

**EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE FORCE
PROTECTION CONDITION**

BRAVO

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FPCON BRAVO. Applies when an increased or more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. Sustaining BRAVO measures for a prolonged period may affect operational capability and military-civil relationships with local authorities.

BRAVO 1: Fully implement all measures of lower FPCON levels.

BRAVO 1.1 (AF Added): Brief personnel on the updated threat and associated procedures. Update signs at installation gates and utilize mass communication systems to inform/remind personnel of the FPCON level.

BRAVO 1.2 (AF Added): Increase frequency of daily RAMs. Focus additional RAMs on current situation and nature of threat.

BRAVO 1.3 (AF Added): Have intelligence and OSI provide a CBRN threat briefing to the Threat Working Group (TWG) or equivalent. Include specific information such as probability of CBRN use, type(s) and amount of CBRN material, likely CBRN material release mechanisms and probable targets.

BRAVO 1.4 (AF Added): Verify the interoperability of CBRN response procedures with local community resources, to include activities outlined in the CEMP 10-2, Disease Containment Plan (DCP) and Medical Contingency Response Plan (MCRP).

BRAVO 1.5 (AF Added): Contact local hospitals and establish/ensure lines of communication for notification of the installation in the event of significant increase in antibiotic use or people exhibiting symptoms of exposure to CBRN materials.

BRAVO 2: Enforce control of entry onto facilities (Facilities as defined in IAW JPI -02) containing U.S. infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment, lucrative targets, or high-profile locations; and randomly search vehicles entering these areas. Particular scrutiny should be given to vehicles that are capable of concealing a large IED (e.g., cargo vans, delivery vehicles) sufficient to cause catastrophic damage to property or loss of life.

BRAVO 3 (AF Modified): Keep cars and objects (e.g., crates, trash containers) away from buildings to reduce vulnerability to bomb attacks. Apply this criterion to all critical and high-occupancy buildings. Consider applying to all inhabited structures to the greatest extent possible. Standoff distance should be determined by the following factors: asset criticality; the protection level provided by structure; IED/Vehicle Borne IED threat IAW JP 3-07, Antiterrorism, and available security measures. Consider centralized parking and implementation of barrier plans. Utilize UFC

4-010-01, *DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings*, and UFC 4-010-02, *DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standoff Distances for Buildings*. The AFH 10-2401, *Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide*, is an additional tool for standoff planning.

BRAVO 4: Secure and periodically inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

BRAVO 5: At the beginning and end of each workday, as well as at random intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious packages.

BRAVO 6: Implement mail-screening procedures to identify suspicious letters and parcels.

BRAVO 7: Randomly inspect commercial deliveries. Advise family members to check home deliveries.

BRAVO 7.1 (AF Added): Increase random security checks of vehicles and persons entering installations or facilities under the jurisdiction of the United States. Inspect all commercial deliveries (AF Baseline FPCON posture directs inspection of all large commercial vehicles in FPCON Normal).

BRAVO 8 (AF Modified): Randomly inspect food and water for evidence of tampering or contamination before use by DoD personnel. Inspections should include delivery vehicles, storage areas, and storage containers.

BRAVO 9: Increase security measures and guard presence or initiate increased patrols and surveillance of DoD housing areas, schools, messes, on-base clubs, military treatment facilities, and similar high-occupancy targets to improve deterrence and defense, and to build confidence among staff and family members.

BRAVO 10: Implement plans to enhance off-installation security for DoD facilities. In areas with Threat Levels of Moderate, Significant, or High, coverage includes facilities (e.g., DoD schools and daycare centers) and transportation services and routes (e.g., bus routes) used by DoD employees and family members.

BRAVO 11: Inform local security committees of actions being taken.

BRAVO 11.1 (AF Added): Consult local authorities on the threat and mutual AT measures. As appropriate, brief law enforcement agencies who provide support to the installation and request assistance as necessary to ensure protection of resources and personnel. As appropriate, coordinate with local authorities regarding infrastructure outside the installation, e.g. infrastructure supplying energy to the installation.

BRAVO 12 (AF Modified): Verify identity of visitors to the installation and randomly inspect their suitcases, parcels, and other containers. Visitors are non-DoD affiliated personnel who do not have official DoD credentials authorizing installation access.

BRAVO 13: Conduct random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.

BRAVO 14: As necessary, implement additional security measures for High Risk Personnel (HRP).

BRAVO 15: Place personnel required for implementing AT plans on call; commanders should exercise discretion in approving absences.

BRAVO 16: Identify and brief personnel who may augment guard forces. Review specific rules of engagement including the use of deadly force.

BRAVO 17: As deemed appropriate, verify identity of personnel entering buildings.

BRAVO 18: Review status and adjust as appropriate operations security, communications security, and information security procedures.

BRAVO 19 (AF Modified): (Airfield-specific) Limit access points in order to enforce entry control. As appropriate, erect barriers and establish manned checkpoints at entrances to airfields. Ensure the identity of all individuals entering the airfield (flight line and support facilities) with no exceptions. Randomly inspect vehicles, briefcases, and packages entering the airfield.

BRAVO 20: (Airfield-specific) Coordinate plans to safeguard aircraft departure and approach flight paths with local authorities. Be prepared to activate contingency plans and issue detailed air traffic control procedures. As appropriate, take actions to mitigate the threat of surface-to-air missiles or standoff weapons that can be delivered from beyond the airfield perimeter.

BRAVO 21 (AF Added): Ensure CBRN detectors are operational as outlined with the detection plan (deployment and home station assets).

BRAVO 22: Review all higher FPCON measures.

WESTOVER LOCAL FPCON MEASURES

BRAVO WESTOVER LOCAL 1. Implement enhanced security measures for key facilities and critical infrastructure.

BRAVO WESTOVER LOCAL 2 . CONUS installations will review NORAD Instruction 10-22, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warning and Reporting System. OCONUS units will review their theater or MAJCOM guidance.