

**BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER  
FIFTH AIR FORCE**

**AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 10-245**



**PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
Supplement**

**5TH AIR FORCE**

**Supplement**

**27 OCTOBER 2011**

**Operations**

**ANTITERRORISM (AT)**

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AFI 10-245, *Antiterrorism (AT)*, 30 March 2009, is supplemented as follows: This supplement implements and extends the guidance of the AFI 10-245. This publication consolidates the procedures and criteria that support Headquarters Fifth Air Force (HQ 5 AF) AT program. It applies to all 5 AF installations and tenant units unless specifically stated in the applicable paragraph. For conflicting guidance, contact HQ 5 AF Antiterrorism Officer (ATO) to clarify the requirement. Send recommended changes to this supplement via AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*, to HQ 5 AF/A7S, Unit 5087, APO AP 96328. Route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. Ensure all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with (IAW) Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at <https://www.my.af.mil/afirms/afirms/afirms/rims.cfm>. No waivers may be granted for any part of the publication.

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES**

This document has been substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. Major changes include: Provides major updates for the 5 AF Antiterrorism Program, and has been substantially

revised at all levels and must be completely reviewed; outlines specific USPACOM requirements and incorporates USPACOM OPOD 5050-08, PACAF Supplement to AFI 10-245, and additional AT policy; provides specific AT guidelines set forth by the Combatant Commander when traveling inside the USPACOM AOR or another Combatant Commander's AOR; updates guidance for Unfunded Requests (UFR), Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund (CbT RIF) and Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF) submissions; and 5 AF Threat Working Group reference was removed IAW 5 AF/CC guidance.

1.1. The 5 AF AT program is designed to provide the commander information and oversight for implementation of a comprehensive risk based AT program to meet his AT responsibilities. This is pursued through an integrated AT Risk Management methodology approach used to assess criticality, terrorist threat, and vulnerabilities across the spectrum of missions accomplished in 5 AF. The integrated AT program will be documented in this doctrine, which will also address the program requirements for Numbered Air Forces (NAF) and Wings outlined in USPACOM OPOD 5050-08, *Antiterrorism/Critical Infrastructure Protection*, AFI 10-245\_PACAFSUP, *Antiterrorism (AT)*, and service component requirements in United States Forces, Japan Instruction (USFJI) 31-201, *Antiterrorism (AT) Program*.

1.1.1.1. 5 AF installations, tenants, and unit commanders are responsible for implementing DoD, AF, USPACOM, PACAF, USFJ, and 5 AF AT policy within their organizations.

1.1.3.1.1. 5 AF installations shall ensure forces provided to another geographic commander are aware of and comply with the geographic commander's FPCON requirements IAW USPACOM OPOD 5050-08, Appendix 2 to Annex C.

1.1.3.1.2. (Added) 5 AF installations shall ensure all forces traveling through a Combatant Commander's AOR define who has AT responsibility within their travel orders.

1.2.1.1.1. The HQ 5 AF AT structure is categorized into one main group: AT Working Group (ATWG).

1.2.1.1.1.1. To limit overlap with installation AT responsibilities, 5 AF will not have a formal Antiterrorism Executive Committee (ATEC). As required, A7S and A3 will provide information to 5 AF senior leadership on AT/CIP related issues that warrant their attention.

1.2.1.1.1.2. 5 AF Threat Working Group (TWG). HQ 5 AF/TWG requirement has been removed per 5 AF/CC guidance. 5 AF/A7S will liaise with both 5 AF Installations TWG and USFJ/TWG as required.

1.2.1.1.1.2.1. During exercises and contingency operations, HQ 5 AF will activate the Security Control Cell (SCC) to serve as the Air Component security/base defense coordination element to US Forces Japan, PACAF, and 13 AF IAW USFJI 31-202. The SCC will be manned by 5 AF/A7S and draw on the members of the 5 AF Staff as needed for expertise. When needed the SCC will also be manned with AFOSI, and Intelligence personnel.

1.2.1.1.1.2.1.2. During exercises and contingency operations, 5 AF installations will coordinate all AT, security/base defense issues through the HQ 5 AF SCC.

1.2.1.1.1.2.1.3. (Added) 5 AF installation commanders will appoint their TWG chairperson and should consider having their respective TWG chaired by the installation/wing SIO or designated personnel.

1.2.1.1.1.2.1.4. (Added) 5 AF installations should consider establishing a Bilateral Threat Working Group (BTWG) that is comprised of members from their installation TWG, local Japanese National Police (JNP), Japanese Self Defense Forces (JGSDF, JASDF, etc.), Sister Services, and any other local national agency that may be collocated in your installations AOR. The BTWG provides the forum for the US and Japanese military to discuss threats bilaterally.

