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SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

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***Nuclear, Space, Missile, Command and
Control***

***PRIME NUCLEAR AIRLIFT FORCE
OPERATIONS***

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This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 13-5, and supports AFPD 11-2, *Aircrew Operations*, portions of Air Force Joint Instruction (AFJI) 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials*, and Technical Order (T.O.) 11N-45-51 series, *Transportation of Nuclear Weapons Materiel*. It establishes the requirements and guidance for wartime and peacetime logistic airlift of Department of Defense (DoD) nuclear and nuclear-related cargo. The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3”) number following the compliance statement. See AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, Table 1.1 for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternatively, to the publication office of primary responsibility (OPR) for non-tiered compliance items. This AFI may be supplemented at any level; Commanders route all supplements that directly implement this publication to Air Mobility Command (AMC/A3N) for coordination prior to certification and approval. It applies to all personnel, especially planners, aircrews, controllers, security forces and maintenance personnel, involved in nuclear airlift and wartime/peacetime nuclear logistics movements. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) does not apply to the Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC). Submit suggested improvements to this instruction on AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*, through Major Command (MAJCOM) channels to AMC/A3NA, amc.a3na@us.af.mil. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with (IAW) Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of IAW Air Force Records

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document has been revised and must be completely reviewed. This revision identifies tiered waiver authorities for unit level compliance items, incorporates revised planning and scheduling criteria codified in the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide Special Weapons Overflight Guide Supplement. Additionally the Service Logistics Agent's organization is updated to reflect Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC)/A4 Detachment 5, Nuclear Control Point (NCP) (formerly AFNWC/NCL). PNAF Courier and Aircraft Commander qualification and upgrade training requirements have been revised to streamline certification timelines.

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Chapter 1

GENERAL

1.1. Objective. Guidance contained in Volume 2, 3, and 4 of this instruction series are written exclusive of each other based upon the mission to be executed. Specifically, guidance from one Volume is exclusive and independent from other Volumes. This Volume prescribes the organization and basic guidance to plan, schedule, command and control (C2), execute, and support Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAM) assigned to transport nuclear weapons cargo. It prescribes standard procedures directed for use by Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) aircrews, maintenance personnel, and all other entities supporting a PNAF mission.

1.2. Key Words Explained

1.2.1. "Will" and "shall" indicate a mandatory requirement.

1.2.2. "Should" is normally used to indicate a preferred, but not mandatory, method of accomplishment.

1.2.3. "May" indicates an acceptable or suggested means of accomplishment.

1.2.4. "Note" indicates operating procedures, techniques, etc., which are considered essential to emphasize.

1.3. Responsibilities. Unless otherwise specified in cited source references, the AMC/A3 is the waiver authority for the procedures unique to this publication and 18 AF/CC is the authority for specified mission planning and execution waivers.

1.4. Distribution. The following individuals and agencies associated with supporting or executing nuclear airlift operations will maintain a copy of this instruction:

1.4.1. Commanders of nuclear capable logistics units (PNAF/ Munitions Squadron (MUNS)/ Munitions Support Squadron (MUNSS)). (T-2)

1.4.2. Operations, logistics, and safety staff agencies. (T-2)

1.4.3. Security Forces units. (T-2)

1.4.4. PNAF airlift squadron(s)/units. (T-2)

1.4.5. Each individual PNAF aircrew member. (T-2)

1.4.6. Munitions Accountable Systems Officer (MASO) for nuclear accounts. (T-2)

1.4.7. Custodial unit Civil Engineering, Readiness and Emergency Management, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units. (T-2)

1.4.8. Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) and applicable nuclear MAJCOM IGs. (T-2)

1.5. Protecting Classified Information.

1.5.1. Use caution at all times to avoid compromising classified information. Adhere to all available classification guidance.

1.5.2. *DoD Foreign Clearance Guide (DoD FCG), Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG) Supplement*, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Classification Policy, CG-W-

5, *Joint DOE/DoD Nuclear Weapon Classification Policy Guide*, TCG-WPMU-3, *Joint DOE/DoD Topical Classification Guide for Weapon Production and Military Use*, Airlift Request, Mission Setup Message, and nuclear transportation technical orders govern the classification of nuclear mission information. Restricted data and formerly restricted data are not normally releasable to foreign nationals (NOFORN). Do not send this type of information to any agency (civilian or military) of a foreign government unless directed to do so by an authoritative publication such as the DoD FCG SWOG.

1.5.3. The use of terms in unclassified text that reveals nuclear or classified cargo is aboard a specific aircraft or mission or at a specific location can compromise the mission and is prohibited.

1.5.4. Personnel will refer only to the SAAM number, aircraft tail number, or Aircraft Commander's name when discussing a particular mission via unclassified media or unsecure phone lines. (T-0) Do not use the term "PNAF" or "special weapons mission" in conjunction with the SAAM number, aircraft tail number, or Aircraft Commander's name. (T-0) Do not associate T.O. 11N-45-51A, *Transportation of Nuclear Weapons Material* (S), line numbers with any of the shipping information that reveals actual nuclear cargo data (e.g., nuclear cargo or package name, net explosive weight (NEW), dimensions, or weight). (T-0)

1.5.5. Do not discuss any aspect of a PNAF SAAM unless the receiver of the information has an appropriate security clearance and a definite need-to-know. (T-0) This applies even after a mission is complete.

1.6. Releasing Information. Only appropriate commanders and public affairs officers may release information about nuclear mishaps to the public or news media. Public Affairs will ensure timely and uniform implementation of DoD approved policies as referenced in DoDI 5400.13, *Public Affairs (PA)*, and AFI 35-104, *Media Operations*, to establish and conduct efficient and effective procedures for the release of nuclear activity information to the public, including news media (domestic, international), to include nuclear operations, accidents, improvised nuclear device (IND) incidents, or nuclear weapon significant incidents. (T-0)

1.7. Nuclear Transportation Working Group and PNAF Working Group

1.7.1. Nuclear Transportation Working Group (NTWG).

1.7.1.1. IAW DoDI 4540.05, *DoD Transportation of U.S. Nuclear Weapons* and AAFP 21-2, *Munitions*, the NTWG provides a forum to resolve issues pertaining to efficient, safe, and secure transportation of nuclear cargo.

1.7.1.2. AF/A10 is the service lead to this meeting in order to present the Air Force position on NTWG agenda items as well as discuss current topics involving Air Force nuclear transportation issues.

1.7.1.3. AF/A10 will limit participation from MAJCOM, Air Operations Center (AOC), and Unit personnel to the minimum deemed necessary to support discussions on specific issues. AF/A10 invites agencies as necessary.

1.7.2. PNAF Working Group (PWG)

1.7.2.1. This action officer-level forum provides a venue to vet issues, enhance cross-organizational communication, and a means to formally coordinate a standardized Air Force position ahead of discussions with other agencies.

1.7.2.2. The PWG will normally meet the day prior to the Nuclear Transportation Working Group (NTWG), semi-annually, or as required.

1.7.2.3. AF/A10C will chair this action officer-level meeting to establish the Air Force position on NTWG agenda items as well as address current topics involving the PNAF mission.

1.7.2.4. AF/A10C will direct membership from Headquarters Air Force (HAF), AMC, United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE), and Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC). AFGSC/A4, Det 5, Nuclear Control Point (AFGSC/A4 Det 5, NCP) as Service Logistics Agent (SLA), 618 AOC (TACC) (*also known as "Tanker Airlift Control Center" or "TACC"*), as central planning node, and AF/A10-S, Foreign Clearance Program (FCP) Office, as foreign clearance office, are permanent invited observers. AF/A10 will invite other agencies as necessary.

1.7.2.5. Topics for the PWG include, but are not limited to: NTWG agenda items, projected movements, Logistic Movement inspection trends, and Policy Updates at HAF/DoD/CJCS level. Other topics may be added with approval by AF/A10C.

1.7.2.6. AF/A10C, Nuclear Stockpile/Transportation Branch will act as executive secretary to hold and follow up on action items.

1.8. Nuclear Airlift Monitor (NAM).

1.8.1. MAJCOM NAM. MAJCOMs tasked with oversight responsibilities of certified PNAF-capable unit(s) will maintain a NAM function on their headquarters staff.

1.8.1.1. The MAJCOM NAM manages and implements nuclear airlift policies and procedures for the Command.

1.8.1.2. The MAJCOM NAM continuously monitors and evaluates nuclear airlift guidance, makes required improvements, and collaborates with subordinate units and other nuclear agencies in developing and approving DoD nuclear-related regulations and policies.

1.8.1.3. The AMC NAM (AMC/A3NA), in coordination with the Headquarters Air Force functional (AF/A10C) and the AMC Nuclear Surety Manager (NSM) (AMC/SEW), represents the USAF and AMC at DoD and Joint meetings pertaining to nuclear airlift and provides technical advice to staff agencies and AMC aircrews on procedures regarding nuclear cargo loading, equipment, or airlift.

1.8.2. PNAF Unit NAM. PNAF certified nuclear capable units will maintain a NAM function within their staff. (T-1)

1.8.2.1. The PNAF Unit NAM officer is established to manage and implement nuclear airlift policies and procedures for the unit, ensure proper crew/personnel training, currency, and qualification, and develop crew makeup for each PNAF SAAM and Training mission.

1.8.2.2. The Unit NAM continuously monitors and evaluates nuclear airlift guidance, recommending improvements as required, and collaborates with the MAJCOM NAM to review and implement other DoD nuclear-related regulations and policies. (T-1)

1.8.2.3. Selection. The commander of each PNAF squadron/unit will select and assign an officer to this duty.

1.8.2.4. Duties include, but are not limited to:

1.8.2.4.1. Prepare the pre-departure briefing for aircrews. (T-2)

1.8.2.4.2. Debrief Aircraft Commanders. (T-2)

1.8.2.4.2.1. Document and maintain file copies of post mission debriefs for 1 year. (T-2)

1.8.2.4.2.2. Provide copies of mission debriefs to AMC/A3N within 14 calendar days of mission completion. (T-2)

1.8.2.4.3. Review and process Special Assignment Airlift Mission Reports (SAAMREPs). (T-2)

1.8.2.4.4. Maintain Nuclear Mission Kits. (T-2)

1.8.2.4.5. Management of PNAF crews (training, scheduling, upgrades, etc.). (T-2)

1.8.2.4.6. Attend wing Nuclear Surety Working Group (NSWG) and Nuclear Surety Council (NSC) meetings. (T-2)

1.8.2.4.7. Maintain file copies of completed DD Forms 1911 on file for 6 months. (T-2)

1.8.2.4.8. Send AF Form 527F, *Checklist for Nuclear Mission Support*, to the wing Nuclear Surety Manager (NSM) after review. (T-2)

1.8.2.4.8.1. Provide copies of the AF Form 527F to AMC/SEW and A3N within 14 days of mission completion. (T-2)

1.9. PNAF Safety Rules.

1.9.1. Weapon system safety rules apply to all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems in accordance with DoDD 3150.02, *DoD Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*. Safety rules always apply, even during war.

1.9.2. PNAF missions will comply with AFI 91-115, *Safety Rules for Nuclear Logistics Transport by the Prime Nuclear Airlift Force*. Refer to AFI 91-115 for a complete list of safety rules and accepted deviations allowed during emergency situations.

1.10. Logistics Movement and Handling of Nuclear Cargo.

1.10.1. PNAF is comprised of aircraft and aircrews that provide peacetime logistical airlift support for the movement of nuclear cargo or nuclear components.

1.10.2. Nuclear weapons security rules apply at all times. Refer to DoD S-5210.41-M, *DoD Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*, and AFMAN 31-108, *Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*, for a complete list of security rules, accepted waivers, and deviations allowed.

1.10.3. Commanders will ensure DoD nuclear cargo and Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Special Nuclear Material (SNM) are not combined on the same mission. (T-0)

1.10.4. Commanders will ensure all nuclear cargo air movements are accomplished by qualified PNAF aircrews unless waived or directed by SECDEF. (T-0)

1.10.5. Commanders will ensure additional landings with nuclear cargo aboard are not made for the sole purpose of loading or offloading DoD nuclear-related or general cargo. (T-1)

1.10.6. DoD nuclear-related cargo should be consolidated with established nuclear cargo SAAMs when possible. If unable, Commanders will ensure a SAAM equal to the appropriate priority is established.

1.11. Aircrew Operational Reports. The reporting requirements in this instruction are exempt from licensing IAW AFI 33-324, *The Air Force Information Collections and Reports Management Program*.

1.12. Mission Tasking. Commanders will ensure all nuclear airlift missions are processed according to established USTRANSCOM SAAM requirements and 618 AOC (TACC) tasking procedures. (T-1)

1.12.1. In addition to the SAAM Request provided to USTRANSCOM, AFGSC/A4 Det 5, NCP will provide an Airlift Request to 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD. (T-1)

1.12.2. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD will validate all nuclear Airlift Requests. (T-1)

1.12.3. 618 AOC (TACC) will task the appropriate unit(s) to execute the nuclear airlift mission. (T-1)

1.12.4. On an annual basis, (AFGSC/A4 Det 5, NCP) will provide AMC/A3N a PNAF Capabilities and Support Memorandum. The capabilities memorandum should identify anticipated airlift logistic requirements for each nuclear weapon type in the upcoming year. PNAF capable wings will tailor unit training to support anticipated (AFGSC/A4 Det 5, NCP) logistics requirements. (T-1)

Chapter 2

MISSION MANAGEMENT

2.1. General. This Chapter provides guidance in planning and scheduling nuclear airlift missions. OPSEC is essential at all times and in all mission correspondence. Nuclear airlift mission success relies upon reliable, qualified, and prepared aircrews and support personnel during all phases of a mission (from planning through execution). As a critical function of reliability, crew morale is essential to enduring nuclear airlift mission success.

2.2. Planning and Scheduling Criteria. Nuclear surety, national security, and mission compliance with Weapon System Safety Rules (WSSR) are the most important considerations when scheduling a mission.

2.2.1. Aircrews should transport nuclear cargo by the most efficient route while complying with diplomatic clearance requirements. When possible, minimize unnecessary landings, air refueling and handling of nuclear cargo.

2.2.1.1. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners and Aircraft Commanders will refer to the requirements in the *DoD FCGictectSpecial Weapons Overflight Guideictect(SWOG)*. (T-0).

2.2.1.2. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will ensure missions transporting nuclear cargo are planned to avoid heavily populated areas when practical. (T-2) This consideration should not cause such an additive amount of additional flight time to generate additional air refueling events or unnecessary crew requirements.

2.2.2. Mission planners, squadron/unit Nuclear Airlift Monitor (NAM), aircrew, shipper, and receiver personnel will coordinate on all scheduled operations and sequences of events. (T-2)

2.2.3. Plan missions to ensure on-loading and off-loading of nuclear cargo, ground crew operations, and convoy movement times occur during daylight hours. Exceptions to this policy must be approved by the US installation wing commander, or for MUNSS locations, MUNSS commander and host nation installation commander. The US installation wing commander, or for MUNSS locations, MUNSS commander and host nation installation commander, must approve any exceptions to this policy. (T-1)

2.2.4. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will avoid scheduling more than one nuclear-laden aircraft to transit the same airfield each day. More than one mission may be scheduled to the same location in one day if approved by the US installation wing commander, or for MUNSS locations, the MUNSS commander and host nation installation commander.

2.2.5. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will ensure all primary and supporting installation agencies are coordinated with when determining Crew Replacing, Staging, and Swapping sequence of events (SOE) and procedures for a particular mission. (T-2) See paragraph 2.12 for additional execution guidance.

2.2.6. Aircrew scheduling requirements/limits directed in AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3, *C-17 Operations Procedures*, and Volume 1 of this instruction apply. Due to the critical importance of safely transporting nuclear cargo, the portion of any mission from the

beginning of Crew Duty Day (CDD) until the aircrew is no longer required per DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, is further restricted as follows:

2.2.6.1. When nuclear cargo is airlifted, the Aircraft Commander will ensure all PNAF duties are accomplished within the PNAF CDD. (T-1) When PNAF duties are complete or the PNAF CDD has expired, aircrew may only perform non-nuclear ground/flight duties within the remaining Crew Duty Time (CDT) IAW AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3. (T-1)

2.2.6.1.1. Basic PNAF CDD. Limited to 16+00 hours (regardless of crew composition). (T-1)

2.2.6.1.2. Augmented PNAF CDD. Limited to 20+00 hours for missions scheduled for aerial refueling (A/R) or a C17 mission using the extended range tank in lieu of an A/R. (T-1) If a scheduled A/R is canceled after crew alert and the crew was alerted for a 20-hour crew duty day, Aircraft Commanders will ensure the PNAF CDD does not exceed 20+00 hours. (T-2)

2.2.6.1.3. In order to remain within prescribed crew-duty day limitations, 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners should consider increasing aircraft performance speeds (within allowable limits) to minimize the need for duty-day waivers.

2.2.6.2. Basic and Augmented PNAF CDDs include ground time for loading and offloading of nuclear cargo and terminates when the aircrew is no longer required per DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. (T-1) Additionally, the Aircraft Commander will develop a work-rest plan to mitigate Operational Risk Management (ORM) factors. (T-1)

2.2.6.3. The 18 AF/CC is the waiver authority for PNAF scheduling requirements and CDD limits associated with this instruction. The 18 AF/CC may issue a CONOPS to waive standing or known mission execution requirements. Waivers may be requested by either the operating wing or the 618 AOC (TACC).

2.2.6.4. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners and Aircraft Commanders will ensure adequate ground time is available for proper crew rest prior to executing a nuclear airlift mission segment. (T-1)

2.2.6.4.1. Before home station departure or crew replacement, stage, or swap, 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners and Aircraft Commanders will ensure crew duty periods do not exceed 16+00 hours unless crews are afforded a minimum of 24+00 hours ground time prior to alerting for a nuclear airlift mission. (T-1)

2.2.6.4.2. During non-nuclear PNAF mission segments (no nuclear or nuclear-related cargo transported, on loaded, or offloaded), 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will ensure the CDT is planned IAW AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3 requirements. (T-2) Aircraft Commanders will ensure these segments are not planned to exceed a basic 16+00 hour CDD unless ground time at the nuclear loading location is at least 24+00 hours prior to executing a nuclear PNAF mission segment. (T-2)

2.2.6.5. Ground Operations. Required ground operations vary greatly depending upon the cargo type, quantity, and overall complexity of the operation. Therefore, 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will develop the mission itinerary with detailed input from the operating squadron/unit prior to publishing the Mission Setup Message. (T-2)

2.2.6.5.1. Remain Over Night (RON). Aircrew fatigue and morale have immeasurable impacts on nuclear surety. Crew rest locations should be selected not only for mission requirements, but also to provide a suitable atmosphere for crew rest.

2.2.6.5.2. To ensure crew and installation support personnel are focused solely on the offload operation, PNAF missions should normally be scheduled to crew rest at the conclusion of a nuclear airlift segment. **Note:** If custodial installation aircraft support is inadequate for RON conditions between offload and onload operations, a repositioning leg is authorized to a suitable installation.

2.2.6.5.2.1. Normal ground time between arrival and departure is 17+15 hours. If both an offload upon arrival and onload prior to departure are scheduled, ground time should be a minimum of 20+15 hours. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners may adjust ground time to satisfy known mission requirements; however, minimum ground time will not be less than 16+30 hours. (T-1)

2.2.6.5.2.2. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will ensure PNAF missions carrying nuclear cargo are not scheduled to RON at en route locations. (T-1) With the exception of emergency divert situations, 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners and Aircraft Commanders will ensure nuclear laden aircraft only RON at installations with adequate support. (T-1)

2.2.6.5.2.3. USAFE/A3/10 approval is required to RON with nuclear cargo aboard (Hot RON) in the USAFE Area of Responsibility (AOR).

2.2.6.5.2.4. Refer to the DoD FCG SWOG for additional RON guidance.

2.2.6.5.3. En route Stop (Non-RON). Normal ground time for loading and offloading is 3+15 hours. Planners will adjust this time based on the type and quantity of cargo being transported, ground support available, and anticipated complexity of on/offload procedures. (T-2) Do not increase ground or flight times to avoid delays or decrease times to remain within PNAF CDD constraints.

2.2.6.6. Pre/Depositioning Mission Segments.

2.2.6.6.1. PNAF missions will not be planned to flow from or into another equal or higher priority mission without approval of the 18 AF/CC. (T-2) During planning or execution, 618 AOC/TACC coordination with the operating OG/CC is required for all other mission changes on pre/depositioning segments (e.g. assigning aircrew/aircraft for a follow-on mission). (T-2)

2.2.6.6.2. Due to stringent maintenance preparation requirements for mission aircraft, 618 AOC/TACC will only schedule the minimum number of legs required to position an aircraft to the first onload location. (T-2) If a prepositioning stop is required, 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will ensure the en route location is capable of providing the necessary support requirements. (T-2)

2.2.6.6.3. PNAF missions will be scheduled to crew rest at the conclusion of a nuclear airlift mission prior to returning to home station or other follow on non-nuclear mission tasking. (T-2) The PNAF Aircraft Commander may request a quick-turn or an early return to home station through normal channels.

2.2.6.6.4. On positioning legs without nuclear or nuclear-related cargo, the operating airlift wing may return the aircraft and crew to home station on training time. If the operating wing elects to operate on training time, the Aircraft Commander will coordinate their intentions with 618 AOC (TACC)/XOC prior to the positioning leg. (T-2) Once notified of the requested training, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD planners will facilitate the aircrew mission request; changes to the Mission Setup Message are not required. (T-2) When requested by the operating wing, training time should be planned into Mission Setup Message prior to mission launch from home station to minimize coordination efforts during the nuclear airlift-tasked portion of the mission.

