S. compliance with arms control agreements. Such measures may include, but are not limited to: removal of sensitive papers from office spaces; shrouding of sensitive pieces of equipment, displays or dials on such equipment; logging off of computer systems and turning off data-indicating devices; providing access to a certain percentage of buildings or rooms within a building; or providing access to only selected members of an inspection team.

**National Authority** — The designated national focal point for effective liaison with the OPCW and other states parties. The Department of State is the United States National Authority.

**National security exclusion** — The unilateral right of the United States to exclude the IAEA from access to locations, sites, or facilities, or associated information or activities of direct national security significance.

**New START-accountable** — An item identified in the New START Treaty Database and subject to provisions of the New START Treaty applicable to the specific weapons system.
New START Compliance Review Group—DoD body tasked to monitor the compliance of all DoD activities with New START and to coordinate DoD guidance on issues arising from questions of compliance with the treaty.

New START Implementation Working Group—The DoD body tasked to monitor and coordinate Military Department and other DoD Component planning, programming, and budget issues related to the implementation of New START.

New START Reporting Handbook—A guide developed and maintained within the Air Force Central Node to assist Air Force personnel at all levels charged with operational reporting in support of New START. It consolidates and integrates reporting guidance from numerous sources in a single location. It provides event specific reporting matrices, including specific notification and timing requirements, and examples. The NST Reporting Handbook are available on the Air Force Central Node Sharepoint Site: [https://cs2.eis.af.mil/sites/11607/default.aspx](https://cs2.eis.af.mil/sites/11607/default.aspx)

Nuclear Issues Resolution and Integration Board—Chaired by the AF/A10 and is responsible for exercising AF-wide oversight of the nuclear enterprise, including resources, integration, and training, and for resolving cross-command and staff issues.

Nuclear Oversight Board—Chaired by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force and provides senior level executive oversight and strategic direction to resolve key issues affecting the AF nuclear enterprise.

Old Chemical Weapons—Chemical Weapons produced before 1925, or those produced between 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to such an extent that they can no longer be used as Chemical Weapons.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)—The international organization established under Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention to ensure the implementation of Chemical Weapons Convention provisions, including those for international compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among states parties. All Chemical Weapons Convention states parties are members of the OPCW.

Perimeter—In the case of a challenge inspection, the external boundary of the inspection site, defined by either geographic coordinates or markings on a map or picture.

Point of Entry/Exit—The location(s) designated for the in-country arrival of inspection teams and for their departure after completion of each inspection mission. Dulles International Airport, Washington, District of Columbia, is the only United States point of entry for Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspections. San Francisco International Airport may be used for inspections in the western United States only when an inspection team conducting continuous monitoring at a chemical weapons destruction site is not bringing inspection equipment into the country.

Program protection plan—The principal document that identifies a system’s critical program elements (critical program information and critical components), threats, and vulnerabilities throughout the system’s life cycle. Program protection is a comprehensive effort that encompasses all security, technology transfer, intelligence, and counterintelligence processes through the integration of embedded system security processes, security manpower, equipment, and facilities.
Purposes Not Prohibited under the Convention — These include:

a: — Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, or other peaceful purposes.

b: — Protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and chemical weapons.

c: — Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent upon the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare.

d: — Law enforcement, including domestic riot control.

Requested Perimeter — The inspection perimeter specified by the requesting state party and presented by the inspection team upon its arrival at the point of entry to conduct a challenge inspection. The requested perimeter must conform to the following:

a: — Run at least 10 meters outside any buildings or other structures.

b: — Not cut through any existing security enclosures.

c: — Run at least 10 meters outside any existing security enclosures that the requesting state party intends to include within the requested perimeter.

Requesting State Party — A state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention which has requested a challenge inspection.

Requesting State Party Observer ("Observer" in treaty text) — A representative of a requesting state party designated to observe a Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection. An observer may be a citizen of the requesting state party or of another state party as designated by the requesting state party.

Riot Control Agent — Any chemical not listed in a Schedule of chemicals, which can rapidly result in human sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.

Routine Inspections — Synonymous with the term Systematic Inspections as defined below.

Security vulnerability assessment — The analysis of threats from potential inspector visits pursuant to the integrated safeguards to determine the susceptibility and vulnerability of Air Force equities. Conducting security vulnerability assessments involves determining the risk of exposure of Air Force equities during an arms control inspection.

Site — A more narrowly defined term than “facility” that refers to the specific area within a facility/location where IAEA inspectors are allowed to conduct an inspection. If the inspectors wish to go beyond the demarcated boundary of the site, a complementary access must be requested in accordance with the Additional Protocol provisions. Examples of a site include, but are not limited to, a room, storage vault, or specific building.

