This publication implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 16-6, *International Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements, and the DoD Foreign Clearance Program* by providing guidance directly associated with Air Force implementation of, and compliance with, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, otherwise known as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty or the New START Treaty (NST). This instruction is consistent with AFPD 13-5, *Air Force Nuclear Enterprise*, and Air Force priorities for the Nuclear Enterprise. It applies to all Air Force organizations (including Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve) responsible for: implementing and complying with arms control agreements, specifically involved with the hosting of NST inspections at Air Force facilities; providing NST-mandated notifications; providing logistics support to the U.S. and foreign NST inspection teams; and protecting U.S. Air Force equities from the vulnerabilities associated with the NST implementation and verification regime. This Air Force instruction (AFI) may be supplemented by subordinate organizations, but all supplements must be routed to AF/A10S for coordination prior to certification and approval. The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3”) number following the compliance statement. See AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, Table 1.1, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the Publication Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for non-tiered compliance items. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the OPR using the Air Force (AF) Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Form 847 from the field through
appropriate chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with (IAW) Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of IAW the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) in the Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS).

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES**

This instruction is substantially revised and requires a complete review. This revision modifies language to reflect current NST implementation activities and the updated roles and responsibilities for each Air Force organization responsible for implementing and complying with arms control agreements. This revision updates AFI 16-608 IAW AFI 33-360 (see Table "Tier Waiver Authorities"), refining wing-level duty requirements and identifying the waiver authority for these requirements.

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Chapter 1

OVERVIEW

1.1. General.

1.1.1. This document is UNCLASSIFIED.

1.1.2. **Strict adherence to the NST requirements and use of standard operating procedures for NST activities is paramount.**

1.1.3. The NST and its associated Protocol and Annexes are the primary references for addressing questions related to compliance. In cases where clarification will be required, guidance will be requested from Headquarters Air Force (HAF) Strategic Stability and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy Division (A10S). Units at all levels will adhere to NST requirements. (T-0; see AFI 33-360, Table 1.1, for Tier approval information).

1.1.4. This guidance describes processes, provides procedural guidance, and specifies HAF, Major Command (MAJCOM), and unit responsibilities for implementation of and compliance with the NST. This includes coordination and execution of inspections, training, financial oversight, reporting, and use of assets and personnel.

1.1.5. The NST-declared Air Force facilities referenced in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 are subject to NST inspections.

1.1.6. Affected MAJCOMs (see paragraph 3.2.) will develop supplements, implementation, or compliance plans and procedures to execute this guidance, and will coordinate plans and procedures with AF/A10.

1.2. Introduction.

1.2.1. The NST entered into force on 5 February 2011 and has a duration of ten years. It may be extended for a period of no more than five years by mutual agreement of the Parties.

1.2.2. The purpose of the Treaty (e.g., NST) is to increase transparency and mutual trust, enhance predictability and stability, and reduce and limit the strategic offensive arms and associated warheads of both the United States and the Russian Federation. The items that are considered to be “strategic offensive arms” for purposes of the Treaty are specifically listed in the Treaty. "Offensive" forces contrast with those that are “defensive” in nature, such as ballistic missile defense systems. The Treaty requires the Parties to mutually and transparently reduce their nuclear forces over a period of seven years but allows each Party the flexibility to determine the structure of its own strategic forces within the aggregate limits of the Treaty.

1.2.3. The NST requires each Party to reduce and limit its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of the Treaty, do not exceed:

1.2.3.1. 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;
1.2.3.2. 1550 warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;

1.2.3.3. 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

1.2.4. The first and second aggregate limits are intended to limit the deployed strategic forces of each Party. Deployed delivery vehicles are ICBMs in launchers, SLBMs in launch tubes, and nuclear-equipped heavy bombers. The third central limit is intended to limit the ability to “break out” of the Treaty limits by constraining the number of non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and non-deployed heavy bombers. Non-deployed launchers are empty ICBM and SLBM launchers and test silos, and non-deployed heavy bombers are test heavy bombers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments located at repair or production facilities.

1.2.5. Air Force warheads counted against the aggregate limits of the Treaty include all reentry vehicles (nuclear and conventional) emplaced on Minuteman III (MM III) ICBMs. Each deployed heavy bomber counts as a single warhead toward the NST aggregate limit.

1.2.6. Existing weapons systems are to be operated in a manner consistent with NST obligations. The HAF shall ensure operations are accomplished in a Joint manner to support the Commander, US Strategic Command and to ensure that the number of accountable items remain within the NST central limits. (T-0).

1.3. New START Treaty Verification.

1.3.1. Verification of the NST is carried out using on-site inspections, national technical means (NTM), unique identifiers (UID), data exchanges, and notifications.

1.3.2. On-Site Inspections. Each Party may conduct up to 18 on-site inspections each treaty year. These inspections are divided into two types.

1.3.2.1. Type One Inspections. Type One inspections are conducted at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases. The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty; the number of warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; and the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers. Each Party is allowed to conduct up to ten Type One inspections each treaty year.

1.3.2.2. Type Two Inspections. Type Two inspections are focused on non-deployed strategic arms and conducted at facilities such as storage sites, test ranges, and conversion or elimination facilities (a listing of the facilities subject to Type Two inspections is contained in Section VII of Part Five to the Protocol to the NST and should be consulted prior to a Type Two inspection). The purpose of Type Two inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers, types, and technical characteristics of non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty and to confirm that strategic offensive arms have been converted or eliminated. In addition, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at formerly declared facilities, which are provided for in Part Two of the Protocol to the Treaty, to confirm that such facilities are not being
used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. Each Party is allowed to conduct up to eight Type Two inspections each treaty year.

1.3.3. National Technical Means. In addition to inspections, the Treaty authorizes the use of NTM (e.g., reconnaissance satellites) to monitor compliance with treaty provisions. The NST precludes Parties from interfering with NTM or using methods of concealment that might impede verification via NTM.

1.3.4. Unique Identifiers. Each deployed and non-deployed ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber subject to the Treaty is required to be labeled with a unique alpha-numeric identifier visible to the inspecting Party.

1.3.5. Notifications Concerning Data Pertaining to Strategic Offensive Arms. Each Party must provide updated data for each category of data contained in Part Two of the Protocol no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six-month period following the entry into force of the Treaty. Additional notifications may be required under certain circumstances. Consult the Treaty, AF/A10, and/or the servicing legal office for questions concerning notification requirements.


1.4.1. Air Force facilities directly affected by the NST include those designated as NST points of entry (POE), ICBM Bases, Air Bases, Storage Facilities, ICBM Repair Facilities, Conversion or Elimination Facilities, Test Ranges, and Formerly Declared Facilities (FDF). The NST also indirectly impacts other declared facilities. Air Force weapon systems directly impacted by the NST include ICBMs, ICBM launchers, and heavy bombers.

1.4.2. Article III of the NST lists existing types of strategic offensive arms at the time of treaty signature. Since then, the Air Force has removed some systems from accountability. Table 1.1 below lists accountable Air Force weapons systems as of the date of this AFI publication. Notifications required by the NST apply to all B-52H heavy bombers, regardless of equipage.

Table 1.1. Existing Types of Accountable Air Force Weapons Systems*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minuteman III (MM III) ICBM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-52H Heavy Bomber Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-52H Heavy Bomber Equipped for Nuclear Armaments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-2A Heavy Bomber Equipped for Nuclear Armaments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Minuteman II (MM II) ICBM, Peacekeeper (PK) ICBM, B-52G heavy bomber, and B-1B heavy bomber were initially listed as existing types, but are no longer accountable under the Treaty. Although B-1B heavy bombers no longer count toward the Treaty limits, they remain subject to Type Two inspections.

** B-52H heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments no longer count towards Treaty limits; however, they remain subject to Type One inspections IAW the Third Agreed Statement and Type Two inspections.
1.4.3. At entry into force (EIF), the Air Force declared 14 facilities subject to on-site inspections under NST. The original list of 14 facilities has since been revised to the following:

1.4.3.1. Table 1.2 lists Air Force facilities currently subject to Type One inspections. It is possible that changes to this facility list have occurred since the publication of this AFI. If there are questions about facility status, or for an up-to-date list, contact AF/A10S.