2.2.7. Schedulers, planners, and operating aircrew must also consider the following:

2.2.7.1. DoD Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG), at <https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil> or <http://www.fcg.pentagon.smil.mil>, which also includes a Classified Supplement. (T-0)

2.2.7.2. Host military command restrictions. (T-0)

2.2.7.3. Airfield restrictions, operating hours, Prior Permission Required (PPR), etc. (T-2)

2.2.7.4. User capability (hours of operation, security, etc.).

2.2.7.5. DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. (T-0)

2.2.7.6. Deconflict mission itinerary with non-support messages IAW AFI 21-203, *Nuclear Accountability Procedures*. (T-2)

2.2.7.7. Planning considerations found in DoDI 4540.05, *DoD Transportation of US Nuclear Weapons*. (T-0)

2.3. Air Refueling (A/R).

2.3.1. A/R should be planned to reduce ground exposure of nuclear cargo at bases without established authorized weapons storage areas (WSA) and to avoid the increased safety and security risks inherent in additional approaches, landings, takeoffs, and departures. Plan these missions to be accomplished non-stop between onload and offload installations. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will ensure PNAF missions are only planned to conduct A/R in order to arrive at intended destinations and suitable alternates with required contingency fuel. (T-1).

2.3.2. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD mission planners will coordinate with 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOKS for tanker support. (T-2) 618 AOC (TACC)/XOPSA will coordinate altitude reservations with the appropriate altitude reservation facility. (T-2) Plan a backup 24-hour slip in tanker support and altitude reservations, if applicable.

2.3.2.1. Mission planners will include the following information in the tanker request and A/R supplement:

2.3.2.1.1. Airborne or manned ground spares for each primary tanker. (T-2)

2.3.2.1.1.1. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD mission planners will determine the best course of action to satisfy requirements for each mission segment. (T-2) Mission planners will coordinate the information with 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOKS for

planning. (T-2)

2.3.2.1.1.2. A/R planners should coordinate spare tankers at a separate location outside the primary's weather pattern. 618 AOC (TACC)/DDO3 will ensure notifications, restrictions, and requirements are passed to the operating tanker wing(s). (T-2)

2.3.2.1.1.3. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD mission planners will provide the operating tanker crew a briefing concerning mission OPSEC, SWOG routing, and other relevant restrictions via secure means. (T-1)

2.3.2.1.1.4. To minimize en route times and CDD, use single primary and alternate tankers for each planned A/R to the maximum extent possible. Mission planners and tanker units will only split the planned offload of fuel across multiple tankers if a single tanker is incapable of providing the total planned/required offload. (T-2)

2.3.2.1.1.5. A single KC-10 tanker may backup two KC-135 tankers if the offload is sufficient and does not exceed A/R performance charts. A different refueling altitude and routing along the altitude reservation (ALTRV) or A/R track may need to be coordinated and approved before substituting a KC-135 with a KC-10.

2.3.2.1.2. SWOG restrictions apply to the tanker(s) when refueling.

2.3.3. To prepare for the unlikely event of an unsuccessful A/R, PNAF support bases and pre-coordinated emergency divert locations identified in the Mission Setup Message will stand by to support emergency diverts until released by 618 AOC (TACC)/XOC. (T-2)

2.3.3.1. Mission planners will ensure the pre-coordinated emergency divert location is prepared to receive a nuclear-laden aircraft in the event of an emergency divert. (T-2) Wing commanders at these designated bases will ensure the capability to provide security for potential emergency diverts of nuclear-laden aircraft IAW the Mission Setup Message and DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. (T-0) Should the A/R be aborted, 618 AOC (TACC) will notify the pre-coordinated emergency divert location and confirm host nation notification/coordination. (T-1)

2.3.3.2. 618 AOC (TACC) should not attempt to contact the aircrew in flight to determine the successful completion of an A/R event. However, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOC may contact the aircrew if successful A/R confirmation is not received after 15 minutes past the planned end of A/R time. After the A/R is successfully completed, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD planners or XOCG will notify the appropriate pre-coordinated emergency divert location to release ground support personnel. (T-2) In all instances, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOC will contact the aircrew immediately in order to transmit high-priority messages or emergency orders. (T-2)

2.3.4. The Aircraft Commander will cancel a planned A/R event at the earliest opportunity if he/she determines it is not required for mission accomplishment. (T-1) The Aircraft Commander's decision is final.

2.3.5. A/R over open ocean areas at least 12 nautical miles (NM) off shore. (T-0)

2.3.5.1. Aircraft Commanders will accomplish air refueling events as safely and efficiently as possible. (T-1)

2.3.5.1.1. Aircraft Commanders will only accomplish those maneuvers required for transferring the mission required fuel. (T-1) Example: Receiving the required onload from the primary tanker only. Additional events during A/R beyond those necessary to onload required fuel, including training by tanker and/or receiver crews, are prohibited at all times.

2.3.5.1.2. Aircraft Commanders will not conduct A/R upgrade training on missions carrying nuclear cargo (T-1)

2.3.5.1.3. If the designated PNAF Aircraft Commander is a current Instructor or Evaluator, they may refuel from either seat, regardless of who is occupying the other seat.

2.3.5.2. Current and qualified PNAF Aircraft Commander certified pilots may perform air refueling on nuclear cargo-laden missions, provided the designated PNAF Mission Aircraft Commander is occupying the other seat. (T-1)

2.3.5.3. PNAF Aircraft Commander upgrade candidates (C-17A Instructor Pilot or higher) entered in the formal PNAF Aircraft Commander training program may air refuel nuclear-laden aircraft provided the designated PNAF Mission Aircraft Commander is an Instructor Pilot or higher and is occupying the other seat. (T-1)

2.3.6. The Aircraft Commander will provide the post-A/R report to the controlling C2 cell via appropriate means within 15 minutes after completing an A/R. (T-2)

2.3.7. To minimize crew fatigue and negative nuclear surety implications, aircrews will only accomplish one offload of nuclear cargo after an A/R segment. (T-1)

2.4. Mission Planning/Coordination.

2.4.1. Cargo Clearances. IAW DoD FCG SWOG requirements, AFGSC/A4 Det 5, NCP will transmit cargo clearance requests to appropriate agencies and forward a copy to 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD planners. (T-0)

2.4.2. Overflight Clearances. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will coordinate overflight clearances as directed by the SWOG and country specific Letters of Understanding. (T-0)

2.4.3. Diplomatic Clearances. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will coordinate Diplomatic Clearances as IAW SWOG and DoD Foreign Clearance Guide requirements. (T-0)

2.4.4. Plan nuclear airlift mission itineraries with the utmost care. Consider factors such as weather, routing, overflight rights, suitable alternate/emergency airfields, host base capabilities, anticipated onload/offload times, fuel requirements, CDT, PNAF CDD, and aircrew fatigue factors. Refer to the SWOG for additional information.

2.4.5. Approximately 30 days prior to mission execution, mission planners will transmit a "soft" itinerary to applicable units/agencies. (T-2) Requested units will acknowledge receipt and provide required responses within 3 duty-days of receipt. (T-2)

2.5. Mission Setup Message (Content, Classification, and Distribution).

2.5.1. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will prepare a classified Mission Setup Message for all missions transporting nuclear cargo. (T-2) 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD planners will transmit Mission Setup Messages at least 15-calendar days prior to home station departure. (T-2) (See Attachment 3 for a sample message). Mission planners will use secure means to coordinate mission support requirements. (T-2)

2.5.2. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will classify Mission Setup Messages according to mission destinations, SWOG overflight classification requirements, and/or Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Classification Policy. (T-0)

2.5.3. Mission Setup Messages will be classified according to mission destinations, overflight classification designated by the SWOG, or the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Classification Policy.

2.5.3.1. PART I will be *Unclassified*.

2.5.3.2. PART II will be *Classified*. All paragraph classifications will be marked IAW DoDM 5200.01, Vol 2. (T-0)

2.5.4. At a minimum, mission planners will publish the Mission Setup Message to contain the following information:

2.5.4.1. PART I *Unclassified* (T-2)

2.5.4.1.1. SAAM Number. (T-2)

2.5.4.1.2. Mission Itinerary. (T-2)

2.5.4.2. PART II *Classified* (T-2)

2.5.4.2.1. Hazardous Cargo Information. Aircrews will use T.O.11N- 20-11 (C-RD), *General Guidance and Material Hazard Information for Nuclear Weapons, Components, and Nonnuclear Weapon Designations*, line numbers (including LLCs and trainers). (T-0) For items not listed in T.O.11N- 20-11 include hazardous cargo information required by AFJI 11-204, *Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials*, to include all cargo weights, size, and detailed description. (T-1)

2.5.4.2.2. Security Requirements

2.5.4.2.3. Specific station requirements. To preclude misunderstanding by host base support personnel, mission planners will write special requirements in plain language with a clear and detailed description of the sequence of ground operations. (T-1)

2.5.4.2.4. PNAF Courier Officer Listing

2.5.4.3. Information may be added or modified as long as messages are in standard format (Attachment 3).

2.5.5. Distribution of Mission Setup Message

2.5.5.1. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will ensure Mission Setup Messages are distributed to the operating unit, all stations (including pre-coordinated emergency divert locations) identified on the mission itinerary, Command and Control entities,

participating MAJCOMs and combatant commands, Air Force, Joint Staff, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). (T-2)

2.5.5.2. Requests to receive Mission Setup Messages will be directed to HQ AMC/A3N.

2.5.5.2.1. HQ AMC/A3N will forward approved requests to 618 AOC/XOOOD with the correct SIPR organizational and/or individual email addresses.

2.5.5.2.2. Organizations or individuals approved for receipt of the Mission Setup Message will annually validate approval by the end of each fiscal year (FYXX) with the applicable MAJCOM. (T-2)

2.5.6. Mission Setup Message (Station Support Requirements Acknowledgement and 24-Hour Confirmation):

2.5.6.1. All stations listed on the mission itinerary will send an acknowledgement of ability to support/non-support the mission itinerary and/or the applicable special requirements listed in Part II of the Mission Setup Message. (T-2)

2.5.6.1.1. The Acknowledgement of Station Support Requirements message will follow a standard format. (AF Form 527D) (T-2)

2.5.6.1.2. Paragraph 7 of the Mission Setup Message will indicate when an acknowledgement message must be transmitted or received by mission planners, the operational unit, and 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG-DDO2. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will provide three working days for stations to acknowledge receipt of an original Mission Setup Message. (T-2)

2.5.6.1.3. A station only needs to send acknowledgement for the most current Mission Setup Message, i.e., when a change to a Mission Setup Message is released before a station has sent the acknowledgement for the previous message.

2.5.6.2. All en route stations will send a 24-Hour Confirmation of Support Requirements message, along with pre-coordinated emergency divert locations as listed in the mission itinerary. (T-2) A station with multiple itinerary entries on the same day may be combined on one 24-Hour message. A station with a single entry spanning two consecutive days and no additional entries on the second day need only send one 24-Hour message.

2.5.6.2.1. The 24-Hour Confirmation of Support Requirements message will follow a standard format. (AF Form 527E) (T-2)

2.5.6.2.2. Mission planners will ensure the 24-Hour Confirmation of Support Requirements message is transmitted to the operational unit and 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG-DDO2 no later than 24-hours prior to station arrival. (T-2) Mission planners will ensure receipt of the confirmation message during an official duty day if the 24-hour period falls on a non-duty day. (T-2) 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG-DDO2 will make a final voice confirmation of support with the 24-Hour POC identified on the acknowledgement and confirmation messages. (T-2)

2.5.6.2.3. A station is only required to send a 24-Hour Confirmation of Support message for the most current Mission Setup Message. (T-2) For example, a Mission

Setup Message change is released before a station has sent the 24-Hour Confirmation for the previous message.

2.6. Changes to Mission Setup Message.

2.6.1. Changes to Mission Setup Messages should be kept to a minimum. If changes are absolutely necessary, the following guidance applies:

2.6.1.1. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will coordinate and distribute all changes IAW paragraph 2.5.5. and acknowledged IAW para 2.5.6. (T-2)

2.6.1.2. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will use separate messages for each message change. (T-2) Planners should include a clear statement advising the reason for the change and clearly identify information that is altered from the previous message. (T-2)

2.6.1.3. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will ensure message changes are not generated solely to correct non-critical typographical errors. (T-2) Write-in changes to Mission Setup Messages are not permitted.

2.6.2. Requesting Changes to the Mission Setup Message.

2.6.2.1. Wing Commanders will submit Mission Setup Message change requests to 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD for coordination. (T-2)

2.6.2.2. Stations will send a request for change to the Mission Setup Message submitting a non-support acknowledgement message. (T-2)

2.6.2.3. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will not accept requests to adjust the mission itinerary by greater than 2 hours within 10 days of mission execution. (T-2)

2.6.2.4. Missions enter the execution phase 24-hours prior to scheduled home station departure. Missions are considered complete after the last active leg of the mission itinerary. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will automatically issue changes to the Mission Setup Message for the following conditions:

2.6.2.4.1. Mission is delayed more than 2 hours by maintenance, weather, or other factors. (T-2)

2.6.2.4.2. Change to cargo information that does not impact the itinerary or timing beyond 2 hours. (T-2)

2.6.2.4.3. Aircraft Divert (T-2)

2.6.2.4.4. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners will not issue Mission Setup Message changes solely to cancel an A/R. (T-2)

2.6.3. Waiver authority is 618 AOC (TACC)/CC. Note: 618 AOC (TACC)/CC will deny waiver requests that do not contain the following information:

2.6.3.1. Name, grade, unit and title of requester. (T-2)

2.6.3.2. Date of request. (T-2)

2.6.3.3. Mission number of affected mission. (T-2)

2.6.3.4. Detailed reason the change is necessary. (T-2)

2.6.3.5. Date and time the required change was discovered. (T-2)

2.6.4. When changes to the itinerary are necessary after a mission is in execution, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG-DDO2 will coordinate with 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD mission planners to publish changes to the Mission Setup Message and forward to the aircrew with an information copy to the operating wing. (T-2) To avoid mission delays, voice confirmation of changes between 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG-DDO2 and the aircrew are acceptable, but should be used as a last resort. Mission planners will transmit changes to the Mission Setup Message to all stations and the operating wing using the format provided in [Attachment 3](#). (T-2)

2.7. Additional Airlift Requirements.

2.7.1. If changes to nuclear/nuclear-related cargo are approved before a mission is in execution, mission planners will coordinate changes to the Mission Setup Message IAW procedures outlined in paragraph 2.6. (T-2)

2.7.2. [Attachment 2](#) identifies handling requirements for various types of nuclear and nuclear-related materials. The Service Logistic Agent (SLA) will schedule nuclear and nuclear-related cargo missions via the Nuclear Ordnance Shipping Schedule (NOSS). 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD and AFGSC/A4 Det 5, NCP will coordinate any changes to the SAAM Airlift Request. (T-2) 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD and the SLA will accomplish coordination as soon as additional cargo is identified. (T-2)

2.7.3. Only nuclear cargo identified in the Mission Setup Message and Airlift Request may be accepted by the Courier. (T-1)

2.7.3.1. If a discrepancy is identified between the nuclear cargo, the Mission Setup Message, or the Airlift Request, contact 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD planners via the Consolidated Control Center (CCC). 618 AOC (TACC) will immediately contact the SLA to resolve any discrepancies. (T-2) The SLA will review all mission documentation and identify to 618 AOC (TACC) acceptable actions (i.e. transposed serial number, wrong line number, etc.) The SLA will determine if the nuclear cargo should be accepted by AMC Courier or remain at the shipping unit and transported on a future mission. The Courier retains the ultimate authority to accept or deny nuclear cargo.

2.7.3.2. The SLA and 618 AOC (TACC) will issue an updated Airlift Request and new Mission Setup Message if the discrepancy is resolved and the decision is made to proceed with nuclear cargo transport. (T-2) The aircrew will not depart without a hard copy of the modified Airlift Request and Mission Setup Message. (T-2)

2.7.3.3. If a discrepancy is identified at the arrival/offload location, affected Commanders and the Courier will resolve the issue prior to offloading nuclear cargo. (T-2) All involved personnel should strongly consider security and excessive exposure of nuclear cargo when resolving discrepancies at an offload location.

2.7.4. Cargo:

2.7.4.1. Opportune cargo may be transported on unsanitized positioning legs. However, the planned route of flight should not be adjusted solely to accommodate the movement of opportune cargo.

2.7.4.2. Nuclear cargo can only be scheduled and airlifted if a corresponding loading procedure is published in T.O. 1C-17A-16-1, *Loading and Air Transport of Nuclear Weapon Cargo*. Accident/incident response or emergency nuclear airlift operations (ENAO) may require the use of non-standard procedures to load nuclear cargo; however, appropriate Technical Order procedures will be used to the maximum extent possible. The 18 AF/CC is not authorized to waive this requirement for PNAF operations. (T-0)

2.7.4.3. Unused space aboard nuclear cargo missions may be used for opportune cargo if:

2.7.4.3.1. The user approves the transportation of general cargo.

2.7.4.3.2. The opportune cargo does not generate additional landings.

2.7.4.3.3. The added weight will not adversely affect fuel requirements, aircraft center of gravity (CG), loading operations, etc.

2.7.4.3.4. The cargo is compatible with nuclear or nuclear-related cargo. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners and aircrew will use the hazardous material compatibility chart available in AFMAN 24-204 (I), *Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments*, to determine compatibility requirements of nuclear cargo, major assemblies, and nuclear components with other explosive and hazardous materials.

2.7.4.3.5. The cargo's dimensions will not cause additional handling or movement of nuclear cargo. The Aircraft Commander will ensure nuclear-related and opportune cargo are loaded in a manner that preserves the ability to jettison nuclear cargo. (T-1) **Note:** Time permitting, aircrews should jettison general cargo and unclassified nuclear-related cargo (in order of precedence) before jettisoning classified nuclear-related cargo.

2.7.4.3.6. The cargo will not generate additional security measures associated with aerial port onload and offload operations.

2.7.4.3.7. The cargo is thoroughly searched and sanitized before loading aboard the aircraft.

2.7.4.3.8. The cargo is properly stored in a secure manner following sanitization .

2.7.4.4. Aircraft Commanders will ensure foreign nationals (non-US persons/citizens) are not utilized to load or offload nuclear or nuclear-related cargo. (T-0)

2.7.4.5. Aircraft Commanders will ensure foreign nationals are not utilized to load or offload general cargo when nuclear and/or nuclear-related cargo is present. (T-0)

2.8. Passengers, Mission Essential Personnel, and Flying Crew Chief.

2.8.1. Passengers:

2.8.1.1. Once the aircraft is sanitized, Aircraft Commanders will ensure passengers are not transported until all nuclear cargo legs are complete or aircraft sanitization is no longer required. (T-0) After the last nuclear cargo sortie, passengers may be transported on any mission segment in which the aircraft is empty or only carrying general or unclassified nuclear-related cargo.

2.8.1.2. When nuclear and/or classified nuclear-related cargo is aboard, only the following passengers may be carried as necessary to accomplish the PNAF mission:

2.8.1.2.1. Couriers, shipper escorts, permissive action link (PAL) teams, authorized inspectors, flying crew chiefs, and security forces personnel authorized in the Airlift Request or by separate message. Responsible commanders of identified personnel will ensure personnel lists are provided to the operating wing a minimum of ten days prior to home station departure. (T-2)

2.8.2. Mission Essential Personnel (MEP):

2.8.2.1. MEPs must meet the basic requirements outlined in AFI 11-2C-17V3, *C17 Operations Procedures*, AMCI 11208, *Tanker/Airlift Operations*, and AFI 11-401, *Aviation Management*. (T-2) Commanders at all levels will minimize extraneous personnel on nuclear missions and inside nuclear mission exclusion areas. (T-2)

2.8.2.1.1. Individuals requesting MEP authorization will provide the approving authority, their Social Security Number (SSN), security clearance, Personnel Reliability Assurance Program (PRP) status, specific mission for which MEP is requested, and reason for participating in the mission. (T-2) Commanders will notify the operating wing a minimum of ten days prior to mission execution identifying MEP's that require escort by the PNAF crew. (T-2) This provision ensures escort officials are properly added to the aircrew composition and are prepared to execute their duties IAW the mission plan. MEPs should be kept to a minimum.

2.8.2.1.2. Commanders will ensure MEP procedures and approval is IAW AFI 11-401, *Aviation Management*. (T-2) Commanders will ensure MEP authority is not used as blanket approval on all nuclear airlift missions nor does it constitute personnel travel clearance required by the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide (FCG). (T-2) AMC/A3 will approve inspector and observer lists after prior coordination with AMC/A3N. Inspector/Observer lists may remain valid for a maximum of one year. Commanders will ensure Inspector/Observer lists are renewed annually or when personnel changes dictate. (T-2)

2.8.2.1.3. Classify requests appropriately if a specific mission or location is included. Approve requests for MEP based on security clearance, need-to-know, space available on the aircraft, and valid in-flight or ground duty to perform.