Site Diagram — A diagram or map of a facility which includes the geographic coordinates, boundaries, road/rail entrances/exits, scale of the diagram, network of roads/rails, arrow indicating orientation relative to geographic (true) north, locations of all buildings and other structures, and a description of symbols used in the diagram.

State Party — Any nation that has deposited its instrument of ratification of or accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
**Systematic Inspections** — Recurring on-site inspections conducted by the OPCW Technical Secretariat as part of systematic verification activities for declared facilities.

**Technical Secretariat** — The organizational body of the OPCW responsible for carrying out the verification measures and functions provided for by the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council.

**Toxic chemical** — Any chemical which, through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans and animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin, method of production, or whether they are produced in facilities, munitions, or elsewhere. (For the purpose of implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, known toxic chemicals which have been specifically identified for the application of verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention Annex on Chemicals.)

**Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons** — The treaty entered into force in 1970 and aims to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide. The treaty prohibits nuclear weapon states from assisting non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapon states are afforded opportunities to use nuclear technologies/materials for civil purposes, but must subject these materials and the associated activities to IAEA safeguards.

**U.S. Additional Protocol Declaration** — Refers to a list of those civilian nuclear or nuclear-related activities disclosed by the United States to the IAEA for verification, pursuant to Article 2 of the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol. The IAEA may request complementary access to verify the completeness or correctness of the declaration.

**U.S. Eligible Facilities List** — The list is confidential and contains specific information (i.e., building numbers, maps) regarding facilities containing special fissionable material, or nuclear source material, where the IAEA inspectors have been permitted to conduct inspections in the past. In accordance with Article 1 (b) of the U.S.-IAEA Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement, Eligible Facilities List refers to “a list of facilities within the United States that are not associated with activities with direct national security significance to the United States....” A facility is subject to IAEA safeguards when selected from the list by the IAEA.

**U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol / Information Circular 288/Add.1** — The Additional Protocol was signed by the United States on 12 June 1998 and the United States Senate provided advice and consent to ratification on 31 March 2004. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 6 January 2009. The U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol was based on the Model Additional Protocol, which was aimed at providing greater assurance to the IAEA that nuclear materials are not diverted for illegal purposes. Unlike the Model Additional Protocol, the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol includes a national security exclusion clause in Article 1 which allows the United States to preclude, without justification, the application of IAEA safeguard measures to materials, activities, and facilities of direct national security significance. In addition, the Additional Protocol allows the right to use managed access to protect activities or information of national security significance during International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.
U.S.-IAEA Agency Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement / Information Circular 288 —
Signed by the United States and the IAEA on 18 November 1977 and provided advice and consent to ratification from the U.S. Senate on 2 July 1980. President Carter ratified the Agreement on 31 July 1980 and it entered into force on 9 December 1980. Information Circular 288 requires the United States to declare only commercial nuclear power reactors, research reactors, and fuel fabrication plants as eligible for safeguards. Under this agreement, IAEA inspectors regularly visit four U.S. nuclear facilities to verify records of nuclear material in storage, to check and maintain IAEA-installed instruments and surveillance equipment, and to confirm physical inventories of nuclear material. The U.S. government reserves the right to add or remove facilities, at any time and for any reason, from the Eligible Facilities List, but is required to notify the IAEA when it does so.

U.S. Lead Agencies — Those Executive Departments or Agencies designated as having jurisdiction over locations of declarable activities and/or national security equities as well as responsibility for implementation of the Additional Protocol’s requirements to provide information or declarations to the IAEA and/or provide complementary access. The Lead Agencies are the Departments of Energy, Defense, Commerce and State, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Verification — The determination that a state party is complying with the provisions of a treaty.

Verification Measures — Those activities and actions taken, for instance, by the Technical Secretariat to determine a state party’s compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Verification includes review and analysis of states parties’ data declarations and active measures. The two principal categories of active verification measures are on-site inspections and continuous monitoring either by inspector presence or by instruments and systems installed at declared facilities.
Attachment 2

COMPONENTS OF NEW START COMPLIANCE PLAN

A2.1. The wing/unit New START Compliance Plan should include, but is not limited to, base support procedures, escort requirements, notification and report preparation and transmission, procedures to notify local personnel and affected organizations, security provisions, billeting and transportation requirements, and protocol and public affairs procedures.

A2.2. The New START Compliance Plan identifies offices/organizations responsible for providing logistics support to the visiting escort and inspection teams. The final plan should include a list showing all tasked organizations including other tenant organizations.

A2.3. Suggested components of a compliance plan:

A2.3.1. Force Support. This includes lodging, dining, and mortuary services. Lodging and dining arrangements always need to be planned in advance. Consult with the DTRA New START/Nuclear Division for lodging requirements.

A2.3.2. Security. This section needs to reference applicable plans for high- and low-threat security procedures for escorts, guards, inspector entry into controlled areas, operations security, and communications security. **Note:** Inspectors may not view normal security procedures.