1.2.1.1.1.3. HQ 5 AF Antiterrorism Working Group (ATWG). HQ 5 AF ATWG requirement will be met by membership in the USFJ Joint ATWG. Since Commander 5 AF is dual-hatted as the Commander USFJ, there is no need for duplicate ATWG's.

1.2.1.2. Assignment of AT Operational Responsibility. Department of State and Commander USFJ responsibilities are detailed in the FP Memorandum of Agreement between the Chief of Mission, American Embassy Tokyo and the Commander, US Pacific Command.

1.2.1.5. 5 AF ATO will routinely serve as a conduit for information and will coordinate with US Department of Defense (DoD) Forces (PACAF and USFJ). Supporting the ATO, the 5 AF/A7S will coordinate with Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) and Japanese National Police Agency (NPA). AFOSI Representative to 5 AF is responsible for coordinating Counterintelligence functions in the support of AT plans and programs.

1.2.6.3.1. Each 5 AF installation will complete an annual food/water vulnerability assessment as addressed in: Memorandum, USD, (AT & L), DOD Policy on drinking water Vulnerability Assessment and Emergency Response Plans, July 2003 and also in AFI 10-246, *Food and Water Protection Program*. The annual food and water assessment will be incorporated into the annual VA assessment.

2.2.1. Current Country Threat Level can be obtained at <https://paccas.nmci.navy.mil/navy/cpf/atfp/iatp.nsf/threatmatrixscroll?openview&count=-1>

2.3.1.1. The 5 AF installations AT risk management process will be incorporated into the installation antiterrorism plan. Refer to AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, Chapter 3 for Air Force Risk Management Process. This should be the guide to determine how the commander plans for risk management.

2.3.1.4. 5 AF installation ATWGs will use an operational risk assessment matrix as a guideline to determine risk mitigation measures for on-going and future operations. Integrated Defense Risk Management Process (IDRMP) is the manual method for conducting a risk assessment. ForcePRO is the automated version of the tool. Refer to AFI 31-101, *Integrated Defense*, Chapter 3 for further guidance.

2.3.1.5. (Added) 5 AF installations will incorporate terrorist threat assessments into the risk management process for planning; Program-Planning-Budgeting System (PPBS), terrorist incidence response, and consequence management.

2.4.1. AFOSI Det 621, 622, 623, and 624 will prepare an annual threat assessment for their respective AOR in Japan, for use by HQ 5 AF and installation working groups.

2.4.1.1. (Added) 5 AF installations will conduct an annual terrorism threat assessment and use it as part of their AT plan.

2.6.1. 5 AF installations local vulnerability assessments (VA) teams as a minimum, will be comprised of the installation ATO as the team chief; and functional experts from AFOSI, IN, SF, CE Readiness, Infrastructure and Structural Engineers, EOD (if available), Communication,

Infrastructure Engineer, and Medical Readiness. When IDRMP is used, the ATO and the ATWG members will ensure that CVAMP and ForcePRO recommended courses of action are synchronized. The installation ATO will also assure that all documentation of the risk acceptance is consistent between CVAMP and IDRMP. It is recommended that the Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) listed above be released from their normal day to day operations and assigned to the installation ATO for the duration of the local VA.

2.6.1.1. 5 AF ATO will observe and provide augmentation to VA teams that are on any 5 AF installations.

2.6.1.1.2. (Added) 5 AF installation ATOs will establish a process by which annual VA's are conducted during years that a HHQ Assessment are not accomplished. Such processes should prescribe methodology; designate who shall conduct the assessments, frequency, and a process to track; and address vulnerabilities IAW USPACOM OPORD 5050-08, Appendix 8 to Annex C.

2.6.1.1.3. (Added) 5 AF installation VA teams will review the installation threat by using, as a minimum, these baseline documents. The "Worldwide Asymmetrical Threat to USAF Installations, Personnel and Resources Assessment," "Defense Threat Assessment," and the "Installation Design Basis Threat (DBT)." The installation threat assessment must include local criminal, terrorist, and contingency threat. The term "no threat" is not acceptable for an installation threat assessment.

2.6.1.1.4. (Added) The 5 AF General Officer Mitigation Action Plan (GO MAP) will include at a minimum PACAF requirements listed in AFI 10-245\_PACAFSUP, Paragraphs 2.6.1.1.1.1. through 2.6.1.1.1.6.