2.8.2.1.4. Commanders will ensure individuals requesting MEP authorization to observe onload and offload operations without a specific in-flight duty are not approved if any other transportation is available. (T-2)

2.8.2.1.5. Commanders of tasked operating wings and NAFs may authorize MEP status for people under their command. Commanders will ensure MEP status of all other individuals is authorized and approved by AMC/A3. (T-2)

2.8.2.1.6. Commanders will ensure AMC/A3 validated MEP letters are transmitted via message from AMC/A3N, and approved by the owning PNAF Operations Group Commander. (T-2)

2.8.2.2. The PNAF Operations Group Commander is the final authority of MEP status on nuclear airlift missions operated by their wing IAW AFI 11-401. MEPs must be on official orders, and fall into one of the following categories:

- 2.8.2.2.1. Commanders, supervisors of PNAF aircrews and related programs: Vice commanders, operations group commanders, deputy operations group commanders, and PNAF squadron/unit commanders and operations officers. (T-2)
- 2.8.2.2.2. PNAF certified aircrew flight examiners from the operating PNAF parent wing or MAJCOM. (T-2)
- 2.8.2.2.3. Chiefs of Safety and Nuclear Surety Managers (NSM) from the parent wing and MAJCOM performing Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits (NSSAV) or augmenting Functional Expert Visits (FEV). (T-2)
- 2.8.2.2.4. AMC nuclear operations staff personnel performing FEVs, augmenting NSSAVs, or escorting authorized DVs. Crewmembers and guests are either part of the crew or on MEP status, but not both for any given mission day. (T-2)
- 2.8.2.2.5. MAJCOM inspector general, Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA), Air Force Safety Center (AFSEC), DTRA, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and AMC Nuclear Surety office inspectors and augmentees conducting inspections/observations. **Note:** AFIA, AMC/IG, DTRA, USSTRATCOM, and AMC/SEW offices are responsible for distributing and maintaining current authorization letters. When changes occur, updated letters will be signed and digitally distributed to: AMC/A3N, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG and 4 AS/DOOMS. (T-2)
- 2.8.2.3. MEP authorizations (individual orders or MAJCOM/NAF message) will include the following information: approval authority, security clearance, SSN, mission number, and reason for participating on the mission. Transmit classified mission information or MEP coordination via secure means (i.e. SIPRNet, Secure Fax, STE, VOSIP, etc.). (T-2)
- 2.8.2.4. The operating squadron/unit will brief persons traveling as MEP (Aircraft Commanders will brief MEPs when joining the mission en route). Briefing items should include but are not limited to mission specific information required to accomplish the assigned task. Commanders will ensure briefings cover applicable safety and security standards as well as emergency procedures. (T-2) Reference AFI 13-527, *Nuclear Weapons Airlift Operations Training* for additional MEP training requirements
- 2.8.2.5. The Courier will ensure MEPs are positively identified by a service or agency official identification card. (T-2)
- 2.8.2.6. The Courier must verify the MEP's PRP status prior to executing the tasked mission. (T-2) Certified individuals must have an appropriate annotation in their MEP authorization. (T-2) A valid Two-Person Concept (TPC) team must escort individuals not certified under PRP. (T-2)
- 2.8.2.7. Commanders will ensure MEP travel orders identify the MEP approval authority and are presented to the aircrew before mission execution. (T-2)
- 2.8.2.8. MEP authority provides direct access to the mission aircraft without processing through passenger service section; therefore, the aircrew is responsible for manifest and anti-hijacking procedures for MEPs. The Loadmaster will annotate all MEPs not listed on the AF Form 4327A, *Crew Flight Authorization*, on a DD Form 2131, *Passenger Manifest*. (T-2)

2.8.2.9. MEPs on PRP status and designated by the Courier may be authorized unescorted entry into the restricted area around the aircraft. MEPs certified under PRP and knowledgeable in the task to be performed may be used as part of a two-person team.

2.8.2.10. MEP verification. Aircraft Commanders will not allow anyone to fly on a nuclear mission unless they are convinced of the person's identity and the legality of their authorization. (T-1)

2.8.2.10.1. If there is any doubt or suspicion, regardless of rank or position, diplomatically but firmly deny access to the aircraft and cargo.

2.8.2.10.2. Unless personally known, do not accept a single set of orders as MEP authorization. Confirm orders through appropriate channels. For example, MAJCOM IG, AFIA, AFSEC, DTRA, and AMC Nuclear Surety inspectors are identified on a Master Inspector List/Letter included in the Nuclear Mission Kit. If required, the Aircraft Commander will contact outside agencies to assist in MEP verification. (T-2)

2.8.3. Flying Crew Chiefs (FCC). Flying crew chiefs are not normally required on PNAF missions. FCCs will be scheduled on nuclear missions at the discretion of the PNAF wing commander (if required). (T-2)

2.8.3.1. FCCs need not be PRP-certified, but must possess a minimum final Secret security clearance. (T-2) Ensure PRP status is noted on the aircrew entry authority list (EAL).

2.8.3.2. FCCs will attend the squadron/unit's nuclear mission briefing. (T-2) The Nuclear Airlift Monitor or designated representative will individually brief the FCC before attending the nuclear mission briefing. (T-2) The operating Squadron Commander will ensure the FCC briefing covers security precautions and no-lone zone procedures in sufficient detail to prevent inadvertent violations by the FCC. (T-2) Additionally, the briefing will cover nuclear safety precautions and specific precautions identified in Chapter 8.

2.8.3.3. Aircraft Commanders will ensure FCCs do not seal mission aircraft or grant FCCs unescorted access to aircraft containing nuclear or nuclear-related cargo. (T-2) Do not provide FCCs sole custody of the Nuclear Mission Kit or aircrew side-arms. **Exception:** When aircraft servicing and maintenance is required, FCCs may seal unsanitized and empty nuclear mission aircraft. The Aircraft Commander will ensure the mission aircraft is re-sanitized before subsequent loading of nuclear cargo. (T-2)

2.9. PNAF Structure.

2.9.1. The PNAF is composed of specially selected and trained aircrews assigned to PNAF-certified wings that have successfully completed an initial nuclear surety inspection with a "Ready" rating, and continue to meet recurring inspection and training requirements associated with nuclear surety standards.

2.9.2. PNAF-certified wings will maintain a prescribed number of qualified aircrews as determined by their respective MAJCOM. (T-1) In addition to CJCSI reporting requirements, the PNAF Wing Commander will notify the 18 AF/CC, AMC/A3R and AMC/A3N when the PNAF crew force falls below the wing's Designed Operational Capability (DOC) required

levels. (T-2) Attached crewmembers may be PNAF-qualified and counted towards the number of crews at the squadron/unit commander's discretion.

2.10. PNAF Aircrew Qualification and Certification.

2.10.1. Flying Qualifications: Crewmembers who occupy a primary PNAF crew position when nuclear cargo is airlifted will be qualified according to AFI 11-2C-17V2, *C-17 Aircrew Evaluation Criteria*, and current in both the mission aircraft and recurring PNAF training requirements IAW AFI 11-2C-17V1, *C-17 Aircrew Training* and AFI 11-237, *Nuclear Weapons Airlift Training* (to be replaced by AFI 13-527, *Nuclear Airlift Training*). (T-1)

2.10.2. "Qualified" means: PRP-certified or Interim-Certified IAW DoD 5210.42_AFMAN 13-501, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program*, with a minimum final SECRET security clearance, PNAF certified IAW AFI 11-237 (to be replaced by AFI 13-527, *Nuclear Airlift Training*), and current in their current PNAF crew position. Additional crewmembers and supervisors of aircrews not meeting the above requirements will not occupy a primary crew position with nuclear cargo aboard. (T-1) Refer to AFI 91-115 for additional PRP requirements.

2.10.3. Nuclear Handling Qualifications. IAW DoDM 3150.02, nuclear weapons will not be used for training or troubleshooting. (T-0) Personnel will not handle nuclear cargo or perform duties requiring PNAF certification unless they meet the following criteria:

2.10.3.1. PRP-Certified IAW DoD 5210.42_AFMAN 13-501. (T-0)

2.10.3.2. Possess minimum final SECRET security clearance with Restricted Data (RD)/Formerly Restricted Data (FRD). (T-0)

2.10.3.3. Qualified on Two-Person Concept (TPC) requirements as it applies to PNAF operations. (T-0)

2.10.3.4. Current in Nuclear Surety training and PNAF academics. (T-0)

2.10.3.5. Completed Intrinsic Radiation (INRAD) training IAW AFI 91-108, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation and 91(B) Radioactive Material Safety Program*. (T-0)

2.10.3.6. Completed initial/recurring training in CDS training IAW AFI 21-205, *Command Disable System (C/FRD)*. (T-0)

2.10.3.7. PNAF Certified. (T-0) PNAF Certified refers to PNAF Copilot or PNAF Loadmaster Certification. Officers must be PNAF Copilot Certified before entering a formal PNAF Courier or PNAF Aircraft Commander Qualification upgrade. (T-1)

Note: PNAF Courier and Aircraft Commander Qualification training does not constitute "training with nuclear cargo" as PNAF certification is a prerequisite for either crew position.

2.10.3.7.1. PNAF Certified Copilots in formal upgrade to PNAF Courier or PNAF Aircraft Commander may occupy and perform duties in a primary crew position on nuclear missions as long as the individual satisfies the following:

2.10.3.7.1.1. Current for the weapon type designated for logistics transport (T-1)

2.10.3.7.1.2. Directly supervised by a qualified PNAF Courier or PNAF Aircraft Commander Instructor counterpart (T-1)

2.10.3.7.2. PNAF Copilot or Loadmaster Trainees are authorized access to nuclear cargo missions for the sole purpose of observing certified personnel perform required tasks. (T-1)

2.10.4. PNAF Training. Crewmembers in training for PNAF certification/qualification must be interim or formal certified under PRP, have a minimum final SECRET security clearance with Restricted Data (RD)/Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) and accomplished PNAF academic and Nuclear Surety training. (T-2)

2.10.5. PNAF Evaluations. Crewmembers on Interim PRP may receive PNAF evaluations. Commanders will ensure initial crewmember evaluations are not accomplished on missions carrying nuclear cargo. (T-2)

2.10.6. PNAF Certification. PNAF squadron/unit commanders will certify each nuclear airlift qualified crewmember, including themselves, senior ranking commanders, and attached crewmembers. (T-2) Following OG/CC review, the Wg/CC will approve all crewmember certifications. (T-2) Document all certifications in the Review and Certification Board minutes IAW AFI 11-202V2, *Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation Program*, the appropriate MAJCOM supplement, and on the individual crewmember's AF Form 4324, *Aircraft Assignment/Aircrew Qualification Worksheet* IAW AFI 11-2C-17V1. Crewmembers will not perform PNAF duties with nuclear cargo until certification is approved by the Wg/CC. (T-2)

2.11. Aircrew Complement. Use Table 2.1. for minimum aircrew complement on nuclear and nuclear-related cargo airlift missions.

Table 2.1. Aircrew Complement.

Crew Position ^{1, 2, 3}	C-17
PNAF Aircraft Commander	1
PNAF Courier ⁴	1
PNAF Co-Pilot	1
PNAF Loadmaster	2
Additional PNAF Certified Crewmember ⁵	1

Notes:

Note 1. PNAF qualified and certified in accordance with paragraph 2.10.

Note 2. Non-PNAF flight examiners will not administer evaluations on PNAF missions. (T-2)

Note 3. Squadron/unit commanders will ensure the appropriate crew complement is assigned to meet mission requirements IAW applicable portions of this instruction and AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3. (T-2)

Note 4. List authorized Couriers in the Mission Setup Message. Do not annotate on the flight authorization.

Note 5. An additional PRP-certified crewmember will be assigned on missions requiring the Two-Person Concept (TPC). (T-2)

2.12. Aircrew Replacement, Staging, and Crew Swap.

2.12.1. Do not replace PNAF crewmembers unless absolutely necessary. Avoiding Courier replacement is especially critical due to briefing requirements, letters of introduction, Courier

identification, and custody receipt. See Chapter 6 for specific procedures if a Courier is replaced.

2.12.2. Aircrew Staging. Pre-position PNAF aircrews at forward/en route locations to maximize performance in large scale (multi-mission) movements or to satisfy aircraft support requirements. This practice eliminates pre-and de-positioning legs. It may involve swapping aircrews at an en route location with nuclear cargo aboard, but will not involve handling of nuclear cargo at the en route location used. All planned stage crews will participate in the pre-departure briefing at home station IAW paragraph 3.2. (T-2) During execution, crewmembers will brief counterparts on unique mission aspects not covered during the pre-departure mission briefing. (T-2)

2.12.2.1. In order to satisfy aircraft support requirements and/or reduce the overall CDD of some PNAF aircrew members, 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners may elect to pre-position the aircraft from a staging location with only a portion of the designated PNAF aircrew. Regardless of when the nuclear cargo is unloaded, re-consolidating the PNAF aircrew (J-Coded crewmembers) at the onload location is authorized to minimize the need for a CDD waiver for the entire PNAF aircrew. (T-2)

2.12.3. Crew Swap. A crew swap is defined as using pre-positioned aircrews or aircrew members to initiate or complete a nuclear mission. 618 AOC (TACC) mission planners and the operational unit should consider all options before implementing crew swap procedures, which should primarily be used to avoid or minimize excessive crew duty-day waivers. (T-2)

2.12.3.1. A pre-positioned aircrew may perform pre-flight actions, pre-position the aircraft, and onload nuclear cargo via normal procedures when used prior to mission departure. The pre-positioned crew will transfer custody of the cargo and mission responsibilities to another operating crew to execute the primary mission segment. (T-2) Transfer of custody and mission responsibilities, if required, will occur at an en route location with a pre-positioned crew and security to utilize the available crew duty-day of both operating crews. (T-2)

2.12.3.2. A pre-positioned aircrew, if required after mission arrival, will accept custody of nuclear cargo and mission responsibilities from the primary crew prior to performing cargo offload, post-flight actions, and aircraft re-positioning (as necessary).

2.12.3.3. Additional crews, either swapped or pending swap, will not deadhead with nuclear cargo aboard. (T-2)

2.12.3.4. Mission planning. Mission planners will ensure all primary and supporting installation agencies are coordinated with when determining Crew Swap SOEs and procedures for a particular mission. (T-2)

2.12.3.4.1. Unit mission planners will ensure the appropriate number of PNAF crews are scheduled to complete the mission. (T-2)

2.12.3.4.2. Create a separate EAL for each crew. All crewmembers from each crew will be listed on each EAL. (T-2) Commanders will ensure EALs designate each respective crew's Aircraft Commander and Courier as Sole Vouching Authority (SVA). (T-2) Example: One EAL will annotate the upload crew's Aircraft Commander/SVA and the other will annotate the main operating crew's Aircraft

Commander/SVA. Commanders will ensure both EALs list all crewmembers assigned to the upload and operating crews. (T-2) Crews should depart home station with only their crew's EAL. (T-2)

2.12.3.4.3. Create one set of crew orders that includes all crews. Commanders will ensure appropriate remarks are included on the aircrew orders that indicate when/where the transfer of Aircraft Commander responsibilities will occur. Each crew will depart home station with the same set of crew orders. (T-2)

2.12.3.4.4. IAW paragraph 3.2, each participating mission aircrew will participate in the home-station pre-departure briefing. (T-2) During execution, crewmembers will brief counterparts on unique mission aspects not covered during the pre-departure mission briefing. (T-2)

2.12.3.5. During mission execution, the primary Courier should consider out-processing the originating aircrew unless required for mission execution or to minimize weapon exposure time.

Note: Mission requirements may warrant the use of pre-positioned PNAF crewmembers to augment a download operation without requiring an entirely new/full aircrew complement. In these circumstances, crew swap procedures are not required. (T-2)

2.12.3.6. PNAF crews will use AMC/A3N developed checklist(s) to aid in crew swap mission planning and execution. (T-2)

Chapter 3

PREDEPARTURE REQUIREMENTS

3.1. Aircrew Mission Planning. Aircrew mission planning has an immeasurable effect on nuclear surety. The Aircraft Commander, Courier officer, primary Loadmaster, and trainees in each respective crew position shall begin a mission information review and inter-organizational coordination NLT three duty days prior to crew entering Pre-Mission Crew Rest for home station departure. (T-2) At a minimum, the designated mission Aircraft Commander will ensure the following are accomplished prior to the pre-departure briefing:

- 3.1.1. Review the AFGSC/A4 Det 5, NCP Airlift Request. (T-2)
- 3.1.2. Review the Mission Setup Message and current changes as necessary. (T-2)
- 3.1.3. Review onload and offload methods to be used at each station. (Coordinate with unit and 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD) (T-2)
- 3.1.4. Prepare a list using AMC Form 292, *C-17A Special Loading Equipment Receipt*, of required equipment and coordinate this information to an APS representative and place a copy in the Mission book. (T-2) Specific items to consider:
 - 3.1.4.1. Shoring required for primary and alternate loading methods to be used.
 - 3.1.4.2. Additional tie down chains and devices.
 - 3.1.4.3. Empty 463L pallets.
 - 3.1.4.4. Bridge plates or truck loading ramps.
 - 3.1.4.5. Wheeled prybars.
 - 3.1.4.6. Forklift spacers (As required)
- 3.1.5. The Aircraft Commander will prepare a detailed load floor plan including exact tie-down patterns for each mission leg with nuclear cargo. Use AF Form 4114, *C-17A Nuclear Floor Plan Worksheet*, as appropriate, for each floor plan. (T-2)
- 3.1.6. The Aircraft Commander will review all mission requirements at each station to determine locations/situations where the aircrew will provide security. (T-2)
- 3.1.7. The Aircraft Commander will review availability and desired delivery dates (DDD) of cargo. (T-2)
- 3.1.8. The Aircraft Commander will prepare a Sequence of Events (SOE) for each shipping/receiving installation. Aircrew and primary shipping/receiving installations will formally coordinate SOEs during pre-mission planning activities and prior to aircrew home station departure. (T-2)

3.2. Predeparture Briefing. The squadron/unit NAM or a designated representative (Deputy NAM, PNAF Deputy Chief, or PNAF Chief) will conduct a predeparture briefing for aircrew members before each nuclear airlift mission. (T-2) The Aircraft Commander and Courier will brief anyone who joins the mission en route. (T-2)

- 3.2.1. At a minimum, Predeparture Briefings will cover the following:

- 3.2.1.1. Classification of briefing, cargo, and en route locations of nuclear cargo. (T-2)
- 3.2.1.2. Mission Setup Message and local FRAG. (T-2)
- 3.2.1.3. Itinerary. (T-2)
- 3.2.1.4. Airfield restrictions such as NOTAMs, gross weight limits, operating hours, parking, approved waivers, PPRs, previous problems, etc. (T-2)
- 3.2.1.5. Air refueling mission segments (including restrictions and post-A/R reporting). (T-2)
- 3.2.1.6. Intelligence (See paragraph 7.5.). (T-2)
- 3.2.1.7. Aircraft commander's briefing (see AFI 11-2C-17, Vol 3). (T-2)
- 3.2.1.8. Courier's briefing:
 - 3.2.1.8.1. Applicability of Two-Person Concept (TPC). (T-2)
 - 3.2.1.8.2. PRP qualification of each crewmember, MEPs, etc. (T-2)
 - 3.2.1.8.3. Security profiles at each station and expected crewmember duties. (T-2)
- 3.2.1.9. Loadmaster's briefing (primary Loadmaster):
 - 3.2.1.9.1. Cargo information:
 - 3.2.1.9.1.1. Nuclear cargo. (T-2)
 - 3.2.1.9.1.2. Nuclear-related cargo (LLC, trainers, etc.). (T-2)
 - 3.2.1.9.1.3. General cargo. (T-2)
 - 3.2.1.9.1.4. Dash-16 primary and alternate loading methods. (T-2)
 - 3.2.1.9.1.5. Loading duty assignments. (T-2)

3.3. PNAF Aircrew Nuclear Mission Kits.

- 3.3.1. Aircraft Commanders will ensure Nuclear Mission Kits contain, at a minimum, the following:
 - 3.3.1.1. Publications:
 - 3.3.1.1.1. DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.1.2. AFI 91-115, *Safety Rules For Nuclear Logistics Transport By The Prime Nuclear Airlift Force* (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.1.3. *DoD Foreign Clearance Guide, Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG) Supplement.* (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.1.4. T.O. 11N-45-51, *Transportation of Nuclear Materiel.* (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.1.5. T.O. 11N-45-51A (S-RD), *Transportation of Nuclear Weapons Materiel.* (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.1.6. T.O. 11N-45-51B, *Transportation of Nuclear Weapons Materiel.* (T-2)

- 3.3.1.1.7. T.O. 11N-20-11 (C-RD), *General Guidance and Materiel Hazard Information for Nuclear Weapons, Components and Nonnuclear Weapon Designations (C-RD)*. (T-2)
- 3.3.1.1.8. T.O. 1C-17A-16-1, *Loading and Air Transport of Nuclear Weapon Cargo*. (T-2)
- 3.3.1.1.9. T.O. 1C-17A-16-1CL-1, *Loading and Air Transport of Nuclear Weapon Cargo*. (T-2)
- 3.3.1.2. Forms:
 - 3.3.1.2.1. AFGSC/A4 Det 5, NCP Airlift Request. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.2.2. Mission Setup Message and any changes. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.2.3. Entry Authority List. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.2.4. AF Form 1109, *Visitor Register Log*. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.2.5. AF Form 527F, *Checklist for Nuclear Mission Support*. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.2.6. DD Form 2825, *Individual Receipt*, AF Form 1297, *Temporary Issue Receipt*, or other official receipt form. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.2.7. DD Form 1911, *Materiel Courier Receipt*. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.2.8. DD Form 2131, *Passenger Manifest* (not required if item is included in the normal mission kit). (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.2.9. SF 312, *Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement*. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.2.10. Blank cargo manifests. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.2.11. AF Form 310, *Document Receipt and Destruction Certificate*. (T-2)
- 3.3.1.3. Letters:
 - 3.3.1.3.1. Lists of persons authorized to receive nuclear cargo (include lists for certified alternate airfields). (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.3.2. U.K. Letter of Understanding. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.3.3. Official Courier identification letters. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.3.4. Request for waiver to customs and agriculture boarding requirements. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.3.5. Security acknowledgment letters. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.3.6. Current MEP authorization letters of AMC/IG, AFIA, DTRA, MAJCOM Nuclear Surety, and MAJCOM Nuclear Operations (i.e. AMC/A3N) personnel. (T-2)
 - 3.3.1.3.7. Sequence of Events letters. (T-2)
- 3.3.1.4. Serialized security seals and tamper tape (not required if items are included in the normal mission kit). (T-2)
- 3.3.2. Each PNAF squadron/unit will maintain a commensurate number of Nuclear Mission Kits as MAJCOM tasked PNAF aircrews. (T-2) Squadron Commanders will ensure each

mission kit satisfies the requirements directed in AFI 16-1404, *Air Force Information Security Program*, for protecting classified material aboard the aircraft. (T-2) Attach a clear plastic shield with the prescribed DoDM 5200.01, Vol 3, *DoD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information*/AFI 16-1404 certification for Courier material inserted. Number kits using the wing designator and kit number (i.e.: 62AW #1).

3.3.3. The Courier officer will conduct an inventory of the kit, accept custody of the classified material, and sign an AF Form 310, prior to home station departure. (T-2) Account for all classified material upon return to home station.