Table 1.2. Air Force Facilities Subject to Type One Inspections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F.E. Warren AFB, WY (ICBM Base)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malmstrom AFB, MT (ICBM Base)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minot AFB, ND (ICBM Base)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barksdale AFB, LA (Air Base)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minot AFB, ND (Air Base)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whiteman AFB, MO (Air Base)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4.3.2. Table 1.3 lists Air Force facilities currently subject to Type Two inspections. It is possible that changes to this facility list have occurred since the publication of this AFI. If there are questions about facility status, or for an up-to-date list, contact AF/A10S.

Table 1.3. Air Force Facilities Currently Subject to Type Two Inspections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barksdale AFB, LA (Air Base)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Navajo, AZ (Storage Facility for ICBMs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ (Conversion or Elimination Facility for Heavy Bombers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ (Storage Facility for Heavy Bombers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyess AFB, TX (Formerly Declared Facility)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellsworth AFB, SD (Formerly Declared Facility)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill AFB, UT (Repair Facility for ICBMs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minot AFB, ND (Air Base)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oasis Complex, UT (Storage Facility for ICBMs and SLBMs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandenberg AFB, CA (Test Range)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Verify B-52H conversions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4.4. While not inspectable, the supporting facilities in Table 1.4 are declared under the NST.
Table 1.4. Declared Support Facilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATK Launch Systems</td>
<td>UT</td>
<td>ICBM, UT (Production Facility for ICBMs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeing Plant, Wichita, KS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Repair Facility for Heavy Bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwards AFB, CA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Heavy Bomber Flight Test Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Spaceport Complex, AK, formerly known as the Kodiak Launch Complex</td>
<td></td>
<td>Space Launch Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northrop Plant, Palmdale, CA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Production Facility for Heavy Bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeing Plant, Palmdale, CA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Repair Facility for Heavy Bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeing Plant, San Antonio, TX</td>
<td></td>
<td>Repair Facility for Heavy Bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinker AFB, OK</td>
<td></td>
<td>Repair Facility for Heavy Bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandenberg Space Launch Complex, CA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Space Launch Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallops Flight Facility, VA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Space Launch Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whiteman AFB, MO</td>
<td></td>
<td>Repair Facility for Heavy Bombers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4.5. No other currently deployed Air Force weapons or delivery systems are affected. However, the NST has provisions for declaring new types of strategic offensive arms and new facilities during the duration of the Treaty, as required.

1.4.6. The NST includes provisions for exchanging numerical and technical data concerning treaty-accountable items and activities concerning their placement and posture, as well as exhibitions, inspections, and demonstrations to assist in the verification of exchanged data.
Chapter 2

ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY

2.1. Department of Defense (DoD) Relationships.

2.1.1. The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is responsible for overall coordination of NST policy for DoD and represents the Secretary of Defense on NST matters in the Interagency process involving other Federal agencies. (DoDD 2060.1)

2.1.2. The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (USD(AT&L)) is responsible for oversight of DoD implementation of, and compliance with, arms control agreements, including the NST. The Deputy Director, Treaty Compliance (OUSD(AT&L)/A/SSI/SS&TC) serves as the Treaty Manager for the NST. (DoDD 2060.1). Additionally, OUSD(AT&L)/A/SSI/SS&TC chairs the NST Compliance Review Group (CRG), which addresses NST compliance concerns and the NST Implementation Working Group (NST IWG), which monitors and coordinates DoD implementation activities.

2.1.2.1. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has the overall lead for NST escort missions at US facilities and NST inspection missions at Russian facilities. As such, DTRA determines team composition and provides mission commanders, deputy mission commanders, weapons systems experts, trained linguists, and other representatives required to support escort and inspection missions and other NST activities. DTRA may require Air Force support, including airlift, to facilitate these missions.

2.1.2.2. The DTRA Team Chief is Mission Commander for NST escort missions and is responsible for conduct of the mission. The DTRA Team Chief serves as the senior US Government (USG) representative during these missions, regardless of his/her relative seniority, and is empowered to directly interact and communicate with Russian inspectors during NST escort missions.

2.1.2.3. Coordinating with Unit Treaty Compliance Officers (TCOs), DTRA is responsible for transporting Russian inspection teams to facilities designated for inspection within the Treaty-prescribed time limits.

2.1.3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) serves as the interface between Combatant Commands and other USG Departments and Agencies. AF/A10S is the Air Force interface with the Joint Staff concerning all activities related to international arms control and nonproliferation agreements, to include Air Force NST implementation and compliance. AF/A10 shall lead engagement with the Joint Staff to oversee execution of force structure reductions.


2.2.1. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower, Personnel and Services (AF/A1) shall ensure billets are properly assigned and allocated to support treaty compliance offices and activities.
2.2.2. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AF/A2) shall provide intelligence information concerning foreign threats in relation to NST activities.

2.2.3. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (AF/A10) shall ensure nuclear operations policy and guidance complies with the NST. AF/A10 shall oversee the force structure development and execution process for implementation of the NST in coordination with Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), and Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC).

2.2.3.1. AF/A10 shall provide oversight toward ensuring all non-nuclear combat operations involving use of NST-accountable forces are conducted in a treaty-compliant manner.

2.2.3.2. AF/A10 shall raise questions and concerns from MAJCOMs to the Chair of the NST CRG about Air Force operations, or contemplated operations, employing NST-accountable forces for compliance assessment before such operations are initiated.

2.2.3.3. AF/A10 shall provide updates on NST implementation and compliance activities to the Nuclear Oversight Board (NOB), Nuclear Issues Resolution and Integration (NIRI) Board, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Secretary of the Air Force (SAF), as necessary.

2.2.3.4. On behalf of AF/A10, AF/A10S manages all aspects of the Air Force arms control process, including management of NST compliance (IAW AFPD 16-6, AFI 16-601, Implementation of, and Compliance with, International Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements, and AFI 16-603, Education and Training Requirements for Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements). AF/A10S shall be responsible for the following.

2.2.3.4.1. Oversee NST-related requirements as the Air Force Treaty Implementation Manager.

2.2.3.4.2. Participate in and represent the Air Force at the NST IWG meetings and activities. When invited, participate as technical advisor in Interagency and international meetings, such as the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

2.2.3.4.3. Review all appropriate acquisition plans and testing documents, as well as periodic reviews of Air Force acquisition programs related to NST-accountable forces/installations for compliance.

2.2.3.4.4. Provide, in coordination with DTRA, training to the Air Force network of TCOs on NST, as requested by MAJCOMs. AF/A10S will include NST training in annual TCO training.

2.2.3.4.5. Provide training through the Air Force Central Node (AFCN) for personnel responsible for origination or review and approval of NST notifications contained in Sections I through VII of the Annex on Notifications.

2.2.3.4.6. Coordinate with DTRA and MAJCOMs to schedule and conduct NST mock inspections.
2.2.3.4.7. Submit notifications, as directed, to the Joint Staff that are required by the NST for forwarding to the Department of State (DOS) for transmittal.

2.2.3.4.8. Coordinate and submit conversion and elimination plans for Air Force Treaty-accountable strategic delivery systems for approval by the CRG.

2.2.3.4.9. Coordinate all Air Force notifications and data submissions related to telemetric information. Collaborate with the United States and JS/J5 to develop the annual recommendation of US launches for exchange of telemetry with the Russian Federation.

2.2.3.4.10. Submit, to the Joint Staff, NST simplified site diagrams and inspection site diagrams of Air Force inspectable facilities, changes to such diagrams and diagrams associated with new inspectable facilities declared after EIF.

2.2.3.4.11. Function as the Program Element Monitor (PEM) within the Arms Control Program Element (PE) 35145F for all arms control treaties and agreements’ related costs, including NST. Infrastructure-related costs to support Treaty Compliance Offices, including associated manpower are funded through the Arms Control PE 35145F. The PEM provides guidance to TCOs/MAJCOM Resource Managers on the POM process, FinPlan updates, and critical timelines, when available.

2.2.3.4.12. Host, as needed, NST Workshops with participants from the NST-affected MAJCOMs, NST TCOs, and Air Staff.

2.2.3.4.13. Establish manpower requirements and manage authorizations and personnel to support required MAJCOM and base Treaty Compliance Offices.

2.2.3.4.14. Establish and sustain a capability to access and/or integrate data from appropriate sources to determine, on an as-needed basis, the number of deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and warheads using NST counting rules. This information serves purposes that include responding to Air Force (and higher) leadership inquiries about the numerical status of forces at the time requested as well as general oversight of compliance with established numerical constraints on Air Force systems. Appropriate data sources may include other HAF offices, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), MAJCOMs, and existing Air Force or DoD-wide databases amended as necessary to ensure accurate and timely information appropriate to the aforementioned purposes.