2.6.1.1.5. (Added) 5 AF installations will provide a copy of the local VA assessment to 5 AF/ATO so that a consolidated copy of all 5 AF installations can be provided to USFJ/J023 and PACAF/A7SOF.

2.6.1.2. All 5 AF installation tenant organizations will be part of the annual VA process.

2.6.1.2.1. IAW USPACOM OPORD 5050-08, 5 AF installations will populate CVAMP within 90 days from the completion of the assessment. At a minimum, attach PACAF required documents listed in AFI 10-245\_PACAFSUP, Paragraphs 2.6.1.2.1.1. through 2.6.1.2.1.3.1.

2.6.1.2.1.2. 5 AF installation ATOs will update CVAMP Vulnerability status monthly or whenever a change to the vulnerability happens.

2.6.1.3. 5 AF installations supporting OPLAN contingency operations must include a Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) review of critical operational nodes/links when conducting the VA.

2.6.1.4. Annually, 5 AF installation VA teams will conduct the following:

2.6.1.4.1. Assess first responder's capabilities per DoDI 2000.16, Standard 20/21.

2.6.1.4.2. Conduct a Local Water/Food Vulnerability Assessment.

2.6.1.4.3. Review AT Plan and Program annually.

2.6.1.4.3.1. (Added) Installation AT Plan will be coordinated for review through the 5 AF/A7S not later than (NLT) 30 days before the installation commander's annual review to ensure issues in paragraph 2.7. are addressed.

2.6.1.4.4. Review counterintelligence, law enforcement liaison, and INTEL support to force protection.

2.6.1.4.5. Review physical security measures to protect the installation, resources, and personnel.

2.6.1.4.5.1. 5 AF installations will ensure AT Physical Security Standards are considered. These measures must support and be referenced within installation AT Plan to ensure an integrated approach to terrorist threats. Where there are multiple commanders at an installation, the installation commander is responsible for coordinating and integrating individual unit physical security plans and measures into their AT Plan IAW USPACOM OPORD 5050-08, Annex M.

2.6.1.4.5.2. (Added) Vehicle inspections for large commercial vehicles are vital to installation physical security measures because they deter individuals from introducing explosives to an installation. 5 AF Installations inspections at a minimum will include a check of the interior, exterior, under carriage, engine compartment, and all interior storage bays of the vehicle. A large commercial vehicle will be defined by the 5 AF installation ATWGs and approved by installation commander.

2.6.1.4.6. 5 AF installations will review threat and terrorist incident response, WMD, and CBRNE (toxic industrial chemicals/materials).

2.6.1.4.7. 5 AF installations will review written plans to ensure they identify the most probable threats towards facilities, availability of resources to support the AT plan, and assess the extent of the overall AT plan exercised. Synchronization of support plans and integration of host nation is also exercised.

2.6.1.4.8. 5 AF installations will review host nation, inter-service, tenant support, and adequacy of resource availability to execute agreements. Review written agreements (MOAs/MOUs) with the external agencies that support the AT Plan.

2.6.1.5. 5 AF installation's local VA reports will be reviewed and recommendations provided by the TWG and/or ATWG to the installation commander prior to the VA report being submitted to 5 AF/ATO who will in turn submit the report to PACAF/ATWG.

2.6.1.6. 5 AF ATO will work with HQ PACAF/A7S to ensure all 5 AF installations receive a higher headquarters VA at least once every three years IAW USPACOM OPORD 5050-08, Appendix 8 to Annex C.

2.7.7.1. 5 AF personnel taking part in an operational tasking or event (e.g., air shows, exercises, deployments) off of a US installation must have an approved AT Plan IAW USPACOM OPORD 5050-08. The AT Plan will be accomplished by the PACAF appointed ATO for events and submitted to the 5 AF/ATO and PACAF/ATWG for review prior to approval by the deployed commander. For minimum requirements for an Installation AT Plan, see PACAF Attachment 6 (Antiterrorism Plan Template).

2.7.7.1.1. (Added) All Active Duty personnel will enter their travel information into the Travel Tracker (TT)/Individual Antiterrorism Plan (IATP) program prior to traveling to a foreign country in the USPACOM AOR, and foreign country in another Combatant Commander's AOR. This applies to unofficial and official travel when the latter is not part of a unit deployment or PCS move. It does not apply to travel within the foreign country of assignment. All other DoD civilians, contractors and family members will enter their travel information into the TT/IATP

program prior to traveling to a foreign country in the USPACOM AOR, and foreign country in another Combatant Commander's AOR while in an official capacity. This applies to official travel when not part of a unit employment or PCS move, but does not apply to travel within the foreign country of assignment. Personnel are encouraged to enter unofficial travel into the TT.