3.3.4. Aircrews will store classified material in a suitable document storage facility (Command Post, communications center, security forces classified holding area, Base Operations, etc.) at RON locations. (T-1) Obtain a receipt (DD Form 2825, AF Form 1297, or other official receipt) for the kit when released to any agency. When transferring classified material between stage or replacement Couriers, the Couriers will conduct an inventory of the kit. Use an AF Form 310 to transfer custody of classified documents. (T-2)

3.3.4.1. Nuclear Mission Kits may be stored in the aircraft during crew rest provided:

3.3.4.1.1. The aircraft is sealed. (T-1)

3.3.4.1.2. A full-time US guard, military, or sworn government civil servant, who is present to perform a policing function (not required if aircraft is parked in a designated "Protection Level 1 (PL-1)" restricted area). Refer to AFI 16-1404 for additional information on protecting classified material on aircraft. (T-1)

3.3.4.1.3. Only PNAF aircrew, not including the FCC(s) or other MEPs, are authorized access to the aircraft. (T-1)

3.3.4.1.4. Security personnel are informed classified material is aboard (security forces do not guard classified material unless associated with the required priority level). (T-1)

3.3.4.2. Aircraft Commander should present the Identification of an Official Courier letter (Attachment 4.1.) if a customs agent requests to inspect the contents of the Nuclear Mission Kit containing classified material. If problems cannot be resolved, contact the nearest US embassy, US consulate, or US military agency for assistance.

3.4. Aircrew/Security Team Arming.

3.4.1. Security of the nuclear assets is the primary concern for PNAF aircrews. Limit exposure to the maximum extent possible.

3.4.1.1. All PNAF crewmembers will be issued weapons commensurate with mission requirements. (T-2)

3.4.2. Nuclear Mission Segments:

3.4.2.1. Aircrew will arm IAW AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*, and authorized by AFI 36-2654, *Combat Arms Program*. (T-1)

3.4.2.2. Aircrew will wear the sidearm exposed when directly involved in protecting nuclear cargo, except when prohibited by host country policy listed in DoD Foreign Clearance Guide. (T-0) Conceal or stow sidearm at all other times.

3.4.3. Aircrew will comply with AFI 11-2C-17V3, during positioning and depositioning mission segments

3.4.4. PNAF crews will store their weapons IAW AFI 11-2C-17V3, during RONS, (T-2)

3.5. Personal Requirements. Each PNAF crewmember will carry a copy of AFI 13526V1 on all nuclear missions. (T-2) Additionally, each Loadmaster will carry a copy of T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 on all nuclear missions. (T-2)

Chapter 4

EN ROUTE OPERATIONS

4.1. General. This Chapter outlines en route operational procedures to be used by aircrews and command and control centers (CCC). Included are procedures for communications, cargo loading and offloading, aircraft emergency divers, and crew rest.

4.2. Special Considerations When Transporting Nuclear Cargo.

4.2.1. Aircraft transporting nuclear cargo are prohibited from approaching within an unsafe distance to an unfriendly border. Commanders will ensure that positive measures are used to prevent overflight or landing in unfriendly territories or countries where such actions are prohibited. (T-0) Refer to the SWOG for additional information.

4.2.2. When practical, PNAF Aircrews will avoid overflight of heavily populated areas during missions with nuclear cargo-laden. Approach, landing, and takeoff tracks are excluded from this limitation. The Aircraft Commander should comply with air traffic control (ATC) normal routings when a request to avoid heavily populated areas would place aircraft in greater danger by conflicting with traffic in crowded airspace. Beware of ATC instructions that may cause flight into unauthorized areas. Do not reveal the purpose of the mission merely to proceed via flight-planned route.

4.2.3. Aircrew members will not consume alcoholic beverages within 12 hours of crew show time on active legs carrying nuclear cargo. (T-1)

4.2.4. Current and qualified PNAF Aircraft Commander certified pilots may perform the takeoff and landing on nuclear cargo-laden missions, provided the designated PNAF Mission Aircraft Commander is occupying the other pilot seat. (T-1) **Exception:** PNAF Aircraft Commander candidates (Instructor or higher) entered in the formal PNAF Aircraft Commander training program may accomplish takeoffs and landings provided the designated PNAF Mission Aircraft Commander (pilot-in-command) is an Instructor pilot or higher and is occupying the other seat. (T-1)

4.2.5. Aircrew members and associated personnel will strive to minimize the time nuclear cargo is exposed outside secure storage. (T-1) Coordinate fully with support agencies, shippers, and receivers. Keep them informed of mission progress and intentions.

4.2.6. When nuclear cargo is aboard, do not land early unless absolutely necessary and base agencies have been notified. (T-1) If a takeoff at the published departure time would generate an early arrival (due to unexpected en route winds, etc.), stay on the ground where security is known and established. The Aircraft Commander will coordinate with proper CCC and 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD for later takeoff time. If an early arrival cannot be avoided en route, ensure mission requirements are passed to the arrival base and are completely understood. The Aircraft commander or Courier will obtain official confirmation (names, initials, etc.) from the arrival destination to indicate that updated requirements are understood and will be coordinated. At a minimum, ensure security forces are notified and can provide required support. Inform 618 AOC (TACC)/XOC and 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD of the early arrival.

4.2.7. Security Alternate Fuel. When fuel planning for nuclear and nuclear-related mission segments, include sufficient fuel (10,000 pounds for C-17) to permit departure from destination and climb to an appropriate altitude to level off with "required overhead" fuel. List this fuel in the "stored fuel" on the appropriate fuel planning form according to AFI 11-2C-17V3. Security alternate fuel is designed for all missions to allow the Aircraft Commander the option of departure from an immature or deteriorating security situation. This is in addition to all other required fuel. Do not offload nuclear or nuclear-related cargo to allow for security alternate fuel. General cargo should be offloaded to allow for security alternate fuel. (T-1)

4.2.8. Flight Planning. Enter "hazardous cargo," "inert devices," or both if applicable and the mission number in the "remarks" section of the DD Form 175, *Military Flight Plan*, or in the "other information" section of the DD Form 1801, *DoD International Flight Plan*. (T-0)
Note: LLCs with line numbers and certain Type 3 trainers and JTAs are hazardous cargo.

4.2.9. On air refueled mission segments transporting nuclear or nuclear-related cargo, use the pre-coordinated emergency divert location designated in the Mission Setup Message if at all possible. If a different emergency divert location is necessary, inform the controlling CCC as soon as possible so the duty controller can advise the new emergency divert location. Before takeoff, the Aircraft Commander must ensure the new emergency divert location confirms security is available. (T-2)

4.2.10. Aircraft Firefighting Support Requirements when transporting, loading or unloading nuclear cargo or nuclear-related cargo:

4.2.10.1. On-Scene Coordinators (OSC) will ensure fire protection is provided during engine starts, servicing, taxi, takeoff and landing IAW TP 20-11 or Engineering Liaison Office Publication 1 (ELO-1) for host nation fire departments. (T-0)

4.2.10.2. At Air Force bases, do not display hazardous cargo placards (explosives category 1.1, etc.). The host determines use of placards at other bases.

4.3. Aircraft Preparation.

4.3.1. Do not service or perform aircraft maintenance during nuclear cargo loading or unloading operations (concurrent servicing). Refer to AFI 91-115 for specific aircraft maintenance requirements and considerations. The nuclear cargo convoy will not normally depart the storage site until the aircraft is serviced, security is established, and the aircrew is ready for loading. (T-1)

4.3.2. Aircrews will ensure appropriate T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 and T.O. 1C-17A-9, *Loading Instructions*, preloading checklists are complete prior to commencing onload of nuclear cargo. (T-1)

4.3.3. The OSC and Aircraft Commander will ensure fire protection requirements directed in TP 20-11 are satisfied prior to conducting loading, offloading and servicing operations with nuclear cargo on board. (T-0)

4.3.4. Commanders or designated representative (e.g. On-Scene Coordinator) will ensure the necessary aerospace ground equipment (AGE) and support equipment is prepositioned at the designated parking area before aircraft arrival. (T-2) Commanders or designated representative will ensure the equipment is inspected for serviceability, fully serviced, and

sanitized before placement at the parking area. (T-1) Ensure AGE equipment is positioned so it does not block taxi routes or aircraft avenues of exit.

4.4. Two-Person Concept (TPC). See AFI 91-104, *Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Program*, for TPC and no-lone zone guidance and DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Volume 3, Enclosure 9 for exclusion area guidance.

4.4.1. Aircrews will apply the TPC when airlifting nuclear cargo. (T-0) As the Sole Vouching Authority (SVA), the Courier will ensure an exclusion area is established, aircrew and security personnel are briefed on exclusion area procedures and individual responsibilities, and enforce TPC. (T-0) While it is the Courier's primary responsibility, compliance and enforcement are everyone's concern regardless of who has physical possession of nuclear cargo. **Note:** An individual may enter a lavatory within an exclusion area without continuous direct observation by the remaining TPC team.

4.4.2. Individual TPC team members must be certified under their respective service-directed PRP and thoroughly briefed on the location of the exclusion area. (T-0) They must be familiar with the safety and security requirements of the task to be performed. (T-0) The TPC team must be a minimum of two PRP-certified individuals. (T-0) Two interim certified individuals will not form a TPC team. (T-0)

4.4.3. A TPC team will escort persons not certified under PRP and comply with applicable escort ratios IAW AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, and DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. (T-0) Non-PRP individuals will be kept to a minimum, taking into account the nuclear cargo, mission complexity, crew work/rest cycles, expected visitor activity, and ability to effectively control all visitors. (T-0) It is the Courier's responsibility to ensure anyone who has access, understands and complies with the rules in the exclusion area.

4.4.4. Two-Person Concept for Inspectors:

4.4.4.1. Upon proper identification and authentication of inspector's EAL, PRP-certified inspectors may be authorized unescorted entry into the restricted area by the Courier.

4.4.4.2. PRP-certified inspectors will not form a TPC team with crewmembers or personnel receiving the inspection. (T-0) PRP-certified inspectors will form an independent TPC team to ensure the inspection doesn't impact the performance of aircrew duties. (T-0)

4.5. Cargo Acceptance and Transfer.

4.5.1. The Courier will accept and transfer custody of nuclear cargo IAW T.O. 11N-45-51 and Chapter 6 of this regulation. (T-0) Only nuclear cargo identified in the Mission Setup Message and Airlift Request may be accepted and handled. If cargo differs from the Mission Setup Message and Airlift Request, follow procedures IAW paragraph 2.7.3.

4.5.2. Aircrew will not accept opportune or non-nuclear cargo on PNAF SAAMs without prior MAJCOM coordination through the SLA. (T-1) The SLA will indicate approval of additional cargo by providing 618 AOC (TACC) an updated SAAM Airlift Request. Updated cargo information identified in the SAAM Airlift Request will be incorporated into a change to the Mission Setup Message. (T-2)

4.5.3. Custody and Physical Possession. Possession occurs at the pre-determined point when the aircrew or receiver "takes" physical control of each item of cargo. Munitions personnel

assisting in aircrew loading operations do so under the control of and on behalf of the Courier. Before transfer of custody occurs, the Courier, shipper/receiver, and Senior SF representative (SNCO or Officer) will agree where each piece of cargo is to be relocated in case of attack or emergency, irrespective of who has custody e.g., during loading operations, if cargo chains are removed, the cargo may be brought on board for defense. (T-1) Refer to AFI 21-205 (C/FRD) for additional guidance.

4.6. Loading and Offloading Procedures. Commanders will ensure nuclear cargo is only loaded on a mission capable aircraft serviced and prepared for loading. (T-1) The Aircraft Commander and aircrew are responsible for safe and proper loading of nuclear cargo. The Aircraft Commander will personally monitor all loading operations of nuclear cargo by direct reference to T.O 1C-17A-16-1 or T.O 1C-17A-16-1CL-1. (T-1) **Note:** Do not load nuclear cargo on PNAF aircraft unless a loading procedure is published in T.O 1C-17A-16-1.

4.6.1. The primary Loadmaster, in coordination with the Aircraft Commander, will direct loading, tie down, load distribution, and shipping preparation of nuclear cargo. (T-1) During loading operations, the primary Loadmaster may transfer responsibilities to another certified PNAF Loadmaster to accomplish some or all primary Loadmaster responsibilities. (T-1)

4.6.2. Use T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 or T.O. 1C-17A-9 procedures for loading and offloading. The appropriate T.O. by type of cargo is specified in T.O. 11N-45-51A (S-RD) and Attachment 2. No deviations to these T.O. procedures are authorized. Commanders will ensure weapons are configured for shipment IAW the appropriate weapons dash-1 T.O. before presenting to aircrew for logistics transport. (T-0)

4.6.3. The Aircraft Commander and primary Loadmaster will ensure all personnel involved in the loading operation understand their duties before each onload and offload. (T-1) Shippers or receivers may be asked to assist with loading operations. The Aircraft Commander will ensure shippers or receivers are thoroughly briefed and comply with AMC aircrew procedures while cargo is in aircrew custody or physical possession. (T-1)

4.6.4. Use nuclear weapon protective covers as much as possible to minimize visual exposure. Host installations shall consider prohibiting restricted area photography for force protection or OPSEC concerns. (T-0) If local installations prohibit photography, Commanders should consider incorporating procedures in the installation defense plan for photography authorization requests.

4.6.5. Aircrew may touch nuclear cargo as necessary to facilitate onload, offload, and inflight duties IAW T.O. 1C-17A-16-1, T.O. 1C-17A-9, and T.O. 11N-45-51A (S-RD). Crew members should avoid excessive handling of nuclear cargo. Handle only one item or package of nuclear cargo at a time. When hand-carrying, use both hands if practical.

4.6.6. Forecast or actual inclement weather (high winds, ice storms, etc.):

4.6.6.1. Onload and offload can be delayed due to local policies or the Aircraft Commander's judgment.

4.6.6.2. Do not load nuclear cargo containing explosives when an electrical storm is within 10 miles unless cargo would be safer inside aircraft. (T-0)

4.6.6.3. During the shipper's brief, the Courier and MASO will coordinate procedures establishing custody and security of nuclear cargo when the aircraft is partially on/offloaded and weather has temporarily ceased operations. (T-2)

4.6.7. To minimize aircraft noise during loading operations, the Aircraft Commander should utilize the ground power unit (GPU) as the primary source of aircraft power. At a minimum, the GPU should be connected to provide a backup source of aircraft power. The Aircraft Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) should primarily be used in the following situations: sufficient GPU is not available, required for avionics cooling, or required to heat the aircraft during cold weather operations.

4.6.8. Crew members will maintain a 30-inch space between general or nuclear-related cargo and the nearest nuclear cargo. (T-1)

4.6.9. The primary Loadmaster will identify and brief the aircrew which cargo can and cannot be jettisoned. (T-1) This is a physical determination with reference to limitations of AFMAN 24-204(I), T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 or T.O. 1C-17A-9. **Note:** AFMAN 24-204(I) is applicable to general cargo only and does not apply to nuclear weapon major assemblies and nuclear components packaged and shipped IAW T.O. 11N-45-51 and its supplements.

4.7. Ground Emergencies.

4.7.1. Anyone observing an unsafe act or condition during any ground phase of the nuclear cargo mission will immediately stop the operation. (T-0) Correct the condition before operations are resumed. Report all ground emergencies to the OSC. While the Aircraft Commander retains responsibility for the aircraft, the OSC is responsible for coordinating incident response actions and will integrate into the installation Incident Command System (ICS) structure. (T-1)

4.7.1.1. The Aircraft Commander will coordinate with the OSC to contact the local safety office and evacuate non-essential personnel as briefed when an accident occurs during the loading of nuclear cargo and the case is dropped but intact. (T-0) Do not ship items which have been exposed to abnormal conditions unless specifically authorized. (T-0)

4.7.1.2. In the event nuclear cargo is dropped or damaged during handling and the case is ruptured, personnel involved in the loading operation will take the following immediate actions:

4.7.1.2.1. Coordinate emergency actions through the OSC, security forces, and fire department. Notify tower or ground control requesting them to notify the local support United States EOD team immediately and declare a ground emergency. (T-0)

4.7.1.2.2. Evacuate nonessential persons upwind a minimum of 2,500 feet, if possible, or as briefed. (T-0)

4.7.2. Security Emergencies. Coordination and planning prior to mission arrival and during initial communications between the aircrew and Senior Security Forces Representative (SSR) are essential to ensure security of nuclear cargo. Aircrew members and associated personnel will adhere to Nuclear Weapon Security Standards. (T-0)

4.7.2.1. If confronted with hostile force, deadly force is authorized to protect nuclear cargo. Resist any attempt by a hostile force to capture nuclear cargo to the fullest extent possible.

4.7.2.2. Consider any attack on aircraft loaded with nuclear cargo, including a hijacking attempt, as an attack against nuclear cargo.

4.7.2.3. Should hostages be used to gain access to, as cover for removal, or to thwart recovery of nuclear cargo, the welfare and safety of hostages should be considered in determining actions to be taken. However, Commanders will ensure the presence of hostages do not deter taking decisive, prompt, and effective action that includes using deadly force to prevent unauthorized access, removal or recovery of nuclear cargo. (T-0)

4.7.2.4. If attacked during a PNAF logistics movement, aircrew and associated personnel should take the following actions:

4.7.2.4.1. If attack occurs during an onload or offload, respond IAW the pre-coordinated security response plan. If the decision is made to load the nuclear cargo on board the aircraft, conduct the operation as expeditiously and safely as possible. Refer to AFI 21-205, *Command Disable System (C/FRD)* for additional guidance.

4.7.2.4.2. If the Aircraft Commander determines the aircraft is airworthy and the taxi and departure routes are safer than remaining in place, consider making an immediate takeoff with the cargo IAW previously coordinated security response plans.

4.7.3. Some weapons are equipped with a command disable system (CDS).

4.7.3.1. CDS codes and at least one individual knowledgeable in CDS procedures will remain on the aircraft until Type I security is established after arrival and when ropes and stanchions are removed until departure. (T-0)

4.7.3.2. CDS is the only disablement procedure authorized for PNAF aircrews. (T-0)

4.7.3.3. Commanders will ensure CDS authorization, protection of codes, and procedures for execution are IAW T.O 11N-45-51 and AFI 21-205 (*C/FRD*). (T-0)

4.8. Procedures for Cross-load Transfer of Nuclear Cargo. An aircraft change may be necessary during a nuclear airlift mission due to maintenance or other unforeseen problems. This could occur at home station, en route, or at an emergency divert location. Aircraft change may require a cross-load of the nuclear cargo to keep it moving to its final destination. If a cross-load transfer is required, the following procedures will help ensure a safe, secure transfer of nuclear cargo from one aircraft to another. In the interest of safety and security, refer to the following guidance when conducting nuclear cargo cross-load operations:

4.8.1. Whenever possible, cross-loads should be performed by personnel who are trained and certified IAW AFI 21-204, *Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Procedures* in the performance of handling and transportation tasks. (T-1) In emergency or contingency situations where no certified handling personnel are present, PNAF aircrew are authorized to conduct cross-load operations IAW AFI 91-115. (T-1)

4.8.2. Aircraft Commanders will ensure cross-loads of nuclear cargo do not begin until the replacement aircraft has been fully configured, undergone preflight actions, fueled, sanitized, and appropriate security requirements are in place. (T-1)

4.8.3. One Courier will maintain custody of the nuclear cargo throughout the cross-load. (T-1) Couriers will ensure any transfer of custody occurs before the cross-load begins or after the cross-load is complete. (T-1)

4.8.4. PNAF aircrew will ensure the safest and most secure environment for any nuclear cargo involved in the cross-load. (T-1) Use nuclear weapon protective covers (if available) to minimize visual exposure. PNAF aircrews will remove protective covers immediately prior to inspecting weapons and conducting loading/offloading operations (when the aircrew takes possession of each weapon). (T-2)

4.8.5. Use a single Protection Level 1 (restricted) area around both cross-load aircraft to the maximum extent possible. The receiving aircraft will be sanitized IAW Chapter 5 requirements before the Type-I restricted area is expanded around both cross-load aircraft.

4.8.6. The Aircrew is responsible for directing the cross-load operation and will work closely with the base commander or OSC, shipper or receiver, munitions, security, intelligence, and transportation personnel to execute the operation. (T-1)

4.8.7. The Aircraft Commander and Courier will conduct briefings with all personnel participating in the cross-load operation. (T-1) The briefings will provide an overview of the cross-load operation and direct specific individual responsibilities and requirements. Before the operation, the Courier officer will brief security, cargo, and no-lone zone requirements and the Primary Loadmaster will brief loading/offloading duties.

4.8.8. The Courier will coordinate with the SSR to ensure security requirements are understood and security is adequate before commencing the cross-load operation. (T-1) The Courier will also ensure no-lone zones are briefed and understood by all participants. (T-1)

4.8.9. Use T.O. 1C-17A-16-1 or T.O. 1C-17A-9 procedures for loading and offloading. The appropriate T.O. by type of cargo is specified in T.O. 11N-45-51A (S-RD) and Attachment 2. No deviations to these T.O. procedures are authorized. Weapon configurations will be directed for shipment IAW the applicable weapon dash-1 T.O. (S-RD).