2.2.3.4.15. Ensure the AFCN, functioning as an adjunct to AF/A10S, manages all aspects of Air Force NST reporting and associated requirements, including providing guidance and support for NST notification processing (IAW this instruction and the NST Reporting Handbook) during normal duty hours. After hours, the AFCN duty officer may be contacted through the AFGSC Command Center. The AFCN will be responsible for the following.

2.2.3.4.15.1. Serve as the releasing authority for Air Force NST notifications. Notification routing occurs as directed by the Joint Staff and is incorporated into the NST software. In unusual situations, the AFCN Duty Officer or higher
authority will direct any necessary routing deviations. AFGSC Command Center personnel, acting in support of the AFCN, are authorized to release notifications as directed by the AFCN or AF/A10S.

2.2.3.4.15.2. Develop, maintain, and administer the NST Notification Training Course. The AFCN delivers the formal curriculum using one of three methods. In order of priority they are: (1) students travel to the AFCN facility at Langley AFB, VA for training (arms control funds temporary duty (TDY) expenses); (2) an AFCN instructor travels to the location requiring mass training (six or more students); or (3) the unit requiring training coordinates with the AFCN to conduct on-line training using web-based tools, such as Defense Collaboration Services.

2.2.3.4.15.3. Develop, maintain, and publish the NST Reporting Handbook.

2.2.3.4.15.4. Conduct monthly validation of Air Force data resident in the NST Database.

2.2.3.4.15.5. Analyze Air Force NST notifications and collect and report accuracy and statistical error of the data.

2.2.3.4.15.6. Serve as the interface between Air Force NST reporting nodes and DTRA for Arms Control Enterprise System (ACES) support issues. The AFCN manages all ACES accounts for Air Force NST users, to include account creation, deletion, and locking/unlocking when required.

2.2.3.4.15.7. Ensure the accuracy of the Air Force portion of the NST Database supporting semi-annual data exchanges.

2.2.3.4.16. Obtain photographs of all exhibited items and declared distinguishing features necessary to support the exhibition prior to the arrival of Russian inspectors. Local units shall support AF/A10S in obtaining photographs of all exhibited items and declared distinguishing features necessary to support the exhibition prior to the arrival of Russian inspectors. (T-1).

2.2.4. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection (AF/A4) coordinates logistical support with the MAJCOMs to ensure Treaty implementation and compliance activities are fully supported. This includes necessary logistic and engineer support to ensure that conversion and/or elimination of NST-accountable systems is accomplished as directed. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection (AF/A4) shall ensure all deployed and non-deployed NST-accountable items are properly accounted for while in Air Force possession, even if diverted for other purposes.

2.2.5. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Plans and Requirements (AF/A5/8) shall factor NST-required force modifications and limitations into all future Air Force strategic plans. AF/A5/8 shall also incorporate NST implementation and force reduction requirements into the Air Force programming process, in coordination with AF/A10S.

2.2.6. The National Guard shall ensure that any NST-limited items, such as converted heavy bomber aircraft transferred from the component, remain configured in an NST-compliant manner until eliminated in accordance with the Treaty or the Treaty is no longer in force.
2.2.7. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) shall ensure appropriate acquisition and testing documents for acquisition programs involving strategic nuclear forces are submitted to AF/A10S for NST compliance review.

2.2.8. The Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Special Program Oversight and Information Protection (SAF/AAZ), in coordination with AF/A10S, shall ensure all special access programs are in compliance with the NST. SAF/AAZ will ensure special access programs are protected against unnecessary or inadvertent exposure during NST verification activities. A treaty representative from SAF/AAZ will be on-site to support applicable NST inspections.

2.2.9. The Air Force General Counsel (SAF/GC) shall provide legal advice to HAF regarding NST implementation and compliance activities and coordinate this advice with the Air Force Judge Advocate General (AF/JA) as appropriate.

2.2.10. The Director of Public Affairs (SAF/PA) shall interface with the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs and provide requested support as necessary to DoD and Air Force public affairs and strategic communications actions relative to the implementation of and compliance with the NST.

2.3. Waiver Authority. When complying with official policy, guidance, and/or procedures, the unit may request a waiver. The fundamental aim of a waiver is to enhance mission effectiveness at all levels, while preserving resources and safeguarding health and welfare. When a commander approves a waiver, the commander is communicating to subordinates and superiors that the commander accepts the risk created by non-compliance. Each requirement mandated for compliance at the wing-level found within this instruction is tiered, signifying the appropriate waiver authority to the requirement (i.e., T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3). See AFI 33-360 paragraph 1.9 for waiver process and a detailed description of the standardized waiver authority levels.
Chapter 3

MAJCOM & WING COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1. General MAJCOM Responsibilities.

3.1.1. MAJCOM arms control duties and responsibilities are derived from AFPD 16-6, AFI 16601, and AFI 16-603.

3.1.2. All MAJCOMs shall ensure any proposed modifications to NST-accountable items are submitted to AF/A10S for treaty compliance review prior to approval and funding.

3.1.3. Each MAJCOM with NST-accountable items or inspectable facilities shall be responsible for the following.

3.1.3.1. Develop and maintain, through the MAJCOM TCO, a MAJCOM supplement or NST Compliance Plan and ensure each of its units implementing NST provisions submit NST Compliance Plans.

3.1.3.1.1. MAJCOM NST Compliance Plan or Supplement must address all assigned wings and units affected by NST verification and implementation activities and identify plans to ensure compliance with each applicable obligation and provision of the NST. MAJCOM NST Compliance Plan or Supplement will also include requirements for completing and maintaining facility protection plans and vulnerability assessments for units subject to NST inspection.

3.1.3.1.2. MAJCOM NST Compliance Plan or Supplement defines procedures for adherence to the NST and articulates MAJCOM guidance for compliance with the NST. NOTE: This requirement is only applicable to those MAJCOMs having within their infrastructure, wings/units designated to support NST activities (i.e., Air Combat Command (ACC), AFMC, AFGSC, AFSPC, Air Mobility Command (AMC)).

3.1.3.1.3. Plans or supplements define applicable rules/directives and task affected wings to support treaty requirements.

3.1.3.2. Ensure units with NST-inspectable assets or facilities remain prepared to support NST inspections. This includes being prepared to receive, store, transport, and return radiation calibration sources for NST-permitted Radiation Detection Equipment (RDE).

3.1.3.3. Submit simplified site diagrams and inspection site diagrams of all NST inspectable facilities to AF/A10S. These diagrams must meet the requirements outlined in Part Four of the Annex (to the Protocol to the NST) on Inspection Activities. MAJCOMs shall submit any NST site diagram updates or changes to AF/A10S for approval. AF/A10S will provide site diagram changes to JS/J5 for delivery through diplomatic channels.

3.1.3.4. Ensure subordinate units comply with NST notification guidance.

3.1.3.5. Coordinate requests for NST mock inspections through AF/A10S with DTRA.

3.1.4. MAJCOMs must submit annual requests for funding under the Arms Control PE 35145F in accordance with instructions provided separately.
3.1.5. MAJCOMs shall ensure logistical support and maintenance of all NST-accountable items are conducted in a manner compliant with NST requirements until the item is removed from accountability in accordance with the Treaty, or until the Treaty is no longer in force.

3.1.5.1. MAJCOMs ensure all personnel who own/possess NST items of inspection (IOIs), are educated and trained in NST responsibilities.

3.1.5.2. MAJCOMs ensure the accuracy and timeliness of all NST notifications IAW the Treaty and NST Reporting Workbook guidelines.

3.1.5.3. MAJCOMs develop local training of command Center personnel supporting NST notification processing.

3.2. Specific MAJCOM Responsibilities.

3.2.1. AFGSC, AFMC, and AFSPC commanders are responsible for maintaining compliance with NST provisions covering accountable items and inspectable facilities in their command. ACC, AMC, Air Education and Training Command (AETC), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) and United States Air Force Europe (USAFE) are not the lead commands for any NST-accountable items or inspectable facilities but may be required to provide support. Even though a MAJCOM may not own any NST-accountable assets or inspectable facilities, MAJCOM commanders may be required to develop future plans to support NST requirements and other commands, as needed, if circumstances change. Schedule newly assigned personnel to receive local ACES training NLT 90 days from being assigned and complete the ACES-NST Initial User training course within 180 days of assignment.

