

**EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE
FORCE PROTECTION CONDITION**

CHARLIE

**FORCE PROTECTION CONDITION
EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE**

439 AWVA 10-210, 24 OCT 2012, OPR: 439 SFS/S3A

CERTIFIED CURRENT 31 OCTOBER 2016

FPCON CHARLIE

FPCON CHARLIE. This condition applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action or targeting against personnel or facilities is likely. Prolonged implementation of CHARLIE measures may create hardship and affect the activities of the unit and its personnel.

CHARLIE 1: Fully implement all measures of lower FPCON levels.

CHARLIE 1.1 (AF Added): Conduct 100% identification checks of all personnel entering the installation, to include vehicle passengers.

CHARLIE 1.2 (AF Added): Brief personnel on the updated threat and associated procedures. Update signs at installation gates and utilize mass communication systems to inform/remind personnel of the FPCON level. If a CBRN threat exists ensure the Disaster Response Force and, if permissible, local authorities are briefed on the threat.

CHARLIE 1.3 (AF Added): Increase frequency of daily RAMs. Focus additional RAMs on current situation and nature of threat.

CHARLIE 2: Recall additional required personnel. Ensure armed augmentation security personnel are aware of current rules of engagement and any applicable Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA). Review types of weapons and ammunition issued to augmentation security personnel; heightened threats may require employment of different weapon capabilities.

CHARLIE 3: Be prepared to react to requests for assistance from both local authorities and other installations in the region.

CHARLIE 3.1 (AF Added): Ensure flow of information between on and offbase medical treatment facilities participating in the medical surveillance program. Consider initiation of manual collection of data if the automated system has a 24-hour or more delay in providing results.

CHARLIE 3.2 (AF Added): Consider Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).

CHARLIE 4: Limit access points in order to enforce control. Randomly search vehicles.

CHARLIE 4.1 (AF Added): Increase random security checks of vehicles and persons entering installations or facilities under the jurisdiction of the United States.

CHARLIE 4.2 (AF Added): Implement procedures to expedite the entry of first and emergency responders onto the installation during emergencies. Ensure these procedures prevent unauthorized entry.

CHARLIE 5: Ensure or verify the identity of all individuals entering food and water storage and distribution centers, use sign-in and sign-out logs at access control and entry points, and limit or inspect all personal items.

CHARLIE 6 (AF Modified): Initiate contingency (credible CBRN threat) monitoring for chemical, biological, and radiological contamination as required. Suspend contractors and off-facility users from tapping into the facility water system. An alternate locally developed measure should be implemented when contractors are responsible for DoD water supplies or when water is provided by local (non-DoD) sources or agencies.

CHARLIE 6.1 (AF Added): If a CBRN threat exists, ensure all shortages of CBRN equipment and its potential impact is briefed to the installation commander.

CHARLIE 6.2 (AF Added): Verify operation, deploy and begin using all available CBRN detectors (deployment and home station) as outlined in the detection plan.

CHARLIE 7: Increase standoff from sensitive buildings based on the threat. Implement barrier plan to hinder vehicle-borne attack.

CHARLIE 8 (AF Modified): Increase patrolling of the installation/facility to include waterside perimeters, if appropriate. Be prepared to assist local authorities in searching for threatening actions/persons outside the facility perimeter. For airfields, patrol or provide observation of aircraft parking areas, and approach and departure flight corridors as appropriate to the threat (coordinate with Transportation Security Administration, Marine Patrol, United States Coast Guard and local law enforcement as required to cover off-facility approach and departure flight corridors).

CHARLIE 9 (AF Modified): Increase protection for all designated infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment. Give special attention to and coordinate with local authorities regarding infrastructure outside the military establishment.

CHARLIE 9.1 (AF Added): Consider closing or enhancing security at remote sites and alternate, practice or training airfields.

CHARLIE 9.2 (AF Added): Protect DoD personnel at vulnerable mass gathering facilities during peak usage, especially near the installation perimeter. Coordinate protection of mass gathering facilities off the installation with civilian law enforcement agencies.

CHARLIE 10: To reduce vulnerability to attack, consult local authorities about closing public (and military) roads and facilities and coordinate any other precautionary measures taken outside the installation perimeter.

CHARLIE 11: Randomly inspect suitcases, briefcases, and packages being brought onto the installation through access control points and consider randomly searching them upon leaving the installation.

CHARLIE 12: Review personnel policy procedures to determine appropriate courses of action for dependent family members.

CHARLIE 13: Review access procedures for all non-U.S. personnel and adjust as appropriate. For airfields, consider terminating visitor access to the flight line and support facilities.

CHARLIE 14: Consider escorting children to and from DoD schools (among options to consider are escorting school buses, recommending parents escort children to/from school, etc.).

CHARLIE 15: (Airfield-specific) Reduce flying to only essential operational flights. Implement appropriate flying countermeasures as directed by the Flight Wing Commander (military aircraft) or Transportation Security Administration (civilian aircraft). Consider relief landing ground actions to take for aircraft diversions into and out of an attacked airfield. Consider augmenting fire-fighting details.

CHARLIE 15.1 (AF Added): Consider aircraft dispersal, or the dispersal of other high value assets, based on assessment of local threat from standoff weapons, vulnerability of the assets and operational feasibility.

CHARLIE 16: Review all FPCON DELTA measures.

WESTOVER LOCAL FPCON MEASURES

CHARLIE WESTOVER LOCAL 1. Civil Engineer units will request their servicing weather unit to provide 12-hour and/or 24-hour effective downwind messages and chemical downwind messages.

CHARLIE WESTOVER LOCAL 2 . If the threat is specifically against the installation, evacuate all dependents and non-essential civilian and military personnel to enhance the effectiveness of security surveillance and response efforts and to minimize the risk to those personnel. Coordinate evacuation with local officials. Cease all operations not related to countering the threat. If the threat is not specifically against the installation, consider evacuating nonessential personnel from the installation.

Curtail nonessential activities. This will reduce the number of personnel at risk and minimize the traffic and personnel on base who could complicate emergency response and recovery operations. Minimizing the personnel and traffic on base also makes detecting suspicious personnel, vehicles, and activity easier. Moving vital resources to more secure locations should also be considered when feasible. Note: In overseas locations, consider bringing DoD affiliated personnel (dependants, civilian employees, etc.) living off base on base for their protection if the threat against them is greater off base.

CHARLIE WESTOVER LOCAL 3. Consider evacuating nonessential personnel from the installation and curtailing nonessential activities. This will reduce the number of personnel at risk and minimize the traffic and personnel on base who could complicate emergency responses. Minimizing the personnel and traffic on base also makes detecting suspicious personnel, vehicles, and activity easier. Moving vital resources to more secure locations should also be considered when feasible.