4.8.10. If a PNAF aircrew is required to conduct a cross-load of nuclear cargo and transfer custody to another PNAF aircrew, both PNAF Aircraft Commanders will agree which aircrew is responsible for accomplishing each phase of cross-load operation. Unless circumstances dictate otherwise, the outgoing PNAF aircrew should conduct the cargo download and the new PNAF aircrew should conduct the cargo upload. Transfer of physical possession will be thoroughly briefed and understood by all aircrew members engaged in the operation. The new Courier will assume custody of the nuclear cargo by signing of the DD 1911. (T-1) Couriers will ensure all authorized personnel assisting with the operation clearly understand who is in charge of each piece of cargo/weapon and its disposition at all times. (T-1)

4.8.10.1. The primary Loadmaster of the new aircraft, with coordination from the Aircraft Commander, will direct the nuclear cargo movement operation to the new aircraft. (T-1)

4.9. Departure Procedures.

4.9.1. Destination Support Confirmation.

4.9.1.1. PNAF Aircraft Commanders will not takeoff with nuclear cargo on board until all destinations and identified emergency divert locations acknowledge they are capable and ready to provide pre-coordinated security requirements. (T-1)

4.9.1.2. Before beginning each day's operation, the PNAF Aircraft Commander will contact the MAJCOM CCC to confirm the status of stations scheduled to be transited that day. (T-2) CCC will review the mission folder to ensure all stations on the day's itinerary have confirmed security and support requirements. (T-2) If security is questionable or a 24-hour confirmation message has not been received, CCC will immediately attempt to confirm security and hold departure to the suspect station until security is confirmed. (T-2) If the 24-hour confirmation message is not available, MAJCOM CCC will contact the destination base directly. If required, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD can provide base contacts and telephone numbers.

4.9.2. Engine-Start Notification. Before engine-start, the PNAF aircrew will contact the controlling agency (ground or tower) and provide the following information: aircraft parking location, approximate engine-start time, and hazardous cargo is on board the aircraft. (T-1) The PNAF Aircraft Commander will ensure a minimum of one Major Crash Vehicle (MCV) is available for engine start IAW T.O. 11N-20-11. (T-0) Reference T.O. 11N-20-11 for all other fire-fighting requirements.

4.9.3. Release of Security. When directed by the Aircraft Commander, the Courier officer will direct security guards to remove any barriers outlining the restricted area. (T-0) The security force will maintain surveillance of the aircraft until it is airborne and remain available for recall 30-minutes thereafter, or as otherwise coordinated in the Mission Setup Message. (T-0)

4.9.4. Departure Message:

4.9.4.1. Once airborne, the aircrew will contact the CCC via any means necessary (ACARS, radio, phone patch, etc) and provide an updated departure time and estimated time of arrival (ETA). (T-1)

4.9.4.2. CCC will notify destination point of contact (identified in their acknowledgment message) by the most expeditious means available and pass aircraft type, mission number, tail number, and ETA. (T-1) Insist security forces be notified. If CCC is unable to contact destination, they will advise the Aircraft Commander. (T-1) The Aircraft Commander will make the final decision to land or divert to a pre-coordinated emergency divert location. (T-1) If there is a reasonable doubt the security of nuclear cargo could be jeopardized if the aircraft lands, divert to a suitable alternate that can provide security. **Note:** OPSEC procedures are extremely important during this process. Make every effort to avoid "signatures" of a nuclear cargo mission. Avoid discussions that could reveal the purpose of the mission.

4.9.4.3. For missions with brief en route times or several quick stops that would make departure calls to destinations impractical, CCC should contact destinations before the aircraft departs and provide required information. (T-2)

4.10. CCC Coordination.

4.10.1. PNAF aircrew will advise 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCCG of mission progress to include all ETA changes of 15 minutes or more. (T-1) 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCCG will relay relevant aircrew mission updates to the arrival destination's C2 agency as soon as possible. (T-1)

4.10.2. Releasing Pre-coordinated Emergency Divert Locations.

4.10.2.1. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCCG will develop Mission Setup Message support requirements for applicable pre-coordinated emergency divert locations. (T-2) Bases will be tasked to support the unlikely event of an emergency divert for any reason (e.g. Weather, A/R, maintenance, etc.). 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCCG will coordinate with the operating unit during mission planning to establish standby posture requirements and key time points/related mission milestones (completion of A/R, ETP passage, etc.). (T-2)

4.10.2.2. The Aircraft Commander will contact the 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCCG-DDO2 after sequencing key time points/related mission milestones. (T-2) Upon concurrence with the Aircraft Commander, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCCG-DDO2 will contact the pre-coordinated emergency divert location command post to release installation standby requirements. (T-2)

4.10.3. Aircraft Divert. The Aircraft Commander will inform 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCCG as soon as possible after coordinating any divert with air traffic control agencies. (T-1) 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCCG will notify the pre-coordinated emergency divert location, appropriate en route agencies, host nation authorities, and original destination to advise them the aircraft is diverting. (T-1)

4.11. Arrival Procedures.

4.11.1. In-Flight Notification:

4.11.1.1. At least 30-minutes prior to the ETA, the PNAF aircrew will contact one of the following C2 agencies to confirm the arrival base is ready for aircraft arrival (in order of preference): (1) Command Post, (2) Base Operations, or (3) Control Tower. The aircrew should request the coordinating C2 agency relay the updated ETA to appropriate support agencies, as well as the single point-of-contact identified in the Security Acknowledgment Message.

4.11.1.2. If the arrival base does not have hazardous cargo information, request the following be relayed immediately to the crash-fire protection agency and other support agencies as appropriate:

4.11.1.2.1. Aircraft call sign, type, and mission number.

4.11.1.2.2. ETA.

4.11.1.2.3. DoD explosives hazard class and division.

4.11.1.2.4. Request for special handling (isolated parking, security, etc.).

4.11.1.2.5. Line numbers (if requested).

4.11.1.3. On legs with no hazardous cargo aboard, pass the call sign, mission number, and any special requests to the appropriate agency at least 30-minutes before ETA.

4.11.2. Taxi and Parking. It is the Aircraft Commander's responsibility to make host airfield operations aware of the need for isolated parking. (T-1) It is a host base responsibility to

ensure the taxi route and parking spot meet the quantity-distance separation requirements of AFMAN 91201, *Explosives Safety Standards*, and T.O. 11N-45-51A (S-RD). (T-1) An explosive/nuclear-laden aircraft is classified as an above ground unbarricaded storage magazine.

4.11.3. Arrival Message. Contact CCC with unclassified arrival information as soon as possible after landing. CCC will dispatch arrival message. (T-2) The Aircraft Commander will ensure land times have been transmitted to appropriate C2 facilities as soon as possible after landing (verify via local AMCCs/CPs or confirmation the aircraft's automated reporting system has sent both and 'On the Deck' and 'In Blocks' notifications). (T-2) If notification is in question or has not been sent, contact CCC with unclassified arrival information as soon as possible after landing. CCC will dispatch arrival message. (T-2)

4.11.4. Security. Immediately upon block-in, Courier designated aircrew members will deplane. (T-1) Keep aircraft doors closed and delay preparation for nuclear cargo transfer until security is established IAW DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108 requirements. (T-0) **Note:** If Security Forces do not meet the aircraft, the Courier must decide whether the nuclear cargo would be more secure airborne. (T-0) Consider such factors as: fuel aboard, weather, local air traffic density, local security threat, and prospects for obtaining proper security support within a reasonable time. If necessary, depart destination base and orbit overhead until assured of proper security support or divert.

4.11.4.1. The Courier and designated security forces representative will review pre-coordinated security requirements. Confirmation of date-time-groups (DTGs) on applicable Security Briefing Worksheets and local threat assessments constitutes acknowledgement of required briefing information (see paragraph 5.10). (T-2) The Courier and security forces representative should only brief information that differs from the pre-coordinated security briefings. Examples of required briefing updates include but are not limited to: schedule changes, maintenance problems, evacuation points, or any other situation that affect loading times, convoy times, or security status. (T-2) The Courier and security forces representative will ensure all questions about forms or cargo is resolved before accepting cargo. (T-2)

4.11.4.2. Ensure all agencies supporting the mission are informed of the sequence of ground operations.

4.11.5. On-Scene Coordinator. The Aircraft Commander or Courier will meet the OSC after security is established. (T-2)

4.12. Divert to Alternate Airfield.

4.12.1. Refer to the SWOG for additional guidance on divert locations, unscheduled landing, and inadvertent overflight procedures. If controlling CCC determines security at destination is inadequate, contact aircrew by the most expeditious means and direct divert to a location with adequate security. (T-1) If security is questionable, a decision to continue to destination should be based on host-theater logistics and Security Forces concurrence.

4.12.2. If pre-coordinated emergency divert locations cannot be used or as listed in the SWOG, alternate locations may be considered according to the SWOG priority and the following:

- 4.12.2.1. Be under US military control.
- 4.12.2.2. Have adequate security. DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108 and the SWOG contain additional information on security guidance for PNAF emergency divers.
- 4.12.2.3. Should have a nuclear storage capability. Consider the type of cargo to be handled, e.g. Army units are not certified to handle and maintain Air Force nuclear weapons. Every attempt should be made to store nuclear cargo on the aircraft while at non-nuclear emergency divert location or at a location without nuclear storage capacity during entire ground time.
- 4.12.3. Ensure the route to be flown to the divert location is compatible with the SWOG. (T-0)
- 4.12.4. If aircraft maintenance is the cause or a contributing factor for an emergency divert, consider maintenance capability at the alternate location. Security support and possible nuclear storage capability are the most important factors.
- 4.12.5. If the divert location is in CONUS or a US military base in a foreign country, use procedures in the SWOG as well as the following additional guidance:
 - 4.12.5.1. The aircrew should direct the controlling CCC to relay hazardous cargo information and coordinate arrangements for security, storage, etc. To the max extent possible, the Aircraft Commander should provide a 30-minute in-flight notification prior to arrival.
 - 4.12.5.2. If unable to contact CCC or if CCC cannot contact alternate base, during the 30-minute notification, the aircrew should request security forces meet the aircraft upon arrival.
- 4.12.6. If the airfield is in a foreign country, but not under US military control, the Aircraft Commander should contact the controlling CCC and relay the aircraft call sign, mission number, aircraft type, airport of intended landing, ETA, and reason for the emergency divert. In coordination with the 618 AOC (TACC), Aircraft Commanders should request assistance from nearest Air Force base, American Embassy, or consulate. Landing in any foreign country with nuclear weapons on board is extremely sensitive and should be handled as discreetly as possible with the agency controlling the field. Aircraft Commanders should make every effort to keep the mission as inconspicuous as possible while still protecting the nuclear cargo. Use procedures in the DoD FCG to protect the sensitivity, which states, "US military aircraft are sovereign instrumentalities." Under international law, military aircraft are State aircraft and are therefore, entitled to the privileges and immunities accorded to State aircraft consistent with international custom and practice, and in the absence of stipulations to the contrary, these immunities include: exemption from duties and taxation; immunity from search, seizure, and inspections (including customs and safety inspections); and immunity from other exercises of jurisdiction by the host nation over aircraft, and personnel, equipment, or cargo aboard aircraft. **Note** that once personnel, equipment, and/or cargo are no longer on the aircraft, different legal standards may apply.
 - 4.12.6.1. Air Force Aircraft Commanders will not authorize search, seizure, inspection, or similar exercises of jurisdiction enumerated above by foreign authorities except by direction of Air Force headquarters or the American Embassy in the country concerned.

(T-0) Diplomatically, but firmly, deny any access to aircraft by foreign officials and attempt to have US officials in the country resolve the problem.

4.13. Emergency Procedures. During any emergency, aircrew must take every precaution to protect lives and property. (T-0) The following emergency procedures apply:

4.13.1. Pass the following information to appropriate ATC agency and request it be communicated to the divert location: (T-1)

4.13.1.1. Aircraft call sign, nature of the emergency and landing intentions.

4.13.1.2. Aircraft position and ETA to destination.

4.13.1.3. Number of personnel aboard.

4.13.1.4. Fuel aboard.

4.13.1.5. Hazardous cargo is aboard.

4.13.2. Make a 30-minute prior-to-arrival radio call to the destination base to include: (T-1)

4.13.2.1. Line numbers (if base is under U.S. control-or understands T.O. 11N-20-11).

4.13.2.2. Location of the cargo.

4.13.2.3. A statement that "negative hazardous cargo is aboard" when aircraft carries inert devices only.

4.13.2.4. A description of the physical appearance and location in the aircraft of inert devices when mixed loads of hazardous material and inert devices are aboard.

4.13.3. If an emergency requires an immediate landing and the Aircraft Commander must choose between communication security and flight safety, safety takes precedence. (T-1) Classified information may be disclosed only to the extent necessary for safety of flight.

4.13.4. Jettisoning Nuclear Cargo. In an emergency, the Aircraft Commander bears a moral obligation to jettison cargo or crash-land in a location where he/she estimates will cause the least amount of damage. The Courier is responsible for the activation of CDS equipped items before jettisoning or crash landing. (T-1) The aircrew will record the coordinates of each piece of jettisoned cargo. Observe jettison restrictions in the SWOG. (T-0)

4.13.5. Lightning Strikes. Any time an aircraft transporting nuclear cargo is struck by lightning or has a significant static discharge that could affect the nuclear cargo or components, inspect cargo and take the following actions:

4.13.5.1. If there are signs of damage, land as soon as possible where a USAF EOD team is available and can provide initial evaluation of weapons condition. Isolate aircraft with cargo aboard and request USAF EOD support. If USAF EOD support is not available then request support from the nearest Service EOD team that can provide initial evaluation of the weapons condition. Initiate official request for USAF EOD support to the weapons custodial installation for USAF EOD support.

4.13.5.2. If there are no signs of damage, continue the flight to the scheduled destination and have the weapons inspected by USAF EOD team and nuclear weapons personnel as soon as possible.

4.13.5.3. File an accident, incident, or deficiency (AID) report IAW AFMAN 91-221, *Weapons Safety Investigations and Reports*. (T-1)

4.14. Border Clearance Procedures.

4.14.1. Purpose. To give aircrews border clearance procedures when carrying nuclear cargo or warheads, LLCs, and classified nuclear support materiel.

4.14.2. Policy and Procedures. Border clearance is the responsibility of the Aircraft Commander.

4.14.2.1. Use general border clearance procedures in AFI 11-2C-17V3, *C17 Operations Procedures*.

4.14.2.2. Prepare cargo manifests (DD Form 1385, *Cargo Manifest*) for customs officials on all cargo. The shipper will supply manifests for unclassified non-nuclear cargo. (T-2) Loadmasters will prepare manifests for nuclear cargo and other classified cargo. Loadmasters will designate cargo on manifests as classified ordnance, classified electronics equipment, classified test equipment, or similar wording and annotate the number of units, weight, and cubic displacement (in feet). (T-2). Loadmasters will ensure cargo manifests do not associate cargo with nuclear material. (T-2)

4.14.2.3. Waivers of Customs and Quarantine Boarding. If required, the Aircraft Commander will provide appropriate agents a waiver from Customs and Quarantine Boarding and Examination using verbiage outlined in Attachment 4.2. (T-2) Prepare customs paperwork using appropriate organizational letterhead. (T-2)

4.14.3. The Aircraft Commander will request US customs and agriculture quarantine inspectors accept a waiver for boarding and examination of aircraft based on the cargo classification (T-2)

4.14.3.1. If the waiver is denied and the aircraft is at an en route location, the Aircraft Commander will request a “permit to proceed” to the final destination. (T-1)

4.14.3.2. If the waiver or “permit to proceed” is denied, the inspectors will comply with entry control guidance IAW DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108 and be escorted using a TPC team. (T-0) Ensure that all serial numbers, as a minimum, are covered before letting the inspectors board to get a full customs and quarantine clearance. If possible, cover all weapons completely.

4.14.4. Do not allow foreign customs or other local government officials on board the aircraft. If they insist on boarding, refuse entry in the most diplomatic, but positive manner. Situation depending, the Aircraft Commanders will contact the Base Commander (if on a US military base) or the Air Attaché (if on a non-US base) and request assistance. In all cases, notify CCC as soon as possible. (T-1)

4.14.5. When filing a flight plan to a base that does not have customs or agriculture quarantine inspectors readily available, request customs and/or agriculture inspectors meet the aircraft by contacting the arrival base command post/AMCC. Determine hours of operations of customs facilities and comply with any requirements for advance notification. In a divert situation, provide as much lead-time as possible to arrange for customs and agriculture inspectors.

4.15. Crew Rest Procedures. Before entering crew rest at an en route station, the Aircraft Commander will ensure the aircraft is sealed (when required) and a sequence of events is distributed to appropriate support agencies for follow-on operations. (T-2) Reference Attachment 4.3 and 4.4. Provide command post and 618 AOC (TACC) contact information during crew rest in the event of an emergency.

4.16. Itinerary Deviation.

4.16.1. As soon it is determined a mission will deviate from the published itinerary, the Aircraft Commander will notify CCC and provide updated ETA's for remaining en route stations on that day's itinerary. (T-1) CCC will immediately notify destination points of contact and appropriate diplomatic clearance authorities by telephone and provide updated information. (T-2) Passing timely and accurate information to affected destinations is extremely important to mission accomplishment.

4.16.2. If a mission deviates by two or more hours from last published itinerary, the CCC will coordinate with the Aircraft Commander and XOOOD to disseminate a Mission Setup Change Message (Attachment 3). (T-2) Using secure communications, the CCC will transmit the updated information to the following agencies (at a minimum): identified POCs at bases scheduled to be transited, pre-coordinated emergency divert locations, tanker units (if applicable), appropriate en route and C2 agencies, any agency with a need to know. (T-2) The Aircraft Commander will delay departure until CCC receives positive confirmation from affected stations remaining on the mission itinerary. If the aircrew coordinates and changes directly with the shipper or receiver, advise CCC.

4.16.3. Mission Change Message:

4.16.3.1. 618 AOC (TACC) will coordinate the Mission Change Messages with the Aircraft Commander. (T-2) If necessary, CCC may adjust ground times to return a mission to its original itinerary. Do not sacrifice proper crew rest to return to the original schedule. However, CCC should do not perpetuate small delays by using originally planned ground times if less time provides adequate crew rest.

4.16.3.2. The Aircraft Commander will relay revised information to CCC. (T-2) CCC is responsible for checking times for conflicts with other missions, notifying the pre-coordinated divert location, tanker unit (if applicable), appropriate en route agencies, and remaining bases. The mission planning section will draft and send any message traffic required. (T-2) The Aircraft Commander, CCC, and associated agencies will take appropriate measures to ensure classified information is not compromised when communicating mission updates.

4.16.3.3. The CCC should reference Attachment 3 of this regulation when developing changes to the Mission Setup Message. At the outset of each message change, CCC should briefly and clearly identify the major changes contained within. CCC should classify changes to the Mission Setup Message consistent with the original message, IAW SWOG guidance, or as required. CCC should incorporate hazardous cargo information if changed from the previous Setup Message. Changes to diplomatic overflight information will normally be directed by the SWOG or contained in applicable Letters-of-Agreement (LOA).

4.16.3.4. Include all addressees in the Mission Setup Message including the aircrew's current location, divert locations, and remaining bases. Omit stations already transited.

4.16.4. Unscheduled Hot RON. Mission delays may force the aircrew to execute an unscheduled Hot RON. If it becomes apparent the crew is unable to proceed to the next destination and/or unable to complete the offload within remaining CDT, the Aircraft Commander will immediately contact the CCC and request authority for either: (T-1)

4.16.4.1. An extension to crew duty day.

4.16.4.2. Permission to offload cargo and attempt the mission at a later time.

4.16.4.3. Permission to Hot RON at current location, emergency divert location, or destination airfield. The Aircraft Commander will not proceed to destination if the mission is estimated to arrive without sufficient time to complete offload (if one is planned) unless destination base has confirmed through CCC they can support the Hot RON. At USAFE bases, USAFE/A3/10 approval is required for a Hot RON. (T-1) CCC will coordinate Hot RON requests through USAFE/A3/10NM. (T-1)

Chapter 5

SECURITY

5.1. General. Security standards for nuclear cargo, aircraft sanitization, EALs, and emergency security actions are listed in DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. Security standards for PL 1, 2, and 3 area entry control, marking, and security requirements are located in AFI 31-101.

5.2. Threat and Vulnerability. When nuclear cargo is outside secure storage areas, it is susceptible to accidental damage and terrorist attack. Personnel should take every action to reduce the time nuclear cargo spends outside a secure storage area.

5.3. Types of Security. The degree of security protection varies according to the cargo identified for transport. DoD security requirements are broken into two categories: Type I security and Type II security. Refer to DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108 for a full description of Type I and Type II security requirements. Refer to AFI 31-101 for a full description of PL 1, 2, and 3 security. **Note:** When discussing security requirements with another service, a detailed description may be necessary.

5.4. Protection Standards. Nuclear cargo requires Type I security. Aircrew will ensure security meets DoD and Air Force standards when transporting nuclear cargo. (T-0)

5.5. Type I Exclusion Area Procedures. Entry into an area containing nuclear cargo will be controlled IAW DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN31-108 (T-0). Aircrew will comply with following guidance regarding exclusion areas procedures:

5.5.1. Type I Entry Control and Authority. All personnel requiring entry into the exclusion area will be on an EAL IAW DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. (T-0) To enhance control and limit access to the area, commanders will ensure EALs list the minimum number of personnel required for mission accomplishment. (T-2) The Courier will ensure all EALs are retrieved from the entry controller prior to aircraft departure. (T-2)

5.5.2. During planned nuclear logistics movements, personnel and vehicles requesting entry into the exclusion area will be processed by security personnel prior to aircraft arrival and placed into a sanitized/secure holding area. (T-0) This process streamlines ground times and allows the Courier to quickly validate personnel and equipment requiring access to the area.

5.5.3. Every effort should be made to streamline operations but not at the cost of surety. Emphasis is on safety, surety, efficient ground times, and minimal exposure of nuclear cargo.