3.2.1.1. Ensure MAJCOM Command Post Controllers have current voice formats and use proper reporting procedures to notify subordinate wings/units and tenant organizations of upcoming NST events.

3.2.2. AFGSC Commander Responsibilities. AFGSC ensures all assigned forces and installations affected by the NST are operated in a treaty-compliant manner until the Treaty is no longer in effect or the systems are removed from accountability in accordance with the NST. AFGSC shall operate assigned converted heavy bombers in a manner consistent with NST commitments and obligations. AFGSC shall also ensure converted heavy bomber aircraft in the command’s possession remain in their NST-compliant configuration and will not seek aircraft modifications to converted NST-accountable aircraft without AF/A10 approval.

3.2.2.1. The AFGSC Command Center, in support of the AFCN, serves as the first level of review for all Air Force-originated NST notifications and will be responsible for the following.

3.2.2.1.1. Ensure sufficient number of trained personnel are available to support NST notification processing requirements on a continual basis.

3.2.2.1.2. Ensure the accuracy and timeliness of all NST notifications IAW the Treaty and NST Reporting Workbook guidelines. Contact the AFCN, or the designated AFCN duty officer, prior to the transmission of any NST notification that does not pass the automated compliance checks.
3.2.2.1.3. Add notification reference information, when required, and forward notifications for additional processing IAW the Treaty and NST Reporting Handbook guidelines.

3.2.2.1.4. Appoint a primary and alternate Point of Contact for local training of AFGSC Command Center personnel supporting NST notification processing. Provide a copy of the appointment letter to the AFCN via e-mail to afcn.nst@us.af.mil. These individuals will be responsible for the following.

3.2.2.1.4.1. Serve as trusted agents for the request of ACES user accounts.

3.2.2.1.4.2. Schedule newly assigned personnel to receive local NST notification processing and ACES procedures training no later than (NLT) 90 days from assignment. Completion of the NST Notification Training Course is required within 180 days of assignment. After the initial local ACES instruction, newly assigned personnel can request an ACES training account but will not process actual NST notifications without supervision (by an individual who has completed formal NST & ACES training) until completing the formal NST Notification Training Course. Managers should make every effort to have this training completed as part of a controller's initial training program, prior to certification.

3.2.2.1.4.3. Oversee local procedures training in support of NST notification processing.

3.2.3. Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Commander Responsibilities.

3.2.3.1. AFMC shall also work with AFGSC and AFSPC to ensure that any conversions or eliminations of strategic nuclear delivery systems are conducted in accordance with NST procedures.

3.2.4. AFSPC Commander Responsibilities. In connection with implementing the NST telemetry regime, AFSPC shall participate in the mission planning as well as launch day activities and post-mission creation of required products for all NST accountable launches subject to potential exchange of telemetric information and related materials. AFSPC shall provide recommendations to AFGSC on the advisability of exchanging these telemetry-related materials with the Russian Federation.

3.2.5. AMC Commander Responsibilities. AMC shall provide airlift to support the Department of Defense, DTRA inspector, and escort operations as requested through United States Transportation Command.

3.2.6. Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) Commander Responsibilities. The Air Force Reserve shall operate heavy bomber aircraft that are transferred from the Regular Air Force in a manner consistent with NST commitments and obligations. The Air Force Reserve ensures converted heavy bombers in the Command’s possession remain in their NST-compliant configuration and will not seek aircraft modifications to converted NST-accountable aircraft without AF/A10 approval.

3.2.7. Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) shall ensure availability of properly trained and certified individuals to support all NST inspections involving potential use of radiation detection equipment (RDE). (T-1)
3.3. MAJCOM TCO Responsibilities.

3.3.1. MAJCOM TCOs play a crucial role ensuring the Air Force meets its arms control obligations. They provide a critical link between subordinate wings/units, the MAJCOM, and HAF. MAJCOM TCOs will:

3.3.1.1. Develop and coordinate compliance guidance for subordinate wings and units.

3.3.1.2. Review and coordinate on higher headquarters directives and instructions. MAJCOM TCOs will participate in the review and coordination of Air Force arms control implementation, compliance, and guidance.

3.3.1.3. Ensure subordinate wings/units implement DoD, higher headquarters and MAJCOM policies on arms control treaties and agreements.

3.3.1.4. Coordinate with MAJCOM programs that may impact treaty compliance.

3.3.1.5. Coordinate and monitor contractual agreements to ensure work is completed according to treaty specifications.

3.3.1.6. Provide training and guidance for wing/unit personnel on NST implementation and compliance activities where applicable.

3.3.1.7. Serve as the focal point for NST matters as they affect the MAJCOM.

3.3.1.8. Develop contingency plans to ensure NST inspector rights guaranteed by the Treaty are executable under furlough, sequestration, or possible government shut down periods. These contingency plans would include alternatives to ensure transportation, billeting, dining, medical, and full access to all inspectable areas is still available.

3.3.1.9. Ensure standardized compliance procedures throughout their command and maintain and review subordinate wing/unit compliance plans.

3.3.1.10. Ensure all existing and future contracts involving storage, production, movement, modification, or elimination of NST accountable items, to include reporting requirements, are compliant with the NST. Any contract found to be deficient will be modified as soon as possible.

3.4. MAJCOM Inspection Responsibilities.

3.4.1. Each MAJCOM must have a 24-hour point of contact for NST notifications.

3.4.2. MAJCOM TCOs will keep AF/A10S and MAJCOM Operational Security (OPSEC) informed of any activity at inspectable Air Force facilities that could impact NST activities (e.g., runway closures, air shows, major exercises/operations that impact OPSEC, ramp space, billeting challenges).

3.4.3. If present during an inspection, MAJCOM treaty personnel primarily serve as observers and shall not interfere with wing/unit TCO or DTRA escort team’s role in the treaty compliance process.

3.4.4. MAJCOM TCOs have a current understanding of existing USG, DoD, and Air Force positions/guidance relating to the hosting of NST activities on US territory.
3.4.5. If questions arise, the MAJCOM TCO should coordinate with their chain of command and/or AF/A10S for clarification. The MAJCOM TCO advises the wing/unit TCO with responses to communicate to the DTRA Escort Team Chief.

3.4.6. Identification and prevention of any prohibited activity when the DTRA Escort Team and Russian inspection team members are at an inspectable Air Force facility during an NST escort mission is in accordance with USG, DoD and/or Air Force guidance and is the responsibility of the DTRA Escort Team, supported by the wing/unit TCO, in direct support of treaty compliance.

3.4.7. The MAJCOM TCO shall promptly notify his/her chain of command, including AF/A10S, of any prohibited activity reported by his/her wing/unit TCOs during NST activities at inspectable Air Force facilities, the circumstances of those activities, and the resultant actions taken.

3.5. MAJCOM Arms Control Training and Awareness.

3.5.1. MAJCOM TCOs will ensure subordinate wing/unit TCOs and MAJCOM personnel receive appropriate NST training if directly involved in NST implementation and compliance. Examples of appropriate NST training include attending the Air Force Arms Control Overview Course, the ACES-NST Initial User training course, Air Force-level NST workshops, and MAJCOM-level arms control workshops, as well as using the AF/A10S Portal Training site and participating in US-only mock inspections and training visits.

3.5.2. MAJCOMs conduct mock inspections and training visits. US-only mock inspections are valuable training activities for the escort mission teams, local base personnel and logistics support activities as well as those personnel involved in the notification process.


3.6.1. MAJCOM TCOs function as resource managers and monitor arms control funding and manpower. Successful execution requires close coordination between MAJCOM TCOs, base TCOs, and appropriate financial management counterparts. Budgeting and manpower requirements differ from base to base and MAJCOM to MAJCOM. Effective resource management is necessary to ensure sufficient funding and proper program execution.

3.6.2. MAJCOM TCOs act as command resource managers for PE 35145F.

3.6.3. Resource managers are responsible for managing resources and budgeting funds for MAJCOM arms control activities and ensuring MAJCOM wing requirements are included in budget submissions. The MAJCOM treaty office and FM work with the field units to build a Spend Plan. Spend plans must include Official Representation Funds (ORF) requirements. ORF requirements are passed to the HAF PEM in the fiscal year prior to execution. In turn, the HAF PEM designates PE 35145 funds for ORF purposes with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Financial Management & Comptroller (SAF/FM). The funds will be distributed to the wings via the Wing Protocol offices.