2.7.7.1.1.1. (Added) Personnel traveling to a USPACOM Travel Restricted area require an AT plan as detailed in USPACOM OPOD 5050-08. When required, the AT plan must be approved prior to submission of the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System (APACS). The following categories of personnel will complete and obtain approval of their AT plan using the TT/IATP program when traveling to a USPACOM Travel Restricted area. Installation commanders may require individual AT plans for travel to non-USPACOM travel restricted areas at their discretion, and may direct the submission and approval through the TT/IATP program.

2.7.7.1.1.1.1. (Added) Active Duty personnel based in the USPACOM AOR traveling in either an official or unofficial capacity and all other DoD personnel traveling in an official capacity. An individual AT plan is not required when traveling is part of a unit deployment or PCS move.

2.7.7.2. When there is no COMAFFOR, deployed commander, etc., and the Wing Commander does not accept the minimum security requirements for the event, then the plan will be submitted through 5 AF/ATO and 5 AF/A3/A5 for review prior to submitting it to PACAF/ATWG to HQ PACAF/A3/A5/A8 for approval. **Note:** For JCS-sponsored exercises and associated planning events, the executive agent for the exercise will develop and submit the AT Plan for all participating US forces. Templates for consideration are included in USPACOM OPOD 5050-08, E-1-1.

2.7.8. 5 AF installation deployment AT Plans will use the established format by the COCOM of the region which the unit is deploying, along with the additional PACAF requirements listed in the AFI 10-245\_PACAFSUP, Paragraphs 2.7.8.1. through 2.7.8.5.

2.8.3.1.2. 5 AF personnel deploying outside of the USPACOM AOR into another Combatant Commander's AOR must follow the specific AT guidelines set forth by that Combatant Commander along with USPACOM guidelines.

2.8.3.2. 5 AF approving authority for AT Travel Plans is as follows:

2.8.3.2.3. Travel to USPACOM travel restricted areas for 5 AF personnel requires the approval of the first O-7 or above in the chain of command. If applicable, a civilian Senior Executive Service (SES) or equivalent exercising authority satisfies the requirement for travel restricted areas only.

2.8.3.2.3.1. Permission to travel to USPACOM travel restricted areas for 5 AF personnel can only be granted by USPACOM/J02 and only for mission essential travel. Refer to USPACOM/J34 NIPRNET website for the latest listing of travel-restricted countries.

2.8.3.2.3.2. 5 AF requests must be endorsed and processed through the individual or unit's chain of command.

2.8.3.2.3.3. 5 AF personnel who must travel to USPACOM travel restricted areas will register with the US Embassy upon arrival in country and maintain heightened security precautions.

2.8.3.2.4. (Added) Travel plans requiring O-7 approval from 5 AF/CV must be processed by the installation ATO and installation commander or his designee prior to submission.

2.8.3.3. In addition to AT Plans, 5 AF personnel must accomplish a travel request through the APACS. Individuals must register for an account at <https://apacs.dtic.mil/apacs/apacsservlet?cmd=apacslogin>.

2.9.1.7. All 5 AF installations will designate, in writing, a primary and alternate ATO and forward a copy of the letter to 5 AF/ATO and HQ PACAF A7SO within 30 days of appointment. All appointed ATOs within 5 AF will be trained by a formal USAF Level II AT course within 90 days of appointment.

2.9.1.7.1. 5 AF/A7S will designate a full-time civilian and an alternate to serve as the 5 AF/ATO and Commander's Anti-Terrorism Program Manager. The 5 AF AT Program Manager will serve to address Air Force AT issues across Japan, act as a liaison facilitating AT matters for subordinate units and higher headquarters, and ensure the 5 AF installation AT program requirements are met.

2.9.1.7.2. All 5 AF installation assigned squadrons and tenant units shall designate in writing, primary and alternate ATO or AT rep to provide functional level assistance to the installation ATO. AT reps are for units or squadrons with less than 100 personnel.

2.9.1.9. 5 AF installation ATOs will be assigned to a full-time position, report directly to the installation Wing or Vice Commander, and manage the wings AT program. The ATO will have a Top Secret clearance to ensure access to all levels of threat reporting. The ATO will not be assigned additional duties or programs, e.g., Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), as these are separate functions.