5.5.4. Convoy Arrival at Aircraft. The Aircraft Commander will ensure the aircrew is ready to conduct loading operations as soon as the convoy arrives. (T-2) The Courier will ensure the exclusion area is large enough to accommodate the safe maneuvering of vehicles transporting nuclear cargo. (T-2)

5.5.5. Exclusion area procedures will comply with DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3 (T-0) No person shall raise, lower, or change any part of the exclusion area without explicit coordination and approval from the Courier officer and designated host security forces representative. (T-0)

5.5.6. Contraband is defined in DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. PNAF aircrews transporting nuclear cargo are authorized government issued and personal cell phones,

computers, other electronics devices, and other general cargo. Aircrew should minimize the number of devices used to accomplish the mission and will comply with AFMAN 91-201 or specific Nuclear Certification Impact Statement requirements. (T-2) The Courier remains the ultimate authority for all equipment allowed to be in the exclusion area. Commanders will ensure government and personal electronic devices meet the following requirements: (T-1)

5.5.6.1. Government issued cell phones, computers, and other electronic devices assigned to C-17 aircrew are authorized for use on board the aircraft if the systems perform a unique, mission-essential function. However, if a system performs a backup or redundant function, it should not be used unless the primary system(s) are not functioning properly. If not required for mission accomplishment, Aircraft Commanders will ensure the equipment is turned off, battery removed (if possible), and remains stowed when nuclear cargo is on board the aircraft. (T-1)

5.5.6.2. Personal cell phones, computers, and other electronic devices carried by C-17 aircrew are authorized for use on board the aircraft if the government issued electronic equipment is not functioning. If not required for mission accomplishment, the Aircraft Commander will ensure the equipment is turned off, battery removed (if possible), and stowed when nuclear cargo is on board. (T-1) If the battery cannot be removed, Aircraft Commanders will ensure the item is placed in an approved Radio Frequency Shielded Bag and stowed. (T-1)

5.6. Sanitized Aircraft. Sanitize aircraft before carrying nuclear cargo at the most logical station, normally at the first onload location. Sanitization can also be accomplished at an en route station when several stops are made before unloading nuclear cargo. When approved by the Aircraft Commander and Courier officer and coordinated with host base, Type II security may be dropped for an empty aircraft during RON. When the aircraft is defined as a PL3 resource, host base Security forces will provide random checks on the aircraft. (T-0) Before loading nuclear cargo, the Courier will ensure the aircraft is sanitized, a restricted area established, and Type I security provided. (T-0)

5.6.1. Sanitization Procedures. Aircrews will conduct a thorough visual inspection and appropriate aircraft dash-1 preflight or through-flight inspection to search for explosives, suspicious devices or packages, or unauthorized persons. (T-0) When available, an explosive detection dog (EDD) or portable explosive detection devices will be used to sanitize the aircraft and crew baggage. Do not delay the mission if an EDD is not available. If a suspicious device or explosives are found during the aircrew search, cordon off the area and request support from the nearest military EOD unit. During periods of inclement weather, crew bags may be sanitized on board the aircraft.

5.6.2. If an alternate aircraft is required to complete a mission transporting nuclear cargo, the Courier will ensure the new aircraft is sanitized. (T-0)

5.6.3. Providing Type II security on a sanitized aircraft maintains the sanitization, and precludes the need to re-sanitize before loading nuclear cargo. **Note:** Consider removing Type II security if extended servicing or maintenance is required. If Type II requirements are removed at any time, re-sanitize the aircraft before unloading nuclear cargo. (T-0)

5.6.3.1. The Courier will seal sanitized aircraft when the aircrew is not present. (T-0)

5.6.3.2. Type II security will be maintained for sanitized aircraft (not required if aircraft is parked in a designated "PL1" restricted area) e.g., an AFGSC alert area. (T-0)

5.6.3.3. Only the aircrew (not including the crew chief) are authorized unescorted access to the aircraft. (T-0)

5.6.3.4. The Courier will inform Security personnel if Type II security material is on board the aircraft. (T-2) **Note:** The aircrew should not request security support merely to guard the Nuclear Mission Kit or classified mission material.

5.7. Emergency Diverts of Nuclear-Laden Aircraft. CONUS and OCONUS bases should handle emergency diverts using support plan (SPLAN) procedures for receiving nuclear-laden aircraft. The pre-coordinated emergency divert location will maintain standby forces to receive nuclear-laden aircraft IAW an SPLAN that complies with current DoD and Air Force guidance. (T-0)

5.8. Sealing Aircraft. Under normal conditions, the Aircraft Commander should consider sealing nuclear mission aircraft during crew rests and extended en route delays. During RONs at normal AMC maintenance airfields, sealing is at the discretion of the Aircraft Commander. If sealing for security purposes, an SF representative should verify seal numbers when the aircraft is sealed and re-opened. If sealing for maintenance or non-security purposes, the Aircraft Commander should make every effort to comply with host base security procedures. As a minimum, two aircrew members should verify all seals and record the seal number. (T-1) Each time the aircrew or other authorized persons enter the aircraft, the Courier will ensure the aircraft is resealed before departing. (T-1) Reference DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108 for additional sanitization procedures/requirements.

5.8.1. Before the aircraft is sealed, aircrew will tape interior emergency escape hatches, paratroop doors, maintenance/ditching hatches, etc., to provide evidence of forced or unauthorized entry (T-2). The aircrew will also ensure the crew entrance door(s) and any under floor access are closed and sealed using a serialized security seal. (T-2)

5.8.2. After the crew door is sealed, the Courier will ensure the area is wiped clean. (T-2) The Courier will provide the seal number to SF and command post. (T-2)

5.8.3. Before opening a sealed aircraft, the Courier or designated representative will verify the seal number and inspect seals inside the aircraft according to DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. (T-0)

5.8.4. In the event of forced entry or evidence aircraft seals have been tampered with, the Aircraft Commander/Courier should take the following actions:

5.8.4.1. Ensure all evidence remains untouched. (T-0)

5.8.4.2. When the aircraft is empty, the Aircraft Commander will report the incident to base command post who will notify SF, EOD, and the Office of Special Investigations (OSI). (T-1) The Aircraft Commander should request an immediate investigation. (T-1)

5.8.4.3. When nuclear cargo is on board, Aircraft Commanders will report the incident to base command post who will notify SF, EOD, and the Office of Special Investigations (OSI). (T-1) The aircrew will assume the weapon has been tampered with and comply with procedures outlined in DoDM 3150.08, *Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)*, DoDI 3150.10, *DoD Response to U.S. Nuclear Weapon Incidents*,

and AFI 10-2501, *Air Force Emergency Management Program*. (T-0) The Aircraft Commander should request an immediate investigation. (T-0)

5.8.4.4. After investigation is complete and aircraft is released by EOD and security forces, perform a thorough preflight and send appropriate reports IAW AFMAN 91-221.

5.9. Security Acknowledgment Letter. Security acknowledgment letters are a means of transferring security responsibility to host base security forces. Couriers may use the letter in Attachment 4.4. after determining security requirements while the crew is not at the aircraft.

5.10. Security Briefing Worksheet. Tasked locations identified in the Mission Setup Message (Primary and Divert locations) will develop and coordinate a security briefing (AF Form 527A) with the Aircrew Courier. (T-2) Host base SF units will coordinate with AFOSI (as applicable) to obtain local threat assessment information for events that may impact the tasked mission. Security briefings will include a unique Date Time Group (DTG) and may only be distributed via secure means. IAW AFI 21-203, all coordination will be completed NLT two duty days prior to home-station mission departure.

Chapter 6

CUSTODY TRANSFER PROCEDURES

6.1. General. This Chapter expands on Courier requirements and nuclear cargo custody procedures in T.O. 11N-45-51. The Courier is final authority for cargo security, except during airborne emergencies when the Aircraft Commander rules that safety-of-flight is paramount. The Courier retains the ultimate authority to accept or deny nuclear cargo.

6.2. Courier Designation and Certification.

6.2.1. All PNAF Aircraft Commanders must be Courier-qualified. (T-1)

6.2.2. Courier certification and duty requirements are directed in T.O. 11N-45-51. Refer to AFI 91-115 for Courier PRP requirements.

6.2.3. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD Mission planners will identify Couriers to Shippers in writing and include the following information: name, rank, and security clearance. (T-2) Normally, Courier identification will be transmitted in the Mission Setup Message. Courier identification may also be communicated via a separate message sent by 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD. This option may be required when Couriers are replaced during mission execution. Verify the Courier's identity using the DoD Identification (ID) Card. **Note:** "Identification of an Official Courier Letter" (Attachment 4.1.) is for use during border clearance and does not satisfy any of the requirements above.

6.3. Persons Authorized to Sign for Nuclear and DoD Nuclear-related Cargo.

6.3.1. Organizations that ship or receive nuclear weapons material are required to publish a listing of persons authorized to sign for cargo for their respective accounts (Refer to T.O. 11N-45-51 and AFI 21-203). The Courier will have the appropriate "Certification of Personnel to Receipt for Classified Material" NLT ten days prior to home station departure. (T-2) If letter changes are required while a mission is execution, the organization initiating the change will provide the corrected copy to 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD who, in turn, forwards to the Courier. (T-2) Couriers will transfer custody of nuclear and nuclear-related cargo only to authorized persons. (T-1)

6.3.2. Couriers will identify shipper/receivers IAW procedures specified in T.O. 11N-45-51. (T-1)

6.4. Courier Responsibilities. The Courier is responsible for receipt, custody, security, safety, and delivery of DoD nuclear and nuclear-related cargo to authorized receivers. Specific Courier responsibilities include:

6.4.1. Have written instructions that specify DoD nuclear and nuclear-related cargo to be shipped (Mission Setup Message and Airlift Request).

6.4.2. Have a list of authorized receivers.

6.4.3. Receive the shipper's briefing.

6.4.3.1. The Courier will use the AF Form 527B, *Courier Briefing Worksheet* to satisfy required briefing items. (T-2) The shipper may use the example brief provided in AF Form 527C, *Shipper's Briefing Worksheet* or a locally developed brief provided all

requirements specified in T.O.11N-45-51 are satisfied. Prior to aircraft home-station departure, the Courier and Shipper/Receiver will exchange completed briefings via secure means. (T-2) The Courier and Shipper/Receiver will assign a unique DTG to completed briefings. (T-2) If necessary, the Courier will contact the Shipper/Receiver to clarify mission details. (T-2) The Courier and Shipper/Receiver should complete all pre-mission coordination NLT two duty-days prior to aircrew home-station departure.

6.4.3.2. During mission execution, the Courier and shipper will verify DTGs on previously exchanged briefings. To expedite ground operations, the Courier or Shipper should only brief applicable updates or changes. (T-2) The Courier will resolve any questions about forms or cargo before accepting cargo. (T-2)

6.4.3.3. When cargo is CDS equipped, the Courier and at least one additional crewmember will be trained and knowledgeable in the performance of CDS procedures. (T-1) Before transferring custody, the shipper will brief anyone requesting CDS instructions IAW T.O. 11N-45-51, Section 5. (T-2) The shipper will provide the Courier at least two sets of CDS codes when transferring custody via the signing of the DD Form 1911. (T-0) The CDS codes and at least one crewmember trained and knowledgeable in the performance of CDS procedures will remain onboard the aircraft from the moment ropes and stanchions are removed prior to departure until Type-I security is established at the arrival destination. (T-0) During the cargo inspection process, the Courier will verify each weapon with an accessible CDS panel is not CDS activated. (T-0) Additionally, the Courier will not accept a CDS-equipped weapon without CDS codes unless all of the following exist: the Mission Setup Message or Airlift Request indicated shipment of a disabled weapon, the disablement indicator (pin) is verified, and the weapon is documented on the DD Form 1911 remarks section as being disabled and without CDS codes. (T-0)

6.4.3.4. If the Aircraft Commander and Primary Loadmaster were not present for the Shipper and Courier briefing, the Courier will brief them on hazards or nature and special handling instructions before loading. (T-2)

6.4.4. The Courier, Shipper and designated Loadmaster will inspect all nuclear and nuclear-related cargo before accepting custody or conducting loading operations. (T-1) Shipper personnel should delay removing nuclear weapon covers until cargo inspection procedures are accomplished by the Courier and Loadmaster. Due to safety concerns, the Aircraft Commander will ensure weapons covers are removed before commencing loading operations. (T-1)

6.4.4.1. Couriers, Shippers and designated Loadmaster will inspect cargo for general condition and the following (as applicable): weapon(s) securely attached to bolster; pressure relief valves; tie-down and winching attachments; number and integrity of seals; condition of bolster tires/wheels; and condition of casters, wheels, and carrier brakes. (T-0) The Courier, Shipper, and designated Loadmaster will correct any deficiencies affecting safety before accepting cargo. (T-0)

6.4.4.2. The Courier will document minor damage, e.g. scratches, scrapes, small dents, etc., in the remarks section of the DD Form 1911 and have the shipper initial entry. (T-0)

6.4.4.3. Couriers will inspect all containers to verify condition of seals and request the Shipper replace any broken or missing seals. (T-0) Shippers will verify the condition of palletized LLCs seals. (T-0) The Courier should consider rejecting containers if broken or missing seals cannot be replaced and the integrity of the container is unknown. If the Courier chooses to accept a container with broken or missing seals and the integrity is verified, annotate the exact condition on the DD Form 1911. (T-0)

6.4.4.4. The Courier and shipper will ensure nuclear and nuclear-related cargo presented for shipment is exactly as described in the Mission Setup Message and Airlift Request. (T-1) If nuclear cargo differs from the information documented on the Mission Setup Message or Airlift Request, follow procedures IAW paragraph 2.7.3. The Courier and Shipper will verify all serial numbers listed on the DD Form 1911 and Cargo Diplomatic Clearance Message match the serial numbers assigned to the nuclear/nuclear-related cargo presented for shipment (T-1). Refer to T.O. 11N-45-51 for additional information regarding serial number verification requirements.

6.4.4.5. IAW T.O.11N-45-51, LLC serial numbers will not be listed on the DD Form 1911. The Courier will verify any LLC serial numbers listed on the Cargo Diplomatic Clearance Message against serial numbers listed on the applicable LLC shipping tags. If serial numbers differ, the Courier will comply with procedures in paragraph 2.7.3. (T-1)

6.4.5. The Courier will accept custody of nuclear/nuclear-related cargo by signing the DD Form 1911. (T-0) The Courier will transfer custody of nuclear/nuclear-related cargo only to positively identified and authorized receivers or a replacement Courier using the DD Form 1911. (T-0) The Courier will not sign for any cargo he/she cannot maintain custody and/or inspect. (T-0)

6.4.6. IAW AFI 91-104 and associated regulations, the Courier is responsible for enforcing the Two-Person Concept (TPC). (T-1)

6.5. Documentation. Shippers will provide properly completed DD Forms 1911 for all nuclear/nuclear-related cargo shipments. (T-0) Instructions pertaining to form completion are specified in T.O. 11N-45-51. Upon mission termination at home station, the Courier will return completed DD Form 1911s to the designated squadron/unit representative. (T-2) The PNAF unit will retain and dispose of signed DD Form 1911 IAW applicable Service directives. (T-2) IAW T.O. 11N-45-51, LLC cargo will include a DD Forms 1387, *Military Shipment Label*. Commanders will ensure a DD Form 1387-2, *Special Handling Data/Certification*, is utilized for all hazardous cargo not identifiable by a T.O. 11N-20-11 line number. (T-2)

6.6. Replacement Courier.

6.6.1. If the Courier must be replaced while a mission is in execution, Commanders will ensure custody is transferred to another Courier qualified officer. (T-1) If the replacement Courier was not previously identified in the Mission Setup Message, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD will notify the remaining locations via official message to the designated CCC or wing agency. (T-2)

6.6.2. If a replacement Courier is not available, Courier duties may be assumed in the following order of precedence:

6.6.2.1. Courier Qualified Extra Pilot. (T-2) In this case, the mission may proceed to a location where a replacement Courier is available or continue to mission completion if the additional Courier workload does not detract from pilot responsibilities.

6.6.2.2. Aircraft Commander. (T-2) As a last resort, the Aircraft Commander may assume Courier responsibilities if security or other concerns dictate moving the mission over waiting for a replacement Courier. (T-1) Cargo security is paramount.

6.6.3. In an aircraft mishap, when the Courier and/or another Courier-qualified crewmember cannot perform duties, the highest ranking surviving crewmember will automatically assume Courier duties. (T-2)

Chapter 7

NUCLEAR AIRLIFT MISSION SUPPORT

7.1. General. Nuclear airlift missions are one of the most important missions directed to US Transportation Command for execution. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) instructions assign “1A3” airlift priority for DoD nuclear and nuclear-related cargo missions (CJCSI 4120.02D, *List of Priorities - DOD Transportation Movement Priority System*), preceded only by presidential support, presidential-approved, and combat troop support missions. Priorities are used to fill Airlift Requests. All mobility agencies will support designated missions according to the JCS priority. Support involves all aspects of the mission, to include but not limited to: security, EOD, maintenance, fuel, aircrew transport, and billeting. Bases that belong to other MAJCOMs or services fall under AFJI 11-204 which directs base commanders to establish a written plan or directive to ensure priority support.

7.2. Nuclear Airlift Support. Bases with an operational PNAF wing and those that support PNAF missions will have a written plan or instruction that prescribe standard processes that support PNAF missions. (T-2) Commanders of wings that regularly receive or support PNAF mission aircraft will ensure support plans comply with requirements specified in AFJI 11-204. (T-2) MAJCOMs will review and maintain current copies of wing PNAF support plans.

Note: Chapter 4 of this regulation and the SWOG contain additional guidance related to emergency divert locations.

7.3. Responsibilities.

7.3.1. Bases requiring a written instruction or plan to support nuclear missions will ensure the following is specified: (T-2)

7.3.1.1. A single focal point to handle information on the mission.

7.3.1.2. The base communications procedures to notify the appropriate agencies of an inbound aircraft. Bases must be able to respond to a short-notice emergency divert. (T-2)

7.3.1.3. Taxi routes and parking spots.

7.3.1.4. Security force procedures (equipment, response times, etc.).

7.3.1.5. Priority maintenance and aerial port support.

7.3.1.6. Priority crew transportation, billeting, and messing.

7.3.1.7. Fire-fighting support requirements in T.O. 11N-20-11.

7.3.1.8. EOD capability and responsibilities (notification procedures, response, and equipment requirements).

7.3.1.9. Emergency Management procedures, defined in the Installation Emergency Management Plan (IEMP) 10-2.

7.3.2. The installation commander or OSC will be present for shipments and receipts of nuclear cargo to personally ensure priority support. (T-2)

7.3.3. In addition to the support plan, installation commanders will ensure all support requirements are coordinated with appropriate base support agencies. (T-2)

7.3.4. Commanders of USAFE units in tenant status will arrange priority support with their hosts. (T-2)

7.4. Command and Control. Nuclear airlift missions place added demands on the command and control system above and beyond normal operations. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD planners will ensure a "Y" is placed in the CLOSE WATCH block for each tasked mission. (T-2) 618 AOC (TACC) will monitor the status each PNAF mission in execution. (T-1) Additionally, 618 AOC (TACC) will ensure PNAF aircraft transporting nuclear cargo are continuously tracked from takeoff to landing. (T-0) C2 agencies specified below are responsible for the following:

7.4.1. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD will maintain ready access to the SWOG and the DoD FCG, understand overflight procedures and restrictions, and in coordination with tanker planning section, coordinate tanker support, and secure altitude reservation (ALTRV) approvals. (T-2) Flight planning branch will: validate computer flight plans (CFPs) for SWOG compliance and DoD FCG restrictions, EURO Control Route Availability Document (RAD), ALTRV routings, and avoid heavily populated areas then transmit to the current C2 system. (T-2) Mission planning section confirms diplomatic clearances and ensures alternates on CFPs are capable of supporting PNAF missions. (T-2)

7.4.2. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG mission planners will assist PNAF Aircraft Commanders determine the best divert location(s) for nuclear cargo missions. (T-2) In accordance with the Mission Setup Message and this instruction, notify the selected divert location of all required support needed upon aircraft arrival. When the Aircraft Commander informs 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG that he or she has selected a different divert location from the one pre-coordinated via the Mission Setup Message, the duty controller must then coordinate with the new divert location and advise the pre-coordinated divert location it is no longer under consideration as a divert option. (T-2) Time permitting, refer to guidance for mission change message in paragraph 2.6.

7.4.3. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG will actively monitor security status of bases that nuclear airlift missions are scheduled to transit. (T-2) 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD will be prepared to confirm each day's itinerary when Aircraft Commanders check-in. (T-2) 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD will ensure Mission Setup Message requests and support confirmation messages are transmitted from each base on the itinerary to appropriate CCC 24-hours before mission arrival at each base. (T-2) Use this message to confirm security before authorizing an Aircraft Commander to proceed. Attempt contact with the destination base to confirm support via non-secure means if the 24-Hour confirmation of support message is not received.

7.4.4. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD mission planners will prepare and transmit mission change messages IAW paragraphs 2.6 and/or 4.16.3 after coordination with the Aircraft Commander. (T-2) Check for conflicts with other nuclear missions and include hazardous cargo information if the cargo requirement is changed.

7.4.5. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD will act as the point of contact between Shippers or Receivers and Aircrew during mission execution and relay updates to down-line bases when requested by the Aircraft Commander. (T-2)

7.4.6. 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG will ensure nuclear airlift missions delayed for maintenance problems receive immediate and priority support. (T-2)

7.4.7. AMC Command Center will prepare and submit Operational Report 3 (OPREP-3) covering nuclear mission incidents according to paragraph 10.1 and JCS Pub 6. (T-0)

7.5. Intelligence Support. Intelligence support is an essential component of PNAF missions. To ensure PNAF missions and aircrews receive timely intelligence and threat information, Commanders will comply with the following requirements: (T-2)

7.5.1. Home Station OSS/IN will:

7.5.1.1. Monitor planned PNAF missions for pre-mission intelligence briefing requirements and remain aware of off-station missions that could require en route Intelligence support. (T-3)

7.5.1.2. Provide pre-mission intelligence briefings to PNAF aircrews IAW AFI 11-2C-17V3. (T-2)

7.5.1.2.1. Home Station OSS/IN will ensure Intelligence pre-mission briefings are IAW AFI 11-2C-17V3, and include the following: (T-2)

7.5.1.2.2. Airborne and surface threats from potential hostile countries.

7.5.1.2.3. Terrorist and sabotage threats.

7.5.1.2.4. Other activity along route that might impact mission.

7.5.1.2.5. All source Foreign intelligence collection and criminal threats.

7.5.1.3. Debrief PNAF aircrews on their return (as required) and report mission results IAW the Mobility Intelligence Reporting Directive (MIRD). (T-2)

7.5.2. AMC/A2 will provide support IAW AFI 11-2C-173 and DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. AMC/A2 will:

7.5.2.1. In coordination with AFOSI 3 FIR, provide a PNAF mission threat summary message for each PNAF mission. The PNAF threat summary should assess the threat levels for each scheduled stop. AMC/A2 will ensure this message assesses threat levels for each scheduled stop and is transmitted no later than 24-hours prior to scheduled mission departure. Lead for intelligence support (OSI or A2) will vary depending mission itinerary.