3.6.4. AF/A10S approves the MAJCOM Spend Plan by validating the NST requirements within the Air Force arms control budget.

3.6.5. MAJCOM TCOs must ensure that all subordinate wing/unit requirements are identified and defended, when necessary, and then submitted to A10S.
3.6.6. MAJCOM TCOs must also ensure that all requirements comply with fiscal requirements in the DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) 7000.14-R V5, AFI 65-601 V1, Budget Guidance and Procedures, and AFI 65-603, Official Representation Funds.

3.6.7. MAJCOM TCOs are responsible for monitoring manpower authorizations and identifying requirements. Most wing, some MAJCOM, and other arms control billet authorizations are centrally managed by AF/A10S. These billets are not under the control of MAJCOM planners. Moving or reclassifying a billet requires coordination with and concurrence from AF/A10S. In accordance with AFPD 16-6 and AFI 16-601, MAJCOM planners must identify arms control requirements to AF/A10S sufficient to support MAJCOM headquarters and subordinate wing/unit arms control requirements.

3.7. General Wing/Unit Treaty Responsibilities.

3.7.1. Wing/unit TCOs serve as NST notification releasing authority and ensure unit-originated NST notifications comply with all Treaty requirements and are of the highest quality with regard to accuracy and timeliness. The TCOs will determine local roles and responsibilities for preparation and transmission of NST notifications. These should be documented in the local NST Compliance Plan.

3.7.1.1. All newly-assigned personnel whose duties include the preparation, review or transmission of NST notifications must receive local ACES training NLT 90 days from being assigned and complete the NST Notification Training Course within 180 days of assignment. (T1). After the initial local ACES instruction, newly assigned personnel can request an ACES training account, but will not process notifications without supervision (by an individual who has completed formal ACES training) until completing the formal ACES-NST Initial User Course. Every effort should be made to complete this formal training as part of a controller's initial training program, prior to certification.

3.7.1.2. TCOs must maintain proficiency in NST Reporting and ACES operation(s) and take steps to ensure that personnel originating notifications at the Wing/Unit have a working knowledge of NST notification requirements and procedures. (T-2). See NST Reporting Handbook for proficiency requirements.

3.7.2. Each wing/unit that hosts an NST inspectable facility will have an NST Compliance Plan applicable to all NST inspectable facilities on the installation. (T-0). The NST Compliance Plan is submitted to the parent MAJCOM, and the MAJCOM will provide the plan to AF/A10S for review. Air Force facilities declared under the NST that are not subject to on-site inspections or any NST reporting requirements do not require a compliance plan.

3.7.3. The wing/unit NST Compliance Plan shall detail the logistics support to facilitate NST inspection activities to ensure all NST timelines are met. (T-2). Suggested components of a wing/unit NST Compliance Plan are contained in Attachment 2.

3.8. Wing/Unit Exhibition Responsibilities.

3.8.1. Units hosting NST Exhibitions shall conduct a mock exhibition in coordination with AF/A10S prior to the actual exhibition. (T-2).

3.8.2. Local units shall provide support for digital photography to meet NST Exhibition photography requirements in paragraph 3, section 3, Part Eight of the Annex on Inspection Activities. This support must include the ability to print photographs as directed. (T-0).
3.9. Wing/Unit Inspection Responsibilities.

3.9.1. Wing Commanders will ensure Russian inspection teams are afforded their full treaty rights under NST while protecting US national security interests. (T-0).

3.9.2. The Wing/Unit TCOs are responsible for facilitating DTRA Escort Teams in fulfilling inspection obligations. (T-2). This involves coordination from a variety of supporting activities such as: Base Ops, transportation, dining and billeting, force protection, security and OPSEC PM and unit OPSEC Coordinators, aircraft services (e.g., fuel, water, air, de-icing, lavatory, flight meals, parking), protocol and public affairs, medical and recreational services, meeting/conference rooms and communications availability, and escorting. Host unit local activities are outlined further in paragraph 6.5.

3.9.3. Wing/Unit TCOs should work closely with their base functional points of contact (POCs) to identify possible problems and recommend solutions.

3.9.4. Wing/Units shall make every effort to ensure compliance with applicable treaty timelines.

3.9.5. Wing/Unit TCOs should keep the MAJCOM informed of major base/community events that could impact NST inspection operations as soon as possible. Airfield maintenance, air shows, exercises, inspections, weather events (e.g., hurricane staging support), etc., may limit transportation options, support personnel availability and billeting availability and can affect the ability to host NST activities.

3.9.6. Each wing/unit must have a 24-hour point of contact for NST notifications. (T-1). The NST inspection activities, by treaty design, are typically short-notice events. TCOs may only have 24 hours notification or less that they are required to host a Russian inspection team. Routine training of escorts and awareness briefings for wing leadership are a key to the success of the event.

3.9.7. Upon site designation, the Unit TCO receives a call from the DTRA Escort Team. The Unit TCO shall provide NST-required information to the DTRA Escort Team Chief on the number of accountable items located at the inspection site and additional logistical information (e.g., arrival time). (T-0)

3.9.8. No later than one hour after designation of the inspection site, the designated unit’s TCO shall ensure that all applicable NST pre-inspection restrictions are implemented. (T-0). The TCO shall notify the DTRA Escort Team Chief immediately if any pre-inspection restriction cannot be fulfilled or sustained. (T-0).

3.9.9. Upon arrival at the airfield associated with the inspection site, the inspected unit shall provide local escort support to the DTRA escorts. (T-1).

3.9.10. The DTRA Escort Team Chief serves as the official NST national escort and is empowered to interact directly with Russian inspectors. The TCOs support the DTRA Escort Team by providing inspection-related subject matter expertise and ensuring Air Force policies and weapons system safety rules are observed. Local escort support is outlined further in Chapter 6.6. (T-1).

3.9.11. The unit TCO shall complete a pre-inspection briefing for the Russian inspection team within one hour of the team’s official arrival at the inspected facility. (T-0). The TCOs shall ensure this briefing provides all NST-required information IAW Para 14, Sect V, Part
Five of the Protocol of the Treaty including annotated site diagrams and includes the information required to be provided to the national escorts. (T-0).

3.9.12. The unit TCO, in coordination with the DTRA Escort Team Chief, shall ensure that Russian inspectors and their DTRA escorts are transported to items designated for inspection within the timeframes specified in the NST. (T-0).

3.9.13. The unit, in coordination with the DTRA Escort Team, shall provide continuous escort of Russian inspectors. (T-1).

3.10. Wing/Unit Education, Training and Exercises.

3.10.1. Education, training, and mock inspection activities should thoroughly prepare facilities for NST inspection activities. Base TCOs should strive to make these activities as “real” as possible, taking time, manpower, cost, and mission team requests/desires into consideration. They should focus on the timeline for the event, providing a timely and accurate pre-inspection briefing, and focus on facility and escort responsibilities, and safety. TCOs should also coordinate with the OPSEC PM who accomplishes a wing/unit impacts/vulnerabilities assessment.

3.10.2. Unit TCOs shall develop and maintain facility training programs that are flexible and applicable to specific unit needs and requirements. (T-2).

3.10.3. Unit TCOs will provide escort training sufficient to cover ALL requirements for the NST activities for their installation. (T-2). This training will be submitted to the appropriate MAJCOMs and provided to AF/A10S for review.
Chapter 4
REPORTING

4.1. General.

4.1.1. Reporting is closely linked to database maintenance and notifications within the NST. This requires careful tracking of deployed and non-deployed Air Force treaty-accountable assets and scrupulous reporting.

4.2. Notifications.

4.2.1. MAJCOMs and Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) shall provide notifications IAW Part Four of the Protocol and the Annex on Notifications to the AFCN via ACES. (T-1). Most notifications are passed between the Parties through the established Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. NST has four notifications in the Annex to be employed by inspectors while in-country conducting inspections. These are passed from the inspectors to the DTRA national escorts. In addition, NST contains provisions for the Parties to address situations where there are no pre-established notifications. Should such situations arise during the course of an inspection on an Air Force installation, whether initiated by the Russian inspectors or at the behest of the unit, to address it through the established command channels and escalation processes.

4.3. Database Reporting.

4.3.1. The NST establishes a database of information concerning items of accountability that the Parties exchange twice annually in March and September, based on data effective 1 March and 1 September. Wings/units will process NST notifications through the ACES reporting network. (T-1).