2.9.1.9.1. Based upon the unique work load at each installation, 5 AF Wing Commanders should properly staff the wing AT office to execute the wing AT program. As a minimum, consider manning the AT staff with two or three full-time (cross-functional) personnel to meet the regulatory AT program requirements. Installations should consider completing a manning study to validate additional AT staff for permanent positions. Consider changing the ATO positions to a supervisor position as personnel are added to the AT staff.

2.9.2.3.1. 5 AF installations ATOs will forward Unfunded Requests (UFR), Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund (CbT RIF), and Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF) requests for review to the 5 AF ATO bi-annually unless otherwise specified. An installation commander has the option to use unit Operations and Maintenance funding at his/her discretion depending on the necessity of correcting/mitigating the vulnerability. Additional funds must be programmed accordingly through the DoD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS).

2.9.2.3.2. (Added) Installation ATOs will establish procedures to identify, document, prioritize and communicate AT resource shortfalls to USPACOM, IAW USPACOM OPOD 5050-08, Annex N. Each Wing will forward their short-falls to HQ 5 AF ATO for review prior to sending them to HQ PACAF/A7SO for validation.

2.9.3.3. 5 AF installations will ensure the Core Vulnerability Assessment Program (CVAMP) is used to identify and track AT resourcing actions and appropriate vulnerabilities are submitted up through 5 AF ATO for review.

2.9.3.3.1. (Added) 5 AF ATO will serve as the CVAMP administrator to grant access and rights to subordinate units for the purpose of CbT RIF, CCIFs, UFRs, and other funding requirements.

2.9.3.4. Within 90 days of completed assessment, 5 AF installation ATOs will ensure a GO MAP to mitigate or eliminate vulnerabilities is forwarded to the 5 AF/CV. (Refer to AFI 10-245\_PACAFSUP, Paragraphs 2.6.1.1.1. through 2.6.1.1.5. for exact format of GO MAP).

2.9.3.4.1. A signed copy of the GO MAP letter will be sent to HQ PACAF/A7SO and electronically attached to the assessment in CVAMP.

2.9.3.4.2. Through the installation ATWG process, the ATO will prioritize all vulnerabilities. After the Wing Commander has approved the list, the ATO will forward the results through HQ 5 AF ATO to HQ PACAF/A7SO for command consolidation.

2.9.3.6.1. 5 AF Installation ATOs will form a Vulnerability Mitigation Working Group (VMWG) where all vulnerabilities will be addressed and tracked until they are mitigated and/or closed. The installation ATWG or key members of the WG can be used in this capacity.

2.9.3.6.1.1. All 5 AF programmatic vulnerabilities must have a funding stream request (UFR, CbT RIF, or CCIF) in CVAMP. Coordinate cost analysis, estimates, etc., through Subject Matter Experts (SME) and/or functional representatives who are the office of primary responsibility (OPR) or office of collateral responsibility (OCR).

2.9.3.6.1.2. All 5 AF installation funding requests must be reviewed quarterly by the installation ATO and updated within CVAMP.


2.9.3.10.1. IAW USPACOM OPORD 5050-08, 5 AF individual or unit/squadron ATO is responsible for preparing the AT plan for individual or small group deployments/TDYS.

2.9.3.10.1.1. 5 AF unit/squadron ATOs will maintain a copy of the signed plan through the duration of travel. Wing ATOs will provide guidance and oversight when assistance is needed.

2.10.2.1. 5 AF installations should consider appointing the Security Forces Commander or Wing ATO as the chairperson of the ATWG.

2.11.1. 5 AF Threat Working Group (TWG). HQ 5 AF/TWG requirement has been removed per 5 AF/CC guidance. 5 AF/A7S will liaise with 5 AF Installation TWG's and USFJ/TWG as required.

**Figure 2.2. (Added) HQ 5 AF Threat Information Dissemination Process**



2.11.2. 5 AF installation commanders will designate the TWG chairperson in writing. Installation commander should consider having their respective TWG chaired by the installation/wing SIO or designated personnel. The installation chairperson will organize and facilitate TWG meetings. Primary membership of the installation TWG will include the installation ATO; senior representatives from OSI, IN, SF and CE; and local agencies as required. During BTWG, invite host nation and civilian Law Enforcement. During BTWG meetings ensure classified information is not discussed unless local agencies have been cleared

for classified. Installation TWGs and BTWGs should consult their local Information Protection Offices (IPO) for further guidance.

2.11.3.1. 5 AF installation SIO or their appointed official will provide the DoD Terrorism Threat Levels for each country in which they have personnel deployed. The Terrorism Threat Levels are posted on both the USPACOM and PACAF SIPRNET websites. Installations will use the DoD Terrorism Threat Level System listed in DOD 2000.16 Standard 2 and USPACOM OPOD 5050-08 Appendix 2 to Annex C.3.b.1.