7.5.2.2. Monitor PNAF missions worldwide and provide intelligence updates and threat warnings to 618 AOC (TACC)/XOZ and home station OSS/IN as necessary.

7.5.2.3. As required, provide intelligence threat updates and terrorist advisories to Setup Message addresses during mission execution.

7.5.3. At locations where AMC intelligence support is not available, host base intelligence unit or theater air command intelligence staff will provide threat data to PNAF missions in execution. (T-2)

Chapter 8

LOGISTICS SUPPORT

8.1. General. The following guidance outlines maintenance procedures for aircraft utilized to transport nuclear cargo. It applies to all maintenance and operations personnel who support or conduct nuclear airlift missions.

8.2. Aircraft Selection and Preparation. Nuclear airlift missions are assigned a JCS priority 1A3. PNAF Wing Commanders will ensure aircraft selected for PNAF missions are the most reliable and do not have a history of uncorrected, repeat or recurring malfunctions on systems identified as mission capable IAW the Minimum Essential Subsystem Listing (MESL), Home Station Departure (HSD), and Air Refueling Conventional (ARC). (T-2) To preclude unnecessary mission delays which could have a serious effect on nuclear surety or mission accomplishment, PNAF Wing Commanders will ensure aircraft selected for PNAF missions conform to the stringent criteria outlined in this paragraph. (T-2)

8.2.1. Maintenance Operations Officer/Superintendent has the overall responsibility for aircraft selection, PNAF maintenance team selection, and aircraft preparation and will accomplish the following:

8.2.1.1. Select PNAF maintenance teams from highly experienced technicians who are motivated and qualified in their career field for their specific aircraft. (T-2)

8.2.1.2. Coordinate with the Maintenance Operations Squadron's Plans, Scheduling and Documentation Section to schedule aircraft for PNAF missions. (T-2)

8.2.1.3. Oversee aircraft selection process. (T-3)

8.2.1.4. Select a Senior Maintenance Representative (SMR) highly experienced on the C-17 to oversee and execute all aircraft preparation functions. (T-2) The SMR must be a maintenance officer, senior NCO, or civilian equivalent designated by the Maintenance Squadron Commander. (T-2)

8.2.1.5. The operating wing may use automated products (e.g. Excel Spreadsheet or Access Database) to maintain oversight of aircraft preparation, manage aircraft maintenance preparation requirements, and/or provide leadership with preparation status. The wing NSM will approve all automated MX products used for PNAF aircraft preparation. (T-2)

8.2.2. Aircraft Selection: Select the safest, most reliable aircraft available for PNAF missions. Maintenance Commanders will ensure aircraft are selected by the unit not later than 48-hours before mission departure in order to accomplish inspections, servicing, maintenance, cleaning, and configuration. (T-2) Select aircraft for PNAF missions based on the following criteria:

8.2.2.1. Do not select any aircraft that has a history of uncorrected repeat or recurring system malfunctions on any system identified in the aircraft MESL/ARC. Commanders will ensure all aircraft systems used during PNAF missions are mission capable IAW the aircraft MESL for HSD/ARC. (T-2) Maintenance Group Commanders will ensure PNAF

aircraft do not have any restrictions on systems and subsystems identified in the MESL for HSD/ARC that will be used during PNAF missions. (T-2)

8.2.2.2. Maintenance Commanders will ensure aircraft are equipped with equipment to enable continuous tracking by Command and Control agencies. (T-2)

8.2.2.3. Before aircraft departure, Maintenance Commanders will ensure all time-change inspection items projected to expire during mission execution are accomplished. (T-3) Aircraft engine time changes may be exceeded by 10 percent or 100 hours, whichever is greater, as prescribed in T.O. 2-1-18, *Aircraft Engine Operating Limits and Factors Operating Limits and Pipeline Times*.

8.2.2.4. Maintenance Commanders will ensure all urgent action or interim routine safety time compliance technical orders (TCTOs) or one-time inspections are accomplished before departure according to T.O. 00-5-15, Air Force TCTO System. (T-2)

8.2.2.5. Maintenance Commanders will ensure tires with cuts deeper than 1/2 of the embossed tire cut limit, cuts which exceed 4/32-inch deeper than the wear mark and tread groove without an embossed cut limit, or cuts of more than 1/2-inch in length are replaced during PNAF aircraft mission preparation. (T-1) Maintenance Commanders will ensure all cuts are measured from the bottom of the nearest groove at the immediate vicinity of the cut. (T-1) If any cut extends into the cord body, Maintenance Commanders will ensure the tire is replaced as prescribed by T.O. 4T-1-3, *Inspection, Maintenance Instructions, Storage, And Disposition Of Aircraft Tires And Inner Tubes*. (T-1)

8.2.2.6. Maintenance Commanders will ensure aircraft selected do not have fuel leaks or seepage limits greater than 1/2 of the allowable limit in T.O. 1-1-3, *Inspection and Repair of Aircraft Integral Tanks, and Fuel Cells*. (T-1)

8.2.2.7. Maintenance Commanders will ensure aircraft selected do not have hydraulic or oil leakage limits greater than 1/2 of the allowable limits in mission design series (MDS) specific technical orders. (T-1)

8.2.2.8. Consider all available safety and structural enhancements when selecting an aircraft.

8.2.2.9. If an aircraft has evidence of a fuel tank fire, Maintenance Commanders will ensure the aircraft is not scheduled to execute or continue on a PNAF mission. (T-1)

8.2.2.10. Maintenance Commanders will ensure AFTO Form 781 series forms are reviewed during aircraft selection to ensure no discrepancy exists that could impact an aircraft during a nuclear airlift mission, e.g. discrepancies with winch, tie-down equipment, cargo ramp, rails, etc. (T-1)

8.2.3. The PNAF SMR or Commander designated alternate will review and prepare aircraft selected for PNAF missions IAW the following:

8.2.3.1. Review and validate accuracy of aircraft documentation (e.g., aircraft forms, Integrated Maintenance Data System (IMDS) histories, time change items, special inspections, scheduled/unscheduled delayed discrepancies, outstanding time compliance technical orders, and engine data trend analysis). (T-1) **Note:** Ensure aircraft documentation is cleared correctly IAW T.O. 00-20-1, *Aerospace Equipment*

Maintenance Inspection, Documentation, Policies and Procedures, and the MAJCOM supplement.

8.2.3.2. Check IMDS aircraft histories for completed repeat/recurring maintenance actions and required operational checks. (T-1) Re-verify repeat/recurring discrepancies with questionable, incomplete actions or operational checks.

8.2.3.3. Ensure PNAF aircraft has a current preflight inspection. (T-1)

8.2.3.4. An SMR will personally inspect aircraft for cleanliness (especially in tie down ring pans), proper configuration, and mechanical condition. (T-1)

8.2.3.5. After aircraft has been prepared and inspected, a SMR will clear the aircraft forms by entering the following in the AFTO Form 781A, *Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document*, Corrective Action Block: "INFO NOTE: Aircraft prepared IAW appropriate directives." (T-1) Until this step is accomplished, the aircraft is not mission ready.

8.2.4. PNAF Maintenance Team. The PNAF aircraft preparation maintenance team will:

8.2.4.1. Accomplish all inspections, maintenance, and servicing with the most highly qualified technicians available. (T-1) To ensure maintenance continuity on missions that require flying crew chiefs (FCCs), Commanders will ensure FCCs are included in the aircraft preparation process. (T-3)

8.2.4.2. Perform a preflight inspection IAW MDS specific -6 T.O, T.O. 00-20-1 and any applicable supplements no later than 24-hours before mission departure. (T-1)

8.2.4.3. Ensure all systems that will be used during the mission are operational in accordance with the command weapon system MESL, HSD/ARC. (T-1)

8.2.4.4. Check C-17 stabilizing struts for proper operation, servicing, and leaks. (T-1)

8.2.4.5. Ensure tie-down rings are clear of any debris that would prevent a chain or tie-down device from being attached. (T-1) Replace any unserviceable tie-down rings that cannot be repaired IAW appropriate technical data.

8.2.4.6. Service winches in accordance with appropriate T.O. guidance. (T-1)

8.2.4.7. Properly configure the aircraft and ensure all equipment specified by the wing operations directives will be aboard, including serviceable engine/inlet covers. (T-1)

8.2.4.8. Ensure Aerial Port Squadron (APS) verify cargo tie down equipment has been inspected IAW T.O. 13C2-1-1, *Cleaning, Repair and Test Instructions for Cargo Tie-Down Equipment*. (T-1)

8.2.4.9. All liquid/gaseous oxygen/nitrogen will be serviced to capacity as prescribed in MDSspecific technical orders. (T-1)

8.2.5. Required Equipment for aircraft departing home station. PNAF wings will establish local procedures for ensuring the equipment and shoring specified by the aircrew is delivered to the aircraft in sufficient time to allow for inventory and receipt before departure, to include but not limited to: (T-2)

8.2.5.1. Two grounding wires, each 100 feet long. (T-2)

- 8.2.5.2. Three sets of aircraft chocks (six total). (T-2)
- 8.2.5.3. Shoring and special equipment as specified in paragraph 3.1.4. (T-2)
- 8.2.5.4. Two cases each of hydraulic fluid and engine oil. (T-2)

8.3. General Maintenance and Servicing.

- 8.3.1. Preflight validity period is in accordance with T.O. 00-20-1. (T-1)
- 8.3.2. Refer to AFI 91-115 for limitations and procedures related to fueling, maintenance, and servicing.
- 8.3.3. Fuel servicing guidance for explosive loaded aircraft is contained in T.O. 00-25-172, *Ground Servicing of Aircraft and Static Grounding/Bonding*. To minimize the potential for an aircraft mishap, Aircraft Commanders will ensure aircraft refueling is accomplished prior to conducting initial loading operations with nuclear cargo. (T-1) Aircraft loaded with transportation-configured explosives (e.g. chaff or flares) may be refueled at aircraft explosive cargo parking areas, commonly referred to as "Hot Cargo Pads" (HCPs). If fuel servicing is necessary with nuclear cargo aboard, ensure firefighting support requirements (fire extinguishers, Aircraft Rescue Fire Fighting (ARFF) vehicle, etc.) are available and positioned IAW AFI 91-115 and T.O. 11N-20-11.
- 8.3.4. Aircrew must control all maintenance activities on aircraft with nuclear cargo aboard. (T-1)
- 8.3.5. Commanders will not perform maintenance that increases the probability of fire on an aircraft with nuclear cargo aboard.(T-1)
- 8.3.6. Commanders will ensure fuel or oxygen servicing, and any loading of external chaff or flares is conducted before loading nuclear cargo. (T-1)
- 8.3.7. Commanders will not load flares or chaff on PNAF aircraft unless required for mission accomplishment. (T-1)
- 8.3.8. Commanders will ensure replenishment chaff or flares are transported on PNAF aircraft. (T-1)
- 8.3.9. Commanders will not service aircraft or use integral jacking during nuclear cargo loading or unloading. (T-1)
- 8.3.10. Commanders will not jack aircraft with nuclear cargo aboard. (T-1) **Exception:** Using aircraft integral jacking procedures to lift one set of landing gear for minor maintenance that includes a tire change is authorized. (T-1)

8.4. En route Maintenance.

- 8.4.1. Close coordination between MAJCOM CCC, USAFE AMOCC, 618 AOC (TACC), maintenance, and the Aircraft Commander is required at all times; especially in situations when a PNAF aircraft has a maintenance problem.
- 8.4.2. When coordinating maintenance support, the Aircraft commander will ensure the safety and security of nuclear cargo is considered at all times. (T-1) The Aircraft Commander's decision is final.

8.4.3. Use weapon system MESL to determine status of PNAF aircraft. A Maintenance Operations Control (MOC) senior controller will personally monitor maintenance support for PNAF missions while on their station. (T-2)

8.4.4. Commanders will ensure maintenance support of nuclear airlift missions takes precedence over missions with lesser JCS priorities. (T-0)

8.4.5. If a replacement aircraft is required after a mission is in execution, Commanders will make every effort to select an aircraft that satisfies criteria listed in paragraph 8.2. (T-2)

8.4.5.1. The aircraft may be selected from the nearest location consistent with mission requirements.

8.4.5.2. Commanders will coordinate with 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG before selecting or sourcing a spare/replacement aircraft for a nuclear airlift missions in execution. (T-2)

8.4.5.3. Maintenance Commanders will ensure open aircraft discrepancies will not adversely affect or delay a PNAF mission. (T-1) Special aircraft preparation entries in the AFTO Form 781A are not required.

8.4.5.4. If required, Aircraft Commanders will ensure replacement mission aircraft are sanitized according to procedures in Chapter 5. (T-1)

8.5. Safety Precautions and Personnel Requirements.

8.5.1. When the aircraft is loaded with nuclear cargo, the Aircraft Commander and Courier will ensure maintenance actions are only performed in the presence of the aircrew. (T-2) The Aircraft Commander will ensure all safety precautions are observed, to include but not limited to:

8.5.1.1. Use only equipment, procedures, and checklists that are consistent with US Air Force approved publications for any operation directly associated with nuclear cargo. (T-2)

8.5.1.2. Approved publications conform to the safety rules in AFI 91-115 and DoDD 3150.02. (T-0)

8.5.1.3. Ground aircraft in accordance with MDS specific technical orders and T.O. 00-25-172. (T-1)

8.5.1.4. Installation Commanders will ensure aircraft parking areas satisfy explosive safety and quantity-distance criteria. (T-1) If the Aircraft Commander has any doubt regarding the status of the parking area safety criteria, consult the local safety office or explosive safety officer.

8.5.1.5. If cargo compartment access is required, the aircrew will cover nuclear weapons cargo to the maximum extent possible. (T-2) As a minimum, the Aircraft Commander will ensure weapon serial numbers are obscured. (T-2)

Chapter 9

POST MISSION REQUIREMENTS

9.1. General. This Chapter describes procedures for reporting and solving problems encountered on nuclear airlift missions and for identifying outstanding host base support to nuclear airlift missions.

9.2. Special Assignment Airlift Mission Report (SAAMREP). This report is used to correct deficiencies in equipment, procedures, or support. It is a way to monitor, evaluate, and continually improve operational policies and procedures. The Aircraft Commander may submit a report on a mission, or the squadron/unit nuclear airlift monitor may submit a report when multiple missions encounter the same problem.

9.2.1. SAAMREPs should not be used in place of other reports (e.g., hazard reports, Dull Sword/OPREP-3 reports, material deficiency reports) or command operational reports, such as AMC Form 43, *AMC Transient Aircrew Facilities Comment*, or AMC Form 54, *Aircraft Commander's Report on Services/Facilities*.

9.2.2. PNAF units will ensure SAAMREPs are prepared IAW the message format illustrated in Attachment 5.1. (T-2) SAAMREPs should include enough details to identify deficiencies and clearly indicate problem areas. As a minimum, SAMREPs should include names, organizations, dates, times, and locations that pertain to the suspected deficiency. The report should be written with sufficient detail to stand alone and include a statement in the report that the OSC was informed of the problem. PNAF units should separate reports by problem area and location to assist in timely resolution. When a SAAMREP is the result of multiple missions encountering the same problem, the report should indicate who at the identified location was informed of the problem.

9.2.3. PNAF units will classify SAAMREPs if necessary. (T-0)

9.2.4. Report Processing:

9.2.4.1. The squadron/unit NAM will ensure reports are prepared IAW Paragraph 9.2.2. (T-2) Significant problems that are resolved on the spot through aircrew involvement or at squadron/unit level may be submitted as reports "FOR DOCUMENTATION ONLY." In these cases, label the report "FOR DOCUMENTATION ONLY," assign it a unit number, and file it with other SAAMREPs. Send a copy of the report to AMC/A3N to facilitate MAJCOM monitoring of the entire PNAF.

9.2.4.2. The squadron/unit commander must endorse reports generated "FOR DOCUMENTATION ONLY" and submit to the parent Wing and MAJCOM. (T-2) Information addressees on up-channeled reports include: AMC/A3N, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD, AMC/SEW, the parent wing NSM, SEW, and PNAF squadron/unit. The commander or operations officer of the base where the problem occurred must be an information addressee on report. (T-2)

9.2.4.3. The wing Nuclear Surety Manager reviews the report and determines Wing Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR).

9.2.4.4. Within 14 days of mission completion, the squadron/unit NAM will submit reports to AMC/A3N for MAJCOM review. (T-2) If follow-on action is required, AMC/A3N will take responsibility for the initial report and notify subordinate levels.

9.2.5. Each level should act on reported problems within 5 duty days from receipt. Include all previously addressed information addressees on correspondence related to the problem.

9.2.6. For documentation purposes, Commanders or responsible agencies at all levels will maintain a SAAMREP log or file and indicate the date received, the agency the report was sent to and date, and brief comments about its status. (T-2)

9.2.7. Completed SAAMREPs should be submitted to HQ AMC/A3N with all other levels includes as information addressees (refer to Attachment 5.2). If AMC/A3N is the final action agency, send the response to the initiating squadron/unit, with all other levels as information addressees. AMC/A3N will forward the completed SAAMREP to AMC/SEW and 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD for review of recommended actions. AMC/SEW will determine if the report should be forwarded to the AMC Nuclear Surety and Operations Council (NSOC) for command level oversight of recommended actions.

9.2.8. The squadron/unit NAM is responsible for monitoring the SAAMREP coordination process and updating the individual who submitted the report on the final resolution. (T-2)

9.2.9. The squadron/unit NAM will maintain SAAMREPs for 2-years from the month of close-out. (T-2)

9.2.10. The squadron/unit NAM should maintain mission debrief records and "FOR DOCUMENTATION ONLY" reports on file so the unit can effectively determine if a recent problem was not an isolated incident and warrants a separate SAAMREP.

9.3. AF Form 527F, Checklist for Nuclear Mission Support. To recognize outstanding host base supports of nuclear airlift missions, PNAF units should submit AF Form 527Fs to AMC/SEW for consideration. AMC/SEW awards the Annual Nuclear Surety Certificate of Appreciation.

9.3.1. The Aircraft Commander or designated unit representative should complete AF Form 527F covering each DoD installation that supports his or her aircraft while carrying nuclear and nuclear-related cargo.

9.3.2. The Aircraft Commander or designated unit representative should not use AF Form 527F in lieu of the SAAMREP or other reports to identify and solve problems.

9.3.3. The Aircraft Commander or designated unit representative will classify AF Form 527F according to Mission Setup Message only if the base being rated is not on the numerical listing of bases published by AMC/A3N. (T-0) When using the numerical designation for base location, be sure the narrative does not contain classified information.

9.3.4. If possible, provide a copy of AF Form 576F to the OSC. Do not include location or numerical listing on that copy.

9.3.5. Squadron/unit NAM will provide copies of the AF Form 527F to AMC/SEW and A3N within 14 days of mission completion. (T-2)

Chapter 10

REPORTING NUCLEAR MISHAPS

10.1. General. Aircrews are responsible for initiating mishap reports should a mishap occur involving nuclear and nuclear-related cargo in their custody. Reportable events involving nuclear cargo range from a condition that could degrade nuclear safety to the loss or destruction of nuclear cargo. These events require a report IAW AFMAN 91-221, *Weapons Safety Investigations and Reports* and are categorized as nuclear accidents, incidents, or deficiencies (AID). Nuclear AIDs identified with the flag words are discussed in AFMAN 91-221. Refer to the DoD FCG SWOG for additional guidance for overseas mishaps.