4.3.2. Prior to this exchange, all wings/units who own/possess and have responsibility for MMIII first stages identified in Tables 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 will conduct a physical inventory of all non-deployed MMIII first stages stored at their facility within 15 days of the semi-annual data exchange. This requirement does not apply to deployed MMIII first stages. Inventories will verify the UID against the NST database. (T-1).

4.3.2.1. These inventories will be checked against the unit’s NST database and then forwarded to the AFCN, either directly or per MAJCOM-directed process, for a final check before the semi-annual NST data exchange. (T-2).

4.3.3. In addition, some NST notifications require concurrent reporting through separate channels to support distinct but complimentary databases. USSTRATCOM’s Force Status/Readiness (FSR) database is one such system. As such, the TCO and local FSR representative will coordinate to ensure that NST force status changes for their unit are reflected in the same manner in both ACES and the FSR NST module, consistent with established reporting procedures. (T-1).

4.3.3.1. TCOs will establish FSR accounts, and will verify the accuracy of the FSR NST module data for their unit within 24 hours of an NST-reportable movement/event that changes the deployed/non-deployed status of a strategic delivery vehicle. (T-1). If this movement/event is outside normal duty hours, the TCO will conduct the check the next
duty day. If mismatches are noted, the TCO will immediately coordinate with the FSR representative to determine if corrective actions are needed.

4.4. Treaty Compliance Officer Reports.

4.4.1. Post-inspection reports by the unit TCO shall be prepared within seven days following an inspection, exhibition, or demonstration. (T-2). The TCOs will forward these reports through the MAJCOM to AF/A10S, who will distribute as necessary. (T-2)

4.5. Treaty Compliance Certifications.

4.5.1. From time-to-time the Secretary of Defense may request Air Force certification of compliance with NST. Such requests are subsequently sent to all MAJCOMs. Each MAJCOM will certify command compliance with NST. Certifications are sent to AF/A10S who will compile them with other required certifications from SAF/AQ and SAF/AAZ and combine them into an Air Force certification. The AF/A10 will certify Air Force operational and acquisition compliance with NST in response to the Secretary of Defense.

4.6. NST Reporting Deviations.

4.6.1. A reporting deviation is identified as providing incorrect information, or failing to provide the required information, in an NST notification format. An example would include omitting a reference, or providing an incorrect reference, in an NST Format 3 notification regarding the movement of a heavy bomber or ICBM. All NST reporting deviations are managed IAW procedures outlined in the NST Reporting Handbook.
Chapter 5

SAFETY AND SECURITY

5.1. General.

5.1.1. Compliance with the NST is mandatory. However, such compliance should not compromise operational safety or security requirements. Adherence to existing Air Force safety and security directives and proper advance planning should prevent situations from arising where inspection rights conflict with established procedures. It may be necessary to reassess such requirements as a result of the NST and change requirements to allow compliance with the NST.

5.1.2. Should situations arise where inspection rights conflict with established safety and security procedures, the unit TCO shall consult with the DTRA Escort Team Chief to resolve the situation in such a way as to accommodate NST compliance within the bounds of safety and security standards. (T-1)

5.1.3. Ensuring personnel safety remains the highest priority of all escorts. Safety standards cannot be relaxed or compromised in the course of inspections.

5.1.4. Operational security and communications security (COMSEC) standards apply during inspections. The mission of inspection escorts is to ensure that compliance with these standards is maintained while allowing the inspection team to satisfy their treaty rights. Disagreements on-site default to protecting information until the DTRA Team Chief and unit leadership agree on a process, or escalate the matter through the appropriate chain of command for resolution.

5.1.5. Security Classification of NST Information. US information provided to inspectors during inspections is classified in accordance with existing DoD classification guidance. As a general rule, DoD classified information is not provided to inspectors, however, some information when aggregated becomes classified. DoD security classification guides regulate sharing.

5.2. Host Unit Security.

5.2.1. Russian inspectors have specific diplomatic rights, privileges, and immunities as outlined in the Protocol to the NST (Part Five, Section II), and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961. The person of the inspector is inviolable, meaning for example that he or she cannot be subjected to a pat-down or other search and is not subject to arrest or detention. Inspectors are not subject to US criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction. Similarly, inspectors’ papers, correspondence, and personal property are immune from search and seizure in US territory, as may be the aircraft transporting inspectors to and from POEs.

5.2.1.1. As a courtesy and to avoid revealing security procedure information to the visiting team, DTRA Escort Team members, their luggage, and hand-carried items are exempt from searches, unless dictated by a specific base security situation (see DOD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108V1, The Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual, DOD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108V2, General Nuclear Weapon Security Procedures, and DOD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108V3, Nuclear Weapon Specific Requirements).
5.2.2. The DTRA Escort Team shall meet in-coming Russian inspectors at the point of entry and transport them to the facility designated for inspection. Luggage and equipment belonging to the assigned Russian inspector(s) include personal property and papers which the Treaty protects. At the POE, DTRA, and United States Customs personnel will identify and distinguish the luggage and equipment belonging to persons who do not share the same privileges and immunities. (T-0). Searches of the visiting inspectors and/or their property are prohibited, and any questions regarding searches are directed to the DTRA Escort Team Chief.

5.2.3. It is Air Force policy that if no specific threat exists against the inspection team or the host unit before or during their visit, additional security requirements are neither warranted nor appropriate. Treatment of the inspection team as distinguished visitors (DVs) is sufficient.

5.2.4. It is Air Force policy that the local base escort team will have the primary responsibility for ensuring the protection and safety of inspection team members and for limiting access to them by non-essential personnel. (T-1).

5.2.5. If a threat arises before or during the visit of an inspection team, the host unit will react appropriately, inform the DTRA Escort Team Chief (prior to arrival if possible), and brief the arriving team of the situation, the precautions they should take, and the protective measures being taken by the base. (T-1).

5.2.6. If a threat exists during an NST activity at a host unit, considerations should be taken to billet the inspection team on base and limit/restrict their movement as much as possible, depending on the threat. If a credible threat exists to NST activities and movement is required to off-base locations, base Security Forces advise the Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI) and local law enforcement agencies.

5.2.7. If a credible threat exists, treaty activities may be restricted to on-base, with Security Forces personnel posted on the boundaries of areas used for lodging, dining, and other treaty activities. Off-base activities require coordination with local law enforcement. This information is passed expeditiously to AF/A10S. If required, a recommendation to consider terminating the inspection and removing the inspectors from the area is passed by the Air Staff to the USG Interagency.

5.3. Operational Security (OPSEC).

5.3.1. The purpose of OPSEC is to reduce the vulnerability of Air Force missions to successful adversary collection and exploitation of critical information. OPSEC applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces during all phases of operations (see AFI 10-701, Operations Security).

5.3.2. Wing OPSEC PMs and unit OPSEC Coordinators will accomplish risk and vulnerability assessments of facilities subject to NST inspections annually.

5.3.3. Facility personnel should guard against the possibility that someone may attempt to gather information on our abilities, capabilities, operations, intentions, personnel and organizations. It is incumbent on facility personnel to be observant and diligent in protecting information that might be used to compromise our security, while at the same time being courteous and pleasant.
5.3.4. If inquiries or actions of a Russian inspection team member raise suspicions, the host-unit’s escort shall notify the TCO, who in turn notifies the DTRA Escort Team Chief. (T-2). Base security force representatives and AFOSI are notified of any suspicious situations. Wing OPSEC PM will also be notified.
Chapter 6

OTHER INSPECTION RELATED REQUIREMENTS

6.1. Inspection Team Arrival Procedures.

6.1.1. The Wing Commander, or designated representative, should meet the visiting escort and inspection teams upon arrival to the unit being inspected.

6.1.2. Local base escorts and appropriate security forces, if necessary, should be immediately available to support the arriving teams. Arrangements should be made to expedite transportation of personnel to each event (e.g., welcome/arrival briefings, stop at billeting) and movement of equipment to the appropriate location.

6.2. Asylum Requests.

6.2.1. Should any foreign national inspection team member or visitor express to Air Force personnel a desire to seek asylum in the United States, that individual discretely informs the DTRA Escort Team Chief. Requests for asylum are handled in accordance with existing guidance and procedures in accordance with AFI 51-704, Handling Requests for Asylum and Temporary Refuge.