2.11.4. 5 AF installation intelligence squadrons/detachments (Intel and/or OSI) will provide all-source threat information and analysis to the installation TWG and Intelligence Fusion Cell (IFC), staffs and units within their commands and attached tenant units. Intelligence and OSI personnel must coordinate intelligence information to ensure a full spectrum threat picture is presented to the installation TWG and ATWG.

2.11.5. The purpose of Blue Dart is to pass time-sensitive threat warning information from the information collector to the threatened US unit/person in the PACOM AOR. Refer to USPACOM OPOD 5050-08, for specific procedures in disseminating Blue Dart threat information. In addition to USPACOM Blue Dart exercises, the 5 AF/A7S may conduct no-notice Blue Dart exercises as directed by HQ 5 AF/CC or designated representative. 5 AF installation command centers will report imminent threats simultaneously to HQ 5 AF and USFJ JOC.

2.11.6. 5 AF installation commanders will establish an installation TWG. Installation TWG and ATWG components must communicate on a frequent basis so that local commanders and operators are aware of threat intelligence and possible mitigation measures in a timely manner. Additionally, installation TWGs must forward locally derived threat information and planned FP measures to the 5 AF ATO and PACAF/ATWG as soon as possible when changes are planned or executed.

2.11.6.2. 5 AF installation TWG will:

2.11.6.2.1. Distribute pertinent threat information to the affected units.

2.11.6.2.2. Analyze information to determine if they can be linked to other reports and make any recommendations to the ATWG for potential/mitigating measures.

2.11.6.3. (Added) Disseminate TWG minutes to installation ATO; senior representatives from AFOSI, IN, SF, and CE; and local agencies as required. Send courtesy copies to 5 AF/A7S and PACAF/TWG at a minimum.

2.12.1. 5 AF installations will focus their ATEC meetings towards emerging AT issues with the potential to impact operations and/or harm personnel; and eliminating and/or mitigating vulnerabilities identified in either HHQ Vulnerability Assessments (VA) or during annual local VAs.

2.12.2. 5 AF installation ATEC will serve as the final approving authority for all funding initiatives implemented to close vulnerabilities. Once the funding initiatives have been approved, the completed cost estimate will be built into a funding request and added to the installation's prioritized unfunded AT requirements. These unfunded requirements will be forwarded to 5 AF ATO who will in turn forward it to HQ PACAF/A7S.

2.13.2. 5 AF commanders at all levels must continually review their AT posture to stay current with changing policies and threat levels. All physical security guidance will be adhered to IAW AFI 31-101\_PACAFSUP and USPACOM OPOD 5050-08. These core documents will be used to synchronize physical security and integrated defense into the wing AT plan.

2.13.4.2. 5 AF installations will use Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-01 DoD minimum AT standards for buildings, when upgrading existing or installing new base physical security measures.

2.15.1. 5 AF installations will establish AT Measures for DoD facilities, housing, activities and personnel residing/located off-installation. These measures should include emergency notification, recall procedures, selection for off installation housing, temporary billeting and any other facility being used. This guidance will be threat based and incorporated into AT planning and located in the installation AT Plan IAW USPACOM OPOD 5050-08, Appendix 3 to annex M.

2.15.1.2. (Added) 5 AF/A7S will ensure 5AF installation AT Plans address off-base personnel protection and evacuation during higher FPCONs.

2.15.1.3. (Added) 5 AF installations when located in a SIGNIFICANT or HIGH threat area, will conduct physical security reviews for all off-installation DoD housing.

2.15.1.4. (Added) Based on physical security reviews 5 AF installations will establish procedures to provide recommendations to off-installation residents and facility owners to implement mitigation recommendations. This process will be prescribed in the AT Plan for negotiation with property owners of off-installation housing.

2.15.2. 5 AF installations will develop Mutual Aid Agreements or other similarly structured protocols with the appropriate local, state, federal, and host-nation authorities to coordinate security measures and assistance requirements to ensure the protection of DoD personnel and their family members at off-installation facilities and activities.

2.16.1. No designated high-risk billets reside in 5 AF; however, high-ranking personnel and personnel in positions of visibility are at a greater risk of targeted attacks and should receive enhanced training and timely security awareness briefings.

2.16.6. While no high-risk billets are designated in 5 AF, General Officer, Installation Commanders, Command Chiefs and other high visibility leadership travel details should be protected and treated as For Official Use Only, and may be classified CONFIDENTIAL when traveling to High-threat areas. Declassify itineraries when the trip concludes.