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DCS, Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

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Prescribed Forms

AF Form 527A, *Security Briefing Worksheet*

AF Form 527B, *Courier Briefing Worksheet*

AF Form 527C, *Shipper's Briefing Worksheet*

AF Form 527D, *Acknowledgment of Station Support Requirements*

AF Form 527E, *24-Hour Confirmation of Station Support Requirements*

AF Form 527F, *Checklist for Nuclear Mission Support*

Adopted Forms

AF Form 310, *Document Receipt and Destruction Certificate*

AF Form 1109, *Visitor Register Log*

AF Form 1199, *Air Force Entry Control Card*

AF Form 4114, *C-17A Nuclear Floor Plan Worksheet*

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

AF Form 1297, *Temporary Issue Receipt*

DD Form 175, *Flight Plan, Military*

DD Form 1385, *Cargo Manifest*

DD Form 1387, *Shipment Label, Military*

DD Form 1387-2, *Special Handling Data/Certification*

DD Form 1801, *International Flight Plan, DoD*

DD Form 1911, *Material Courier Receipt*

DD Form 2131, *Passenger Manifest*

DD Form 2825, *Internal Receipt*

SF 312, *Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement*

AMC Form 43, *AMC Transient Aircrew Comments*

AMC Form 292, *C17A Special Loading Equipment Receipt*

AMC Form 54, *Aircraft Commander's Report on Services/Facilities*

AFTO Form 781A, *Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document*

AFTO Form 781, *ARMS Aircrew/Mission Flight Data Document*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

A/R—Air Refueling

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFJI—Air Force Joint Instruction

AFGSC/A4 Det 5, NCP—Air Force Global Strike Command, A4 - Detachment 5, Nuclear Control Point

AFMAN—Air Force Manual

AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive

AFSEC—Air Force Safety Center

AGE—Aerospace Ground Equipment

AID—Accidents, Incidents, or Deficiencies

ALTRV—Altitude Reservation

AMC—Air Mobility Command

AOC—Air Operations Center

AOR—Area of Responsibility

APU—Auxiliary Power Unit

ARC—Air Refueling Conventional

ATC—Air Traffic Control

AW—Airlift Wing

CAC—Common Access Card

CC—Commander

CCC—Consolidated Control Center (618 AOC (TACC)/XOC)

CDS—Command Disable System

CDD—Crew Duty Day

CDT—Crew Duty Time

CFP—Computer Flight Plans
CG—Center of Gravity
COMSEC—Communications Security
CONUS—Continental United States
C—RD – Confidential Restricted Data
DDD—Desired Delivery Date
DoD—Department of Defense
DOE—Department of Energy
DTRA—Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EAL—Entry Authority List
ECP—Entry Control Point
EDD—Explosive Detector Dog
ENAO—Emergency Nuclear Airlift Operations
EOD—Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ETA—Estimated Time of Arrival
FCC—Flying Crew Chief
FCG—Foreign Clearance Guide
FCP—Foreign Clearance Program
FEV—Functional Expert Visit
FRAG—Local Fragmentary Order
FRD—Formerly Restricted Data
GDSS—Global Decision Support System
HSD—Home Station Departure
IND—Improvised Nuclear Device
INRAD—Intrinsic Radiation
ICAO—International Civil Aeronautical Organization
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff
LLC—Limited Life Component
LOA—Letter of Agreement
MAJCOM—Major Command
MASO—Munitions Accountable Systems Officer
MDR—Material Deficiencies Report

MDS—Mission Design Series (e.g., C-17)
MEP—Mission Essential Personnel
MESL—Mission Essential Subsystem Listing
MHE—Materials Handling Equipment
MIRD—Mobility Intelligence Reporting Directive
MOC—Maintenance Operation Control Center
MUNS—Munitions Squadron
MUNSS—Munitions Support Squadron
NAF—Numbered Air Force
NAM—Nuclear Airlift Monitor
NEW—Net Explosive Weight
NHC—Negative Hazardous Cargo
NLT—No Later Than
NM—Nautical Miles
NOFORN—Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOSS—Nuclear Ordnance Shipping Schedule
NSC—Nuclear Surety Council
NSM—Nuclear Surety Manager
NWRM—Nuclear Weapons Related Material
NSSAV—Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit
NTWG—Nuclear Transportation Working Group
OCONUS—Outside the Continental US
OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility
OPREP—3 – Operational Report 3
ORM—Operational Risk Management
OSC – On—Scene Coordinator
OSI—Office of Special Investigations
PAL—Permissive Action Link
PNAF—Prime Nuclear Airlift Force
PPR—Prior Permission Required
PRP—Personnel Reliability Assurance Program
PWG—PNAF Working Group

RD—Restricted Data
RON—Remain Over Night
SAAM—Special Assignment Airlift Mission
SAAMREP—Special Assignment Airlift Mission Report
SECDEF—Secretary of Defense
SMR—Senior Maintenance Representative
SOE—Sequence of Events
SSN—Social Security Number
SVA—Sole Vouching Authority
SWOG—Special Weapons Overflight Guide
S—RD – Secret Restricted Data
S—FRD – Secret Formerly Restricted Data
TACC—Tanker Airlift Control Center
TCTO—Time Compliance Technical Order
TPC—Two Person Concept
UHF—Ultra High Frequency
USAFE—United States Air Force in Europe
VHF—Very High Frequency
WSA—Weapons Storage Area
WSSR—Weapon System Safety Rules

Terms

Class II Components—Weapon components composed of fissionable or fusionable materials that contribute substantially to nuclear energy released during detonation.

Custody—The responsibility for the control of, transfer and movement of, and access to, weapons and their components. Custody also includes maintaining accountability for weapons and their components.

Handling—Physically maneuvering weapons either directly or indirectly by people.

Inert Devices—Devices not containing hazardous materials, but closely resembling nuclear item or explosive items that are classified as hazardous.

Logistics Movement—The transport of nuclear weapons in connection with supply or maintenance operations. Under certain specified conditions, combat aircraft may be used for such movements.

Nuclear Airlift Mission—A SAAM tasked to transport Nuclear or DoD Nuclear-Related cargo.

Nuclear Cargo—Nuclear weapons, nuclear warheads, and Class II nuclear components prepared for logistics movement.

Nuclear-Related Cargo—Nuclear training and test weapons, non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons, limited life components (LLC), and equipment associated with the logistics movement of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Weapon—A complete assembly (i.e., implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear type), in its intended ultimate configuration that, upon completion of the prescribed arming, fusing, and firing sequence, is capable of producing the intended nuclear reaction and release of energy.

Prime Nuclear Airlift Force—Those aircrews, aircraft, and other functions that provide for peacetime support of logistical airlift of nuclear weapons and nuclear components.

Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM)—All domestic requirements and those requiring special delivery at points other than those within the established channel airlift route patterns and those that require special handling due to weight or size of the cargo, the urgency or sensitivity of movement, or other special factors.

Special Weapons Overflight Guide (SWOG) Supplement—Supplement to the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide, applicable to all elements of the DoD, which delineates areas authorized for overflight by United States aircraft carrying nuclear weapons and the specific security classification for overflight of foreign countries.

Attachment 2

NUCLEAR AIRLIFT RESTRICTIONS & REQUIREMENTS

Table A2.1. –Cargo Requirements

Type of Cargo	Load by Dash 16	Comply w/ SWOG	Two-Person Concept ¹	Security Required ¹	Remote Parking Required	PNAF Required	SAAM Required
<i>NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WARHEADS, AND RELATED COMPONENTS / KITS</i>							
War Reserve Weapons (Bombs, Warheads, Missiles)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Type I	Yes	Yes	Yes
Class II Nuclear Components (H1343)	Yes	Yes	See T.O. 11N-45-51A	Type I	No	Yes	Yes
Limited Life Components (LLCs)	No	Yes	No	Type II	No	Yes ²	Yes
H1700 With or Without Components	No	Yes	No	Type II	Yes	Yes	Yes
Base Spares Group X Kits	No	No	No	PL3	No	No	No
Bomb Dummy Units (BDU)	No ³	No	No ³	PL3 ³	No	No	No
Munitions Dummy Unit (MDU)	No ³	No	No ³	PL3 ³	No	No	No
Type 3A, B, C, and D Trainers	Yes	Yes	No	Type II	No	No	Yes
Type 3E Trainers (OCONUS Only)	Yes	Yes	No	PL3	No	No	No

Attachment 2 NUCLEAR AIRLIFT RESTRICTIONS & REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Type of Cargo	Load by Dash 16	Comply w/ SWOG	Two-Person Concept ¹	Cargo Classification	Security Required ¹	Remote Parking Required	PNAF Required	SAAM Required
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OTHER MAJOR ASSEMBLIES (OMA) / JOINT TEST ASSEMBLIES (JTA)⁶

Joint Test	Yes	Yes	No	U-S-RD	Type II	No	Yes	Yes
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Assemblies								
OMA (e.g. CTU, VFA, ITMU, TTTU)	Yes	SeeNote 6	No	Unclassified – S-RD	PL3 ⁶	No	Yes ²	Yes for OCONUS

Notes:

Note 1. In accordance with this table or as necessary by the user, whichever is more restrictive.

Note 2. Required when transported to/from OCONUS. **Once in-theater, non-PNAF USAFE or AMC aircrews and aircraft may transport LLCs, other Type II cargo, and OMAs. Ref: TO 11N-45-51A.**

Note 3. May simulate / execute equivalent WR weapon requirements for exercise or training purposes or per unit request.

Note 4. **Type 3A, B, C, D trainers are NWRM and require positive inventory control. Ref: AFI 20-110**

Note 5. **Type 3E load trainers are not NWRM. Ref: AFI 20-110**

Note 6. **OMA's may include but are not limited to, Joint Test Assemblies (JTA), Compatibility Test Units (CTU), Vibration Fly Around Units (VFA), Instrumented Test Measurement Units (ITMU), and Thermal Telemeter Test Units (TTTU).** Assistance in determining transportation requirements can be obtained from AFGSC/A4 Det 5, NCP

Attachment 3

MISSION SETUP MESSAGE

This attachment depicts an example Mission Setup Message. Planners may deviate from this format as necessary to accommodate mission-specific requirements and ensure proper information is thoroughly coordinated between all agencies executing or supporting the tasked mission. **Figure A3.1 – Sample Set-up Message**

----- [START OF SAMPLE SETUP MESSAGE] -----
****618 AOC (TACC)/XOOON MISSION: ONLY USE SECURE MEANS (STE or SIPR) WHEN DISCUSSING ANY ASPECT OF THIS MISSION. PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION REFER ALL QUESTIONS TO 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOON DSN 779-4584. AFTER DUTY HOURS, CONTACT 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG AT DSN 779-3366/3367 TO REACH THE ON-CALL PLANNER. 24-HourS PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION CONTACT 618 AOC (TACC)/XOCG STE 779-0324-3366/3367. ****
(U) MMM SAAM: 0000-00 // DTG: DD0000Z MMM YY // Call Sign: REACH 0000
(U) Part I is UNCLASSIFIED, Part II is classified (*Identify classification*)
PART I (*Use this section to describe the unclassified / releasable mission data*)

(U) Close Watch SAAM 0000-00 operated by C-17; itinerary follows (all dates calendar MMM YY; all times ZULU):

(Indicate information for all installations transited or tasked for support and any aerial refueling tracks in the provided blocks. Arrival/Departure info will be depicted in DD/hhmm format, Ground Time / Event Duration will be in hh+mm format. Indicate key Unclassified information in the Remarks blocks)

Station / Event	ICAO	Arrival/Start Time	Ground Time/Event Duration	Departure/End Time	Remarks

Notes: (*Add notes as necessary for clarity, examples provided below*)

Note 1. The air refueling track is not a published track and has no specific identifier. This is the GDSS identifier used for non-published air refueling tracks.

Note 2. The active portion of the mission is complete at this station. The remaining itinerary may change without need to create a Setup Message change.

PART II (*Use this section to describe the classified support and cargo requirements*)

- (U)** Indicate mission priority here. For example “JCS Priority is 1A3.”
- (U)** Indicate type of cargo being transported IAW the appropriate parts of this instruction. For example “This mission transports Nuclear (*and/or Nuclear Related*) cargo.” Furthermore, indicate the following: “Priority support is required by AFJI 11-204, A/R 95-27. Specific requirements are identified by station in paragraph (*indicate appropriate paragraph*).”
- Use this section to describe the cargo hazards for each location tasked to support. **(U)** Hazardous cargo on-board for arrival at station:

STATION	T.O. 11N-20-11 LINE NUMBER ¹

Notes: : *(Add notes as necessary for clarity, examples provided below)*
Note 1. Shippers: DD Form 1387-2, Special Handling Data/Certification, are required on all hazardous cargo not identifiable by a T.O. 11N-20-11 line number.
Note 2. Not a scheduled landing. Hazardous cargo information only for divert situation.

4. (U) Types of Security *(List only the Security references)*

- 4.1. (U) **Type I** -- Security IAW to DoDD 5210.41; DoDM S-5210.41M-Vol 3; AFMAN 31-108Vol 3)
- 4.2. (U) **Type II** -- Security IAW DoDD 5210.41; DoDM S-5210.41M-Vol 3; AFMAN 31-108 Vol 3)

5. (Identify Classification) Special Requirements for Each Station *(Indicate requirements for all installations transited or tasked for support in separate paragraphs with sub-paragraphs detailing the following if appropriate for each installation:*

- 1) Fuel, MHE, or equipment requirements
- 2) Clarify if specific waivers or command authorizations are granted/approved at each installation
- 3) Crew requirements for billeting or vehicles
- 4) Requirements for security by location [Type I, Type II, standby/divert support, etc.]
- 5) EDD requirements when necessary
- 6) Fireguard requirements where necessary
- 7) Support / SF release coordination
- 8) PPR requirements, to include a suspense for receiving the PPR
- 9) Message acknowledgment expectations

(Separately identify de-positioning itinerary installation information after the following statement)

****THE ACTIVE PORTION OF THIS MISSION IS NOW COMPLETE. THE REMAINING PORTION OF THIS PARAGRAPH IS INFORMATIONAL ONLY AND MAY CHANGE WITHOUT CREATING A SETUP MESSAGE CHANGE.****

6. (U) Courier Officer will be one of the following *(these individuals are authorized to sign and receipt for nuclear weapons/DOE/NNSA specified cargo):*

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>CLEARANCE</u>

7. (U) Acknowledgement and Confirmation Messages

- 7.1. (U) Send acknowledgement of the station support requirements listed in this classified message NLT DD MMM/0000Z. Send to the following SIPR addresses 618 TACC/XOC-DD02 (TACC.XOC.DD2@AMC.AF.SMIL.MIL); 618 TACC/XOOON SAAM MISSIONS (TACC.XOOON@AMC.AF.SMIL.MIL); tasked unit organizational account (e.g. 4AS.DOOMS.MCCHORD@AMC.AF.SMIL.MIL). Blank Acknowledgement of Station Support Requirements and 24-Hour Confirmation of

Station Support Requirements forms were included with this message. Please complete the appropriate form for Acknowledgement or confirmation.

- 7.2. (U) Send acknowledgement messages for any subsequent changes to the Setup using the proper form in para. 7.1., except use “**Acknowledge Change X to Setup MMM SAAM PJM 0000-00 DTG: 000000Z MMM YY**” in the subject line of the email and/or AMHS message. Fill in the Change Number block of the form with appropriate number.
- 7.3. (U) Send a confirmation message 24-Hours (or last duty day) prior to the aircraft scheduled arrival at your location. Use the proper form listed in para. 7.1, except use “**24-Hour Confirmation MMM SAM PJM 0000-00 DTG: 000000Z MMM YY (CHANGE X)**” in the subject line of the email and/or AMHS message. **Your station may be required to send multiple 24-Hour confirmations if the mission will transit your base on different days.**

8. (U) Send required briefings to tasked unit NLT COB DD MMM YY.

9. (U) 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOON POC's are [NAME], [NAME], and [NAME].

****ONLY USE SECURE MEANS (STE or SIPR) WHEN DISCUSSING ANY ASPECT OF THIS MISSION. REFER ALL QUESTIONS TO 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOON STE DSN 312-779-4584****

DERIVED FROM: TCG-WPMU-3, 12/2013 & DOD FCG SUPPLEMENT-SPECIAL WEAPONS OVERFLIGHT GUIDE, 08/2006

CLASSIFIED BY: [NAME]

Exempt from Automatic Declassification - FRD

----- [END OF SAMPLE SETUP MESSAGE] -----

Attachment 4

PNAF FORMS

Figure A4.1. Identification of an Official Courier Letter.

MEMORANDUM FOR WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

FROM: (Appropriate Wing/CC)

SUBJECT: Identification of an Official Courier

1. (Rank) (Name), (SSN), USAF, is acting in an official capacity as Courier for (organization) and is carrying one Mission Kit in support of this assigned mission. Documents in this kit will be used during temporary duty in conjunction with this mission and returned to (organization) when the mission terminates.

2. The inscriptions on the cover, "OFFICIAL UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COMMUNICATION, EXEMPT FROM EXAMINATION," and the signature of the Courier's commander further identify this kit.

Wing Commander Signature Official Signature Block

Figure A4.2. Request for Waiver of Customs and Quarantine Boarding and Examination.

MEMORANDUM FOR CUSTOMS AND QUARANTINE

(Date)

FROM: (Aircraft Commander)

SUBJECT: Request for Waiver of Customs and Quarantine Boarding and Examination Office (base name—port of entry)—I hereby certify that aircraft (type and number), based at (name and location of base), is carrying classified cargo, and I request a waiver of customs and quarantine boarding and examination. I further certify that all baggage (crew and passenger) has or will be offloaded and made available for customs examination, and that the aircraft has been sprayed in accordance with local procedures or as requested by the quarantine inspector.

(Signature of Aircraft Commander)

(Rank)

Note: Use official stationary header**Figure A4.3. Mission Sequence of Events Checklist (Sample).**

MEMORANDUM FOR HOST BASE AGENCIES (Date)

FROM: Courier Officer

SUBJECT: Sequence of Events Checklist (Mission Number)

1. This checklist is to be used to coordinate the support activities for the departure of aircraft tail number _____ on _____ (date). (Indicate time as Zulu or local.)

a. Crew legal for alert (LFA) time _____

b. Aircrew will show at aircraft not later than _____

- c. Fuel will be available not later than _____ (refuel time _____)
- d. EDD team will be available NLT _____ (preflight & MWD time _____)
- e. Security established not later than¹ _____
- f. Convoy start time not later than² _____
- g. Time required to convoy (security forces estimated) _____
- h. Loading start time³ _____
- i. Time required to load cargo (aircrew estimated) _____
- j. Start taxi and takeoff _____
- k. Scheduled departure time _____

2. Contacts:

- a. Shipper (name, rank, telephone): _____
- b. Security forces (name, rank, telephone): _____
- c. Aircrew Courier (name, rank, contact point): _____
- d. On-Scene Coordinator or senior officer (name, rank, telephone):

Remarks: (Maintenance/servicing requirements, special requests, load sequence, EDD time, etc)

Notes:

Note 1. Security should be established NLT convoy start time.

Note 2. Aircraft maintenance, servicing, preflight and sanitization should be completed no later than convoy start time.

Note 3. Cargo should arrive at the aircraft not later than 10-minutes before load time.

Figure A4.4. Security Acknowledgment Letter.

MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR ON-DUTY SECURITY FORCE OFFICIAL

FROM: Courier Officer

SUBJECT: Security Acknowledgment (check only one paragraph)

1. I understand the nature of the cargo aboard aircraft number _____, and will provide security that meets the requirements of DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108. No one except the aircrew on the attached orders will be allowed to enter the aircraft restricted area

unless there is an emergency that endangers the aircraft or personnel. Allow emergency personnel immediate entry and notify the Aircraft Commander or Courier officer immediately. The restricted area around the aircraft is a no-lone zone when the aircrew is not present.

2. I will provide at least one posted entry controller for aircraft number _____. No one except the aircrew on the attached orders will be allowed to enter the aircraft, unless there is an emergency that endangers the aircraft or personnel. Allow emergency personnel immediate entry and notify the Aircraft Commander or Courier officer immediately. The aircraft interior is / is not (select one) a no-lone zone.
3. I will provide at least one posted entry controller for aircraft number _____. Persons on the attached list(s) may be allowed into the aircraft. Anyone not on the list(s) will be escorted by someone who is listed, except in an emergency. The escort official must remain with the person being escorted and ensure the aircraft is resealed IAW DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108.
4. I will provide frequent checks by security forces for aircraft number _____. Persons on the attached lists(s) may be allowed into the aircraft. Anyone not on the list(s) will be escorted by someone who is listed, except in an emergency. The escort official must remain with the person being escorted and ensure the aircraft is resealed IAW DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108.
5. This aircraft is a Protection Level 3 resource. I will provide frequent checks by security forces for aircraft number _____.

Seal Number(s) _____

(Name, Rank, Duty Title, Signature)

(Organization)

(Time and Date)

Attachments (2):

1. Aircrew Orders
2. Access List(s)

Attachment 5

SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT AIRLIFT MISSION (SAAM) REPORTS (SAAMREP)

Figure A5.1. Example of Original Special Assignment Airlift Mission Report (SAAMREP).

APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION		
		OPERATING SQUADRON/UNIT CC
		PARENT WING Current Operations
	INFO	618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD
	INFO	USAF/A5XP (OCONUS Location)
		USAFE/A10 (if USAFE-related SAAMREP)
		PARENT MAJCOM A3N/A10
		PARENT MAJCOM SEW
		PARENT WING SEW
		HOST BASE/AGENCY CC/DO/POC
<p>(APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION) FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 SUBJECT: SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT AIRLIFT MISSION REPORT - (UNIT REPORT SEQUENCE NUMBER) (U)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. (U) UNIT NR: (SQUADRON/UNIT PLUS SEQUENCE NUMBER). 2. (U) MISSION IDENTIFICATION: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> A. (U) AIRCRAFT TAIL NUMBER. B. (U) MISSION NUMBER. C. (U) MISSION DATES. 3. (CLASSIFICATION) GENERAL PROBLEM AREAS ENCOUNTERED: (SECURITY, LOGISTIC, SHIPPER, COMMUNICATION, LOADING EQUIPMENT, ETC.). 4. (U) ON-SCENE COORDINATOR INFORMED OF PROBLEM. (YES OR NO) IF NO, STATE WHY. 5. (CLASSIFICATION) SPECIFIC COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS: 6. (U) AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: (NAME/RANK/ORGANIZATION). 7. (CLASSIFICATION) INITIAL ENDORSEMENT: (SQUADRON/UNIT COMMANDER'S COMMENTS). 		

Figure A5.2. Example of Special Assignment Airlift Mission Report (SAAMREP) Response.

APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION	
	ACTION OFFICE
	NEXT ACTION OFFICE
	INFO 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOOD
	USAF/A5XP (OCONUS Location)
	USAFE/A10 (if USAFE-related SAAMREP)
	PARENT MAJCOM A3N/A10
	PARENT MAJCOM SEW
	INTERMEDIATE LEVELS ADDRESSED ON ORIGINAL REPORT

LOWER LEVELS ADDRESSED ON ORIGINAL REPORT
<p>(APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION) FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA - ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 REF A (ACTION OFFICE AND DATE TIME GROUP OF ORIGINAL REPORT) REF B (REFERENCE ANY AND ALL OTHER MESSAGES CONCERNING THE SUBJECT REPORT)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. (U) UNIT NR: (SEE ORIGINAL MESSAGE)2. (CLASSIFICATION) SPECIFIC COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS/ACTIONS/ ENDORSEMENTS:3. (U) ENDORSER: (NAME/RANK/ORGANIZATION)4. (U) REQUEST EACH ACTION ADDRESSEE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE MESSAGE TO AMC/A3N, 618 AOC (TACC)/XOOD, AND MESSAGE ORIGINATOR. Officer's Name, Rank, Office Symbol, DSN Phone Commander's Name, Rank, XX OG/CC, DSN Phone <p>APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION STATEMENT</p>