6.3. Public Affairs.

6.3.1. Hosting units shall accommodate media coverage of NST activities IAW DoD "Principles of Information," DoD Directive 5122.05, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)), SAF/PA, DTRA/PA, MAJCOM/PA and OASD(PA) guidance. (T-0).


6.4.1. Hosting Russian NST inspection missions is a national, legal obligation. The foreign team is afforded the opportunity to exercise their rights under the NST. The host units must facilitate the conduct of the inspection activity. (T-0).

6.4.2. Reception of the visiting NST teams is polite, courteous, and accommodating.

6.4.3. In the event a US dignitary, very important person (VIP), or flag officer accompanies the inspection activity, appropriate protocol accommodations are afforded him or her. Coordinate these procedures with the DTRA Escort Team Chief.

6.4.4. Nearly all NST activities include a formal dinner or function outside of treaty requirements. These may be coordinated by the TCO, host unit Protocol Office and the DTRA Escort Team Chief. Appropriate host unit representation, at a level commensurate with the visibility of the activity, should be in attendance. These events are not open to the media.

6.4.4.1. Unit TCOs should coordinate with the DTRA Escort Team Chief prior to any gift exchange to determine the appropriate level of gift and to avoid duplication.

6.5. Wing/Unit Local Activities.

6.5.1. A wing/unit that is hosting NST activities may be called upon to support or facilitate leisure time activities for members of the inspection team. Creativity, ingenuity, and
flexibility on the part of the TCO are encouraged. Not all Russian inspectors speak English, so coordination with the DTRA Escort Team Chief for appropriate linguistic services is crucial to the success of an activity.

6.5.2. On-base activities may include, but are not limited to, visits to the Base Exchange and/or Commissary, Class Six store, clothing sales, Officer and/or Enlisted Clubs, cafeterias and fast food establishments, museums or displays, or other recreational facilities. If the Base Exchange and/or Commissary are visited, the TCO will be responsible for crowd control and coordinates with the facility manager to provide a separate check-out lane if required. (T-2).

6.5.2.1. As guests of the United States, Russian inspection team members are authorized use of the Base Exchange and Commissary, Class Six store, convenience stores, and Officer and/or Enlisted Clubs. Only non-issue military clothing/items may be purchased at the clothing sales store. The hosting unit TCO will notify any of these facilities prior to the arrival of the inspection team. (T2).

6.5.3. Off-base activities include shopping, tourist and recreational activities, etc. Any off-base routine activity, including when the teams are housed off-base, requires notification to AFOSI and base Security Forces to ensure appropriate coordination once activities are completed. Base Security Forces will only provide security for off-base areas that are within their jurisdiction. (T0).

6.5.3.1. The DTRA Escort Team has primary responsibility for all visiting NST personnel during all activities.

6.5.3.2. If requested by the DTRA Escort Team Chief, the TCO may provide, as available, local base escorts and drivers to facilitate movement off-base.

6.6. Local (Base) Escorts.

6.6.1. Local escorts are necessary to assist the DTRA Escort Team and to facilitate NST activities/events when Russian inspectors are visiting their base.

6.6.2. Local escorts are site-knowledgeable base representatives designated as points of contact for the DTRA Escort Team.

6.6.3. The TCO will control the reporting, usage, and associated duties of local escorts assisting during NST activities IAW their NST Compliance Plan training and instruction guidelines and Attachment 2. (T-2).

6.7. Medical and Dental Support / Mortuary Services.

6.7.1. Host units are expected to provide or arrange for emergency/non-elective medical/dental care as necessary and as requested by the DTRA Escort Team Chief for inspection and/or escort team members to accomplish their duties, to save lives or to stabilize injuries. (T-2). Military treatment facilities are to be used unless competent medical authority deems otherwise.

6.7.2. The Host unit should be prepared to transport a team member to a local civilian medical facility if required and to stay with him/her at the local facility until care is rendered. (T-2). The host unit should be prepared to accommodate a national escort (DTRA) to accompany the individual should evacuation be necessary. The military medical staff
-coordinate care with the civilian facility as required. The DTRA Escort Team Chief is kept apprised of the patient’s condition and treatment at all times.

6.7.3. Transportation to an appropriate POE, if required, is accomplished via usual air evacuation procedures after coordination with the DTRA Escort Team Chief and Russian Inspection Team Chief.

6.7.4. Commanders must ensure arrangements for mortuary services are performed in accordance with Air Force regulations, local and state laws, foreign preferences, and in coordination with the DTRA Escort Team Chief. (T-0).

6.7.5. In accordance with Part Five, Section V, paragraph 2 of the Protocol to the Treaty, the inspected Party is responsible for providing medical services to the inspecting Party. The inspected Party shall bear the costs of all such services. (T-0). DTRA will reimburse the Air Force for any costs associated with medical care provided to the inspecting Party.

6.8. Lodging and Dining.

6.8.1. Host unit TCOs coordinate lodging and dining requirements/desires with the DTRA Escort Team Chief.

6.8.2. DTRA preference for lodging NST teams is on-base or in a single off-base hotel that can accommodate both the entire US escort and Russian inspection teams. Coordination for off-base lodging, if arranged by the host-unit TCO, is through the base Lodging Office.

6.8.3. In the event of a threat situation, lodging is arranged in on-base facilities. This may involve creativity due to the short notice nature of NST activities and the relatively large size of the escort and inspection teams.

6.8.4. For on-base lodging, certain precautionary measures, (e.g., removal of the honor bar, turning off access to pay-TV channels) may be taken in preparing the rooms, but extraordinary measures, (e.g., excessive lighting from outside light sources shining on the building) are not necessarily appropriate. The TCO should coordinate with the DTRA Escort Team Chief regarding requirements for lodging (e.g., housekeeping services, telephones, security protection, availability of a 24-hour on-site contact). Use OPSEC procedures as a guide when preparing on-base lodging. Coordinate with OPSEC PM when preparing base lodging.

6.8.5. Local travel is reimbursed IAW wing/unit local travel instructions.

6.8.6. Meals, both on- and off-base, are coordinated between the TCO and the DTRA Escort Team Chief.

6.8.7. DTRA Escort Team members will pay for their own accommodations and meals, while the DTRA Escort Team Class “A” Agent pays for the Russian inspection team members.

6.8.8. The TCO should work with the DTRA Escort Team for box lunch arrangements if requested by the DTRA Escort Team Chief. Payment for box lunches is typically in advance. The TCO coordinates with the DTRA Escort Team to accommodate this payment.
6.9. Transportation.

6.9.1. Host unit TCO coordinates transportation requirements with the DTRA Escort Team Chief.

6.9.1.1. NST activities are conducted on a strict timeline. Transportation must account for road closures, base gate security procedures, and traffic situations to ensure adherence to this timeline. (T-2). Transportation will account for weather delays and unanticipated events as best they can, and the NST activity accommodates for these situations. Delays must be mitigated to the maximum extent possible, but if not possible, TCO will notify the DTRA team chief so a determination can be made as to how to proceed under the terms of the treaty. (T-0).

6.9.1.2. The TCO should attempt to accommodate the DTRA Escort Team Chief’s requests for transportation support for off-base and cultural activities for the Russian inspection team as much as practical, within existing policies/guidelines/restrictions. In cases where Wing Commander approval is required for the type of activity or location, the TCO will facilitate that request. (T-2).