2.17.3. 5 AF installations will ensure at least one engineer at their Civil Engineering (CE) Squadron has completed the Security Engineering and Design Course to review, document, and track construction projects for compliance with both UFC and AT standards.

2.17.3.1. 5 AF installation ATOs and CE SMEs will review all installation construction or renovation projects to ensure they meet UFC 4-010-01 requirements. This review will include initial project design to final project completion.

2.17.3.2. (Added) 5 AF installations will submit through 5 AF to PACAF an annual assessment of their existing billeting and primary gathering/inhabited structures using DOD and USPACOM construction standards within the Unified Facilities Code and Ref. 9.9. Follow PACAF guidance on format and timelines for meeting this requirement. 5AF/A7S will provide a copy of all

submissions to USFJ/J023. USPACOM also requires an additional report that identifies installations whose perimeters do not meet design considerations and standards follow PACAF guidance for submission of this report also – 5 AF/A7S will provide a copy to J023.

2.18.1. 5 AF installation ATOs will ensure AT measures are incorporated into the logistics and contracting process when the provisions of the contract or services provided affect the security of DoD elements, personnel, mission-essential cargo, equipment, assets or services.

2.19.3. 5 AF installations senior communications and information representative, IAW AFPD 10-24, *AF Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP)*, provides guidance on IT issues to the CIP representative on the TWG. At a minimum, installations will identify critical IT infrastructure to the 5 AF and PACAF CIP representative through the installation ATWG. CIP representatives should review AFI 10-245\_PACAFSUP, Paragraphs 2.19.3.1. through 2.19.3.8. for specific AT measures for Critical Asset Security.

2.20.1. 5 AF/A7S will provide a review of the incident response plan annex to the installation AT Plan.

2.20.1.1. (Added) 5 AF/A7S will serve as a conduit to USFJ Provost Marshal's office for addressing issues that require coordination at a Japanese national level.

2.21.1. The installation will designate an AT Crisis Response Force. This Response Force will have the capability to secure and contain the scene of a terrorist incident, gather information, report incident, and request additional follow-on support IAW USPACOM OPORD 5050-08, Appendix 10 to Annex C.

2.21.1.2. 5 AF/ATO will review installation AT Plan to ensure all items in AFI 10-245, paragraph 2.21.1. are addressed or are referenced in other plans.

2.21.2. 5 AF installations will have an evaluation process in place to evaluate their installation and activity preparedness to respond to terrorist incidents (including CBRNE incidents).

2.21.6. 5 AF installation commanders shall include terrorist consequence management preparedness and response measures in the installation AT plan focused on the design basis threat (DBT). General security situations that should be included in the AT Plan include hostage taking, Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attacks, active shooter on base or at on-base schools, hi-jacking, etc. Specific Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) response procedures will be included in the installation Combined Emergency Response Plan (CEMP).

2.21.6.1. (Added) 5 AF installations will conduct WMD assessment and will be incorporated in the AT Plan to include off installation facilities.

2.22.1. USPACOM sets the baseline FPCON for the PACOM AOR. Commander USFJ/5 AF along with installation commanders can adjust FPCONs for their geographic areas and personnel/assets however it must not be less than the established USPACOM FPCON baseline.

2.22.2. 5 AF installation commanders will implement all basic measures outlined in the FPCON measure descriptions in AFI 10-245. Traveler and airfield measures will be implemented based on the measure descriptions in USPACOM OPORD 5050-08.

2.22.4.1. 5 AF installation ATOs shall report FPCON and/or additional measure changes to 5 AF/ATO and HQ PACAF/A7SO immediately upon implementation. Included in the report should be the change, the intelligence driving the change, and the level at which the change was

dictated. Reporting procedures are outlined in USPACOM OPORD 5050-08, Appendix 4 to Annex C.

2.22.4.2. 5 AF commanders at all levels (e.g., installation, tenant, squadron, GSU, etc.) shall establish local measures to supplement those listed in DODI 2000.16, AFI 10-245 and USPACOM OPORD 5050-08. Any additional local measures will be forwarded to the 5 AF ATO and PACAF/ATWG for review through the PCC.