A2.3.2.1. If a known threat to the inspection is recognized, high-threat options are imposed. These could include measures such as posting guards and implementing entry control points requiring Entry Access Lists granting the escort and inspection teams and local escorts authorized access to inspection sites and support facilities. Low-threat options may allow implementation of normal Distinguished Visitor procedures.

A2.3.2.2. Operations security procedures such as limiting access and controlling travel routes should be included. Weapons handling and storage areas, flight lines, and other areas of sensitive operations are to be protected.

A2.3.2.3. Communications security concerns (e.g., how inspectors are allowed to communicate with their embassy/consulate) are to be included in preparations. For example, have local escorts work with the DTRA Escort Team to establish appropriate communications links for inspectors to use.

A2.3.3. Medical. Arrangements for emergency/non-elective medical treatment of mission team members are to be included. DTRA is responsible for the cost of all medical treatments and is billed accordingly.

A2.3.4. Communications. This section includes public address systems for ceremonies/briefings, contact between local escorts, methods for inspectors to contact their embassies, contact between inspection team subgroups, or other treaty-specific items.
A2.3.5. Transportation. All personnel transportation requirements, arrival through departure, and equipment/baggage handling to include special handling instructions for inspection equipment are included in this section. The TCO tries to accommodate the DTRA Escort Team Chief’s requests for support of transportation for off-base and cultural activities for the Russian inspection team, within existing guidelines/restrictions. In cases where Wing Commander approval is required for the type of activity or location, the TCO will facilitate that request.

A2.3.6. Funding. Considerations include specific billing and payment procedures. Ensure the DTRA Escort Team Chief, or his/her designated liaison, knows what is required in advance. Coordinate with base activities for items DTRA may request to accomplish their responsibilities. Coordinate with the MAJCOM TCO and Program Element Monitor, preferably in advance of incurring expenses for reimbursement of expenses not paid by DTRA. If DTRA is not able to fund a TCO request, Operations and Maintenance dollars may be pursued at the discretion of the local wing/unit commander as long as the requirement is authorized in accordance with financial regulations.

A2.3.7. Public Affairs. Clearly established ground rules on control of media movement and actions are necessary to prevent interference with inspections. The U.S. government and DoD posture for New START inspections is “passive.” A “passive posture” means TCOs can respond to inquiries, but not actively promote media activities. New START limits mass media coverage of inspection activities to the point of entry. Any public affairs activity, including photography (e.g., team photo), at an inspection facility is pre-coordinated with the DTRA Escort Team Chief.

A2.3.8. Personnel. Personnel may include base escorts, facility managers, baggage details, measurement teams, weapon load teams and inspection support staff. Support staff is comprised of individuals working real-time contingencies while the treaty office is busy with inspectors; and should have a representative from each key support and inspection organization.

A2.3.9. Training. TCOs are responsible for ensuring all base personnel involved in a New START activity are well trained and able to perform their duties, including suitability of local escorts. Not everyone is suited to perform escort duties. While no specific certification is required, TCOs should ensure experienced, mature individuals are selected. TCOs must select and train a sufficient number of personnel as escorts to support a New START inspection. In most cases, periodic refresher training is desirable and necessary. At other times, just-in-time training of local personnel may be all a base can complete due to limited availability of personnel. Bases should have a goal of maintaining a pool of trained personnel, as continuity promotes a high level of efficiency and support for complying with treaty procedures.

A2.3.10. Safety/Security. The TCO presents a safety/security briefing to the visiting DTRA escort and Russian inspection teams as part of the treaty-mandated pre-inspection procedures. The briefing should be adapted to the local environment and should provide a perspective of the base and facilities to be used by the teams, weather conditions the teams should expect, base security policies, escort procedures and local policies, and whom to contact should any visiting person need assistance. The TCO develops the briefing in advance and coordinates it with AF/A10P.
A2.3.11. **Prohibited Activity.** Identification of any prohibited activity during a New START escort mission at an inspectable facility is in accordance with U.S. government, DoD, and/or Air Force policy/guidance and is the responsibility of the DTRA Escort Team, supported by the wing/unit TCO, in direct support of treaty compliance.

A2.3.12. **Protocol.** If requested, protocol assists the TCO in making arrangements for Distinguished Visitors, arranging off-base meals, hosting reception and departure functions, closing ceremonies, and memento exchanges.

A2.3.13. **Cultural Activities.** At the DTRA Escort Team Chief’s request, pre-coordinate and facilitate leisure activities such as tours, shopping, and recreational opportunities. Work with affected support services: Transportation, Base Exchange, Commissary, Recreational Services, and affected civilian establishments. The participation of wing/unit personnel in cultural activities is at the discretion of the DTRA Escort Team Chief, the wing/unit commander, and the wing/unit TCO.