JACK WEINSTEIN, Lt Gen, USAF
DCS, Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration
Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References
DoD Directive 5122.05, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)), September 5, 2008
Air Force Supplement to DoD Instruction, 5210.41M, DOD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108V3, Nuclear Weapon Specific Requirements, 21 February 2014
AFPD 16-6, Arms Control Agreements, 29 December 2010 (certified current, 20 March 2012)
AFI 10-701, Operations Security (OPSEC), 8 June 2011
AFI 16-601, *Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements*, 18 February 2011
AFI 65-603, Official Representation Funds, 24 August 2011
New START Treaty Reporting Workbook, 13 February 2013

*Adopted Forms*
AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

*Abbreviations and Acronyms*
ACC—Air Combat Command
ACES—Arms Control Enterprise System
AETC—Air Education and Training Command
AF—Air Force
AF/A1—Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower, Personnel & Services
AF/A2—Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
AF/A4—Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection
AF/A5/8—Air Staff Strategic Plans and Programs Directorate
AF/A10—Air Staff Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Office Directorate
AF/A10S—Air Staff Strategic Stability and CWMD Division
AF/JA—Judge Advocate General
AFCN—Air Force Central Node
AFGSC—Air Force Global Strike Command
AFI—Air Force Instruction
AFMAN—Air Force Manual
AFMC—Air Force Materiel Command
AFOSI—Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive
AFRC—Air Force Reserve Command
AFRIMS—Air Force Records Information Management Systems
AFSPC—Air Force Space Command
AFTAC—Air Force Technical Applications Center
AMC—Air Mobility Command
COMSEC—Communications Security
CRG—Compliance Review Group
DCS—Deputy Chief of Staff
DoD—Department of Defense
DOS—Department of State
DRU—Direct Reporting Unit
DTRA—Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DV—Distinguished Visitor
EAL—Entry Access Lists
EIF—Entry Into Force
PDF—Formerly Declared Facility
FMR—Financial Management Regulation
FSR—Force Status/Readiness
HAF—Headquarters Air Force
IAW—In Accordance With
ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IOI—Item of Inspection
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff
MAJCOM—Major Command
MM II—Minuteman II
MM III—Minuteman III
NIRI—Nuclear Issues Resolution and Integration
NLT—No Later Than
NOB—Nuclear Oversight Board
NST—New START Treaty
NST IWG—New START Treaty Implementation Working Group
NTM—National Technical Means
O&M—Operations & Maintenance
OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility
OPSEC—Operations Security  
ORF—Official Representation Funds  
OUSD(AT&L)/A/SSI/SS&TC—Deputy Director, Treaty Compliance  
PACAF—Pacific Air Forces  
PE—Program Element  
PEM—Program Element Monitor  
PK—Peacekeeper  
POC—Point of Contact  
POE—Point of Entry  
RDE—Radiation Detection Equipment  
RDS—Records Disposition Schedule  
SAF—Secretary of the Air Force  
SAF/AAZ—Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Special Program Oversight and Information Protection  
SAF/AQ—Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition  
SAF/FM—Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Financial Management & Comptroller  
SAF/GC—General Counsel  
SAF/PA—Public Affairs  
SLBM—Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile  
TCO—Treaty Compliance Officer  
TDY—Temporary Duty  
UID—Unique Identifier  
USAF—United States Air Force  
USAFE—United States Air Forces in Europe  
USD(P)—Undersecretary of Defense for Policy  
USD(AT&L)—Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics  
USG—United States Government  
USSTRATCOM—United States Strategic Command  
VIP—Very Important Person  
WMD—Weapons of Mass Destruction  

Terms

For a full list of NST terms and their definitions— Refer to the NST Protocol, Part 1.
Attachment 2

COMPONENTS OF COMPLIANCE PLAN

A2.1. The wing/unit NST Compliance Plan should: Include, but is not limited to, base support procedures, escort requirements, notification and report preparation and transmission, procedures to notify local personnel and affected organizations, security provisions, billeting and transportation requirements, and protocol and public affairs procedures.

A2.2. The NST Compliance Plan identifies offices/organizations responsible for: Providing logistics support to the visiting escort and inspection teams. The final plan should include a list showing all tasked organizations including other tenant organizations.

A2.3. Suggested components of a compliance plan:

A2.3.1. Force Support. This includes lodging, dining, and mortuary services. Lodging and dining arrangements always need to be planned in advance. Consult with the DTRA START/Nuclear Division for lodging requirements.

A2.3.2. Security. This section needs to include high and low threat security procedures for escorts, guards, inspector entry into controlled areas, operations security (OPSEC), and communications security (COMSEC). (Note: Inspectors may not view normal security procedures.)

A2.3.2.1. If a known threat to the inspection is recognized, high threat options are imposed. These could include measures such as posting guards and implementing entry control points requiring Entry Access Lists (EAL) granting the escort and inspection teams and local escorts authorized access to inspection sites and support facilities. Low threat options may allow implementation of normal DV procedures.

A2.3.2.2. OPSEC procedures such as limiting access and controlling travel routes should be included. Weapons handling and storage areas, flight lines, and other areas of sensitive operations are to be protected.

A2.3.2.3. COMSEC concerns (e.g., how inspectors are allowed to communicate with their embassy/consulate) are to be included in preparations. For example, have local escorts work with the DTRA Escort Team to establish appropriate communications links for inspectors to use.

A2.3.3. Medical. Arrangements for emergency/non-elective medical treatment of mission team members are to be included. DTRA is responsible for the cost of all medical treatments and is billed accordingly.

A2.3.4. Communications. This section includes public address systems for ceremonies/briefings, contact between local escorts, methods for inspectors to contact their embassies, contact between inspection team subgroups, or other treaty-specific items.

A2.3.5. Transportation. All personnel transportation requirements, arrival through departure, and equipment/baggage handling to include special handling instructions for inspection equipment are included in this section. The TCO tries to accommodate the DTRA Escort Team Chief’s requests for support of transportation for off-base and cultural activities for the Russian inspection team, within existing guidelines/restrictions. In cases where Wing
Commander approval is required for the type of activity or location, the TCO will facilitate that request. (T2).

A2.3.6. Funding. Considerations include specific billing and payment procedures. Ensure the DTRA Escort Team Chief, or his/her designated liaison, knows what is required in advance. Coordinate with base activities for items DTRA may request to accomplish their responsibilities. Coordinate with the MAJCOM TCO and PEM, preferably in advance of incurring expenses, for reimbursement of expenses not paid by DTRA, or that DTRA does not pay. If DTRA is not able to fund a TCO request, Operations and Maintenance (O&M) dollars may be pursued at the discretion of the local wing/unit commander as long as the requirement is authorized IAW financial regulations.

A2.3.7. Public Affairs. Clearly established ground rules on control of media movement and actions are necessary to prevent interference with inspections. The USG and DoD posture for NST inspections is “passive.” A “passive posture” means TCOs can respond to inquiries, but not actively promote media activities. The NST limits mass media coverage of inspection activities to the point of entry. Any public affairs activity, including photography (e.g., team photo), at an inspection facility is pre-coordinated with the DTRA Escort Team Chief.

A2.3.8. Personnel. Personnel include base escorts, facility managers, baggage details, measurement teams, weapon load teams and inspection support staff. Support staffs are individuals working real-time contingencies while the treaty office is busy with inspectors; support staff should have a representative from each key support and inspection organization.

A2.3.9. Training. TCOs are responsible for ensuring all base personnel involved in an NST activity are well trained and able to perform their duties, including suitability of local escorts. Not everyone is suited to perform escort duties. While no specific certification is required, TCOs should ensure experienced, mature individuals are selected. TCOs must select and train a sufficient number of personnel as escorts to support an NST inspection. In most cases, periodic refresher training is desirable and necessary. At other times, just-in-time training of local personnel may be all a base can complete due to limited availability of personnel. Bases should have a goal of maintaining a pool of trained personnel, as continuity promotes a high level of efficiency and support for complying with treaty procedures.

A2.3.10. Safety/Security. The TCO presents a safety/security briefing to the visiting DTRA escort and Russian inspection teams as part of the treaty-mandated pre-inspection procedures. The briefing should be adapted to the local environment and should provide a perspective of the base and facilities to be used by the teams, weather conditions the teams should expect, base security policies, escort procedures and local policies, and whom to contact should any visiting person need assistance. The TCO develops the briefing in advance and coordinates it with AF/A10S. (T-1). (Note: The TCO shall apply the same safety/security procedures to the Russian inspection teams, DTRA Escort Teams, and local escorts.)

A2.3.11. Prohibited Activity. Identification of any prohibited activity during an NST escort mission at an inspectable facility is in accordance with USG, DoD, and/or Air Force policy/guidance and is the responsibility of the DTRA Escort Team, supported by the wing/unit TCO, in direct support of treaty compliance.
A2.3.12. Protocol. If requested, protocol assists the TCO in making arrangements for DVs, arranging off-base meals, hosting reception and departure functions, closing ceremonies, and memento exchanges.

A2.3.13. Cultural Activities. At the DTRA Escort Team Chief’s request, pre-coordinate and facilitate leisure activities such as tours, shopping, and recreational opportunities. Work with affected support services: Transportation, Base Exchange, Commissary, Recreational Services, and affected civilian establishments. The participation of wing/unit personnel in cultural activities is at the discretion of the DTRA Escort Team Chief, the wing/unit commander, and the wing/unit TCO.