2.22.4.3. 5 AF communications and information commanders, postmasters and installation official mail managers will comply with FPCON measures outlined in HQ PACAF Air Postal Squadron (AIRPS) Operating Instruction 10-1, PACAF Postal Antiterrorism Program, available at the HQ PACAF/AIRPS home page on the Air Force Portal at <https://www.hqpacaf.af.mil/airps/>, or by contacting PACAF AIRPS/DO at email [pacaf.airps.do@hickam.af.mil](mailto:pacaf.airps.do@hickam.af.mil)

2.22.5. (Added) To provide additional resources during implementation of higher FPCON measures, USFJ and the Japanese Government have negotiated the Guard and Protect Agreement. 5 AF/A7S is responsible for facilitating and ensuring subordinate units meet the requirements of the agreement, to include annual training sessions.

2.23.1. 5 AF installation ATOs will ensure they have a process by which AT Assessments are incorporated into all training and exercises. This process should be integrated into the development of operational AT plans and identification of AT resource shortfalls IAW USPACOM OPORD 5050-08, Appendix 3 to Annex C.

2.23.2. All 5 AF installations will ensure they conduct at a minimum an annual exercise to validate AT plans. The exercise is not limited to, but will include, physical security measures, terrorist incident response measures, terrorist CM measures and FPCON declaration. In addition, note the requirement in HQ USFJI 31-201 paragraph 5.12.15, 5.13.5 and Ref 9.17. to have a minimum annual Guard and Protect (G & P) training session/exercise. 5 AF encourage installations to conduct their G & P training in conjunction with a base-wide exercise event, to enhance bilateral coordination and interoperability.

2.23.3. Installations will maintain exercise documentation for a minimum of two years, to include lessons learned.

2.23.3.1. (Added) Submit applicable lessons learned through the Joint Lessons Learned Program.

2.23.4. All 5 AF units/organizations should consult their installation TWG in the initial exercise or deployment planning stages for threat assessments/information and possible mitigation measures.

2.24.2.1.1. (Added) Installation ATOs will ensure AT training requirements are documented and will be tracked by the installation ATO. Tracking of training personnel will be addressed during the annual review or Level I data calls provided to 5 AF upon request.

2.24.2.1.2. (Added) Installation ATOs will establish a process to verify incoming personnel have received required individual AT training. If training was not accomplished then provide the required training.

2.25.3.1. 5 AF AT Level I training will include improvised explosive device (IED) recognition, biological/chemical response actions as part of the WMD session and Blue Dart procedures.

2.25.11. 5 AF annual AT Level I training is mandatory for all military, contractors, and civilian (DoD/NAF/DoDEA) personnel. Level I training will be completed through the use of ADLS.

2.26.1. 5 AF installation ATOs that have not been formally trained as Level II certified, will request AT Level II training through 5 AF ATO and HQ PACAF/A7SO.

2.26.2. 5 AF installation Unit AT Representatives with more than 100 personnel are mandated to have PACAF AT Level II Training, however it is highly recommended that all Unit AT Representatives attend PACAF AT Level II Training.

2.29.3. 5 AF installations shall ensure that a process has been developed to provide transiting units detailed threat information covering transit routes and sites that will be visited by the deploying unit or individuals.

2.29.4. (Added) 5 AF installations will conduct required AT pre-deployment assessments and training for units and individuals. Monitor and track service component forces employing into Japan. Ensure appropriate processes are available so that these incoming forces obtain comprehensive Japan AOR specific threat information as part of their pre-deployment orientation and training.

2.30.1. HQ 5 AF ATO will conduct HHQ Program Reviews (PR) of their installations every three years. 5 AF CIP and A7 representatives will be invited to be part of the 5 AF PR Team to assist with the comprehensive PR that covers all DoD Benchmark Checklists items.

2.30.1.1. PR reports will be forwarded to HQ PACAF/A7SO.

2.30.1.2. 5 AF installation ATOs are responsible for conducting PRs of their subordinate units.

2.31.2. 5 AF installation commanders will review both their own and subordinate AT programs and plans at least annually to ensure key elements are addressed.

2.31.5. The 5 AF ATO will independently, or in conjunction with PACAF, conduct a triennial review of each wing's AT Program. The program review will be conducted using the PACAF ATO Unit Compliance Inspection (UCI) Checklist and USPACOM Benchmarks. This may be done in conjunction with Vulnerability Assessment (VA) augmentation and/or observation. Any observations or vulnerabilities that are found during the program review will be tracked using CVAMP. AT programs shall also be reviewed when the terrorism threat level changes.

2.31.6. 5 AF installation ATOs will conduct annual internal PR of their AT Programs a HHQs PR/JISVA/VAT/Staff Visit conducted during that calendar year meets this requirement.

BURTON M. FIELD, Lieutenant General, USAF  
Commander, Fifth Air Force